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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN
EUROPEAN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
The Far Right in the

Workplace
A Six-Country Comparison
Seongcheol Kim · Samuel Greef

Wolfgang Schroeder
Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology
Series Editors
Carlo Ruzza, School of International Studies, University of Trento,
Trento, Italy
Hans-Jörg Trenz, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola
Normale Superiore, Pisa, Italy
Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology addresses contemporary
themes in the field of Political Sociology. Over recent years, attention has
turned increasingly to processes of Europeanization and globalization and
the social and political spaces that are opened by them. These processes
comprise both institutional-constitutional change and new dynamics of
social transnationalism. Europeanization and globalization are also about
changing power relations as they affect people’s lives, social networks and
forms of mobility.
The Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology series addresses
linkages between regulation, institution building and the full range of
societal repercussions at local, regional, national, European and global
level, and will sharpen understanding of changing patterns of attitudes
and behaviours of individuals and groups, the political use of new rights
and opportunities by citizens, new conflict lines and coalitions, societal
interactions and networking, and shifting loyalties and solidarity within
and across the European space.
We welcome proposals from across the spectrum of Political Sociology
and Political Science, on dimensions of citizenship; political attitudes and
values; political communication and public spheres; states, communities,
governance structure and political institutions; forms of political participa-
tion; populism and the radical right; and democracy and democratization.
Seongcheol Kim · Samuel Greef ·
Wolfgang Schroeder
The Far Right

in the Workplace
A Six-Country Comparison
Seongcheol Kim Samuel Greef
University of Kassel University of Kassel
Kassel, Germany Kassel, Germany
Wolfgang Schroeder
University of Kassel
Kassel, Germany
With financial support from the European Union
Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology

ISBN 978-3-031-04001-6 ISBN 978-3-031-04002-3 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04002-3
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
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names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
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The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
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the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
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Cover credit: Samuel Greef (CC BY-SA 4.0)
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Acknowledgments
This book presents the results of a two-year research project funded by the
European Commission (“More democracy not discrimination and racism
at the workplace,” grant number VS/2020/0114). The contents and
research findings reflect solely the views of the three authors. The Euro-
pean Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the
book’s contents.
The project was conducted in cooperation with the following national
trade union centers in the six countries under examination: ACV/CSC
(Belgium), CGT (France), DGB (Germany), MASZSZ (Hungary), CGIL
(Italy), OPZZ (Poland). The DGB initiated and coordinated the project
and played a key role in making it possible, from the planning stages to
completion. Our sincere thanks are due to our DGB colleagues Hermann
Nehls, who came up with the idea for the project and tirelessly coor-
dinated its implementation; Martin Roggenkamp and Christoph Hoeft,
who were actively involved in the project preparations, implementation,
and discussions; and Andrea Schiele, who provided organizational support
in the first year of the project. We would like to express our sincere thanks
to our colleagues in all six trade union confederations, who will not be
named here in the interest of maintaining the anonymity of all intervie-
wees, for their invaluable support, input, and camaraderie, as well as the
national leaderships of the aforementioned trade unions for agreeing to
take part in the project.
v
vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The results of the research project were presented and discussed in

full in joint workshops conducted with the six partner trade unions. The
results were also presented in part in workshops and colloquia at the
University of Kassel, the WZB Berlin Social Science Center, and the Vrije
Universiteit Brussel. We are grateful for the helpful and critical input of all
our academic and trade union colleagues who participated in these discus-
sions. It goes without saying that the authors bear sole responsibility for
any errors or inconsistencies in the text.
Kassel and Berlin Seongcheol Kim

February 2022 Samuel Greef
Wolfgang Schroeder
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Taking Stock: The Far Right in the 2010s 2
1.2 Research Questions and Methodology 4
1.3 Structure of the Book 7
References 9
2 The Far Right and the Workers: An Overview 11
2.1 Conceptual Framework: Workers, Far Right, Radical
and Extreme Right, Right-Wing Populism 12
2.2 Literature Review: The Far Right and the Workers 17
2.3 Methodology: Triangulation and Theory–Practice
Dialogue 21
2.4 A Comparison of Background Conditions: Far-Right
Parties, Trade Unions, Workplace Contexts 24
References 30
3 Belgium 35
3.1 Introduction 35
3.2 Trade Unions and Workplace Representation
in Belgium: An Overview 36
3.3 The Vlaams Belang and the Workers 38
3.4 Trade Unions and Far-Right Politics: An Overview 46
3.5 Case Study and Findings from the Field 48
vii
viii CONTENTS
3.5.1 Insights into the Workplace Context: DAF

Trucks Westerlo 48
3.5.2 The Response Strategy of the ACV
and ACV-Metea: Political Education Outside
the Workplace 52
3.6 Conclusion 58
List of Interviews 59
References 60
4 France 63
4.1 Introduction 63
in France: An Overview 65
4.3 The Front National und the Workers 67
4.4 Right-Wing Trade Union Actors: A (Historical)
Overview 77
4.4.1 CGSI, CFT, CSL: The Lineage
of “Independent” Trade Unions 77
4.4.2 The FN Trade Union Experiment (1995–1998) 80
4.5.1 The Regional Constellation: The FN
at the Factory Gates and in Town Halls 82
4.5.2 Insights into the Workplace Context: PSA
Trémery 85
4.5.3 The Response Strategy of the CGT: Political
Education Outside the Workplace 90
4.6 Conclusion 93
References 95
5 Germany 99
5.1 Introduction 99
in Germany: An Overview 100
5.3 The AfD and the Workers 104
5.4 Zentrum Automobil and Right-Wing Politics:
An Overview 108
5.5.1 Insights into the Workplace Context: Daimler
Stuttgart-Untertürkheim 112
CONTENTS ix
5.5.2 The Response Strategy of the IG Metall:

Publicity Work in the Workplace 116
5.6 Conclusion 120
References 122
6 Hungary 127
6.1 Introduction 127
in Hungary: An Overview 128
6.3 Fidesz, Jobbik, and the Workers: Between
Rapprochement and Threat 131
6.3.1 Fidesz 132
6.3.2 Jobbik 137
6.4 Trade Unions and Right-Wing Politics: An Overview 140
6.5.1 The Local Constellation: From MSZP
to Fidesz—And Then Jobbik? 143
6.5.2 Insights into the Workplace Context: ZF Eger 145
6.5.3 The Response Strategy of MASZSZ/Vasas:
Economic Unionism 149
6.6 Conclusion 152
References 153
7 Italy 157
7.2 Trade Unions and Workplace Representation in Italy:
An Overview 159
7.3 The Lega and the Workers 161
7.4 The UGL as a Right-Wing Union Actor 168
7.4.1 From CISNAL to UGL 168
7.4.2 The UGL Today: Between Party Union, Yellow
Union, and Protest Union 169
7.5.1 The Local Constellation in Sant’Agata
Bolognese: From Left-Wing Continuity
to Right-Wing Dominance 174
x CONTENTS
7.5.2 The Response Strategy of the FIOM

Lamborghini: Political Education
in the Workplace 178
7.5.3 A Look Beyond Lamborghini: Schnellecke
and Berco 184
7.6 Conclusion 188
References 189
8 Poland 193
in Poland: An Overview 194
8.3 PiS and the Workers 197
8.4 Solidarność and Right-Wing Politics: An Overview 202
8.5.1 Insights into the Workplace Context: FCA
Bielsko-Biała and Tychy 208
8.5.2 The Response Strategy of OPZZ/Metalowcy:
Economic Unionism 215
8.6 Conclusion 218
References 219
9 Conclusions: The Far Right and the Workers
in Comparative Perspective 223
9.1 Messaging Strategies of Far-Right Parties on Labor
Issues 224
9.2 Organizing Strategies of Far-Right Actors
in the Workplace 231
9.3 Response Strategies of Established Trade Unions 236
9.4 Conclusion and Outlook 242
References 245
Index 247
Abbreviations
ABVV/FGTB Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond/Fédération Générale du

Travail de Belgique [General Federation of Belgian Labor]
ACLVB/CGSLB Algemene Centrale der Liberale Vakbonden van
België/Centrale Générale des syndicats libéraux de Belgique
[General Confederation of Liberal Trade Unions of Belgium]
ACV/CSC Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond/Confédération des syndi-
cats chrétiens [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions
(Belgium)]
AfD Alternative für Deutschland [Alternative for Germany]
AFSZ Audi Független Szakszervezet [Audi Independent Trade
Union (Hungary)]
AN Alleanza Nazionale [National Alliance (Italy)]
ANAR Associazione Nazionale Autonoma dei Riders [Autonomous
National Association of Riders (Italy)]
ASZSZ Autonóm Szakszervezetek Szövetsége [Autonomous Trade
Union Alliance (Hungary)]
AWS Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność [Solidarity Electoral Action
(Poland)]
CCNL Contratto collettivo nazionale del lavoro [National collective
bargaining agreement (Italy)]
CD&V Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams [Christian Democratic and
Flemish]
CFDT Confédération française démocratique du travail [Demo-
cratic French Confederation of Labor]
xi
xii ABBREVIATIONS
CFE-CGC Confédération française de l’encadrement—Confédération

générale des cadres [French Confederation of Management—
General Confederation of Executives]
CFT Confédération française du travail [French Confederation of
Labor]
CFTC Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens [French
Confederation of Christian Workers]
CGB Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund Deutschlands [Christian
Trade Union Federation of Germany]
CGIL Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro [Italian General
Confederation of Labor]
CGM Christliche Gewerkschaft Metall [Christian Metalworkers’
Union (Germany)]
CGSI Confédération Générale des Syndicats Indépendants [General
Confederation of Independent Trade Unions]
CGT Confédération Générale du Travail [General Confederation
of Labor]
ChZZ Chrześcijański Zwiazek
˛ Zawodowy “Solidarność” im. ksi˛edza
Jerzego Popiełuszki [Christian Trade Union “Solidarity”
named after the Priest Jerzy Popiełuszko (Poland)]
CISL Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori [Italian
Confederation of Workers’ Trade Unions]
CISNAL Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Nazionali dei Lavoratori
[Italian Confederation of National Workers’ Trade Unions]
CRZZ Centralna Rada Zwiazków˛ Zawodowych [Central Council of
Trade Unions (Poland)]
CSL Confédération des syndicats libres [Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (France)]
dbb dbb beamtenbund und tarifunion [German Civil Service
Federation]
DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund [German Trade Union Confed-
eration]
EPP European People’s Party
ÉSZT Értelmiségi Szakszervezeti Tömörülés [Professional Trade
Union Bloc]
ÉTMOSZ Életre Tervezett Munkavállalók Országos Szakszervezete
[National Trade Union of Workers Planned for Life]
ETUC European Trade Union Confederation
EU European Union
FCA Fiat Chrysler Automobiles
FdI Fratelli d’Italia [Brothers of Italy]
FI Forza Italia [Forward Italy]
ABBREVIATIONS xiii
FIM Federazione Italiana Metalmeccanici [Italian Federation of

Metal Mechanics]
FIOM Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici [Italian Federa-
tion of Metalworkers]
FN Front National [National Front (France)]
FO Force Ouvrière [Workers’ Power (France)]
FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs [Freedom Party of Austria]
FSU Fédération syndicale unitaire [Unitary Trade Union Federa-
tion (France)]
FZZ Forum Zwiazków˛ Zawodowych [Forum of Trade Unions
(Poland)]
KOD Komitet Obrony Demokracji [Committee for the Defense of
Democracy (Poland)]
KOSZ Kéményseprők Országos Szakszervezete [National Trade Union
of Chimneysweepers (Hungary)]
LGBT Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
LN Lega Nord [Northern League (Italy)]
LO Lutte Ouvrière [Workers’ Struggle (France)]
LR Les Républicains [The Republicans (France)]
M5S Movimento Cinque Stelle [Five Star Movement (Italy)]
MASZSZ Magyar Szakszervezeti Szövetség [Hungarian Trade Union
Alliance]
MDF Magyar Demokrata Fórum [Hungarian Democratic Forum]
MSI Movimento Sociale Italiano [Italian Social Movement]
MSZOSZ Magyar Szakszervezetek Országos Szövetsége [National
Alliance of Hungarian Trade Unions]
MSZP Magyar Szocialista Párt [Hungarian Socialist Party]
NESZE Nemzeti Szakszervezet [National Trade Union (Hungary)]
NPA Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste [New Anti-Capitalist Party
(France)]
N-VA Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie [New Flemish Alliance]
OPZZ Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiazków ˛ Zawodowych [All-
Poland Alliance of Trade Unions]
PC Porozumienie Centrum [Center Alliance (Poland)]
PCF Parti communiste français [French Communist Party]
PCI Partito Comunista Italiano [Italian Communist Party]
PD Partito Democratico [Democratic Party (Italy)]
PEGIDA Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abend-
landes [Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the
Occident (Germany)]
PiS Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [Law and Justice (Poland)]
PO Platforma Obywatelska [Civic Platform (Poland)]
PRL Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa [Polish People’s Republic]
xiv ABBREVIATIONS
PS Parti socialiste [Socialist Party (Belgium)]

