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“In this updated edition, Gentilin has refected on the events of the past few years
and provided us with a deeper, more expansive understanding of governance failures
within institutions. By doing so, he has taken the exploration of ethical challenges in
business to a completely new level.”
Lindsay Tanner, Australian Minister for Finance 2007–2010
“If you liked the frst edition of The Origins of Ethical Failures, then you MUST read
this largely revised edition. Gentilin has gone back to the drawing board to review
the research and recent industry developments, including case studies that emerged
from the Hayne Royal Commission. His readable style brings to life rigorous
research fndings and presents the case for a less idealistic and more hardnosed focus
on institutional arrangements.This is a fascinating and challenging account of why
people behave badly at work and what can be done about it.”
Professor Elizabeth Sheedy, Macquarie Business School
“Gentilin provides a challenging narrative for those of us who commit our profes-
sional lives to promoting ethics and governance. By drawing our attention to our
capacity to err, he builds a compelling argument that ethics codes, although necessary,
are not sufcient. To make ethical conduct a reality, leaders must ‘focus obsessively’
on putting in place ‘institutional arrangements’ that support the pledges within
these foundational documents. This book is a must-read for leaders, regulators and
students who are serious about creating lasting positive change.”
Cris Parker, Director,The Banking and Finance Oath
“The Origins of Ethical Failures ofers the reader a range of powerful insights into
what drives misconduct in fnancial service institutions. Ethics, culture, economic
incentives, public and private governance and group dynamics in big organisa-
tions are all dissected to draw the reader to the inevitable conclusion that there is
no one silver bullet for solving this problem. Rather, the answer lies in examining
the insights gained from a range of disciplines and drawing the threads together,
something that Gentilin does well. I commend this book to anyone seeking a more
holistic understanding of ethical failure.”
Helen Bird, Senior Lecturer, Swinburne Law School
“Gentilin knows the research, and the theory, but more importantly – he has lived
and exemplifed the reality. If you want to be a better professional, and to be a better
professional organisational leader with credibility, you will buy and read this book.”
A. J. Brown, Professor of Public Policy & Law, Grifth University;
Board member,Transparency International
The Origins of Ethical Failures
In this thoroughly updated new edition of his ground-breaking and award-winning

book, Dennis Gentilin draws on both his personal experience as a well-known
whistleblower and recent events in the Australian fnancial services industry to
provide insights into how widespread, systemic ethical failure can take hold in an
industry and, crucially, what leaders need to focus on to avoid it.
In 2001, as a young university graduate, Dennis Gentilin became a member of
an FX trading desk at one of Australia’s largest banks, the National Australia Bank.
In the years that followed, the desk became involved in a trading scandal that
resulted in the resignation of the chairman and CEO, the collapse of the board,
signifcant fnancial loss and incalculable reputational damage. Over the past decade,
the frequency of ethical failure within the Australian fnancial services industry
has only increased. Among other failures, there have been multiple breaches of
the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act, rigging of
the benchmark BBSW interest rate, mis-selling of consumer credit insurance and
predatory sales practices. In this new edition, Gentilin draws on experimental
research from economics and fnance to illustrate how, when the conditions are
permissive, humans have a predisposition towards dishonesty, and therefore, to
reduce the likelihood of ethical failure, leaders must focus obsessively on putting in
place appropriate institutional arrangements.
Gentilin’s combination of intellectual rigour and real-life refections makes this
book a must-read for students, practitioners and leaders alike who would like to
develop a deeper understanding of corporate ethics, governance and conduct.
Dennis Gentilin is a risk and governance professional with over 20 years’

experience in the banking and fnance industry. A unique experience early in his
career in which he was publicly named as a “whistleblower” was the catalyst for
his strong interest in ethics, conduct and culture. He has contributed articles to
The Australian Financial Review and The Australian on these topics and is invited to
lecture at some of Australia’s leading business schools. Dennis currently works with
UniSuper, one of Australia’s largest superannuation funds.
The Origins of Ethical Failures
Lessons for Leaders
SECOND EDITION
Dennis Gentilin
Designed cover image: Getty Images / erhui1979
Second edition published 2023

by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2023 Dennis Gentilin
The right of Dennis Gentilin to be identifed as author of this work has been
asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from
the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or

registered trademarks, and are used only for identifcation and
explanation without intent to infringe.
First edition published by Routledge 2016
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Gentilin, Dennis, author.
Title: The origins of ethical failures: lessons for leaders / Dennis Gentilin.
Description: Second edition. | Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge,
2023. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifers: LCCN 2022032286 (print) | LCCN 2022032287 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Business ethics. | Organizational behavior—Moral and
ethical aspects. | Professional ethics. | Leadership.
Classifcation: LCC HF5387 .G465 2023 (print) | LCC HF5387 (ebook) |
DDC 174/.4—dc23/eng/20220707
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022032286
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022032287
ISBN: 978-1-032-33456-1 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-032-36832-0 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-33536-8 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003335368
Typeset in Bembo
by codeMantra
To my wife and daughters, who provide corporate ethics with the necessary context.
Contents
Preface xi
List of acronyms xiii
Introduction 1
References 13
1 Our fawed humanity 17
Are humans honest? 21
Fee-for-no-service scandal 32
Lessons for leaders 37
References 37
2 Incentives 41
Are incentives effective? 45
Balanced scorecards 48
Long-term incentives 57
The role of public institutions 61
References 68
ix
Contents
3 Accountability 71
Does accountability promote ethical behaviour? 74
A failure of self-regulation 82
References 99
4 Group dynamics 102
Leadership 103
Group norms 111
Whistleblowing 115
References 128
Conclusion: What are the lessons for leaders? 131
It starts at the top 133
What about purpose? 137
Don’t forget ethical followership 139
Finally 140
References 141
Index 143
x
Preface
For a variety of reasons, this edition was a long time in the making. A failed collabo-
ration, a global pandemic and work commitments all caused me to continually revise and
push back the anticipated completion date. But I was determined to produce a largely
reviewed and improved version of the frst edition. In addition to my understanding of
the issues having evolved, a lot has happened since it was published in early 2016.
The book benefted from the opinions provided by a range of reviewers.What was
a nine-chapter manuscript was pared back to what you are currently reading. Due to
their input, the book is now far easier to read and a more faithful second edition. I am
deeply appreciative to them for not only reading earlier versions (that were far more
difcult to consume) but for also taking the time to provide valuable feedback.
I would also like to thank countless friends who have been patient and supportive
as I have worked on this project; my employers, both past and present, who have
also shown tremendous support and allowed me to pursue my interests in ethics,
governance and writing; and my family, who have had to tolerate a dad and husband
spending a lot of his spare time with his head buried in a laptop.
This edition represents a paradigm shift of sorts for me. In the frst edition, I placed
far more faith in our capacity for honesty. In this edition I am more circumspect,
placing greater emphasis on our capacity to err (especially when the conditions are
permissive). Ultimately, the evidence was too overwhelming.What does not change
is the central role of leadership, albeit the lessons for leaders have evolved.
Like the frst edition, my primary goal is to educate. I hope that students and
emerging leaders (and perhaps current leaders) across the private and public sectors
fnd something of value within this book.
Dennis Gentilin
9 June 2022
xi
Acronyms
ADI authorised deposit-taking institution

AMP Australian Mutual Provident Society
ANAO Australian National Audit Ofce
ANZ Australia and New Zealand Banking Group
APRA Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission
ASX Australian Securities Exchange
AUD Australian dollar
AUSTRAC Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
BBSW bank bill swap rate
BEAR Bank Executive Accountability Regime
BS balanced scorecard
CBA Commonwealth Bank of Australia
CEO chief executive ofcer
CG compliance gateway
CHF Swiss Franc
CRO chief risk ofcer
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EUR Euro
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board
FoFA Future of Financial Advice
FP fxed pairs
FR fxed remuneration
FSB Financial Stability Board
xiii
Acronyms
FX foreign exchange
LIBOR London Interbank Ofered Rate
LTI long-term incentive
LTIP long-term incentive plan
MLC Mutual Life and Citizens Assurance Company Limited
NAB National Australia Bank
NEPA Norwegian Environmental Protection Agency
OSC Open Science Collaboration
PIO principal integrity ofcer
PWC PricewaterhouseCoopers
R&D research and development
RP random pairs
SRO self-regulating organisation
STI short-term incentive
WBC Westpac Banking Corporation
WWTW Whistling While They Work
xiv
Introduction
Doubt is not a pleasant condition, but certainty is absurd.

