Paper No.

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2227

Corrosion Management of Refinery Process Units by Using Integrity Operating

Window (IOW)

Musaed M. Al Arada, Bader Dh. Al Otaibi, Faisal Al Refai, Sami Haggag, Anil Kumar Ray
Kuwait National Petroleum Company, Mina Abdulla Refinery
P.O. Box-69, Safat, Kuwait 13001
E-mail: fhr012@knpc.com

ABSTRACT

Refining industry handles highly volatile Hydrocarbons from crude oil to light gases or heavy products.
Operation of refinery units while producing useful products also causes deterioration / damage to
various process equipment and piping by degradation mechanisms. The design codes and standards do
not address equipment deterioration while in service and that deficiencies due to degradation or from
original fabrication may be found during subsequent inspections. The root causes of deterioration could
be due to inadequate design considerations including materials selection and design details, or the
interaction with aggressive environments/conditions that the equipment is subjected to during normal
service or during transient periods.

Therefore, operation of process units within a defined Integrity Operating Window (IOW) is necessary
to establish and maintain a controlled process environment which would enable feedstock to be
converted into products in a safe, environmentally responsible manner without upsets and unplanned
shutdowns. In its broadest context, the IOW of a process unit can be defined as the set of boundary
operating conditions within which parameters must be routinely controlled to ensure safe, reliable
operation.

Keywords: corrosion, degradation mechanisms, Integrity Operating Window (IOW), operating

parameters, corrosion loop, target range.

INTRODUCTION

Refining industry handles highly volatile Hydrocarbons from crude oil to light gases or heavy products.
Operation of refinery units while producing useful products also causes deterioration / damage to
various process equipment and piping by degradation mechanisms. The ASME and API design codes

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and standards for pressurized equipment provide rules for the design, fabrication, inspection, and testing
of new pressure vessels, piping systems, and storage tanks. These codes do not address equipment
deterioration while in service and those deficiencies due to degradation or from original fabrication. The
root causes of deterioration could be due to inadequate design considerations including materials
selection and design details, or the interaction with aggressive environments/conditions that the
equipment is subjected to during normal service or during transient periods.

Therefore, operation of process units within a defined Integrity Operating Window (IOW) is necessary
to establish and maintain a controlled process environment which would enable feedstock to be
converted into products in a safe, environmentally responsible manner without upsets and unplanned
shutdowns. In its broadest context, the IOW of a process unit can be defined as the set of boundary
operating conditions within which parameters must be routinely controlled to ensure safe, reliable
operation. This paper discusses the IOW parameters required to monitor and control corrosion
degradation mechanisms in Crude unit of Mina Abdulla refinery, Kuwait National Petroleum Company,
Kuwait.

RISK BASED INSPECTION (RBI) & IT’S INTERFACE WITH INTEGRITY OPERATING
WINDOW (IOW)

Risk Based Inspection is a risk assessment and management tool that addresses an area not completely
addressed in other organizational risk management efforts such as Process Hazards Analyses (PHA) or
reliability centered maintenance (RCM). It complements these efforts to provide a more thorough
assessment of the risks associated with equipment operations.

RBI produces Inspection and Maintenance Plans for equipment that identify the actions that should be
implemented to provide reliable and safe operation.2 The RBI effort can provide input into an
organization’s annual planning and funds required to maintain equipment operation at acceptable levels
of performance and risk.

Risk is the combination of the probability of some event occurring during a time period of interest and
the consequences, (generally negative) associated with the event. In mathematical terms, risk can be
calculated by the equation 1:

Risk = Probability (likelihood) x Consequence (1)

Operating within the defined boundaries is critical to the validity of the RBI study as well as good
operating practice. It may be worthwhile to monitor key process parameters to determine whether
operations are maintained within boundaries or not.

