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Public Diplomacy in Vietnam

This book explores how Vietnam's leadership conceptualises and conducts

public diplomacy (PD) and offers a comparative analysis with regional powers.
Drawing on social constructivism as its theoretical framework, it investigates the
rationale behind an authoritarian regime's implementation of public diplomacy to
contribute to a better understanding of the broader framework of foreign-domestic
policy. This theoretical and practical exploration of Vietnam's PD in cases of
cultural diplomacy, South China Sea diplomacy, and online activism situates it
in the general academic and theoretical discussion on soft power. Key variables
to the conceptualisation and conduct of Vietnam's PD, namely national interest,
national identity, and changing information technologies, especially the Internet
and social media, are also thoroughly investigated. With cross-cutting themes
ranging from politics and international relations to communication studies, it will
appeal to students and scholars of identity politics, populism, and nationalism.

Vu Lam is currently a visiting fellow at the Australian National University. He

holds a PhD in international and political studies from the University ofNew South
Wales and a Master of International Studies (Advanced) from the University of
Queensland, Australia. His areas of interest include soft power, public diplomacy,
cyber policy, and public participation on social media.

/
Rethinking Asia and International, Relations
Series Editor - Emilian Kavalski, Li Dak Sum Chair Professor in
China-Eurasia Relations and International Studies, University of
Nottingham, Ningbo, China

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The series seeks to encourage conversation on:
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• how will global problems be reframed and addressed by a 'rising Asia';
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This series invites proposals for interdisciplinary research monographs
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Edited by Fabienne Bossuyt and Bart Dessein
Public Diplomacy in Vietnam
National Interests and Identities in the Public Sphere
Vu Lam
Public Diplomacy in Vietnam
National Interests and Identities in the
Public Sphere

Vu Lam

I~ ~~~J~;~~~up
LONDON AND NEW YORK
First published 2023
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
©2023 Vu Lam
The right ofVu Lam to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Libra,y of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book
ISBN: 978-1-032-01406-7 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-01408-l (pbk)
ISBN: 978-l-003-17848-4 (ebk)
DOI: l0.4324/9781003178484
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

/
Contents

List offigures X
List oftables xi
Acknowledgements xii
Abbreviations xiii
A note on the text xiv

1 Introduction to Vietnam's public diplomacy 1

Background 1
Making a case for Vietnam 's public diplomacy 3
Research questions and central argument 4
Research design 5
Time frame for document collection 6
Interviews and surveys 8
Digital humanities to support PD evaluation 10
Overview ofthe chapters 13
Notes 14

2 The long road of public diplomacy 18

From practice to concept 18
Multidisciplinary approaches to an ever-evolving concept and
practice 21 / :
Communication~ 1and public diplomacy 22
Public relations: marketing, and public diplomacy 24
International relations and public diplomacy 25
The new public diplomacy and expanded role ofnon-state actors 28
Public diplomacy 2.0 30
Legitimacy and credibility in public diplomacy 31
Subsets ofPE> 32
The domestic extension ofpublic,'diplomacy 33
Public diplomacy of middle powers 34
The east vs. the west 36
Concluding notes 37
Notes 39
viii Contents
3 An integrative framework for new public diplomacy 48
Theoretical foundations in IR 48
Realism and public diplomacy 49
Liberalism and public diplomacy 50
Constructivism and public diplomacy 52
Analyticalframework 55
The.first dimension -stakeholders 55
The second dimension - content 57
The third dimension - instruments 59
The domestic dimension 61
The boundaries ofpublic diplomacy 62
Concluding notes 63
Notes 64

4 Vietnamese contemporary conceptualisation of public diplomacy 69

Background on PD discourse in Vietnam 69
Public diplomacy and propaganda 71
The introduction qfsoft power 72
Empirical.findings on the conceptualisation ofPD 73
Subsets ofPD 74
What does 'public' mean in PD? 75
Objectives ofPD 75
PDactors 77
The need for an official induction ofPD 79
Domestic PD 80
What is Vietnamese PD? 81
Further discussion 82
Concluding notes 85
Notes 85

5 National interests~ identities, and Public diplomacy 90

Historical background 90
Public diplomacyjbefore Doi Moi 91
Doi Moi to the Jjescue 93
Doi Moi and the rethinking ofnational interests and national
identities 94
Doi Moi and national interest 96
Doi Mai and national identity 98
Doi Moi and public diplomacy 105
Publiedip~omacy and the (;PV's legitimacy 108
Concluding notes 110
Notes 111
 Contents ix
6 Information and communication technologies and public
diplomacy 119
International background 1 I 9
The booming ofthe Internet and social media in Vietnam 120
The rise of online activism 122
Online activism and nation branding of Vietnam I 25
State response against the rise of the Internet and social media 129
Public diplomacy and social media 133
Concluding notes I 39
Notes 140

