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 Routledge Studies in the Economics of Innovation

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

OF DIGITAL ECOSYSTEMS
SCENARIO PLANNING FOR ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
Meelis Kitsing
The Political Economy of Digital
Ecosystems

This book connects political economy perspectives with scenario planning for
mapping out future trajectories of digital ecosystems. The focus is purposefully
on digital ecosystems as it encompasses economic, political and social contexts
on a global, national and local level. The diversity of political economy
approaches allows the author to explore alternative meanings of digital ecosystem
development, which is particularly useful for envisioning alternative futures.
Often visions about the future of digital ecosystems suffer from a lack of
imagination and confirmation bias, which is favorable to the extrapolation of
current trends. A wide range of political economy perspectives applied through
positivist theorizing in this book shows different interpretations of developments
in digital ecosystems. Scenario planning teams around the world have applied a
collective imagination to show how future trajectories can be radically different
from the current trends. The book outlines meta-scenarios for alternative futures
of the political economy of digital ecosystems by reviewing and synthesizing the
work of foresight teams. These meta-scenarios served as insights for developing
four scenarios for European digital ecosystems through the workshops with
high-level executives and experts. The scenarios identified the nature of EU
cooperation and the development of digital infrastructure as key drivers.
These four scenarios developed in the workshops are further operationalized
in a specific context by exploring the implications for Estonia as well as for
Chinese investment in European platforms. This exercise shows how scenarios
of digital ecosystems can be used for stress-testing decisions and strategies.
Decision-makers, students, scholars and other stakeholders in a wide range
of industries ranging from academia to ride-sharing can use the scenarios
for reframing different development trajectories and future-proofing their
strategies. The scenarios can be further developed and modified for specific
purposes and contexts as they are not written in stone.

Meelis Kitsing is Rector and Professor of Political Economy at the Estonian

Business School (EBS), a nonprofit private university with campuses in Tallinn,
Estonia, and in Helsinki, Finland. Previously, he served in different analysis and
strategy-focused positions for the Estonian government and taught at numerous
universities in Europe and the US. He received his PhD from the University
of Massachusetts Amherst and his master’s degrees from the Fletcher School at
Tufts University and London School of Economics.
Routledge Studies in the Economics of Innovation

The Routledge Studies in the Economics of Innovation series is our home for
comprehensive yet accessible texts on the current thinking in the field.
These cutting-edge, upper-level scholarly studies and edited collections bring
together robust theories from a wide range of individual disciplines and provide
in-depth studies of existing and emerging approaches to innovation, and the
implications of such for the global economy.

Capitalism, Power and Innovation

Intellectual Monopoly Capitalism Uncovered
Cecilia Rikap

Robot Ethics and the Innovation Economy

Jon-Arild Johannessen

The Co-Creative University

Evaluation, Expectations and Economic Policy Implications
Łukasz Mamica

The Economics of Digital Transformation

The Disruption of Markets, Production, Consumption and Work
Katarzyna Śledziewska and Renata Włoch

The Political Economy of Digital Ecosystems

Scenario Planning for Alternative Futures
Meelis Kitsing

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/

Ro utled ge-St udies -in-t he-Ec onomi cs-of -Inno vatio n/boo k-ser ies/
ECONINN
The Political Economy of
Digital Ecosystems
Scenario Planning for Alternative Futures

Meelis Kitsing
First published 2022
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2022 Meelis Kitsing
The right of Meelis Kitsing to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Kitsing, Meelis, author.
Title: The political economy of digital ecosystems : scenario planning for
alternative futures / Meelis Kitsing.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2022. |
Series: Routledge studies in the economics of innovation |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021008547 (print) | LCCN 2021008548 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Information technology--Economic aspects. |
Technological innovations--Economic aspects.
Classification: LCC HC79.I55 K6235 2022 (print) | LCC HC79.I55
(ebook) | DDC 338/.064--dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021008547
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021008548
ISBN: 978-0-367-65397-2 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-367-65398-9 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-12926-4 (ebk)
Typeset in Bembo
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India
Contents

List of figures vi
List of tables vii
Meelis Kitsing’s biography viii
Preface ix

1 Introduction 1

2 The emergence of digital ecosystems 11

3 Global political economy of digital ecosystems 30

4 Multilevel formal and informal governance of digital ecosystems 48

5 Scenario planning for global futures 68

6 Alternative futures for digital ecosystems 81

7 Scenarios for European digital ecosystems 93

8 Implications of scenarios for Estonia 120

9 Implications of scenarios for Chinese investment in European

platforms 137

10 Conclusion 146

Appendix A: Key terms and concepts 151

Appendix B: Scenario planning workshop participants 156
Appendix C: Crowdsourcing for scenarios 157
Index 158
Figures

3.1 Absolute and relative gains of China, the EU and US. Source:
the Author 35
3.2 Prisoner’s dilemma: China versus the US (1 is the worst and 4
is the best payoff). Source: the Author 36
3.3 Battle of the sexes: EU and US (1 is the worst and 4 is the
best payoff). Source: the Author 37
3.4 Sequential interactions between Chinese and US technology
platforms. Source: the Author 43
3.5 The Cournot competition between Chinese and US
technology platforms. Source: the Author 44
4.1 The great technology debate on consequences.
Source: the Author 49
7.1 The key drivers and scenarios. Source: the Author 105
Tables

5.1 Three meta-scenarios for global political economy and their

characteristics 78
6.1 Three meta-scenarios for digital ecosystems and their
characteristics 90
7.1 Scenarios and their characteristics 106
8.1 Percentage of individuals aged 16–74 using internet banking
in the CEE countries and the average for the 27 members of
the EU 125
8.2 Scenarios and their characteristics and implications for Estonia 129
8.3 Key implications of scenarios for the Estonian digital
ecosystem across policy areas 133
9.1 Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in different sectors in the
European economy (2005–2019) 140
9.2 Scenarios and their characteristics and implications for
Chinese FDI into European digital platforms 144
Meelis Kitsing’s biography

Meelis Kitsing is Rector and Professor of Political Economy at the Estonian

Business School (EBS), a nonprofit private university with campuses in Tallinn,
Estonia, and in Helsinki Finland. Previously, he served as the Chair of EBS
Economics and Finance Department and Head of Research at Foresight Center,
a think tank at the Estonian Parliament. Kitsing also worked as an Adviser
at the Strategy Unit of the Estonian Cabinet Office and Head of Economic
Analysis at the Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication.
He also served as the President of the Estonian Economic Association.
Professor Kitsing’s current research interests focus on the political econ-
omy of digital ecosystems. His research has been published by Transnational
Corporations Review, Journal of Politics, Policy and Internet, Journal of Information
Technology and Politics as well as by Springer, IEEE, ACM, Leuven University
and MIT Press. He has conducted research and taught at the University of
Massachusetts, National Center for Digital Government (US), George Mason
University, Central European University, Harvard University, University of
Connecticut, Stockholm School of Economics and numerous other universi-
ties in Europe and in the United States. He has been quoted in the Financial
Times, Economist, Reader’s Digest, El Comercio and Postimees.
Meelis Kitsing received his PhD from the University of Massachusetts,
Amherst (US), his MALD as a Fulbright scholar from the Fletcher School
at Tufts University (US) and his MSc as a Peacock scholar from the London
School of Economics (UK). Prior to his academic pursuits, he worked for
multinational companies and was elected to two consecutive terms to the City
Council of Tallinn, capital of Estonia. Meelis is an avid cross-country skier,
cyclist and swimmer. He also enjoys downhill and roller skiing.
Preface

I have wrestled with the ideas presented in this book for almost two decades.
My interest in politics and economics of digital technologies started when I
worked for a consulting firm in the 1990s and advised an internet service pro-
vider in Estonia. I went on to cofound an ecommerce start-up where we had
to tackle differences in internet use on a daily basis. While internet banking
was widely used in Estonia in the late 1990s, we had to set up a special entity
in Delaware for accepting checks from our customers in the US. This practi-
cal business experience was certainly eye-opening for my academic and policy
interests. I am grateful to my business partners and coworkers – Oliver, Pirkko,
Risto, Allan and many others – from these turbulent times.
Since Estonia was a transition economy in the 1990s, then my first instinct
was to explore whether any lessons could be learned from more advanced
Nordic countries. I wrote my Master of Science thesis on the political econ-
omy of internet diffusion in Finland and Sweden at the London School of
Economics and Political Science in 2001. This was an attempt to apply tra-
ditional political economy ideas to what was then considered a field outside
of the traditional realm of political economy. I am grateful to my supervisor
David Stasavage and Professor Razeen Sally for their advice as well as to the
Michael Peacock Scholarship Program for fully funding my studies at LSE.
However, the key understanding that resulted from these explorations was
that there are not many lessons to be learned from Finland and Sweden. First,
these countries had different political economy systems and had followed dif-
ferent development trajectories than Estonia. Second, Estonia was actually
quite advanced in the use of the internet and related technologies in compari-
son with Finland and Sweden. Hence, my interest shifted toward improving
my understanding of internet diffusion in Estonia and Central Eastern Europe.
Immediately after my graduation from LSE, I received an international
policy fellowship from the Center for Policy Studies (affiliated with the Open
Society Institute and Central European University) to study Estonia and
Slovenia, which were considered the most advanced countries in information
and communication technologies (ICT) development in Central and Eastern
Europe. This fellowship allowed me to travel to Slovenia in January 2003 to
learn about the use of digital technologies. As a side project, I also traveled to
x Preface
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to evaluate the activities
of the Global Internet Policy Initiative (GIPI) in the summer of 2002. This
experience certainly deepened my understanding of how different institutional
constraints and development trajectories of countries shape digital ecosystems.
I am thankful to Jerzy Celichowski, Darius Cuplinskas, Pamela Kipaldi and
others for making this fellowship possible.
I continued pursuing my research interest at the Fletcher School at Tufts
University, where I wrote my Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy thesis in
2004 on the impact of economic openness on internet diffusion in Estonia and
Slovenia. This was an attempt to combine my newly gained understanding
of international trade economics with that of technology diffusion. I am very
grateful to my supervisor Carsten Kowalczyk for his advice and support.
I would like to thank the Fulbright Program of the US State Department,
the Humane Studies Fellowship of the Institute for Humane Studies at George
Mason University, the Armand Hammer Scholarship Program, the Lellep
Scholarship of Estonian Students Fund in the US and the Linna Scholarship
of the Estonian World Council for making my studies at the Fletcher School
possible.
After graduation from the Fletcher School, I pursued my research on inter-
net diffusion in a PhD program at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Simultaneously, I have presented early versions of the first three chapters of this
book at numerous conferences of the American Political Science Association,
International Studies Association, Industry Studies Association, Midwest
Political Science Association, Oxford Internet Institute, Ronald Coase Institute,
International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance
(ICEGOV), Electronic Government (EGOV) and Digital Government
Society.
My contributions have also been published by the Journal of Politics, Policy
and Internet, Journal of Information Technology and Politics as well as by MIT Press,
Springer, IEEE, ACM, Leuven University and other outlets. I am indebted
to colleagues I have met at these conferences and many anonymous review-
ers who have provided me feedback on my work. I am very thankful to the
University of Massachusetts in Amherst, the US National Science Foundation,
the Hayek Fund for Scholars at the Institute for Humane Studies and the
Estonian Business School for funding my conference travels. I am especially
grateful to Jane Fountain, Eric Einhorn and Charles Schweik for serving on my
PhD committee and for their detailed and invaluable comments.
I benefited tremendously from participating in OECD and EU foresight
conferences as well as OECD workshops on industrial policy, broadband and
internet economy in Paris, London and Washington, DC. I would like to
thank the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications in Estonia, the
Strategy Unit at the Estonian Cabinet Office and the Foresight Center at the
Estonian Parliament for making it possible.
The recent versions of my work on digital ecosystems have benefited tre-
mendously from the possibility of presenting my work at the conference of
 Preface xi
the Asian Development Bank in Manila and the workshop organized by the
Oxford Internet Institute and European University at the Hertie School of
Governance in Berlin. Absolutely invaluable was the support of the Foresight
Center, where I served as the Head of Research. The Center made it possi-
ble to build a network of experts and stakeholders which gave valuable feed-
back on different parts of this book. My special thanks go to Martin Kenney,
Risto Penttilä, Erik Terk, Merle Maigre and Kai Jia for their invaluable com-
ments and suggestions. I would like to thank the Foresight Center staff – Tea
Danilov, Johanna Vallistu, Kadri Mats, Berit Brandt, Marina Bachmann and
Uku Varblane – and numerous stakeholders who served in the advisory com-
mittees and participated in the seminars. Great gratitude goes to Helin Sepa for
the help in designing figures as well as to James Schaefer from the University of
Tartu and Aditya Ramachandran from the Fletcher School of Tufts University
for providing valuable research assistance. All mistakes are mine.
Meelis Kitsing
Tallinn, February 2, 2021
1 Introduction

At the dawn of the global financial crisis, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II vis-
ited the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in 2008 to
inquire why no one predicted the global financial crisis. In a letter that fol-
lowed many months later by LSE Professor Tim Besley and eminent historian
Peter Hennessy, they wrote that it was a result of “a failure of [the] collective
imagination of many bright people” (Stewart, 2009).
This book will not rely on one prediction or vision about the future of
digital ecosystems. Through literature reviews of work done by many foresight
organizations, this book relies on the collective imagination of many bright
people around the world. This is complemented by discussions of scenarios
that emerged on the basis of scenario planning workshops with high-level busi-
ness executives and experts.
The key premise of the book is to emphasize the importance of thinking
about the futures of digital ecosystems in the context of the global politi-
cal economy by using scenario planning. This approach breaks linear logic
and uses the imagination of different futures for stress-testing various what-if
worlds. It suggests that it is a superior approach in a global political economy
shaped by complexity, turbulence and uncertainty to linear forecasts about
the future based on rational calculation by relying on past data. “It is better to
be vaguely right than exactly wrong”, wrote British logician and philosopher
Read (1914) a century ago.

