TOPIC: WELFARE LAWS

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CASE NO. 1

G.R. No. 176150 June 25, 2008

IBARRA P. ORTEGA, petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner, a member of respondent Social Security System (SSS), filed claims for partial permanent
disability benefits on account of his condition of Generalized Arthritis and Partial Ankylosis, which
claims the SSS granted for a total monthly pension of 23 months.

After the expiration of his disability pension, petitioner filed with the SSS Malabon Branch Office on
April 26, 2000 a claim for total permanent disability benefits. His application, was denied, however,
on the ground that he was already granted disability benefits for the same illness and physical
examination showed no progression of illness. Dr. Juanillo Descalzo III, SSS Malabon Branch senior
physician, observed that petitioner merely had a "slight limitation of grasping movement for both
hands."7

Aggrieved, petitioner filed before the SSC an unverified Petition of June 19, 2000, 8 alleging that the SSS
denied his application despite the fact that his attending physician, Dr. Rafael Recto, Jr., diagnosed him
to be suffering from Trigger finger 4th (L) and thumb (L) while another private medical
practitioner, Dr. Flo dela Cruz, diagnosed him to be also suffering from Bronchial Asthma,
Hypertension and Gastro-Esophageal Reflux Disease.

Further claiming to be afflicted with rheumatoid arthritis of both hands affecting all fingers and both
palms, petitioner contended that the medical opinion of the SSS physician who interviewed him for
less than three minutes cannot prevail over the findings of his physicians who have been treating him
over a long period of time.

SSS Legal Department denied a reconsideration of the denial of his claim.

SSC denied petitioner’s claim for entitlement to total permanent disability for lack of merit.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is entitled to entitled to total permanent disability benefits under the
Social Security Law. (NO)

RULING:

The initial physical examination and interview revealed that petitioner had slight limitation of
grasping movement for both hands. According to Dr. Descalzo, this finding was not enough to grant
an extension of benefit since petitioner had already received benefits equivalent to 30% of the
body. Responding to the allegation that the April 2000 physical examination was performed in a short
period of time, the doctor credibly explained that petitioner’s movements were already being
monitored and evaluated from a distance as part of the examination of his extremities in order
to minimize malingering and overacting.
Contrary to petitioner’s asseverations, the SSC did not ignore the certifications of petitioner’s

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attending physicians as, in fact, it ordered the SSS in June 2001 to conduct an investigation as
to the medical findings and final diagnosis by his attending physicians. It was surfaced that
petitioner’s medical records in the custody of Dr. Flo dela Cruz could not be found as they were
allegedly destroyed by inundation. And it was found that the July 10, 2001 letter-certification by Dr.
Rafael Recto, Jr. only narrated the recurring condition of petitioner’s trigger finger, the administration
to him of local steroid injections, and the performance of surgical release on his left 4th trigger finger
on June 16, 1998; and that he was diagnosed on August 28, 2000 with mallet finger (R, 5th), for which
he was advised to undergo reconstructive surgery.

Adopting a liberal attitude and exercising sound discretion, the SSC even directed the conduct of
another physical examination on petitioner to judiciously resolve his motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner’s reliance on jurisprudence on work-connected disability claims insofar as it relates

to a demonstration of disability to perform his trade and profession is misplaced.

Claims under the Labor Code for compensation and under the Social Security Law for benefits
are not the same as to their nature and purpose. On the one hand, the pertinent provisions of the
Labor Code govern compensability of work-related disabilities or when there is loss of income due to
work-connected or work-aggravated injury or illness. On the other hand, the benefits under the Social
Security Law are intended to provide insurance or protection against the hazards or risks of disability,
sickness, old age or death, inter alia, irrespective of whether they arose from or in the course of the
employment. And unlike under the Social Security Law, a disability is total and permanent
under the Labor Code if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform
any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days regardless of whether he
loses the use of any of his body parts.

Unfortunate as these events were, the appellate court correctly ruled that it could not consider
such allegation of subsequent events since "a factual question may not be raised for the first
time on appeal[,] and documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will
not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action."

Fair play dictates that the SSS be afforded the opportunity to properly meet the issue with respect to
the new ailments besetting petitioner, in line with the actual practice that only qualified government
physicians, by virtue of their oath as civil service officials, are competent to examine persons and issue
medical certificates which will be used by the government for a specific official purpose. This holds
greater significance where there exist differences or doubts as to the medical condition of the person.

In this case, the SSS medical examiners are tasked by law to analyze the extent of personal incapacity
resulting from disease or injury. Oftentimes, a physician who is adequately versed in the knowledge of
anatomy and physiology will find himself deficient when called upon to express an opinion on the
permanent changes resulting from a disability. Unlike the general practitioner who merely concerns
himself with the examination of his patient for purposes of diagnosis and treatment, the medical
examiner has to consider varied factors and ascertain the claimant’s related history and subjective
complaints. The members of this Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don the physician’s
gown, so to speak, in a pretense to correlate variances in medical findings.

Finding no cogent reason to discuss the ancillary issues, the Court dismisses the petition, without
prejudice to the filing of a new application by petitioner who is not left without any recourse in
his legal bout respecting his supervening claims anchored mainly on Coronary Artery Disease
1VD and Diabetes Mellitus Type 2, these illnesses having been found to be dissimilar from the
subject matter of the present action.
 CASE NO. 2

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G.R. No. L-43320 June 30, 1978

CECILIA V. ULIBAS, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Bureau of Public Schools) and THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.

FACTS:

The claimant had worked with the respondent as a classroom teacher from June 1, 1930 up to
November 21, 1968 with interruption during the time of war. From her entrance to the service up to
June 30, 1952, the claimant was assigned in the Division of Romblon and on July 1, 1952, she was
transferred to the Division of Ilocos Sur. As such classroom teacher, she handled subjects in the
elementary level such as Reading, Writing, Arithmetic, Social Studies, Health & Science, Music,
Language, Arts, Pilipino, Art Education and Work Education. Her last annual salary was P3,384.72.

Aside from teaching academic subjects, she had homeworks to do such as lesson plans for the subjects
to be taught, writing boardwork, reading subject matter and references and preparation teaching aids
and devices. In the preparation of all these, she usually slept late than usual for it took her up to 10:30
in the evening, or even later, to finish the same. She also attended to problems of students and did
some home visitations. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 A.M. up to 11:30 A.M., and then, from 1:30 P.M.
up to 5:00 P.M., Monday to Friday. During Saturdays, she usually attended seminars and meetings.

In the course of employment, sometime in 1966, claimant began to complain of pains and
inflammation of joints and muscles particularly the knees and ankle especially so during the
night. This condition has been on and off. Unable to perform her daily chores efficiently due to feeling
of general debility, easy fatigability, dizziness and fainting spells, she likewise suffered from loss of
voice and difficulty in continuous tailing in the classroom. But then she continued to work until the
symptoms of these ailments became more frequent and more severe that sometime in
September, 1966, this condition necessitated medical attendance. She consulted Dr. Alfredo A.
Cadena of Candon, Ilocos Sur for treatment on September 16, 1966. After a brief history of the case
was taken and after her subjection to a thorough medical examination, her ailments were diagnosed
as chronic poly articular rheumatism, chronic laryngitis, anemia-hypotension and chronic weeping
eczema for which she was administered several medicines, among which are: ergapyrin injections and
tablets, reipar injections, arcobutina forte injections, microferon capsules, enzactin ointments and
noe-far ointment. With proper medications and regular consultation with her attending
physician, the claimant was able to continue performing her duties as classroom teacher.
However, when the manifestations of body weakness became prevailing, she was compelled to
apply for retirement because she felt that she could no longer work on account of her disabling
ailments. On November 22, 1968, the claimant was effectively retired at the age of 60.

Acting Referee Ignacio Valera rendered a decision in favor of the claimant and against the respondent.

Commission reversed the award of the referee and absolving the employer, Bureau of Public Schools,
from any liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is entitled to compensation benefits. (YES)

RULING:

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The claim of petitioner for disability compensation benefits is meritorious and justified. The evidence
submitted below shows that in the course of petitioner's employment as a teacher she
developed in the year 1966 "chronic poly articular rheumatism, chronic laryngitis, anemia-
hypotension and chronic weeping eczema" resulting in her loss of voice and general physical
weakness which compelled her to leave her teaching job at the age of 60. Respondent's
contention that petitioner Ulibas stopped working at her own choice to enjoy the benefits of
retirement, is accordingly without basis.

In Bellow vs. W.C.C. and Republic of the Philippines, L-43018, October 28, 1977, the Court stated:

Disability occurs when an employee is disabled from rendering further service due to
his physical inability to perform work in the usual and customary way. For purposes of
the Workmen's Compensation Act there is disability when there is a loss or diminution
of earning power which is due to an injury arising out of and in the course of the
employment. It is not the injury which is compensated but rather it is the
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity."

In Abana vs. Quisumbing, 1968, the Court ruled:

While there is that possibility that factors other than the employment of the claimant
may also have contributed to the aggravation of his illness, this is not a drawback to its
compensability. For, under the law, it is not required that the employment be the
sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of claimant's illness to
entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment had
contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease. It has been
repeatedly held that under the Workmen's Compensation Law, it is not necessary for a
claimant to carry the burden of proof to establish his case to the point of
demonstration. It is sufficient to show that the hypothesis on which he bases his
claim is probable.

Viewing the case from a different angle, the exact medical cause of the illness, however,
is not really significant. For, granting, only for argument's sake, that the evidence for
petitioner is sufficient to show a causal link between the nature of his employment and
his heart ailment, under the provision of section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, as amended, it is to be presumed that petitioner's illness, which supervened at the
time of his employment either arose out of or was at least aggravated by, said
employment. With this legal presumption, the burden of proof shifts to the
employer, and the employee is relieved of the burden to show causation.

In the instant case of Ulibas there can be no question that her work as a classroom teacher from 1930
to 1968, with a brief interruption during World War 11, took its toll on her health, and in fact directly
caused and aggravated the inflammation of the larynx and loss of voice and her anemia-hypotension
which produced general physical weakness.
 5
CASE NO. 3

G.R. No. 159887 April 12, 2006

BERNARDO REMIGIO, Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, C.F. SHARP CREW MGT., INC. & NEW COMMODORE
CRUISE LINE, INC.,1 Respondents.

FACTS:

On November 27, 1997, petitioner Bernardo Remigio entered into a Contract of Employment with
respondent C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. (respondent agency), for and in behalf of its foreign
principal, co-respondent New Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd. (respondent principal). The contract
provided that the terms and conditions of the standard employment contract governing the
employment of all seafarers, approved per Department of Labor and Employment's
Department Order No. 33 and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's
Memorandum Circular No. 55, both Series of 1996 (1996 POEA SEC), were to be strictly and
faithfully observed. Under the contract, petitioner was to work as Musician II on board SS
"Enchanted Isle," a vessel owned and operated by respondent principal, for ten (10) months, at a
basic monthly salary of US$857.00, overtime rate of US$257.00 per month and vacation leave with
pay of three (3) days per month.

After petitioner passed the pre-employment medical examination, he joined the vessel and started
performing his job as a drummer in December 1997. On March 16, 1998, while the vessel was docked
at the port of Cancun, Mexico, petitioner went ashore to attend to some personal matters. While
walking, petitioner suddenly felt severe chest pain and shortness of breath. He returned to the
vessel and experienced another such episode on the same evening. When his chest pain recurred the
following day, he went to the vessel's infirmary where he again suffered from chest pain. Petitioner
was brought and confined for seven (7) days at the Grand Cayman Island Hospital. His pain
worsened upon physical exertion but improved with rest. Thus, he was instructed to refrain from
performing any kind of physical activity and to have a complete bed rest. He rejoined the vessel
on March 24, 1998.

Upon the vessel's arrival at the port of New Orleans, Louisiana, U.S.A., petitioner was brought to the
West Jefferson Medical Center for a more thorough check-up and evaluation. Dr. S. Kedia's
"impression" was that petitioner's chest pains were "probable secondary to severe coronary artery
disease." Dr. Armengol Porta conducted a physical examination on petitioner, including a coronary
angiogram, and found that he had several blockages in his coronary arteries. A triple coronary
artery bypass was performed on petitioner on April 2, 1998 by a Dr. Everson.

