Velarde Aninang Cd9

DOCTRINE: Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing
held in common among those to whom it may belong. Every act which is
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs, legatees and devisees
is deemed to be a partition, as it may be inferred from circumstances that
support this presumption.
G.R. No. 185745 October 15, 2014
SPOUSES DOMINADOR MARCOS and GLORIA MARCOS, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF ISIDRO BANGI and GENOVEVA DICCION, represented by
NOLITO SABIANO, Respondents.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On June 26, 1998, the heirs of Isidro Bangi (Isidro) and Genoveva Diccion
(Genoveva) (respondents), filed with the RTC a complaint,5 docketed as
Civil Case No. U-6603, for annulment of documents, cancellation of
transfer certificates of titles, restoration of original certificate of title and
recovery of ownership plus damages against spouses Dominador Marcos
(Dominador) and Gloria Marcos (Gloria) (petitioners). Likewise impleaded
in the said complaint are spouses Jose Dilla (Jose) and Pacita Dilla
(Pacita), Ceasaria Alap (Ceasaria), and spouses Emilio Sumajit (Emilio)
and Zenaida Sumajit (Zenaida).
In their complaint, the respondents averred that on November 5, 1943, their

parents, Isidro and Genoveva, bought the one-third portion of a 2,138-
square meter parcel of land situated in San Manuel, Pangasinan and
JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

2023-24-2ND SEM.
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 22361 (subject property)
from Eusebio Bangi (Eusebio), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by the latter. OCT No. 22361 was registered in the name of Alipio
Bangi (Alipio), Eusebio’s father. After the sale, the respondents claimed
that Isidro and Genoveva took possession of the subject property until they
passed away. The respondents then took possession of the same.
Further, the respondents alleged that sometime in 1998, they learned that
the title to the subject property, including the portion sold to Isidro and
Genoveva, was transferred to herein petitioner Dominador, Primo Alap
(Primo), Ceasaria’s husband, Jose, and Emilio through a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated August 10, 1995, supposedly executed by Alipio with the
consent of his wife Ramona Diccion (Ramona). The respondents claimed
that the said deed of absolute sale is a forgery since Alipio died in 1918
while Ramona passed away on June 13, 1957.
Consequently, by virtue of the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale dated August

10, 1995, OCT No. 22361 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 47829 was issued to Dominador, Primo, Jose and Emilio. On
November 21, 1995, Primo, Jose and Emilio executed another deed of
absolute sale over the same property in favor of herein petitioners. TCT No.
T-47829 was then cancelled and TCT No. T-48446 was issued in the
names of herein petitioners. The respondents claimed that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 21, 1995 was likewise a forgery since
Primo could not have signed the same on the said date since he died on
January 29, 1972.

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Thus, the respondents sought the nullification of the Deeds of Absolute
Sale dated August 10, 1995 and November 21, 1995 and, accordingly, the
cancellation of TCT Nos. T-47829 and T-48446. The respondents likewise
sought the restoration of OCT No. 22361.
In their answer, herein petitioners, together with the spouses Jose and
Pacita, Ceasaria and the spouses Emilio and Zenaida, denied the
allegations of the respondents, claiming that they are the owners of the
subject property, including the one-third portion thereof allegedly sold by
Eusebio to the respondents’ parents Isidro and Genoveva. They averred
that the subject property was originally owned by Alipio; that after his death,
his children – Eusebio, Espedita and Jose Bangi – inherited the same. That
on May 8, 1995, Espedita and Jose Bangi executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with quitclaim wherein they waived their rights over the subject
property in favor of Eusebio’s children – Ceasaria, Zenaida, Pacita and
herein petitioner Gloria.
They further claimed that their father Eusebio could not have validly sold
the one-third portion of the subject property to Isidro and Genoveva. They
explained that Eusebio supposedly acquired the parcel of land covered by
OCT No. 22361 by virtue of a donation propter nuptias from his father
Alipio when he married Ildefonsa Compay (Ildefonsa) in 1928. They
claimed that the donation propter nuptias in favor of Eusebio was fictitious
since Alipio died in 1918 and that, in any case, the said donation, even if
not fictitious, is void since the same was not registered.
They also averred that they had no participation in the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995, claiming that it was a certain

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Dominador Quero, the one hired by herein petitioner Gloria to facilitate the
transfer of OCT No. 22361 in their names, who caused the execution of the
same.
Subsequently, the respondents and Ceasaria and the spouses Emilio and
Zenaida entered into a compromise agreement wherein Ceasaria and
spouses Emilio and Zenaida acknowledged the right of the respondents
over the subject property and admitted the existence of the sale of the one-
third portion thereof by Eusebio in favor of the spouses Isidro and
Genoveva. Thus, the case as to Ceasaria and the spouses Emilio and
Zenaida was dismissed.
On March 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision6 the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995 x x x and
Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 21, 1995 x x x as null and void;
2) Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-47829 issued in the names

of PRIMO ALAP married to [Ceasaria] Alap, JOSE DILLA married to Pacita
Dilla, DOMINADOR MARCOS married to Gloria Marcos, and EMILIO
SUMAJIT married to Zenaida Sumajit x x x and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-48446 in the name of Spouses DOMINADOR MARCOS and
GLORIA BANGI x x x as null and void.
Consequently, the Registrar of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan is hereby

directed to cancel the same and all the other copies thereof and that

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Original Certificate of Title No. 22361 in the name of Alipio Bangi married to
Romana Diccion be revived and/or reinstated in the registration book.
3) Declaring the sale by Eusebio Bangi of his share to the land in question
in favor of x x x Isidro Bangi and Genoveva Diccion as valid and effective.
4) For the defendant to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.7
The RTC opined that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995 is a
nullity; that the same was falsified considering that Alipio could not have
executed the same in the said date since he died in 1918. Consequently,
all the documents and certificates of title issued as a consequence of the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995 are void. Thus:
In fact, defendant Gloria Marcos admitted in Court that the Deed of

Absolute Sale was falsified, only it was allegedly falsified by a certain
Dominador Quero. This notwithstanding, the fact still remains, that the
Deed of Absolute Sale, which was the basis for the cancellation of the
Original Certificate of Title No. 22361, was falsified. x x x x
The Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995, being a forged
document, is without question, null and void. This being the case, the land
titles issued by reason thereof are also void because a forged deed
conveys no right.8
The RTC upheld the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 5, 1943 over
the one-third portion of the subject property executed by Eusebio in favor of
the spouses Isidro and Genoveva. The RTC pointed out that the petitioners

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merely claimed that the signature of Eusebio appearing on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 5, 1943 was falsified without presenting
any other evidence to prove such claim.
As regards the claim that Eusebio could not have validly sold the one-third
portion of the subject property since his acquisition of the same in 1928
through a donation propter nuptias by Alipio was fictitious since the latter
died in 1918, the RTC found that the petitioners likewise failed to present
any evidence to prove such allegation. Considering that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 5, 1943 is a notarized document, the RTC
ruled that the same must be sustained in full force and effect since the
petitioners failed to present strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity.
RULING OF THE CA:
On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed

Decision,10 which affirmed the Decision dated March 26, 2007 of the RTC.
The CA upheld the petitioners’ claim that the supposed donation propter
nuptias of the subject property in favor of Eusebio from his parents was not
sufficiently established. The CA pointed out that the purported Deed of
Donation was not recorded in the Register of Deeds; that there is no
showing that the said donation was made in a public instrument as required
by the Spanish Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the supposed
donation in favor of Eusebio.
Nevertheless, the CA found that Eusebio, at the time he executed the Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of the spouses Isidro and Genoveva, already

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owned the subject property, having inherited the same from his father Alipio
who died in 1918. Further, the CA did not give credence to the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim purportedly executed by Espedita and
Jose Bangi since it appears to have been caused to be executed by the
petitioners as a mere afterthought and only for the purpose of thwarting the
respondents’ valid claim.11
The petitioners sought a reconsideration12 of the Decision dated September

30, 2008, but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution13 dated December 4,
2008.
ISSUE: Whether or not the partition can be presumed to have been

effected in the instant case, even in absence of a Deed of Partition.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

Yes. Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong. Every act which is intended
to put an end to indivision among co-heirs, legatees and devisees is
deemed to be a partition, as it may be inferred from circumstances that
support this presumption. The general principle is that, independent and in
spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition
when it has been completely or partially performed. It may also be
sustained on the ground that parties thereto have acquiesced in or ratified
the
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing

disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30,

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2008 and Resolution dated December 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 89508 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of

ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall
only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the
decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights
of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such
as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property
included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.
G.R. No. 156407; January 15, 2014

THELMA M. ARANAS, PETITIONER, VS. TERESITA V. MERCADO,
FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD
V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L.
MERCADO, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991,
survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five
children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M.

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Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his
two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado
and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma). Emigdio inherited and acquired
real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir
Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation
Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange
for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian,
Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir
Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu
City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of
Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB). The RTC granted
the petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of
administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of

Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the
RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio
had “left no real properties but only personal properties” worth
P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and
fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806
shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of
stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from
the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the

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inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s
motion through the order of January 8, 1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January
8, 1993,supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks
covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock; the deed of assignment
executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the
market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty
shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; and the certificate of
stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson
worth P30,000.00.
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be

examined under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed
30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the
inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the
parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the
court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory. On April 19, 1993,
Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to
examine Teresita on the inventory. With the parties agreeing to submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties
should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for
the hearing on that issue.[8]
Ruling of the RTC:

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After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued
on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory
submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included, and
accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and
considerations, the Court hereby denies the administratrix’s motion
for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders the said
administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties which are supposed
to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado by
including therein the properties mentioned in the last five immediately
preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the revised inventory
within sixty (60) days from notice of this order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of
her administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which
had come to her possession. She must render such accounting
within sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely

sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground
that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian,
Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land
covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the possession
of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.[10] Thelma opposed the
motion.

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On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,[11] stating
that there was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the
movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what
properties should be included or excluded from the inventory already
estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
Decision of the CA:

On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing
as follows:[13]
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this
petition is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders dated March 14,
2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as
the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at
Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various
parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated
February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to
be submitted by the administratrix is concerned and affirmed in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition
for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of
properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil Code,
to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold “shall be transferred to the
vendee” upon its “actual and constructive delivery,” and to Article 1498 of
the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made through a public instrument

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was equivalent to the delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio
and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir
Realty because the deed of absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989
had been notarized; that Emigdio had thereby ceased to have any more
interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of land to
Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 “for the purpose of saving, as
in avoiding taxes with the difference that in the Deed of Assignment dated
January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land were included”; that
as to the January 10, 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been
“even at the losing end considering that such parcels of land, subject
matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again
given monetary consideration through shares of stock”; that even if the
assignment had been based on the deed of assignment dated January 10,
1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the inventory
“considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable about the estate
planning scheme”; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power
to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property registered
in the name of third persons or corporation; that a property covered by the
Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title;
that the RTC, by disregarding the presumption, had transgressed the clear
provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that
the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et
al. were estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because of their
agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be
included in the inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:

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In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that
petitioners are estopped from questioning its jurisdiction considering that
they have already agreed to submit themselves to its jurisdiction of
determining what properties are to be included in or excluded from the
inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because actually, a reading
of petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before
public respondent court clearly shows that petitioners are not questioning
its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for which they are
not estopped, since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the
administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory of properties which
were already titled and in possession of a third person that is, Mervir Realty
Corporation, a private corporation, which under the law possessed a
personality distinct and separate from its stockholders, and in the absence
of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of
conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation should
stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority

to determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction and even if public respondent court was not merely acting in a
limited capacity as a probate court, private respondent nonetheless failed
to adjudge competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale
the veil of corporate fiction because to disregard the separate jurisdictional

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personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and
convincingly established since it cannot be presumed.[14]
ISSUE: Whether the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing
the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such
properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate
shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime. [NO]

First, the SC clarified that the assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying
Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated May
18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is
because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final
determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and
the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at
anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate
court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be instituted by the parties.

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The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of
properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to
be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be
provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to
the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of
the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the
inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred
by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent
during his lifetime.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, Rule 78, demands the inclusion of
all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory.
However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his
possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be
known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her
possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the
phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the
decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in
the possession of another person or entity.

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There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate
court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to
third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court
can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should
be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate
court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the
probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but
does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by

expediency and convenience. First, the probate court may provisionally
pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice
to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral
to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of

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the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal
or exclusive property of the deceased spouse
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review

on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and
May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional
Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No.
3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma
Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a
mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law;
however, Socorro's right to the property is not because she rightfully can
claim heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her
husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother's
inheritance.
ZOSIMA VERDAD, Petitioner, -versus- THE HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES, NAPOLEON
ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA
ROSALES AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 109972, April 29, 1996
FACTS OF THE CASE:

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During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel
Burdeos and the second, following the latter's death, with Canuto Rosales.
At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A.
Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela
Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage,
namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora
Rosales. Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself,
some time after Macaria's death, died intestate without an issue.
In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos,

namely, his widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and
Ramon, Jr., sold to petitioner Zosima Verdad their interest on the disputed
lot supposedly for the price of P55,460.00.
Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she was at the City
Treasurer's Office. She sought the intervention of the Lupong Tagapayapa
of Barangay 9, for the redemption of the property. She tendered the sum of
P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused to accept the amount for being
much less than the lot's current value of P80,000.00. No settlement having
been reached before the Lupong Tagapayapa, private respondents initiated
against petitioner an action for "Legal Redemption with Preliminary
Injunction" before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Socorro C. Rosales is entitled to redeem the

property.