7 Vietnamese public diplomacy in action 147

Vietnamese cultural nationalism 147
Cultural diplomacy 150
Structure, aims, and objectives of Vietnam's cultural
diplomacy 15 I
Main activities of cultural diplomacy 153
Further remarks I 55
The South China Sea dispute 156
Background 156
Public diplomacy by the state 157
Public diplomacy by the public 159
Evaluation of Vietnamese PD 161
Concluding notes 17I
Notes 171

8 Conclusions and. suggestions 178

Suggestions for Vietnam's public diplomacy 182
Notes 184

Bibliography 185
Index 223

J
/
Figures

1.1 Internet users in Vietnam from 2009 to 2017. Source: World

Bank, retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET
.USER.ZS?end=2017&locations=VN&start=2009&view=chart 7
l.2 Survey respondents 9
1.3 The PD process 11
2.1 Public diplomacy in English corpus. Source: Google, 'Google
Books Ngram Viewer' (2019) 20
2.2 Public diplomacy and nation branding 26
2.3 Dimensions of public diplomacy and levels of engagement 30
3.1 PD flow in the infosphere 62
4.1 PD and other concepts 74
4.2 The public and public diplomacy 75
4.3 PD and diplomacy 76
4.4 PD objectives 76
4.5 Roles of local authorities 78
4.6 PD stakeholders 79
4.7 PD targeting domestic public 80
4.8 Why aim at domestic public? 81
6.1 Global interest in Formosa incident (2016) 121
6.2 Global interest in cybersecurity law 128
6.3 Impact of so9(a1 media on PD 137
7.1 The efficiency of Vietnam's PD 161
7.2 Global interest in WEF-ASEAN 163
7.3 Global interest in Hue Festival 164
7.4 Global search queries about Vietnam 166
7.5 Global news coverage about Vietnam 167
7.6 Intern~tional arrivals by country. Source: Vietnam's National
Administration of Tourism. Vietnam National Administration of
Tourism, "Statistics on International Arrivals" 167
7.7 Interest in Vietnam by region 168
7.8 Global attention to the South China Sea by region 169
7.9 Global interest in the South China Sea over time 170
Tables

3 .1 Analytical framework by Gilboa 60

5.1 Vietnam's national interests and identities 105
5 .2 PD before and after Doi Moi 111
6.1 The politics ofblogging in Vietnam (2003-2018) 124
6.2 Vietnamese regulations on the Internet 130
6.3 Most frequent topics 138
7.1 News coverage on WEF-ASEAN 154

/
/
Acknowledgements

A large part of this book comes from my doctoral dissertation and marks a major
milestone on my academic journey. I could not have been able to finish those long
years of intensive research and consecutive stress tests without the support from
the people named below.
First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my doctoral
supervisor, Professor Carl Thayer. His extensive expertise, detailed guidance,
and constructive suggestions have carried me through every painstaking moment
of conducting the research and producing this book. On a more personal note, I
would like to extend my sincere appreciation to Mrs Zubeida Thayer, whose gen-
erous hospitality and support have provided my family and I with a strong moral
and mental anchor and a sense of belonging.
Secondly, I would like to thank UNSW and the School of Humanities and
Social Sciences for allowing me the chance to pursue my doctoral research. I am
grateful for the support the University and the School have offered me during my
candidature, especially from Mrs Bernadette McDermott, Mrs Shirley Ramsey,
and Mrs Elvira Berra.
Thirdly, I am grateful to ANU's Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs for
their support during my visiting fellowship when I finalised this monograph.
Data collection presented one of the biggest challenges for this research.
Therefore, I woul<;Ylike to extend my thanks to those who took part in or got
involved with thi,S research openly or anonymously. This monograph would lose
much of its empirical value without the enthusiastic participation of interviewees
and survey respondents. I am especially thankful to Mr Luong Thanh Nghi, Dr
Nguyen Hong Thach, and Dr Pham Xuan Thanh for their wholehearted support
with my fieldwork.
During my PhD journey, I am lucky to have the company and support of
friends who have made what could have been a lonely path more enjoyable and
memorable. I especially owe ii to my dear friends Le Van Anh Cuong, To Dieu
Lien, Nishat Falgunee, Kutub Rana, Tran Thi Le Dung, Luc Anh Tuan, and others
at ADFA for bearing with me over the last couple of years.
I am obliged to my parents, siblings and my in-laws for their encouragement,
and for their tolerance of my ultra-anxiety during the time my dissertation was
written up.
Abbreviations