On April 8, 1998, petitioner was transferred to the Marine Medical Unit for observation. After twelve
(12) days of confinement, petitioner's cardiologist found him "not fit for sea duty" and
recommended for him to be "[r]epatriated to home port for follow up with a cardiologist." He
was repatriated to Manila on April 23, 1998.

On May 13, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, sent a formal communication to respondent agency
demanding payment of unpaid wages, sickness allowance and permanent total disability
benefits. The demand, however, was refused.
LA: rendered judgment ordering the respondents jointly and severally to pay complainant, his

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sickness allowance in the amount of US$3,400.00.

NLRC: affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto. CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits. (YES)

RULING:

"Disability" is generally defined as "loss or impairment of a physical or mental function

resulting from injury or sickness." Clearly, "disability" is not synonymous with "sickness" or
"illness," the former being a potential effect of the latter. The schedule in Sec. 30 of the POEA SEC is a
Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted. It is not
a list of compensable sicknesses. Unlike the 2000 POEA SEC,28 nowhere in the 1996 POEA SEC is
there a list of "Occupational Diseases."

The unqualified phrase "during the term" in Section 20(B) of the 1996 POEA SEC covers all injury
or illness occurring in the lifetime of the contract. The injury or illness need not be shown to be
work-related.

The petitioner is correct in invoking the Labor Code's concept of permanent total disability in the case
at bar.

Art. 192 (c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules; x x x

Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the
New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining,
strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar
subjects."

Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of
seafarers.

Petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefit

There are three kinds of disability benefits under the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 626: (1)
temporary total disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent partial disability.
Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code differentiates the
disabilities as follows:

Sec. 2. Disability.-- (a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the
employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days,
except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.

(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is
unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except
as otherwise provided for in Rule X47 of these Rules.
 (c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee

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suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body. (emphasis supplied)

In Vicente v. ECC:48

x x x the test of whether or not an employee suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ is a
showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the
disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is
unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the
coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in more detailed
manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said employee
undoubtedly suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ regardless of whether or not he loses the
use of any part of his body.

A total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled, or totally
paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue
her usual work and earn therefrom. On the other hand, a total disability is considered
permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days.

Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the
same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any
kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.

Applying the foregoing standards, we find that petitioner suffered from permanent total disability.

That the company-designated physician did not specify that petitioner suffered from any disability
should not prejudice petitioner's claim for disability benefits. In the first place, it is well to note that it
was respondent agency which referred petitioner to the American Outpatient Clinic giving only the
specific instruction that the designated physician indicate in the medical report "the estimated
treatment period and the exam conducted." Moreover, what is important is that the facts stated in the
medical report clearly constitute permanent total disability as defined by law. It is well-settled that
strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability
benefits. Disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss
of earning capacity.

Having suffered from permanent total disability, petitioner is entitled to US$60,000.00 which is the
amount due for permanent total disability under Section 30-A of the 1996 POEA SEC.
 8
CASE NO. 4
Micronesia Resources vs. Cantomayor, G.R. No. 156573, June 19, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Fabiolo Cantomayor entered into a contract of overseas employment with respondent
Dynacom Shield Shipping Ltd. and Singa Ship Management A.S. represented by respondent Micronesia
Resources to work on board the vessel M/T "CLOUD". Two (2) months after joining said vessel,
petitioner started to feel weak and encountered difficulty in breathing. Petitioner ignored his
condition and continued with his employment. However, on or about February 17, 1999, petitioner,
while working, suddenly felt dizzy and eventually collapsed. He regained consciousness not long after
but since then he always felt weak and was constrained to work lightly.

When the vessel reached Italy, petitioner was brought to a hospital and was diagnosed to have
coronary artery disease and was advised to undergo by-pass surgery. In view thereof, petitioner was
repatriated to the Philippines and immediately sought treatment at the Medical Center of Manila,
attended by a company-designated physician who noted that three (3) of his artery vessels were
blocked, thereby confirming the diagnosis made by the doctors in Italy and echoing the same
recommendation for immediate by-pass surgery. Thus, on or about June 30, 1999, petitioner
underwent coronary artery by-pass at the Philippine Heart Center.

Considering his medical condition, petitioner was not able to return to his previous employment as a
Third Officer. Consequently, he requested respondents to grant him permanent and total disability
compensation as well as the reimbursement of his medical expenses in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarer on Board Ocean-going Vessels (otherwise known as the POEA Standard Employment
Contract) and the JSU-AMOSUP CBA, of which he was allegedly covered.

Micronesia denied the claim of Cantomayor but shouldered the expenses of his ongoing medical
treatment. They also offered to pay him compensation for his Grade 7 permanent and partial
disability.

Cantomayor pressed for payment of permanent and total disability compensation amounting to US
$80,000.00 and filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Arbitration
Board. Labor Arbiter (LA) Romeo Go dismissed the complaint for lack of merit However, he ordered
the respondents to pay the complainant the amount of US$20,900 pertaining to grade 7 disability
benefits.

Cantomayor appealed the decision to the NLRC , insisting that he be compensated for the permanent
and total disability he suffered. The NLRC dismissed his appeal including his motion for
reconsideration. Cantomayor then filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals to which the

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decision of the NLRC was reversed declaring that the former’s disability is permanent and total.
Micronesia’s MR was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that Cantomayor suffers from total and
permanent disability. NO

RULING:

The CA overturned the NLRC and LA and held that the coronary artery disease which afflicted
Cantomayor during his employment with Micronesia, et al. caused him to suffer a permanent and total
disability with a Grade 7 impediment rate, for which he is entitled to full compensation. The reasons
cited by the CA in reversing the NLRC and LA are summarized as follows:

First, Cantomayor's ailment is compensable under Section 32-A of the POEA Standard Employment
Contract. Second, respondent's ailment was not pre-existing as shown by the result of his Pre-
employment Medical Examination (PEME) where physicians designated by petitioners declared him fit to
work. The finding that respondent's ailment was already in an advanced stage when it was discovered
does not preclude the possibility that it developed during his employment with petitioners. Finally,
respondent's disability is permanent and total because the severity of his ailment rendered him incapable
of performing the work of a seafarer.

The reasoning of the CA is well-founded, although we note that it was mistaken when it cited Section
32-A of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. In Paragraph 2 of their September 29, 1998
Contract of Employment,17 the parties incorporated the provisions of the 1996 POEA Standard
Employment Contract (1996 POEA-SEC),18 such as Section 20-B (5) which reads:

Section 20 Compensation and Benefits

xxxx
B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of his
contract are as follows:
xxxx
5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of his employment
caused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of
benefits enumerated in Section 30 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or
disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or
disease was contracted.

We have interpreted the foregoing provision to be a sufficient legal basis for a grant of disability
benefits to a seafarer who suffers any injury or illness during the term of his contract. Citing Remigio
v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held:
 10
"Disability" is generally defined as "loss or impairment of a physical or mental function resulting from
injury or sickness." Clearly, "disability" is not synonymous with "sickness" or "illness," the former
being a potential effect of the latter. The schedule in Sec. 30 of the POEA SEC is a Schedule of Disability
or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted. It is not a list of compensable
sicknesses. Unlike the 2000 POEA SEC, nowhere in the 1996 POEA SEC is there a list of "Occupational
Diseases."

The unqualified phrase "during the term" in Section 20(B) of the 1996 POEA SEC covers all injury
or illness occurring in the lifetime of the contract. The injury or illness need not be shown to be
work-related.

As in Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission, therefore, the Court applied to the present
case Section 20-B(5) of the 1996 POEA-SEC as legal basis for the grant of disability benefits to
Cantomayor who was afflicted with coronary artery disease during the term of his contract. The CA
therefore was correct in ruling that the claim of Cantomayor had legal basis. We must point out,
though, that it was mistaken in citing, not Section 20-B, but Section 32-A. The latter provision (Section
32-A) can be found only in the 2000 POEA-SEC,21 which took effect after the parties entered into their
1998 employment contract.

As to the finding of the LA and NLRC that said ailment was pre-existing, the same is belied by the
result of Cantomayor's PEME. In his PEME result, Cantomayor declared that he did not suffer from
high blood pressure or heart trouble or that he had not been told that he suffered from any such
ailment. Micronesia, et al. claim that such declaration is untruthful. The Court disagreed, for it was
found that in the same PEME result, there appears a certification that after physical examination,
Cantomayor was found to have a normal heart. However, the result of his ECG is that he had poor R-
waves progression yet the examining physician designated by the petitioner certified him fit to work.

The foregoing entries in his PEME result confirm that even if Cantomayor had declared himself free of
heart ailment, Micronesia, et al. had the opportunity to pre-qualify, screen and verify, as it
actually did in the case of Cantomayor for it even noted significant findings in his ECG result. This
precludes the possibility that Cantomayor concealed his illness. Rather, Micronesia, et al. hired him
despite the ECG Report and should now accept liability for his ailment in the course of his
employment.

As to the amount of compensation, the company physician issued an assessment limiting his disability
to a Grade 7 impediment rate. Both the LA and NLRC relied on the assessment. Micronesia insists that
said assessment is conclusive to which the Court not so. For the Court held that while it is the
company-designated physician who must declare that a seafarer-claimant suffers a permanent
disability, the former's declaration is not conclusive upon the latter or the court. In the present
case, there is no indication that Cantomayor sought a second opinion. Nonetheless, it is of record that
the latter was rendered unfit to discharge his duties as Third Officer for more than 120 days. Based on
Cantomayor’s medical record alone, it is clear that the former had not been able to resume work as a
Third Officer for more than 120 days and that he continues to suffer chest pains and fatigability on
long distance ambulation. The partial disability assessment of the company physician is therefore
inconsistent with said record. Therefore in this case, the petitioner suffered from permanent

11
total disability. Citing Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, the Court held:

Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of
whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body x x x

Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind
of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a
person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability
compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting
in the impairment of one's earning capacity.

It is undisputed that petitioner started to suffer chest pains on March 16, 1998 and was repatriated on
April 23, 1998 after having been found as "not fit for duty." The medical report clearly proved that
petitioner was unfit to work as drummer for at least 11-13 months -- from the onset of his ailment on
March 16, 1998 to 8-10 months after June 25, 1998. This, by itself, already constitutes permanent total
disability. What is more, private respondents were well aware that petitioner was working for them as
a drummer, as proven by the communication of respondent principal to respondent agency referring
to petitioner as "drummer with our enchanted isle quartet." [55] Thus, the certification that petitioner
may go back specifically as a piano or guitar player means that the likelihood of petitioner returning
to his usual work as a drummer was practically nil. From this, it is clear that the petitioner's disability
is total and permanent.

Private respondents' contention that it was not shown that it was impossible for petitioner to play the
drums during the 8-10 months that he was on land is specious. The petitioner's unfitness to work
attached to the nature of his job rather than to its place of performance. Indeed, playing drums per se
requires physical exertion, speed and endurance. It demands the performance of hitting strokes and
repetitive movements that petitioner, having undergone a triple coronary bypass, has become
incapacitated to do.

The possibility that petitioner could work as a drummer at sea again does not negate the claim for
permanent total disability benefits. The Court held in Crystal Shipping Inc. that the law does not
require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his
customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability.

Given that Cantomayor had not been able to resume the same work or activity for more than 120 days,
the CA cannot be faulted in discarding the Grade 7 disability assessment of the company physician and
in declaring that Cantomayor suffers from Grade 1 disability.

Petition is dismissed.
 CASE NO. 5

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G.R. No. 123891 February 28, 2001

PHILIPPINES TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, and CARLOS NIETES, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent, Carlos Nietes filed a complaint against Philippine Transmarine Carriers Inc. (PTC)
for payment of disability benefit, sickness wages, refund of medical expenses and attorney’s fees.
POEA Adjudication Office issued its decision in favor of the private respondent awarding disability
benefit.