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YES. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere
relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however,
Socorro's right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim
heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband,
David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother's inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria

died, her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David
Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David
Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his undivided
interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow
Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and

illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should
there be any, under article 1001. xxx xxx xxx
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David
Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally
descended from Macaria. When their interest in the property was sold by
the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of
private respondents; thus:

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Art. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same
terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who
acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other
transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title.
Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in

case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a
third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the

Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos

may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the
Civil Code is clear on this. Should a person make a partition of his estate
by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as
it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-

ZARAGOZA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
ALBERTA ZARAGOZA MORGAN, respondents. G.R. No. 106401,
SECOND DIVISION, September 29, 2000
FACTS OF THE CASE:

2023-24-2ND SEM.
On December 9, 1964, Flavio Zaragoza Cano died without a will and was
survived by his four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all
surnamed Zaragoza.
On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed

a complaint with CFI against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, herein
petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and
871, and for payment of damages.
She alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited
properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister
were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid
consideration, while her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was
not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because of her
marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire
lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason,
no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these
lots during her father’s lifetime
ISSUE: Whether or not the partition intervivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of

his properties, which include Lots 871 and 943, is valid.
YES. The Court held that it is basic in the law of succession that a partition
inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art.

2023-24-2ND SEM.
1080 of theCivil Code is clear on this. Should a person make a partition of
his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
Thus, the court ruled that that during the lifetime of Flavio, he already
partitioned and distributed his properties among his three children,
excepting private respondent, through deeds of sale. Adeedof sale was not
executed in favor of private respondent because she had become an
American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor.
Petitioner admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private
respondent.
As to the alleged prejudice on legitimes, the Court stated that the legitime
of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article
1061: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may
have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may becomputedin the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original

petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other
compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without
prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable
parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime
and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.

2023-24-2ND SEM.
DISPOSITIVE:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant

petition for review. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 27,
1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12587, entitled Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan vs.
Spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda Enriquez-Zaragoza is VACATED
and SET ASIDE. The complaint for delivery of inheritance share in the
Regional Trial Court, for failure to implead indispensable parties, is also
DISMISSED without prejudice to the institution of the proper proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.
DOCTRINE: If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person

obtaining it is considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes. Based on this rule, a trustee
cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property entrusted to him
until and unless he repudiates the trust. However, in constructive implied
trusts, prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate
the relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is not a condition
precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.

2023-24-2ND SEM.
G.R. No. 144773 May 16, 2005
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
LAURENCIO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE
OTHER HEIRS OF EMILIANO AYING, PAULINO AYING, IN HIS OWN
BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF SIMEON AYING,
AND WENCESLAO SUMALINOG, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN
BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF ROBERTA AYING, respondents.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Culled from the evidence proffered by petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Co.
(hereafter AZNAR), it appears that Lot No. 4399 containing an area of
34,325 square meters located at Brgy. Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City, was
acquired by AZNAR from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an
Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3
March 1964. This deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-
Lapu City on 6 March 1964 as shown on the face thereof. After the sale,
petitioner AZNAR declared this property under its name for taxation
purposes and regularly paid the taxes thereon. Herein private respondents
were allegedly allowed to occupy portions of Lot No. 4399 by mere
tolerance provided that they leave the land in the event that the company
would use the property for its purposes. Later, AZNAR entered into a joint
venture with Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corporation for the
development of the subject lot into a multi-million peso housing subdivision

2023-24-2ND SEM.
and beach resort. When its demands for the private respondents to vacate
the land failed, AZNAR filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTCC) of Lapu-
Lapu City a case for unlawful detainer and damages, which was docketed
as Civil Case No. R-1027.
On the other hand, the private respondents alleged that they are the
successors and descendants of the eight children of the late Crisanta
Maloloy-on, whose names appear as the registered owners in the Original
Certificate of Title No. RC-2856. They had been residing and occupying the
subject portion of the land in the concept of owner since the time of their
parents and grandparents, except for Teodorica Andales who was not a
resident in said premises. Private respondents claimed that the
Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is void ab
initio for being simulated and fraudulent, and they came to know of the
fraud only when AZNAR entered into the land in the last quarter of 1991
and destroyed its vegetation. They then filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City a complaint seeking to declare the subject
document null and void. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2930-L.
On 1 February 1994, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering the private

respondents to (a) vacate the land in question upon the finality of the
judgment; and (b) pay P8,000 as attorney’s fees and P2,000 as litigation
expenses, plus costs.[2]
The MTCC delved into the issue of ownership in order to resolve the issue
of possession. It found that petitioner AZNAR acquired ownership of Lot
No. 4399 by virtue of the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the Heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on on 3 March
2023-24-2ND SEM.
1964, which was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City
on 6 March 1964 as appearing on the face thereof. Private respondents’
allegation that two of the signatories were not heirs of the registered
owners; that some of the signatories were already dead at the date of the
execution of the deed; and that many heirs were not parties to the
extrajudicial partition is a form of a negative pregnant, which had the effect
of admitting that the vendors, except those mentioned in the specific denial,
were heirs and had the legal right to sell the subject land to petitioner. The
fact that some or most heirs had not signed the deed did not make the
document null and void ab initio but only annullable, unless the action had
already prescribed. Since the private respondents occupied the land merely
by tolerance, they could be judicially ejected therefrom. That the Deed has
not been annotated on OCT RO-2856 is of no moment, since said title was
reconstituted only on 25 August 1988, while the subject Deed was
executed on 3 March 1964. Lastly, the reconstituted title has not as yet
been transferred to a purchaser for value.
Aggrieved by the decision of the MTCC, private respondents appealed to
the RTC.
During the pendency of the appeal, or on 8 March 1994, the RTC, upon
Aznar’s ex parte motion, issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of
execution pursuant to Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court in
view of the failure of private respondents to put up a supersedeas bond. A
week later, a writ of execution was issued. The sheriff then served upon
private respondents the said writ of execution together with a notice to
vacate. On 11 April 1994, the sheriff padlocked their houses, but later in the
day, private respondents re-entered their houses. Thus, on 6 May 1994,

2023-24-2ND SEM.
AZNAR filed an omnibus motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition,
which private respondents opposed. This motion was set for hearing three
times, but the parties opted to submit a consolidated memorandum and
agreed to submit the same for resolution.[3]
On 22 July 1994, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC and ordered
the issuance of a writ of demolition directing the sheriff to demolish private
respondents’ houses and other improvements which might be found on the
subject premises.
On 29 July 1994, a writ of demolition was issued, and notices of demolition

were served upon private respondents. Per Sheriff’s Report,[5] private
respondents’ houses were demolished on 3 August 1994, except for two
houses which were moved outside the premises in question upon the plea
of the owners thereof.
On appeal by the private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed and

set aside the decision of the RTC; declared the private respondents as the
rightful possessors de facto of the land in question; and permanently
enjoined Sheriff Juan Gato or whoever was acting in his stead from
effectuating the demolition of the houses of the private respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the executed Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of

Absolute Sale is valid.