Oeuvres Complètes de Voltaire (translated from p. 703,Voltaire, 1817)
As the readers of the frst edition of this book are aware, the experience that was the
catalyst for my interest in ethics, governance and conduct was the foreign exchange
(FX) trading scandal that rocked the National Australia Bank (NAB) in 2004. The
incident, which resulted in the ofending traders receiving custodial sentences and
the resignations of the then chairman and chief executive ofcer (CEO), cost the
NAB AUD 360 million.Although marginal by international standards, it remains the
largest incident of its kind in Australia (Rafeld, Fritz-Morgenthal & Posch, 2020).
It followed the typical trajectory associated with trading scandals. Although
initially nominal, the losses being concealed mounted. When a method to conceal
losses is discovered and deployed, it is very difcult to put that genie back in the
bottle. As the losses mounted, so too did the size of the position taken to try to
recoup them. Wash, rinse, repeat. It all gets very ugly, very quickly. I was publicly
named as one of the whistleblowers in the scandal and like most whistleblowers,
spent the years that followed in deep refection.
Among the questions I pondered, one was “Why?” Specifcally, why do ethical
failures happen? And why will they continue to happen? One of my motivations
for writing the frst edition of this book was to provide plausible responses to these
questions.The FX trading scandal provided me with some extraordinary insights. I
felt that by combining those insights with the research in the behavioural sciences,
I could ofer a unique perspective on the origins of ethical failure.
In many ways the exercise proved successful.The book received plaudits, a prize,
and was endorsed by some prominent individuals. But as the years passed an urge
DOI: 10.4324/9781003335368-1 1
Introduction
arose to write a second (and hopefully improved) edition. There were primarily
two reasons for this urge.The frst was the Royal Commission into Misconduct in
the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (hereafter the Royal
Commission). The second was a review of the book written by Professor Andreas
Ortmann from the University of New South Wales Business School (Ortmann,
2018).
The Royal Commission was established in December 2017, just under two years
after the frst edition of this book was published. Those who read the frst edition
would have recognised that at the time of its publication, I felt that the Australian
fnancial services industry was at a crisis point. Given what has transpired since,
this observation has not aged well. At that point in time, we were still enjoying
pre-dinner drinks with respect to ethical failures in the banking and fnance industry.
In the short period between the book’s publication and the announcement of the
Royal Commission, there were a range of signifcant, high-profle ethical failures, as
the following examples attest.
The rigging of the bank bill swap rate (BBSW), Australia’s benchmark interest
rate, frst hit the headlines in 2017. It had many parallels with the London Interbank
Ofered Rate (LIBOR) scandal which swept through the Northern Hemisphere a
few years earlier. Australia’s four major banks were charged with market manipu-
lation and unconscionable conduct. The NAB (Dunkeley & Danckert, 2017),
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) (Yeates, 2018) and Australia and New
Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) (Danckert & Yeates, 2017) agreed to pay combined
fnes of AUD 125 million. Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC) contested the
charges with some success, although they were still found to have behaved uncon-
scionably (Danckert, 2018).
Although it did not result in similar penalties, the scandal that besieged
CommInsure (the CBA’s insurance arm) was highly symbolic as it captured the
public’s attention. Unlike many of the prior governance failures, it vividly demon-
strated how misconduct in the fnancial services industry can have real impacts
on real people. Former CommInsure chief medical ofcer turn whistleblower
Dr Benjamin Koh went to the media to reveal how CommInsure used technicalities
in insurance contracts to avoid making payouts to clients. Listening to victims tell
their story on Four Corners, one of the national broadcaster’s fagship documentary
programs, made for uncomfortable viewing (Ferguson, 2016).
Arguably the most signifcant incident was the breaches of the Anti-Money
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) by the CBA. In August
2
Introduction
2017, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) issued
a statement of claim that alleged the CBA breached the Act on no fewer than
53,000 occasions (Yeates, 2017a). The breaches involved a failure to properly
monitor and report a range of suspicious customer deposits made through “intel-
ligent deposit machines”, some of which were associated with organised crime and
terrorism activity.The enormity of the incident resulted in the Australian Prudential
Regulation Authority (APRA) announcing an independent review of the CBA, the
frst of its kind (Yeates, 2017b).
These incidents (and others) only served to amplify the already raucous calls
for some form of government inquiry into the sector. Then Prime Minister
Malcolm Turnbull and his ruling Liberal-National Government, who were
resisting the mounting public pressure, eventually capitulated after the chairs
and CEOs of the four major banks sent an e-mail to the then Treasurer Scott
Morrison requesting “a properly constituted inquiry” (Gartrell & Bagshaw,
2017). As outlined in Box I.1, what followed was further revelations of
serious wrongdoing, causing many members of the government to publicly
acknowledge the error in their earlier judgment that there was no need for an
inquiry (Grattan, 2018).
The evidence presented at the Royal Commission made me seriously question
some of my views on both the causes of ethical failure but also the possible remedies.
The frst edition of the book spoke about the important role of leadership and how
by articulating “a meaningful social purpose for their organisations that is under-
pinned by a virtuous set of values” (p. 99, Gentilin, 2016), leaders could draw on
human nature’s capacity for honesty. Elements of this remain true but the evidence
emerging from the Royal Commission, coupled with recent research emerging
from experimental economics, demonstrates that in some important ways it is also
misguided.
In addition to drawing attention to the above issue, in his review of the frst
edition of the book Ortmann (2018) highlighted the shortcomings associated
with the research referenced to support some of the conclusions drawn. Research
emanating from the behavioural sciences, and in particularly from psychology,
has come under signifcant criticism in recent times. Although the reckoning has
gathered apace over the past few years, it could be argued that the canary in the coal
mine was a famous article written by John Ioannidis in 2005 which claimed that
for a range of reasons, many research fndings across a range of felds are spurious
(Ioannidis, 2005).This proved to be prescient.
3
Introduction
Box I.1 The Royal Commission into misconduct in the banking,

superannuation and fnancial services industry
Although there had been calls for some type of inquiry into Australia’s fnancial
services industry for many years (as early as 2014), the spate of governance
failures during 2016 and 2017 placed increasing pressure on the former
Liberal-National Coalition Government to establish a Royal Commission.
During 2017, with government members threatening to cross the foor and
support the then opposition Labor Party in calling for a Royal Commission, it
seemed to be a foregone conclusion. Perhaps recognising this and the damage
all of the speculation was doing to the industry, the chairs and CEOs of the
four major banks sent an email to the then Treasurer Scott Morrison on
30 November 2017 stating, inter alia (Gartrell & Bagshaw, 2017):
We now ask you and your government to act to ensure a properly consti-
tuted inquiry into the fnancial services sector is established to put an end
to the uncertainty and restore trust, respect and confdence.
Then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced the establishment of a

Royal Commission shortly thereafter and former High Court judge Kenneth
Hayne was appointed as the commissioner. The terms of reference provided
him with authority to investigate misconduct that was not only illegal but fell
below “community standards and expectations” (Commonwealth of Australia,
2017). As part of his inquiry, Commissioner Hayne was also asked to ascertain
whether wrongdoing was attributable to “particular culture and governance
practices” or “other practices, including risk management, recruitment and
remuneration practices”. In addition, any conduct that was being “dealt with
by another inquiry or investigation or a criminal or civil proceeding” was
disqualifed (ruling out many notable incidents).
Despite this latter requirement, the extent of what was revealed surprised
and shocked many, including me. The majority of the wrongdoing occurred
within the wealth sector of the industry and to a lesser extent, within the retail
banking sector. Even then, the wrongdoing involved the use of dubious sales
practices by retail bankers to push wealth products onto customers. As will
be described in Chapter One, the banking sector made a raft of acquisitions
4
Introduction
in the wealth sector around the turn of the twentieth century. Many of these
assets were acquired at signifcant premiums, with one of the justifcations for
the infated purchase prices being the promise of “cross sell” (a big driver of
the dubious sales practices).
The product that was at the centre of the majority of these sales practices
was consumer credit insurance, insurance products that were “added on” to
the sale of a home loan, personal loan or credit card. In theory, consumer
credit insurance was supposed to provide customers with protection when life
circumstances resulted in them no longer being able to fulfl their obligations
under their loan or credit card contracts. In one of the case studies examined,
the CBA sold consumer credit insurance to customers who were never eligible
to make a claim under the agreement as they did not fulfl certain employment
eligibility criteria (in some cases they were not employed and were receiving
social security benefts).
Another source of wrongdoing was inappropriate fnancial advice. In many
ways, the revelations associated with this conduct were not surprising as it
has been a known problem in the Australian fnancial services industry for
some years. In 2014, the Senate Economics Reference Committee investi-
gated an incident within the fnancial planning division of the CBA where
so-called “rogue” fnancial planners engaged in a range of inappropriate
behaviour, including the overcharging of fees, forging signatures and creating
unauthorised investment accounts (Ferguson & Vadelago, 2013). Although
arguably not as egregious, the misconduct exposed at the Royal Commission
primarily involved dubious sales practices (for example, churning products or
selling products that clearly were not in the customer’s best interest).
The most startling revelation was the fee-for-no-service scandal, an incident
that will be described in greater detail in Chapter One. In short, the scandal
involved institutions debiting fees from customers’ investment or superan-
nuation accounts on the promise of providing a service (typically some form
of review) which was subsequently not delivered. The incident frst came to
the public’s attention in 2015 when the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC) announced it would commence an investigation into
the conduct. The following year they announced that over 27,000 customers
had been compensated approximately AUD 23.7 million for the conduct.
5
Introduction
This fgure has subsequently blown out to over AUD 1.2 billion (Australian
Securities and Investments Commission, 2021).
In some circles, there have been criticisms of the Royal Commission. For
example, some have questioned whether the inquiry addressed the root cause
of the wrongdoing it exposed, such as why the system prioritises shareholders
(and in many cases, the employees within institutions) ahead of customers.
Others have questioned whether the way in which the inquiry was conducted,
whereby a small number of case studies were handpicked for deep exami-
nation, fed a media circus. Commissioner Hayne pre-empted such criticism
and provided an explanation for why he narrowed his focus on particular
issues and how the case studies were selected.
Regardless of what your opinion might be, what cannot be denied is that
when combined with the governance failures that came to the public’s attention
in the lead-up to the inquiry, the Royal Commission exposed systemic and
extensive unethical behaviour across the fnancial services industry.
Although there had been failed attempts to replicate fndings of research from
psychology in the interim, the epiphany for the feld arrived in 2015 when the
Open Science Collaboration (OSC) – a group of almost 300 scientists – published
the results of the frst large-scale replication project (Open Science Collaboration,
2015).This project attempted to replicate the fndings of 100 experiments published
in three leading psychology journals. The results weren’t fattering. Findings were
replicated in only about one out of three experiments and when they were, the
efect size was only about half of what was found in the original study. Ironically,
and relevant to this book, even research into honesty has since been exposed as being
fawed (refer to Box I.2).
Sufce to say, there has been sufcient criticism of much of the research referenced
in the frst edition of this book, including the Stanford Prison Experiment (Haslam,
Reicher & Van Bavel, 2019; Le Texier, 2019), Milgram’s obedience studies (Perry,
2012), priming research (Chivers, 2019; Kahneman, 2022; Schimmack, Heene &
Kesavan, 2017), ego depletion (Vadillo, Gold & Osman, 2018) and mortality salience
(Klein et al., 2019; Sætrevik & Sjåstad, 2022). In this edition of the book, I have
been more discerning when selecting research used to support the conclusions.This
has resulted in me drawing on felds beyond psychology, leaning more heavily on
research from experimental economics and fnance.
6
Introduction
This is not to suggest that research from these latter felds is bereft of shortcomings.
The statistical fallacies that have played a central role in many of the questionable
fndings emerging from psychology (for example,“p-hacking” [Simmons, Nelson &
Simonsohn, 2011] and “forking paths” [Gelman & Loken, 2014]) can wreak havoc
in any feld that requires the analysis of experimental data. Furthermore, the highly
controlled laboratory conditions experimental economists create to conduct their
research creates trade-ofs. On the one hand, these conditions provide a far more
precise and clearer picture of how a particular variable of interest (in our case, ethical
behaviour) is infuenced by another variable (for example, incentives). On the other
hand, the setting can be excessively artifcial and not represent what someone would
encounter in real-world settings.
However, research from experimental economics and fnance is more likely to
contain features that provide greater confdence in what the results tell us about
human behaviour (or, for our purposes, about ethical behaviour). Most prominently,
these features include refraining from employing deception as an experimental
tool (something that, as Hertwig and Ortmann [2001] outline, can compromise
results) and using incentives or real-world data in their methodology (something
that increases the likelihood that participant behaviour refects what would occur in
natural settings – when nothing is at stake, it is far easier for a participant to claim
that they are “ethical” and will do the “right thing”).
Box I.2 “Nudging” for honesty: too good to be true
The term “nudge” was popularised by a book of the same name authored by
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). In their book,
nudging was defned as follows (p. 6):
A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture
that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any
options or signifcantly changing their economic incentives.To count as
a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges
are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning
junk food does not.
7
Introduction
Since being conceived, the idea has spawned an industry. According to