PS Parti socialiste [Socialist Party (France)]
PSA Groupe Peugeot Société Anonyme [Peugeot Public Limited
Company Group (France)]
PVDA/PTB Partij van de Arbeid van België/Parti du Travail de Belgique
[Workers’ Party of Belgium]
RDS Rada Dialogu Społecznego [Council of Social Dialogue
(Poland)]
RN Rassemblement National [National Rally (France)]
RPF Rassemblement du peuple français [Rally of the French
People]
RSU Rappresentanza sindacale unitaria [Unitary union represen-
tation (Italy)]
SIA Syndicat indépendant de l’automobil [Independent Automo-
tive Trade Union (France)]
SLD Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej [Democratic Left Alliance
(Poland)]
SP Socialistische Partij [Socialist Party (Belgium)]
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [Social Democratic
Party of Germany]
SUD Solidaires Unitaires Démocratiques [Solidaristic, Unitary,
Democratic (France)]
SZDSZ Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége [Alliance of Free Democrats
(Hungary)]
SZEF Szakszervezetek Együttműködési Fóruma [Cooperation
Forum of Trade Unions (Hungary)]
UAG Unabhängige Arbeitnehmergruppe [Independent Workers‘
Group (Germany)]
UD Unia Demokratyczna [Democratic Union (Poland)]
UGL Unione Generale del Lavoro [General Union of Labor (Italy)]
UIL Unione Italiana del Lavoro [Italian Union of Labor]
UK United Kingdom
UMP Union pour un mouvement populaire [Union for a Popular
Movement (France)]
UNSA Union nationale des syndicats autonomes [National Union of
Autonomous Trade Unions (France)]
UP Unia Pracy [Union of Labor (Poland)]
US United States
UW Unia Wolności [Freedom Union (Poland)]
VB Vlaams Belang [Flemish Interest]
VB Vlaams Blok [Flemish Block]
VSV Vlaamse Solidaire Vakbond [Flemish Solidarity Union]
VU Volksunie [People’s Union (Belgium)]
ABBREVIATIONS xv
ZA Zentrum Automobil [Automobile Center (Germany)]

ZF Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen [Cogwheel Factory
Friedrichshafen (Germany)]
ZNP Zwiazek
˛ Nauczycielstwa Polskiego [Polish Teaching Union]
ZZIT Zwiazek
˛ Zawodowy Inżynierów i Techników [Trade Union of
Engineers and Technicians (Poland)]
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Overview of selected far-right parties 26

Table 2.2 Overview of trade unions and industrial relations 28
Table 2.3 Overview of company case studies 30
Table 9.1 Programmatic offers on labor issues 225
Table 9.2 Welfare-state positions of far-right parties and their
resonance within the automobile sector 228
Table 9.3 Industrial-policy interventions of far-right parties
within the automobile sector 229
Table 9.4 Extents of political positioning and party proximity
at the leadership level 232
Table 9.5 Organizing strategies at the workplace level
Table 9.6 Response formats of the metalworkers’ unions
of the established trade union confederations
Table 9.7 Response procedures of the metalworkers’ unions
of the established trade union confederations
xvii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This book is the first comparative study of far-right strategies at the

workplace level in Europe, examining not only the messaging strategies
of far-right parties on labor issues but also the organizing strategies of
right-wing to far-right trade unions and workplace groups as well as the
response strategies of established trade unions in six countries: Belgium,
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Poland. In doing so, the book
straddles the national and workplace levels of analysis, examining the
extents to which far-right messaging and organizing strategies at both
levels find demand-side resonance among workers in specific workplace
contexts, with a focus on the automobile industry in the period from
2010 to 2020. Based on a research project in cooperation with trade
unions in the six countries, the book is grounded in a theory–practice
dialogue with trade union actors that brings workers’ voices into the anal-
ysis by identifying challenges to trade union work from the far right based
on the perception patterns of workers and trade unionists themselves. By
linking the supply and demand sides of far-right interventions in labor
relations and presenting a comparative classification of far-right strate-
gies and trade union counter-strategies, The Far Right in the Workplace
constitutes a significant advance within the growing academic and media
interest in the relationship between the far right and workers today.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
S. Kim et al., The Far Right in the Workplace,
Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04002-3_1
2 S. KIM ET AL.
This introductory chapter sets up the object of inquiry by taking stock

of the 2010s as a decade that saw not only the electoral growth but
also a gradual mainstreaming of far-right actors and politics in much of
Europe, which is emphasized in the literature as a key feature of the
“fourth wave” (e.g. Mudde, 2019).1 Against this background, this book
examines the implications for the world of labor and directs particular
attention to the manifold dimensions of far-right supply and demand,
organizing attempts at the workplace level, demand-side receptiveness to
these supply-side offers among workers in specific workplace contexts, and
trade union responses. These dimensions are then introduced in turn in
conjunction with the research questions and methodology underlying this
study. Finally, the chapter closes with an overview of the structure of the
book and of the eight chapters that follow.
1.1 Taking Stock: The Far Right in the 2010s

The decade of the 2010s has been noted by many observers for the
growing electoral-parliamentary success and not least the mainstreaming
of the far right throughout much of Europe. This mainstreaming thesis
takes on a prominent role in numerous diagnoses of the far right
today (e.g. Brown et al., 2021; Mondon & Winter, 2020; Mudde,
2019; Pytlas, 2016; Wodak, 2021) and points to an increasing context-
dependent acceptance of far-right actors and politics in numerous
countries: from specific far-reaching policy demands such as Brexit,
refugee caps, or headscarf bans to government coalitions (e.g. Austria
2017–2019, Estonia 2019–2021, Finland 2015–2019, Italy 2018–2019)
or confidence-and-supply arrangements involving far-right parties (e.g.
Denmark 2015–2019, Netherlands 2010–2012, United Kingdom 2017–
2019). This also includes the transformation of mainstream conservative
parties to those with increasingly radical right-wing tendencies—such as
Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland—as well as the
electoral progression of parties that have remained on the far right and
continue to be blocked from coalitions, such as the Vlaams Belang (VB)
1 Following Klaus van Beyme’s work, Mudde (2019) designates the first three waves of
the postwar far right as neo-fascism (1945–1955, with the MSI in Italy being a paradig-
matic case), right-wing populism (1955–1980, e.g. Poujadism in France and other agrarian
or small-business-based movements), and radical right (1980–2000, with the emergence
or conversion of modern far-right parties such as Front National, Vlaams Blok, and FPÖ).
1 INTRODUCTION 3
in Belgium and the Front National (FN) or Rassemblement National

(RN) in France. In Germany, too, a far-right party is represented in federal
parliament with the 2017 entry of the Alternative for Germany (AfD),
a party that had initially emerged with an aura of professorial-bourgeois
respectability before radicalizing in subsequent years. The far-reaching
consequences of these developments, certainly different depending on
the country, can hardly be underestimated: since 2010 and 2015, respec-
tively, Hungary and Poland have come to be considered the most severe
cases of “democratic backsliding” in post-1989 Europe—something that
was not least enabled in the Hungarian case by the longtime protection
of Fidesz by its powerful partners within the European People’s Party
(EPP). It is worth recalling that at the turn of the millennium—which is
where Mudde (2019) situates the beginning of the “fourth wave”—there
were outpourings of public shock at high-profile far-right breakthroughs
such as the Austrian Freedom Party’s (FPÖ) entry into government in
2000 or Jean-Marie Le Pen’s advancement to the second round of the
2002 French presidential elections, triggering mass demonstrations in
the respective countries with the active participation of civil society and,
in the Austrian case, even short-lived bilateral sanctions by the EU-14
governments against Austria. In the following decade, at least at first
glance, there were no such responses of a comparable magnitude when
it came to, for instance, the FPÖ’s return to government in 2017 or the
new electoral high-water marks of the FN in the 2012 and 2017 presi-
dential elections. In this context, the question of the precise relationship
between far-right political offers, the extent to which these offers find
demand-side traction, and counter-responses within civil society is an
increasingly pressing question that has been examined in the authors’
previous work in relation to German civil society (Schroeder et al., 2019,
2020, 2022) and will be the subject of this book from a comparative
perspective with a specific focus on the area of labor politics. How and to
what extent processes of mainstreaming of the far right can be seen within
the world of labor in the contexts analyzed here is an open question that
will have to be addressed in context-specific fashion.
The question of the implications of far-right electoral success for
labor relations and trade unions is one that arises not least against the
background of rightward tendencies within working-class electorates:
in Germany, according to exit polls, about 19% of workers and 15%
of trade union members voted for the AfD in the 2017 parliamen-
tary elections (compared to 12.6% of the overall electorate; Deutscher
4 S. KIM ET AL.
Gewerkschaftsbund, 2017), with the figures amounting to 16 and 12.2%

in the 2021 elections, respectively (compared to 10.3% overall; Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund, 2021). Here, a growing literature has emerged on
the supply and demand sides of the extent of working-class voting for
the far right (see Chapter 2). Our research combines this more estab-
lished interest in far-right parties’ policy offers on labor issues as well
as demand-side voting patterns among workers on the one hand with
particular attention to the workplace level as a locus of far-right inter-
ventions and workers’ potential receptiveness to them on the other. The
workplace can be understood as a fundamentally “conflictual space” in
which there is a constant tug-of-war between institutionalized “regula-
tion strategies” and attempts at politicizing the structural contradictions
between employer and employee in different directions—including the
far right (Schroeder et al., 2019, p. 186). This has been pointed out in
examples ranging from interwar fascism (Ost, 2018) to the tradition of
right-wing company unionism, such as in the French automobile industry
(Loubet & Hatzfeld, 2002), or the more recent example of Zentrum
Automobil as a workplace group with far-right roots within the German
automobile industry (Schroeder et al., 2019). In addition, recent reports
of far-right politicians staging leafleting actions in front of factory gates
(see Chapter 2)—such as Tom Van Grieken at DAF Trucks in Westerlo,
Marine Le Pen at PSA Sochaux, or Björn Höcke at Opel Eisenach—
suggest, more than ever, the need to examine interventions by far-right
party and workplace actors as well as the extent of their attractiveness
among workers in workplace-specific contexts. An approach centered on
semi-structured interviews with workers and trade union actors at the
workplace level allows for a possibility to gauge the extent to which far-
right offers find demand-side traction in workplaces, as will be discussed
in the following section.
1.2 Research Questions and Methodology

In light of these considerations, we now present our three-part research
question as follows: (1) What are the messaging and organizing strate-
gies of far-right actors (political parties, trade unions, workplace groups)
on labor issues at the national and workplace levels? (2) What are the
response strategies of the largest trade unions? (3) How successful are these
far-right strategies and trade union counter-strategies? We deploy here
1 INTRODUCTION 5
a broad understanding of “strategy” as encompassing patterns of situa-

tional actions and responses, even when these do not correspond to a
systematically conceived design.
The research keys in on six European countries—Belgium, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Poland—with a focus on the automobile
industry for the period from 2010 to 2020. The automobile sector consti-
tutes not only an important branch of industry in all six countries, but also
one of the central arenas of industrial transformation in which a height-
ened conflict potential can be seen not least due to the generally high
density of organized actors present. The decade of the 2010s was one
characterized by electoral growth and mainstreaming of far-right parties
in all six countries, for all the important differences and nuances among
them (see Chapter 2). In this context, the question is not only how far-
right parties tailor their policy offers to labor electorates and possibly also
address workplace-specific issues within the automobile industry, but also
how far-right trade unions or workplace groups try to organize within
workplaces and how established trade unions, in turn, respond to all these
challenges. In addressing these multifaceted research questions, the aim
is to develop a classificatory scheme that presents an initial mapping out
of far-right strategies and trade union counter-strategies along the afore-
mentioned dimensions—a task to which the final, comparative chapter
of the book is devoted. As an indicator of the success of these strategies
and counter-strategies—and in the interest of linking supply and demand-
side aspects—the classifications in the comparative chapter incorporate the
dimension of workplace salience of far-right policy profiles and interven-
tions as well as the relative coverage of far-right organizing strategies and
trade union response formats.
A hardly trivial task at the outset is that of deciding which actor cate-
gories qualify as “far-right” and fall within the scope of the analysis.
Here, the growing gap between far-right “parties and politics ” (Mudde,
2017, p. 610) constitutes a key consideration: in other words, the poli-
tics of the far right has increasingly been taken up by parties that are not
commonly thought of or referred to as “far-right” in public discourse
and, indeed, have their roots in mainstream party politics (e.g. Fidesz
and PiS). In this vein, Chapter 2 discusses a diverse range of parties in
the six countries that can currently be said to engage in far-right politics.
Within this wider field, each country analysis then focuses on far-right
parties and workplace actors that were identified as challenges to trade
union work in the interviews conducted with trade union actors, while
6 S. KIM ET AL.
also backing up each classification as “far-right” based on an analysis of

constitutive dimensions of far-right politics such as nativism (domestic
vs. foreign), nationalism (“the nation” vs. non-national Others), and/or
authoritarianism (dismantling of institutional checks, rejection of non-
conformist or non-traditional lifestyles). The book is thus committed not
only to context-specific analysis grounded in extensive case knowledge but
also practices a distinctive form of theory–practice dialogue that is also
based on cooperation with the largest trade union centers by membership
according to available data (as of 2019) in the six countries: ACV/CSC in
Belgium, CGT in France, DGB in Germany, MASZSZ in Hungary, CGIL
in Italy, and OPZZ in Poland. As cooperation partners participating in the
research project, each of these trade unions was asked for its input from
the initial stages of research in providing preliminary suggestions about
which far-right actors and workplace contexts to focus on. In the field
work phase, semi-structured interviews were conducted with trade union
actors at the national and workplace levels, academic research experts,
and in some cases also local politicians; the interview results were trian-
gulated with analyses of far-right communication materials on the one
hand (mostly at the national level) as well as relevant secondary-literature
studies and available survey data on working-class voting for the far right
on the other (both at the national level) in order to develop an integrated
understanding of each country-specific constellation based on different
source types and levels.
The centerpiece of each country analysis is a company case study
within the automobile sector that examines the far-right strategies and
trade union counter-strategies in the context of an automobile produc-
tion or parts supplier factory. The selection of each company site was
made in close consultation with the trade union partners, corresponding
to our underlying research interest in far-right actors and workplaces
that are perceived by established trade union actors themselves as chal-
lenges to trade union work. The choice of company sites was made based
on different forms of initially identifiable far-right presence—from trade
unions and workplace groups to leafleting actions by far-right politi-
cians or positions of executive office at the local level held by the far
right—with these initial considerations then being further examined and
questioned in the field research. Within the framework of the theory–
practice dialogue, the possibility was left open for other company sites
to be visited and examined as supplementary case studies based on
on-site suggestions from interviewees. In the end, six company case
1 INTRODUCTION 7
studies were conducted—DAF Trucks in Westerlo (Belgium), PSA in