Petitioner admits that private respondent suffered illness which rendered him unfit for work.
However, it points out that private respondent did not submit proof of the extent of his disability as
required by Section C (4) [b] and [c] of the POEA Standard Contract for Seamen. Without this proof,
petitioner argues that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the findings of the
POEA Adjudication Office.

ISSUE:

Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming with modification, the judgment of the
POEA Adjudication Office. NO

RULING:

NO. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation.

In NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. vs. NLRC, the Court held:

Strict rules of evidence, it must be remembered, are not applicable in claims for compensation and
disability benefits. Private respondent having substantially established the causative circumstances
leading to his permanent total disability to have transpired during his employment, we find the NLRC to
have acted in the exercise of its sound discretion in awarding permanent total disability benefits to
private respondent. Probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in
compensation proceedings.

Consistently the Court has ruled that "disability should not be understood more on its medical
significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an
employment to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that [he] was trained for
on accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could
do. It does not mean absolute helplessness." In disability compensation, we likewise held, it is not the
injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of

13
one’s earning capacity.

Petitioner faults public respondent for allowing the reimbursements of private respondent’s medical
expenses despite the fact that the latter’s treatment was done by a physician not designated or
accredited by the petitioner in violation of the POEA Standard Contract for Seamen. However, records
of the case show that private respondent had initially sought treatment at Seamen’s Hospital
under the care of Dr. George Matti, a company accredited physician. Only after he was refused
admission thereat was he compelled to seek medical assistance elsewhere. His life and health being at
stake, private respondent did not have the luxury to scout for a company-accredited physician for was
it fair at this late stage for his employer to deny him such refund for medical services that previously
he was admittedly entitled to.

The POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the protection and
benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its
provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor.
Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.

Petition is dismissed.
 CASE NO. 6

14
[G.R. No. 163838 : September 25, 2008]

WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND WALLEM SHIP- MANAGEMENT HONGKONG, LIMITED,
Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND TIBURCIO D. DELA CRUZ,
Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner WMSI, acting as manning agent of petitioner WSHL, hired respondent as messman under an
employment contract. Respondent was deployed on November 1, 19995 to board his vessel M/V
Vanadis at Fujairah, United Arab Emirates where his work as messman involved manually carrying
and loading seastores/supplies.

Sometime in March 2000, respondent complained of pain on his left groin radiating to his lower back
area. He was examined in Fujairah by petitioner's accredited physician, who issued a medical
certificate that respondent was not fit to resume sea duties. Respondent then was repatriated to the
Philippines where, from March 23, 2000 through November 22, 2000, he was examined and treated at
the Metropolitan Hospital under Dr. Robert D. Lim and other physicians accredited with petitioners.

Petitioners paid for the costs of respondent's treatment. They also paid him a sickness allowance
equivalent to his monthly wage, but only for the period of 120 days or from March 23, 2000 to July 24,
2000. On November 22, 2000, Dr. Lim issued a medical report finding the respondent fit to work. The
latter then signed a Certificate of Fitness for Work whereby he released petitioners from any liability
for his injury.

On August 2, 2001, respondent filed with the NLRC Arbitration Branch (Labor Arbiter) a Complaint
against petitioners for payment of permanent total disability benefits in the amount of US$50,000.00.
Claiming that the November 22, 2000 fit-to-work medical report issued by Dr. Lim was false,
respondent argued that he was actually suffering from a total permanent disability as established by
the following evidence: first, he was certified not fit to work by petitioners' accredit physician in
Fuijairah (Annex "C"); and second, the Overseas Workers' Welfare Administration (OWWA) issued to
him an Impediment Grade - Medical Evaluation Report (Annex "E"), which stated that he was suffering
from an impediment grade six and that he was entitled to 50% disability benefits.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. Ruling that Dr. Lim's medical
report was conclusive, because the latter was the company-designated physician who actually
examined and treated respondent for eight months. Dr. Lim's findings could not be overturned by a
contrary medical report issued by a doctor at OWWA who did not actually examine respondent but
merely referred to earlier medical reports on the latter's condition prior to treatment. Neither can Dr.
Lim's findings be outweighed by the medical report issued in Fujairah months before respondent
underwent treatment in the Philippines.

Respondent then appealed to the NLRC which reversed the LA Decision and partly granting
respondent's claim. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC denied it. Petitioners
then questioned the NLRC decision and resolution before the CA but the latter affirmed the same,

15
albeit with modification deleting the twenty-five (25%) percent attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the NLRC decision. NO

RULING:

The terms and conditions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard

Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) which the parties incorporated into their employment contract
grant respondent compensation and benefits should he suffer from an illness or injury, subject to the
following conditions:

Section 20-B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness. - The liabilities of the employer when
the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board the vessel.

2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be
liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board
and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.

However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or
illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of
his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance
equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has
been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred
twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is
physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period
is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement
shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

The NLRC interpreted Section 20-B(3) to mean that if a seafarer is repatriated on the basis of a
certification issued by a company-designated physician overseas that said seafarer is not fit to resume
sea duties, such finding shall remain valid until the seafarer is declared fit to work by the company-
designated physician in the Philippines; but if, after 120 days from the repatriation of the seafarer, no
such fit-to-work declaration is made by the company-designated physician in the Philippines, the
presumption will arise that the seafarer suffered from a permanent disability based on the earlier not-
fit-to-work assessment made by the company-designated physician overseas. In the case of
respondent, the NLRC ruled that the assessment by petitioners' accredited physician in Fujiarah that
respondent was not fit to work held sway because Dr. Lim failed to overturn such finding within 120

16
days from respondent's repatriation. The CA sustained this view of the NLRC.

The Court agrees with the result of the CA decision, but differs with the CA's adoption of the NLRC
interpretation of Section 20-B(3), just as it disagrees with petitioners' interpretation of said provision.
The more accurate view of Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC is that espoused by respondent. In his
Comment and Memorandum, respondent cited Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission in
which the Court referred to the definition of permanent disability under the Labor Code to interpret
Section 20-B(3), thus:

The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate
under E.O. No. 247 to "secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract
workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino
workers overseas." Section 29 of the 1996 POEA SEC itself provides that "[a]ll rights and obligations of
the parties to [the] Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is
a signatory." Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that
the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining,
strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects."

Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of
seafarers x x x. There are three kinds of disability benefits under the Labor Code, as amended by
P.D. No. 626: (1) temporary total disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent partial
disability.

Thus, it is not accurate to state - - as the CA and the NLRC did - that respondent is presumed
permanently disabled just because, after 120 days from his repatriation due to injury, he was not
declared fit to resume sea duty by Dr. Lim. Nor would it be correct for petitioners to claim that
respondent does not suffer from permanent disability just because at the end of an 8-month period of
evaluation and treatment, Dr. Lim had declared him fit to work. Rather, the true test of whether the
respondent suffered from a permanent disability is whether there is evidence that he was
unable to perform his customary work as messman for more than 120 days.

Under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC, it is a requirement sine qua non to the filing of a claim for
disability benefit that the claimant seafarer be examined by a company-designated physician within
three days from his repatriation. But whatever medical report said company-designated physician
may issue will not be conclusive on the claimant, for the latter may dispute said report by
promptly consulting a physician of his own choice. However, neither the medical report issued
by the company-designated physician nor the medical report issued by claimant's physician of
choice is binding on the labor tribunals and the courts, for both reports will have to be
evaluated based on their inherent merit.

Indeed, the records of the present case are replete with evidence that respondent was unable to
resume work as messman for more than 120 days from his repatriation. In all, the respondent was
under medical evaluation and treatment for almost eight months. During that period, he was unable to
resume his work as messman. In fact, twice within that period, Dr. Lim certified that he was not fit to
resume sea duties. Certainly, the foregoing evidence conclusively established that respondent had

17
suffered from a permanent disability.

As to whether respondent's permanent disability was total or partial, the Court cannot alter the
concurrent finding of the CA and the NLRC, as respondent did not appeal therefrom.

Petition is denied.
 CASE NO. 7

18
EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION (SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM), petitioner, vs.
EDMUND SANICO, respondent, G.R. No. 134028, Dec 17, 1999

FACTS:
Respondent Edmund Sanico was a former employee of John Gotamco and Sons who worked as “wood
filer” from 1986 until he was separated from employment on 31 December 1991 due to his illness. His
medical evaluation report, dated 31 September 1991, showed that he was suffering from pulmonary
tuberculosis (PTB).

On 9 November 1994, respondent filed with the Social Security System (SSS) a claim for compensation
benefits. On 23 April 1996, the SSS denied private respondent’s claim on the ground of prescription.
The SSS ruled that under Article now 207 of the Labor Code, a claim for compensation shall be given
due course only when the same is filed with the System three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued. In private respondent’s case, the SSS reckoned the three-year prescriptive period on
21 September 1991 when his PTB first became manifest. When he filed his claim on 9 November
1994, the claim had allegedly already prescribed.

On appeal, petitioner ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS. Respondent then elevated the case to the
CA, which reversed petitioner’s decision and granted private respondent’s claim for compensation
benefits.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s claim for compensation benefit had already prescribed when he
filed his claim. (NO)

HELD:
The SC said that it has consistently ruled that “disability should not be understood more on its medical
significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an
employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do.
It does not mean absolute helplessness.” It has also held that in disability compensation, it is not the
injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of
one’s earning capacity.

The prescriptive period for filing compensation claims should be reckoned from the time the
employee lost his earning capacity, i.e., terminated from employment, due to his illness and not when
the same first became manifest. Indeed, a person’s disability might not emerge at one precise moment
in time but rather over a period of time.

In this case, respondent’s employment was terminated on 31 December 1991 due to his illness, he
filed his claim for compensation benefits on 9 November 1994. Accordingly, private respondent’s
claim was filed within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 207 of the Labor Code.
 CASE NO. 8

19
PABLO A. AUSTRIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION (SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM), (CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC),
respondents, G.R. No. 146636, August 12, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Austria was employed as bag piler at Central Azucarera de Tarlac from June 1, 1977 to July
20, 1997. Among his duties were carry and pile sacks of refined sugar and move stock piles for shifting
or return to the refinery.

In 1994 or after 17 years of his employment, petitioner began to feel severe back pain which was
diagnosed as osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine. Therefore, he filed with the SSS a claim for
compensation benefits. The claim was granted and petitioner was awarded permanent partial
disability benefits for 30 months.

Thereafter requested the SSS for conversion of his permanent partial disability benefit to permanent
total disability benefit. The SSS denied the request. On appeal, the ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS.
The CA which dismissed the petition, ruling that the law does not allow the conversion of permanent
partial disability to permanent total disability.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s permanent partial disability can be converted to permanent total
disability. (YES)

HELD:
The law provides three types of disability benefits to qualified employees: (1) temporary total
disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent partial disability.

In Vicente vs. ECC, the SC ruled that the test of whether or not an employee suffers from ‘permanent
total disability’ is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work
notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained,
the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days, then the said employee
undoubtedly suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ regardless of whether or not he loses the use of
any part of his body.

Disability is intimately related to one’s earning capacity. It should be understood less on its medical
significance but more on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability is disablement of an
employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that she was trained for,
or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of her mentality and attainment could
do. It does not mean an absolute helplessness but rather an incapacity to perform gainful work which
is expected to be permanent. Total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely
disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that she cannot pursue
her usual work and earn therefrom.

There is nothing in the law that prohibits the conversion of permanent partial disability benefit to
permanent total disability benefit if it is shown that the employee’s ailment qualifies as such.

Here, petitioner entitled to permanent total disability benefit under the law. His duties require him to
carry heavy loads of refined sugar and to perform other manual work. Since his work obviously taxes
so much on his back, his illness which affects his lumbar spine renders him incapable of doing his
usual work as bag piler. Hence, his disability to perform his regular duties may be considered total
and permanent.
20
 CASE NO. 9

21
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. FELOMINO S. CASCO,
respondent, G.R. No. 173430, July 28, 2008

FACTS:
Felomino Casco, a teacher of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports for 21 years, was
diagnosed to be hypertensive sometime in 1994. He was admitted at the Philippine General Hospital
where he was diagnosed of having a thrombotic cerebrovascular accident (CVA) in the right middle
cerebral artery. On October 14, 1999, he suffered another attack and was confined at the hospital. This
forced him to retire from the government service at an early age.