consulting frm McKinsey and Company, over 400 so-called “nudge units”
have been established, many of these associated with governments and
providing advice on public policy (Fusaro & Sperling-Magro, 2021). In
addition, there have been countless research articles published investigating the
efectiveness of diferent nudge techniques.
The concept has delivered some successes, arguably the most notable being
so-called “defaults”. When people are required to make a choice and one of
the possible options is pre-selected for them, there is a strong likelihood they
will choose the pre-selected option (Jachimowicz, Duncan,Weber & Johnson,
2019). Beyond this, fndings have been patchy. As Hummel and Maedche
(2019) concluded in their review of the nudging literature,“it remains unclear
if nudges really work and, if so, under which conditions” (p. 47). Nudging
people towards honesty is one example of such an outcome.
One of the most widely cited examples of an honesty nudge is the
positioning of honesty pledges on forms that ask people completing them to
make certain declarations. In the original experiment of its kind, Shu et al.
(2012) asked participants in a laboratory experiment to complete a simple
arithmetic task. After completing the task, they were randomly assigned to
three groups and required to self-report, on a separate form, both (a) their
performance on the task and (b) the length of time it took them to commute
to the experiment.
In both cases the incentives created a temptation to over-report (higher
performance and longer commuting times earned the participants a higher
monetary payout).To assess how honesty pledges would infuence self-reporting
behaviour, the form on which participants provided their information difered
between the three groups. Specifcally, one group was required to date and sign
the top of the form alongside a statement that read:
I declare that I carefully examined this return and that to the best of my
knowledge and belief it is correct and complete.
A second group was required to provide the date and their signature at the
bottom of the form alongside the same statement. Meanwhile the third group
was not required to date or sign the form (the control group).
8
Introduction
Shu et al. (2012) reported diferences in dishonesty across the three groups.
Specifcally, 37 per cent of the participants who were required to date and
sign the top of the form dishonestly infated their actual performance on the
arithmetic task compared to 79 per cent of participants who were required to
date and sign the bottom of the form and 64 per cent of the participants who
were not required to provide their signature. Similarly, participants who were
required to date and sign the top of the form claimed less travel time than the
other groups. Overall, they were compensated on average USD 5.27 compared
to USD 9.62 for participants who dated and signed the bottom of the form
and USD 8.45 for those who were not required to sign.
Shu et al. (2012) then went on to test this seemingly simple but efective nudge
in a feld experiment.Working with a car insurance company, they changed the
format of the policy review form on which customers were required to record
the reading on their odometer. Some customers were required to provide a date
and signature at the top of the form alongside a statement declaring that the
information provided was true (“I promise that the information I am providing
is true”). Others were required to do the same at the bottom of the form.
As predicted, those signing the top of the form reported higher odometer
readings, requiring them to pay higher premiums (as it is an indicator of
more driving and, by extension, a higher likelihood of being involved in an
accident). Voilà. A simple manipulation and it seems the problem of human
dishonesty can be largely solved. It seems too good to be true.
It was.
As others tried but failed to replicate the fndings, the researchers involved
in the original study joined Ariella Kristal and Ashley Whillans to conduct
a replication of their own (Kristal et al., 2020). The laboratory experiment
proceeded as described above, except that no control group was included, thus
allowing a comparison between participants who signed and dated the top
and bottom of the form. Using a much larger sample of 1,235 participants
(compared to 101 in the original study), there was no discernible diference
between the two groups with regards to the reported number of matrices
solved and the time taken to travel to the experiment.
In addition to failing to replicate the laboratory study, Kristal et al. (2020)
looked at the feld experiment “with new eyes” and were “concerned with
its potential faws”. The diference found in the reported odometer readings
9
Introduction
appears to have been due to diferent driving behaviours rather than dishonesty.
That is, there was a failure to conduct a proper random assignment of partici-
pants between the experimental groups (a foundational requirement in good
experimental design). In describing their fndings, they concluded (p. 7106):
With the new data presented here, we recommend that practitioners

take this fnding out of their intervention “tool-kit” as it is unlikely to
increase honesty.
Unfortunately for Shu et al. (2012), the failure to conduct a proper random
assignment may have been the least of their concerns. In an article published
on their web site Data Colada, Simonsohn et al. (2021) provide credible
evidence demonstrating that the reason Kristal et al. (2020) were unable to
confrm the fndings of the research with the car insurance company was
because the data was fabricated.The journal that published the article authored
by Shu et al. (2012) has since issued a retraction notice, citing the evidence
provided by Simonsohn et al. (2021) (Berenbaum, 2021).
To give you a sense of the magnitude of the crisis gripping scientifc research,
according to Retraction Watch, a website that tracks and maintains a database of
all retracted scientifc articles, a total of 9,004 articles were retracted from journals
in the fve calendar years to December 2020 (Retraction Watch, n.d.). Only 278
of these were psychology papers (a feld that has experienced intense criticism).
Most concerning, for approximately half of these articles, fraud (which includes
plagiarism or the fabrication or falsifcation of results) is the reason provided for
retraction (Brainard & You, 2018). Not surprisingly, many of the themes discussed
in this book also explain the origins of this ethical failure in academic research.
In summary, my objectives for writing this second edition are twofold. First, I aim to
update the frst edition so that the research cited provides a more reliable précis of both
the origins of ethical failure but also the lessons that ethical failure provides leaders. But
more importantly, given what has transpired since the publication of the frst edition, I
aim to document the enduring lessons that have emerged from the Royal Commission.
To achieve the latter, this edition of the book uses the Australian fnancial services
industry as a case study. Admittedly, there were numerous other examples of ethical
failure I could have drawn from. Unfortunately, royal commissions have become a
10
Introduction
feature of public life in Australia over recent years. Among others, there have been
inquiries into the aged care sector and responses to institutional child sexual abuse.
And, of course, there are countless case studies I could have drawn from that occurred
in other countries. However, although some have encouraged me to look beyond the
banking and fnance industry, I have decided to remain targeted. Not only is it an
industry with which I have an afnity, but the lessons it provides can be broadly applied.
Like the frst edition, this book contains four chapters and a conclusion, albeit the
content and structure have been modifed.To describe the origins of ethical failure,
I begin by exploring what recent research emerging from the feld of experimental
economics tells us about human nature. Is it in our nature to be ethical and honest?
Or do we have a predisposition towards dishonesty, thus making ethical failure
more likely? No book seeking to explain ethical failure can go without a properly
grounded discussion of these questions and in this edition, it is provided precedence.
What we will fnd through this discussion is that humans have a predisposition
towards dishonesty, especially when the circumstances are favourable. This conclusion
leads us to one of the central themes of this book: the importance of “institutional
arrangements”. This is a term you will read a lot in this edition. If we accept that a
predisposition towards dishonesty exists (something the research clearly suggests we
should), then to avoid ethical failure we must focus obsessively on putting in place insti-
tutional arrangements that reduce the likelihood of us succumbing to our fawed nature.
And what exactly are these institutional arrangements? Although there are many
we could point to, Chapters Two and Three focus on the arrangements surrounding
incentives and accountability, two of the more prominent catalysts of wrongdoing
in the Australian fnancial services industry. In both cases we fnd that the proposed
remedies are not necessarily straightforward.Although incentives can elicit dishonesty,
they also motivate discretionary efort. By scrapping them we risk throwing the baby
out with the bathwater. And as necessary as it might be, in practice accountability
can be difcult and costly to apply. In short, there are trade-ofs.
Furthermore, in discussing incentives and accountability, we fnd that responsi-
bility for putting in place appropriate institutional arrangements does not exclusively
reside with the fnancial institutions within which the wrongdoing occurs. To be
sure, they have a lot to answer for. But we would be remiss to overlook the pivotal
role played by our public institutions, the leaders within them, and our elected
ofcials. Independent and well-resourced public institutions and a political class
that acts with probity, passes efective legislation and holds those who transgress
to account are crucial institutional arrangements if our goal is to create a fnancial
system that is more resilient to ethical failure.
11
Introduction
Chapter Four explores group dynamics, a central theme of the frst edition. Ethics
and morality are, above all else, social constructs. It is people interacting together that
ultimately determine the type of behaviour that is to be condemned and condoned.
And so often, people of seemingly “good” character act in “bad” ways when they
become submerged in a group within which unethical behaviour emerges and is
endorsed. I also discuss how extraordinarily difcult it can be to speak up in groups.
Given the important role employee voice plays in detecting a minor indiscretion
prior to it becoming a full-blown scandal (especially when it comes to “conduct” or
“non-fnancial” risk), this is an unfortunate reality.
Like the frst edition, each chapter concludes by providing lessons for leaders.
Unlike the frst edition, there is less focus on purpose, values and principles. This
is not to suggest that the exercise of defning purpose, values and principles is
not important for institutions. To the contrary. Rather, as will be described in the
Conclusion, the argument made in this edition is that without the supporting insti-
tutional arrangements, the utterances and proclamations made in these statements
of intent will not, in and of themselves, be efective in promoting ethical behaviour.
Despite the urge I had to write a second edition, I also had a signifcant reservation.
Namely, what if this is as good as it gets? That is, what if ethical failure is the gift that
keeps on giving, and the best we can do is accept that it happens and pick up the pieces
when it occurs? These questions weighed heavily on me, especially given the history of
the industry that serves as the case study.And not just its recent history.
In his book White-collar crime in modern England, George Robb devotes a chapter
to banking fraud (Robb, 1992). Apparently, the mid-nineteenth century was fertile
ground for banking scandals in the United Kingdom. A string of bank failures
through the 1840s and 1850s were the precursor to the banking crisis of 1857,
during which several major banks in Scotland and Northern England collapsed,
sparking a nationwide panic. Subsequent to the crisis, a public parliamentary
inquiry was called (sounds familiar) that focused on the failure of three major banks.
According to Robb (p. 64):
In a report issued in 1858, the Commons catalogued a litany of abuses