Trémery (France), Daimler in Stuttgart-Untertürkheim (Germany), ZF
in Eger (Hungary), Lamborghini in Sant’Agata Bolognese (Italy), and
FCA in Bielsko-Biała/Tychy (Poland)—in addition to supplementary case
studies at Dunaferr in Dunaújváros (Hungary) as well as Schnellecke in
Sant’Agata Bolognese and Berco in Copparo (Italy).
As will be discussed in Chapter 2, the six-country case selection is
designed to allow for a high level of variance in background conditions
in order to map out a wide-ranging universe of outcomes, thus corre-
sponding to the “diverse-case method” with the goal of developing a
classificatory scheme (Gerring, 2007). While all six countries under exam-
ination have seen the electoral growth and mainstreaming of the far right
(especially in the decade of the 2010s), they provide a diverse mosaic
in terms of (1) the ideological and organizational roots of current far-
right parties, from those issuing from neo-fascist movements (FN/RN,
Jobbik) or separatist alliances (Lega, Vlaams Belang) to mainstream
national-conservative parties (Fidesz, PiS); (2) the trade union landscapes,
including the historical roots of the main trade unions themselves—
from the historically Christian-democratic ACV/CSC to the previously
communist CGT and CGIL or the formerly state-socialist MASZSZ and
OPZZ—and the systems of industrial relations, from monistic to mixed to
dual systems of labor representation; and the (3) initially identifiable forms
of far-right presence in the company sites selected for the case studies.
These dimensions are each discussed in turn in Chapter 2 and revisited in
part in the comparative discussion in Chapter 9.
1.3 Structure of the Book

The book proceeds with a conceptual and methodological chapter
featuring initial comparative considerations on background conditions
in the six countries (Chapter 2), followed by the six-country chapters
(Chapters 3–8) and, finally, a comparative chapter that develops a classi-
ficatory scheme of far-right strategies and trade union counter-strategies
(Chapter 9). Chapter 2 provides conceptual considerations and clarifica-
tions on key terminology, including “workers” and “far right” as well as
associated terms such as “radical” or “extreme right” and “right-wing
populism.” This is followed in the same chapter by an overview of the
methodology as well as differences in background conditions across the
six countries, especially in relation to the far-right parties in the party
8 S. KIM ET AL.
systems, the trade union landscapes, and systems of industrial relations as

well as the company sites chosen for the case studies.
Chapters 3–8 consist of the six country studies, presented in alphabet-
ical order: Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Poland. Each
country chapter follows the same basic structure, beginning with (1) a
brief introduction of the problem constellation to be discussed in the
chapter and (2) a brief overview of the trade union landscape and system
of industrial relations, followed by (3) an analysis of far-right parties’
messaging strategies and interventions on labor issues, focusing here on
the far-right parties highlighted as challenges to trade union work in the
interviews. This is then followed by (4) an overview of the activity of trade
unions and workplace groups for which our initial considerations suggest
some kind of link to far-right politics, which may be questioned, revised,
or discarded accordingly. What then follows is (5) the company case study
for the selected automobile factory (followed by shorter, supplemen-
tary case studies if applicable), in which the previously outlined far-right
messaging and organizing strategies are examined in depth in the work-
place context, followed by an examination of the response patterns of the
established trade union at the national and workplace levels alike. While
Section 3 of each chapter draws on macro-level data on working-class
voting for far-right parties (to the extent available) in addition to our own
analysis of far-right communication patterns in illuminating supply and
demand-side aspects at the national level, the company case study draws
on workplace level interviewees’ accounts of the extents of far-right pres-
ence as well as workers’ receptiveness to far-right offers—including rough
ad hoc estimates of vote shares for far-right parties within the workforce—
in order to examine the supply–demand dynamics in workplace-specific
contexts.
Chapter 9 is the centerpiece of the comparative analysis, bringing
together the results of the country chapters to map out the various far-
right strategies and trade union counter-strategies across the six countries.
Specifically, the chapter presents classifications of (1) far-right parties’
messaging strategies in terms of social-policy offers and industrial-policy
interventions within the automobile sector, juxtaposed with workplace
salience as an indicator of the demand-side resonance of these supply-
side offers in the workplaces under examination; (2) far-right workplace
actors’ political positionings at the leadership level and organizing strate-
gies at the workplace level, juxtaposed with the relative coverage of
1 INTRODUCTION 9
the organizing strategies within the automobile sector; and, finally, (3)
trade union response strategies in terms of response formats against the
perceived influence of far-right messaging and interventions as well as
internal response procedures against members seen to be engaging in far-
right agitation. On this basis, the chapter identifies three country clusters
featuring a relative convergence of various patterns of far-right strategies
and trade union counter-strategies: Belgium/France, Germany/Italy, and
Hungary/Poland. The chapter and the book conclude with some final
considerations on future developments, including ongoing challenges
associated with the COVID-19 pandemic that fall outside the temporal
scope of this work.
References
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University Press.
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Siècle. Revue D’histoire, 73(1), 67–81.
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tics in the twenty-first century. In C. Mudde (Ed.), The populist radical right:
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CHAPTER 2
The Far Right and the Workers:

An Overview
This chapter presents a condensed overview of the conceptual and

methodological framework of the six country chapters that follow, the
state of research on the relationship between “the far right and the
workers,” and the different background conditions in the six countries
under examination. In a first step, we present terminological and concep-
tual considerations on the object of investigation, including “workers”
and “far right” as well as associated terms. This is followed by a liter-
ature review on the far right and the workers, in light of which we
situate the contribution of this study at the interface of supply- and
demand-oriented research approaches. We then discuss our methodology,
which is characterized by an interweaving of triangulation of different
source materials (including semi-structured interviews) within a frame-
work of theory–practice dialogue with trade union cooperation partners.
Finally, the six-country case selection is discussed and differentiated along
three background dimensions: (1) the far-right parties at the party system
level; (2) the trade union landscape and the system of industrial rela-
tions; and (3) the automobile plants chosen for the company case studies.
Overall, the research design covers a wide spectrum of different country
contexts, which is appropriate for an explorative approach geared toward
classification-building in light of the multifaceted research interest in
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 11

Switzerland AG 2022
S. Kim et al., The Far Right in the Workplace,
Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04002-3_2
12 S. KIM ET AL.
the messaging and organizing dimensions of far-right interventions at

both the national and workplace levels as well as trade union response
strategies.
2.1 Conceptual Framework: Workers, Far Right,

Radical and Extreme Right, Right-Wing Populism
In the broadest terms, the research presented here is a comparative study
of the relationship between the far right and the workers at the national
and workplace levels in six countries and in light of perception patterns
among trade unionists. As a first step, basic terminological and conceptual
clarification is necessary regarding the twofold object of inquiry: namely,
“workers” (or “working class”) and “far right” (in addition to a series of
associated terms such as “radical right,” “extreme right,” and “right-wing
populism”). In the following, both are discussed in turn.
“Workers,” following a long tradition going back to Marx, can
be understood relationally in a broad sense as all those dependent
on performing wage labor. In common parlance and public discourse
today, however, the term “workers” tends to refer more specifically
to those engaged in manual labor, especially (but not exclusively) in
manufacturing, processing, or construction-related industries. In the
empirical social sciences in many countries, this narrower understanding
of “workers” has found quasi-institutionalized status in the form of
standardized classifications of occupational categories for survey anal-
ysis (including election studies), with a common distinction being that
of blue-collar “laborers” and white-collar “staff” (Arbeiter/Angestellte
in German, ouvriers/employés in French, operai/impiegati in Italian,
arbeiders/bedienden in Dutch, etc.).1 Even within this narrower under-
standing, however, talk of “workers” in media or indeed academia often
evokes more specific, if not outright loaded, connotations, such as the
image of a slowly dying breed of uneducated “losers of globalization”
who are particularly susceptible to reactionary attitudes and voting for
far-right parties (see also Mondon, 2017). In this context, studies like
ours on “the far right and the workers” are faced with a double-edged
sword: on the one hand, the widespread availability of cross-national data
1 In the UK, notably, the conventional classification based on the NRS social grades is
more differentiated, distinguishing between “skilled” (C1) and “semi-skilled and unskilled
manual workers” (C2).
2 THE FAR RIGHT AND THE WORKERS: AN OVERVIEW 13
on questions such as voting behavior of workers (qua manual laborers);

on the other hand, the heightened need for terminological and context-
specific nuance, all the more so in the context of qualitative case analysis.
In this study, our primary interest is twofold: on the one hand, a narrower
interest in labor relations and manual laborers in the automobile industry
in particular—an established area of manufacturing undergoing challenges
related to industrial transformation and allowing for a basis for compar-
ison across the six countries as well as a narrower level of analysis for the
company case studies (see Sects. 2.3 and 2.4); on the other hand, a wider
interest in far-right attempts to address the “world of labor” (Arbeitswelt,
monde du travail, mondo del lavoro, świat pracy, etc.) broadly understood
to encompass all those living off wage labor, but with a particular interest
in manual workers as exemplified by the focus on the automobile sector.
As such, we generally opt for the generic term “worker” to encompass
both levels throughout, while the German version of this study switches
accordingly between the narrower Arbeiter (e.g. in relation to demand-
side aspects of voting behavior or attitudes), Arbeitnehmer in the context
of labor relations in general to encompass all those engaged in wage labor
(e.g. far-right parties’ policies on labor issues as concerning all Arbeit-
nehmer), or Beschäftigte in reference to those with employment status in
a specific workplace (e.g. in the company case studies).
A more elaborate clarification is arguably needed in relation to “far
right” and related terminology. An initial difficulty arises from the fact
that different national and linguistic contexts have different vocabularies
for describing similar phenomena. In Germany, for example, “right-wing”
(rechts ) is often used in common parlance as a synonym for radical or
extreme right, whereas in France, “right-wing” (droite) refers to main-
stream conservatives and the label “extreme right” (extrême droite) is
reserved for nationalists à la Front National. These differences are not
least tied to discursive “normality dispositifs” that valorize the “center”
in German party competition, as opposed to the “left” and “right” party
camps that are considered the norm in France or Italy, whereby social
democrats and communists are generally labeled “left-wing,” conserva-
tives “right-wing,” and Trotskyists and ethno-nationalists “extreme” left
or right, respectively (Link, 2018, 2020). In the academic literature, too,
different generic terms for political forces to the right of the conser-
vative mainstream established themselves over the course of the 1990s
depending on the national or linguistic context: “estrema destra” (Ignazi,
1994), “extrême droite” (Mayer, 1994), or “extreem-rechts ” (Lucardie &
14 S. KIM ET AL.
Voerman, 1990) on the one hand and “radikale Rechte” or “radical right”
on the other (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Minkenberg,
2000). In English-speaking international scholarship today, the label “far
right” has increasingly established itself as an overarching category for all
forces to the right of the conservative and liberal “mainstream right,” with
Mudde (2019), for example, additionally differentiating “far right” into
the anti-democratic “extreme right” and the anti-liberal-democratic “rad-
ical right.” These can thus be understood as differences of degree within
the superset “far right,” which also partly coincide with the distinction
made by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Germany,
for example, between “radicalism” and “extremism.” In our study, we
more or less consistently use the overarching term “far right” to designate
the actor groups of interest, whereas the German version mostly speaks of
“rechts ” (right-wing)—and, in some cases, “Rechtsaußen” as a more direct
(but somewhat more ponderous) translation of “far right”—for reasons
of simplicity as well as the different terminological context in Germany.
The core features of the far right are commonly seen to consist of
nativism, authoritarianism, and in some cases also populism (see also
the paradigmatic conceptualization of “populist radical right” by Mudde,
2007). According to Mudde’s understanding, nativism consists of a
combination of nationalism and xenophobia2 : the “nation” is thus defined
in exclusionary fashion against groups perceived to be “foreign,” whether
these are immigrants, national minorities, or even supranational institu-
tions. Authoritarianism, following a long tradition in social psychology,
is often understood as a set of attitudes centered on identification with
strong authority figures, social conformism, and the rejection of non-
traditional lifestyles, which has found widespread reception especially in
German-speaking scholarship in light of work done on this topic by
the Frankfurt School (Adorno, 1973; Horkheimer et al., 1970) as well
as recent applications in empirical social research, such as the so-called
Leipzig “Mitte studies” (Decker & Brähler, 2018). Populism, following
most established definitions in the social sciences—regardless of whether it
is understood as a type of discourse, frame, ideology, or style—is centered
on the construction of an antagonistic divide between a “people” and an
2 It is just as conceivable, however, that a nativist rejection of “foreign” Others is

expressed not (or not primarily) in nationalist terms, but rather in regionalist (in the name
of regional identities, e.g. against southern Italians in northern Italy) or “civilizationist”
fashion (in the name of a “Christian Europe” against Islam; see Brubaker, 2017).
“elite” (e.g. Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Canovan, 1999; Hawkins,