2023-24-2ND SEM.
We now come to the issue of the validity of the Extrajudicial Partition with
Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the instant case, private respondents have set up the defense of

ownership and questioned the title of AZNAR to the subject lot, alleging
that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale upon which
petitioner bases its title is null and void for being simulated and...
fraudulently made.
The foregoing are bare allegations with no leg to stand on. No birth or
death certificates were presented before the MTCC to support the
allegations that some of the parties to the deed were minors and others
were already dead at the time of the execution of the deed. What... private
respondents adduced as evidence was merely a family tree, which was at
most self-serving. It was only when the case was on appeal with the RTC
that the private respondents presented as Annex "B" of their Memorandum
and Appeal Brief a photocopy of the certificate of death... of Francisco
Aying,[19] son of Crisanta Maloloy-on, who reportedly died on 7 March
1963. This certificate was allegedly issued on 17 January 1992 by the
Parish Priest of Virgen de Regla Parish, Lapu-Lapu City. The fact remains,
however, that this photocopy... was not certified to be a true co
It is worthy to note that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute

Sale is a notarized document. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of
regularity, and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution.[20] It is admissible in evidence without further
proof of authenticity[21] and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
[22] He who denies its due execution has the burden of proving that
contrary to the recital... in the Acknowledgment he never appeared before

2023-24-2ND SEM.
the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be his voluntary act.[23] It
must also be stressed that whoever alleges forgery has the burden of
proving the same. Forgery cannot be presumed but should be proved... by
clear and convincing evidence.[24] Private respondents failed to discharge
this burden of proof; hence, the presumption in favor of the questioned
deed stands.
It must be borne in mind that the act of registering a document is never...

necessary to give the conveyance legal effect as between the parties[26]
and the vendor's heirs. As between the parties to a sale, registration is not
indispensable to make it valid and effective. The peculiar force of a title is
exhibited only when the... purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the
land described in the conveyance. The purpose of registration is merely to
notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may
be ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the deed evidencing said...
transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations
thereunder.[27] Here, no right of innocent third persons or subsequent
transferees of the subject lot is involved; thus, the conveyance executed in
favor of AZNAR by private respondents... and their predecessors is valid
and binding upon them, and is equally binding and effective against their
heirs.
By and large, it appears on the face of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed
of Absolute Sale that the same was registered on 6 March 1964. The
registration was under Act No. 3344 on unregistered lands allegedly
because at the time, no title was existing in the files of the

2023-24-2ND SEM.
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, as it was allegedly lost during the last
world war. It was only on 8 August 1988 that the title was reconstituted at
the instance of the petitioner.
DISPOSITIVE:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and

the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2000 is MODIFIED, as
follows: The amended complaint of the heirs of Roberta Aying is
DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. However, the heirs of Emiliano
Aying and Simeon Aying, having instituted the action for reconveyance
within the prescriptive period, are hereby DECLARED as the LAWFUL
OWNERS of a 2/8 portion of the parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-2856.
SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: Article 1088 of the Civil Code does not justify legal
redemption in this case because it refers to sale of hereditary rights, and
not to specific properties, for the payment of the debts of the decedent’s
estate as to which there is no legal redemption. “In the administration and
1liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, sales ordered by the
probate court for payment of debts are final and not subject to legal

2023-24-2ND SEM.
redemption. Unlike in ordinary execution sales, there is no legal provision
allowing redemption in the sale of property for payment of debts of a
deceased person”
AMORANTE PLAN, petitioner, -versus- INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT and FEDERICO BAUTISTA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-65656, SECOND DIVISION, February 28, 1985
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Federico, who claims one-eight (1/8) interest in the property, alleged that
he was not notified of the sale of two conjugal lots made by his mother
Florencia as administratrix in the intestate proceeding for his deceased
father’s estate, made to Amorante Plan with the authorization and approval
of the probate court. His mother had a five-eight (5/8) interest in the
property.
In the intestate proceeding for the settlement of Regino Bautista’s estate,

his widow filed a motion dated December 9, 1964 for authority to sell to
Plan the two lots and theater for not less than P140,000.00. The purpose
was to pay the debts amounting to P117,220.00
On December 22,1964, Judge Jose B. Jimenez granted the authority to sell

to Plan the entire estate of the deceased for not less than P140,000 so as
to pay the obligations of the estate “land it appearing that all the heirs have
conformed thereto.”
A motion to approve the sale was fled on January 5, 1965. It should be

noted that in 1963 the widow and four of her seven children as owners of

2023-24-2ND SEM.
7/8 interest in the said property had, in consideration of P9,600.00 agreed
to sell that same property to Plan for the same amount of P140,000.00
Sixteen days after the sale, Federico Bautista filed an “Opposition to

Agreement to Sell Absolute Sale, Project of Partition and Request for
inventory and Accounting of estate and for Furnishing of Orders, Notices
and Pleadings." Judge Jimenez gave Federico’s counsel ten (10) days
within which to interpose any opposition to the project of partition filed by
the administratrix on October 16, 1964 which had not been acted upon by
the court and of which the decedent’s six children were notifed through
Milagros Bautista.
Federico instituted a separate action to nullity the sale but the court
dismissed the case on the ground that the remedy is in the intestate
proceeding and not in a separate action. Upon appeal to the CA, the CA
declared the agreement as void and also allowed Federico to redeem the
said lots even if he did not pray for the recon4eyance of the lots. The
recon4eyance was based on Article 1088 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Federico Bautista could nullify in a separate action,

instead of in the intestate proceeding for his deceased father's estate, the
sale of two conjugal lots, with the theater thereon, made by his mother
Florencia Topacio as administratrix to Amorante Plan with the authorization
and approval of the probate court.
Article 1088 of the Civil Code does not justify legal redemption in this case
because it refers to sale of hereditary rights, and not to specific properties,

2023-24-2ND SEM.
for the payment of the debts of the decedent’s estate as to which there is
no legal redemption. “In the administration and 1liquidation of the estate of
a deceased person, sales ordered by the probate court for payment of
debts are final and not subject to legal redemption. Unlike in ordinary
execution sales, there is no legal provision allowing redemption in the sale
of property for payment of debts of a deceased person” (Abarro vs. De
Guia, 72 Phil. 245). Such sale is not the one contemplated in article 1067,
now article 1088 of the Civil Code (Vda. de Mendoza vs. Mendoza, 69 Phil.
155).
ln the instant case, we agree with Judges Fule, Catolico and Vallejos that
Federico’s remedy is in the intestate proceeding where his petition for relief
has been pending for nearly twenty years. He should amend it by
impleading the present administratrix and Plan himself and serving copies
of the petition upon them. Plan, as the purchaser of the disputed property,
is a forced intervenor in the intestate proceeding, He should answer the
amended petition for the annulment of the sale The probate court has
jurisdiction over him.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Appellate Court is

reversed and set aside. The trial court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of res judicata provides that the judgment in a

first case is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, between the
parties and those privy with them, not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand but as to any

2023-24-2ND SEM.
other admissible matter which must have been offered for that purpose and
all matters that could have been adjudged in that case.
G.R. No. 210252 June 16, 2014
VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FIDEL I.