including fctitious bills, false reports, manufactured dividends and advances
made on doubtful securities.
Although we could argue that the modern-day banking scandals are not as egregious
as those of the mid-nineteenth century, the parallels are telling. It could be that
dealing with ethical failure is akin to a game of whack-a-mole – as they occur,
12
Introduction
we deal with the fallout, put in place the institutional arrangements to reduce the
likelihood of a similar failure recurring, and await for the next one to arise. After
all, regardless of how hard we might try, there will never be an ethical utopia. Even
the idealist in me is prepared to concede this (and as the evidence in this book will
demonstrate, we would be foolish to conclude otherwise).
However, despite these caveats, I conclude that we can do better.Yes, our fawed
humanity ensures that ethical failure will be inevitable, but there are shortcomings in
institutional arrangements that can be addressed. Doing so will reduce the likelihood
and frequency of ethical failure. My hope is that I have illustrated this in a way that
strikes the right balance, highlighting that although the ethical resilience of our
institutions can be enhanced, doing so inevitably requires us to navigate trade-ofs.
Alas, no foolproof or straightforward solution exists. Most importantly, I hope I can
help readers deepen their understanding of ethical failure.
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16
Chapter One
Our fawed humanity
Everyone is a moon, and has a dark side which he never shows to anybody.
Following the Equator: A Journey Around the World (p. 654,Twain, 1897)
“Rogue NAB traders face their judgement day” read the headline on 1 July 2006 in
the lead-up to the sentencing of two of the four traders involved in the FX trading
scandal at the NAB (Moncrief & Miletic, 2006). As mentioned in the introduction,
I was publicly named as one of the whistleblowers in the incident.
When I began working on the FX options trading desk at the NAB as a trainee
in 2001, one of my duties was to feld calls from the operations area of the bank that
advised the desk of transactions that had been entered into the trading system incor-
rectly. I would proceed to correct the errors, oblivious of the changes in the value of
the portfolio and daily proft and loss these corrections would create. At some point,
a senior trader advised me that some of the errors I was correcting were created by
design, not accident. As was explained, entering spot FX transactions with incorrect
rates was a practice used to reduce the volatility in the daily proft and loss of the desk.
The independent investigation into the scandal completed by audit frm
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) described the loopholes that made this possible
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004). By taking advantage of a “one-hour window”
between when trades were entered into the trading system and subsequently recon-
ciled by the operations area, the traders could, just prior to the daily proft and loss
being posted to the general ledger, enter a spot FX transaction at a rate that would
infate or defate (more often the former than the latter) its value.This value would
be captured in the daily proft and loss report, creating an outcome which, for all
intents and purposes, was fctitious.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003335368-2 17
Our fawed humanity
This practice was widely known, used and endorsed at senior levels. It was clearly
dishonest, used initially to avoid any scrutiny that a volatile proft and loss would
invite and eventually to conceal large losses.And it was rationalised as being necessary,
given the pressure to avoid volatility in (but also to grow) profts. One technique
used to rationalise the practice was to colloquially label it as “smoothing”, something
that sounds far more palatable than “manipulating the value of the daily proft and
loss”. As psychologist Albert Bandura has proposed, adopting “euphemisms” to
describe reprehensible conduct is one way we morally disengage (Bandura, 2016).
In the years that followed the scandal and subsequent court cases, I was fascinated
and preoccupied by the question of what drove the conduct of those involved.
Specifcally, was the dishonest behaviour, as the 1 July 2006 headline in the paper
suggested, the work of a few rogue traders? Or was it supported and abetted by a
fawed system? Or perhaps a mixture of both?
These are the types of questions that I seek to answer in this book. Knowing the
answers to them is central to developing an understanding of business ethics. If it
is the case that unethical and illegal behaviour is caused by a handful of rogues, the
solution is relatively straightforward: identify and deal with them appropriately. If
systems play a role, the remedy is far less straightforward. Rectifying fawed systems
is difcult, as is identifying the individuals ultimately responsible for shaping them.
A good place to begin looking for answers to these questions is exploring human
nature. Are we selfsh, dishonest and devious beings who will deceive, exploit and
plunder when the opportunity presents itself? Or is it in our nature to be honest,
giving and to never take advantage of others? This is precisely where we begin. As
will become apparent, like all matters to do with human nature, the answers to these
questions are not straightforward. But before we begin exploring these questions,
some defnitions are in order.What do I mean when I use the term (un)ethical? In
Box 1.1, I attempt to answer this question.
Box 1.1 What does it mean to be (un)ethical?
How does one make a judgement on whether conduct is “ethical”? This is

a complex question, but one that cannot be ignored in a book about ethical
failures. It is especially important to give this question due attention in light
of the terms of reference that guided the Royal Commission. The Letters
Patent directed Commissioner Hayne to inquire into “whether any conduct,
18
Our fawed humanity
practices, behaviour or business activities by fnancial services entities fall

below community standards and expectations” (Commonwealth of Australia,
2017).
In his book Outlines of the History of Ethics, Sidgwick (1886) describes the
challenges that come with defning “ethics”.Across time, diferent schools and
traditions have applied diferent meanings (p. 1):
There is some difculty in defning the subject of Ethics in a manner

which can fairly claim general acceptance; since its nature and relations
are variously understood by writers of diferent schools, and are in conse-
quence conceived somewhat indefnitely by educated persons in general.
To add to the confusion, in his book Sidgwick chose to use the words “moral”
and “ethical” synonymously.
For the purposes of this book, the word “moral” is used to describe the
things we value and consider to be “good” or “right”. As elucidated by Singer
(2005), whether one couches morality in the various religious traditions, the
writings of the great philosophers or more recently, evolutionary biology,
moral behaviour has emerged to enable humans to co-operate and live
together in large groups. After all, being able to successfully live together in
large groups successfully carries with it numerous benefts (the most important
being an increased likelihood of survival).
For this reason, there is broad (if not universal) agreement that killing
(the sanctity of life), stealing (property rights) and failing to treat all people
with dignity and respect (human rights) are morally “wrong”. These acts
compromise group cohesion. Granted, morality does evolve over time. For
example, prior to amendments being made to the Commonwealth Electoral
Act 1918 (Cth) in 1962, Indigenous Australians were not aforded the basic
right to vote in federal elections, something that by today’s standards is clearly
immoral. Despite this emergent quality, at any point in time there is broad
(albeit not unequivocal) agreement on what is considered “moral”.
Ethics, meanwhile, is the process where one must deliberate and determine
what is the moral thing to do. We are said to be facing an ethical dilemma
when we are required to make a decision between two or more competing
moral values. Consider the Heinz dilemma, a hypothetical scenario developed
19
Our fawed humanity
by Lawrence Kohlberg (Heinz dilemma, n.d.). In it, Heinz’s wife is terminally