2009; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2004; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Stanley,
2008). With the “ideational turn” in populism research (Kim, 2022),
most definitional approaches have converged around a common recogni-
tion that categories such as “the people” and “the elite” are constructions
that are compatible with a wide range of different contents. In other
words, it remains an open question whether “the people” is additionally
constructed as an ethnicity, a class, a multicultural nation, or a collec-
tion of enterprising individuals, thus implying a great deal of variability:
populist phenomena can be left wing or right-wing, democratic or author-
itarian, progressive or reactionary, and urban or rural in character. There
is a fundamental “ambivalence” (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012) in the fact
that populism is always about the construction of a people/elite divide
and thus a reference to the founding democratic promise of popular
sovereignty, which, however, can flip over into a totalizing claim to repre-
sent a one true “people” in the case of authoritarian populisms (see also
Canovan, 2002; Jörke & Selk, 2017; Kim, 2021; Möller, 2020).
In this context, right-wing populism can be understood as a partic-
ular variety of populism that combines the populist construction of
a people/elite or bottom/up divide with an additionally nationalist
or nativist opposition between domestic/foreign or inside/outside
(e.g. Brubaker, 2017; De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; Kim, 2022;
Lewandowsky et al., 2016; Mudde, 2007; Schroeder et al., 2020). De
Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017), for example, draw an “architectonic”
distinction between populism as a logic of constructing a bottom/up
frontier on the one hand and nationalism as a logic of constructing
an inside/outside divide on the other. What is important to emphasize
is that populism and nationalism (or nativism) are conceptually distinct
but empirically combinable: as soon as “the people” are pitted not only
against “the elite” or “those in power” but also “mass immigration”
or “those outside,” a specifically right-wing (or far-right, depending
on the radicality) populist construction is at work. In a similar vein,
Mudde conceptualizes the “populist radical right” as consisting of the
three ideological dimensions of authoritarianism, nativism, and populism,
while noting that “nativism, not populism, is the ultimate core feature
of the ideology of this party family” (Mudde, 2007, p. 26). Overall,
right-wing or far-right populism is a dynamic and variable combination
that can go hand in hand with different relative weights of the two
dimensions (populism and far right) as well as degrees of radicalism or
16 S. KIM ET AL.
extremism, with empirical examples ranging from the national conser-

vatism of Dupont-Aignan in France to the extreme right-wing neo-fascism
of Kotleba in Slovakia.
Broadly speaking, our research interest is devoted to the strategies
toward the world of labor of those actor groups that can be subsumed
under the overarching label “far right,” many of which can arguably also
be classified as populist. The range of actors classifiable as “far right” has
arguably expanded in recent years: indeed, it has been argued that a main-
streaming of the far right in established and younger democracies alike
can be observed in the context of the ongoing “fourth wave” (Mudde,
2019) of the postwar far right (e.g. Brown et al., 2021; Minkenberg,
2015; Mondon & Winter, 2020; Pytlas, 2016; Wodak, 2021), leading
to a growing gap between “populist radical right parties and politics ”
(Mudde, 2017, p. 610). In other words, the politics of the far right—
from demands such as Brexit or refugee caps to coalition cabinets—has
in many respects been taken up and indeed embraced by parties of the
“mainstream right” in many countries, pointing to a “radicalization of
the mainstream” as a key aspect of the mainstreaming of the far right
(Mondon & Winter, 2020). This includes the transformation of previ-
ously mainstream conservative parties such as Fidesz in Hungary and Law
and Justice (PiS) in Poland into radical right ones (Bozóki, 2016; Mudde,
2019; Ost, 2018; Pytlas, 2021). It should be noted, however, that parties
such as Fidesz, PiS, and partly also the AfD tend to be referred to in public
discourse in their respective national contexts as “right-wing” rather than
“far right,” which was taken into account accordingly in the different
language versions of the interview questionnaire. In sum, the country
chapters that follow feature a broad spectrum of parties and groups that
can currently be said to engage in far-right politics from an analytical
standpoint and are also identified as challenges to trade union work in the
subjective perception patterns of our interviewees (see Sects. 2.3 and 2.4).
In the process, the analyses in the country chapters substantiate this clas-
sification by identifying the variously nationalist, nativist, authoritarian,
and/or (if at all) populist elements in the messaging of each far-right
party under examination.
2.2 Literature Review: The

Far Right and the Workers
The relationship between the far right and the workers—especially
the latter’s apparently increasing receptiveness to the former’s political
offers—has become a subject of growing interest in academia and media
alike. The starting point for much of the scholarship on this topic is a
structural observation tied to a diagnosis of the present: namely, that the
world of labor and industrial relations has been subject to far-reaching
processes of transformation in the past three decades in all of Europe—
from the end of Fordism or state socialism to increasing deindustrializa-
tion and offshoring tendencies as well as the concomitant decline of trade
union organizing capacities. Various studies point, for example, to the
manifold experiences of inequality among wage laborers (Dörre, 2019;
Dörre et al., 2018), workplace “regimes of insecurity” (Sauer & Detje,
2019), or post-socialist transformation processes toward market societies
in Central and Eastern Europe (Kalb, 2011; Ost, 2005; Scheiring, 2020a,
2020b) as a heightened breeding ground for “right-wing populism”
(Sauer & Detje, 2019; Sauer et al., 2018), “völkisch populism” (Dörre
et al., 2018), “illiberal” identity politics (Ost, 2005), or “working-class
populism” or “neo-nationalism” (Kalb, 2011; Scheiring, 2020a, 2020b).
In slight contrast to these approaches, Schroeder et al. (2019, 2020) start
from an understanding of the fundamentally conflictual nature of indus-
trial relations and, in particular, of the workplace as a “conflictual space”
in which the structural contradictions between employer and employee
are supposed to be absorbed via institutionalized “regulation strategies”
but can nonetheless be activated and channeled from different political
directions (Schroeder et al., 2019, p. 186). Seen this way, there has
always been potential for political offers from the far right holding out the
promise of resolving the grievances and frustrations of workers in their
favor as an integral component of an organic “nation,” as Ost (2018)
points out in relation to interwar fascism as well as present-day “radical
right” parties such as Fidesz and PiS. The question, then, is not least the
following: What is it that accounts for the particular attractiveness of the
far right’s political offers for working-class voters today, in the present
conjuncture?
On the one hand, there are a series of explanations that identify
diachronic shifts on the supply side of social and economic policies of
18 S. KIM ET AL.
far-right parties. Kitschelt and McGann (1995) had argued in their influ-
ential mid-1990s study that “the winning formula” for far-right parties
in Western Europe consists of a combination of social-authoritarian and
economic liberal positions that enables these parties to reach a cross-
class electorate of workers (thanks to their social authoritarianism) and
small entrepreneurs (thanks to their economic liberalism). Since then,
this thesis has been widely discussed, reworked, and partly refuted in
comparative scholarship: while Rovny (2013) argued that the social and
economic policies of Western European far-right parties are characterized
by strategic vagueness and “blurriness,” Enggist and Pinggera (2022)
have recently identified a clear trend among Western European far-
right parties toward a prioritization of “consumption”-oriented social
policy, such as pensions, unemployment insurance, and family support,
at the expense of “social investment” such as education and childcare.
A stronger, if only selective, social-welfarist accent has likewise been
identified in more country-specifically grounded observations: Schel-
tiens and Verlaeckt (2021) refer to a “social nativism” that advocates
welfare state and public services for “our own people” in the case of
the present-day Vlaams Belang in particular, while Ost (2018) identi-
fies a nationalist, quasi-socialist welfare state politics in the case of PiS
that displays apparent commonalities with a universalist, decommodi-
fying social-democratic model following Esping-Andersen’s (1990) classic
typology. What has been identified as a general trend in the Central and
Eastern European context is the rise of “neo-nationalism” (Kalb, 2011;
Scheiring, 2020a) or “conservative developmental statism” (Bluhm &
Varga, 2020) that rejects the neoliberal principle of the primacy of the
market in favor of a development-oriented nation-state based on a cultur-
ally exclusive understanding of the nation and providing some degree of
social protection against the effects of globalization—thereby also holding
out the promise of absorbing the manifold dislocatory experiences of
post-socialist transformation. Here, too, social-policy shifts among parties
of the (far) right are emphasized—with a paradigmatic example being
Fidesz, which turned from an initially economic liberal party into one
characterized by varying degrees of national conservatism and national
protectionism.
On the other hand, demand-oriented explanations—which can addi-
tionally go hand in hand with the aforementioned supply-side obser-
vations—start from the socio-structural positioning of workers as well
as (to varying extents) structural assumptions about the latter’s materi-

ally rooted political behavior. In comparative party system research, the
argument is often made that globalization has created a new conflict
dimension pitting “winners” against “losers” or “cosmopolitans” against
“communitarians” and that workers tend to take the side of “national-
communitarian” positions and increasingly vote for far-right parties by
virtue of the underlying sociology of globalization (de Wilde et al.,
2019; Kriesi et al., 2008; Merkel, 2017). Class-based approaches, in
contrast, often argue that wage laborers looking for a Polanyian “counter-
movement” against transformation toward a market society often find an
alternative in the form of right-wing nationalism in the absence of a class
politics of the left (Kalb, 2011; Scheiring, 2020a, 2020b). In this regard,
it is often argued that far-right attitudes among workers ultimately point
to a “repressed class problem” (Dörre et al., 2018), “subtexts of class”
(Kalb, 2011), or non-class expressions of “economic anger” (Ost, 2005):
a kind of “imaginary revolt” against neoliberal capitalism that re-fashions
bottom/up contradictions between labor and capital into inside/outside
frontier-building against foreigners perceived to be competing and cutting
in line for scarce jobs and resources (Dörre et al., 2018). Here, too, as
in the aforementioned supply-side explanations, a change over time is
posited: namely, in the form of an intensification of far-reaching political-
economic transformation processes toward a primacy of the market
coupled with a simultaneous erosion of class-political attachments that
combine to facilitate the drifting away of workers toward far-right patterns
of identification.
In Western European countries in particular, numerous research
debates and findings on workers’ voting patterns for far-right parties have
emerged on the basis of various election studies since the 1990s. Here, the
long-standing discussions in France (see Chapter 4) around the gaucho-
lepénisme thesis (Perrineau, 1995, 2017) and the ouvriéro-lepénisme
thesis (Mayer, 1999, 2007) take on a paradigmatic character: while the
former identifies a substantial shift from a previously left-wing-voting
working-class electorate to the FN beginning with the 1995 presidential
elections, the latter approach argues that the FN’s working-class electorate
consists primarily of a combination of previously right-wing and polit-
ically apathetic (“neither-nor”) voters. In more general terms, the two
explanations can be summarized as the switching thesis and the radical-
ization thesis, respectively, which shed light on different aspects of the
working-class vote for far-right parties that are each undoubtedly present
20 S. KIM ET AL.
depending on the context. For example, Éribon’s (2009) autobiograph-