Imagine all futures

The combination of different scenarios from many bright people helps to map
out alternative futures such as digital ecosystems dominated by large private
platforms, government platforms or decentralized open platforms.
If the current trend toward the dominance of large private platforms is
reversed by the rise of government-dominated platforms, it will lead to the
splinternet, including the emergence of a new internet protocol (IP) in China
and affiliated countries. Meanwhile, the old IP is used in the US and among
its allies. Reduced economies of scale and network effects may lead to digital
ecosystems becoming less efficient.
2 Introduction
The decentralized ecosystem scenario seems more desirable for open nations
and organizations but navigating these waters is more complex as they are
characterized by a diversity of platform ecosystems with multiple private, com-
munity, local, national and global solutions. There is also a huge divergence in
the regulatory approaches. Internet regulations in the global political economy
currently resemble Swiss cheese with overlapping authorities and gaps that
offer opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.
If we let our collective imagination go wild, it is not difficult to foresee a
scenario where small nations risk becoming “digital rose islands”, particularly
if they fail to consider alternative futures and stress-test their digital strategies.
The original Rose Island was built as a platform by young Italian engineers in
the Adriatic Sea in 1968 and was later blown up by the Italian navy. They had
a vision that embodied the old Silicon Valley belief – before it was stated by
Alan Kay from Xerox Parc in 1971 – that “the best way to predict the future
is to invent it” (Kay, 1989).
Similarly, small nations may be successful in building up their own digital
platforms only to see them to be wiped off by great power competition in tech-
nology wars. However, a strong vision is necessary for digital solutions to take
off, but they are not sufficient in the current turbulent global environment. The
liberal multilateral world that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union is
being reshaped by technology wars between China and the US. The COVID-19
pandemic is adding complexity and uncertainty for future digital developments.

Platformization of digital ecosystems

The shifts in the global political economy interact with digital ecosystems that
are increasingly structuring our economic, political and social life. The num-
ber of people using the internet has increased to over 4 billion globally from
slightly less than 2 billion 10 years ago. Digital platforms have re-organized
many economic sectors such as shopping and entertainment and have wide-
reaching macroeconomic impacts as well as the ability to challenge the essence
of democratic politics.
Fifteen years ago, the “internet”, “online” and “virtual” were separate from
“real life”. This distinction has increasingly blurred with the introduction of
the smartphone in 2007 and particularly in the new context of physical distanc-
ing. Digital tools have become so embedded in our daily life that it is difficult
to go on with daily activities or even imagine life without them.
This is so particularly in the case of large digital platforms such as Google,
Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft, which is sometimes referred to as
GAFAM. Seven out of the ten most valuable public companies in the world
by market capitalization were digital platforms on April 30, 2020. Five of them
– Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Alphabet and Facebook – are US companies and
two are Chinese – Alibaba and Tencent (Statista, 2021). Ten years ago, Apple
and Microsoft made it to the top ten. Twenty years ago, only Microsoft made
it to the list of top ten companies by market capitalization.
 Introduction 3
The rise of large digital platforms and growing technological stand-off
between China and the US contradicts the old perspective where the internet
is perceived as a global borderless technology that is not limited by politics,
morality and geography. Technolibertarians used to argue that some govern-
ments may try to stop its use or regulate some aspects of its use, but even these
governments often face an uphill battle. In the early days of the internet, inter-
net activist John Perry Barlow published a “Declaration of the Independence
of Cyberspace”, where he argued that governments do not have sovereignty in
cyberspace (Barlow, 1996). He said to “Governments of the industrial world”
that “Cyberspace does not lie within your borders” (Barlow, 1996).
This was not just talk but taken seriously by many entrepreneurs. Following
the true spirit of early internet pioneers, for example, Estonian computer pro-
grammers teamed up with Danish and Swedish entrepreneurs and created Kazaa
in 2001. Kazaa facilitated peer-to-peer online file-sharing, which soon became
the most downloaded computer app in the world in the early 2000s. However,
they soon discovered that there are clear borders in cyberspace. According
to the Hollywood-based entertainment industry, Kazaa had violated some of
these borders. The US imposed its extraterritorial sovereignty in cyberspace
and Kazaa’s founders became fugitives of the US justice system. The case over
the different perception of borders was finally settled for 100 million dollars
in 2006. Fortunately, Kazaa’s founders had just sold their other digital-border-
testing venture, called Skype, to eBay for 2.6 billion dollars (Kitsing, 2015).
The internet clearly is not a borderless technology. The nature of its use and
diffusion is clearly limited by geography, state sovereignty, economics, politics
and numerous other factors. China has built a wall around its borders where
many American platforms such as Google and Facebook cannot access. Large
US platforms have built up gated communities over the last decades where
they are effectively rule-makers and enforcers of the rules. This platformiza-
tion runs clearly opposite to the vision laid out by Barlow in 1996, but it is not
always governments that may limit the freedoms of individuals in cyberspace
but also large private platforms.

Heterogeneous digital ecosystems

If the world was flat and the internet borderless, we would expect the inter-
net to be diffused evenly and its use to be uniform. Yet within the borders
of developed countries, digital ecosystems are more advanced than those of
developing countries. In addition, among different countries of the industrial
world, digital ecosystems vary considerably.
This is quite revealing for at least two reasons. First, it clearly indicates that
the internet is a global technology, but digital ecosystems are not aspatial but
spatial. As digital ecosystems develop differently over time, they are not ahis-
torical but historical. In other words, history matters for how digital ecosystems
develop over time with different extensity and intensity in different loca-
tions. Second, if digital ecosystems are dependent on historical, geographical,
4 Introduction
political, social and other factors, then it is important to understand how these
factors enable and constrain the development of digital ecosystems in the con-
text of the global political economy.
Understanding the relationship between digital ecosystems and the vast vari-
ety of social, political and economic factors has increasingly become a crucial
issue as more and more societies rely on these ecosystems for a wide range of
interactions ranging from work to leisure. While there has been an increasing
number of studies on digital ecosystems and platforms that have used a variety
of variables, this book connects digital ecosystems with the broader literature
on international political economy, multilevel formal and informal governance
and scenario planning as a method for exploring futures.
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are particularly illustra-
tive in the context of heterogeneous digital ecosystems. They had socialist
economic and political systems until 1991, albeit with some important differ-
ences. They all went through an economic, political and social transition in the
1990s toward democracy, freer markets and greater social openness. The most
advanced of these countries joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007.
However, the digital ecosystems vary considerably in these countries (Kitsing,
2015; European Commission, 2020).
Different from several CEE countries, digital interactions have become
embedded in Estonia, for example. Some of these services are easily under-
standable, such as internet banking that Estonians have enjoyed since 1996.
Others are unique to the outside world, such as internet voting, which has
been available since 2005 and is used by almost half of voters. Some are invis-
ible but fundamental for the ecosystem – such as the X-Road – which, as the
backbone of digital infrastructure, facilitates data sharing among public and
private organizations (Kitsing, 2015).
Digitalization in Estonia has been an evolutionary process where key deci-
sions about the delivery of services and digital identity were already made
20 years ago. However, this process is also characterized by a high degree of
heterogeneity.

The role of digital ecosystems

The role of digitalization is a challenge to measure. Some scholars have empha-
sized the correlation between the use of digital technologies and national wealth
(Corrales and Westhoff, 2006, p. 912). This would suggest a connection with
productivity, i.e., either more productive countries invest more in digitaliza-
tion or digitalization generates more productivity or both. This suggest that
the impact of digitalization on productivity is notoriously difficult to measure.
To paraphrase a well-known saying by Robert Solow, a Nobel laureate in
economics, we can see digitalization everywhere except in the productivity
statistics.
National accounting has been designed for mid-20th-century economies
with strong manufacturing sectors. Therefore, the contribution by digital
 Introduction 5
services is not well captured and seriously underestimated by the national
accounts. Clearly, digitalization cuts transaction costs, but even transaction cost
economists acknowledge shortcomings in empirical attempts to measure them.
Many scholars have emphasized the connection between digital technol-
ogies and the role of institutions that are defined as the rules of the game.
Most scholars focus on what are called formal rules – laws and regulations
of a country (Milner, 2006). This is understandable because formal rules are
easier to measure than informal rules such as social norms, expectations and
culture. Some scholars have found that democracies have greater use of digital
technologies than authoritarian regimes (Milner, 2006). This is not surpris-
ing because authoritarian governments often try to discourage their citizens
from using digital technologies for at least certain purposes and particularly for
activities that may in some ways undermine the legitimacy of the government.
However, other scholars have found that much more specific rules may matter
for digital technologies. Particularly, how governments regulate the telecom
sector and how much competition they allow for offering various telecom
services matters a great deal (Guillen and Suarez, 2005).
Nevertheless, most of the studies focusing on income or formal institu-
tions rely on a limited set of variables to study a large number of countries.
Ultimately, it means that many factors that may matter for digital ecosystems
may be assumed away. However, countries with similar levels of wealth and
fairly similar institutional settings may still have different digital ecosystems.
For instance, EU countries are all democracies. The formal institutional frame-
work of these countries is fairly similar as they all had to adopt the EU laws
and regulations. Different institutions, i.e., formal and informal rules, their
interactions, conflicts and institutional logics behind these institutions, create
institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Room, 2011; Smets et al.,
2012; Thornton et al., 2012). The regulations of the European Union may
conflict with domestic government regulations or they may be against informal
rules based on the attitudes and expectations of people. For instance, a mac-
roeconomic framework may conflict with government regulation on a micro
level. Communities may not respect micro-level government rules because
they conflict with their social norms. The ecosystem is the result of these vari-
ous interactions.
This suggests that the emergence of digital ecosystems is not an issue to be
explained by a small number of country-level variables, but there are important
elements outside overly simplistic formalized models that must be considered.
Indeed, studies focusing on a small number of cases usually come to different
conclusions on factors that matter for digital technologies than studies based
on a large number of cases (Kitsing and Howard, 2009). Partially, such an out-
come is dependent on the research methods. Case studies allow incorporating
more details and drawing a richer picture. The evolution of digital ecosystems
is limited by different borders which impose different trajectories. In this case,
it is not just easily measurable borders that matter. Mental and epistemic factors
are much more difficult to grasp than the political, economic, geographic and
6 Introduction
legal borders of countries. Hence, it is important to incorporate both literal and
metaphorical borders into the analysis. This book aims to do that by discussing
informal and tacit factors working as a clue for digital ecosystems in the past,
present and future.

Summary of chapters
Chapter 2
The next chapter reviews the literature on digital platforms and combines it
with both classical and newer perspectives on political economy. Particularly, it
emphasizes the role of technology lock-ins, path-dependence, network effects,
the asymmetry between supply and demand as well as multisided markets in
understanding the emergence of digital ecosystems. Digital ecosystems have to
be seen as a path-dependent process where the development of particular pro-
cesses can be traced back to a critical juncture. In the process, both supply and
demand matter even though their interaction may be asymmetric in different
periods of ecosystem evolution, i.e., in the beginning, it may be more supply-
driven and in the mature phase, the demand side gains more prominence.
This chapter emphasizes that the concept of digital ecosystems is a fun-
damentally different organizational form than a hierarchical firm or other
organizations as well as horizontal markets. Digital ecosystems are shaped
by developments in the global political economy, multisided governance as
well as a multitude of political and social factors in addition to economics and
technology.

Chapter 3
Chapter 3 argues that global trends should be taken into account, but it is far
more important to understand alternative perspectives and different theories
of international relations and political economy. The tensions concerning the
digital trade and development of digital ecosystems can be seen through the
lens of the long-term debate of relative and absolute gains as highlighted in
international relations theory. The game of the prisoner’s dilemma allows us to
pin down the essence of Chinese and American technology competition. The
extension of a game theory framework to different interactions and settings
also allows us to show how technology competition shapes outcomes in the
international political economy.

Chapter 4
Chapter 4 focuses on the multilevel formal and informal governance of digi-
tal ecosystems. It argues that the epistemological and network nature of digital
technologies must be taken into account. Such an approach allows us to develop
more nuanced arguments by incorporating insights from the broader accounts
 Introduction 7
in social sciences instead of relying solely on the literature on digital ecosystems.
This is a particularly valuable approach as the literature on the governance of
digital ecosystems is new in the broader context of the governance literature. On
the basis of this synthesis of this literature, the chapter suggests considering insti-
tutional complexity and entrepreneurial discovery in order to understand digital
ecosystems. The interactions between formal and informal governance mecha-
nisms must be considered. Focus on the formal governance mechanism has limi-
tations in explaining the governance of digital ecosystems. Informal governance
institutions, which include habits, norms of behavior, social capital, networks
and many other factors, which have been discussed in length above, may offer a
better explanation. Social capital and networks facilitate the process of entrepre-
neurial discovery, which utilizes localized and dispersed specific tacit knowledge.
This process can be more fundamental for the advancement of digital ecosystems
than relying on top-down social engineering and explicit scientific knowledge.

Chapter 5
Chapter 5 introduces scenario planning and highlights the benefits of scenario
planning in environments characterized by high uncertainty and complexity.
It emphasizes the need to consider alternative futures on the basis of scenario
planning instead of the extrapolation of current trends based on forecasting or
prediction. This approach highlights key elements for the futures of the global
political economy by relying on the sample of scenarios developed by national
and international foresight teams. The chapter develops three meta-scenarios
for the future of the global political economy on the basis of the sample. All
three meta-scenarios imply trade-offs for decision-makers.
The purpose of the scenario planning approach is not to offer concrete
policy suggestions but rather to indicate potential future developments for
decision-makers, which allows formulating a framework for possible responses
and stress-test strategies. Nevertheless, a robust suggestion is that strategists
and decision-makers have to be prepared for alternative scenarios and radical
changes rather than rely on one vision or strategy for thinking about the future
of global political economy shifts and their implications.

Chapter 6
Chapter 6 explores alternative futures for digital ecosystems based on scenario
planning instead of the extrapolation of current trends based on forecasting or
prediction. This approach highlights key elements for the future developments
of digital ecosystems on the basis of scenarios developed by national as well as
international foresight teams. The chapter focuses particularly on digital trans-
formation, governance, business environment and future of work scenarios. It
develops three meta-scenarios for the future of digital ecosystems, emphasizing
the importance of governance. Governance plays a fundamental role in struc-
turing platform ecosystems.
8 Introduction
The Private Platform Ecosystems meta-scenario maps out a world where
large private platforms from the US and China dominate both global and
domestic platform ecosystems, often replacing smaller domestic players and
government platforms.
The Government Ecosystems meta-scenario envisions a world where gov-
ernments have become dominant in directing and regulating platform eco-
systems. This is the world of the so-called splinternet where countries have
grouped in opposing technology blocs and domestically, government platforms
provide not only public but also private goods.
The Decentralized Ecosystems meta-scenario is a world of diversity and
pluralism where public, semi-public, community and private platforms oper-
ate, often in collaboration. It is a world where both domestically and globally,
no platform has sufficient power to make or break the platform’s ecosystem.
However, this diversity also implies uneven access to the benefits of the plat-
form ecosystem.