ill and Heinz cannot aford to purchase a drug that will save her life. Despite
his pleas, the pharmacist refuses to sell the drug to Heinz at a discount. In
this dilemma, Heinz must make a decision between letting his wife die (the
sanctity of human life) or stealing the drug (property rights). What should
he do?
These types of ethical dilemmas, where moral values are pitted against each
other, are often referred to as “right-versus-right” ethical dilemmas. In these
situations, two knowledgeable, well-meaning people can arrive at diferent
ethical decisions. We are unable to claim indisputably that one is morally
“right” and the other morally “wrong”. Navigating these types of ethical
dilemmas can be excruciatingly difcult. However, the various shades of
wrongdoing which were showcased at the Royal Commission did not ft into
this class of ethical dilemma.
Whether we consider charging fees for services not rendered, selling
junk insurance or opportunistic sales tactics, these are not by most people’s
standards and expectations (that is, by the community’s standards and expec-
tations) examples of people making decisions between competing moral
values. Rather, in these situations, people are making a decision between
what is clearly morally “right” and what is morally “wrong”. They are facing
a “right-versus-wrong” ethical dilemma. In this book, “ethical failure” refers
to incidents in which people, when facing a “right-versus-wrong” ethical
dilemma, choose what is morally “wrong”.
A plausible argument could be made that if the Royal Commission terms
of reference had only asked Commissioner Hayne to inquire into conduct
that was illegal (rather than conduct that fell below “community standards and
expectations”), a signifcant proportion of the case studies examined would
still have qualifed as being worthy for consideration under this more rigorous
benchmark. As he stated when describing the nature of the conduct reviewed
during the Royal Commission (p. 1, Royal Commission, 2019):
Very often, the conduct has broken the law. And if it has not broken the
law, the conduct has fallen short of the kind of behaviour the community
not only expects of fnancial services entities but is also entitled to expect
of them.
20
Our fawed humanity
In many ways this made Commissioner Hayne’s task a little less complicated.
For the most part, he was not required to deliberate on “right-versus-right”
ethical dilemmas and whether conduct fell below community standards,
whatever they might be. Similarly, it makes the task of writing this book far
more straightforward, as I too need not concern myself with “right-versus-
right” ethical dilemmas and passing judgement on what is the “right” thing to
do. Rather, the focus is solely on “right-versus-wrong” dilemmas. Specifcally,
why is it that when faced with a decision between doing what is morally
“right” and morally “wrong”, people choose the latter?
Are humans honest?
Ancient literature and scripture are full of stories that speak to human fallibility.
Whether it be Odysseus fastening himself to a mast in Homer’s epic poem The
Odyssey, King David seducing Bathsheba in the Hebrew Bible, or Adam eating from
the tree of knowledge in the Old Testament, the idea that humans can succumb to
temptation is not new. But stories, although compelling, do not necessarily provide
evidence. Can a propensity towards dishonesty be proven? And if so, is it widespread?
In recent years, experimental economists have turned their mind to studying the
question of human honesty. Although several approaches have been employed, one
of the more prominent is the die rolling paradigm developed by Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi (2013). In the original experiment, 389 participants were asked to
roll a die and self-report the outcome. Participants received a payment based on the
outcome they reported. Specifcally, the payment (in Swiss Francs) was equal to the
outcome reported, apart from when the participant reported an outcome of six in
which case the payment was zero (that is, a participant self-reporting an outcome
of one received CHF 1, an outcome of two received CHF 2 and so on up to an
outcome of fve).
Although the experimenters were unable to determine whether each participant
was acting honestly when self-reporting, they could, through some relatively
straightforward statistical analysis, determine the proportion of participants being
dishonest. The reason for this is that each outcome in a die roll is equally likely
(0.1667 probability), meaning that with a sample size of 389, the expected outcome
was that approximately 65 participants would roll each outcome. Of course, although
the experimenters went to great lengths to assure the participants that their actual
21
Our fawed humanity
Figure 1.1: The reported outcomes of die roles completed by 389 participants in the experiment
undertaken by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013).
outcome of the die roll was not being recorded, some may have remained suspicious
(a topic we will return to later).
The results, illustrated in Figure 1.1, clearly demonstrate the presence of dishonesty.
Thirty-fve per cent of participants reported that they rolled a fve (the outcome that
provided the largest payment), more than double the expected outcome of 16.67 per
cent. It is also clear that some participants report dishonestly but temper their greed,
claiming to have “only” rolled a four (27.2 per cent reported this result, once again
well above the expected outcome). In addition, there were some honest participants
who accepted a payment of zero.
In summarising their results, Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) found that
participants could be divided into three categories:
• “Honest subjects”: Those who reported the outcome they actually rolled (this
could be as many as 39 per cent of the participants).
• “Income maximising subjects”: Those who lied to maximise their monetary
payment by reporting a fve (this could be as many as 22 per cent of participants).
• “Partial liars”: Those who did not lie to maximise their payment but did lie to
infate it (approximately 20 per cent of participants).
In an extraordinary piece of research, Abeler et al. (2019) collected data from all experi-
ments undertaken to date that have adopted the Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)
22
Our fawed humanity
paradigm. Not all the experiments they reviewed used die rolling as their method for
assessing honesty. In some experiments, participants reported the outcome of a coin
toss. In others, they reported the colour of a ball drawn from an urn. Whatever the
case, in all instances the experiments (a) enabled participants to self-report outcomes
without revealing the true result, (b) contained an asymmetric payment profle such
that some reported outcomes were more proftable than others and (c) provided the
experimenters with certainty on the expected distribution of outcomes.
The undertaking was enormous. In total, data was collected from 90 experiments
that provided information on 270,616 decisions made by 44,390 participants. The
experiments were run in 47 countries that in total represented 69 per cent of the
world’s population. A sample size this large and representative is rare. It provides
confdence that there is far less of a likelihood that the results are caused by some
type of statistical fuke.
The fndings support those described by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013).
Specifcally, although there were a group of participants who lied for maximum
beneft, they were not in the majority – approximately 75 per cent of the total gains
available to participants were not exploited. However, there was clear evidence for
dishonesty, given outcomes that provided higher payments were made far more
frequently (the dishonest participants and so-called “partial liars” identifed by
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi [2013]). Also, there was a proportion of participants
who reported honestly, even if this resulted in zero payment.
One of the fndings in the experiments described above that has puzzled researchers
is that dishonesty did not increase when the size of the potential payof rose. For
example, when Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) tripled the stakes, so that a partic-
ipant who reported an outcome of fve earned CHF 15, the distribution of results did
not signifcantly difer. Similarly, in the extraordinary sample size complied by Abeler
et al. (2019), dishonest behaviour was not infuenced when there was potential for far
higher monetary gains.This led Abeler et al. (2019) to conclude (p. 1147):
Our new experimental results, combined with our theoretical predictions,

demonstrate that a preference for being seen as honest and a preference for
being honest are the main motivations for truth-telling.
These types of fndings are inconsistent with the standard economic model of
dishonesty developed by Becker (1968) – as the probability of being detected falls
or the size of the payof rises, the level of dishonesty should increase.That people do
23
Our fawed humanity
not always behave like the fgurative Homo economicus dictates is not a new idea, and
experimental economists have provided explanations for why this might be a feature
of their research. One is experimental design. As Levitt and List (2007) describe, there
are numerous factors that can infuence how participants respond in laboratory experi-
ments.These include the degree to which participants believe they are being scrutinised
and their anonymity is being protected.These types of factors are especially pertinent
in experiments where participants are required to make decisions with moral import.
In support of this, experiments adopting techniques that make it impossible for
participants to be exposed as liars do induce increased dishonesty. For example,
Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017) conducted a variant of the original Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi (2013) experiment known as the “mind game”. In this experiment,
participants were frst asked to think of a number between one and six before rolling
a die. If the number rolled was the same as the number they had thought of, they
were provided with a payment.When the results were compared to a control group
who were rewarded if (and only if) they reported that they had rolled a fve, partici-
pants in the mind game were more dishonest (and their level of dishonesty increased
as the size of the payment increased).
However, even in the “mind game”, where the probability of being exposed as
a liar is zero, not all of the participants chose to be dishonest. As will be described
in Chapter Three when we review some of the experimental fndings relevant to
accountability, researchers have proposed alternative explanations for these types of
results. A prominent one is the role of social identity – people place value in being
seen as a moral, upstanding citizen. To create this perception, they tend to resist
maximising their payofs in experiments that require dishonesty. In addition, some
researchers have pointed to potential reputational concerns, whereby participants
refrain from being dishonest because they fear there might be consequences (such
as being precluded from participating in future experiments).
But one thing that appears to be clear is that when the experimental design (or
context) is made more permissive, dishonesty does increase. This was ingeniously
demonstrated in recently published research conducted by Tergiman and Villeval
(2021). Their experiment, which is highly relevant to this book, demonstrates that
although Abeler et al. (2019) may have been right on one hand (people have “a
preference for being seen as honest”), they were of the mark on the other (people
have “a preference for being honest”). They demonstrated this by introducing
the possibility for plausible deniability – the ability to proft from deception and
dishonesty but being able to deny that you have done so.
24
Our fawed humanity
In their experiment, participants were randomly assigned into the role of adviser
(“project manager”) or investor. The advisers were provided with three cards, each
being either blank or containing a star. They then sent a message to the investor
informing them of how many of the three cards contained a star. Based on this
information, the investor made a decision on whether to invest. If an investment
was made, one of the three cards was randomly selected and revealed. If the card
contained a star, the investment was deemed to be a success.
The incentives were structured such that (a) payofs were maximised for the adviser
when the investor chose to invest and (b) payofs were maximised for the investor after
a successful investment. Specifcally, if an adviser could cajole the investor to invest,
their potential payof increased by approximately seven times.The investor meanwhile
received an endowment which they could keep or put at risk by investing. If they
chose to invest and the investment was a success, the size of the endowment tripled.
If, however, the randomly selected card did not contain a star and the investment was
unsuccessful, the size of the endowment was reduced by 70 per cent.
Therefore, the adviser stood to gain handsomely if they could entice the investor to
invest, an outcome that could be achieved by being deceitful and misrepresenting the
true number of stars on the cards. Assuming adviser dishonesty always involves exagger-
ating the true number of stars, Figure 1.2 illustrates the four types of lies an adviser
could make use of, each with diferent probabilities of being detected.They were:
• “Extreme risk” lies which were detected by the investor on all occasions.
• “High risk” lies which, given the card used to determine whether the investment
was a success was chosen at random, had a probability of being detected on
two-thirds of occasions.
• “Low(er) risk” lies which, once again due to the random selection of the card,
had a probability of being detected on one-third of occasions.
• “Deniable” lies which, regardless of which card was drawn to determine if the
investment is a success, could never be substantiated.
Through the inclusion of plausible deniability, Tergiman and Villeval (2021)

departed from the Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) experimental paradigm
where a participant could change the magnitude of a lie but not lie in a way that was
deniable. In addition, it allowed them to explore how various mechanisms, such as
concern for reputation and consequence, infuence dishonesty. Do these mechanisms
increase honesty when they are introduced or do people simply change how they lie?
25
Our fawed humanity
Figure 1.2: The experimental design employed by Tergiman and Villeval (2021) meant that dishonest
advice provided by the adviser had different probabilities of being detected and in some cases was
deniable.
To answer this question, participants in the experiment completed 27 rounds of