Acronym Definition
ADMM+ ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASCC ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting
BRI The Bell and Road Initiative
coc Code of Conduct
CPC Communist Party of China
CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership
CPV Communist Party of Vietnam
DAV Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DOC Declaration of Conduct
DRVN Democratic Republic of Vietnam
EAS East Asia Summit
FDI Foreign direct investment
FTA Free trade agreement
GDP Gross domestic product
ICT Information and communications technologies
MIC Vietnam's Ministry of Information and Communications
MOD Vietnam's Ministry of National Defence
MOFA Vietnam's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MPS Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security
PD Public diplomacy
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
scs South China Sea
SEZ Special Economic and Administrative Zone
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
VUFO Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations
WEF-ASEAN World Economic Forum on ASEAN
WTO World Trade Organisation
A note on the text

In this book, I have generally sustained a couple of conventions about Vietnamese

names. First, Vietnamese names are usually triple-barrelled, with the surname
coming first - and I have followed that naming order, minus the tone marks.
Second, Vietnamese people are commonly addressed by their first names. For
example, former Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh may be referred to as Minister
Minh, Mr. Minh, but not Pham. There are, however, notable exceptions to these
conventions. Ho Chi Minh, for example, is widely known as President Ho, or
Uncle Ho in Vietnam. Also, certain place names like 'Vietnam' and 'Hanoi' are
commonly written as such in English, and for the sake of accessibility, I do not
convert them back into the Vietnamese tradition, i.e., 'Viet Nam' and 'Ha Noi.'
1 Introduction to Vietnam's
public diplomacy

We will increase our exchanges with the rest of the world. America should make a
serious effort to understand other cultures and learn foreign languages. Our inter-
action with the rest of the world must be a conversation, not a monologue. And
America must remain open to visitors and workers and students from around the
world. We do not and will not compromise our security standards. Yet, if our
public diplomacy efforts are to succeed, we cannot close ourselves off from the
rest of the world.
Condoleezza Rice 1

Background
The thirtieth diplomatic conference of Vietnam in 2018 marked the first time a top
leader of Vietnam mentioned the phrase 'public diplomacy' (PD). Accmdingly,
the then Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc2 requested that the Vietnamese dip-
lomatic sector pay the utmost attention to the 'acquisition and application of elec-
tronic government, public diplomacy, digital diplomacy' to 'innovate the work of
foreign relations and better serve businesses and citizens.' As significant as this
reference is, public diplomacy has long been part of Vietnam's politics, though it
has not always attracted much attention, nor is there a unified understanding of its
boundaries. As early as the dawn of the new regime in 1945, different iterations
pertaining to PD have sprouted, ranging from friendship organisations with com-
munist allies to propaganda during the Vietnam War. 3
Nevertheless, not until Doi Moi (i.e., 'renovation') was introduced in 1986 did
PD find a firmer ground in Vietnam's foreign policy. The government's foreign
policy tenet on universal friendship with all nations and peoples for peace, inde-
pendence, and development:4 provides a solid foundation for PD initiatives. The
new foreign policy elevates and transforms PD into an essential part of Vietnam's
diplomacy. As such, any insider can at least name a concept or an activity pertain-
ing to the commonly known domain,'of PD, like people's diplomacy ('ngoai giao
nhan dan' in Vietnamese), external information ( 'thong tin doi ngoai '), or cultural
diplomacy ( 'ngoai giao van hoa ').
However, as of now, PD is still not an official concept in any legal documenta-
tion, despite its de facto presence in political discourse and action. 5 In one ofmy