QUINTOS, JR.; FLORENCIA I. DANCEL, represented by her Attorney-
in-Fact FLOVY I. DANCEL; and CATALINO L. IBARRA, Petitioners,
vs.
PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO L. IBARRA,
PEDRO L. IBARRA, DAVID L. IBARRA, GILBERTO L. IBARRA, HEIRS
OF AUGUSTO L. IBARRA, namely CONCHITA R., IBARRA, APOLONIO
IBARRA, and NARCISO IBARRA, and the spouses RECTO
CANDELARIO and ROSEMARIE CANDELARIO, Respondents.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and

respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra,
David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their
parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject
property, a 281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion
C, Camiling, Tarlac, covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No.
318717.
By 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica had already passed away,

leaving to their ten (10) children ownership over the subject property.
Subsequently, sometime in 2002, respondent siblings brought an action for
partition against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-

2023-24-2ND SEM.
52 and was raffled to the RTC, Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac. However, in an
Order4 dated March 22, 2004, the trial court dismissed the case disposing
as follows:
For failure of the parties, as well as their counsels, to appear despite

due notice, this case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
As neither set of parties appealed, the ruling of the trial court became final,
as evidenced by a Certificate of Finality5 it eventually issued on August 22,
2008.
Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, respondent

siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication6 on
September 21, 2004 to transfer the property in favor of the ten (10) siblings.
As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
390484 was issued in its place by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the
names of the ten (10) heirs of the Ibarra spouses.
Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the
property in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and
Rosemarie Candelario. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale7 dated April
17, 2007 executed in favor of the spouses Candelario and an Agreement of
Subdivision8 purportedly executed by them and petitioners, TCT No.
390484 was partially canceled and TCT No. 434304 was issued in the
name of the Candelarios, covering the 7/10portion.

2023-24-2ND SEM.
On June 1, 2009, petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and
Damages against respondents wherein they alleged that during their
parents’ lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal properties in
favor of their ten (10) children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that
they received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as
their share. They likewise averred that they have been in adverse, open,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over four (4)
decades and are, thus, entitled to equitable title thereto. They also deny
any participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deed of
Adjudication dated September 21, 2004 and the Agreement of Subdivision.
Respondents countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already
barred by estoppel when sometime in 2006, one of petitioners offered to
buy the 7/10 undivided share of the respondent siblings. They point out that
this is an admission on the part of petitioners that the property is not
entirely theirs. In addition, they claimed that Bienvenido and Escolastica
Ibarra mortgaged the property but because of financial constraints,
respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the property in their behalf.
Not having been repaid by Bienvenido and Escolastica, the Candelarios
accepted from their co-respondents their share in the subject property as
payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition
of the property.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 09-15 of the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac, the
quieting of title case was eventually raffled to Branch 68 of the court, the
same trial court that dismissed Civil Case No. 02-52. During pre-trial,
respondents, or defendants a quo, admitted having filed an action for
partition, that petitioners did not participate in the Deed of Adjudication that

2023-24-2ND SEM.
served as the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 390484, and that the
Agreement of Subdivision that led to the issuance of TCT No. 434304 in
favor of respondent spouses Candelario was falsified.9 Despite the
admissions of respondents, however, the RTC, through its May 27, 2012
Decision, dismissed petitioners’ complaint. The court did not find merit in
petitioners’ asseverations that they have acquired title over the property
through acquisitive prescription and noted that there was no document
evidencing that their parents bequeathed to them the subject property.
Finding that respondent siblings were entitled to their respective shares in
the property as descendants of Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra and as
co-heirs of petitioners, the subsequent transfer of their interest in favor of
respondent spouses Candelario was then upheld by the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-entitled case is

hereby Dismissed.
Also, defendants-spouses Rosemarie Candelario and Recto

Candelario are hereby declared as the absolute owners of the 7/10
portion of the subject lot.
Likewise, the court hereby orders the partition of the subject lots
between the herein plaintiffs and the defendants-spouses
Candelarios.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA,

pleading the same allegations they averred in their underlying complaint for

2023-24-2ND SEM.
quieting of title. However, they added that the partition should no longer be
allowed since it is already barred by res judicata, respondent siblings
having already filed a case for partition that was dismissed with finality, as
admitted by respondents themselves during pre-trial.
Similar to the trial court, the court a quo found no evidence on record to
support petitioners’ claim that the subject property was specifically
bequeathed by Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra in their favor as their
share in their parents’ estate. It also did not consider petitioners’
possession of the property as one that is in the concept of an owner.
Ultimately, the appellate court upheld the finding that petitioners and
respondent spouses Candelario co-own the property, 30-70 in favor of the
respondent spouses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents' counterclaim for partition is

already barred by laches or res judicata
The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment. The doctrine
of res judicata provides that the judgment in a first case is final as to the
claim or demand in controversy, between the parties and those privy with
them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain
or defeat the claim or demand,... but as to any other admissible matter
which must have been offered for that purpose and all matters that could
have been adjudged in that case.
The rationale for this principle is that a party should not be vexed twice
concerning the same cause.

2023-24-2ND SEM.
There is res judicata when the following requisites are present: (1) the
formal judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order
on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence
or stipulations submitted by the parties at... the trial of the case; (3) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
With all the other elements present, what is left to be determined now is
whether or not the dismissal of Civil case No. 02-52 operated as a
dismissal on the merits that would complete the requirements of res
judicata.
In advancing their claim, petitioners cite Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court
The afore-quoted provision enumerates the instances when a complaint

may be dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the
date for the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint; (2) if he
fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable... length of time; or (3) if
he fails to comply with the Rules or any order of the court. The dismissal of
a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits,
and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another
action, unless... otherwise provided in the order of dismissal.
In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the Order does not in any language
say that the dismissal is without prejudice and, thus, the requirement that
the dismissal be on the merits is present.

2023-24-2ND SEM.
However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time,
provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
the law generally does not favor the retention of co-ownership as a property
relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners' specific
shares so as to prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in
limbo. Thus, the law provides that each co-owner may demand at any time
the partition of the thing owned in common.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right
granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must
prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-
owner through the promulgation of procedural rules.
This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred
by res judicata. There can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning
the same parties and the same subject matter once the respective shares
of the co-owners have been... determined with finality by a competent court
with jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co-
ownership does not or no longer exists.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTLY

GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013 and November 22, 2013,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for

2023-24-2ND SEM.
purposes of partitioning the subject property in accordance with Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: A party to a partition is also barred from avoiding partition

when he has received and held a portion of the subdivided land especially
in this case where respondents have enjoyed ownership rights over their
share for a long time.
G.R. No. 132518 March 28, 2000
GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO,

NIDA MAGLUCOT, MELANIA MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO
CATUBIG, LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners,
vs.
LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA
MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO ALEJO, respondents.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages alleging, inter alia, that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D.
Said lot was originally part of Lot No. 1639 which was covered by Original
Certificate Title No. 6775 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis,
Bartolome Maglucot. Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo Lara and
Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927. 1 On 19 April 1952, Tomas Maglucot,
one of the registered owners and respondents predecessors-in-interest,