ical book, which has received international acclaim and tends to dominate
discussions within many left-wing circles, is centered on specific exam-
ples of working-class voters in Reims switching from the Communist
Party to the Front National, whereas there are plenty of other exam-
ples of industrial areas in various countries in which the working-class
electorate has long tended to vote for center-right parties—and increas-
ingly also far-right ones—and in which indications could easily be found
for the radicalization thesis, such as parts of northeastern France (e.g.
Moselle, see Chapter 4), northern Italy (e.g. Lombardy, see Chapter 7),
or eastern Germany (Dalton & Jou, 2010). In studies on attitudes and
voting behaviors of trade union members, too, a rough distinction can be
made between the mirroring thesis and the underrepresentation thesis: the
former finds far-right attitudes or party preferences to be just as strong
among trade unionists as in society as a whole, whereas the latter thesis
identifies considerably lower vote shares for far-right parties among trade
unionists than among non-trade-unionists. One example for the former
thesis is the finding of Zeuner et al. (2007) based on a representative
survey conducted in 2003/2004 that no less than 19% of trade union
members in Germany exhibit “extreme right-wing” attitudes compared to
20% of non-members, whereas election studies from France and Italy have
suggested that trade union sympathizers3 or members—with the excep-
tion of those of the FO in France—vote in below-average proportions for
the FN (Andolfatto & Choffat, 2015) or the Lega (Leonardi & Carrieri,
2020) relative to the electorate as a whole.
In light of all these observations, it becomes clear how impor-
tant a differentiated and context-specific examination of the relationship
between the far right and the workers is: what is necessary is not only a
careful analysis of the political offers and organizing strategies of the far
right but also a deeper look into patterns of attitudes and behaviors in
specific workplace contexts in order to gauge the extent to which these
far-right offers actually find demand-side traction. This kind of integra-
tive approach must additionally draw on survey data at the macro-level
while also taking into account the latter’s blind spots, such as the lack
of attention to growing abstention and de-politicization among workers
(Mondon, 2017; Mondon & Winter, 2020). In this vein, a key advance in
3 Due to the low membership density of the French trade unions, most election studies
in France feature questions about trade union sympathies rather than membership status.
the aforementioned qualitative demand-side scholarship has been to direct

attention to the workplace level via interview-based studies that shed light
on patterns of attitudes and problem constellations in specific workplace
contexts and thus bring the voices of workers themselves into the analysis
(e.g. Dörre, 2019; Opratko, 2021; Sauer et al., 2018; Schroeder et al.,
2020). What is still missing in this literature, however, is a cross-national
comparative perspective as well as a systematic linkage of the demand side
of attitudes within workplaces on the one hand and the supply side of
attempts at organized intervention by far-right actors at the workplace
level on the other: the latter, for example, has been examined in recent
work by Schroeder et al. (2019, 2020, 2022) on Zentrum Automobil in
Germany as a workplace group with a far-right background within the
automobile industry. The study presented here is designed to contribute
toward filling this multifaceted research gap and, by incorporating the
dimension of trade union response strategies into the analysis, to inten-
sify the inclusion of the actor perspectives of workers via theory–practice
dialogue.
2.3 Methodology: Triangulation

and Theory–Practice Dialogue
These considerations lead us to the methodology, which draws primarily
on semi-structured interviews with trade union actors, triangulates them
with primary source analysis and various forms of secondary data, and
embeds all this in a theory–practice dialogue with trade union partner
organizations, each of which constitutes the largest trade union center
by membership in its respective country. In the following, the individual
components and steps of this approach are introduced in turn.
Our research interest is directed at both the national and workplace
levels as well as the supply side of far-right messaging and organizing on
the one hand in addition to the demand side of workers’ receptiveness to
these offers in specific workplace contexts on the other. Our starting and
entry point into this problem constellation consists in a theory–practice
dialogue with our trade union partner organizations in order to identify
which far-right actor groups are perceived as challenges for trade union
work in the first place and which workplace contexts come into consid-
eration as hotspots of such challenges from a trade union standpoint. As
a first step of the research project, therefore, the contact persons respon-
sible within each partner union were asked to identify, from their own
22 S. KIM ET AL.
actor perspective, which far-right groups they consider to be the biggest

challenges for trade union work at the party system and workplace levels
alike and to suggest a factory within the automobile sector for conducting
a case study of these challenges. On this basis, a selection was then made
for the six company case studies, which in turn cover a wide spectrum
of starting point conditions in terms of context-specific far-right presence
(see Sect. 2.4). In the ensuing field work phase, semi-structured inter-
views were conducted in the selected workplaces as well as at the national
level with trade union actors who were contacted or suggested as rele-
vant for our research interest via contacts in the partner organizations.
In keeping with the theory–practice dialogue, we left open the possibility
of visiting other factories or interviewees based on on-site suggestions
by interview partners during the field work phase (thus allowing for an
element of snowball sampling in such cases); for Hungary and Italy, for
instance, supplementary case studies on other factories were conducted
on a smaller scale (see Sect. 2.4 as well as Chapters 6 and 7).
The semi-structured interviews were each divided into three main areas
of focus: (1) what kind of challenges from the far right exist for the trade
unions from the interviewee’s perspective and how these actors try to
address labor issues4 and/or organize workers; (2) to what extent workers
are receptive to these far-right offers according to the interviewee’s expe-
rience; and (3) how the trade unions respond to these challenges and how
effective these responses are. In this manner, the interview questions are
designed not only to encompass the multiple dimensions of our research
questions in relation to supply and demand, messaging and organizing,
trade union responses, as well as the effectiveness and limitations of these
strategies, but also to leave space for more detailed and context-specific
follow-up questions. In the interviews at the workplace level, particular
attention was devoted to specific examples of far-right opinions and inci-
dents in the workplace as well as the responses to them. In order to
gauge the effectiveness of far-right offers, the workplace-level intervie-
wees in particular were asked to estimate the vote shares for far-right
parties within the workforce and/or the membership size and develop-
ment of far-right workplace groups. For each country, a total of eight
4 Of course, the very notion of “labor issues” is a political construction, as seen

in numerous far-right parties’ framing of immigration as (among other things) a labor
issue affecting jobs and wages; for this reason, the interviewees were asked how, in their
perception, far-right actors try to position themselves as representing labor interests.
to twelve interviews were conducted, including group interviews with

multiple participants at the workplace level (and in some cases beyond
it) as well as two expert interviews per country with full-time researchers
from academic research institutions. The only exception to this is the
German case (Chapter 5): here, due to the extensive prior work of the
authors on the topic with a similar methodology (Schroeder et al., 2019,
2020, 2022), no expert interviews were conducted with academics and
a smaller volume of four interviews was compiled in addition to the
already available interview material. For those countries (namely France,
Hungary, and Italy) in which the strength of far-right parties at the local
level in or around the factory sites was a consideration in the selection of
the company case studies, additional interviews were conducted with local
politicians. For those countries (namely Belgium, France, and Poland)
in which the status of largest trade union center by membership at the
national level is either not fully clarified based on available data or a partic-
ularly close call, at least one official from the second largest trade union
center was also interviewed (ABVV/FGTB in Belgium, CFDT in France,
and Solidarność in Poland).
These considerations relate, in turn, to the triangulation between
different actor perspectives and source materials underlying our study.
Already with the selection of interviewees, depending on the context,
other trade union actors and local politicians as well as (in all countries
except Germany) academic research experts were included. In addition,
the interview results at the national and workplace levels were triangu-
lated with analysis of primary documents on the one hand (mostly at the
national level) as well as relevant secondary-literature studies and avail-
able data on working-class voting for the far right on the other (both at
the national level) in order to incorporate different source types and levels
into the analysis.5 In this vein, each country chapter opens with overviews
5 There are country-specific differences in data availability: in France, Germany, Italy,

and partly also Belgium (up to and including 2010), there are numerous studies (either
exit polls or post-election surveys) on voting behavior based on standardized occupational
categories (“laborer,” “staff,” “self-employed,” etc.) and/or trade union affiliation. In
Hungary and Poland, by contrast, there is a deficit in public survey data on voting
behavior based on “class,” which also seems to generally find less application as a category
of social research on attitudes in these countries. For Hungary and Poland, therefore, we
drew on either union-internal surveys (Hungary) or rough estimates by our interviewees
(Poland) on the voting behavior of trade union members and cited them accordingly from
the interviews.
24 S. KIM ET AL.
of far-right parties’ messaging on labor issues and, if applicable, the orga-

nizing activities of far-right trade unions or workplace groups at a generic
national level, drawing primarily on programmatic documents, public or
media statements, and miscellaneous campaign materials, partly also based
on information from the interviews. This is followed by a deeper anal-
ysis, with the centerpiece being the company case study, based on the
interview-based findings “from the field.” The systematicity of the study
thus consists of this structured line of action and interweaving of different
source types and levels of analysis in continuous dialogue with the trade
union partners (including two joint workshops on the written results).
2.4 A Comparison of Background

Conditions: Far-Right Parties,
Trade Unions, Workplace Contexts
Among the six countries under examination—Belgium, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, and Poland—there are numerous similarities and differ-
ences in background conditions that are meaningful for the subsequent
analysis. To begin with, our explorative-comparative study has the goal of
developing a classificatory scheme and an initial mapping out of far-right
messaging and organizing strategies as well as trade union counter-
strategies; to this end, a case selection with maximum variance in the
background conditions is suitable for “typological theorizing” that draws
on a wide-ranging universe of diverse cases in order to map out the
different outcomes that may then occur (Gerring, 2007, p. 98). In the
following, we highlight three such background dimensions that are espe-
cially relevant in light of the foregoing discussion and that yield a wide
variance among the six countries: (1) the far-right parties represented
in the party system and their ideological and organizational roots; (2)
the trade union landscape and the system of industrial relations and
labor representation; and (3) the automobile plants selected for the
company case study and the initially identifiable forms of (far-)right pres-
ence specific to them. In the interest of providing a basis for comparison
across the six countries, the focus of the study as a whole is on the decade
2010–2020 as well as the automobile industry.
First, a look at the party systems of the six countries suggests the
diversity as well as the electoral rise of far-right parties in the last decade
that these societies (and trade unions) are generally confronted with. The
electorally relevant forces of the radical or extreme right in the six coun-
tries today display a wide range of genealogies and roots: from radical
separatism (Vlaams Belang in Belgium, Lega in Italy) to academic ordolib-
eralism (AfD in Germany) and extra-parliamentary neo-fascism (FN/RN
in France, Jobbik in Hungary, Konfederacja in Poland) to mainstream
national conservatism (Fidesz in Hungary, Fratelli d’Italia in Italy, PiS in
Poland) or even liberalism before that (Fidesz). In the context of the
above-discussed “fourth wave,” different aspects of the mainstreaming
of the far right come to the fore: on the one hand, the transformation
of established mainstream parties (Fidesz, PiS) or smaller single-issue-
centered outfits (AfD, Lega, Vlaams Belang) into far-right ones; on the
other hand, the phenomenon whereby those parties that were paradig-
matically classified as “extreme right” early on (RN, Vlaams Belang) have
subsequently remained far right in some form—with the exception of
Jobbik and its reverse process of de-radicalization—while becoming elec-
torally more significant as well as more influential in public discourse.
There is a corresponding variance in the government participation of
these parties as well: on the one hand, exclusion via some form of cordon
sanitaire against the far right (AfD, RN, Vlaams Belang); on the other
hand, the formation of majority governments as the dominant party in
the party system (Fidesz, PiS); and, in between, participation in center-
right coalition governments (Lega) or at least electoral alliances (Fratelli
d’Italia, Lega), including the exceptional case of broad-based opposi-
tion alliances with center-left parties in Hungary (Jobbik), all of which
look to have decent prospects of winning majorities at the next elections
at the time of writing. In terms of European Parliament group affilia-
tion, the far-right parties in the six countries are spread out across the
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Identity and Democracy
(ID), and the Non-Inscrits (NI), with Fidesz having left the European
People’s Party (EPP) in 2021 following its long-standing (and increas-
ingly controversial) membership in the latter. Table 2.1 summarizes these
differences in condensed form and Fig. 2.1 shows the electoral devel-
opment, including the upward boost that practically all of the parties
mentioned here experienced at some point in the decade of the 2010s,
which, therefore, is particularly suitable as a timeframe characterized by a
growing influence of the far right in all six countries.
Given the importance of the theory–practice dialogue in the research
design, the selection of the trade union partner organizations and their
26 S. KIM ET AL.
Table 2.1 Overview of selected far-right parties
Country (party) Ideological roots Org. roots Government status EP group
Belgium (VB) Separatism Alliance Exclusion ID