Casco then applied for disability benefits. The GSIS granted him thirty-eight (38) months of
permanent partial disability (PPD. Later, he was again confined at the hospital due to his ailments,
which was likewise paid by the GSIS. Due to his latest physical examination which revealed that he
still experiences chest pain and limping accompanied by lapse of memory and vertigo, he requested
the GSIS to convert his PPD to permanent total disability (PTD). However, the same was denied.
Dissatisfied, Casco appealed before the Employees’ Compensation Commission, which affirmed the
decision of the GSIS. The CA ruled in favor of Casco.

ISSUE: Whether Casco’s claim for conversion of his PPD benefits to PTD benefits should be granted.
(YES)

HELD:
The SC declared that, as it held in Austria v. CA, there is nothing in the law which prohibits the
conversion of PPD benefit to PTD benefit if it is shown that the employee’s ailment qualifies as such.

Disability should be understood not singly through its medical significance but, more importantly, in
terms of a person's loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an
employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that he was trained for
or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could
do. It does not mean absolute helplessness but rather an incapacity to perform gainful work which is
expected to be permanent.

Thus, while Casco had been awarded 38 months of PPD benefits commensurate to his physical
condition at the time of his retirement, this does not preclude the conversion of the benefits to which
he is entitled as a result of the fact that he later on became permanently and totally disabled. A
person's disability might not emerge at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It
is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become
permanent, or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled by
reason of the same cause. When an employee is constrained to retire at an early age due to his illness
and the illness persists even after retirement, resulting in his continued unemployment, as in this
case, such a condition amounts to total disability which should entitle him to the maximum benefits
allowed by law.
Topic: The Increased Risk Doctrine

22
Case No. 1
Cristobal vs. Employees Compensation Commission and GSIS
G.R. No. L-49280, February 26 1981

Facts
The deceased Fortunato Cristobal, worked at the Bureau of Printing, he contracted sickness which
was later diagnosed as anorectal cancer which caused his death. The medical certificate issued by Dr.
Rufo A. Guzman stated that the illness may have been aggravated by the unhygienic conditions in the
Bureau of Printing where he works, handling of chemicals for printing, eating without proper washing
of hands, tension due to the pressure of work, plus neglected personal necessity which may be
attributed to the inadequate facilities in the Bureau of Printing
Petitioner herein, Luz Cristobal, widow of the deceased Fortunato Cristobal, has shown that her
husband contracted rectal cancer or at least the risk of contracting the same had been increased by
the conditions under which he was working, and according ordered GSIS to pay petitioner monetary
benefits.
GSIS and ECC both file MR contending that the ailment of the deceased is not in listed occupational
disease and a proof should have been shown that the cause of the ailment was the working condition.

Issue
WON the illness of the deceased, rectal cancer, is compensable. (YES)

Ruling
Yes, the illness was compensable, applying the theory under the increased risk under Section 1(b)
Rule III of PD 626 which states that:
For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions,
Aside from the possibility that the disease might have been contracted even prior to the effectivity of
the new Labor Code. To establish compensability of the claim under the said theory, the claimant must
show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial
evidence, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion" or clear and convincing evidence.
Apparently, what the law merely requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal
relation. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate
spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules
and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor. "
The MR was denied for lack of merit.
 Case No. 2

23
GSIS vs. Palma
G.R. No. 167572, July 27, 2007

Facts
Respondent Melvin I. Palma started his teaching vocation in the government as a Practical Arts
teacher in Zamboanga City High School from 1967 to 1970. Later on, he became an English teacher at
Jose Abad Santos High School in Manila from 1970 until 1997.
Some time in 1980, respondent underwent surgical excision of the cervical lymph node for thyroid
carcinoma which was diagnosed as papillary cancer of the thyroid. Later on, respondent went through
a radical neck dissection with Total Thyroidectomy. Respondent’s travail continued as two years later
he was made to undergo another surgical excision of the cervical lymph node at the Medical City
General Hospital in Mandaluyong City.
Respondent filed with petitioner GSIS a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626.
GSIS: Denied the petition. The ailment of petitioners is not considered an occupational disease.
ECC: Affirmed the decision of GSIS.
To warrant compensability of an ailment and its resulting disability, sickness, or death under
P.D. 626, as amended, Rule III, Section 1(b) thereof, specifically provides that: (1) The ailment
must be listed by the ECC as an occupational disease. (2) There must be a showing by
substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the ailment is caused or increased by the
employees’ work and working conditions.
Appellant’s ailment, Thyroid cancer is not an occupational disease under Annex "A" of the
aforementioned rule. Under the increased risk theory, compensation may still be had, provided
substantial proof is shown that the risk of contracting the ailment was caused or increased by
the nature of his work and working conditions.
CA: Reversed the decision of ECC. It ruled that the factors enumerated are merely the specific situations
or “risk factors” that increase an individual’s chance of developing said ailment.

Issue
WON the respondent’s ailment (Thyroid cancer) is compensable. (YES)

Ruling
Section 1(b) of Rule III of the Implementing Rules of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended,
provides:
For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions.
Based on the foregoing Rule, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable,
the claimant must prove that (a) his/her sickness was the result of an occupation disease listed under
Annex "A" of the Rules of Employees Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the disease was
increased by his/her working conditions.
This increased risk theory can be made applicable in compensation cases, when the claimant can

24
adduce reasonable proof of the connection between his work and the cause of the disease, or that that
the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant’s working conditions. Strict rules of
evidence are not applicable to claims for compensation.
What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. Medical
opinion to the contrary can be disregarded, especially where there is some basis in the facts for
inferring a work connection. It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the workmen’s claim is based
is probable since probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.
Respondent was diagnosed as having thyroid cancer. Although this disease is not one of those listed as
Occupational Diseases under Annex "A" of the ECC Rules, respondent may nonetheless be entitled to
compensation if he can prove that the risk of contracting thyroid cancer was increased by his working
conditions.
It is notable that experts are open to the probability that development of thyroid cancer may be
increased largely by any other causes such as that to which respondent was exposed while carrying out
his duties, such as: (1) his constant involvement in the training of his students in declamation and
oratory contests wherein his vocal cords were extremely utilized; (2) painting the classrooms during
vacation; and (3) long exposure to and frequent inhalation of muriatic acid while supervising the
cleaning of the school comfort rooms. With these special tasks being performed by respondent and his
continued exposure to a detrimental work environment and the constant fatigue that his body
accumulated, the strong probability that respondent’s thyroid cancer developed in the process is not far-
fetched. We thus find that the probability of petitioner contracting the disease in his workstation has
been substantiated.
The CA correctly observed that it is probable for the respondent to develop thyroid cancer through
strenuous use of his vocal chords like when he trained his students for local and division-wide
declamation and oratorical competitions. And that [respondent’s] chances of developing thyroid
cancer was aggravated when he was regularly exposed to chemicals such as muriatic acid and paints
which, in turn, caused the constant irritation of his throat.

Petition for review was denied.

 25
Case No. 3
Debaudin vs. SSS and ECC
G.R. No148308, September 21, 2007.

Facts
Petitioner is a seaman by profession. During his 18 years of service with UPL (United Philippine
Lines), he boarded various foreign ocean-going vessels while performing his duties and
responsibilities that included cleaning chemical-spill-oil on deck, slat dislodging, and spraying
naphtha chemical and washing dirt and rusts inside the tank.
Petitioner’s medical record shows that his illness started in May 1993 when he experienced episodes
of bilateral blurring of vision. His condition recurred even after his separation from service,
prompting him to seek further eye consultations and treatments in the Philippines. His eye disease
was finally diagnosed as chronic open angle glaucoma.
Petitioner filed before the SSS a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended. The
application, however, was denied on the ground that there is no causal relationship between the
illness and his job as a seaman. Petitioner elevated the case to the ECC which later on affirmed the
assailed decision.
The CA accordingly dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce substantial
evidence supporting the conclusion that the working conditions as a seaman increased the risk of
contracting his chronic open angle glaucoma.

Issue
WON the work of petitioner as a seaman contributed even in small degree in or had increased the risk
of contracting his chronic open angle glaucoma. (NO)

Ruling
No, petitioner’s work had no causal relationship to his ailment
For an illness to be compensable, it must be (1) directly caused by such employment; (2) aggravated
by the employment; or (3) the result of the nature of such employment. Jurisprudence provides that to
establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection and not
direct causal relation is required. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is
based is probable.
Petitioner failed to adduce any proof of a reasonable connection between his work as a seaman and
the chronic open angle glaucoma he had contracted. He presented no competent medical history,
records or physician’s report to objectively substantiate the claim that there is a reasonable nexus
between his work and his ailment. His bare allegations do not ipso facto make his illness
compensable.
The necessity of establishing the supposed work connection is all the more crucial in the face of the
fact that the readily-available medical literature would appear to consistently indicate that open angle
glaucoma is brought about by several factors other than the purported "physical and emotional
strains," such as aging, race, family history, nearsightedness or farsightedness, prolonged

26
corticosteroid use, nutritional deficiencies, brain chemical abnormalities, injuries, infection or
abnormalities in the eye, and medical conditions such as diabetes, high blood pressure or heart
disease. Therefore, to easily attribute to the "physical and emotional strains" allegedly attendant in
petitioner’s job as a seaman the chronic open angle glaucoma he is currently suffering is evidently to
oversimplify an otherwise complex fact-finding process that should have taken place to determine the
true cause of the ailment.
Petition denied.
 27
Case No. 4
Zozobrado vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission
G.R. No. L-65856, January 17, 1986

Facts
Petitioner Roque Zozobrado started working as a civil engineer aide of Bureau of Public Highways at
Cebu City. He was then transferred to the same Bureau at Marawi City until he retired on 1979 from
the Ministry of Public Works at the age of 63 due glaucoma and cataract.
Petitioner filed a claim for total and permanent disability with the GSIS, which denied his claim of the
ground that under Presidential Decree. No. 626 (as amended) glaucoma and cataract are not
occupational diseases.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. He averred that his eye ailment can be considered to have
emanated from his employment because his work entailed constant use of his vision in the process of
reviewing "plans, specifications, bill of materials, cost estimates of projects, act on letters, decide office
problems, settle dispute of sites for projects in the fields, prepare guidelines for Project Engineers and
all other similar duties"
The GSIS reiterated its previous denial. The ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS.

Issue
WON the petitioner’s glaucoma and cataract are compensable or could be considered occupational
disease. (NO)

Ruling
The doctrine of presumptive compensability in the old Workmen's Compensation Law that when an
illness supervenes during the course of employment it is deemed to have either arisen out of or been
aggravated by petitioner's employment has been abandoned. Under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, the present law on compensation, the listed occupational diseases are compensable when
the conditions contained therein are met, and certain diseases are allowed to be compensable
whenever the claimant can prove that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the conditions
of the employment of the deceased. As to the degree of proof required, the claimant must show at
least by substantial evidence that the development of the disease is 'brought largely by the conditions
present in the nature of the job.
Petitioner's eye ailment is "cataract, senile (OS) of the left eye. A cataract is any opacity in the
crystalline lens. Senile cataract is by far the most common type, usually associated with factors related
to aging. "Senile cataract as defined, is the most common form of cataract occurring after the age of
fifty (50) due to aging or degenerative changes It is a risk or hazard to which persons are exposed
regardless of whether they are employed or not, the same (Senile Cataract) being attributed to
degenerative changes or to aging process.
Senile cataract is not a listed occupational disease. Neither does it have any causal connection with
his work as District Engineer in Marawi City. It is due to degenerative changes accompanying the
aging process. It is not generated by strain on the eyes, as petitioner claims. Nor was the risk of
contracting it aggravated by the nature of his duties or his working conditions. It is a physiologic

28
process occurring after the fourth decade of life and to which everyone is exposed whether employed
or not. The claim for disability benefits, therefore, was correctly denied by public respondents.