Chapter 7
Chapter 7 focuses on key uncertainties in order to outline four scenarios for the
EU digital ecosystems. These scenario developments benefited from the input
of different executives and experts in two workshops as well as from meetings
and other ways of engaging stakeholders. By combing two key drivers – the
nature of EU cooperation and digital infrastructure – the workshops generated
four scenarios. The Compass Europe scenario describes the world with strong
EU cooperation and digital infrastructure development, while the Anchored
Europe scenario is about strong EU cooperation in the social sphere but back-
ward digitalization. In the scenarios entitled Fast and Curious and Peaceful
Solidity, EU cooperation is weak, but the former benefits from inflows of pri-
vate capital from the US into digitalization while the latter describes a situation
with severely limited investment into digital infrastructure.
Certainly, the four scenarios imply different opportunities and threats for
the digital ecosystems in Europe. The long-term strategies of public, private
and civil society organizations have to consider a range of alternatives across the
spectrum of imagination instead of relying on tunnel vision and wishful think-
ing. These more abstract scenarios play out concrete implications for different
organizations and for different fields.

Chapter 8
Chapter 8 highlights Estonia as an extreme case, which is relevant for other
small open economies. This is so because Estonia has a high degree of digi-
talization. If Estonia is not able to shape certain outcomes in the desired way,
then it is even more so for less digitalized economies. The chapter uses four
scenarios of digital ecosystems in order to grasp the implications for Estonia and
to deepen our understanding of how the developments in digital ecosystems
 Introduction 9
might affect small open economies in the future. The Compass Europe scenario
offers an opportunity to take part in the EU-led global efforts to set standards
in the world with explicit or implicit US backing depending on the issue area.
The world dominated by large US private platforms, as characterized in the Fast
and Curious scenario, implies that it is challenging to resist the efficiency of
large global platforms in the domestic platform ecosystem. Many services will
be offered by global private platforms – most likely the US – at the expense of
equity and domestic stakeholder engagement. The world-dominated EU plat-
forms impose risks for Estonia in losing control of their platform ecosystem to
some other government that dominates the regional bloc and splinternet. The
decentralized world of the Peaceful Solidity scenario seems appealing as it allows
doing digitalization in its own way. New opportunities may emerge for govern-
ment, the private sector and civil society with variation and diversity. However,
it also carries risks of higher transaction costs and thus lower efficiency.

Chapter 9
Chapter 9 discusses the future implications of Chinese foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) flowing increasingly to sectors of the European economy through
four scenarios. By taking a conceptual approach, this contribution emphasizes
the role of platform ecosystems in understanding the true nature of Chinese
investments in the past, present and future. Network effects and winner-take-
all platform business models not only create the potential for market concentra-
tion but also carry significant political and social risks for Europe.
Therefore, it is crucial to think about alternative futures and the implications
of potential scenarios, none of which were completely favorable for Chinese
global dominance, while they did allow for it in some parts of the world. Since
the review of scenarios was insufficient for understanding potential future
implications for Chinese FDI into European digital platforms, two workshops
with business executives and experts allowed for creating four alternative sce-
narios. These scenarios relied on various combinations of European coopera-
tion and investments in infrastructure until 2035. For different reasons, only
one scenario was partially favorable for the continued inflow of Chinese FDI
into European platforms. The EU’s strategic ambitions, protectionist measures
or balkanization of the EU markets created significant obstacles for the Chinese
investments under three other scenarios.

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2 The emergence of
digital ecosystems

Introduction
This chapter will explore the emergence of global digital ecosystems. It will
consider how economic, political and social developments shape them as well
as how these constantly evolving ecosystems shape the socio-economic con-
text. The internet emerged as a decentralized network with clear advantages
over centralized and smart digital networks in the 1990s. As Isenberg wrote in
his article “The Dawn of Stupid Network” in 1998: “Stupid Networks have
three basic advantages over Intelligent Networks – abundant infrastructure;
underspecification; and a universal way of dealing with underlying network
details, thanks to IP (Internet Protocol), which was designed as an ‘internet-
working’ protocol” (Isenberg, 1998).
However, these trends in the development of the internet did not last for
long and gradually, the Internet started to become smarter. Platformization
became a new trend and turned different segments of the global decentral-
ized internet into “gated communities”. The user experience of China’s
government-controlled internet is radically different from the user experi-
ence of the American private platform-dominated internet. However, it
must be noted that the use of data in China is diverse and the central
government often lacks the ability and capacity to control data effectively
(Yang et al., 2020).
In China, though limited by government-imposed rules, algorithmic deci-
sion-making and “personalization” allow the provision of individualized user
experiences. To illustrate similar developments in the West, Facebook feeds
for each user differ radically depending on their preferences and characteristics.
Hence, in this sense, there is no such thing as the Internet providing a
single experience, but rather different internets providing individually custom-
ized experiences. Therefore, these websites provide individualized user experi-
ences, but the process is managed by highly centralized platforms with a global
reach. This chapter starts by discussing the nature of digital platforms, which
is followed by tackling the emergence of digital ecosystems and how they
interact with governance as well as with broader political, economic and social
contexts.
12 The emergence of digital ecosystems
Digital platforms
Economics and management scholars started to investigate platform dynam-
ics in the late 1990s and 2000s (Cusumano and Yoffie, 1999; Gawer and
Cusumano, 2002; Amaldoss and Jain, 2005). Scholars have explored various
fundamental aspects of platforms such as lock-ins (Arthur, 1989), network
effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1994; Amaldoss and Jain, 2005), winner-take-all
nature (Noe and Parker, 2005), two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2003),
and multisided platform markets (Evans, 2003) as well as long-tail markets
(Brynjolfsson et al., 2006).

Technology lock-ins
Arthur (1989) shows how competing technologies improve when adopted.
The standard economic approach of supply and demand where rational agents
make decisions about the future does not work in understanding the process
of technology adoption. The chosen technological path is not necessarily the
most efficient, and the traditional policy mix of taxes and subsidies is insuffi-
cient for avoiding technology lock-ins.
For instance, retail banking in the US is a good example of such lock-
ins where old checkbook-based technology solutions have been simply digi-
talized instead of exploiting the advantages of full digital transformation. In
other words, digitalization allows for new business models and leaving behind
analog-based business models, but in the real world of transformation, often
analog business models are simply made digital to some extent.

Path-dependence
A crucial element in such a lock-in is often the result of remote historical
events and processes that constrain choice today. This is so because of increas-
ing returns stemming from a particular path. The increasing returns associated
with technology adoption and its subsequent use have led some scholars to
see technology diffusion as a path-dependent process (Mokyr, 1990, p. 163;
Fountain, 2001, p. 85). What is meant by path-dependence? The concept is
often used without explicit specification of the causal mechanism involved in
the process (Campbell, 2010, p. 90). Political science literature emphasizes that
actors gain increasing returns through feedback mechanisms, which is consist-
ent with how they acted in the past. This locks in a particular type of behavior.

Institutionalization of practices
Another approach from sociology is less rational and emphasizes that practices
become institutionalized and are taken as given by different agents involved.
In other words, it becomes difficult to change particular models of behavior
or traditions, particularly when they work, or at least there is a perception
that they work well. Comparative political economy literature on varieties of
 The emergence of digital ecosystems 13
capitalism emphasizes institutional complementarity as a result of the co-evo-
lution of different institutions. This makes it difficult to change one institution
because it is tightly interconnected with other institutions (Campbell, 2010,
pp. 90–92). It is possible to combine these different casual mechanisms of path-
dependence, but this tends to emphasize non-rational chance elements behind
the path-dependent processes. This is particularly important for scenario plan-
ning in the second half of the book because it breaks the linear logic of limited
alternatives by using the imagination to see a wide range of possible outcomes.

Critical junctures in technology lock-ins

The notion of a “critical juncture” for the path-dependent process where all
following actions are severely limited by some decision carried out a long time
ago is conceptually probably the best way to think about the constraints on
adopting technologies. The examples of the importance of critical junctures
in path-dependent processes can range from the adoption of QWERTY key-
boards for typewriters to granting excessive privileges to telecom monopolies
in countries such as Armenia and Latvia. The former lock-in is a particular type
of keyboard that we use today. The latter telecom lock-in increased the cost
for digital solutions through internet connectivity.
David (1985) discusses the economics of QWERTY, a keyboard that almost
everybody uses. He argues that such a solution was locked in in the 19th cen-
tury and increasing returns make it difficult to change this setup – even if more
effective solutions are available. According to David (1985), the path-depend-
ent process can be understood as:

A path-dependent sequence of economic changes is one of which impor-

tant influences upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by tempo-
rally remote events, including happenings dominated by chance elements
rather than systematic forces. Stochastic processes like that do not converge
automatically to a fixed-point distribution of outcomes, and are called
non-ergodic. In such circumstances “historical accidents” can neither be
ignored, nor neatly quarantined for the purpose of economic analysis; the
dynamic process itself takes on an essentially historical character.
(David, 1985, p. 332)

Most importantly, the notion of path-dependency violates the basic assump-

tions of microeconomics, such as rationality, because agents’ choices are
severely constrained in choosing particular technology.

Limits of rational agents in technology adoption

Idealized rational action in explaining the diffusion of new technology solu-
tions implicitly assumes that over time and through some degree of trial and
error, superior technologies will be chosen and used in an increasingly better
14 The emergence of digital ecosystems
manner (Fountain, 2001, p. 84). Milner’s (2006) discussion of the digital divide
is a great example of such a rationalistic understanding of technology adop-
tion. Narrow and overly rational conceptualizations of institutions are com-
bined with oversimplified characterization of interests where potential losers
block the adoption of digital technologies while winners facilitate it (Milner,
2006, p. 178). Evidently, it implies that we are dealing with forward-looking
rational agents who can predict future risks and engage in cost-benefit analysis
in determining whether they will be losers or winners as a result of technology
adoption.
This assumption of rationality in individual behavior or in the market as a
whole implies that the actors are capable of understanding and learning how
technology adoption works and consequently encourage and/or discourage
the process depending on their interests and how institutions may constrain
these interests.
However, perfect rational calculation, as articulated by neoclassical eco-
nomics and rational choice literature in political science, is not an option for
agents facing constant change and a high degree of uncertainty, which is the
case in technology adoption. Most importantly, uncertainty and risk are fun-
damentally different (Keynes, 1936; Knight, 1921). Uncertainty implies that
the role of rational calculation and bargaining based on consideration of risk is
significantly reduced.
If technology adoption was not a messy and path-dependent process
and would lead to a fixed point of distribution of outcomes, then “known
unknowns” can play a vital role, and risks can be assessed and considered in the
calculations of agents. Since new technology may represent more unknown
unknowns than known unknowns by increasing uncertainty, bad decisions can
be made (Fountain, 2001, p. 85). In other words, perceived losers and winners
may get their cost-benefit analysis wrong.
The non-ergodic process of technology adoption implies that accidental
outcomes cannot be canceled out, particularly as this process is rapidly chang-
ing and highly imperfect where chance may matter more than systematic
forces, which implies that “unknown unknowns” dominate. The best we can
do in light of uncertainty and constant change is to see the rationality of agents
in the adoption as highly “bounded” or “adaptive” (see Simon, 1955 for a dis-
cussion of “bounded rationality” and Mueller, 1986 for “adaptive rationality”).
Furthermore, since rational calculation does not provide a formula of action
for agents faced with uncertainty, the agent will follow the logic of appropri-
ateness and values instead of the logic of consequences that rationalist calcula-
tion would require. For instance, it is impossible for an average user to decide
whether a Chinese platform such as TikTok is secure and safe. This would
require a large amount of technical expertise. Hence, the consequences of
using TikTok are unclear. However, users can make their decisions on the
basis of what they consider appropriate and their values. Essentially, it becomes
a question of whether users trust a digital platform. The role of mental mod-
els and agents’ ideologies becomes essential in influencing the rules of the
 The emergence of digital ecosystems 15
game, which are often called institutions (Denzau and North, 1994). And these
changes in institutions can either encourage or discourage the ways technology
is diffused. If a mental model of a user is based on distrust of Chinese platforms,
then the use of TikTok is less likely.

Space and time in technology adoption

It is important to emphasize that technology adoption takes place in a specific
time frame. Pierson (2004) emphasizes the importance of the temporal nature
of institutional change, which is often not captured by rationalistic approaches
to path-dependency. He writes:

There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain

institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice.
Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same
trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although
it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other – and
essential if the chosen branch dies – the branch on which a climber begins
is the one she tends to follow.
(Pierson, 2004, p. 20)

Pierson (2004) connects the temporal nature of institutional change to the

spatial nature of path-dependency, which is also emphasized by the smart spe-
cialization literature. Pierson argues that path-dependence is unmistakable in
“the location of production in space” (Pierson, 2004, p. 25).
However, path-dependence is not the same as inevitability. As Pierson
emphasizes, there are real alternatives available when choices are made.
However, previous choices will affect outcomes and the sequence of events
(Pierson, 2004, p. 20). Path-dependence does not rely on causal independence
through time, but it allows narrowing down the set of choices and shows how
decisions are linked through time (Pierson, 2004, p. 52).
Path-dependency and imperfectly bounded rationality challenge the
assumption that actors will learn the “right” lessons, which is the basis for
rational actor models (Fountain, 2001, p. 85). As was pointed out before, such
an assumption is not justified because actors may also learn the “wrong” lessons
(Fountain, 2001, p. 85). As Pierson emphasizes, the outcomes are the result of
human action but do not result from human design (Pierson, 2004, p. 102).
Nye (1999) uses the term “path-insistence” to capture ideological and political
insistence on specific policies regardless of rational criteria.
Castells (2000) gives an example of how the Soviet Ministry of Electronics
when copying American chips, rounded the area of US chip leads from 1/10
inch to 0.25 millimeters instead of the proper equivalent of 0.254 millimeters.
As a result, the Soviet chips looked like American chips, but these chips did
not fit into a Western socket. The Soviet semiconductor assembly equipment
that was built as a result of this copying effort was, in the end, not able to
16 The emergence of digital ecosystems
make chips for export because of the inherent desire to simplify what seemed
to Soviet government officials as an unimportant aspect of chip design. As this
mistake was uncovered quite late, one bad decision contributed to the widen-
ing of the technological gap between the West and the USSR (Castells, 2000,
p. 32). However rational the Soviet leaders might have been in promoting
the adoption of Western technology, they failed to learn what makes it work,
which, in turn, had devastating consequences on the Soviet economy.
Paul Roemer, an expert in the Soviet economy, echoes this view by argu-
ing that the technological innovation so crucial for so-called intensive growth
was insufficient in the Soviet Union (Roemer, 1994, p. 44). The growth of
the economies became more dependent on the adoption of new information
technologies by the 1980s, and, as a result, “the Soviet-type economies failed
dismally” (Roemer, 1994, p. 44). Innovation did not occur because there were
no incentives to innovate without competition and no other mechanisms for
innovation were available (Roemer, 1994, p. 46). There are historical lessons
here for the rise of China, which is essentially directed by the Communist
Party. Hence, scenarios of digital ecosystems should not assume a linear rise in
China’s technological might but also consider the possibility of its inability to
keep up with the US.