DOI: 10.4324/9781003178484-1
2 Introduction to Vietnam s public diplomacy
communications with a Vietnamese diplomat at the UN, he noted that the concept
of public diplomacy has stirred up much interest among policymakers, but broad
consensus would take time. 6 However, besides certain analytical ambiguity, a
common perception among all the interviewees and survey respondents consulted
for my research is that the importance of PD is irrefutable.
Among key players in international politics such as the United States, the
United Kingdom~ and the EU, public diplomacy has been considered an effectual
supportive channel for traditional diplomacy. One mandate of PD is to cultivate
a nation's international reputation, which is vital to a state's international legiti-
macy.7 PD is also thought to be a major instrument of 'soft power,' a concept
developed by Joseph Nye that refers to the power to achieve one's objectives by
means of persuasion, rather than coercion. 8 Many consider the integration of soft
power as a theoretical pathway for the concept of PD. 9 Specifically, top Asian
economies are known for attaching much importance to their soft power resources,
most notable of which is culture. 10 Nonetheless, the relationship between soft
power and PD requires further investigation, not least because cultural identity is
integral to Asian societies. 11
In the age of modern communications technologies, academia has largely
agreed that PD efforts can only resonate with larger audiences if and when
they graduate from one-way messaging to relationship-building. 12 To build rap-
port with the public, PD must have a vertical reach, embracing a multitude of
actors. 13 That is to say, PD should no longer be under the sole purview of state
actors.
Furthermore, there is an ongoing discussion about the domestic dimension of
PD, i.e., PD that aims at the domestic populace to call for support or to exert a
perceptual impact. 14 Major PD players in Asia are known to have long used PD
to reinforce the legitimacy of the state - both domestically and internationally. 15
However, considering the diverse cultural and political settings across the Asian
region, Chinese PD or Indian PD is not necessarily akin to Vietnamese PD. As
such, any investigation into PD should take into account the sociopolitical and
economic context surrounding a given practitioner.
At the same time, the vastly increased connectivity of the modern era and
the associated grofoth · of social media have created new venues for and posed
momentous chall6nges to the conduct of PD across the sociopolitical spectrum.
The cyberspace has transformed the public sphere, where discussion of public
affairs is no longer nationally bound but is internationally diffuse. If knowledge is
power, then free(er) access to information has given the mass public a formidable
source of power that may help them intervene in state affairs. The Arab Spring
comes to mind as the epitome of the use of social media for collective activism.
How does Vietnam deal with this new situation?
Against this backdrop, this book acts as an exploratory study that focuses on
the dynamics of Vietnam's PD while relating it to several regional players with
similar sociocultural conditions, like China and Japan. The research analyses sev-
eral defining PD cases that aim at enhancing state's international standing and
mobilising domestic support for state's policies.
 Introduction to Vietnam s public diplomacy 3
Making a case for Vietnam's public diplomacy
As previously mentioned, though the designation of PD may be alien to
Vietnamese reality, Vietnam has for a long time engaged in the conduct of many
activities under the purview of PD. Diverse understandings of PD notwithstand-
ing, the general consensus among mainstream scholars is that if an effort is to
have an intentional impact on a foreign public, then it can be considered within
the ambit of PD. 16 With that broad canvas, PD is essential to any diplomatic
conduct, by virtually all international players. Nevertheless, there has been little
in-depth research into the Vietnamese practice, by both domestic academia and
international scholarship. The concept is also a point of contention among top-tier
politicians. Even in 2018, one former deputy prime minister of Vietnam posited
that the concept of 'public diplomacy' is non-existent in Vietnam 17 -while several
other high-ranking public officials confirmed otherwise.
Against that backdrop, Vietnam's foreign policy warrants more rigorous aca-
demic scrutiny. The first reason is a better understanding of Vietnamese dynamics
can be beneficial to regional policymakers. As of 2020, today's Vietnam, by vari-
ous measures, is qualified as a 'middle power. ns However helpful that label might
be, an incontrovertible fact is that Vietnam is asserting its role in the culturally
and ethnically diverse region ofSoutheast Asia. As of 2019, Vietnam established
bilateral relations with 188 over 193 member states of the UN, gained member-
ship in over 70 international and regional organisations, including 16 strategic and
14 comprehensive partnerships. 19 By the time this study was drafted, Vietnam has
been elected as non-permanent UN Security Council member for 2020-2011 with
a record number of votes. Vietnam also assumed the chair of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in January 2020.
Vietnam's active engagement with the international community through bilat-
eral and multilateral diplomacy, including its PD efforts, can create a considerable
impact on regional politics. This statement is backed by the fact that Vietnam is
a major stakeholder in the South China Sea disputes, the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP), and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), among
others. The COVID-19 pandemic, in particular, has showcased Vietnam's PD
efforts in engaging with both domestic and international audiences in a joint oper-
ation to prevent the spread of the coronavirus across local communities during the
early waves. This earned Vietnam the reputation as an 'unsuspecting leader' in
pandemic diplomacy, 20 which proves that a peripheral PD player could rise to the
occasion and yield a lasting impact on international relations.
This leads to the second reason. An exploratory study into Vietnam's public
diplomacy can also provide significant insights into the peripheral realm of diplo-
matic scholarship, in general, and literature on PD in particular. Vietnam, without
doubt, possesses distinct sociopolitical features, unlike most PD players in the
mainstream literature - which are semi-democracies or democracies. Indeed, a
large part of PD scholarship merely focuses on democracies in the west and, to a
less extent, prominent practitioners in the east, like South Korea and Japan. The
4 Introduction to Vietnam~ public diplomacy
only case study that is probably relatable to Vietnam is China, as both are one-
party states with similar political ideologies and comparable cultures under the
East Asian cultural sphere - that some refer to as 'Sinosphere. ' 21
Nonetheless, one cannot expect Vietnam to behave the same way as China.
Vietnam watchers have warned against viewing Vietnam's politics as 'read-off
from the Chinese case. ' 22 The historically turbulent relations, asymmetrical power
structure, and recent territorial disputes all point to the fact that there is still much
to learn about Vietnam on its own merit, and not as a downscaled China. That
is why it is useful to see how PD plays out as part of Vietnam's engagement in
the complex region of Southeast Asia with the involvement of major powers like
China and the United States.
Generally speaking, Vietnam.just like many Asian nation-states, is a latecomer
to a field that has been dominated by the United States and crowded with western
practices. 23 Therefore, it is interesting to see how a non-western non-democratic
emerging nation-state brings PD into play, given that the experience from several
western counterparts shows that smaller-state PD inherently catTies distinct attrib-
utes that conform to their limited hard power resources. 24
Academically, this research is among the first systemic attempts to look into
the ever-growing PD efforts by the (semi.:)authoritarian state of Vietnam. An
undenepresentedPD practitioner like Vietnam, with its own dynamics, is eventu-
ally not isolated from the interconnected world, and thus is prone to making an
impact as well as taking one.