Petition denied.
TOPIC: The Increased Risk Doctrine

29
Case No. 5

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Hon. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 115243, December 1, 1995 (250 SCRA 491)

FACTS

Private respondent Nicolas Flores started his government service on 30 April 1967 when he joined
the Philippine Constabulary at Camp Sergio Osmeña, Sr., Cebu City. In 1971, private respondent was
promoted to the position of Supply Sergeant and was placed in charge of the acquisition and
disposition of all kinds of medicines. He also worked as a Dental X-Ray Technician and as a Dental
Xerox Machine Operator and Clerk Typist. Sometime in February 1989, private respondent
commenced experiencing headaches associated with blurring of vision, reddening of the eyes and
nausea. On 27 March 1989, he was admitted to the Tacloban City Medical Center. His ailments were
diagnosed as “Chronic Angle Closure Glaucoma OS; Acute Angle Closure Glaucoma OD; and Anterior
Polar Cataract OU.” Thereafter, Flores underwent surgical procedures. He was discharged from the
hospital on 15 April in an improved condition. However, he was again admitted to the PC-INP General
Hospital in Camp Crame, Quezon City and diagnosed as suffering from “Cataract OU.” He was
discharged from this hospital on 15 May 1990. On 27 August 1990, Flores filed with petitioner GSIS a
claim for income benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Law. The GSIS disapproved his claim
upon the ground that his “chronic angle closure glaucoma” was not an occupational disease within the
contemplation of the Labor Code and that there was no showing that his occupation had increased the
risk of contracting that ailment. Private respondent Flores appealed to the Employees’ Compensation
Commission (ECC); the latter affirmed the decision of the GSIS. Flores then went to the Court of
Appeals on a petition for review. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the ECC
and declared private respondent’s “chronic angle closure glaucoma” a compensable illness. Hence, this
petition for review by the GSIS.

ISSUE

Whether or not Flores’s “chronic angle closure glaucoma” is work-connected and whether or not
Flores had shown that the risk of contracting that ailment had been increased by his working
conditions. (YES)

RULING

Yes, Flores’s “chronic angle closure glaucoma” is work-connected and he had shown that the risk of
contracting that ailment had been increased by his working conditions.

The Employees’ Compensation Law as set out in the Labor Code as amended, grants disability benefits
to those who suffer loss or impairment of a physical or mental function resulting from injury arising
out of, or in the course of employment, or from any illness accepted as an occupational disease listed
by the ECC or any illness subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the
claimant’s working conditions. Thus, where the claimant’s illness is not listed in the table of
occupational diseases embodied in Annex “A” of the Rules on Employees’ Compensation, he bears the

30
burden of proving by substantial evidence reasonable work-connection, if not direct causal
relationship between his ailment and his working conditions.

In the case at bar, there is no question that angle closure glaucoma is not among the occupational
diseases or illnesses set out in the list attached to the Employees’ Compensation Law. Clearly,
however, that list includes cataract produced by exposure to the glare of or rays from molten glass or
molten or red-hot metal. Here, the Court found sufficient proof of work-connection, if not direct causal
relationship, between the ailment of private respondent Flores consisting of cataract formation and
his working conditions. In support of his claim, Flores submitted to the ECC a letter setting forth the
professional opinion of an ophthalmologist to the effect that one of the causes of cataract formation is
over exposure to x-ray and radioactive material. His work as an x-ray machine operator for almost
twenty (20) years must have substantially contributed to his illness. The circumstance that Flores’s
cataract was associated with glaucoma, the latter not being listed as an occupational disease in the
statute books, is of no moment. The Court further held that the incidence of a listed occupational
disease, whether or not associated with a non-listed ailment, is enough basis for requiring
compensation.

The petition for review is denied.

 Case No. 6

31
Milagros La O vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC)
G.R. No. L-50918, May 17, 1980 (97 SCRA 780)

FACTS

Petitioner Milagros B. La O is the widow of Perfecto V. La O who died on February 7, 1977 at the age of
55 years after more than 28 years of service in the government. The records show that petitioner’s
late husband entered the government service on July 19, 1948 as property and accountable clerk in
the municipal treasurer’s office in Tayabas, Quezon. He went through six promotions until he became
chief of the cash division, provincial treasurer’s office in Lucena City. The deceased suffered
abdominal pains on August 9, 1976 but still continued working until he became sick of liver ailment.
According to Dr. Nomie A. Gagalang of the Quezon Memorial Hospital (QMH), the deceased was
afflicted with hepatoma and was a transferred patient from UST Hospital because of pain and enlarged
mass at the right upper quadrant abdomen. Apparently, the deceased’s ailment at the time of his
admission at the QMH was already on its critical stage. For six days after admission, he died. On May
13, 1977, petitioner filed her claim with the GSIS for income (death) benefits under P.D. 626, as
amended, which claim was denied on the same date. Upon petitioner’s request for reconsideration of
aforesaid denial, the GSIS in its letter-resolution reiterated its previous action. Thereafter, the records
were forwarded to the ECC for review, which affirmed the GSIS resolution, on the ground
that the deceased’s ailment which caused his death is principally traceable to factors which are
definitely not work-connected, and hence, not compensable.

ISSUE

Whether or not the deceased’s ailment, which caused his death, is traceable to factors which are work-
connected and whether the same was aggaravated by his working conditions. (YES)

RULING

Yes, deceased’s ailment is traceable to factors which are work-connected and the same was
aggravated by his working conditions thereby causing his death.

Jurisprudence holds that compensability is not affected by the presence of extraneous factors causing
or accelerating a claimant’s illness. In reiteration, the Court ruled that while there is that possibility
that factors other than the employment of the claimant may also have contributed to the aggravation
of his illness, this is not a drawback to its compensability. For, under the law, it is not required that the
employment be the sole factor in the growth, development, or acceleration of claimant’s illness to
entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment had contributed, even if a
small degree, to the development of the disease. It has been repeatedly held that under the
Workmen’s Compensation Law, it is not necessary for a claimant to carry the burden of proof to
established his case to the point of demonstration. It is sufficient to show that the hypothesis on which
he bases his claim is probable.
In this case, the petitioner alleged that, in the course of the deceased’s employment, the handling of

32
and touching all the dirty ill-smelling mutilated bills and irregular eating time most possibly
aggravated his condition. Also, it must be pointed out that the record of absences of deceased (period
covers from October, 1969 to October 11, 1974) shows that he was consistently sick of stomach
trouble, fever, diarrhea and flu. These ailments apparently showed a pattern which, at the moment,
was not clinically or even physically recognizable. Evidently, considering the imperceptible nature of
hepatoma, the deceased suffered abdominal pains on August 9, 1976 when he still reported for work
until October, 1976 and was finally confined in November, 1976 up to February 7, 1977, the day he
succumbed to said ailment. Clearly, the ailment took its toll within six months which is its usual rapid
and fatal course upon clinical recognition. Further, it must be noted that the medical certificates
issued by the Quezon Memorial Hospital indicate that deceased’s ailment was “acquired” and that
“there are no indications whatever that the disease named was due to immoral or vicious habits”; and
that it started 6 months with a progressive abdominal pain with enlargement.

Verily, the deceased’s ailment is traceable to factors which are work-connected and the same was
aggravated by his working conditions thereby causing his death.

The decision of respondent ECC is set aside.

 33
Case No. 7

Miguel and Cesar Acosta vs. Employees Compensation Commission (ECC)

G.R. No. L-55464, November 12, 1981

FACTS

Fe Acosta was a classroom teacher under the Ministry of Education and Culture. She started working
for the government on July 11, 1949. She was assigned to Asingan Central School in Pangasinan. On
the first week of March 1978, the deceased complained of lumbar pain and enlargement of the
abdomen. On April 18, 1978, she was confined at the UST Hospital, and her illness was diagnosed as
endometrioid carcinoma ovaries, stage III, which compelled her to retire at the age of 51. The patient’s
case reached its terminal stage, and she succumbed to her ailment on October 2, 1978. Thereafter,
Miguel Acosta filed a claim for employees’ compensation benefit with the GSIS relative to the death of
his wife. GSIS denied the claim on the ground that the fatal ailment is not in the least casually related
to the employment of the deceased and hence, the case falls outside the compensable purview of the
Employees Compensation Law. It further alleged that the ailment is not an occupational disease, and
neither was the risk of contracting the ailment increased by her working conditions as a classroom
teacher. Unable to secure reconsideration, Acosta appealed to the ECC which affirmed the GSIS denial
of the claim for compensation benefits. Not satisfied with the said decision, Miguel Acosta filed the
instant petition and alleged that the duties of the deceased consisted not only of classroom work but
also field work and that she performed said activities even during her menstrual periods, exposing her
to health risks. He further alleged that cancer of the ovary, is akin to “rectal cancer” which the
Commission in its Resolution No. 233, dated March 16, 1977, found to be compensable disease.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioners have substantially complied with the condition as to the degree of
proof required under the doctrine of increased risk. (YES)

RULING

Yes, the petitioners have substantially complied with the condition as to the degree of proof required
under the doctrine of increased risk. Hence, their claim should be given favorable consideration.

Under PD 626, as amended, the listed occupational diseases are compensable when the conditions
contained therein are met, and certain diseases are allowed to be compensable whenever the claimant
can prove that the risks of contracting the disease are increased by the working conditions of the
employment of the deceased. As to the degree of proof required, the claimant must show at least by
substantial evidence that the development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present
in the nature of the job. More importantly, in compensation cases, the evidence of the test as to the
relation of the work to the ailment is probability and not certainty.
Here, it appears that the deceased was in perfect health when she joined the government service in

34
1949, but her various out-of-campus activities, exposing her to the elements of heat and rain,
contributed to the deterioration of her health, and her body resistance weakened due to the stress
brought about by the nature of her work. Likewise, the Medical Officer admitted that one of the causes
of the ovarian cancer is infection, then it follows that when the body resistance of the deceased
lowered because of the strain of her out-of-campus activities, her physical constitution weakened,
thus making her more susceptible to contract infection, leading to a dreadful ailment. It is generally
accepted that the exact origin of practically all types of cancer is not yet determined. With this
backdrop, one should not expect ordinary persons like petitioners to prove the real cause of the
ailment of the deceased when the experts themselves are still in the dark.

The decision of the ECC is set aside.

 35
Case No. 8

San Valentin vs. Employees Compensation Commission (ECC)

G.R. No. L-56909, November 2, 1982 (118 SCRA 160)

FACTS

The late Delfin San Valentin, husband of petitioner, entered the government service in 1951 as a
laborer in the Bureau of Plant Industry’s Economic Garden in Los Banos, Laguna. After twenty (20)
years, he was promoted to the post of nursery farm aide. The deceased was assigned in the Plant
Propagation Project where he was tasked with cultivation, propagation and caring of varieties of
plants in the Bureau. Sometime in 1979, the deceased noticed some symptoms of ill-health, such as
discharging urine deep yellow in color, yellowing of skin progressive abdominal enlargement as well
as feeling of fullness. He was confined at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) where he was
diagnosed to be suffering from hepatic encephalopathy obstruction jaundice due to tuberculosis of the
liver, pancreatic carcinoma and hepatoma. On July 28, 1979, he succumbed to said ailments.
Subsequently, petitioner filed her claim with the GSIS for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as
amended. The claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that the fatal ailments are not occupational
diseases. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. The case was elevated to the
ECC for review, which affirmed the GSIS denial of the claim.

ISSUE

Whether or not the deceased’s ailment is compensable by the nature of his work as nursery farm aide.
(YES)

RULING

Yes, the deceased’s ailment is compensable by the nature of his work as nursery farm aide.

The Supreme Court has consistently held that in compensation cases, strict rules of evidence are not
applicable. A reasonable work-connection is all that is required or that there was a showing that the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Further, it has been held that
the test of evidence in compensation cases or the relation of the disease with employment is
probability and not certainty.