2023-24-2ND SEM.
filed a petition to subdivide lot No. 1639. 2 Consequently, on 13 May 1952,
then CFI of Negros Oriental issued an order 3 directing the parties to
subdivide said lot into six portions.
Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D

(subject lot). Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed
Maglucot, rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and
each paying rentals therefor. Said respondents built houses on their
corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount of P100.00 per
annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of Roberto
Maglucot, petitioners predecessors-in-interest. In December 1992,
however, said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over
the subject lot. Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo.
After trail, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The
RTC found the existence of tax declarations in the names of Hermogenes
Olis and Pascual Oils (purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B,
respectively) 5 as indubitable proof that there was a subdivision of Lot No.
1639. It likewise found that Tomas Maglucot, respondents' predecessors-
in-interest, took active part in the partition as it was he, in fact, who
commenced the action for partition. 6 The court a quo cited Article 1431 of
the Civil Code which states that "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon."
Applying said provision of law, it held that while there was no court order
showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be used
by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-in-interest, to deny
the existence of an approved partitioned against the other co-owners who
2023-24-2ND SEM.
claim that there was one. 7 Said court, likewise, ruled that the tax
declarations 8 over the houses of respondents, expressly stating that the
same are constructed on the lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a
conclusive admission by them of the ownership of the subject lot by the
latter. 9
RULING OF THE CA: On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
The appellate court ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied
upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of partition. 11 The CA
likewise found that the prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court was not followed. It thus declared that there was no partition of Lot
No. 1639.
ISSUE: that there was already a partition of said lot; hence, they are
entitled to exclusive possession and ownership of Lot No. 1639-D, which
originally formed part of Lot No. 1639 until its partition.
we find that the petition is meritorious... the order not having been appealed
or questioned by any of the parties to the case, it has become final and
executory and cannot now be disturbed.
In this case, both the order of partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan
are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not object to the
interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they have assented
thereto, they cannot thereafter question the decree,[28] especially, where,
by reason of their conduct, considerable expense has been incurred in the

2023-24-2ND SEM.
execution of the commission.[29] Respondents in this case have occupied
their respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They
cannot after acquiescing to the order for more than forty (40) years be
allowed to question the binding effect thereof.
There is no showing that respondents by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest raised any objections. On the contrary, the records
show that the parties continued their possession of the specific portions of
Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision plan.
It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a
partition accepts the partition allotted to him, and holds and conveys the
same in severalty, will not be subsequently permitted to avoid partition.[34]
It follows that a party to a partition is also barred from avoiding partition
when he has received and held a portion of the subdivided land especially
in this case where respondents have enjoyed ownership rights over their
share for a long time.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

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DOCTRINE: In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an
order to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the
existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of
ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an
action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the
subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the
action to state in his complaint the "nature and extent of his title" to the real
estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the properties.
G.R. No. 152862 July 26, 2004
TERESITA S. REYES-DE LEON, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE B. DEL ROSARIO, respondent.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The instant case traces its origin to an action for Partition filed by Pantaleon
U. del Rosario and his son, respondent Vicente B. del Rosario, before the
Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 11 of Cebu City. In
the Amended Complaint,3 petitioner Teresita Reyes-de Leon was
impleaded as a defendant, being one of the heirs of the late spouses
Pantaleon S. del Rosario and Ceferina Llamas. Plaintiffs therein, Pantaleon
U. del Rosario and Vicente B. del Rosario, are cousin and nephew,
respectively, of the petitioner. The case involved several parcels of land
collectively grouped as follows: "Tupas Properties," "Asinan Properties,"

2023-24-2ND SEM.
"Figueroa Property," "Barili Properties," "Mambaling Properties," "Negros
Properties," and "Other Properties."4 Plaintiffs therein claimed that petitioner
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario
covering all of her shares in the properties sought to be partitioned.5
In her Answer dated 10 November 1998, petitioner claimed that she did not
execute any deed of sale in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario.6 She further
averred that the only portions of her inheritance she ever sold were her
shares in the Asinan and Negros properties, which she sold in favor of
Pantaleon U. del Rosario, and the late Vicente S. del Rosario.7
In December 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of

deed of sale with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City.8 She stated that on 14 December 1983, she sold her one-half (1/2)
share in the Asinan Properties to Pantaleon U. del Rosario, respondent’s
father.9 However, petitioner was shocked when, sometime in August 1996,
she learned from her cousins, who were defendants in the initial partition
case filed by the respondent, that respondent Vicente B. del Rosario was
claiming all of her shares in the estate of Ceferina Llamas, her maternal
grandmother. The claim is based on a deed of absolute sale purportedly
signed by petitioner on 20 January 1985,10 which according to her, covers
the same Asinan properties sold to respondent’s father and for the same
consideration. However, the deed, she further alleged, fraudulently added
the phrase "including any and all of her shares, rights and interests on all
other real estate properties together with their improvements which she
acquired by inheritance from the estate of the late Ceferina Llamas Vda. De
Del Rosario."11 In addition, petitioner sought to recover P500,000.00, as

2023-24-2ND SEM.
moral damages for respondent’s refusal to admit the nullity of the deed,
and for his continued and unjust claim over her properties.
Upon the filing of the Complaint for declaration of nullity, petitioner moved
for the suspension of the partition proceedings. On 19 January 2000, Judge
Victorino U. Montecillo, presiding judge of the partition court, granted the
motion with the following order, to wit:
"In her motion dated December 20, 1999 defendant Teresita de Leon
prayed for the suspension of the trial of this case on the ground that
plaintiff Vicente B. del Rosario would have no cause of action in the
instant case should she prevail in Civil Case No. CEB-24698 wherein
she sought to declare as null and void the deed of sale she allegedly
issued in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario. Plaintiffs filed an opposition
stating that by filing Civil Case No. CEB-24698 movant is guilty of
forum shopping and splitting a cause of action.
....
Movant’s cause of action in Civil Case No. CEB-24698 is entirely

different which cannot and should not be incorporated in the instant
case. Since the partition sought by plaintiffs in the instant case
includes the properties subject of Civil Case No. CEB-24896 there is
merit in movant’s motion to suspend this case."12
Meanwhile, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss13 petitioner’s Complaint,

alleging that, having failed to raise the issue of nullity as a compulsory
counterclaim in her Answer in the partition case, petitioner is barred from
filing the action for declaration of nullity following Section 2, Rule 9 of the

2023-24-2ND SEM.
Rules of Court.14 Furthermore, he alleged that petitioner is guilty of forum-
shopping since the same transactions and essential facts and
circumstances are involved in the action for declaration of nullity and in the
partition case.15
In the interim, the partition case was raffled to Branch 5, RTC Cebu which
was then presided by Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr. In an Order dated 14 July
2000,16 the new partition court set the preliminary conference for the case,
and in fact held a preliminary conference on 29 July 2000. In
its Order dated 15 August 2000,17 the partition court ordered the parties to
submit to the court a list of uncontested properties. As a result of the
preliminary conference, the parties agreed to partition an uncontested
portion of the estate.18
Likewise on 15 August 2000, the Complaint for declaration of nullity was

eventually dismissed by Branch 6, RTC Cebu, this time presided by Judge
Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr. The trial court ratiocinated that the issue of ownership
should be determined and resolved in the partition case.19 It also noted that
the filing of a separate action to determine the real owner of the properties
in issue and sought to be partitioned would result in multiplicity of
suits.20 Petitioner sought the reconsideration of the Order dated 15 August
2000, but the same was denied in the trial court’s 19 February 2002 Order,
issued this time by Judge Anacleto L. Caminade.21 Hence, the instant
petition.
While the petition was pending, petitioner died and was substituted by her
heirs, namely: Michael Alain Reyes De Leon and Isidro de Leon.