Digital network goods

Technology lock-ins and path-dependent processes are reinforced by the fact
that the internet and related digital technologies are network goods, not inde-
pendent goods. This is emphasized by the digital platform literature, and it
implies that the value of the internet is not determined solely by the connec-
tion at a particular speed (Harknett 2001, pp. 242–246). The network good
means that a value of a good for any given person is influenced by consump-
tion choices made by other persons. This notion is grounded in basic micro-
economics and the study of externalities. In other words, there are externalities
to being connected to certain classes of goods. The externalities are particularly
important because initially, the internet was by nature a decentralized network,
i.e., applications are hosted at the edge of the network by absolutely anyone.
This meant that the internet was much less controllable than a smart network
which has emerged as a result of platformization.
The network effects on the digital ecosystem are strengthened by asym-
metry between supply and demand. As Mokyr (1990) has argued, demand for
technologies is essentially “derived demand”. Consumers and citizens usually
do not demand technology for its own sake but rather as a means to an end.
If ride-sharing platforms such as Uber or Bolt are not able to reach people on
time, as often happens in Helsinki, or are not available, as in Copenhagen,
then people will use the regular taxi service. The smart specialization literature
emphasizes the importance of supply as well. Similarly, Joseph Schumpeter
describes demand as having little importance for the development of innova-
tions. He points out that innovations are not generally generated by the wants
 The emergence of digital ecosystems 17
of consumers. Consumers do not have the ability to determine what goods are
produced. Producers initiate the innovation process and bring about economic
change. The consumers are then “taught” by the producers to desire the new
products that they offer (Schumpeter, 1975). As Henry Ford once suppos-
edly said, “If I had asked people what they wanted, they would have said
faster horses” (Vlaskovits, 2011). More recently, Steve Jobs has said that “It’s
really hard to design products by focus groups. A lot of times, people do not
know what they want until you show it to them” (Ciotti, 2013). Obviously,
supply is a necessary precondition for the initial introduction of innovation.
No consumers in the 1950s asked for the internet. Rather it was the result
of work in several computer laboratories, which later led to its adoption and
commercialization. Similarly, consumers did not demand Google in the 1990s
or Facebook in the 2000s. Rather, the supply of this service created demand,
which, depending on the country, can obviously vary.

Demand for digital technologies

However, supply is necessary but not a sufficient precondition for the diffu-
sion of innovation. To gain a more comprehensive picture of the role of the
demand side, the innovation process needs to be considered. Rogers (1995)
and his diffusion of innovations is the most well-known take on the demand
side, which was first published in 1962. However, the same idea, presented
more succinctly, can be found in Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty published in
1960. Hayek describes the demand side as the determining force in the inno-
vation process. Due to the associated high cost, innovations are initially used
only by a few wealthy consumers, as they benefit more from the innovation
than other consumers. Luxuries today are the necessities of tomorrow. Their
special needs are better satisfied by new products or services, i.e., innovations.
The consumption behavior of these initial consumers serves as a test phase for
the innovation. By experimenting with the innovation, the initial group of
consumers assesses whether the innovation can, in fact, serve a wider range of
consumers in society. If these initial consumers consider an innovation useful
or important, they will buy it. If the innovation fails to gain their favor, they
will reject it by not buying it. Thus, the decision to buy or not to buy an inno-
vation is a vote for or against it. This voting characteristic of the initial con-
sumer’s consumption behavior steers the innovation process of the society in
the direction favored by these initial consumers. Obviously, consumers do not
make these decisions in a vacuum but are influenced by the choices of other
consumers, imperfections of their knowledge, informal and formal institutions
and many other factors. Hayekian understanding differs from neoclassical eco-
nomics because Hayek does not assume that markets are perfect and reach
equilibrium but instead believes that markets are imperfect. Hence, his theory
is not necessarily in conflict with Schumpeter’s and other theories emphasizing
the supply side. Supply matters for bringing new innovations to the market-
place such as search engines, ride-sharing or social media. If the environmental
18 The emergence of digital ecosystems
factors, consumer tastes and thousands of other variables are favorable, then the
innovation spreads. Again, it is important to emphasize that conditions govern-
ing supply and demand differ in different countries.
To simplify the innovation diffusion literature, we can say that essentially
there are different types of consumers. The first group is early adopters who
may be wealthy or at least willing to spend a high cost on a given product.
The cost here not only refers to the direct cost in dollar or euro terms but also
to the opportunity cost of using new products. They have special needs and
desires that can only be satisfied by innovation. They are the “test drivers” of
the innovation process. In fact, they demand technology for the sake of tech-
nology. Their decision to buy or not to buy steers the innovation process in
the direction they favor. They are willing to take risks, and in a way, they can
be entrepreneurial in their adoption of products. And there are laggards. They
are not willing to spend a premium on a given product and/or they are risk-
averse. They only have average needs and desires that are satisfied well enough
by existing products. They will only adopt an innovation once it became a
mass product. Between laggards and early adopters are different groups, some
more than others are less cautious in adopting new products.
Hayek (1960) overemphasized agency and income – particularly in today’s
context of platformization. However, Rogers (1995) emphasized innovation
itself, time, communication channels and social system as the main variables in
the diffusion process. Rogers’ work was based on summarizing earlier diffusion
theories in sociology, some of them dating back to the 19th century. Hence,
the fact that similar ideas were covered by Hayek (1960) is understandable. Key
to successful diffusion was human capital and characteristics of different adopter
groups such as innovators, early adopters, the early majority, late majority and
laggards. He distinguished between diffusion and adoption, seeing the latter as
an individual phenomenon and the latter as a broader societal phenomenon.
In order for innovation to diffuse, a critical mass of adopters must emerge to
make innovation self-sustainable. For Rogers (1995), a perceived advantage is
the most important factor explaining innovation adoption. This implies study-
ing the relative advantage of innovation, meaning whether consumers perceive
the use of technology to be convenient. For instance, in the case of Amazon, a
relative advantage can be whether buying books online gives consumers better
and quicker access to books than an offline bookstore. The perceived advan-
tage also entails complexity and the user’s context. The lack of technological
complexity implies that consumers find it easy to use Amazon, for instance,
and it does not require sophisticated information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT) skills.
Eriksson et al. (2008) studied the adoption of internet banking in Estonia on
the basis of Rogers’ model. Ironically, they called adopting internet banking a
“Western-style” technology, forgetting that it was developed and introduced
in Estonia in 1996 and is more widely used in Estonia than in most Western
countries. They found that the adoption of internet banking is consistent with
Rogers’ theory and also with other empirical studies carried out in the Western
 The emergence of digital ecosystems 19
markets. They found that the use of internet banking is strongly influenced
by relative advantage and lack of technological complexity in Estonia. They
also found that perceived risk (meaning trustworthiness of services and worries
about security and data leakages) is an important factor influencing decisions
when consumers start using the service, but its importance disappears once
use becomes regular (Eriksson et al., 2008, pp. 164–165). Rogers (1995) did
not identify perceived risk, but it has been found to be an important factor by
scholars building on his work (Eriksson et al., 2008). Eriksson et al. (2008) also
argue that their findings in Estonia are consistent with the technology accept-
ance model, which relied on empirical analysis of the USA. The shortcoming
of this study is that it does not factor in the supply side and the broader envi-
ronment concerning internet banking. It does not answer questions on how
and why banks started to offer this service and how and why the government
started to build its own e-government services on top of internet banking;
essentially, using internet banking as a platform for e-government services.

Integration of supply and demand

Both supply- and demand-side explanations of innovations can be integrated
into explaining the emergence of digital ecosystems. In some areas and phases,
innovation is more supply-driven and other sectors more demand-driven. As
digital technologies are general-purpose technologies, it can be argued that
innovation occurs because of the interaction between the supply and the
demand side in a competitive situation. However, the interaction is not simul-
taneous. First, there must be supply, which enables a select number of consum-
ers or businesses to experience the innovation. They simply may not know
what to demand in the first place. Suppliers achieve temporary monopolies by
bringing an innovation to the market. Because of the high monopoly price,
the innovation is at first consumed only by a limited number of consumers.
They can pay the monopoly prices because they benefit more from consuming
the innovation than the average consumer. For instance, Black and co-authors
found that users of online financial services have higher income and they are
heavy internet users (cited in Eriksson et al., 2008). Second, if the innovation
proves to be successful, it becomes more widely distributed in the market. This
motivates imitators to copy the innovation and to undercut the monopoly
prices of the innovator. In effect, the price is further reduced, and large parts of
society are able to consume the innovation. This, in return, motivates innova-
tors to come up with a new innovation, which again secures them the con-
sumption of early adopters and the resulting monopoly profits. This is at least
how it should work in the long run. The question is, how long is the long run?
The platformization of the last few decades has allowed large platforms to dom-
inate digital ecosystems and increase market concentration. Many of them still
earn monopoly profits. Google dominates the search engines, Facebook, social
media and Amazon, e-commerce, in the West. However, several alternatives
with different business models, such as DuckDuckGo emphasizing privacy in
20 The emergence of digital ecosystems
search engines, have emerged, but the open question is whether they will be
able to take on large platforms in the future.
On the fundamental level, supply dominates over demand as smart, supply-
driven network applications are hosted in the network’s core and usually by
the operator of the network as a result of platformization in the digital ecosys-
tems. Let us recall Isenberg, who in 1998 pointed out that a typical example of
a smart and centralized network is a telephone network (Isenberg, 1998, pp.
24–31). Ironically, digital platforms and some countries such as China in some
ways have made the internet more similar to a smart network of the old-fash-
ioned telephone network on a fundamental level. Apple is a good example of a
smart, supply-driven network. For instance, 15 years ago, many different social
network platforms were used by different groups such as Facebook for college
students, MySpace for the general population and Orkut, which was popular
in India and Brazil. As Facebook has grown and entered different market seg-
ments, these other platforms have disappeared. As it is easier to connect and use
one platform rather than multiple platforms, Facebook benefited from network
effects that are favorable for a winner-takes-all type of platform economy.

Platformization in multisided markets

It is no wonder that the preponderance of digital platforms has increased by
making networks smarter. This process can be called “platformization” because
digital platforms are not just facilitators in business transactions but increasingly
participants, gate-keepers and rule-makers in two-sided or multisided markets.
The concept of two-sided markets was introduced before the dominance of
large digital platforms and applied initially to credit card companies such as Visa
(Rochet and Tirole, 2003). It implies that companies subsidize one side of the
business with revenue from other activities with the aim of exploiting network
effects and increasing market dominance in different markets.
For instance, Google offers “free searches” that are subsidized by advertising
revenue. It is free only in the sense that externalities associated with the use of
the search engine are not taken into account. It is possible to think about an
alternative approach where a search engine would be a paid service without
advertising, such as music streaming by Spotify or movies provided by Netflix.

Long-tail markets
Market dominance is further strengthened by opportunities to exploit many
different so-called long-tail markets (Brynjolfsson et al., 2006). Digital plat-
forms do have to concentrate on offering mainstream and popular products
and services, but digital technologies make it possible to cut transaction costs
and focus on many market niches. For instance, Amazon can sell books that
interest millions of customers but also offer very specifics books that might be
relevant for only 100 scholars in the world. The dominance of the Amazon
platform means that most people will search for both types of books on
 The emergence of digital ecosystems 21
Amazon rather than try to find some niche platforms. Sellers of niche books
do not have to be Amazon and can just facilitate a transaction between a
scholar in the US and Sweden, for example. The search for relevant books
on Amazon also indicates that Amazon may be in some ways a competitor for
Google search.

Boundary resources
Similar to serving niche markets, platforms can take advantage of the exploi-
tation of boundary resources (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013). Digital
platforms attract third-party developers, which can develop apps appealing to
larger or smaller segments of platform users. The boundary resources expose
and extend the platform architecture.
For instance, Japanese company Rakuten offers a language learning app
called “Super English”, which is developed by the Estonian startup Lingvist.
However, the relation between the platform and app developer is asymmetri-
cal, where the platform controls the information flow and monetization and is
in direct contact with end-users. If a solution offered by a third-party developer
is successful, then the platform may develop its own version, which would be
in direct competition.
This exploitation of information asymmetries and reliance on conflicts of
interest creates opportunities for abuse, which may not only undermine spe-
cific marketplaces provided by platforms but trust in capitalism as well as in
governance.
The so-called Amazon effect is a case in point where the rumor or belief
that a key platform, such as Amazon, enters or is rumored to be entering a
market, so the stock prices of the incumbent firms immediately drop. It has
even been suggested that the decisions of a large platform firm can impact
macroeconomic indicators such as wage growth and inflation (Krishna, 2019).

Platform-dependent entrepreneurs
Digital platforms are changing the nature of work by substituting different job
functions and creating new opportunities for underemployed and underused
assets. They impact entrepreneurs by making it easy for smaller players to reach
global markets but at the same time also develop power over those using the
platform commercially to the point where it has been suggested that there is
an “emergence of a new and enormous category of businesses operated by
platform-dependent entrepreneurs” (Cutolo and Kenney, 2019).
This is particularly so with platforms that have dominant market power
globally and can be seen as “systemically important digital platforms” (SIDP).
In many ways, they are similar to systemically important banks in that they
provide a critical economic infrastructure (Kitsing, 2018). In doing so, they are
essentially providing semi-public goods, and with explicit or implicit public
sector backing, have become “too big to fail”.
22 The emergence of digital ecosystems
This is the key distinction between dominant platforms such as Google and
Facebook and other platforms such as Spotify or Booking.com. In many mar-
kets, substitutes are not easily available for large platforms, which often enjoy
a monopoly position (Kenney and Zysman, 2020). Their demise would affect
enormous numbers of businesses and economies, while the demise of systemi-
cally unimportant platforms would lead to the emergence of new substitutes
or consolidation.