Here, following the theory of increased risk, petitioner was able to present convincing proof that
would entitle her to the relief prayed for. The frequent exposure of the deceased to plant chemicals
and insecticides affected his health. The exposure resulted to the lowering of his body resistance, for it
is undisputed that the deceased was in good health when he entered the government service; for,
otherwise, he would not have been accepted for insurance purposes by the Government Service
Insurance System. It is not too far-fetched that the ailment of the deceased developed due to the
chemicals used in the nursery farm where he was assigned, for it cannot be denied that the nature of
his work required him to deal with different kinds of plants which have to be sprayed with

36
insecticides and the like. Hence, the deceased’s ailment is compensable by the nature of his work as
nursery farm aide. The decision of the ECC is set aside.
CASE NO. 9
G.R. No. 142392 September 26, 2000
DOMINGA A. SALMONE, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1982, the Petitioner was employed as sewer by the Paul Geneve Entertainment
Corporation, a corporation engaged in the business of sewing costumes, gowns and casual and formal
dresses. She was later promoted as the officer-in-charge and the over-all custodian in the Sewing
Department.
In the early part of 1996, Petitioner started to feel chest pains. She filed a leave of absence from work
as the chest pains became unbearable. Per results of Petitioner's Medical examination conducted by a
Medical Specialist, found out that the petitioner was suffering from Atherosclerotic heart disease,
Atrial Fibrillation, Cardiac Arrhythmia. Upon recommendation of her doctor, Petitioner resigned from
her work hoping that with a much-needed complete rest, she will be cured.
Petitioner later filed a disability claim with the SSS. The SSS denied Petitioner's claim. Her Motion for
Reconsideration with the SSS was denied. Petitioner appealed from the said Decision to the Public
Respondent but the latter still denied it.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed ruling that petitioner's illness was not
compensable because petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence proving any of the conditions of
compensability.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner's illness is compensable, as work-related, and whether there was sufficient
evidence of compensability. (YES)
RULING:
Under the Labor Code, as amended, the law applicable to the case at bar, in order for the employee to
be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be or must
have resulted from either (a) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the
Commission, or (b) any illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the
same is increased by working conditions.
In other words, for a sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the said
sickness must be an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of said Rules, otherwise, the claimant
or employee concerned must prove that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
condition.
The Court of Appeals ruled that "atherosclerotic heart disease, atrial fibrillation, cardiac arrhythmia"
from which petitioner suffered falls under the classification "cardiovascular diseases" and under
Resolution No. 432 of the Employees' Compensation Commission, cardiovascular disease is listed as
compensable occupational disease in which the petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence
In this case, petitioner has shown by uncontroverted evidence that in the course of her employment,
due to work related stress, she suffered from severe chest pains which caused her to take a rest, per
physician's advice, and ultimately to resign from her employment. She was diagnosed as suffering
from "atherosclerotic heart disease, atrial fibrillation, cardiac arrhythmia" which is included within
the term cardiovascular disease and no further proof of casual relation between the disease and

37
claimant's work is necessary.
(Nice to read but not related to the topic) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was no
substantial evidence supporting the finding that petitioner's illness was an occupational disease
compensable under P. D. No. 626, as amended.
The degree of proof required under P. D. No. 626, is merely substantial evidence, which means, "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The claimant
must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease is brought largely by the
conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and
not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is
probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the
facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchtone.
 CASE NO. 10

38
G.R. No. L-52133 June 23, 1983

NORMA B. NAJERA (deceased) substituted by her husband MANUEL NAJERA, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, respondents.

FACTS:

Norma B. Najera was employed as a ward nurse at the National Orthopedic Hospital on April 1, 1968.
In 1973, she was found suffering from cancer of the cervix (adenocarcinoma) for which she was
operated on. Subsequently, she was given cobalt and radium treatment. The records do not disclose
when she reported back to work, but from June 1975, she was unable to work again. She was
hospitalized on September 16, 1975 for treatment of recto-vaginal fistula, post radiation or the
bleeding and passage of feces through the vagina as a result of cobalt and radium therapy. She
underwent sigmoid colostomy and was discharged from the hospital on October 1, 1975 to recuperate
at home.

Petitioner filed her claim with the GSIS for income, medical and other benefits under PD 626 as
amended. The GSIS disapproved her compensation claim stating that her ailment was not the direct
result of the nature of her duties, nor was the risk of contracting it increased by her working
condition, but was the inevitable consequence of the treatment for adenocarcinoma of the cervical
stump, which is neither an occupational disease and, therefore, not compensable.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that she was afflicted with adenocarcinoma in 1973
before the effectivity of the New Labor Code, and continued to suffer from the same since then that the
nature of her work as a nurse exposed her to all kinds of diseases/infections and irritations which
directly caused/aggravated her illness; and that her ailment, which was already under control,
recurred because of the nature of her work. The GSIS denied reconsideration averring that her
ailment is not peculiar to her type of work as she could have suffered from the same had she been
employed in another field of occupation. Petitioner appealed to respondent Commission.

Petitioner died at the UST Hospital. The cause of her death was "(a) Adenoca cervix. Due to (b) uremia
Due to (c) ureteral occlusion.

The Commission affirmed the decision of the GSIS and dismissed petitioner's claim. It was only on
December 5, 1979 that petitioner's husband, Manuel Najera, allegedly obtained a copy of the
Commission's decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the doctrine of presumption of compensability is still applicable to the petitioner's
claim; (YES)

2. Whether or not petitioner's disability and subsequent death is compensable. (YES)

RULING:

1. The provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, on the presumption of

compensability or presumption of work-connection or work aggravation; waiver of non-
 jurisdictional defense due to non-controversion; and the 10 year prescriptive period apply to

39
the present case.

The fact that Norma was healthy at the time of her employment and that her illness
supervened during the course of employment appear not to have been controverted by her
employer. Hence, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, she was freed from the burden of
proving that her illness was caused or aggravated by the nature of her work. There exists in her
favor the rebuttable presumption of compensability and the burden to overcome such
presumption is shifted to the door of the employer which the latter must do by substantial
evidence but which the employer in this case has failed to do. So rigid is the rule that even
where the cause of the employee's death is unknown the right to compensation subsists , the
reason being that the Workmen's Compensation

2. Under the New Labor Code, Norma's ailment is not listed among the occupational diseases for
which compensation may be granted. However, it is not disputed that she was found suffering
from adenocarcinoma in 1973 in the course of her employment was a ward nurse at the
National Orthopedic Hospital for the treatment of which she underwent cobalt and radium
therapy. She was hospitalized for the second time in 1975 for recto-vaginal fistula, post
radiation, a complication of the cervical cancer and the effect of radiation therapy.

The foregoing data clearly shows that her illness supervened in 1973 so that her cause of
action accrued prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code, or when the Workmen's
Compensation Act was still in fun force and effect. Although she did not file her claim on or
before March 31, 1975 in accordance with Section 4 (b), Rule 11, Book VII of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, it is held that where injury or illness has its onset
prior to January 1, 1975, the same shall be decided under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
and not under the New Labor Code, and the fact that the claim was filed after March 31, 1975
will not bar the application of said law as the prescriptive period of said claim is 10 years, it
being a right founded on statute.
 CASE NO. 11

40
G.R. No. 128523 September 28, 1998

GOVERNMENT SERVICE, INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and ZENAIDA LIWANAG, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent Zenaida Liwanag is the surviving spouse of the late Jamie Liwanag who died on
September 14 1994. He was 48 years old and had served the police force continuously for 17 years. At
the time of his death, he was a Senior Superintendent of the Philippine National Police.
Sometime on August 28, 1994 the late Superintendent Jaime Liwanaag was admitted at Medical
Center of Manila due to complaints of Ascites, Poor Appetite. Despite medical intervention Jaime
Liwanag succumbed to upper GI bleeding cirrhosis secondary to Hepatitis B on September 14 1994 .
As a consequence, private respondent filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System for
compensation benefits. The claim was denied for not being an occupational disease under the law and
neither was the risk of contracting the ailment of the disease increased by his employment as a
member of the full police force.
On appeal, pursuant to Section 5 Rule 18 of PD No. 626, as amended, the Employees Compensation
Commission affirmed the GSIS ruling and ultimately dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the death benefits under Presidential Decree No.
626 (NO)
RULING:
At the outset certain basic postulates governing employees compensation benefits under Presidential
Decree be reviewed. First, said Decree abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory
of aggravation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Second, for the sickness and resulting
disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must prove either the two things: a)That the
sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of the Rules on Employees
Compensation or b) If the sickness is not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was
increased by the claimant's working condition . Third, the claimant must prove this causal relation
between the ailment and working conditions by substantial evidence since the proceeding is taken
before the ECC, an administrative or quasi-judicial body. Within the field of administrative law, while
strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in adducing
evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence
cannot be disregarded. Finally, in case of doubt in construction then interpret interpretation of social
legislation statutes, deliberately of the law in favor of the working man and woman prevails in light of
the Constution’s social justice policy.
It is well to remember that if diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or
recklessly include, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims
of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to
which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for compensation whenever covered
accidents, diseases and deaths occur.
Applying these principles to the instant case, there is no dispute that Hepatitis B, the disease which

41
caused the demise of the decedent, is not listed as an occupational disease under Annex “A” of the
Rules on Employee’s Compensation. As such, private respondent burden of evidence before the ECC
was to prove, by substantial evidence, the causal relationship between her deceased husband's illness
and his working conditions.
The respondent court in reversing the ECC, committed an error of law by misappreciating the legal
standard of what constitutes substantial evidence , and in according full credence to the proceedings
before the PNP board and thus shifting the burden of evidence to petitioner to rebut private
respondents claim when prevents private respondents evidence was sorely wanting to justify the
award of compensation under PD 626 as amended .
 CASE NO. 12

42
G.R. No. 156182 April 13, 2007
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
LUZVIMINDA C. MECAYER, Respondent.
FACTS:
On July 12, 1992, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, P/Chief Inspector Rodelino Peralta, along with
one Mrs. Brenda Bawar, chanced upon SPO2 Mecayer who, while on duty, was then having a drink
with SPO4 Habil Upao, also of said Holding Center. SPO2 Mecayer and SPO4 Upao were in the process
of consuming one (1) bottle of beer each when P/Chief Insp. Peralta warned them, that drinking while
on duty, is prohibited. At this point, Mrs. Bawar butted in, resulting in a heated argument with SPO2
Mecayer. However, P/Chief Insp. Peralta pacified them.
After the lapse of a few minutes, SPO1 Timoteo Bawar, husband of Mrs. Bawar, with whom SPO2 had
an earlier altercation, shot the latter. He was brought to a hospital where he was pronounced dead on
arrival. The cause of death was "hemorrhage as a result of the gunshot wound of the trunk."
On October 12, 2000, the widow of SPO2 Mecayer, Luzviminda C. Mecayer (respondent), filed with
petitioner a claim for compensation benefits under the Employees Compensation Law (P.D. No. 626),
as amended, believing that her husband’s death arose out of and in the course of employment. The
PNP issued a Certification that the death of SPO2 Mecayer was in the line of duty and that all the
benefits due should be given to his legal heirs as provided by law.
The GSIS found SPO2 Mecayer's death as due to a personal grudge on the part of the suspect, SPO1
Bawar, which was not work related and thus not compensable under P.D. No. 626.
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Respondent then filed an appeal with the ECC which dismissed the appeal and affirmed petitioner's
denial of respondent's claim of compensation benefits.
When appealed to the CA, the latter granted its petition. The CA found no substantial evidence on
record to support the ECC finding that SPO2 Mecayer was intoxicated at the time of the contingency.
Thus, respondent never felt the need to refute the alleged intoxication of her husband when she
appealed the decision of petitioner to the ECC. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
the CA.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, must be the
result of accident "arising out of" and in the course of" the employment (YES)
2. Whether or not the State Insurance Fund shall be liable for compensation to the employee or
his dependents, except when the disability or death was occasioned by the employee's
intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or another, notorious negligence, or
otherwise provided (YES)
RULING:
For death to be compensable under P.D. No. 626, as amended, Section 1 (a), Rule III of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation provides:
Section 1. Grounds - (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
 (2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