France (RN) Neo-fascism Movement Exclusion ID
Germany (AfD) Ordoliberalism Party Exclusion ID
Hungary (Fidesz) Liberalism Party Majoritarian EPP NI
National
conservatism
Hungary (Jobbik) Neo-fascism Movement Exclusion NI
Electoral alliance
Italy (FdI) National Party Electoral alliance ECR
conservatism
Italy (Lega) Separatism Alliance Coalition ID
Poland (K) Neo-fascism Alliance Exclusion n/a
Poland (PiS) National Party Majoritarian ECR
conservatism
Source Authors’ own creation
60%
50%
VB
40%
FN/RN
Vote share
AfD
30%
Fidesz
Jobbik
20% FdI
Lega
10% K
PiS
0%
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Year
Fig. 2.1 Electoral progression of selected far-right parties (Vote shares for (1)
VB: shares of the Dutch-speaking list vote; (2) FN/RN: vote shares in the first
round of presidential elections; (3) K: as KORWiN in 2015; another component
of the future Konfederacja, namely Ruch Narodowy, stood in 2015 as part of
a joint list with Kukiz’15, which won 8.8% of the vote. It bears emphasizing,
as noted elsewhere, that several parties on this graph were not far-right for the
entire period presented here. Source Authors’ own creation)
positioning in their respective trade union landscapes takes on partic-

ular significance. In all six countries, the largest trade union center by
membership at the national level according to available data as of 2019
was selected for the cooperation: ACV/CSC in Belgium, CGT in France,
DGB in Germany, MASZSZ in Hungary, CGIL in Italy, and OPZZ
in Poland (see Chapters 3–8 for discussions of membership figures and
the relative weights of the trade unions). This, in turn, covers a wide
spectrum of historical and ideational roots observable among European
trade union movements: from the historically Christian-democratic “pil-
larized” trade union ACV/CSC to the postwar center-left “unity union”
DGB or the formerly communist-oriented unions CGT and CGIL to
the MASZSZ and OPZZ organizations emerging from the state-socialist
monopoly unions. In this vein, the six trade union confederations also
have different histories of political ties, all of which have more or less
eroded in the past decades: from the ACV/CSC’s Christian-democratic
milieu anchorage in the Belgian tradition of “pillarization” to the DGB’s
“privileged partnership” with the German social democrats, the “trans-
mission belt” characterizing the proximity of the CGT and CGIL to
the respective Communist Party, or the official monopoly status that the
predecessor organizations of the MASZSZ and OPZZ enjoyed under state
socialism. All this suggests that the six union confederations, in light of
their protracted loss of party-political reference points, find themselves
confronted with new challenges via the rise of far-right parties, while also
being in a position to formulate societally relevant actor perspectives for
assessing these challenges as the largest trade union confederations by
membership in their respective countries.
These trade unions operate, in turn, in different systems of industrial
relations that entail different barriers and scopes for action. To begin
with, Germany stands out with its dual system of interest representation
in the form of trade unions as collective bargaining actors on the one
hand and works councils as workplace interest representation organs on
the other—a model that provides for high barriers for trade union collec-
tive bargaining eligibility but low thresholds for participation in works
council elections. With the partial exception of Poland, where there is a
mixed system with the possibility (albeit with high barriers) for forming
workers’ councils in parallel to the trade unions in the workplaces, the
other countries feature monistic systems of interest representation via
trade union organizations at the collective bargaining and workplace
levels alike. Tripartite collective bargaining mechanisms are in place in all
28 S. KIM ET AL.
six countries except Hungary, where the national tripartite interest medi-
ation organ was abolished under Fidesz in 2010 (see Chapter 6), and
partly also Poland, where the Council of Social Dialogue at the national
level tends to operate only irregularly due to recurring boycotts by one or
more parties (see Chapter 8). All these institutional framework conditions
create different barriers and openings for new entrants, including from the
far right: in Germany, the far-right workplace group Zentrum Automobil
(ZA) has been able to gain a presence in a handful of (mostly Daimler)
automobile plants via works council elections, whereas at the other end
of the spectrum, the Belgian system with its high threshold of 50,000
members per union for taking part in countrywide works council elections
poses an enormous obstacle for the formation of new trade unions beyond
the three established ones. Between these two extremes, the other coun-
tries feature trade unions with right-wing to far-right roots or tendencies
of various kinds (as well as sizes) that are historically rooted to different
degrees: for example, the historically company-backed “yellow” auto-
mobile union SIA (France), the former neo-fascist party-affiliated union
UGL (Italy), or broadly national-conservative trade unions emerging
from the democratization movements of the 1980s such as Munkás-
tanácsok (Hungary) and Solidarność (Poland). Here, too, a variance can
be seen between trade union landscapes that are politically and ideo-
logically fragmented (France, Hungary) or divided along bipolar lines
(Poland) on the one hand and those characterized largely by the domi-
nance of one (Germany) or three union confederations that more than
rarely cooperate with each other (Belgium, Italy) on the other. These
differences are summarized in simplified form in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Overview of trade unions and industrial relations
Country (union) Postwar profile Union landscape Interest

representation
Belgium (ACV/CSC) Christian-democratic Three dominant Monistic

France (CGT) Communist Fragmented Monistic
Germany (DGB) Social-democratic One dominant Dual
Hungary (MASZSZ) State-socialist Fragmented Monistic
Italy (CGIL) Communist Three dominant Monistic
Poland (OPZZ) State-socialist Bipolar Mixed
Source Authors’ own creation

Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Budapest
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
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under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.
Title: Budapest
Regény
Author: Tamás Kóbor
Release date: July 20, 2022 [eBook #68571]
Language: Hungarian
Original publication: Hungary: Franklin-Társulat, 1919
Credits: Albert László from page images generously made available

by the Google Books Library Project
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BUDAPEST

***
Megjegyzés:
A tartalomjegyzék a 341. oldalon található.
KÓBOR TAMÁS
*
BUDAPEST
REGÉNY
HARMADIK KIADÁS
BUDAPEST, 1919
FRANKLIN-TÁRSULAT
MAGYAR IROD. INTÉZET ÉS KÖNYVNYOMDA
KIADÁSA
FRANKLIN-TÁRSULAT NYOMDÁJA.
ELSŐ FEJEZET.
A KORONAHERCEG-UTCA.
– A XIX. század végén. –