the investment task in four diferent experimental conditions, the results for two of
which are described here. In the baseline “random pairs” (RP) condition, an adviser
was randomly paired with an investor for each of the 27 rounds of the task. To
assess whether concerns for reputation leads to greater honesty, a “fxed pairs” (FP)
condition was created in which an adviser was randomly assigned to an investor at
the beginning of the experiment and then completed all 27 rounds of the task as one
dyad. Finally, consequence for the adviser was introduced by allowing the investor
to desist from investing in any round.
The results demonstrate that when the arrangements are permissive, dishonesty is
a feature of human nature. Figure 1.3 illustrates, across the RP and FP experimental
conditions, the percentage of dishonest announcements by advisers, the percentage
of advisers who are dishonest in the frst round, the percentage of advisers who
26
Our fawed humanity
Figure 1.3: The percentage of dishonest announcements made by advisers and the percentage of
advisers lying at different stages of the experiment, as per the research conducted by Tergiman and
Villeval (2021).
are dishonest within the frst fve rounds and the percentage of advisers who are
dishonest at some stage across all 27 rounds of the experiment. Clearly, concerns
for reputation and consequence play a role in dissuading dishonesty, as overall there
are more dishonest announcements in the RP conditions versus the FP condition.
However, by the fnal round, a greater proportion of advisers in the FP condition
were dishonest (and a large proportion at that).
The results from Figure 1.3 are even more revealing when viewed in conjunction
with those displayed in Figure 1.4, which illustrates the types of lies employed by
advisers who were dishonest at least once across the 27 rounds of the task. What is
obvious is that the “riskier” lies (that is,“extreme risk” and “high risk” lies) were used
far more prominently by advisers in the RP condition.Advisers in the FP condition
predominantly made use of “deniable lies”. Therefore, concerns for reputation and
consequence did not necessarily reduce dishonesty per se, but rather changed the
types of lies used by advisers.
At this point it is worth repeating that, as was described in the Introduction,
there are trade-ofs associated with experimental research conducted in labora-
tories. By creating a controlled environment that eliminates confounding variables,
the experimental design provides a far more precise and clearer picture of how
the independent variable (for example, incentives and reputation) infuences the
27
Our fawed humanity
Figure 1.4: In the experiment conducted by Tergiman and Villeval (2021), advisers were more likely to
use risker lies that had a higher likelihood of being detected in conditions where their reputation was
not at stake because they were assigned to a new investor after each round of the experiment.
dependent variable (for example, honesty). However, the experimental design also
creates an environment that is both unique and highly artifcial, something that can
infuence how participants placed within it respond and behave. For example, it is
possible that participants in the research conducted by Tergiman and Villeval (2021)
(and other research described in this chapter for that matter) may have interpreted
the experiment as being a game in which the whole point was to deceive and be
dishonest.1
However, by employing plausible deniability, Tergiman and Villeval (2021) do call
into question how previous fndings from dishonesty research have been interpreted.
As they conclude (p. 4):
But because we allow for a wider breadth of lies (from extreme – detectable
for sure – to deniable – not detectable lies), our work shows that individuals
adapt their lying to the market environment they face, and how people lie
in markets plays out very diferently compared with what might have been
expected given the prior literature on cheating and deception games.
More importantly, their fndings make it clear where our focus should be if our goal
is to reduce the likelihood of unethical behaviour (p. 7):
28
Our fawed humanity
Instead, because only few subjects exhibit preferences for honesty per se, the
nature of lies responds to the institutions in place, which delivers clear policy
recommendations.
And herein lies one of the central themes of this book – if our goal is to reduce the
frequency of ethical failure, the focus must be on institutional arrangements. This
conclusion naturally emerges from the fact that when the institutional arrangements
are permissive, humans do not tend to exhibit a preference for honesty. More on this
in the fnal section of the chapter.
In the interim, below is described one of the more notable ethical failures
examined at the Royal Commission – the fee-for-no-service scandal. What
happened? Why did it happen? Was the behaviour associated with the incident
dishonest? And if so, what were the institutional arrangements that abetted the
conduct? Before then, Box 1.2 describes a key concept that underpins much of the
wrongdoing exposed at the Royal Commission, conficts of interest.
Box 1.2 Conficts of interest
Simply put, a confict of interest exists when an individual or institution has

multiple interests and therefore, when serving one of those interests, is unable
to do so without bias or prejudice, given their competing priorities. Although
disclosure is often seen as a remedy to conficts of interest, at times it can
infate the bias or prejudice of the conficted party (Sah, 2018).
High-powered incentive schemes are arguably the most prominent form
of confict of interest.They result in an individual putting their own personal
interest ahead of the client or institution to which they have a duty (something
the research conducted by Tergiman and Villeval [2021] demonstrates). These
will be discussed in the following chapter. In this box, another form of confict
of interest that has received considerable attention in Australia’s fnancial
services industry over the past decade is discussed: the conficts of interest
created by vertical integration.
Towards the end of the twentieth century, major banks began acquiring
a range of assets that both manufactured and distributed investment and
insurance products. The distribution of these products was typically the
responsibility of fnancial advisers who were employed by advice licensees. At
29
Our fawed humanity
times, these licensees operated under a trading name that was unrelated to the
major bank that owned and provided product to them, creating the perception
that they were independent.
This institutional arrangement created conficts of interest for fnancial
advisers. As one of the submissions made by Australian Government Treasury
to the Royal Commission outlined, these stretched beyond the incentives
provided to fnancial advisers (Australian Government Treasury, 2018):
The incentive for in-house or afliated advisers to recommend in-house

products is likely to be more deeply rooted than remuneration incentives
alone and include factors like career progression, greater visibility of and
access to information/training on in-house products and a tendency for
advisers to identify with a frm and its products.
Given these conficts, there are numerous legal and operational safeguards that
have been put in place to protect consumers. For example, under Division 2 of
Part 7.7A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), fnancial advisers providing personal
advice must (a) act in the best interests of the customer, (b) provide the customer
with appropriate advice and (c) prioritise the customer’s interests over their own.
Therefore, if a product manufactured by the institution that owns an advice
licensee does not fulfl these requirements, fnancial advisers employed by this
licensee would be in breach of the Corporations Act if they recommended it.
For this reason, advice licensees typically compile an “approved product
list”. This is a list of products that fnancial advisers employed by them can
sell to their customers.The approved product list contains a mix of “in-house”
products (that is, products manufactured by the institution that owns the
licensee) and products manufactured by other non-related institutions. This
arrangement is put in place to ensure that advisers, as they seek to serve the
best interest of their customers, are not put in a position where they are
non-compliant because they are only able to ofer in-house products.
Given the above arrangements, did fnancial advisers prioritise their duty to
the client ahead of self-interest?
In January 2018, ASIC published the fndings of a review into how institu-
tions manage these conficts of interest (Australian Securities and Investments
Commission, 2018).The review involved the collection of data from ten advice
30
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Erämaan
matkaajille
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.
Title: Erämaan matkaajille

Saarnoja
Author: Arvi Järventaus
Release date: April 2, 2024 [eBook #73320]
Language: Finnish
Original publication: Porvoo: WSOY, 1926
Credits: Juhani Kärkkäinen and Tapio Riikonen
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ERÄMAAN

MATKAAJILLE ***
ERÄMAAN MATKAAJILLE
Saarnoja
Kirj.
ARVI JÄRVENTAUS
Porvoossa, Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1926.

SISÄLTÖ:
Alkulause.
Jumalan valtakunta, 1. Adventtisunnuntai.
Älä heitä pois uskallustasi! 2. Adventtisunnuntai.
Todellinen suuruus. 3. Adventtisunnuntai.
Nöyrien luo tulee Kristus 4. Adventtisunnuntai.
Mikä merkitys on joululla meille? Joulupäivä.
Uhrautuvaisuus. 2. Joulupäivä.
Arkielämässä. Joulun jälk. sunnuntai.
Vapahtaja luottaa meihin. Uudenvuodenpäivä.
Häviämätön omaisuus. Uudenvuodenpäivän jälk. sunnuntai.
Toivo. Loppiainen.
Lapsemme. 1. Loppiaisen jälk. sunnuntai.
Kuuliaisuus. 2. Loppiaisen jälk. sunnuntai.
Anna! 3. Loppiaisen jälk. sunnuntai.
Elämän taistelussa. 4. Loppiaisen jälk. sunnuntai.
Kilparadalla. Septuagesima.
Kylväjä lähti kylvämään siementänsä. Sexagesima.
Veisatkaa Herralle uusi virsi! Kynttilänpäivä.
Käy sisään kärsimysportistasi! Laskiaissunnuntai.
Mistä meidän on iloittava. 1. Paaston aik. sunnuntai.
Eräs elämäntarina. 2. Paaston aik. sunnuntai.
Tulesta temmattu kekäle. 3. Paaston aik. sunnuntai.
Jumalan siunaus. Puolipaastosunnuntai.
Ristin voima. 5. Paaston aik. sunnuntai.
Äiti. Marian Ilmestyspäivä.
Vanha muistolahja. Palmusunnuntai.
Se on täytetty! Pitkäperjantai.
Minä uskon iankaikkiseen elämään. Pääsiäispäivä.
Kun elämä vaikenee. 2. Pääsiäispäivä.
Ja aurinko nousi, kun hän kävi Pnielin ohitse. 1. Pääsiäisen
jälk. sunnuntai.
Herra on minun paimeneni. 2. Pääsiäisen jälk. sunnuntai.
Mieskohtainen usko. 3. Pääsiäisen jälk. sunnuntai.
Sielun jano. 4. Pääsiäisen jälk. sunnuntai.
Kaikkien sydänten päivä. Rukoussunnuntai.
Kuinka pääsemme taivaaseen? Helatorstai.
Opetuslapsena olemisen vaara ja ihanuus. 6. Pääsiäisen jälk.
sunnuntai.
Pyhä Henki. Helluntai.
Hyvä sanoma. 2. Helluntaipäivä.
ALKULAUSE.
Useimmat näistä saarnoista ovat syntyneet Lapissa, kaukana suuren

maailman elämästä ja hälinästä. Siis yksinäisyydessä.
Siitä johtuu, että ne melkein poikkeuksetta pyörivät yhden ja

saman kysymyksen ympärillä: kuinka ihminen jaksaa kestää? Mutta
samasta syystä johtuu myös, ettei tämä kysymys monessakaan
näistä tule selvästi näkyviin. Yksinäisyydessä ei ajatella
»ohjelmanmukaisesti». Siellä tyydytään vain siihen, että voidaan
lausua rohkaiseva sana itselle ja lähimmäiselle, joka kamppailee
saman yksinäisyyden painon alla.
Mutta — sellaiseksihan muodostuu elämä monelle nykyajan

ihmiselle muuallakin. Suuressa kaupungissa voi ihminen tuntea
itsensä vielä yksinäisemmäksi kuin erämaassa. Näiden »erämaan
matkaajien» puoleen tahtoisin siis tällä kokoelmallani kääntyä.
Tahtoisin sanoa jotenkin tähän tapaan: »Älkäämme hätäilkö! Ehkäpä
tämän synkän metsän läpi sittenkin johtaa jokin tie ja mekin
pääsemme — vaikka ehkä yksinäisiä polkuja kulkien — sille portille,
joka vie elämään.»
Jos siis tämä kokoelma voi jotakin yksinäistä, tuskassa ja
pimeässä kamppailevaa lohduttaa, on sen tarkoitus saavutettu.
Tekijä.
JUMALAN VALTAKUNTA.
1. Adventtisunnuntai. — Jes. 25, 6—10.
Vanha kirkkovuosi on loppunut; me seisomme uuden kynnyksellä.