Digital ecosystems
Even though many different concepts are used to describe this phenom-
enon, such as the sharing economy, GAFAnomics, precariat and so on, the
most encompassing is the “platform economy” (Kenney and Zysman, 2016).
However, the platform economy itself is a limited term because this power is
not only about the economy. Platforms rely on and exploit “culture connec-
tivity” (Van Dijk, 2013). Platformization touches directly on politics, culture
and social issues in the broadest sense. Hence, it makes sense to talk about the
rise of new global digital ecosystems with far-reaching economic, political,
cultural and social consequences (Jacobides et al., 2018).

National and regional systems of innovation

The use of the term “ecosystem” needs clarification because it is not immedi-
ately clear why the term “ecosystem” is used and not just “system”. Traditional
literature on national and regional systems of innovation has relied on the
term “system” (Lundvall, 1992; Cooke and Morgan, 1998). The literature
on national systems of innovation, in fact, describes a system that was linear
in nature where all key players such as government, universities and firms
had a formal role. The government provided the funding and made the rules;
universities did the research and firms applied the research findings in prac-
tice. This was an idealized world where cooperation among all the players
resulted in innovation and subsequent economic growth. Lack of cooperation,
for instance, will deliver scientific results that are not relevant for businesses and
economic stagnation.
This view of the innovation process has not disappeared in many policy
circles where voices can still be heard that either entrepreneurs are ignorant
and do not understand the excellent research done by universities or universi-
ties do irrelevant research for entrepreneurs and researchers are detached from
the real world.
Scholars in the tradition of regional innovation systems depart from such
linear worlds and describe innovation systems as interactive processes where in
addition to formal organizations and rules, many informal aspects have to be
considered. Informal networks enable high trust relationships that lower trans-
action costs, facilitate the use of tacit knowledge through the entire region and
organizations within these regions as well as organizational and institutional
 The emergence of digital ecosystems 23
learning, which is essential for regional economic performance (Cooke and
Morgan, 1998).
If standard neoclassical economic theory assumes that private firms have
incentives to underinvest in innovation, then the literature on regional inno-
vation systems paints a richer world of innovation where private firms may
capture significant externalities of innovation by operating in specific regional
systems or what are also called “clusters” (Porter, 1998).
The most well-known example of such a regional innovation system is the
Silicon Valley, which is formally part of the national innovation system of the
US. Silicon Valley’s universities do receive funding from the federal govern-
ment, and there are formal ties between different layers of government, univer-
sities and firms. However, this is only the tip of the iceberg. The modus operandi
of this high-tech cluster relies heavily on informal networks and rules that have
been well documented by many scholars (Kenney, 2000). This informal back-
bone makes it very difficult to replicate this innovation system elsewhere, as
many regions in the US and in the world have tried to do.
In a way, the regional innovation systems literature takes a step closer to
the literature on ecosystems as the emphasis on informal networks and cul-
tural dimensions of innovative regions connect the two. In a normative per-
spective, “systems” seems to suggest something that is possible to design and
manage, while “ecosystems” suggests more of limited capability for direct-
ing and managing specific regions in a top-down fashion as many intended
and unintended consequences of undertakings executed by various actors
interact.

Smart specialization
Hence, more recent developments in innovation emphasize the role of the
entrepreneurial discovery process on multiple levels and doubt the usefulness
of top-down decision-making in delivering innovative results. This approach is
also central to the concept of smart specialization, which has become a central
policy-prioritization framework in the European Union (EU) aimed at pro-
moting growth through innovation.
This framework emphasizes the importance of contextual specificity in
understanding different comparative advantages and development trajectories
of regions. Instead of a top-down industrial policy approach focusing on spe-
cific sectors and picking winners, smart specialization emphasizes a bottom-up
process of entrepreneurial discovery in finding domains for specialization.
Although smart specialization has been extensively and intensively covered
in the academic literature and various EU guidelines and policy papers, the
operationalization of this concept remains a challenge on the ground (Kitsing,
2015).
For instance, Kitsing (2015) reviewed key EU and Estonian policy docu-
ments and reports on smart specialization in the context of academic and policy
literature. He found that policy reports used for selecting smart specialization
24 The emergence of digital ecosystems
domains in Estonia suffer from a weak conceptualization of smart specialization
(Kitsing, 2015).
More extensive and intensive conceptualization would have contributed to
a better public understanding of smart specialization as well as more focused
operationalization of smart specialization in empirical work. The measures
used for identifying key domains oversimplified the meaning of smart speciali-
zation. For instance, a survey was conducted among experts with a question
of whether a domain has a strong basis and potential for entrepreneurship and
science.
However, smart specialization emphasizes that innovation does not need
to be science-based, but it can be knowledge-based. Such an oversimplified
interpretation of smart specialization unnecessarily narrowed down the choices
for experts. It was also found that the methodological choices made are unclear
and poorly documented. All of this reduces measurement validity.
The problems highlighted above were found on the basis of Estonian pol-
icy-making, but they are relevant in other EU countries as well. Difficulties
in translating the concept of smart specialization into policy reduce the reli-
ability and trustfulness of work conducted for selecting smart specialization
domains. Hence, the policy debate on smart specialization cannot ignore dif-
ferent ways for the operationalization of a concept. On the basis of literature,
Kitsing (2015) suggested that smart specialization can be divided into four
sub-concepts: embeddedness, relatedness, connectivity and diversity. The sub-
concepts can be operationalized by using different quantitative and qualitative
indicators.

Bottom-up vs. top-down

The implementation of smart specialization is a good example of how the EU
Commission tries to implement regional innovation systems throughout the
EU. It is ironic that national and regional policies are often too centralized and
do not follow bottom-up processes of entrepreneurial discovery suggested by
EU guidelines. On the one hand, policy-makers have learned the lesson that
top-down policy in innovation does not work. On the other hand, they sug-
gest implementing bottom-up policy in a top-down fashion.
Furthermore, the theoretical logic of smart specialization suggests finding
a few domains for specialization. However, public policy-making in practice
suggests selecting a wide range of domains as this increases flexibility. If the
entrepreneurial process of discovery would lead to finding a new domain, then
transaction costs for replacing existing domains are too high. The decentralized
entrepreneurial process of discovery and centralized process of policy-making
create tensions in the implementation of smart specialization. Systems thinking
intervenes with the reality of ecosystems.
A similar error of logic emerges in the recent work by Rikap and Lundvall
(2020), where they seem to assume that in the “global corporate innovation and
production system” different countries or regions face simple binary choices
 The emergence of digital ecosystems 25
either in integrating with the global value chain of a foreign firm or develop-
ing their own firm-based global value chain. They suggest that one option is to
follow the example of China, which has created its own technology platforms
or what they call “intellectual monopolies” such as Alibaba, Huawei, Tencent
and others. However, such suggestions downplay the radically different politi-
cal economy of China, which is a communist dictatorship. The current trade
war suggests that it is not that easy to get away with protectionist measures as
retaliation will hit eventually. Instant economic gratification is followed by
delayed retaliation.
The use of ecosystems also suggests more of an evolutionary process, which
makes it at best difficult for policy-makers to manage immediate decoupling
from global value chains linked to dominant ecosystems without severe eco-
nomic setbacks.

Key characteristics of ecosystems

In order to understand it better, let us outline the key characteristics of an eco-
system in comparison with an organization or market (Jacobides et al., 2018).
Jacobides and his co-authors (2018) argue that modularity allows ecosystems
to emerge where coordination among interdependent organizations can take
place without a hierarchical setup. They show that the added value provided
by the ecosystems stems from the realization of non-generic complementarities
and the creation of rules that each actor in the ecosystem has to follow.
In other words, ecosystems have the best of both worlds. There is stronger
cooperation among different players than customized contractual agreements
in markets would allow. Concurrently, ecosystems with their horizontal and
modular structures for coordination and cooperation avoid principle-agent
problems of hierarchical organizations where top-down management may not
be able to create sufficient incentives for desired performance.
As contract theory has found all contracts are in one way or another way
incomplete (Hart 2017), firm managers may want to formulate detailed con-
tracts with performance targets, but as Holmström (1999) has found, such
attempts often misfire. Outside organizations, firms may want to have detailed
agreements with their suppliers and other partners, but such agreements often
fail to factor in changing circumstances.
Ecosystems allow minimizing such challenges as they rely on informal net-
works and rules in addition to formal rules. In fact, they are creating their own
markets within ecosystems with tighter institutional settings where both formal
and informal rules interact and create net positive outcomes. If there was a
conflict between formal and informal rules, as often happens in markets, then
the outcome would be net negative and constitute a major constraint for the
emergence of an ecosystem.
This is probably the most important factor as to why a transfer of practices
from one ecosystem, such as Silicon Valley, to another seemingly similar eco-
system by formal rules has not worked. The modus operandi resulting from the
26 The emergence of digital ecosystems
interaction of formal and informal rules is a constraint in one place while an
enabler in another setting. Bridging social capital and networks allow to reduce
transaction costs for doing business in some regions while bonding social capi-
tal in other regions creates barriers.
Furthermore, the use of the term “ecosystems” instead of “the economy”
avoids economic determinism where “economy” determines developments in
other areas. The emphasis on informal networks and social capital highlights
that in many advanced economies, the path to growth does not stem from
directing more resources such as labor, capital and land into production but
from the ability to combine them efficiently. This is not a simple mathematical
optimization exercise but a highly cultural and tacit undertaking where mental
models and ways of doing things play a crucial role. The key is to understand
that an economy does not operate in a vacuum but is interdependent with
politics, culture and society (Iversen and Soskice, 2019). There is a rigorous
debate in the comparative political economy literature on how this interaction
is structured. However, it does not have to be elaborated here. The key point
is that economy cannot be decoupled from politics, culture and social issues.
Hence, for the research on technology platform ecosystems, the focus on the
degrees of openness and closeness are crucial themes. The achievement of col-
lective outcomes and governance of core technology must be considered for
understanding the costs and benefits of different governance models.
Most importantly, technological ecosystems are often dominated by pri-
vate platforms that they have a direct impact on and politics has an impact on
platform businesses. The Facebook business model came under scrutiny in the
2016 US presidential elections because of the alleged manipulation of this plat-
form by Russian troll farms. Countries have different regulatory approaches to
platform business models. Some countries are very open and facilitative. Some
countries try to ban, regulate or even design specific tax policies via platforms.
Some countries try to navigate on a balanced course by welcoming some plat-
forms but banning others. For instance, Denmark allows Airbnb to operate but
not Uber and other ride-sharing companies. China, of course, basically bans
foreign platforms.

Conclusion
In order to grasp the implications for rapid digitalization around the world,
it is important to deepen our understanding of platformization and digital
ecosystems. This chapter reviewed the literature on digital platforms and
combined it with both classical and newer perspectives in political economy.
Particularly, it emphasized the role of technology lock-ins, path-dependence,
network effects, the asymmetry between supply and demand as well as mul-
tisided markets in understanding the emergence of digital ecosystems. Digital
ecosystems have to be seen as a path-dependent process where the develop-
ment of particular processes can be traced back to a critical juncture. In the
process, both supply and demand matter, even though their interaction may
 The emergence of digital ecosystems 27
be asymmetric in different periods of ecosystem evolution, i.e., in the begin-
ning, it may be more supply-driven, and in the mature phase, the demand side
gains more prominence.
This chapter emphasized that the concept of the digital ecosystem is
a fundamentally different organizational form from a hierarchical firm or
other organizations as well as from horizontal markets. Digital ecosystems
are shaped by developments in the global political economy, multisided
governance as well as a multitude of political and social factors in addition
to economics and technology. These issues will be explored in the follow-
ing chapters.

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3 Global political economy
of digital ecosystems

Introduction
Shifts in the global political economy have had a tremendous impact on eco-
nomic, political, social and technology developments. In addition to these shifts
impacting tradable sectors through global value chains (GVA), they have wide-
reaching consequences for digital ecosystems as well as the ability to shape their
governance and the essence of domestic technopolitics.
The history of Europe is full of examples of how developments in the global
political economy have shaped the fate of companies, communities, individu-
als and nations. The shifts in the balance of power that resulted from World
War I created the pre-conditions for the self-determination and independence
of many nations. World War II changed these conditions as many countries
were incorporated into the Soviet Union or had to adhere to the rules of
the Soviet hemisphere, which also implied limited technology transfer due to
strict rules. The heyday of global liberal multilateralism in the 1990s enabled
many European countries to re-integrate into the global economic, political
and technology networks. Now, growing technology- and trade-related ten-
sions between China and the US are shaping European digital ecosystems. If
10 years ago, large US platforms were either seen as benign players or even
forces for good, then current concerns about “technology sovereignty” would
have generated concerns about their reach.
This chapter explores the global political economy and its potential impli-
cations for digital ecosystems. It makes two contributions. First, it discusses
global trends affecting digital ecosystems based on policy literature. It argues
that the interpretation of these trends depends on a particular perspective.
Since the future is uncertain, especially in the long-term, then the extrapola-
tion of current trends to the future carries serious limitations and risks. Even
our understanding of past developments and current trends depends on a par-
ticular perspective. Therefore, positive theorizing based on ideal types means
engaging in thought experiments about alternative futures.
Second, this chapter summarizes academic literature in international rela-
tions and political economy to demonstrate how digital ecosystems cannot
be explored based on trend extrapolation but are subject to uncertainty and
 Global political economy 31
complexity. This implies that potential future developments must be explored
on the basis of scenario planning. Hence, it is crucial to explore alternative
futures for the global political economy and shifts in the balance of power
to see how global economic, political and social developments might shape
policies. This chapter emphasizes alternative perspectives in the global politi-
cal economy that will directly contribute to scenario planning in the second
half of the book. This approach maps out alternative scenarios based on work
carried out by foresight teams at international and national organizations in
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
This chapter is structured in the following way. It starts by discussing the
current trends and their interpretation from different perspectives. Then, dif-
ferent theories of international relations and political economy are introduced.
This is followed by a discussion of how these perspectives help us understand
the global political economy of digital ecosystems.