43
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for
the employer.
It had been established that respondent’s husband, a driver at the PNP Administration Division and
Holding Center, Camp Crame, was in the place where his work required him to be and in the course of
performing his official function when he was shot to death on July 12, 1992. As a driver, SPO2 Mecayer
may not be doing anything the whole day while he was on duty except to wait for his superior's
instructions and yet he was still considered as performing his official function. This is so because drivers
are required to remain on call and subject to orders by his superiors during his duty and could not use his
time effectively and gainfully for his own purposes. Thus, even if SPO2 Mecayer was just waiting around
and in the process of consuming a bottle of beer would not preclude the work-connected character of
his death because he was still performing his official function at the time of his death. In fact, a
certification issued by the PNP showed that SPO2 Mecayer’s death was in the line of duty. Thus, SPO2
Mecayer's death is compensable as it happened right in the place where he was required to be and
while he was on duty notwithstanding the fact that the killing was personal in nature.
In other words, the third person’s criminal intent should be regarded as a supervening cause having
the effect of nullifying the circumstance that, when SPO2 Mecayer was attacked and killed, he was
where his work required him to be and that he was then in the course of performing his official duties.
Also, there was no evidence to sustain the ECC findings that SPO2 Mecayer was intoxicated at the time
of his death and thus not compensable pursuant to Section 1, Rule IV of the Amended Rules of the
Employees’ Compensation Commission, to wit:
Section 1. Limitation — No compensation shall be allowed to the employee or his dependents when
the injury, sickness, disability or death was occasioned by any of the following:
(1) his intoxication;
(2) his willful attention to injure or kill himself or another; or
(3) his notorious negligence.
The ECC failed to show how it arrived at its finding that SPO2 Mecayer was intoxicated at the time of
the contingency. The records show that SPO2 Mecayer and his companion were in the process of
consuming one bottle of beer each which is not a sufficient basis to establish that SPO2 Mecayer had
been affected by such alcohol drink. Considering that his intoxication had not been proven, ECC's
finding that SPO2 Mecayer's intoxication might have emboldened him to engage in a heated argument
with the assailant's wife which triggered the assailant to shoot him is a mere speculation with no
supporting evidence.
It has been held that even if it could be shown that a person drank intoxicating liquor it is incumbent
upon the person invoking drunkenness as a defense to show that said person was extremely drunk.
This is so because a person may take as much as several bottles of beer or several glasses of hard
liquor and still remain sober and unaffected by the alcoholic drink. Thus, intoxication which does not
incapacitate the employee from following his occupation is not sufficient to defeat the recovery of
compensation, although intoxication may be a contributory cause to his injury. It must be shown that
the intoxication was the proximate cause of death or injury and the burden of proof lies on him who
raises drunkenness as a defense. ECC have not established that the state of drunkenness of the
deceased is the proximate cause of his death.
 44
CASE NO. 13

EMELITA ENAO, Petitioner, v. THE EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Respondent.

G.R. No. L-46096 April 15, 1985

FACTS:
On August 1, 1975, appellant (Emelita Enao), a Public School Teacher, together with others, was on
her way from her official station at Sergio Osmeña, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte to Dipolog City. Miss
Enao was on her way home from station when their group was ambushed and fired upon by armed
men hitting her on her forearm and abdomen necessitating operation.

According to appellant’s witnesses, who were members of the ambushed party, she was on her way to
Dipolog City for the purpose of ‘securing supplies and other training and school aids necessary for
furthering services as a school teacher. When the appellant and her group were at barrio de Venta
Perla, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, they were fired upon by a band of armed men believed to be
communist insurgents. As a result of the ambush, the appellant sustained gunshot wounds on her left
forearm and abdomen which compelled her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial
Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975, for surgical removal of foreign bodies (shrapnel) from her left arm
and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 10 to 12, 1975 for definitive treatment. She
also developed interstitial pneumonia as a result.

Thereafter, petitioner sent a notice of claim of injury to the Secretary of Education and Culture. This
claim was not controverted. On the same date, a claim for income benefits for disability was filed by
the herein petitioner with the Government Service Insurance System but this claim was denied on the
ground that the accident happened outside her time and place of work and that she was not in the
performance of her official functions when it happened which was affirmed by the Employees’
Compensation Commission (ECC).

ISSUE: WON Petitioner’s claim for loss of income benefits should be granted? (YES)

RULING:
The Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, which is a Friday, from her station at
the Municipality of Sergio Osmeña, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte, intended to procure supplies and other
training aids which are needed facilities in connection with her services as a school teacher at the
Wilbon Primary School, cannot be at all disputed. The companions of the Petitioner at the time of the
ambush and who appear to be co-teachers of the Petitioner, namely: Francisco L. Podol and Juanita
Adanza, have attested in their respective affidavits that they and the Petitioner were at that time on
their way to Dipolog City "for the purpose of securing supplies and other training and school aids
necessary for the furtherance of their services as school teachers." There is no mention at all in the
decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission that this particular assertion has been at all
contradicted or controverted by any evidence whatsoever submitted to the Commission by the GSIS.

Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any evidence, then such statements of appellant’s witnesses would
suffice to establish that the multiple gunshot wounds and injuries sustained by appellant and which
caused her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1, to 6, 1975 for
removal of shrapnels from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 1 to

45
12, 1975, are definitely work-connected.

Furthermore, the fact that Dipolog City is also the residence of the Petitioner does not at all, by this
singular circumstance, render untrue or false the clear evidence submitted in this case that Petitioner
and her co-teachers were proceeding to Dipolog City at the true to purchase needed supplies and
other training and school aids. That Dipolog City happened to be also the Petitioner’s place of
residence, in this instance, becomes simply incidental and/or purely coincidental.

As it can be rightfully ruled that the Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing her official
functions, it hardly matters then whether such task which Petitioner was then engaged in or
discharging, happened outside the regular working hours and not in the Petitioner’s place of work. It
is rather obvious that in proceeding to purchase school materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would
necessarily have to leave the school premises and her travel need not be during her usual working
hours. What is significant and controlling is that the injuries she sustained are work-connected, which
the Court finds to be so.
TOPIC: THE PERSONAL COMFORT DOCTRINE

46
CASE NO. 1

LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-19742 January 31, 1964

FACTS:

Antonio Cordero was employed as a sailor on a barge of the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. His duty was
to look after the safety of the barge and its cargo especially in the absence of the patron. On September
11, 1956, Cordero, having been requested by the patron to take over, was left alone in charge of the
barge. Two days later his lifeless body was found floating in the Pasig river by the Manila Police
Department.

The deceased's widow filed a formal claim for compensation which was referred to a hearing officer
who, after hearing, rendered decision ordering the company to pay to claimant death benefits in the
amount of P2,912.00, to reimburse the claimant the amount of P200.00 as burial expenses, to pay
attorney's fees in the amount of P218.40, and the sum of P35.00 as fees of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission Office.

The company filed a petition for reconsideration based on three grounds: (a) there was no causal
connection between Cordero's death and his employment as a sailor; (b) Cordero's death was due to
his own negligence.

The Workmen's Compensation Commission affirmed the decision in toto; hence the present petition
for review.

It is contended by petitioner that Cordero died not in the course of employment, or that his death did
not arise out of it, because at the time of his death he was swimming with some companions in the
Pasig river and as a consequence he was drowned and his lifeless body was found floating on the
surface of the river. Hence, petitioner claims, his heirs are not entitled to the compensation prescribed
by law.

ISSUE: WON the widow is entitled to death benefits? (YES)

RULING:

While in the strict sense death caught up with Cordero when he was not in the barge where he is
supposed to be for 24 hours watching and taking care of it but swimming with some companions
somewhere in the Pasig river near where the barge was moored, it may be said that he died in line of
duty for he was then undertaking something that is necessary to his personal need and comfort since
the taking of bath is not only habitual in a sailor but necessary to the human body. He went swimming
not for pleasure, not for fun, but in answer to the daily need nature, in the same manner as a human
being needs to answer other calls, such as eating, sleeping and the like. When these needs are satisfied
in the course of employment and something takes place that may cause injury, harm or death to the
employee or laborer, it is fair and logical that the happening be considered as one occurring in the
course of employment for under the circumstances it cannot be undertaken in any other way. The
situation would be different if the mishap occurs in a manner that it may clearly show that the laborer
has acted beyond his duty or course of employment. Not so in this case.
Neither can it be contended that in going out with some companions to swim the deceased is guilty of

47
notorious negligence for the reason that if his purpose was to take a bath he could have done it with
the aid of a water tank on board the barge. If the deceased were one who does not know how to swim
or is not a sailor accustomed to the perils of the water, the argument may have some value but not so
in the case of the deceased who undisputable was a swimmer. He must have preferred to take a bath
while swimming than by pouring water over his body on board the barge because of his awareness
that he was swimmer and for him to swim in a river was merely routine. And if he died in the course
thereof it must be due to an event that he has not foreseen. At any rate there is no clear evidence that
his death was due to his notorious negligence and not to a cause which he could not have reasonably
avoided.
TOPIC: THE GOING TO AND COMING FROM PLACE OF WORK DOCTRINE

48
CASE NO. 1

EXALTACION VDA. DE TORBELA, Petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Public Schools), Respondents.
G.R. No. L-42627 February 21, 1980

FACTS:
Jose P. Torbela, Sr. in his lifetime, was employed as a Secondary School Principal of the Bureau of
Public Schools. He died on March 3. 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock a.m. due to injuries sustained by him in
a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal is located. In his
possession at the time of the accident were official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on
the eve of his death.

The petitioner, Exaltacion Vda. de Torbela, wife of the deceased filed a claim for compensation with
Regional Office VII, Workmen's Compensation Unit and the Government Service Insurance System.
The claim was denied by the Government Service Insurance System on the ground that the death of
Jose P. Torbela, Sr. was not the result of an employment accident.

The claimant, petitioner herein, appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission which
affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System.

ISSUE: WON the claim is compensable? (YES)

RULING:
When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while
he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his
employment.

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to
injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City,
where he lived, to Hinigaran. Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was
and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in
his residence on the eve of his death.

The claim is compensable.

 49
CASE NO. 2

G.R. No. 136200, June 8, 2000

CELERINO VALERIANO, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

FACTS: Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver. Sometime on the evening of July 3,
1985, petitioner was standing along Santolan Road, Quezon City, when he met a friend by the name of
Alexander Agawin. They decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA, Quezon City, for dinner.

On their way home at around 9:30 PM, the owner-type jeepney they were riding in figured in a head-
on collision with another. Due to the strong impact of the collision, petitioner was thrown out of the
vehicle and was severely injured. As a result of the mishap, petitioner was brought to several hospitals
for treatment.

On September 16, 1985, he filed a claim for income benefits under PD 626, with the Government
Security Insurance Service. His claim for benefits was opposed on the ground that the injuries he
sustained did not directly arise or result from the nature of his work. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the denial by the System but the same was turned down on the ground that the
condition for compensability had not been satisfied.

Petitioner then interposed an appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC for short).
ECC ruled against appellant stating that the injuries appellant sustained from the accident did not
arise out of [and] in the course of his employment.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the finding of the Employees' Compensation Commission that
petitioner's injuries and disability were not compensable, emphasizing that they were not work-
connected.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's injuries are compensable. (NO)

RULING: NO. Valeriano’s injuries are non-compensable.

The two components of the coverage formula - "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" -
are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied; however, it should not be
forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed
in the word “work-connection”, because an uncompromising insistence of an independent
application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected
injuries. The words “arising out of” refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of
its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under
which the accident takes place.

As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment"
when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee may
reasonably be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.

Thus, for injury to be compensable, the standard of "work connection" must be substantially
satisfied. The injury and the resulting disability sustained by reason of employment are
compensable regardless of the place where the injured occurred, if it can be proven that at the
time of the injury, the employee was acting within the purview of his or her employment and
performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto.
 50
Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver was related
to the injuries he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and
social function - having dinner with some friends - is clear from the records of the case.