Risk Based Inspection of Crude unit at refinery has been carried out under the guidance of Shell Global
Solutions. The validity of the Shell RBI (S-RBI)3 analysis, as well as the inspection strategies derived
from it, depend on the process being operated within defined limits. Deviating from these operating
limits during operation of the plant would invalidate the inspection plan derived from the S-RBI analysis
and also place equipment integrity at risk. From an integrity perspective, operating the process within
the IOW limits is the key to preserving the validity of assumptions and the projections made by the RBI

©2013 by NACE International.

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process. The RBI study was carried out using the maximum/minimum values of the IOW parameters of
the unit prevailing at the time of the S-RBI workshop.4

WHAT IS AN IOW?

IOW is window of operating conditions which have an effect on degradation when outside certain range
and can be influenced by operation.

Operating window (OW) is established from the process and equipment design and is controlled by
alarms, trips, pressure relief valves and other delimiting devices. Also, even if all potential degradation
have been addressed during design; operational variations, design & construction faults and/or design
changes can make the original design susceptible to degradation; which may require further limitation of
the OW. An IOW represents this further limitation within the OW. In other words: IOW are typically
inside the operating ranges wherein “operations” are allowed to work and produce a warning/incident
report to indicate that the current operating conditions potentially affect the equipment integrity as
shown in figure 1.

Design Window

Operating Window (OW)

Integrity Operating Window (IOW)

Figure 1: Comparison Between Design, Operating & Integrity Operating Window

Characteristics of IOW Parameters

The parameters used to define an IOW has one or more of the following characteristics:

Physical:

Various limits on pressures and temperatures (including design & operating), partial pressures, dew
points, dry points, heating and cooling rates, delta P, etc.

Flow rates, injection rates, hydrogen flux, corrosion probe etc.

Chemical:

pH, water content, acid gas loading, sulfur content, salt content in crude, NH4HS content, NH3 content,
TAN, acid strength, amine strength, inhibitor concentration, chloride contamination levels, oxygen
content, etc.

Establishment of IOW Parameters

In order to achieve a controllable IOW, the parameters must meet the following criteria:

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All IOW Parameters Must be Quantified:

The first step in quantifying an IOW is to review all corrosion loops (The sections of the unit which are
exposed to similar predicted degradation mechanisms, operating under similar conditions and consist of
similar materials of construction, forms a Corrosion Loop)4 in the plant systematically for corrosion and
degradation processes potentially affecting the equipment integrity during RBI workshop. Also, to
review the critical process and corrosion control parameters related to those degradation mechanisms
and review the historical and current operating conditions.1

Once all the measurable and controlled parameters in the potential degradation process are known, the
critical values, above/below which degradation process start or reach unacceptable rates must be set. The
upper and/or lower limits of a safe operating value for parameter are based on:

a) Historical operating, maintenance and inspection records

b) Design data, lab data and operating data

c) Metallurgical and corrosion data

d) Process chemistry and engineering knowledge

All IOW parameters must either be controlled by the Process, Operation or Inspection & Corrosion staff.

IOW Limits

Depending on the consequences on crossing the limits of operating parameters, the limits are classified
as follows:
a) Critical limit (As shown in figure 2)
b) Standard limit

a) Critical Limit:

A limit at which the operator has one last opportunity to return the process to a safe condition and, if
exceeded, could result in one of the following in a fairly short time frame. The time frame shall be
defined during RBI workshop:

 A Catastrophic Release of Hydrocarbons or Hazardous fluids

 Loss of Containment
 Non-orderly or Emergency Shutdown
 Significant Environmental Impact
 Other Unacceptable Risk

Examples:

− Boiler Feed Water Level

ο Loss of boiler feed water level could quickly cause boiler tube rupture due to starvation.

©2013 by NACE International.

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− Hydro-process Reactor Temperature
ο Metal temperatures below the MDMT (minimum design metal temperature) could give
rise to brittle fracture.

− Heater Tube Skin Temperature

ο Tube could rupture quickly if overheated, caused by a no flow or hot spot condition or
localized flame impingement.