Global trends and perspectives

It is important to distinguish between trends and perspectives. Trends are
developments where there is more or less a consensus about the trajectory.
Climate change is a trend as most climate scientists agree that the climate is get-
ting warmer (ARUP 2019). However, the goal to limit global warming at 1.5
Celsius by 2050 is not a trend because the achievement of this goal is uncer-
tain as states, regions, cities and other actors determine their contributions
toward the reduction of emissions (Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), 2019; Papaconstantinou and Pisani-Ferry, 2019,
p. 152).
Demography is a trend as the world population is expected to grow to 9.7
billion by 2050 from the current 7.7 billion (United Nations, 2019). However,
this growth is distributed unevenly. Overall, the world population growth is
slowing, but the “African youth bulge” is likely to affect Africa and Europe
differently than the US and China. Also, this population growth will feed into
climate warming concerns as new populations put pressure on the environ-
ment, but the catastrophic effects of climate change, in turn, may also affect
population growth (Papaconstantinou and Pisani-Ferry, 2019, p. 125).
In this sense, what we perceive as trends are mutually interdependent and
complex, which reduces the certainty of how these trends are often postulated.
Even in the case of population growth, it is possible to inject some uncertainty
as it depends on the interactions of numerous variables.

Perspectives on global developments

The uncertainty is even more prevalent concerning developments in global
governance, which are sometimes incorrectly presented as trends. These devel-
opments do not count as trends because there is no consensus on the trajectory
and a variety of different perspectives are offered in understanding them.
32 Global political economy
Let us recall that Francis Fukuyama saw the triumph of liberal democracy
and market order in 1989 and assumed that most countries would converge
toward this goal (Fukuyama, 1989). Robert Kaplan warned about impend-
ing anarchy in the international system in 1994, which sharply contradicted
Fukuyama’s thesis (Kaplan, 1994). More recently, Harari (2018) has postulated
that technological developments favor tyranny. This, however, conflicts with
the views that technology can be a tool for decentralization and the advance-
ment of democracy. Some experts have even wondered whether “technology
platforms might be the new Westphalian states” (Foroohar, 2019).
In 2020, several prominent think tanks warned about the fragmentation of
multilateral governance. The OECD points out that developments are mov-
ing toward a “fragmented trade and investment scenario” where restrictive
unilateral actions violate the non-discrimination provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), and the OECD Codes of Liberalization (Odio, 2020). The
World Economic Forum (2020) celebrates its 50th anniversary with the pub-
lication of ten essays from prominent think tankers who discuss disruptions to
multilateral order from various angles and fields.
Similarly, Friends of Europe re-think global governance in their recent dis-
cussion paper, which argues that “multilateralism is in retreat just when collec-
tive action is most desperately needed to tackle complex and interconnected
global challenges, including the climate crisis” (Friends of Europe, 2020).
However, prominent scholars who gathered to discuss developments in
global trade, finance and macroeconomics at the European University Institute
in November 2019 emphasized that the past should not be idealized, and the
framework of global governance never adequately covered the multiple chan-
nels of interdependence.
More recently, the increasingly complex system of global developments
may favor fragmentation. However, this complexity depends on perception
and is “often a retrospective construct”. Papaconstantinou and Pisani-Ferry
(2019, p. 181) concluded that “the challenges of credibility of institutions, and
of their trade-off between inclusivity and efficiency remain”.
For instance, the membership growth of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) delivered inclusivity at the expense of efficiency, and the multilateral
approach to trade has stalled since the mid-1990s. Therefore, this fragmenta-
tion is not a new development because it could be seen during the 1990s,
which was considered the quintessence of the global collective action of the
post–World War II system. As early as 1995, Bhagwati warned about the spa-
ghetti bowl effect, which is the multiplication of regional trade agreements that
undermines multilateral trade governance (Bhagwati, 1995).

The role of great powers

It is also fashionable to think that the benevolent hegemony of the US heading
the golden years of global multilateral governance has come to an end. The
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aussi sûr du moins qu’on peut l’être de quelque chose dans ce
monde sublunaire, où rien n’est certain que l’incertitude.
Les choses en étaient là, lorsqu’un incident imprévu vint
déranger nos calculs.
Un soir que nous avions conduit ces dames aux Italiens, puis
soupé chez elles d’un salmis de perdreaux et de champagne frappé,
nous rentrions à l’hôtel dans notre cabriolet, heureux comme des
mendiants en goguette.
— John, me dit Cinqpoints, qui était de fort bonne humeur, quand
je serai marié, je doublerai tes gages !
Il aurait certainement pu tenir sa promesse sans se ruiner, vu
qu’il ne me les payait jamais. Mais quoi ? Ce serait quelque chose
de joli, si nous autres domestiques nous étions réduits à vivre de nos
gages ! Je ne lui témoignai pas moins ma reconnaissance par
quelques paroles bien senties. Je jurai que ce n’était pas pour les
gages que je le servais (je ne mentais pas), et que jamais, au grand
jamais, je ne quitterais de mon propre gré un si bon maître. Ces
deux discours, — celui de Cinqpoints et le mien, — étaient à peine
terminés que nous arrivions dans la cour de l’hôtel Mirabeau, qui,
comme chacun sait, se trouve à quelques pas de la place Vendôme.
Nous montâmes chez nous, moi portant un flambeau, mon maître ne
portant rien et fredonnant un air d’opéra.
J’ouvris la porte du salon. Il était déjà éclairé. Une bouteille vide
gisait à terre ; une autre à moitié pleine était debout sur la table,
auprès de laquelle on avait roulé le canapé. Sur ce canapé était
allongé un gros gentilhomme, qui fumait son cigare aussi
tranquillement que s’il se fût trouvé dans un estaminet.
Le lecteur n’ignore pas que Cinqpoints détestait le tabac. Il fut
donc très-mécontent de voir son salon transformé en tabagie, et
demanda à l’intrus, dont la fumée ne lui permettait pas de distinguer
les traits, ce qu’il faisait là.
Le fumeur se leva, et, posant son cigare sur la table, partit d’un
éclat de rire sonore et prolongé. Enfin il s’écria :
— Eh quoi ! Percy, tu ne me reconnais pas ?
 On se rappellera une lettre pathétique, portant la signature du
comte de Crabs, insérée dans l’avant-dernier chapitre, et se
terminant par la demande d’un emprunt de dix mille francs. C’est
l’auteur de cette aimable épître qui fumait et riait dans notre salon.
Lord Crabs pouvait avoir soixante ans. C’était un vieillard à face
rubiconde, chauve, assez bien conservé pour son âge, malgré sa
corpulence. Il avait cet air de dignité qui n’appartient qu’aux gens
habitués à inspirer le respect, et, bien qu’il eût bu outre mesure, il ne
paraissait pas plus ivre qu’il ne convient à un personnage de son
rang.
— Comment, mon garçon, tu ne reconnais pas ton père ! répéta-
t-il en s’avançant vers son fils et en lui tendant la main.
Mon maître s’exécuta d’assez mauvaise grâce. Je vis qu’il n’était
rien moins que flatté de cette visite inespérée.
— Milord, balbutia-t-il, je ne… j’avoue vraiment… ce plaisir
inattendu… Le fait est, continua-t-il en se remettant un peu, que je
n’ai pas reconnu tout d’abord la personne qui m’honorait d’une visite
à une heure aussi tardive. Cette satanée fumée…
— Une vilaine habitude, Percy, une bien vilaine habitude !
interrompit le père en allumant un autre cigare. Une dégoûtante
manie, que tu feras bien d’éviter, mon cher enfant ! Quiconque
s’adonne à ce funeste passe-temps ruine son intelligence et peut
renoncer aux travaux sérieux ; non-seulement il détruit sa santé,
mais il offense tous les nez biens constitués. Un de nos ancêtres,
Percy, envoyait ses laquais dans les promenades publiques avec un
cigare à la bouche afin d’en dégoûter les honnêtes gens ; mais nous
dégénérons, mon ami !… A propos, vois donc les infernales feuilles
de chou que l’on débite dans ton hôtel… Ne pourrais-tu envoyer ton
domestique au café de Paris, et me faire rapporter quelques cigares
de choix ?
Milord se versa un verre de champagne et le but. Mon maître fit
la grimace ; mais il me remit une pièce de cinq francs en me disant
d’exécuter la commission. Comme je savais que le café de Paris
était déjà fermé, je mis l’argent dans ma poche et je m’installai dans
l’antichambre, d’où je pouvais entendre ce qui se passait dans le
salon.
— Sers-toi et passe-moi la bouteille, reprit lord Crabs après un
moment de silence.
Mon pauvre maître qui était le roi de toutes les sociétés qu’il
daignait honorer de sa présence, paraissait un petit garçon auprès
de monsieur son père. Il ouvrit l’armoire d’où cet aimable vieillard
avait déjà extrait deux flacons de Sillery, et revint avec une troisième
bouteille, qu’il plaça devant milord après en avoir fait sauter le
bouchon. Ce devoir rempli, il toussa, cracha, arrangea le feu, ouvrit
les fenêtres, se promena de long en large, bâilla à plusieurs
reprises, puis porta la main à son front comme pour échapper à une
subite migraine. Tous ces signes de malaise furent inutiles, milord ne
bougea pas.
— Sers-toi donc et passe la bouteille, répéta-t-il.
— Merci, milord, je ne bois ni ne fume.
— Tu as raison, mon ami, mille fois raison ! Une bonne
conscience vaut son pesant d’or ; mais parlez-moi d’un bon
estomac ! Tu n’as pas de nuits d’insomnie, toi ? Pas de maux de tête
le matin, hein ? Tu te couches tard, mais tu te lèves frais et dispos,
au point du jour, afin de reprendre tes études ?
Mon maître se tenait debout et immobile. Tel j’ai vu un
malheureux soldat attendre en silence les coups de fouet à neuf
lanières qui lui enlèvent la peau. Son digne interlocuteur,
s’échauffant à mesure qu’il parlait, buvait une gorgée de champagne
à chaque fin de phrase, sans doute pour en bien établir la
ponctuation.
— Avec tes talents et de pareils principes tu iras loin ! Sais-tu
bien, Percy, que tout Londres parle de tes exploits et de ton bonheur
insolent ? Mais on aura beau faire ton éloge, jamais on ne te rendra
justice. Tu n’es pas seulement un grand philosophe, tu as trouvé la
pierre philosophale, ce qui vaut beaucoup mieux ! Un bel
appartement, un cabriolet, de jolis chevaux, un vin délicieux… je m’y
connais… tout cela avec une pauvre petite rente dont se contenterait
à peine un bourgeois !
— Je présume que vous faites allusion à la rente que vous
m’avez si généreusement accordée ?
— Précisément, mon garçon, précisément ! répondit milord en
riant aux éclats. Parbleu, c’est là le merveilleux de l’affaire ! Avec
cette rente que tu ne reçois pas, tu trouves moyen de t’entourer de
tant de luxe ! Livre-moi ton secret, ô jeune Trismégiste ! Dis à ton
vieux père comment on accomplit de pareilles merveilles, et alors…
alors, parole d’honneur, je te servirai régulièrement ta rente, y
compris les arriérés !
— Enfin, milord, demanda Cinqpoints avec un geste
d’impatience, me ferez-vous le plaisir de m’apprendre le but de votre
visite ? Vous m’eussiez vu mourir de faim sans éprouver de trop
grands soucis ; et aujourd’hui, parce que j’ai réussi à faire mon
chemin, il vous plaît de vous montrer facétieux à mes dépens ; parce
que vous me voyez dans la prospérité, vous venez…
— Eh bien, tu ne devines pas ? interrompit de nouveau le visiteur.
Attends un peu que je remplisse mon verre… C’est étonnant comme
ces diablesses de bouteilles passent souvent devant moi quand je
bois tout seul !… Voyons, réfléchis un peu. Comment ! je viens te
retrouver dans ta prospérité, et toi, garçon d’esprit, tu es encore à te
demander quel motif m’a engagé à rechercher ton aimable société !
Fi donc, Percy, tu es moins profond philosophe que je ne croyais !
Pourquoi je suis venu ? Mais tout bonnement parce que tu es dans
la prospérité, ô mon fils ! Autrement, pourquoi diantre me serais-je
dérangé ? Ta mère ou moi avons-nous jamais pu découvrir en toi
l’ombre d’un sentiment affectueux ? Nous est-il jamais arrivé (à nous
ou à tout autre) d’apprendre que tu te sois rendu coupable d’une
action honnête ou généreuse ? Avons-nous jamais feint de t’aimer
pour les vertus que tu n’as pas ? Je suis la plus ancienne de tes
victimes, puisque j’ai payé des milliers de livres pour acquitter tes
premières dettes. C’est une faiblesse, je le sais. Heureusement te
voilà en état de la réparer, du moins en partie. Lorsque je t’ai écrit
pour négocier un emprunt, je ne m’attendais guère à une réponse
favorable. Si je t’avais annoncé ma visite, tu n’aurais pas manqué de
me brûler la politesse. Aussi, comme j’ai besoin non plus de dix,
mais de vingt-cinq mille francs, je suis arrivé sans tambour ni
trompette. Maintenant que tu sais ce qui m’amène, sers-toi et passe-
moi la bouteille.
Ce discours terminé, lord Crabs s’allongea de nouveau sur le
canapé et se remit à fumer. J’avoue que cette scène me charma
infiniment. Je fus ravi de voir ce vénérable vieillard donner sur les
doigts de son indigne rejeton, et venger ainsi l’infortuné Richard
Blewitt. Le visage de mon maître, autant que j’en pus juger à travers
le trou de la serrure, devint rouge-homard, puis blanc de perle. Enfin
il répondit en ces termes :
— Milord, je ne vous cache pas que j’avais à peu près deviné le
motif de votre aimable visite. Je n’ignore pas les nobles sentiments
qui vous animent, et je reconnais humblement que j’ai puisé toutes
les vertus que je possède dans les salutaires exemples que j’ai
reçus de vous. Lorsque vous serez moins ému, milord, vous
comprendrez tout ce qu’il y a de ridicule dans votre demande ;
malgré mes défauts, je suis du moins assez sage pour garder
l’argent que j’ai la peine de gagner.
— Fort bien, mon garçon ! répondit lord Crabs d’un ton qui
respirait la bonne humeur. A ton aise ! seulement, si tu refuses, tant
pis pour toi ! Je n’ai nulle envie de te nuire, à moins que tu ne m’y
forces. Je ne suis pas en colère, pas le moins du monde ; mais je te
préviens que tu feras bien de me prêter ces vingt-cinq mille francs…
Sinon, il t’en coûtera peut-être davantage.
— Monsieur, répliqua Cinqpoints, je serai aussi franc que vous :
je ne vous donnerais pas un sou, quand ce serait pour vous
empêcher d’être…
Ici, je crus qu’il était de mon devoir d’ouvrir la porte ; ôtant mon
chapeau, afin d’avoir l’air de rentrer, je m’avançai en disant :
— Milord, le café de Paris est fermé.
— Tant pis, tant pis ! répliqua le comte. Gardez les cinq francs
mon garçon… (C’était bien mon intention) et reconduisez-moi.
 J’allais obéir, lorsque mon maître me prévint.
— Comment donc, milord, s’écria-t-il, vous laisser reconduire par
un domestique lorsque je suis là ! Non, non, mon cher père ;
l’absence ne m’a point fait oublier le respect que je vous dois.
Ils descendirent donc ensemble.
— Bonsoir, Percy, dit lord Crabs d’un ton affectueux.
— Dieu vous bénisse, milord, répondit Cinqpoints. Êtes-vous bien
couvert ?… Prenez garde, il y a encore une marche… Bonne nuit,
mon cher père.
C’est ainsi que se séparèrent ces vertueux personnages.
 V
INTRIGUES