Me suuntaamme katseemme tulevaisuuteen: mitä on tämä uusi
kirkkovuosi tuova tullessaan?
On niin somaa nähdä, että päivän evankeliumikin viittaa

tulevaisuuteen — siihen aikaan, jolloin Jumalan valtakunta ilmestyy
täydessä kirkkaudessaan.
Milloin se tapahtuu?
Toiset sanovat sen jo tavallaan tapahtuneen tahi että se tapahtuu

parhaillaan; toiset taas ovat sitä mieltä, että se tapahtuu
tulevaisuudessa.
Emme rupea väittelemään tästä; olemme yksinkertaisesti sitä

mieltä, että se tapahtuu tulevaisuudessa. Pääasia on vain, että
Jumalan valtakunta kerran ilmestyy täydellisenä. Ja silloin toteutuu
se, mistä tekstin sanat puhuvat.
Kaikki kansat kokoontuvat Jumalan vuoren ympärille, — tuon
vuoren, jolla toimeenpannaan »pidot parhaasta viinistä, ydinrasvasta
ja puhtaasta viinistä». Silloin pannaan myös pois »kääriliina», joka
nyt verhoaa kansoja, t.s. kaikki se, mikä nyt estää näkemästä
Jumalan tarkoituksia ja kunniaa.
Silloin on kuolema nielty iankaikkisesti, silloin on kyynelet pyyhitty

pois ihmislasten kasvoilta. Silloin on »kansan häpeä» poistettu koko
maasta.
Silloin antavat kansakunnat Jumalalle tunnustuksen: »Katso,

meidän
Jumalamme, jota me odotimme!»
Tällaisina aikoina kuin nämä on lohdullista ajatella, että Jumalan

valtakunta kerran ilmestyy kirkkaudessa.
Nyt ovat kansakunnat vielä kaukana rauhasta. Aseet on kohotettu

taisteluun. Ihmiskunta väänteleikse maailman sodan iskemissä
haavoissa. Jumalalla näyttää olevan kovin vähän sanottavaa.
Maailman on vallannut suuri huvitteluhalu; heikko sorretaan, väkevä
esiintyy röyhkeänä.
Se, mikä erityisesti meitä nostaa ja kannattaa, on Jumalan sanan

antama toivo, — toivo paremmasta ajasta. Silloin kun ei apua näy,
saamme kiinnittää katseemme toivon tähteen.
Tiedämmehän, että — kuta pimeämpi yö on, sitä kirkkaammin

tuikkivat tähdet. Niin tämäkin lupaus Jumalan valtakunnan tulosta
loistaa kirkkaana nykyisenä raskaana aikana.
Toivo ylläpitää ja kannattaa, antaa uusia voimia, uutta rohkeutta ja
elämänhalua. Niinhän olemme jo kokeneet maallisessa elämässä.
Me työskentelemme täällä toivossa. Yhtä kannattaa yksi, toista

toinen toive. Mutta yhteistä kaikille on, että toivo ylläpitää.
Ihmiskuntakin kamppailee toivossa. Jokaisella kansakunnalla on

omat toiveensa. Sodassa tappiolle joutunut toivoo pääsevänsä
kerran kostamaan. Ja voittajaa elähdyttää toivo hyötyä voitostaan
niin paljon kuin mahdollista. Mutta ihmiskunnan jaloimpia elähdyttää
lopullisen rauhan toivo — sellaisen ajan odotus, jolloin kansakunnat,
lyöden sovinnon kättä toistensa kanssa, sanovat: »Katso, meidän
Jumalamme, jota me odotimme!»
Entäs me yksityiset ihmiset — mitä sanoo tämä sana meille?
Se kehoittaa meitäkin katsomaan tulevaisuuteen luottamuksella,

toivorikkaina. Se kehoittaa meitä viipymään tämän tulevaisuuden
kuvan tarkastelemisessa lapsen tavoin, joka kaunista kuvakirjaa
katsellessaan unohtaa ikävänsä. Sillä katso — äsken se vielä itki ja
suuret kyynelet vierivät sen poskia pitkin. Sillä oli niin kovin paha
olla. Mutta nyt se hymyilee kyyneltensä lomasta, koska äiti on
ojentanut sille kauniin kirjan. Sitä se nyt ihmetellen selailee ja sen
surulliset ajatukset vaihtuvat kirkkaiksi, onnellisiksi. Sen mielikuvitus
kantaa sen toiseen maailmaan, — maailmaan, jossa on vain hyvää
ja kaunista.
Tällaisina aikoina kuin nämä painaa meidänkin sydäntämme usein

raskas murhe. Missä on Jeesus Kristus? kysymme me. Eikö hän
näe, kuinka surullisella kannalla täällä ovat asiat? Missä on Jumalan
valtakunta, josta kirkoissa saarnataan? Me näemme vain tuskaa,
kärsimystä, kyyneleitä ja kuolemaa, kalpeita, nälkäisiä kasvoja ja
sammuneita silmiä, joiden kerrallisen kirkkauden murhe on
himmentänyt. Missä on lupaus »kaiken uudelleen asettamisesta»?
Ystäväni, se lupaus on tässä esilläolevassa sanassa. Kerran

koittaa aika, jolloin kaikki kyynelet kuivataan. Jumala itse tekee sen
ja — oi, kuinka hellällä kädellä hän sen tekee! Aivan kuin äiti, jonka
luokse lapset tulevat itkien. He ovat riidelleet ja nyt on jokainen pikku
sydän murhetta täynnä; ja he vielä syyttävät toisiaan. Mitä tekee äiti?
Hän nuhtelee heitä lempeästi ja kuivaa sitten vuorotellen itsekunkin
silmät.
Tämänkaltaisen ihanan kuvan luo päivän sana eteemme. Tulee

aika, jolloin kuolemaa ei enää ole; se on menettänyt
peljättäväisyytensä. Silloin on sulanut viha ja katkeruus
ihmissydämistä. Kokonaiset kansat kohtaavat toisensa veljinä. He
ojentavat toisilleen kätensä ja sanovat: »Katso, tämä on meidän
Jumalamme, jota me odotimme, ja hän pelastaa meidät!» Kuinka
mielellämme tahtoisimme olla mukana tuona päivänä!
Tällainen valoisa kuva sielussamme aloitamme nyt uuden

kirkkovuoden. Meillä ei ole täällä Hoosianna-laulua niinkuin etelän
edistyneissä ja väkirikkaissa seurakunnissa. Mutta minusta tuntuu
siitä huolimatta, että nyt on adventti. Sillä mehän voimme laulaa tuon
laulun sydämissämme, kun astumme kirkosta ulos
jumalanpalveluksen päätyttyä, — hyräillä sitä matkalla koteihimme,
kulkiessamme kirkasta talvista tietä pitkin. Ja me voimme kuvitella,
että puiden oksilla kimaltelevat lumihiutaleet ovat kyyneleitä, —
kärsivän ihmiskunnan kyyneleitä, jotka Jumala on kerran pyyhkivä
pois. Amen.
ÄLÄ HEITÄ POIS USKALLUSTASI!
2. Adventtisunnuntai. — Hepr. 10, 35—39.
Uskallus merkitsee tässä samaa kuin ujostelemattomuus, — siis

ominaisuutta, jonka tuntomerkkinä on se, että ihminen jokaisessa
tilaisuudessa näyttää »oikeaa väriä». Siis jokseenkin samaa kuin
teeskentelemättömyys.
Se on tavallisesti ominaista nuoruudelle.
Nuorina ollaan teeskentelemättömiä, — ainakin suuremmassa

määrässä kuin vanhempina, enemmän elämää kokeneina. Silloin ei
tavallisesti olla herkkiä ilmaisemaan sisimpiä ajatuksia. On tultu
varovaisiksi.
Se voi kyllä käydä päinsä monella elämän alalla. Onhan

maailmassa toimialoja, joilla sisimpien ajatusten ja todellisten
tarkoitusten salaaminen luetaan elämän suurimpiin taitoihin
kuuluvaksi. Sellainen on esim. valtiomiehen toimiala.
Maailman valtioviisaus, jonka tarkoituksena on lujan otteen

pysyttäminen oman maan käsissä, rakentuu suurelta osaltaan sille
taidolle, kuinka kulloinkin osataan olla taitavia ja salaperäisiä.
Luulen, että meidän Jumalallamme taivaassa on paljon näitä miehiä
vastaan.
Toista on hengen elämän, Jumalan valtakunnan alalla. Siellä ei

valtioviisaus saa tulla kysymykseen. On aina näytettävä oikeaa
väriä.
Tällä en suinkaan tarkoita sitä, että olisi aina oltava valmis

todistamaan niinkuin esim. Pelastusarmeijassa. Päinvastoin
tuollainen pakollinen todistaminen voi hyvin usein tukahduttaa
oikean uskonelämän. Se on olevinaan uskallusta,
ujostelemattomuutta, mutta pakon orjallinen ies muuttaakin sen
teeskentelyksi, uskalluksen vastakohdaksi.
Ei, minä tarkoitan, että olisit aina rehellinen ja suora. Silloinkin, kun
olet joutunut epäilyksiin. Se on sittenkin parempaa uskallusta kuin
vastakkaisen käsityksen antaminen itsestäsi.
Mutta — sinä sanot — tämähän ei oikeastaan kuulu minulle.

Minähän olen tavallaan luopio kirkollisessa merkityksessä. Minähän
en voi uskoa niinkuin muut. Olen luopunut noilta uskon suurilta
valtateiltä, joita joukot kulkevat. Löysin oman polkuni ja luulin sen
johtavan perille. Mutta — huomaankin eksyneeni suureen, pimeään
metsään, ja polku on häipynyt olemattomiin.
Mitä sanoisin sinulle?
Sanoisinko: käänny takaisin, palaa tutuille, entisille poluille, joita

lapsena vaelsit?
En, sillä tiedän, ettet kuitenkaan voisi sitä tehdä.

Mitä siis sanoisin?
Sanon: älä heitä pois uskallustasi! Pyri vain eteenpäin! Seuraa

vakaumustasi, jonka olet suurten taistelujen kautta saavuttanut. Älä
rupea tuskailemaan uskonkappalten kanssa. Jos olet ne kerran
heittänyt, niin anna niiden olla. Sillä sydämessäsihän asuu kuitenkin
voimakas totuuden löytämishalu. Älä heitä pois uskallustasi, jonka
palkka on suuri!
Luuletko, ettei Jumala taivaastaan seuraa sinun kulkuasi? Oi,

sinun matkaasi hän juuri seuraakin. Hän on itse istuttanut poveesi
tuon kipinän, tuon halun tinkimättömään tutkimiseen ja arvosteluun.
Sinä olet uskollinen itsellesi juuri tuota halua seuratessasi.
Sanot: onhan minulla jo joku pieni sirunen, joku kallis kultajyvänen.