2023-24-2ND SEM.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a party raising the defense of inexistence or nullity of deed

of sale in a partition case (which deed is made as one of the bases of the
plaintiff’s prayer for partition therein) is barred from filing an entirely
separate action for declaration of nullity of the same deed on the ground of
multiplicity of suits and forum-shopping.
The question of validity or nullity of the deed of sale, as well as the claim for
damages, is necessarily and logically intertwined with the partition case.
Only the shares in the lots which are determined to have been validly sold
to the respondent may be included in the action for partition. Conversely,
shares in the lots which were not validly disposed of by the petitioner shall
have to be excluded in the order of partition. Indeed, only properties owned
in common may be the object of an action for partition. Put elsewise, an
order of partition presupposes a state of co-ownership as the status quo
ante. This is implicit from Rule 6928 on Partition which provides in Section 2
thereof that if after trial the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to the
partition sought, "it shall order the partition of the real estate among all the
parties in interest." Of course, this rule of procedure carries out the
substantial right conferred by the Civil Code on co-owners. Article 494 of

2023-24-2ND SEM.
the Code provides that "(e)ach co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned."
The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be

resolved in order to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in
the action for partition itself. As held in the case of Catapusan v. Court of
Appeals:29
"In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to
divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the
existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of
ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state,
an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest
over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the
party filing the action to state in his complaint the "nature and extent
of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership
is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the
properties. xxx."
In the case of Viloria v. Court of Appeals,30 the heirs of deceased co-owners

of a parcel of land sought the partition thereof. The surviving co-owner
opposed the action, contending that the deceased co-owners had sold and
conveyed their shares to him prior to their demise. The trial court ruled that
the decedents remained co-owners of the lot as there was no effective
conveyance of their shares which upon their demise were inherited by their
heirs. On appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court,
with the modification that the deed of sale which defendant therein relied
upon was not valid as such since it merely constituted an express trust.

2023-24-2ND SEM.
Before this Court, petitioner ascribed to the appellate court grave error in
assuming jurisdiction over the validity of the deed of sale as it was never
raised as an issue in the partition case. We held that:
"xxx. In the action for partition private respondents claimed that they
were co-owners of the property subject thereof hence entitled to their
share, while petitioner denied their claim by asserting that their rights
were supplanted by him by virtue of the deed of absolute sale. As a
result, the issue of co-ownership and the legality of the 1965 sale
have to be resolved in the partition case. As enunciated in Catapusan
v. CA, until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. Thus, the
appellate court did not exceed the limits of its jurisdiction when it
ruled on the validity of the 1965 sale."31
The trial court pursued the same tack in this case. It held that as the
partition court, it should determine and resolve the issue of ownership of
the properties subject of the disputed deed of absolute sale. As it pointed
out, petitioner had already raised the allegation of nullity as a defense. It
also agreed with the respondent that petitioner raised in the partition case
the issue of "whether or not defendant Teresita de Leon validly sold all her
shares in the inheritance to plaintiff Vicente B. del Rosario."32
Moreover, in the Verification33 for the Complaint for declaration of nullity,

petitioner claimed that "I have not commenced any other action or court
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or in any other Tribunals or Agency," and that "to the best of my
knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court,

2023-24-2ND SEM.
the Court of Appeals, or in any other Tribunals or Agency." The veracity of
these statements is belied by petitioner herself. In her Complaint, petitioner
alleged that herein respondent is claiming all of her shares in the estate of
Ceferina Llamas, based on a deed of absolute sale purportedly signed by
her,34 and that she was informed of the existence of the said instrument by
her cousins when the same was alleged in the partition case. 35 She even
filed her Answer to the Amended Complaint and claimed therein that she
did not sell any share, much more all of her shares to respondent. It is thus
clear that she was aware of the partition case and that she even
participated therein when she filed her Complaint.
Doubtlessly, petitioner made a false or untrue certification of non-forum

shopping.
To split the proceedings into declaration of nullity of the deed of sale and
trial for the partition case, or to hold in abeyance the partition case pending
resolution of the nullity case would result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous
procedure and unnecessary delay, as the lower court observed.36 The
conduct of separate trials of the parties’ respective claims would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time not only of the parties but also of
the courts concerned. On the other hand, it would be in the interest of
justice if the partition court hears all the actions and incidents concerning
the properties subject of the partition in a single and complete proceeding.
After all, the issue of nullity can be properly ventilated before the partition
court. Thus, even with the dismissal of the action for nullity, petitioner is not
without recourse. She can still dispute the execution of the deed of
absolute sale and assert her rights to the properties subject of the said

2023-24-2ND SEM.
instrument in the partition case. There is no need for a separate case to
resolve the matter.
In light of the foregoing, it is obvious that petitioner resorted to forum-

shopping.
Also present here is litis pendentia.
Petitioner asserts that the action for partition and the declaration of nullity
involve distinct and separate causes of action. While the first calls for the
determination of their respective rights to the inheritance, the second is a
redress for relief for the fraudulent act committed by one party on the
property rights of the other.
At first glance, the second case for declaration of nullity appears to have a
different cause of action. However, a closer examination reveals that the
second case partakes the nature of a compulsory counterclaim.
A compulsory counterclaim, as held in the case of Ponciano v.

Parentela,37 is any claim for money or other relief which a defending party
may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of,
or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of plaintiff’s complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that
if it is within the jurisdiction of the court, and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction, it must be set up therein, and will be barred in the
future if not set up.38

2023-24-2ND SEM.
For this reason, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a
separate action but should instead be asserted in the same suit involving
the same transaction or occurrence which gave rise to it.39 To determine
whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the
following tests: (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the
counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent
suit on defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will
substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as
the defendant's counterclaim? and (4) Is there any logical relation between
the claim and the counterclaim?40 The instant case reveals affirmative
answers to all the foregoing questions.
Clearly, petitioner’s action for declaration of nullity and respondent’s claim

anent his share in the partition case stemmed from the same disputed deed
of sale. An adjudication of validity or nullity of the deed of sale in any of the
two cases would constitute res judicata. It is beyond doubt that the same
evidence would be utilized by the parties to prove their sides in both cases.
The issue of nullity of the deed of absolute sale is necessarily connected
with the partition case since the resolution thereof will determine the proper
shares of the parties in the estate sought to be partitioned.
Petitioner raised the claim of nullity of the deed of absolute sale merely as
a defense in her Answer to the Amended Complaint, thus:
"6. xxx paragraphs 12, 13,14,15,19, and 21 are all denied because
herein defendant never sold her shares to plaintiff Vicente B. del
Rosario. The only portions of the inheritance she ever sold were the