Le lendemain, Cinqpoints se leva avec la physionomie harassée

d’un homme qui a mal dormi. Il savait que la visite de son père ne lui
présageait rien de bon. Pendant son déjeuner, je l’entendis
murmurer quelques phrases décousues, et plus tard je l’aperçus
devant son secrétaire occupé à compter ses billets de banque. Il en
sépara même une petite liasse dont je devinai sans peine l’emploi
projeté ; mais bientôt il parut se raviser.
— Non, non ! murmura-t-il en replaçant l’argent dans un tiroir. En
quoi peut-il me nuire ? Quelque rusé qu’il soit, je me flatte d’être son
digne élève.
Il s’empressa de s’habiller afin d’aller présenter ses hommages à
la belle veuve et à l’intéressante orpheline. Dix heures venaient à
peine de sonner qu’il était déjà installé chez elles, leur dictant pour
ainsi dire l’emploi de leur journée :

1o Promenade à cheval au bois de Boulogne ;

2o Second déjeuner ;
3o Pèlerinage sentimental au tombeau d’Héloïse et
d’Abailard ;
4o Id. id. chez le pâtissier à la mode ;
5o Promenade en voiture aux Champs-Élysées ;
6o Dîner de bonne heure au cabaret ;
7o Assister à la première représentation de la Chaste
Suzanne au théâtre de la Porte-Saint-Martin.
 Ce programme, sauf les deux derniers articles, obtint
l’assentiment de ces dames.
— Notre soirée est déjà prise, mon cher monsieur Cinqpoints.
Une très-aimable invitation de cette chère lady Bobtail… Lisez vous-
même, dit la veuve en tendant à Percy un billet ainsi conçu :

« Chère lady Griffin,

» Voilà plusieurs siècles qu’on ne vous a vue. Peut-être y

a-t-il un peu de ma faute ; mais lord Bobtail et moi, nous
sommes tellement accablés par nos devoirs publics, qu’en
vérité nous n’avons pas le temps de voir nos amis personnels
— au nombre desquels lady Griffin voudra bien nous
permettre de la compter. Aujourd’hui, par hasard, nous avons
un moment de répit. Montrez-vous donc charitable et venez
dîner en petit comité à l’ambassade. J’espère que votre
aimable belle-fille voudra bien vous accompagner et nous
faire entendre quelques-unes de ces romances que personne
ne chante comme elle. Peut-être aurais-je dû adresser à miss
Griffin une invitation spéciale ; mais elle est trop bonne pour
ne pas user d’indulgence envers une pauvre diplomate qui a
tant de lettres à écrire.
» Adieu, ma toute belle. A sept heures, n’est-ce pas ? Je
ne tiendrai aucune excuse pour valable. En attendant, croyez
aux sentiments affectueux de
» Votre dévouée,

» Éliza Bobtail. »

Un pareil billet, écrit par une ambassadrice et remis par le

chasseur de Son Excellence, était bien fait pour émouvoir une
parvenue. Aussi, je renonce à décrire la joie concentrée de lady
Griffin. Longtemps avant la visite de mon maître, elle avait envoyé
Fitzclarence et Mortimer, ses deux valets de pied, porter à
l’ambassade une réponse affirmative.
 La lecture de cette gracieuse épître ne causa pas autant
d’allégresse à Cinqpoints. Il devina qu’il y avait une anguille sous
roche, qu’un complot se tramait dans l’ombre.
— Mon vieux renard de père se serait-il déjà mis en campagne ?
se demanda-t-il. Ce serait commencer de bonne heure.
Il rendit le billet en haussant les épaules ; puis, après avoir
hasardé un peuh ! peuh ! assez expressif, il déclara qu’à ses yeux
une pareille invitation équivalait à une insulte, dès qu’elle ne
s’adressait pas à une amie intime.
— Lady Bobtail, dit-il, se sera aperçue au dernier moment qu’il y
avait un vide à combler à sa table, voilà tout.
Mais il déploya en vain toutes les ressources de son éloquence
astucieuse ; il n’avait pas affaire à une véritable lady, à une pairesse,
mais bien à la veuve d’un simple chevalier de l’ordre du Bain, lequel
avait commencé par être mousse à bord d’un navire de la
compagnie des Indes. Lady Griffin n’ayant jamais assisté qu’aux
grandes réceptions de l’ambassade, sentait qu’on l’y regardait
comme une parvenue. Elle était trop heureuse de s’y voir admise sur
le pied de l’intimité pour prêter l’oreille aux sarcasmes de son
cavalier servant. Dîner chez lord Bobtail en petit comité ! Pouvait-on
refuser un pareil honneur ? Non ; le pauvre Percy dut donc se
résigner à dîner tout seul ce soir-là. Il passa néanmoins la plus
grande partie de la journée avec elles, les ramena vers cinq heures,
se montra spirituel et enjoué avec milady, tendre et sentimental avec
miss, et ne les quitta que lorsqu’elles furent obligées de le congédier
afin de s’occuper de leur toilette.
Lorsque j’ouvris la porte du salon pour annoncer le cabriolet de
mon maître (car j’étais presque chez moi dans cette maison-là), je le
vis qui tirait un portefeuille de sa poche et le glissait sous un des
coussins du canapé.
— A quel jeu joue-t-il donc là, me demandai-je.
Je sus bientôt le mot de l’énigme. Une heure environ après le
départ de ces dames, Cinqpoints retourna à la place Vendôme,
feignant d’être fort inquiet au sujet d’un portefeuille perdu.
 — Demandez à miss Kicksey si je puis lui parler un instant, dit-il
à une des femmes de chambre.
La Kicksey accourut et se déclara enchantée de voir M.
Cinqpoints. Puis elle parut se raviser.
— Je ne sais si, étant seule, je devrais recevoir un jeune homme,
fit-elle en baissant les yeux.
— Ne soyez pas si inhumaine, chère miss Kicksey, reprit mon
maître. Savez-vous que j’avais une double intention en venant ici ?
D’abord, chercher un portefeuille que je crois avoir laissé tomber
dans le salon — ensuite, vous prier de prendre en pitié un pauvre
célibataire, qui ne sait que faire de sa soirée et vous supplie de lui
donner une tasse de votre excellent thé.
Comme on le pense bien, la vieille fille se laissa attendrir, et on
ne tarda pas à servir le thé.
— Vous prenez de la crème et du sucre, je crois ? demanda-t-
elle, d’une voix de tourterelle enrhumée.
— Oui, chère miss Kicksey, répondit mon maître.
Mais je ne rapporterai pas au long leur conversation. Le lecteur a
déjà deviné pourquoi Cinqpoints se donnait la peine de causer avec
la ci-devant jeune fille. Il voulait tout bonnement apprendre ce qu’elle
savait au sujet du testament de feu sir Georges Griffin. En moins
d’une demi-heure, il l’eut retournée comme un gant. Par malheur, les
renseignements qu’elle se trouvait en état de lui fournir furent loin
d’être aussi complets qu’on aurait pu le désirer. Elle avait entendu
dire que ce bon général avait laissé quelque chose comme deux
cent vingt-cinq mille francs de rente. Lady Griffin et Mathilde
donnaient l’une et l’autre leur signature, lorsqu’il s’agissait d’une
vente ou d’un placement. Le cher défunt paraissait avoir fait une part
égale à chacune d’elles ; l’argent était placé soit en rentes sur l’État,
soit en propriétés d’un bon rapport, dont la valeur augmentait
chaque jour.
Deux cent vingt-cinq mille francs de rente ! Cinqpoints s’éloigna
la joue en feu, en proie à une vive émotion, la première peut-être
qu’il eût éprouvée de sa vie. Il n’avait qu’un mot à dire pour disposer
à son gré de la moitié de cette fortune. Oui ; mais était-il bien certain
que la mère et la fille fussent des partis également avantageux ?
Tout le thé qu’il venait de boire ne lui apprenait pas cela d’une façon
positive. Quel dommage de ne pouvoir les épouser l’une après
l’autre !
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vers minuit, lady Griffin et sa belle-fille rentrèrent, enchantées de
l’accueil qu’on leur avait fait. Lorsque la voiture s’arrêta, on en vit
descendre un vieux gentleman qui aida galamment ces dames à
mettre pied à terre. Après avoir échangé avec elles des poignées de
main pleines d’un franche cordialité, il annonça qu’il aurait l’honneur
de revenir le lendemain savoir des nouvelles de la charmante lady
Griffin et de son aimable belle-fille. Il insista ensuite pour les
reconduire jusqu’à la porte de leur appartement ; mais milady
déclara que pour rien au monde elle ne souffrirait qu’il se donnât
cette peine.
— Edward, dit-elle assez haut pour que les gens de l’hôtel
pussent l’entendre, vous reconduirez milord chez lui.
Or, devinez quel était l’aimable gentleman en question ? Ni plus
ni moins que le très-honorable comte de Crabs, ce charmant vieillard
dont la conversation m’avait ravi la veille. Le lendemain, Cinqpoints
fut informé de cette rencontre, et il commença à croire qu’il aurait
peut-être mieux fait de ne point mépriser les menaces paternelles.
Bien que les divers incidents du dîner de l’ambassade ne m’aient
été connus que beaucoup plus tard, je ferai aussi bien de les
raconter ici. Je les rapporte donc, sans y changer un mot, tels que je
les tiens d’un témoin oculaire qui assistait à ce repas, debout
derrière la chaise de lord Crabs.
On dîna en petit comité, ainsi que l’avait annoncé lady Bobtail. Le
comte de Crabs se trouva placé entre les deux Griffin, pour
lesquelles il fut plein d’égards et de prévenances.
— Permettez-moi de vous remercier, chère madame, de vous
remercier bien vivement de l’accueil que vous avez bien voulu faire à
mon pauvre Percy, dit-il à lady Griffin entre le potage et le poisson.
— Vous êtes trop jeune pour avoir jamais éprouvé… mais trop
sensible, j’en suis sûr, pour ne pas comprendre… ce qu’un père doit
ressentir en face de tout témoignage d’amitié accordé à son fils.
Croyez, ajouta-t-il d’une voix attendrie, en regardant milady dans le
blanc des yeux, croyez bien que la moindre preuve d’intérêt donnée
à Percy m’inspire un vif sentiment de reconnaissance et d’affection.
Lady Griffin rougit et baissa la tête, l’émotion l’empêchant de
s’apercevoir qu’elle trempait dans son assiette l’extrémité de ses
tresses blondes. Elle avait avalé sans hésitation les flagorneries du
comte de Crabs. Milord, qui avait appris de fort bonne heure l’art
d’entortiller son monde, talent que l’âge n’avait fait que développer
chez lui, ne tarda pas à adresser à miss Griffin un discours non
moins flatteur. Il n’ignorait pas, dit-il, que Percy songeait à en finir
avec la vie de garçon. (Miss rougit.) Heureux coquin, quel mortel
n’envierait son sort ! (Miss devient écarlate.) Sur ce, le comte poussa
un gros soupir, demanda de la sauce au homard et se mit à manger
son turbot. Mon maître était un roué accompli ; mais on ne pouvait
pas plus le placer sur la même ligne que son père qu’on ne
songerait à comparer une taupinière à une montagne. Avant la fin de
la soirée, milord avait fait plus de chemin qu’un autre n’en ferait en
six mois. On oubliait son nez rouge, son gros ventre et ses
méchants yeux gris, en écoutant les flatteries qu’il débitait d’une voix
si insinuante et les anecdotes qu’il racontait si bien. Il charma surtout
ses voisines par la douce piété et les sentiments honorables qui
perçaient, comme malgré lui, à travers la frivole conversation de
l’homme du monde. Peut-être me direz-vous qu’elles se laissèrent
fasciner trop vite ? Mais veuillez vous rappeler, cher lecteur, qu’elles
arrivaient des Indes, qu’elles n’avaient encore vu que bien peu de
lords, qu’elles adoraient la pairie, selon la louable coutume de toute
Anglaise bien pensante, et qu’elles faisaient pour ainsi dire leurs
premiers pas dans la haute société.
Après dîner, tandis que Mathilde chantait un air italien, le comte
de Crabs accapara de nouveau lady Griffin, et ramena la
conversation sur cet heureux coquin de Percy.
 — Quel bonheur pour nous tous, chère madame, dit-il, que Percy
ait trouvé à Paris des amies aussi honorables que vous et miss
Griffin !
— Pourquoi donc cela, milord ? Je ne vois rien là de bien
extraordinaire. Je présume que l’Honorable M. Cinqpoints ne sera
jamais en peine pour trouver des amis dans la classe où il est né ?
— Cela devrait être, en effet. Sa naissance lui a valu bien des
amitiés précieuses à conserver… Mais…
Ici milord hocha la tête et se tut.
— Mais quoi ? demanda lady Griffin, riant de l’expression lugubre
empreinte sur le visage de son interlocuteur. Vous plaisantez ? Vous
ne voulez pas me donner à entendre que votre fils ne mérite pas
l’amitié des honnêtes gens ?
— Non, non, Dieu merci, il n’en est pas encore là. Mais, hélas ! je
ne plaisante pas. Ce pauvre garçon… (il faut bien que jeunesse se
passe…) aime le jeu ; il est criblé de dettes, que je ne veux plus
payer, et vous savez qu’un jeune homme, dans ces conditions, est
rarement disposé à fréquenter la meilleure société.
— Criblé de dettes ! Il prétend, au contraire, qu’il a cinquante
mille francs de rente qu’il tient de sa mère, et ses dépenses ne
paraissent certainement pas excéder son revenu.
Milord hocha de nouveau la tête, et reprit, d’un ton tristement
ému :
— Ma chère lady Griffin veut-elle me promettre le secret ?
Sachez que Percy ne possède rien au monde qu’une rente de vingt-
cinq mille francs que je lui fais, et qu’il est affreusement endetté. Il a
perdu au jeu des sommes énormes. Voilà pourquoi je suis si
heureux de le voir admis dans l’intimité d’une famille honorable où,
sous l’influence d’attraits plus purs et plus puissants, il pourra oublier
les émotions du tapis vert et la mauvaise compagnie qui a failli le
perdre.
Lady Griffin n’avait plus la moindre envie de rire. Cinqpoints ne
l’aimait donc pas ? Il n’en voulait donc qu’à sa fortune ? Comment en
douter ? Le dénonciateur involontaire n’était-il pas le meilleur ami du
coupable, un pair du royaume-uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande,
incapable par conséquent de mentir ? Lady Griffin se décida à tenter
une épreuve décisive. Elle comprit combien elle aimait Percy en
sentant combien elle pourrait le haïr si elle découvrait qu’il l’avait
trompée.
La soirée se termina sans autre incident digne de remarque, et
les trois convives s’en retournèrent ensemble place Vendôme, où ils
se séparèrent, ainsi que nous l’avons vu, milord pour se faire
reconduire par le cocher de ses nouvelles amies, celles-ci pour
remonter chez elles.
Elles y trouvèrent l’infortunée Kicksey, qui, par extraordinaire,
avait emprunté les traits d’une femme heureuse. A voir son visage
rayonnant, on reconnaissait qu’elle était grosse d’un secret dont elle
avait hâte d’accoucher. Tout en versant le thé, elle s’écria :
— Milady, vous ne devineriez jamais qui m’a fait le plaisir de
passer la soirée avec moi ?
— Probablement Lenoir, ma femme de chambre ? répondit lady
Griffin d’un ton sévère. Je regrette, Jemina, que vous vous abaissiez
jusqu’à rechercher la société de mes gens. N’oubliez pas que vous
êtes ma sœur.
— Du tout, il ne s’agit nullement de Lenoir, mais d’un jeune
homme et même d’un beau jeune homme.
— Ah, j’y suis ! s’écria miss Mathilde. C’est le chevalier de l’Orge ;
il avait promis de m’apporter des cordes pour ma guitare.
— Ce n’est pas M. de l’Orge non plus. Il est bien venu ; mais il n’a
pas eu la politesse de demander après moi. Mon visiteur n’est autre
que votre aimable cavalier, l’Honorable Percy Cinqpoints.
En annonçant cette bonne fortune, la pauvre Kicksey prit un air
aussi joyeux que si elle venait d’hériter d’un oncle millionnaire.
— M. Cinqpoints ? Et qu’est-il venu faire ici ? demanda milady,
qui songeait justement à l’étrange confidence que le comte de Crabs
avait jugé à propos de lui faire.
 — D’abord il avait égaré son portefeuille, que nous avons
retrouvé sur le canapé ; puis ne sachant où passer la soirée, il m’a
demandé une tasse de thé (il a dit de mon excellent thé), et il est
resté plus d’une heure à causer avec moi.
— Et oserais-je vous demander quel a été le sujet de votre
conversation ? Avez-vous parlé musique ou beaux-arts, politique ou
métaphysique ? demanda d’un ton railleur miss Mathilde, qui était un
vrai bas-bleu, comme le sont la plupart des bossues et des
laiderons.
— Non vraiment, il n’a pas été question de tout cela ; autrement,
Mathilde, vous savez bien que je n’y aurais rien compris. Nous
avons causé du temps, de chiens, de chevaux, du jardin des
Plantes, des différentes espèces de thé. Il préfère le Souchon au
Congo. Le thé vert l’empêche de dormir. Puis nous avons parlé
d’éléphants, puis des Indes, et enfin (ici la voix de miss Kicksey
baissa de plusieurs notes) de ce cher sir Georges… M. Cinqpoints
n’ignore pas quel bon mari il faisait…
— Ni quelle fortune il a laissée, hein, miss Kicksey ? interrompit
milady avec un petit ricanement diabolique.
— Oui, ma chère Léonore, il sait tout cela. Il s’intéresse tellement
à vous et à Mathilde, que je ne me lasserais jamais de l’écouter.
Selon lui les femmes n’entendent rien aux affaires et il craignait
qu’étant trop confiantes vous ne fussiez volées par vos gens.
— Et qu’avez-vous répondu à cela, s’il vous plaît ? demanda lady
Griffin.
— Je l’ai rassuré en lui apprenant que votre fortune s’élève à
environ deux cent vingt-cinq mille francs de rente, et que vous ne
dépensez que les deux tiers de votre revenu.
— Et puis ?
— Et puis, c’est tout.
— M. Cinqpoints ne vous a-t-il pas demandé à laquelle de nous
deux appartient cette fortune ?
 — Oui ; mais je n’ai pu lui donner aucun renseignement là-
dessus.
— Je le savais ! s’écria milady, en posant brusquement sa tasse
sur la table. J’en étais sûre !
— Et pourquoi pas, lady Griffin ? interrompit miss Mathilde. Parce
que M. Cinqpoints adresse à votre sœur une question innocente,
est-ce une raison pour briser ainsi votre tasse ? Il n’est pas
mercenaire, lui ! Il possède une assez bonne part des biens de ce
monde pour ne rien envier aux autres. Souvent, bien souvent, il m’a
dit qu’il espère choisir pour femme quelque jeune fille sans fortune,
qui ne pourra douter de la sincérité de son amour.
— Je le crois sans peine, s’écria milady… Peut-être la femme de
son choix est-elle la charmante miss Griffin ?
Elle s’éloigna sans attendre la réponse, laissant Mathilde fondre
en larmes et verser ses douleurs dans le sein de la fidèle Kicksey.
 VI
L’ANE CHOISIT SA BOTTE DE FOIN