Research questions and central argument

This book investigates the dynamics of Vietnamese PD after Doi Moi (i.e., renova-
tion) in 1986, in relation to western understandings of PD. The conceptualisation
and the implementation of PD are analysed theoretically and practically. Besides
the Doi Moi milestone, the focal period for data collection is from 2009 onwai·ds -
the rationale behind this choice will be discussed in the methodology section. The
research assumes that Vietnam's approach to PD is fundamentally different from
western players while sharing several similarities with its Asian counterparts. The
main reason may ~/in' the distinguishable political and cultural context of Vietnam.
The research seeks to validate the following central argument:

The weight of cultural nationalism, national interest and ICT penetration has
shaped Vietnam's public diplomacy into a strategy that serves both interna-
tional and domestic policy goals. 25

For the above theory, the r~search puts forward the following exploratory
questions: '

1. How do key Vietnamese stakeholders perceive public diplomacy?

The main objective is to conceptualise public diplomacy from a practi-
tioner's perspective. With this question, the assumption is that Vietnamese
 Introduction to Vietnam :S, public diplomacy 5
policymakers have their distinct understandings and justifications regarding
the concept and conduct of PD. Built on the historical development of the
concept in Vietnam, this question is addressed using empirical data from
interviews and surveys with a select pool ofpolicymakers and practitioners.
2. How does the Vietnamese context affect Vietnam's conduct of public
diplomacy?
The assumption is that the political context of an authoritarian regime will
affect PD differently from that of democracies. Part of the question, in that
vein, aims to address the impact of authoritarian features - limited civil soci-
ety and freedom of the media, to name but a few - on the participation of
non-state actors and the deployment of key PD instruments. This question
also deals with the recent incorporation of Vietnamese cultural identity into
PD strategy. Cultural identity, including political culture, shared values, and
language, can influence all aspects of PD.
3. Why does Vietnam pursue public diplomacy?
The conventional wisdom would assign PD the task to support foreign
policy. But there is evidence that PD can also support the government's
domestic policies. This research, therefore, seeks to explore the rationale
behind Vietnam's decision to pursue PD. This question has the assumption
that Vietnamese leadership is cognizant of a regional tendency and its own
interest in implementing PD for the two interwoven goals of improving inter-
national standing and domestic stability. Naturally, this question entails sev-
eral trails: What is the relationship between PD and foreign policy? Does
public diplomacy work? Does Vietnam's PD allow room for flexibility and
adaptability?