− Sulfuric Acid Strength in Alkylation

ο Too low acid strength could cause runaway reactions.

b) Standard Limit:

A limit that, if exceeded over a defined period of time (which shall be established during RBI
workshop), could cause one of the following to eventually occur.

 A catastrophic release of hydrocarbons or hazardous fluids

 Loss of containment
 Non-orderly or Emergency shutdown
 A negative impact to the long term unit performance and its ability to meet turnaround run
length
 Excessive financial impact

Examples:

− REAC (reactor effluent air coolers) NH4HS Concentration

ο Corrosion of the air cooler and downstream piping.

− Heater Tube Skin Temperature

ο Metallurgical creep could lead to eventual tube failure.

− Crude Fractionator Dew Point Temperature

ο Sustained operation below dew point could cause rapid corrosion and damage to
fractionator internals.

− pH of Crude Tower Overhead

ο Sustained operation below standard pH level could lead to accelerated corrosion of
tubing and piping.

− Desalter Outlet Salt Content

ο Sustained operation above standard level could lead to corrosion in OVHD system of
fractionators.

©2013 by NACE International.

Requests for permission to publish this manuscript in any form, in part or in whole, must be in writing to
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IOW Terminology

Following terms explain the IOW in detailed manner

Variable or Control Parameter:

This is the parameter or measurements which relates to the identified corrosion / material degradation
mechanisms and is required to be monitored for controlling the same.

Target Range:

Operating limits which are required for stable and reliable operation and may not be directly related to
integrity issues.

Time in Exceedance:

This is the cumulative time for which a particular variable in IOW has exceeded the set boundary limits
and this is applicable only to standard limits. Consequence of such an exceedance is not immediate but
Operator response is required to bring back the operation within the set limits. Generally the default
value is set at 24 hrs., however, a different value is possible and has to be agreed in the RBI workshop
based on the historical data, degradation mechanisms etc…

Corrosion Loop:

Corrosion loop is a group of equipment and piping which have similar materials, similar operating
conditions and also suffer from similar degradation mechanisms. Hence, IOW is generally defined for a
corrosion loop to take care of all the equipment and piping in that loop.

IMPLEMENTATION OF IOWS IN REFINERY

Based on the history of the parameters, the upper and/or lower limits of a safe operating value have been
defined in IOWs for various corrosion loops. After preparation of IOWs by Inspection and Corrosion
Division of refinery, these were sent to Process Engineering and Operations for their review. After
finalization, it has been released for implementation.

The list of IOWs parameters in attached Table 1, have been implemented in Crude unit on pilot basis,
through Distributed Control System (DCS in Central Control Room (CCR) and through Laboratory in
SQL*LIMSTM System. On crossing the boundary conditions of the parameters an alarm is sent to
designated persons for his information and action through emails.

Setting IOW Parameters for Crude Unit of Refinery

During “IOW identification workshop” for crude unit of refinery, the operating parameters, which
require monitoring in order to manage degradation mechanism and/or corrosion rates and thereby
integrity of the equipment and piping were identified for each corrosion loop and their limits were
defined. These limits are referred to as IOWs.

©2013 by NACE International.

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Corrosion loops are marked in the process flow diagram of Crude unit as shown in figure 3 below.
Sample of IOW’s for some corrosion loops are defined in Table 1 (attached) containing following
details:

Variables & Locations:

a) Limits (Min/Max), Units

b) Reason for limit

c) Consequences of exceeding the Limit

d) Time in Exceedance (Days)

e) Observation Frequency

f) Recommended Corrective Actions

Likewise, IOWS have also been defined for other units of the refinery e.g. Atmospheric Residual
Desulfurization (ARDS), Vacuum Rerun, Hydrocracker, Hydrotreaters etc...

IMPLEMENTATION OF IOWS IN KNPC REFINERIES

IOW concept has also been implemented in Shuaiba Refinery of Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC),
where RBI workshops have been completed for some process units based on S-RBI methodology. IOW
implementation in Mina Al Ahmadi Refinery is also in progress.
Management has decided to implement this IOW concept across the board in all three refineries to
enhance the integrity and reliability of the operating units.