Le lendemain, nous nous rendîmes chez les Griffin, moi pour

m’amuser avec les femmes de chambre de la maison, mon maître
pour présenter ses hommages aux dames de son cœur.
Mademoiselle pinçait sa guitare ; milady paraissait occupée à
chercher quelque document parmi des livres de compte, des lettres
d’affaires et des parchemins renfermés dans un coffre noir. Ce genre
d’occupation me conviendrait assez, surtout si chaque année
m’amenait, comme à lady Griffin, une augmentation de revenu. La
jolie veuve surveillait seule ses intérêts et ceux de sa belle-fille,
beaucoup trop sentimentale pour déchiffrer le griffonnage d’un
homme d’affaires ou des comptes de banquier.
Les yeux de Mathilde brillèrent comme des escarboucles dès que
mon maître se présenta ; elle l’invita avec un mouvement plein de
câlinerie (la femme la plus laide est quelquefois aussi gracieuse
qu’une chatte) à prendre place auprès d’elle sur le canapé.
Cinqpoints s’empressa d’obéir ; milady, en voyant entrer Cinqpoints,
s’était contentée de lui adresser un salut bienveillant, mais sans
quitter ses paperasses.
— Lady Griffin a reçu des lettres de ces vilaines gens qu’on
appelle hommes d’affaires, dit Mathilde. Elle ne vous adressera pas
la parole d’ici à une demi-heure au moins ; venez donc vous asseoir
auprès de moi, chevalier félon, et dites-moi pourquoi vous arrivez si
tard.
— Très-volontiers, ma chère miss Griffin… Eh mais, en vérité,
c’est presque un tête-à-tête que vous me proposez là !
 Après avoir échangé une foule de balivernes de ce genre, on
commença à causer d’une façon plus sérieuse.
— Savez-vous, dit miss Mathilde, que nous avons rencontré à
l’ambassade un de vos meilleurs amis ?
— Mon père, sans doute ? Il est très-lié avec lord Bobtail. J’avais
oublié de vous dire qu’il m’a fort agréablement surpris l’autre soir en
tombant chez moi à l’improviste.
— Quel bon et charmant vieillard ! Comme il vous aime !
— Étonnamment ! fit mon maître en levant les yeux au ciel.
— Je vous rendrais trop fier si je vous répétais la moitié du bien
qu’il m’a dit de vous.
On voit par là que lord Crabs n’avait pas jugé à propos de tenir le
même langage à la mère et à la fille. Cinqpoints, rassuré par ce
début, parut respirer plus librement.
— Mon cher père est bien bon ; mais, aveugle et indulgent
comme la plupart des parents, il serait le dernier à s’apercevoir de
mes nombreux défauts.
— Il m’a dit que vous avez toujours été son favori et qu’il regrette
que vous ne soyez pas l’aîné. « Je ne puis, a-t-il ajouté, lui laisser
que la faible part d’un cadet ; n’importe, il a de grands talents, un
beau nom, et d’ailleurs il est indépendant. »
— Indépendant ?… Oui, oui, je suis tout à fait indépendant de
mon père.
— Cinquante mille francs de rente que vous a légués votre
mère… Il n’a fait que répéter ce que vous nous aviez dit.
— Ni plus ni moins, — une modeste aisance qui suffit et au delà
à un homme dont les goûts sont aussi tranquilles que les miens,
répondit mon maître d’un ton modeste.
— A propos, s’écria milady, interrompant cette conversation
qu’elle n’entendait qu’à moitié, puisque vous parlez d’argent, je vous
somme d’accourir à mon aide. Venez ici, et faites-moi cette addition.
 Cinqpoints ne se fit pas prier une seconde fois, je vous jure. Ses
yeux petillèrent tandis qu’il franchissait la distance qui le séparait de
la veuve et des parchemins.
— Tenez, reprit celle-ci, lorsqu’il se fut assis auprès d’elle, mon
banquier m’écrit qu’il a reçu de son correspondant aux Indes une
somme de 7,200 roupies au change 2 shillings et 9 pence par
roupie, qu’il place à mon crédit. Traduisez-moi donc ces chiffres en
monnaie française.
Cinqpoints fit le calcul.
— Cela représente 24,750 francs, dit-il.
— Merci, répliqua la veuve. Je m’en rapporte à vous ; car je suis
trop paresseuse aujourd’hui pour vérifier. Maintenant, il se présente
une autre difficulté : à qui appartient cet argent, à moi ou à
Mathilde ? Aux termes du testament de ce pauvre sir Georges, il me
semble qu’il revient à miss Griffin, mais je n’en suis pas sûre…
Voyons, Mathilde, qu’en pensez-vous ?
— Ces choses-là vous regardent ; je m’en soucie peu, et vous
donne raison d’avance, répondit miss Griffin, qui, en effet, n’était
nullement intéressée : ou plutôt, ajouta-t-elle, en posant la main sur
celle de Percy, vous allez décider pour moi.
— Mais, pour juger en connaissance de cause, il faudrait
connaître le testament auquel lady Griffin fait allusion.
— Qu’à cela ne tienne ; je l’ai là.
On eût dit que la chaise de Cinqpoints se dressait sous lui : il fut
obligé de s’y cramponner des deux mains.
— Le voici, continua lady Griffin ; ce n’est qu’une copie, comme
vous voyez, faite par moi d’après le manuscrit de sir Georges. Les
soldats n’aiment guère avoir recours aux hommes de loi, et l’original
a été écrit en entier de la main du général à la veille d’une bataille.
— Je vais vous lire ça… Moi, Georges Griffin, etc., etc., etc… Vous
savez comment ces choses-là débutent… Étant sain de corps et
d’esprit, etc., etc., etc. Je nomme et institue mes exécuteurs
testamentaires mes amis Thomas Abraham Hicks, colonel au
service de l’honorable Compagnie des Indes, et John Munro
Mackirkincroft, de la maison Huffle, Mackirkincroft et Dobbs, de
Calcutta. Je leur lègue en fidéicommis tous mes biens meubles et
immeubles, qu’ils réaliseront le plus promptement que faire se
pourra sans préjudice pour la succession. L’intérêt des sommes par
eux réalisées sera partagé par parts égales entre ma femme,
Leonora Emilia Griffin (née L. E. Kicksey), et Mathilde Griffin, ma
seule et unique fille légitime. Le principal restera placé aux noms des
dits fidéicommissaires T. A. Hicks et J. M. Mackirkincroft, jusqu’à la
mort de ma femme, L. E. Griffin (née Kicksey), et, à son décès, sera
mis à la disposition de ma dite fille, Mathilde Griffin, ou aux héritiers,
exécuteurs testamentaires ou ayants droit de ma dite fille. Dans le
cas où… Mais le reste ne signifie rien. Maintenant que vous voilà
renseigné, monsieur Cinqpoints, tirez-moi d’embarras. A qui la
somme en litige ?
— La chose est claire comme le jour : l’argent doit être partagé
entre vous et miss Griffin.
— Tant mieux ! je croyais vraiment qu’il appartenait à Mathilde.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Un silence de quelques minutes succéda à cette lecture
émouvante. Mon maître quitta le bureau devant lequel il avait pris
place à côté de milady, se promena de long en large dans le salon,
puis il se rapprocha du canapé sur lequel miss Griffin venait de se
rasseoir.
— Je regrette presque, chère lady Griffin, dit-il alors, que vous
m’ayez lu ce testament ; car je crains que l’aveu que je vais faire ne
paraisse dicté par un vil motif d’intérêt… Mais non ! vous me
connaissez trop bien, je l’espère, pour me supposer des sentiments
indignes d’un gentilhomme… Miss Griffin, Mathilde ! vos chers yeux
me disent assez que je puis parler… Mais ai-je quelque chose à
vous apprendre, mon adorée ? Cet amour, que votre chère belle-
mère est trop clairvoyante pour n’avoir pas deviné, je n’ai pas
longtemps réussi à vous le cacher. Je ne feindrai pas non plus, ma
charmante Mathilde, de n’avoir pas su lire dans votre tendre cœur et