Research design
PD research is driven by practice. As there is no predominant theoretical school
of thought that can set the research agenda, exploratory case studies are still the
most popular choice for PD research. 26 In the same vein, this research makes use
of a structured and focq-6ed case study design that involves several subcases. As
Yin argues, case studies are capable of supporting evaluation research effectively,
with the most important function being 'to explain the presumed causal links in
real-world interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strat-
egies. ' 27 With cross-case analysis, the research intends to extrapolate observa-
tional patterns in several subcases that can contribute to a better understanding of
the PD reality in Vietnam. 28 This case-within-case strategy provides an opportu-
nity to identify similarities and diffe..rences across the subcases and can provide a
pathway to theoretical generalisation, 29 though that is not a key objective of this
project.
The case studies in this research aim to address the different aspects of
Vietnam's PD and to illustrate the evolution of Vietnam's PD, both practically
and theoretically. Each case study highlights a specific PD approach with different
6 Introduction to Vietnam :S, public diplomacy
instruments in place - the general informational strategy towards preferred regions
and countries; the proactive event-based cultural diplomacy, the crisis manage-
ment PD in the South China Sea disputes; and the ethno-nationalist PD that blurs
the line between domestic and international audiences. A comparative analysis
is applied, encompassing regional players who are making use of similar instru-
ments, yet with likely different motivations.
The research for this book is primarily based on document analysis, semi-
structured interviews, and perception surveys. 30 Those qualitative datasets are
supplemented with quantitative data about online search queries and interactions
on social media. Under this general design that covers all the case studies, for each
of the research questions, the research leans towards a specific methodological
approach that is better suited for the purpose.
For question I about the conceptualisation ofPD and question 2 about contex-
tual elements that shape Vietnamese PD, elite interviews and surveys play an inte-
gral role besides access to relevant documents. To stmt with, documents include
both primary and secondary sources, published in Vietnamese and English, many
of which are available online. Of great support to the research is the access to
digitalised resources by the National Libnuy ofVietnam31 which contain scanned
images of Vietnamese newspapers and books from the 20th century. Less acces-
sible documents were collected during my field trip to Vietnam in 2018 and with
support from Vietnam-based colleagues. Access to book collections and news-
paper archives at the National Library of Australia was also of great benefit to
the research. It should be noted, however, that Vietnam has not always allowed
public access to certain documents. A prime example is Resolution 13 on new
directions for Vietnam's foreign policy, which is widely considered the first sign-
post for Vietnam's contemporary foreign policy. Dated May 1988 by the CPV,
this document, nonetheless, has never been made public, even though the central
government and local authorities have frequently cited it, including on the official
website of Vietnam's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). 32 Most recently, the
Secretariat of the CPV issued the Decree 25/CT-TW dated 8 August 2018 on
the promotion ofmultilateralism. Despite multiple mentions, 33 the full text of the
document has not been made available.
/·'
Time frame for dtcument collection
This monograph extensively canvasses the period from 2009 to 2018. 34 There are
three main reasons behind this choice. First, since one of the quintessential inde-
pendent variables in contemporary Vietnam's politics is technological advance-
ments, the year 2009 can be considered a good starting point. This year, fibre
optical tecnnology was first intr,.oduced in Vietnam, boosting Internet connection
speeds up to 100 times as fast as the then predominant ADSL technology. The same
year, 3G was introduced, marking a new era for mobile broadband in Vietnam.
As a result, from 2009 to 2017, Internet users in Vietnam have nearly doubled,
accounting for about 50% out of a 95-million population, making Vietnam one
of the countries with the highest numbers of Internet users (see Figure 1.1).35
 Individuals using the Internet(% of population)
70 -,··-·-······-•·--'·
60 t·· 1-+- Vietnam I· · ......
50
40 + ··················· .... ····················--·· .......... ........... 1111 .......... .

30 ......... J..•. ~
:;,
C
20.k--- ....... ·--~---·····-····--·-- ~
10 §.~
0-i------,------,----.------.-----.-----,.---..----....-----,------, c
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: World Development Indicators
f
Figure I. I Internet users in Vietnam from 2009 to 2017. Source: World Bank, retrieved from https://data. worldbank.org/indicator/lT.NET.USER.ZS ~-
?end=2017&locations=VN&start=2009&view=chart
-§.
C).
~
'B'
[
~
-...l
8 Introduction to Vietnam s public diplomacy
Internet penetration has given rise to online forums and social media platforms
where private citizens can voice their opinions on matters of public interest in an
unprecedented manner. 36
The rapid growth of online civic engagement since 2009 is indeed the second
rationale for the research's focal period since this book examines Vietnam's pub-
lic diplomacy against the backdrop of ICT breakthroughs. How PD stakeholders
take advantage of and respond to the rise of the Internet and social media is of
particular interest as it shows the adaptability and resilience of a regime long on
high alert of social openness and democratisation.
Lastly, the year 2009 was chosen as the year of cultural diplomacy, a test run
before the official adoption of a national strategy for cultural diplomacy in 2011.
This series of events signals a more systemic approach by Vietnam to what main-
stream scholars and practitioners consider the core of public diplomacy. A ten-
year period is long enough to draw some insights and lessons for this popular
subset of PD which has been extensively implemented by Asian nations, notably
China, Japan, and South Korea.