SUCCESS STORIES UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF IOW’S

In the review, one IOW team noticed that a previous project had installed the wrong construction
materials - immediate inspection revealed significant high temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA)
damage.

An operator on the team disagreed with the unit process engineer and said that “we actually operate
much hotter than you think because we use the by-pass” - immediate inspection revealed significant
localized damage.

A corrosion engineer questioned the higher level of NH4HS in the REAC system of a Hydro Cracker
Unit (HCU) - immediate inspection revealed a previously-missed localized spot of significant corrosion.

An IOW was set on NH4HS concentration at one refinery, which then began to take routine lab samples
- soon thereafter discovered the concentration was too high and took steps to increase wash water and
adjust feedstock.

©2013 by NACE International.

Requests for permission to publish this manuscript in any form, in part or in whole, must be in writing to
NACE International, Publications Division, 1440 South Creek Drive, Houston, Texas 77084.
The material presented and the views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author(s) and are not necessarily endorsed by the Association.
 Jose Aranguren - Invoice INV-842161-1W8T46, downloaded on 9/22/2014 11:36AM - Single-user license only, copying/networking prohibited.
CONCLUSION

The key benefits achieved by implementing IOWs are as follows:

a) Improved equipment integrity and safe, reliable, efficient operations.

b) Enabled and empowered plant operations staff who play more pro-active role in corrosion
prevention.
c) Higher confidence in the control and monitoring of various degradation modes.
d) Enable focused inspection strategies.
e) Prevent any premature failure.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors wish to thank the Management of Kuwait National Petroleum Company for their permission
to publish this paper.

REFERENCES

1. Risk Based Inspection, Downstream Segment, American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended
Practice 580, Second Edition, November 2009.

2. Risk Based Inspection Technology, American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice
581, Second Edition, September 2008.

3. Risk & Reliability Management (RRM) Version 2 Manual by Shell Global Solution, 2004.

4. KNPC Crude Unit Risk Based Inspection Work-Shop Report. May 2004.

©2013 by NACE International.

Requests for permission to publish this manuscript in any form, in part or in whole, must be in writing to
NACE International, Publications Division, 1440 South Creek Drive, Houston, Texas 77084.
The material presented and the views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author(s) and are not necessarily endorsed by the Association.
 Jose Aranguren - Invoice INV-842161-1W8T46, downloaded on 9/22/2014 11:36AM - Single-user license only, copying/networking prohibited.
Figure 2: IOW Limits : Critical Limits and Standard Limits

UNIT-11 Sour Gas to

Gas Handling
CRUDE UNIT CL-1115
PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM

Accumulator

V-107
Stabilizer
LPG to Gas Handling
Sour Gas Feed Drum
Compressor

Naphtha to Storage
T-101
CL-1111

V-103
Cold Naphtha Reflux
Overhead Kerosene
CL-1104
Accumulator Stripper
Fractionator

Sour
Crude

Water CL-1116
Preheat Flash Kerosene to
Exchangers Drum HTU/Storage

V-104 V-105

Two Stages Desalters

Diesel
Stripper Steam
Preheat Fired
Preheat Exchangers Diesel to
Exchangers Heater
HTU/Storage
CL-1117

CL-1101 Wash
Water
Crude
P-113
Feed CL-1102 CL-1109 Feed to ARDS U-12
P-101

Figure 3: Corrosion Loops Marked With Different Colors in Process Flow Diagram of Crude Unit

©2013 by NACE International.

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Table 1
Crude Unit: Integrity Operating Window Parameters Based on RBI Rev. 2.1

©2013 by NACE International.

Requests for permission to publish this manuscript in any form, in part or in whole, must be in writing to
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The material presented and the views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author(s) and are not necessarily endorsed by the Association.