Valamikor régen éppenséggel nem kellett az írónak bocsánatot
kérnie, amiért az első pár sorral nem viszi az olvasót témája érdekes
kellő közepébe. Magam is soká töprenkedtem, miképpen
kerülhetném ki a hosszú és száraz leírást, próbáltam is kezdetül
néhány dialógust kifaragni hősöm és hősnőm között, de
mindenképpen arra a megismerésre jutottam, hogy a szinhely
ismerete nélkül az olvasóval nem tudom magamat megértetni.
A világosság kedvéért le kell mondanom a megvesztegető
érdekes kezdetről s szárazon, pedánsan leírom regényem
színhelyét, a Koronaherceg-utcát.
Budapestnek legfővárosiasabb és legfalusiasabb utcája ez. Este
kilenc órakor már alszik. A trafikosüzlet kivételével, mely csak
legutóbb nyilt, minden boltja ilyenkor már be van csukva. Ennélfogva
ember alig jár már benne. Nyáron a Rémi kioszk egy-egy fagylaltozó
társasága szokott rajta keresztül hazasietni: ez az egész forgalma. A
hangos beszéd és kacagás idegenszerüen hangzik benne vissza:
nem idevaló többé s a házak falai fölriadnak szürke álmukból. Sötét
és félelmes utca ez, mint a falué, akár itt, akár a külső csömörei úton
egyaránt nem jó járni éjszaka. Össze-vissza egyetlen tejüveges
lámpa virraszt benne, a táviró-hivatalé. Ott ébren vannak még. S az
ékszeres boltok apró nyilásain át látni, hogy odabent gázláng őrzi a
kincseket, betörő tolvajok ellen. A bakter ezeken kukucskál be s
megnyugodva áll odébb, amíg a gázláng nyugodt lelkiismerettel és
éberen világítja be az üvegszekrényeket.
Vasárnap délután is csak falusias a Koronaherceg-utca. Az ő
üzletei mind olyanok, hogy a munkaszünetes törvény alól nem
kivánnak kivételt.
De amilyen korán alszik az utca, éppoly későn ébred. Ah, reggel
egyet fordul a világ s a Koronaherceg-utca nagyvilágivá válik.
Félnyolc van már, mire megelevenedik. Cilinderes urak és sietős
léptű kisasszonyok elevenítik meg. Csörögnek a vasredők,
koppannak az emelőrudak. Ennivaló szép lányok feszegetik a
zárakat, hogy ragyogó tükörajtók mögé bújjanak raboskodni. Vásárra
nem számítanak még, a kora reggeli órákban ezeknek az üzleteknek
nincs keresetük. De rakosgatni, takarítani, söpörni és porolni csak
ilyenkor érnek rá. Az üzletnek ragyogni kell, mert csupa finom holmi
van benne, azaz olyan, amilyet igen finom öltözetű emberek
vásárolnak. Nem igen találom a kellő szót: ezt is rosszul mondtam.
Nem mind finom öltözetű ember, csak olyan, mintha finom öltözetű
volna. Teszem egy Kerepesi-úti nőidivatkereskedőnél ugyanazt a
tizenkilenckrajcáros mosható kartont kapni, mint Szénássy Gyulánál,
de nem ugyanaz a fejkendős, csatakos szoknyájú józsefvárosi
munkásasszony veszi, aki ott. Ennek sincs több pénze, mint a
munkásasszonynak, de úgy látszik, mintha volna. Ennélfogva
Szénássy Gyula bársonyszékeket is állít a pultja elé és a segédei
mind olyanok, mintha skatulyából vették volna ki.
Igaz, az olcsó karton mellett ott kapni a legdrágább francia
kelméket is, de éppen az a nevezetessége annak az üzletnek,
valamint a Koronaherceg-utca üzleteinek mind, hogy a gazdagság
egy gyékényen árul a szegénységgel.
Tessék például benézni a magasin français-nek nevezett
csecsebecse és ékszeres boltba. Az arany és drágaköves érmek
kirakatában ott csillog a snob feleségének káprázatos brilláns
boutonja, de kapni ott két forintos aranykarikát és ötvenkrajcáros
gyémánt melltűt is. A műipar drága remekei mellett árulják a
norinbergi diszműáruk értéktelenségeit, melyeknek árát a különböző
nemzetek valutája szabja meg. Velencében egy lirába kerül, ami
nálunk egy korona, Németországban egy márkába, ami itt egy forint.
Ragyog, díszlik minden, a kirakaton keresztül, vagy messziről a
ruhán, az üvegszekrény polcán, csak ha az ember kezébe veszi,
látja az egy koronás bazár-származását. De hiszen ha egy szép
kisasszony végig sétál az utcán, nincs az a szemtelen jogász, aki
közelről nézné meg az öve kövekkel kirakott csatját.
Végig az utca kereskedelme a hiuság vásárja. Egyebet, mint
díszítő cikkeket benne nem találsz. Aki cséplőgépet, kályhát,
szövetet, konyhaedényt, húst, zöldséget, tüzelőfát, szerszámot akar
vásárolni, az ne menjen a Koronaherceg-utcába. Ellenben Éva a
paradicsomból kiüldöztetvén, ha végig megy rajta, tökéletesen
kiöltözve s minden toilette-szükséglettel ellátva indulhat haza.
Fehérneműek, ruhaneműek és prémek, fűző, cipő, kalap, fogkefe,
parfum, pirosító, ékszer, legyező, fésű, hajtű, élő- és művirág,
szalondíszek, luxuslámpák, porcellán darabok, iparművészeti bronz
és márvány dolgok, kárpitok, szőnyegek és fotografiák, tükrök és
üvegek a legdrágább és a legolcsóbb árakon itt kaphatók. Aztán
elején, meg a végén egy-egy templom, a közepén meg a
szinházjegyiroda és a főposta, örökidőn szolgáló telegráffal és
poste-restante hivatallal.
Nem vagyok én tudós ember, azért nem is érdekel: az utca
közönsége teremtette-e meg a kereskedelmét, avagy megfordítva.
Látom a tényt, hogy ez a kettő mindenütt együvé való. S mi más
közönsége lehet a Koronaherceg-utcának, mint öltözni vágyó,
tetszeni akaró gazdag és szegény hölgyek serege? Nyolc órakor
nyílnak a boltok, féltíz órakor kezd befelé szűrődni a rendes
publikuma: koránkelő, korántakarító polgárasszonyok lányaikkal
ekkor mennek vásárolni, mivelhogy kevesen vannak még s a boltos
jobban rá ér mutogatni és rábeszélni. Korán jönnek, hogy korán
mehessenek vissza, de hatalmába keríti őket a boltok varázsa, őket
is, másokat is és a kora bevásárlásnak be nem vallott célja, hogy
több boltot járhassanak be, több kelmét lássanak, több kirakat előtt
élvezzék a képzelt birtoklás gyönyörűségeit. A legszolidabb és
legtakarékosabb gazdasszony is ott felejti magát ebben a bűvös,
végzetes utcában s a legmegelégedettebb is, amint műértő szemmel
és fogékony idegekkel végigélvezte az elérhetetlent, halk sóhajjal és
révedező szemmel egybeveti szűk havi budgetjét titkos asszonyi
kivánságaival és nézi a földet, vagy az osztálysorsjátékos
kirakatokat: (kettő is van a koronaherceg-utcában) ha most találna
vagy nyerne százezer forintot!
Mentől közelebb ér a dél, annál elevenebb lesz az utca. Szép
időben tizenegy óra tájt egy csapásra megelevenedik. Alig lehet
benne járni. A kirakatok előtt csoportosulások, az üzletekben
tolongás. Budapest asszonyai mintha mind ide sereglenének minden
áldott nap és az összes délelőttjeiket bevásárlással töltenék. Úristen,
mennyi időn át kell az uruknak dolgoznia, hogy a pénzkiadásnak e
rengeteg idejével versenyezhessen? Ez az igazi tantalusi állapot.
Folyton beszerezni, folyton sóvárogni a beszerzendő után,
megszakítás nélkül, a beteltségnek minden reménye nélkül…
ifjúsága rózsás hajnalán kezdi és ezüst hajjal, nagymama korában
sem végzi be. Az embernek mindig szüksége van arra, amit
nélkülözhet s egy asszony a ruházkodásával sohasem készülhet el.
Látszólag a gondatlanok járnak itt ajtóról-ajtóra. Látszólag
mosolygó, tetszeni vágyó és csinosításra gondoló nősereg sárga
cipője koptatja a szűk járó köveit. Látszólag fölösleges a jól öltözött
úrihölgynek ez a költekezése ujabb ruhára. Látszólag megvan a
pénz, amit apró bugyellárisukban, keztyűs öklükben szorongatnak.
Látszólag komolyabban foghatnák föl e hölgyek az életük hivatását
és látszólag körülbelül egy osztályból valók volnának. Aki asszony itt
a másik után megfordul, legfölebb egy különösebb façont bámul meg
és nem a kelme elérhetetlen drágább voltát. Prém a nyakon és
drága kalap a főn – legujabb a szoknya szabása és a kabáton is
meglátszik, hogy nem készen vették.
A vásárló asszonysereg ilyenkor már átváltozott sétáló
társasággá. Megindult a korzó. Föl-alá az utcán, kettesével
hármasával és magánosan. Tarka, színes, csábító látomások
váltakoznak. Mintha bemutatnák most, amit előbb beszereztek: a
hölgyek megjelenése ragyogó. Természetes, hogy akad, aki
megbámulja. A férfiaknak erre felé semmi dolguk, de ők ilyenkor
szintén sétálnak. Meg-megállnak különösen a szervita-tér és a
kigyó-tér sarkán és defiliroztatják maguk előtt a sétáló szépségeket.
Ezek nem igen bánják. Hiszen arra valók, hogy megbámulják őket.
Amellett ők is látnak. Titkos ismeretségek kötődnek a távolból. Az
ünnepelt színésznőket itt ismeri meg a közönség polgári ruhájukban.
Polgárleányok itt vetnek csodálóan ellenséges pillantásokat az
arisztokrácia hideg szépségeire, akik fogataikon hajtanak keresztül a
polgári pompázók sorfalain, egy-egy üzlet előtt lebegő léptekkel
leszállván. A híres muzsikus és neves író itt hallgatja kéjesen
hegyezett füllel és tettetett közömbösséggel, a háta mögött hogyan
sugnak össze, rámutogatván: itt megy a híres…
A hiúság vásárja ez, a ragyogó gazdagság, Budapest társadalmi
életének valóságos potemkiniádája. A prémek között vannak
hamisak, az asszonyok között olyanok, akiknek sürgősebb dolguk is
volna, de itt vannak, mosolyogva és pompázva és akik képmutatóan
szintén mosolyognak és pompáznak, holott fűzőik pántjai alatt
szorong a gond és boldogtalanság, hisznek a mások külső színében
és úgy lehet, hogy az egyik Lázár sóhajtva vágyódik a másik Lázár
sorsára.
Déli tizenkét órakor. A városháza ó harangja kezdi, finoman és
öblösen egyaránt, aztán belekapnak a többi harangok mind: a
koronaherceg-utcában lehetetlen sietni, egyik ember szorong a
másik mellett. A férfit négy-ötféle parfum illata bódítja és
lehetetlenség minden kalap alá nézni. És ekkor, az utolsó
harangszóval mintha új élet költözködnék a zsibongó utcába. Olyan,
mint amikor a tenger fodrai alatt hömpölyög egy új áramlat. A tollas
kalapok közül kipiroslanak, kikékellenek a szalagosak. Az új szabású
kabátok közé belesötételnek régiek. A fehér glacé keztyűk mellett
láthatod a durva pamutkeztyűket. Tekenősbéka héja helyett drótból
való hajtűk tartanak össze ugyanolyan ragyogó szőke, meg barna
hajat, mint a korzó hölgyeiét. Olcsó kék, meg fekete szoknyácskák
libegnek fakult, kitaposott cipőkön és látni engedi a szaladó leánykák
karcsu fekete harisnyáit. És vannak köztük egészen díszes
eleganciájuak is és mégis meglátni rajtuk, hogy nem sétálnak,
hanem mennek haza. Közben meg egészen szegényes öltözetüek,
kendővel a nyakukon, didergőn vékony, viseltes szoknyában és
nevetségesen elnyűtt kalapkával – valóságos karikaturái a sétáló
urihölgyeknek. Egész rajok hatják át a fényes társaságot s találnak
maguknak utat a sorok közeiben, akadálytalanul törtetve előre ott is,
ahol mindenki más megakadna.
A Munka torlódik bele a Sétába. Boltoskisasszonyok, varrónők,
masamódleányok, probirmamzellek, hímzőleányok, virágárusok.
Akik a pult mögött és a sötétes műhelyben dolgoznak, míg az úri
népség kinn sétál. Akik szintén ismerik a pompát, meg a fényt, de
csak a nyomoruságból, mely előteremti. Akiknek a keze finom
selymeken kopik keményre és feketére, akiknek a szeme fénye
belepusztul a kábító drágaságok előállításába.
Aztán egy másik áradat – boldog, mint az ifjúság, ragyogó,
színes és a maga egyszerűségében életkedvet, jólétet és
gondtalanságot mutató. Az iskolás lányok éppoly sietősen és éppoly
ügyesen törtetnek keresztül a sétáló tömegen. Varrólány és iskolás
növendék összeszorul s az egyik gőgös, a másik ellenséges
pillantással áll odébb. Ah, ezeknek van étvágyuk, nem sétálnak,
hanem sietnek ebédelni. Rövid az idő – két órakor ismét itt kell lenni.
A pult mögött, a kincsek között, mik örökké ott vannak és örökké
elérhetetlenek. Ah, micsoda lelke lehet a kis masamódnak, aki ötven
forintos kalapokat staffiroz ki, száz lépésről megismeri egy kalap
értékét, mikor az ő háromkoronás girardiját a hajára tűzi. Akkor már
boldogabb a virágos bolt tanulóleánya még kopottabb kalapban,
mert ő csak a virágokat ismeri, de egyebekben az értelme és a
tudása tompa. Neki nincs szakérzése, ő a szegénység ölében
fölnevekedve, nem ismeri meg a gazdagság értékeit.
Látszólag idegen emberáramlatok lefolyása ez, különböző
mélységben, különböző sebességgel és különböző irányban.
Látszólag a szegény varróleány csak úgy sietne haza, ha a
koronaherceg-utcában nem volna korzó és a kis zenésleány épp oly
érintetlenül ülne a levesestálhoz, ha az üllői-úton menne végig, mint
most a korzós utcán. Látszólag egyiknek sincs köze a másikhoz és
mégis életpályák irányai változnak, érzelmek és gondolkodások,
erények és bűnök érlelődnek meg itt, éppen itt és éppen azért, mert
oly emberek útjai kereszteződnek, akik más világból valók és
akiknek semmi közük egymáshoz.
Itt, a hiuság utcájában áll ki a képmutatás és éled a vágy. A nők
szocialista hajlamai minden skálában kifejlődnek. Az úridámáé, aki
valódi persianerben jár, de nem fizette ki, irigyli a másikat, aki
kifizette. A hivatalnok felesége egyenlőségesen szembejön az
igazgató feleségével és irigykedő keserűséggel néz utána. És a
munkásleány irigyli a léhütőt és a masamód gúnyos mosollyal ismer
egyik-másik kalapra és gondolja: ez sem fog soká ilyet viselni.
És egyre tart a rejtelmes hatás – egyikről a másikra. A
koronaherceg-utca szűk járóin egy új női osztály fejlődik ki. Napról-
napra szemmel látható a növekedése. Nem kell hozzá nagy
megfigyelés. Csak látni kell, hogy aki tegnap még déli harangszóra
hazafelé sietett, ma már lassabban jár. Aki még tegnap két óra tájt
ismét a város felé tartott, azt ma már hiába várod az utcasarkon.
Szép, jóra született szegény és szorgalmas leányok elhagyják a
munkát, mert a koronaherceg-utcában sétálni és pompázni látják a
jómódban dologtalanokat. A tisztességeseket, akik nem
tisztességesek, de mivel úri a viseletük, hát forma szerint mindenki
megbecsüli őket.
Hogy nevezzem őket? Megvannak, szaporodnak, pusztulnak és
pusztítanak. Bogárfélék ha volnának, a tudomány már régen
berubrikázta volna őket. De csak emberek, nem veszi őket észre
senki. Valami negyedvilágfélét alkotnak. Leányok, kik lemondtak a
férjhezmenés lehetőségéről, elkedvetlenedtek vagy belefáradtak a
munkába, foglalkozás, remény és rendeltetés nélkül nézik magukat
a fényes kirakatok tükrében. Az utca tükre a legveszedelmesebb
kerítő. Ami mézes-mázos hizelgést hazudik, ami megtántorodást
okoz, azt nyomban lecövekeli. Nincs idő a megbánáshoz,
megtéréshez. Az egyiknek azt mondja: hát a te szépséged
száradjon, mint a kóró? Hát a holnap csak olyan lesz, mint a ma s a
mának vége az egyedülvaló, örömtelen vénség, tetézve
nélkülözéssel és a mult minden édes emléke nélkül? A másiknak azt
mondja: az sem gazdagabb, mint te, mégis kacag és jólétben
pompázik. A harmadiknak: tisztességes vagy? Csak azt látják rajtad,
hogy rongyos vagy. Így kérkedhetik magában a vadvirág, hogy senki
sem tépte le, amíg elfonyad vagy valami állat kérődző gyomrába
kerül, holott a rózsát leszakasztják és keblükön viselik.
Minden rangosztályból kerülnek ki e révedező, veszendő
teremtések, mert mindegyiknek van irigyelni valója. Messziről
megismerni őket lassú, leselkedő járásukról, mintha együtt járnának
valakivel, különös, hátra hallgatódzó fejtartásukról s arcukon a
cserkésző vadász merev figyelmességéről. Rendes útjuk a Kossuth
Lajos-utcán át vezeti őket ide, innen a Haris-bazáron keresztül
kerülnek a váci-utcába, ahonnan a Kristóf-téren keresztül ismét a
koronaherceg-utcába jutnak. Megismerni őket járásuk
céltalanságáról, meg hogy minden kirakat előtt megállanak, de
inkább magukat nézik benne, meg a mögöttük elhaladókat.
Leginkább az optikus üzlet vonzza őket, ahol a színésznők
fotografiái vannak kitéve, aztán az ékszeres bolt. Az aranynak bűvös
vonzóereje odacövekeli őket a kövezetre s képzeletben teleaggatják
magukat a legcsillogóbb gyémántokkal. Majd vágyuk leszáll a
lehetőség szferájába és nézegetik az olcsóbb gyűrűket, órákat,
számolgatván: mikor vehetnék meg. A tudósok nem ismerik ezt a
szimptomát, de az aszfaltbetyárok tudnak róla. Amikor egy leányt
követnek, minden kétségük eloszlik, mihelyest az illető egy ékszeres
ablak előtt megáll.
Ha kisüt a nap, százával hemzsegnek az utcán. Ki tudná őket
mind elsorolni? Ott látod a hajdan kartonruhás dohánygyári leányt,
aki beleunt a munkába és szeretne kalapot viselni. A bluzja rikító,
vadonatúj kazsmir, a szoknyája olcsó ternó, melynek kapcsain
keresztül látni a durva, piszkos alsószoknyát, a cipője ócska s nagy
keze durva cérnakeztyübe van bujtatva. Ez a kislány még az első
kalandja után jár és rendesen öreg urak kezébe kerül. Néhány hét
és minden ragyog rajta, az alsószoknyája selyme csak úgy suhog, a
kalapja rendőrség után kiált és cipőjének akkora a sarka, hogy majd
lebukik róla. Ott van teljes szegénységében a gouvernante, erősen
befűzve titokzatos mosollyal az ajkán és olyképpen lesütött
szemmel, hogy mindent meglát és mindenkihez beszél. A
házikisasszony, akit hazulról elüldöz a szegénység, a foglalkozásos
szerető, éktelenül drága részletfizetéses toiletteben, mely messziről
kiáltja, hogy aki viseli, megvásárolható. A hagyományos vidéki úrnő,
aki elvesztette pénztárcáját s noha estére várja az urát, mégis
rászorul addig valamelyik úr szivességére. Ez a hölgy rendszerint
sohse látott férjet, de olykor csakugyan «tisztességes» asszony,
akinek az ura valamelyik kishivatalban görnyed s képtelen
feleségének olyan ruhát csináltatni, amilyenben az járni szeret. És
beletarkul a sokaságba a keresett hanyagsággal, lehetetlen
színösszetételekben kiöltözködött szininövendékek serege, akik
kettesével, hármasával, szerepet vagy kottát szorongatva tüntető
kacagással kényszerítik magukra a figyelmet, mert azt hiszik, hogy
nagy dolog szini-növendéknek lenni. Szinésznő sohasem lesz
belőlük, de egyre a szinház körül jár az eszük, minden szinlap előtt
megállanak, mindennap szabadjegyet kérnek s mindig az utcán
vannak.
Ezeknek a teremtéseknek a gondolkodása tisztára a férfi és a nő
közötti viszony körül forog. Ha valaki rájuk néz, azt gondolják:
engem akar. Ha nem néz rájuk: nem akar ez engem? És sajátságos,
micsoda önérzetük van: a tisztességes társaság tisztességében nem
hisznek, de magukat különbeknek tartják, mivelhogy a rendőrségnek
nincs dolga velök.
Ma már minden bankhivatalnoknak van szeretője, aki ezekből az
utcán csatangoló leányokból kerül ki. Mindegyikük tisztességes
leány számba megy s innen való a fiatal uraknak merőben
elharapódzott skepsise a tisztesség iránt. A húsz éves jogász már
tapasztalatok alapján állítja nincs tisztességes leány! Már hogy
volna? Az utcán találkozom egy előkelőnek és szelídnek látszó
kisasszonnyal. Nem hinnéd, hogy angyal? No várj csak. Oda lépek
hozzá és halk szervusszal köszöntöm. Pedig van apja, anyja és
zongorája és valamikor férjhez fog menni. Már most hogy hinnéd el
egy másik leányról, akinek szinte van apja, anyja és zongorája, hogy
csakugyan angyal! Ez a másik, egy illatos úriasszony, bármikor,
bárkinek rendelkezésére áll. Hát a te feleséged miért volna különb?
– Innen való, hogy ma már nálunk is, akár Párisban, fiatal leánynak
fényes nappal sem bátorságos egyedül az utcán járni, mert
mihelyest csak egy kicsit elmerül gondolataiba s meglassul a járása,
vagy az útja csak legkevésbbé látszik rendszertelennek, rögtön
mellette terem valami skeptikus lovag.
Így szűrődik át ezen az utcán Budapest egész élete. A
gondtalanul sétálók sokaságában örvények forronganak, a bársony
takargatja a szegénység rongyait, az erény színeiben ékeskedik a
romlottság, nehéz munka és léha kalandozás birkózik rajta.
Fölcsillan a tavaszi verőfény, a vér szenvedelmesebben kering és
kicsap a szemekből a szerelem vágya. Minden lépés, minden
fordulat egy-egy dráma. Ki látja ezeket, ki törődik velük? Ki tudja,
hogy mi lesz ebből a szép fiatal városból, ha majd minden erkölcse,
minden élete átszűrődik e gyönyörű, e vonzó, ez előkelő, e gazdag,
e szegény utcán?
MÁSODIK FEJEZET.
ÉVA.
1.
Dél. Utolsónak a bazilika harangja kongja el méltóságosan