Interviews and surveys

Besides document analysis, elite interviewing was conducted with twelve inter-
locutors, including high-ranking diplomats and scholars from Vietnam and
Australia. The interviewees in this research are all considered experts in diplo-
macy with the majority being involved in shaping and implementing PD policy
for the Vietnamese and Australian governments. Several have held senior dip-
lomatic ranks. As insiders,37 they are uniquely qualified to provide comments
and interpretations of relevant PD events. 38 The intended goal of the interview-
ing component was to explore the stakeholders' own reflections of PD, including
what they think may be the potential improvements to PD.
There were four main themes for the interviewing component. The first theme
is the general conceptualisation of PD, with questions related to how an inter-
viewee understands the concept of PD, what PD entails, and who can play a role
in PD. The second theme is to explore the perceptions on the extent and drivers of
PD, with question0urrounding which activities were considered PD, what drives
the conduct of PI) in Vietnam, and what Vietnam would like to achieve with PD.
The third theme dives into key elements in the current practice of Vietnam's PD,
including the identification of contemporary challenges to PD, the potential roles
of non-state actors, and the domestic dimension of PD. The last theme highlighted
what the interviewees' perceptions were of the performance of Vietnam's PD,
inclusive of any suggestions for improvement. To build rapport with the interview-
ees and to e'nco'1l'age quality fee,p.back, however, the interviews were conducted as
friendly talks with no rigid structure and order of questions. The interviewees had
the freedom to lead the conversation and avoid certain questions if they did not
feel comfortable. Consent was obtained in written form or on record.
In addition, a perception survey was subsequently sent to twenty-three respond-
ents with the MOFA, the VUFO, the press, and public universities in Vietnam.
 Introduction to Vietnam ~ public diplomacy 9
To inspire open responses, the survey was designed so that personally identifiable
information was not required, except for workplace details which are then cross-
checked against auto-detected IP addresses for validation only. The open-ended
survey included nineteen questions grouped under the four themes discussed
above. The multiple-choice options of the survey were drawn on the findings of
the interview component, but respondents were given the option to provide their
alternatives. The interviews and questionnaires effectively assisted several main
foci of the research, which was to analyse how PD practitioners perceived the
conceptualisation of PD, and of the impact of PD projects against grand policy
objectives.
This research did not involve random sampling, nor did it aim at a large sam-
ple size. The complexity of the questions required the participants to have an
in-depth knowledge of the field. In a Vietnamese context, it means they were
either policymakers or practitioners with first-hand experience in external infor-
mation management, cultural diplomacy, or people's diplomacy. That rationale
alone drastically limited the demographics and the quantity of the participants. In
Vietnam, these activities are mostly handled by officials affiliated with the MOFA
and VUFO. That reality is reflected by the turnout for the interviews and surveys.
As shown in Figure 1.2, most survey respondents came from or were affiliated
withMOFA.
A majority of interviewees and respondents are state actors, which is in accord-
ance with the research's approach. It goes without saying that an authoritarian
regime like Vietnam places the utmost importance on state control through a net-
work of state-sanctioned agencies. It is virtually impossible for non-state actors

Research participants

12% _ _ __

~
~58%

■ MOFA ..,,• Central government departments

111 Local government departments mVUFO

Ill Higher Education "' Other

Figure 1.2 Survey respondents.

10 Introduction to Vietnam s public diplomacy
to play an active role in either foreign or domestic affairs without some sort of
arrangements with or endorsement from the state. Therefore, studying the percep-
tions of state actors is not just a necessity, but a must when it comes to Vietnam's
PD. Furthermore, as PD is a novel concept in Vietnam's political discourse, gaug-
ing state actors' perceptions is also contextually relevant.

Digital ltumanitles to support PD evaluation

The third question, about the rationale behind PD, requires an investigation into
the logics behind policymaking. A policymaker may be biased towards the·logic
of appropriateness - in which he or she follows what is deemed to be social norms
or rules, including shared identities. Or they can be influenced by the logic of
consequences - in which an action is calculated based on expected returns on
investment. It may also be the case that policymakers are subject to both logics,
especially when they pursue pragmatism, weighing all the options for the best
outcome. 39
For this question, gauging the outcome is important, as 'output' does not
equate with'effect. Sheer numbers of PD activities conducted, or people reached,
for example, do not guarantee the effectiveness of a PD program. The fact that
a message has been delivered does not mean it has exerted an intended effect
on a target group. It has always been intrinsically taxing to measure desired PD
outcomes, such as agenda-setting, presence expansion, or public engagement. 40
The reason, in no small part, is that many PD programs are devised with medium-
and long-term goals in mind- except for informational purposes. Few of the PD
activities, whether dialogic or collaborative, can hit a lightning-quick homerun.
Although there can be specific assessment criteria for a PD effort (e.g., number of
participants in an educational exchange program), it is challenging to pinpoint the
causation between PD programs and effects, and between outputs and outcomes,
given a host of exogenous variables, over an extended period. 41
However, as PD has a strong association with public perception, the improved
profile of a nation may indicate that its PD strategy has been efficacious. On that
note, international polls and indexes have frequently served as a reference point
to evaluate the e~cieticy of a nation's PD. Nonetheless, such polls are not with-
out contention, as one may argue that polls, by nature, are limited to small and
sporadic population samples, and that poll questions are rarely designed to cover
all the necessary bases.42 For instance, the BBC's country ratings polls over the
year have only asked the respondents whether a given country is having a posi-
tive or negative influence in the world. 43 For Vietnam, no such large-scale polls
or surveys are available.
In the absence of extensive ~urveys for Vietnam, the actual impact of PD pro-
jects was not thoroughly examined. However, this research does attempt to pro-
vide a correlative linkage between intent and impact by capitalising on Google
Trends and other tools of digital humanities where applicable. While far from
ideal, a more accessible way to prutly understand the impact of PD is to see it as
a communication process that informs and/or prompts a change in attitudes and
 Introduction to Vietnam s public diplomacy 11
beliefs among interlocutors. In delivering a message, a PD actor may aim at three
desirable impacts - attention, empathy, and rapport. The process starts with the
sender seeking attention from the recipient, who will then see whether they can
empathise with the message (by processing and evaluating the message). If they
can, persuasion and trust have been initially established. Rapport is the ultimate
goal, signalling an enduring positive change in the receiver's attitudes. However,
rappmt requires time and effort, and a single message is unlikely to achieve such
an impact. Attention is almost immediate, and often short-lived, but it is the first
step.
The emphasis on attention and the flow chart in Figure 1.3 are in line with sev-
eral communication theories, including the elaboration likelihood model (ELM)
by Petty and Cacioppo. 44 Accordingly, this model proposes that if a person is
intrigued to think about a message, a sequence of events will happen, includ-
ing attention, comprehension, elaboration, integration, and enduring attitude
change. For the past three decades, the ELM has played an important role in the
social psychology of persuasion. Researchers have applied this model in a wide
range of fields, including marketing, media, health communication, and politics. 45
Researchers have also started to apply the model to study the impact of social
media on the way people process infonnation. 46
As for the potential of digital humanities, the past decade has seen a sharp
rise in digital humanities, often understood as the research, creation, and appli-
cation of digital tools in support of social sciences and humanities. Among those
tools, there is a host of web-based tools that facilitate the collection and analy-
sis of user data to make predictions and demonstrate trends. Google Trends is
among the more accessible and user-friendly tools. This tool provides powerful
big data insights into public curiosity, which is of great help to any research