Olen saanut sen ihanan, vapisuttavan vakaumuksen, että Jeesus
Kristus on ihminen. En tahdo kieltää hänen jumaluuttaan, mutta en
käsitä sitä vielä. Mutta — ihminen, se ajatus lämmittää ja rohkaisee
minua sanomattomasti.
Niin — älä heitä pois uskallustasi. Pidä kultajyväsi. Sinulla on jo

Vapahtaja, joka kuljettaa sinua eteenpäin.
Katso: urhoollisimmat sotilaat palaavat taistelusta haavojen

peittäminä. He eivät säästäneet itseään. He eivät halunneet vetäytyä
pois. Heidän olisi ollut toisinaan helppo suojata itseään ja siten
välttyä iskuilta. Mutta — heidän intonsa, paras osa heissä, vaati
ryntäämään eteenpäin.
Luuletko, ettei Jumala pysty arvostelemaan sinua oikein, sinä

epäilysten haavoittama sielu? Kerran kun pääset perille — ja sinä
pääset! — hän osoittaa sinua enkeleilleen ja sanoo: »Katsokaapa
tätä taivaltajaa. Hän valitsi sangen vaikean tien. Hän lähti kulkemaan
sen suuren korven läpi, jonka nimi on Yksinäisyys. Hänellä ei ollut
toveria matkalla. Hän uupui ja lankesi monta kertaa, hän repi
vaatteensa piikkipensastoissa, mutta perille hän on kuitenkin
päässyt. Hoitakaa hänen haavansa ja antakaa hänelle uudet, ehyet
vaatteet.»
Niin — älä heitä pois uskallustasi. Kulje eteenpäin. Sinähän et

tahdo kuulua niihin, jotka »vetäytyvät pois». Sinä pyrit päämäärään.
Tietysti sinun olisi paljon mukavampi astua uskonnollisen
tavanmukaisuuden teitä. Siellä olisi sinulla paljon tovereita ja saisit
olla rauhassa. Ei kukaan tuomitseisi eikä arvostelisi sinua. Nyt
jokainen osoittaa sinua sormellaan ja sanoo: »Katsokaa hullua
miestä, joka lähti metsään, vaikka edessä oli selvä maantie.»
Niin — siellä olisi turvallista ja paljon matkakumppaneja, noita

pyhiinvaeltajien joukkokaravaaneja, jotka oppaittensa johdolla
matkaavat majapaikasta toiseen, uskotellen, että heidän tiensä on
ainoa, joka vie Pyhään maahan.
Ei — kulje sinä vain yksinäsi. Perille sinäkin pääset. Saat kerran

hämmästyksellä todeta, että sinuun sovellutetaan tekstimme
loppusanat: »… vaan niitä, jotka uskovat sielunsa pelastukseksi».
Amen.
TODELLINEN SUURUUS.
3. Adventtisunnuntai. — Matt. 11, 11—19.
Olette kuulleet puhuttavan suurmiehistä. Tiedätte ehkä jonkun

nimenkin. Suurmiehillä tarkoitetaan sellaisia miehiä, jotka ovat
saaneet aikaan jotakin suurta joko henkisen tahi aineellisen elämän
alalla, — sellaista, mikä tulee koko kansan hyväksi.
Jumalan valtakunnallakin on omat suurmiehensä. Päivän

evankeliumi esittää meille yhden heistä: — Johannes Kastajan.
Hänestä antaa toinen, häntä vielä suurempi, todistuksen: »Hän on
vaimoista syntyneiden joukossa suurin.»
Suuruutta mitataan vain tässä näkyväisessä maailmassa toisin

kuin
Jumalan valtakunnassa. Siellä tulee yksinomaan kysymykseen
henkinen
suuruus. Tämä saavutetaan hengen yhteyden kautta kaikkein
suurimman,
Jeesuksen Kristuksen, kanssa. Sen vuoksi kehoittaa apostolikin:
»Jokaisella olkoon se ajatus, mikä Jeesuksella Kristuksella oli.»
Tämä henkinen suuruus on usein samaa kuin nöyryys ja
vaatimattomuus.
Pienin taivaan valtakunnassa on suurempi Johannes Kastajaakin.
Maallinen suuruus saavutetaan esimerkiksi suurten tietojen kautta.

Sanotaanhan, että tieto on valtaa. Niiden avulla avaantuvat hyvin
monessa tapauksessa yhteiskunnalliset valta-asemat, päästään
ylhäisten ja mahtavien suosioon. Sekin voi olla tavoiteltava
päämäärä. Mutta suurempaa kuin tämä, on se kuninkaallinen elämä,
jonka avulla voitetaan tämä maailma ja sen ruhtinas. Tämä suuruus
on lähtöisin Jumalasta. »Sillä kaikki, mikä on syntynyt Jumalasta,
voittaa maailman; ja tämä on se voitto, joka on voittanut maailman,
meidän uskomme.» (1. Joh. 5, 4.)
Monet ihmiset saattavat olla suuria tässä maailmassa, mutta

maailma on voittanut heidät. He ovat heikkoja suuruudestaan
huolimatta.
Johannes Kastaja oli kohonnut ihmisten yläpuolelle. Hän ei ollut

riippuvainen ulkonaisista tavoista eikä siitä, mitä ihmiset pitivät
tärkeänä. Näkyväinen oli menettänyt merkityksensä häneen nähden.
Sen vuoksi hän esim. esiintyi perin vaatimattomasti puettuna. Hän ei
kuulunut »hienoihin vaatteisiin puettuihin». Siinä oli yksi piirre hänen
suuruudestaan.
Toinen oli siinä, ettei hän halunnut riistää itselleen kunniaa, joka ei
hänelle kuulunut, vaikka hän aivan hyvin olisi voinut sen tehdä.
Hänen julkinen esiintymisensä oli tehnyt siksi voimallisen
vaikutuksen, ettei kukaan olisi hämmästynyt, vaikka hän olisi
julistanutkin itsensä Kristukseksi. Mutta sitä hän ei tehnyt, sillä hän
oli nöyrä. »Hänen tulee kasvaa, minun tulee vähetä», sanoi hän,
puheen johtuessa näihin asioihin.
Kolmas piirre, jonka voimme helposti havaita, ja joka tekee
hänestä suurmiehen Jumalan valtakunnassa, on se, ettei hän
peljännyt ihmisiä. Hän uskalsi mennä nuhtelemaan Herodesta tämän
synnistä. Missä meillä on nykyisin sellaisia miehiä?
Mutta — tämä suuruus, joka Jumalan edessä kelpaa, on

vaikeuksia tuottava ominaisuus. Sen omistaja saa olla aina valmis
kärsimyksiin. Sen todistaa meille Johannes Kastajan elämä.
Hän oli juutalaisten mielestä liian ankara, kovin ahdasmielinen.

Hänen herransa, Vapahtaja, oli taas liian lempeä, liiaksi
vapaamielinen.
Samoin on asianlaita vielä tänäkin päivänä. Kristitty on

ympäristönsä mielestä joko liian maailmallinen tahi liian vapaa.
Käyttäytyipä hän miten tahansa, hän ei koskaan kelpaa. Hän saa
olla aina valmis ottamaan vastaan moitteita ja tuomiota.
Mutta — jos hän — niinkuin Johannes Kastaja — on kokonaan

antautunut Jumalan valtakunnalle, hän ei välitä maailman tuomiosta.
Häntä kannustaa vain yksi ainoa suuri intohimo, jos niin tahtoisimme
sanoa: halu voittaa Jumalan valtakunta kokonaan. Hän tahtoo olla
väkevä, joka »repii» sen itselleen.
Kuulutko, kuulijani, noihin väkeviin, noihin sankarisieluihin, jotka

panevat kaikki alttiiksi päämääränsä saavuttamiseksi? Apostoli
Paavali kuului niihin. Hän sanoo muutamassa lähetyskirjeessään:
»En tahdo mistään muusta tietää kuin Jeesuksesta Kristuksesta,
siitä ristiinnaulitusta». Hän oli »väkevä»; hän »repi» Jumalan
valtakunnan itselleen.

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The Origins of Ethical Failures Lessons

for Leaders 2nd Edition Dennis Gentilin

Good Leaders Learn Lessons from Lifetimes of Leadership

Epic Engineering Failures and the Lessons They Teach -

The Sincerity Edge How Ethical Leaders Build Dynamic

The essentials of factor analysis 2nd Edition Dennis

The Art of Conversation in Cancer Care: Lessons for

Leading Colleges and Universities Lessons from Higher

The Four Pillars of Investing: Lessons for Building a

The Origins of the Crimean War Origins Of Modern Wars

In this thoroughly updated new edition of his ground-breaking and award-winning

Dennis Gentilin is a risk and governance professional with over 20 years’

Second edition published 2023

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2023 Dennis Gentilin

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or

First edition published by Routledge 2016

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN: 978-1-032-33456-1 (hbk)

List of acronyms xiii

1 Our fawed humanity 17

Are humans honest? 21

Lessons for leaders 37

Are incentives effective? 45

The role of public institutions 61

Lessons for leaders 66

Does accountability promote ethical behaviour? 74

The role of public institutions 89

Lessons for leaders 97

4 Group dynamics 102

Group norms 111

The role of public institutions 123

Lessons for leaders 126

Conclusion: What are the lessons for leaders? 131

It starts at the top 133

What about purpose? 137

Don’t forget ethical followership 139

ADI authorised deposit-taking institution

Doubt is not a pleasant condition, but certainty is absurd.

Box I.1 The Royal Commission into misconduct in the banking,

Then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced the establishment of a

Box I.2 “Nudging” for honesty: too good to be true

Since being conceived, the idea has spawned an industry. According to

With the new data presented here, we recommend that practitioners

In a report issued in 1858, the Commons catalogued a litany of abuses

Danckert, S. (2018, November 8). ‘Ridiculous’: Judge challenges ASIC’s push to

Hertwig, R., & Ortmann, A. (2001). Experimental practices in economics: A

Our fawed humanity

Box 1.1 What does it mean to be (un)ethical?

How does one make a judgement on whether conduct is “ethical”? This is

practices, behaviour or business activities by fnancial services entities fall

There is some difculty in defning the subject of Ethics in a manner

by Lawrence Kohlberg (Heinz dilemma, n.d.). In it, Heinz’s wife is terminally

Are humans honest?

Our new experimental results, combined with our theoretical predictions,

Through the inclusion of plausible deniability, Tergiman and Villeval (2021)