2023-24-2ND SEM.
Asinan Properties in favor of plaintiff Pantaleon U. del Rosario and
Negros Properties in favor of the late Vicente S. Del Rosario;"41
That is sufficient to contest the validity of the deed of sale for the purpose
of excluding her shares from the coverage of the partition case. But her
failure to set up the corresponding claim for damages in the partition case
precludes her from filing a separate case or pursuing it, as she did with her
institution of the action for declaration of nullity. As a compulsory
counterclaim, the same is now barred.42
Additionally, petitioner’s action for damages pertains to the alleged moral

damages she suffered because of "defendant’s refusal to admit the nullity
of the deed of absolute sale, and because of his continued and unjust claim
over plaintiff’s properties despite his knowledge of its baselessness, plaintiff
suffered wounded feelings, sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and the
like."43 These are allegations which are proper subjects of a compulsory
counterclaim, which should have been raised in the partition case, which
unfortunately, she did not.
The partition court was not in a position to determine the issue of whether
or not petitioner’s action for declaration of nullity involves a cause of action
separate or distinct from the cause of action in the partition case pending
before it. The issue was appropriately within the competency of the other
RTC branch before which the action for nullity claim was pending. Out of
deference and respect to its co-equal branch, the partition court could have
merely suspended the proceedings, as it did, in view of the pending action
for declaration of nullity.

2023-24-2ND SEM.
Nonetheless, the suspension order issued by Judge Victorino U. Montecillo
presiding over the partition court, as well as his order denying the motion
for reconsideration,45 are provisional in nature. Both orders have no bearing
on the final outcome of the issues of ownership and nullity of the deed of
sale and, eventually, the decision in the partition case. The partition court
could resume hearing the case, as in fact it did when it called for a
preliminary conference on 29 July 2000.46 Actually, the partition court
started to partition the uncontested portions of the estate, even virtually
disregarding the suspension order it issued earlier. That respondent did not
resort to other remedies to set aside the said orders is of no moment, as
the resumption of proceedings and the issuance of said orders by the new
Judge presiding over the partition court have rendered the 19 January
2000 Order of Judge Montecillo functus oficio. As such, we see no reason
why the dismissal of the nullity case should adversely affect the
proceedings in the partition case.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 30 April 2002 is

DENIED. The 15 August 2000 and the 19 February 2002 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 6 dismissing the Complaint in Civil
Case No. CEB-24698 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

2023-24-2ND SEM.
DOCTRINE:
G.R. No. 177703 January 28, 2008
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA, petitioners,

vs.
JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, respondent.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-0010
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City (RTC) against
Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for judicial
partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the decedent Fidel).
Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C.
Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his
second wife, petitioner Vilma.
DECISION OF THE RTC:

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On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S.
Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G.
Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third
(1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees
thereon, if any;
2. Attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)

PESOS is hereby awarded to be reimbursed by the defendants to the
plaintiff;
3. Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.3
The decision became final on March 15, 2004.4
As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land
covered by TCT No. 383714 (subject land), respondent sought its sale
through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it.5 Accordingly, the RTC
ordered the public auction of the subject land.6 The public auction sale was
scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be reset when petitioners refused
to include in the auction the house (subject house) standing on the subject
land.7 This prompted respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent

2023-24-2ND SEM.
Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court,8 praying that petitioners
be declared in contempt.
The RTC denied the motion in an Order9 dated August 30, 2005, for the
reason that petitioners were justified in refusing to have the subject house
included in the auction, thus:
The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house or

improvement erected on the property should not be included in the
auction sale.
A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the

evidence adduced during the ex-parte hearing clearly show that
nothing was mentioned about the house existing on the land subject
matter of the case. In fact, even plaintiff's [respondent's] initiatory
Complaint likewise did not mention anything about the house.
Undoubtedly therefore, the Court did not include the house in its
adjudication of the subject land because it was plaintiff himself who
failed to allege the same. It is a well-settled rule that the court can not
give a relief to that which is not alleged and prayed for in the
complaint.
To hold, as plaintiff argued, that the house is considered accessory to

the land on which it is built is in effect to add to plaintiff's [a] right
which has never been considered or passed upon during the trial on
the merits.
In the absence of any other declaration, obvious or otherwise, only

the land should be partitioned in accordance to[sic] the

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aforementioned Decision as the house can not be said to have been
necessarily adjudicated therein. Thus, plaintiff can not be declared as
a co-owner of the same house without evidence thereof and due
hearing thereon.
The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as correctly

pointed out, judgment must stand even at the risk that it might be
erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of

Court filed by plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC, in its Order dated January 3, 2006, denied respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration.11
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari12 where he sought to

have the RTC Orders set aside, and prayed that he be allowed to proceed
with the auction of the subject land including the subject house.
In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition

for Certiorari, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated

August 30, 2005 and January 3, 2006 issued by the RTC, in Civil

2023-24-2ND SEM.
Case No. SCA 03-0010, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
sheriff is ordered to proceed with the public auction sale of the
subject lot covered by TCT No. 383714, including the house
constructed thereon.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in
its Resolution14 of April 30, 2007.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition.
The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered by the
judgment of partition but in view of the suspended proscription imposed
under Article 159 of the family code, the subject house immediately
partitioned to the heirs. Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by
the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the
dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it
is situated. Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of
its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to
the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, applying

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these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the
subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home
by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began
occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back. Article 159. The
family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of
the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as
there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless
the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless
of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30,

2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are MODIFIED in that the house standing on the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co-ownership of
the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G.
Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public auction within the period
provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

2023-24-2ND SEM.
2023-24-2ND SEM.

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DOCTRINE: Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing

G.R. No. 185745 October 15, 2014

SPOUSES DOMINADOR MARCOS and GLORIA MARCOS, Petitioners,

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In their complaint, the respondents averred that on November 5, 1943, their

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

Consequently, by virtue of the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale dated August

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

2) Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-47829 issued in the names

Consequently, the Registrar of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan is hereby

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

4) For the defendant to pay the costs.

In fact, defendant Gloria Marcos admitted in Court that the Deed of

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

RULING OF THE CA:

On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

The petitioners sought a reconsideration12 of the Decision dated September

ISSUE: Whether or not the partition can be presumed to have been

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

DOCTRINE: The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of

G.R. No. 156407; January 15, 2014

FACTS OF THE CASE:

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be

Ruling of the RTC:

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

Decision of the CA:

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

The CA further opined as follows:

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review

ZOSIMA VERDAD, Petitioner, -versus- THE HON. COURT OF

FACTS OF THE CASE:

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos,

ISSUE: Whether or not Socorro C. Rosales is entitled to redeem the

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria

Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and

JACQUELYN R. VELARDE - ANINANG SUCCESSION MANILA LAW COLLEGE

Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the