Valeriano’s contention, citing the Hinoguin and Nitura cases, that the 24-hour doctrine be applied to
his case since the exigency of his job demand it to be so was held untenable by the Court. The Court
did not find any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a firetruck driver.
Applying the principle laid down in the Alegre case, the 24-hour doctrine is not meant to embrace
all acts and circumstances of an employee though he be on active “on call” duty. Valeriano was
neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met the
accident. He was also not doing an act within his duty and authority as a firetruck driver, or any other
act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. In fact, he was pursuing a purely personal
and social function when the accident happened. The accident not work-connected was,
therefore, non-compensable.
 51
TOPIC: SPECIAL ENGAGEMENT DOCTRINE

CASE NO. 1

G.R. No. L-20137 March 31, 1964

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. FRANCISCO AMIL and WORKMEN’S

COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Respondents.

FACTS: Francisco Amil entered the services of the respondent on June 1, 1955. He worked as a
mechanic in the North Harbor Equipment Depot one of the branch offices of the Bureau of Public
Highways. The bureau in 1959, thru the initiative of the Newsette, its official publication, promoted a
summer basketball tournament which was participated in by. the "bonafide employees of the division
or units of the Bureau whose headquarters of station is in the central office, Manila". The basketball
league was under the control and supervision of a three-man committee which prescribed the rules
and regulations governing the games.

In one of the games played, particularly in April 16, 1959 between the Equipment Division and the
Auditing Division, Francisco Amil, a member of the first mentioned basketball quintet, sustained
an injury of the left knee when Ms attempt to shoot the ball in the basket was foiled by one of
the players of the opposing team.

The game was played inside the respondent's premises during office hours. The following day he was
brought to the National Orthopedic Hospital, where he was given medical treatment, including
physical theraphy, three times a week until he was confined at the same hospital on August 18, 1959.

ISSUE: Whether or not the injury suffered by the claimant while playing basketball in the premises of
the office can be considered as an injury that arose out of, and in the course of, the employment and
therefore COMPENSABLE. (YES)

RULING: YES. This is not a case of an employer possibly permitting the use of space or equipment by
his employees, on their own time and for their own purposes and amusement, but of an employer
actively promoting competitive games during Working hours, as a matter of policy, thereby
voluntarily increasing the chances of injury to the employees, in order to improve labor
relations, build up good will or common benefit, lessen friction, and avoid excessive labor
turnover. Consequently, the participation in the games could legitimately be regarded as an
incident in claimant's employment, and his injury in the course thereof becomes compensable.

In the present case, as we have seen, the games were played in the office premises at 2:00 and 3:00
p.m.; and these we're working hours on April 16, 1959, since only the people in the central office (and
claimant was not one of them) who observed the half-day session (t.s.n., p. 4, Rec, p. 104). The playing
hours were set in a circular (Exhibit G, Rec. p. 96) approved by Commissioner Cuenca (whose
signature appears on the circular), and who was scheduled to award the trophies (Exhibit C). These
circumstances refute the appellant's charge that the games were not authorized.
TOPIC: THE SPECIAL ERRAND DOCTRINE

52
CASE NO.1

G.R. No. 89217, Sept. 4, 1991

JUANITA NITURA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT

INSURANCE SYSTEM (PHILIPPINE ARMY), respondents

FACTS: In the evening of March 2, 1986, Pfc Regino S. Nitura was instructed to go to San Jose, Dipolog
City to check on several personnel of the Command who were then attending a dance party. On his
way back to the camp, he fell from a hanging wooden bridge connecting Barangay San Jose, Dipolog
City and Barangay Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, his head hitting the stony portion of
the ground.

Petitioner filed a death claim for compensation benefits with the GSIS. However, it was denied on the
ground that the condition for compensability, that the injury and the resulting disability or death must
be the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, has not been satisfied.
Her request for reconsideration was likewise denied on the ground that her son was not at his place of
work nor performing his official function as a PA soldier when the accident occurred.

The ECC affirmed the denial of petitioner’s claim by the GSIS.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of Pfc. Nitura is compensable. (YES)

RULING: YES. The concept of a “work place” referred to cannot always be literally applied to a soldier
in active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a
clerk in a particular fixed office. A soldier must go where his company is stationed.

In the case at bar, Pfc. Nitura’s station was at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, but then his
presence at the site of the accident was with the permission of his superior officer having been
directed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. In carrying out said directive, he had to pass by
the hanging bridge which connects the two places. As held in the Hinoguin case, a place where
soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking,
from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer.

A soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to
military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his
superior officers at all times, 7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status.
Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and
unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on an approved vacation leave.
Even vacation leaves may, it must be remembered, be preterminated by superior orders.

In the instant case, the deceased was neither on vacation leave nor on an overnight pass when the
incident occurred. In fact, he was directed by his superior to check on several personnel of the
command then attending the dance party, as attested to by his Battalion Commander. Hence, since Pfc.
Nitura was not on vacation leave, he did not effectively cease performing “official function
 53
TOPIC: THE DOING WORK AT HOME DOCTRINE

Case No. 1

G.R. No. 90267 December 21, 1993

PERLITA LOPEZ vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Facts

Petitioner's late husband, Pedro Lopez, was employed as a public school teacher at the Urdaneta
National High School, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. A memorandum was issued to Pedro Lopez by the head
of the school's Science Department designating him to prepare the MODEL DAM, UNHS official entry to
the forthcoming Division Search for Outstanding Improvised Secondary Science Equipment for
Teachers. Lopez complied with his superior's instruction and constructed an improvised electric
micro-dam, which he took home to enable him to finish it before the deadline. On May 27, 1987, at
around 6:30 A.M., while he was engrossed in his project, he in contact with a live wire was
electrocuted. He was immediately brought to a clinic for emergency treatment but was pronounced
dead on arrival.

Petitioner then filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS, which was denied on the ground that her
husband's death did not arise out and in the course of employment. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. She then elevated the case to the ECC for review, which affirmed
the decision rendered by the GSIS and dismissed the same. Hence, the present petition.

Issues

1. WON the cause of death of petitioner's husband is work connected

2. WON the death of petitioner’s husband is compensable

Ruling

1. Yes.

An injury or accident befalls a man "in the course of" his employment, if it occurs while
he is doing what a man may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed, and at a
place where he may reasonably be during the time. And it "arises out of" the work of the
employer, when it results from a risk or reasonably inherent in or incidental to the conduct of
such work or business.

Here, while the death of Pedro Lopez took place in his house and not in his official work
station, which is the school, he was still discharging his function as the one in-charge of the
project. He was constrained to finish the project within a specific period of time and he could
only do so if he worked overtime in his house. The death of petitioner's husband is service-
connected even if it happened during the summer vacation. He was still under the employ of
the government and there still existed an employer-employee relationship although teachers
do not report for duty during that period.

2. Yes.
 For an injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be

54
the result of an employment accident, satisfying all the following conditions: (a) The employee
must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) The employee must
have been performing his official functions; and (c) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
employee must have been executing an order from its superior. The said rule requires that the
injury must have been sustained by the employee at "the place where his work requires him to
be" and if the injury is sustained elsewhere the employees "must have been executing an order
from his superior." Here, inasmuch as Lopez had to finish the project on the time for the
contest scheduled on October 5 and 9, 1987, it can be implied that Lopez was given permission,
if not direction, to perform his work at his house.

For an injury to be compensable it is not important that the cause therefor shall have
taken place within the purview of his employment, performing an act reasonably necessary or
incidental thereto, the injury sustained by reason thereof falls within the protection of the law
regardless of the place of injury. Here, respondent ECC cannot rely on the fact that Lopez had
been ordered by the school principal to report for duty to assist in the enrollment of the fourth-
year students on the day of the accident. Lopez was electrocuted at 6:30 A.M. while he was
working on the model he was asked to build. To claim that he should have been in school at the
time he died in order to entitle his widow any compensation benefits, is to strain good sense
and logic.
 55
TOPIC: THE SHUTTLE BUS DOCTRINE/
THE MINGLING OF PURPOSE DOCTRINE/
THE 24-HOUR DUTY DOCTRINE

Case No. 1

G.R. No. 84307 April 17, 1989

CIRIACO HINOGUIN vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

Facts

Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his Detachment, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes
Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain Frankie Z. Besas, Commanding Officer of "A" Company to go
on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, "to settle an important matter thereat." Captain Besas
orally granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take their issued firearms with them,
considering that Aritao was regarded as "a critical place " that is, it had peace and order problems due
to the presence of elements of the New People's Army (NPA) in or in the vicinity of Aritao. Three
hours later, the soldiers return to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle, presumably a
motor-driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab while Dft.
Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching the poblacion of Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog
dismounted, walked towards and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand,
not noticing that the rifle's safety lever was on semi automatic (and not on "safety"). He accidentally
touched the trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then still sitting in the
cab, in the left lower abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently realize immediately that he had been
hit; he took three (3) steps forward, cried that he had been hit and fell to the ground. His companions
rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, for treatment. Sgt. Hinoguin was
later moved to the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City and there he died.

Petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits claiming that the death of his son was work-
connected and therefore compensable. This was denied by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner's
son was not at his work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time
of his death. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Motion was, however, denied by the
GSIS. This denial was confirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Hence, the present
petition.

Issue

1. WON Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin was performing official functions

2. WON the death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin is compensable

Ruling

1. Yes.
 It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is really on 24

56
hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a
day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week,
except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not).

Here, the work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was not
effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to the
home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively
cease performing "official functions" because he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow
soldier's home for a few hours for a meal and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he
was nonetheless in the course of performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us that
a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and
unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an approved
vacation leave.

2. Yes.

For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must
be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following grounds: (1) The
employee must have been injured at the place work requires him to be; (2) The employee must
have been performing his official functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
employee must have been executing an order for the employer. It will be seen that because the
Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply to all kinds of employment, such rules
must be read and applied with reasonable flexibility and comprehensiveness. The concept of a
"work place" referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a
soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line
in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his
company is stationed.
In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.
Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt.
Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to
proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured
lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they
are required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an
overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave.
Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably
they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to
and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might
encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to
or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA
bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the
death a compensable one.
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CASE NO. 2

G.R. No. L-66129 January 17, 1986

CARMELITA DE LA REA vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM

Facts

The late Mauricio de la Rea enlisted in the Philippine Navy on October 3, 1972 and re-enlisted every
three years thereafter. On May 15, 1982, he was granted his rest and recreation order, or what is
commonly known as vacation leave, for fifteen (15) days, from May 15, to May 30, 1982, for the
purpose of undergoing physical examination relative to his re-enlistment in the Philippine Navy.
While enjoying his rest and recreation privileges at his hometown in Halang, Amadeo, Cavite, he was
shot to death for unknown motive by a certain Pepito Montoya who is also a resident of the same
place. Mauricio de la Rea died instantly from gunshot wounds he sustained.

Herein petitioner filed a claim for compensation benefits which was later on denied by the GSIS.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above letter denial which was likewise denied. On Appeal to
respondent ECC, the latter rendered the questioned sustaining the denial of petitioner's claim for
compensation benefits primarily because the death of Mauricio de la Rea emanated from factors
which are not work-connected. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue

WON the death of Mauricio de la Rea is compensable

Ruling

No.

For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the
result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: (1) The employee must
have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; (2) The employee must have been
performing his official functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have
been executing an order for the employer.

In the case before us, the required conditions are wanting. There is also no submission that the
above rules are unconstitutional or invalid. Mauricio de la Rea was not at the time and place where his
work required him to be; neither was he performing official functions nor was he executing an order
for his employer at the time he was slain. In other words, his death is not work-related. Mauricio de la
Rea was undisputedly on vacation leave in his hometown in Halang, Amadeo, Cavite when after
alighting from a jeepney, he was shot twice by a certain Pepito Montoya with a .45 caliber pistol. The
motive behind the killing was unknown, The records do not even show, much less was evidence
presented that the death which befell the petitioner's husband arose as an incident to the
performance of his duties in the Philippine Navy or that the same arose from the perils of his work. In
the absence of such causal-connection, especially under the present law on employees' compensation,
the claim cannot be granted.
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