tizenkét ütését. A Koronaherceg-utcában nyüzsög a népség.
Könnyelműség, vígság és elégedetlenség a párája. Egy gyönyörű,
sugár leányba, – csupa illat és elegancia – a Zsibárus-utcából
sietősen kifordulva, beleütközik egy rongyos masamód-lány. A hölgy
gyönyörű arca bosszusan elváltozik, a kis leány elképedve tekint föl
reá, de megismervén, kötekedő mosollyal szól:
– Te is jobban vigyázhatnál.
A hölgy nagy zavarban van. Ösztönszerűleg oldalt pillant és látja,
hogy a katonatiszt, aki eddig követte, töprenkedve és tanakodva,
miféle hölgy lehet ő, most magában mosolyog, mint aki tisztába jött a
problémával. Alkalmasint hallotta is, hogy a kis masamód tegezi a
szép úrileányt.
– Takarodj – sziszegi ez mérgesen és iparkodik oly magatartást
mutatni, amellyel valaki a mesteremberével áll szóba. A kis leánynak
azonban gyönyörűsége telt a másik kellemetlenségében s szinte
hangosan kérdezte:
– Tizenkettő van, nem jösz haza ebédelni?
– Még nem – mondja ez.
– Én bizony sietek, de aztán te se maradj soká, Éva, különben a
mama megint haragszik.
Ezzel fejével egyet biccent, a szeme kárörvendően rácsillog és
mint a hal, tovasiklik a zsibongó tömkelegen keresztül.
Tehát a rongyos kis munkásleány testvérhuga az előkelő
hölgynek. Most már mindent tud a katonatiszt. Kevesebb
föntartással Évával szemben, de nagyobb óvatossággal, esetleges
ismerősök iránt, akik a problematikus rangú hölgygyel láthatnák, a
katonatiszt most már nem mozdul az oldala mellől. Éva fehér arcát
elborítja a vér, de nem a nőiesség lázadása ez, hanem bosszúság.
Összeszorítja fogait s azzal a bizonyos elutasító, dacos tekintettel
állja a katonatiszt kutató, frivol nézését, amely a vállalkozó férfiak
hevét menten le szokta hűteni. A tiszt is meghőköl, kezd kevésbbé
bizonyos lenni a dolgában, de végre mégis csak azt gondolja:
– A huga egy rongyos munkásleány, ő maga meg úgy öltözködik,
mint egy baronesz. Itt mindent lehet kockáztatni.
A tiszt úr egy kissé felületes megfigyelő lehetett. Egészben véve
Éva megjelenése egészen ragyogó volt, de a részletek mégis a
szegénység küzdelmére vallottak az idő koptató hatása ellen. A
hozzáértőnek első tekintetre fel kell tűnnie például a kalap és blouse
közötti anachronismusnak. A blouse új, a kalap tavalyi, egy kissé
átalakítva. A szoknya kissé lekopott moirée, a legdrágább fajtából, a
blouse ellenben új, de a legfoszlóbb olcsó fajtájából. Világos, hogy
mikor a szoknya új volt, Évának több volt a pénze, mint a blouse
csináltatása idejében. De a disharmonia mellett is a leány büszke,
öntudatos tartása és járásának rugalmassága az úri leány
benyomását keltette. Éva, hogy a tiszt tolakodásától szabaduljon,
megállt egy kirakat előtt, amivel azonban csak azt érte el, hogy
lovagja is mellé állt s ezt a pillanatot felhasználta halk megszólításra.
Éva ridegen ránézett, aztán szó nélkül átment a tulsó oldalra. A
tiszt egy darabig meg volt hökkenve, de egyet rándított a vállán és
utána ment. Azonban nem volt módja, hogy újból szerencsét
próbáljon. Éva váratlanul befordult a párizsi udvarba s mire a lovag
utána fordult, már eltünt valamelyik üzletben.
Takarosan, mint a fecske-fészkek, sorakoznak az üvegtetős
keskeny bazárban egymás mellé a cipős-boltok. Az üveges-ajtó
egyik fele kirakat, melyben csábos tisztaságban fényeskednek a
lakkos és sárgabőr topánkák. S a legtöbbjük kicsike, mint a
hamupipőke lábacskája és szabásában, díszítésében fantasztikus,
mint a rózsakirálynő sajkája. Ah, ezek a cipők! Ferdesarkú
varróleányok nem mehetnek keresztül a párisi udvaron, hogy
valamelyik cipős-ablak előtt sóhajtva hiábavaló ábrándokat ne
szőjjenek.
A Wočasek Antal boltjába nyitott be Éva. Amint a kezét a
kilincsre tette, az arca egészben átváltozott. Nyoma sem volt rajta se
boszúságnak, se haragnak, gyönyörű keskeny homloka sugárzott és
acélos kék szeme szinte pajkosan eresztette meg tüzijátékát.
Méltóságos járása is elmult, hajlott és szökdécselt, mint egy kis
szobalány.
– Ah, Dermák kisasszony, örülök a szerencsének, Dermák
kisasszony, köszönti Wočasek úr. A kirakat mögött ült kis varga-
asztala mellett a Kossuth-szakállas, pislogó nézésü derék
mesterember és versenyt kalapálta a bőrt a félemeleten ülő négy
legényével. Wočasek úr szeméből a megelégedés sugárzik, a szája
egyre jár, sajátságos bonhomiával, melyen azonban megérzik, hogy
semmi köze azokhoz, akikről beszél és mik iránt érdeklődik.
– Hogy van Wočasek úr, – adja vissza Éva a szót nagy
barátságosan, szinte hizelegve. – Szabad leülni itt magánál?
– Nagyon örülök, hogy látom, kisasszony. – Igazán? Pedig attól
tartottam, hogy be sem ereszt.
– Kedves kisasszony, – szól kacagva a mesterember – hogy én
ne ereszteném be? A feleségemnek majd mindennap mondom:
ugyan mi lelte a Dermák kisasszonyt, hogy oly rég nem mutatta
magát?
– Igen, – szól affektált duzzogással Éva – mert várja, hogy már
fizessek. Pedig én most sem hoztam pénzt, hanem…
– Cipő kell? (Az arca csak úgy sugárzott örömében.) Kedves
kisasszony, mennyit akar? Hát úgy ismer engem, mint a ki pénzt
kiván? Hiszen tudja, mi az én elvem: ha fogy az árú, biztos a pénz.
Mutassa a lábát, nem lett-e kisebb azóta?
Ezzel odahúzza székét Éva mellé és szeretettel kezébe veszi
lábát.
– Hm, – mondja, figyelmesen nézve a cipőt – kedves kisasszony,
így már bajosabb önnel üzletet kötni. Micsoda cipő ez! És ön ilyen
cipőben megy az utcára? Ön már tudhatja, hogy nem elég, ha egész
a cipő és egyenes a sarka. Nézze, milyen megnyult a bőre. Ezer
ránc van rajta, fakó, agyon van fényesítve. Olyan, mint a
bebalzsamozott holttest. Aztán a gombok is lötyögnek és a sarka
milyen széles, formátlan már.
– Nem mertem magát zaklatni, azt hittem, hozhatok egy kis
pénzt, mielőtt…
– De kedvesem, – mondja szigorúan Wočasek – hogy akar ön
engem fizetni, ha ilyen cipőben jár? Én szívesen hitelezek
mindenkinek akármennyit, amíg jó cipőben jár. Mert addig nincs
mitől tartanom. Szép leány jó cipőben mindig hitelképes. De szép
leány rossz cipőben sohasem jut pénzhez.
Éva homloka egy pillanatra összeráncolódik, de alig
észrevehetőleg. Aztán ismét enyelgő, hizelgő a hangja.
– Igen, Wočasek úr, ismerem azt az üzleti elvét. És sohasem
veszt rajta?
Wočasek úr elégülten mosolyog, úgy néz a szép leányra. Aztán
székével visszalovagol a kis vargaasztalhoz, megfeszíti a térdszíját
és úgy beszél.
– Soha? Azt nem mondhatom. De nincs okom megbánni üzleti
eljárásomat. Emlékszik, mikor először volt nálam? A szeplős

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The Far Right in the Workplace: A

Six-Country Comparison 1st Edition

Far-Right Ecologism: Environmental Politics and the Far

Right Across The World The Global Networking Of The Far

Race, Popular Culture, and Far-right Extremism in the

The Rise of Ecofascism Climate Change and the Far Right

Six Little Ducks Kim Mitzo Thompson Karen Mitzo

Primary Mathematics 3A Hoerst

Researching Far Right Movements Ethics Methodologies

Legislation in Europe A Country by Country Guide 1st

The Far Right in the

Seongcheol Kim · Samuel Greef

The Far Right

With financial support from the European Union

Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology

Cover credit: Samuel Greef (CC BY-SA 4.0)

The results of the research project were presented and discussed in

Kassel and Berlin Seongcheol Kim

3.5.1 Insights into the Workplace Context: DAF

5.5.2 The Response Strategy of the IG Metall:

7.5.2 The Response Strategy of the FIOM

ABVV/FGTB Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond/Fédération Générale du

CFE-CGC Confédération française de l’encadrement—Confédération

FIM Federazione Italiana Metalmeccanici [Italian Federation of

PS Parti socialiste [Socialist Party (Belgium)]

ZA Zentrum Automobil [Automobile Center (Germany)]

Table 2.1 Overview of selected far-right parties 26

This book is the first comparative study of far-right strategies at the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

This introductory chapter sets up the object of inquiry by taking stock

1.1 Taking Stock: The Far Right in the 2010s

in Belgium and the Front National (FN) or Rassemblement National

Gewerkschaftsbund, 2017), with the figures amounting to 16 and 12.2%

1.2 Research Questions and Methodology

a broad understanding of “strategy” as encompassing patterns of situa-

also backing up each classification as “far-right” based on an analysis of

studies were conducted—DAF Trucks in Westerlo (Belgium), PSA in

1.3 Structure of the Book

systems, the trade union landscapes, and systems of industrial relations as

WSI-Mitteilungen, 72(3), 185–192. https://doi.org/10.5771/0342-300X-

The Far Right and the Workers:

This chapter presents a condensed overview of the conceptual and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 11

the messaging and organizing dimensions of far-right interventions at

2.1 Conceptual Framework: Workers, Far Right,

on questions such as voting behavior of workers (qua manual laborers);

2 It is just as conceivable, however, that a nativist rejection of “foreign” Others is

“elite” (e.g. Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Canovan, 1999; Hawkins,

extremism, with empirical examples ranging from the national conser-

2.2 Literature Review: The

as (to varying extents) structural assumptions about the latter’s materi-

depending on the context. For example, Éribon’s (2009) autobiograph-

the aforementioned qualitative demand-side scholarship has been to direct

2.3 Methodology: Triangulation

actor perspective, which far-right groups they consider to be the biggest

4 Of course, the very notion of “labor issues” is a political construction, as seen

to twelve interviews were conducted, including group interviews with

5 There are country-specific differences in data availability: in France, Germany, Italy,

of far-right parties’ messaging on labor issues and, if applicable, the orga-

2.4 A Comparison of Background

Table 2.1 Overview of selected far-right parties

Country (party) Ideological roots Org. roots Government status EP group

Belgium (VB) Separatism Alliance Exclusion ID