Figure 1. 3 The PD process.

12 Introduction to Vietnam s public diplomacy
involved with public opinion and communication.47 Tools like Google Trends
capture and analyse billions of non-identifiable search terms on a real-time
basis. Recently, Google Trends has been applied quite extensively in econom-
ics and health science48 to predict consumer trends or public attention based on
a vigorous dataset of search terms - Google Trends has built up its database
since 2004.
Time-tested to be relatively valid and reliable, Google Trends, however, is
just like any other measure where correlation does not necessarily imply causa-
tion, nor is it a stand-alone tool. Besides, a web-based tool will always have to
face the problem of representativeness, among others. 49 Representativeness, in
this context, refers to how much netizens can account for the entire population
of a country, and how to what extent online behaviour can be representative
of general public opinion. Considering more than half of Vietnam's populace
have frequented the Internet, such a tool, nonetheless, still provides substan-
tial insight into public curiosity. To improve validity, the research also con-
ducts news and social media analysis using available online data and tools. The
collected data is then triangulated with Google Trends for better validity and
reliability. so
It is necessary to restate that gauging attention is just the first step and not
equal to gauging opinion. Search trends represent public interest in certain topics,
but do not indicate public opinions about those - unlike surveys which can ask
whether and/or why respondents have a positive or negative feeling about specific
issues. Search trends, however, can supplement two traditional ways of measur-
ing public opinion - nation-wide polls and media coverage. 51 Google Trends data
is strongly correlated with other datasets and effective in representing a linkage
between online interest and offline behaviour. 52
As will be elaborated in Chapter 2, the decreasing attention span among net-
izens coincides with the increasing amount of information. For a PD project,
drawing attention is important, but even more important is acquiring a longer-
term change in attitudes and behaviours. Researchers have for a while applied
social media analytic tools to explore user attitudes and behaviours based on
their online actions, such as posting, reposting, commenting, sharing, liking, and
disliking. / i

In an ideal sc~mario, an analysis of both search trends and user behaviours on

social media provides comprehensive insights into PD performance. An exam-
ple: If Google Trends shows that people are paying attention to the 2018 Asian
Games (ASIAD 2018), and on social media a majority of people are saying nice
things about the event, then a reliable conclusion is the event has been a success.
Unfortunately, as of mid-2018, Facebook, the predominant social platform for
Vietnamese us~rs, has started tQ limit access to its application programming inter-
faces ( API) in response to a major data breach. 53 As a result, social researchers can
no longer conduct large-scale queries with extensive parameters free of charge. In
the chapter on social media, I have provided a small sample analysis based on a
Facebook group - but compared to the big data provided by Google, this attempt
cannot be overgeneralised.
 Introduction to Vietnam :S public diplomacy 13
Overview of the chapters
This chapter introduces and positions the case of Vietnam within the context that
public diplomacy has been conducted and studied in many parts of the world. It
explains why Vietnamese PD warrants further academy scrutiny. It presents the
main questions and hypotheses of the research, as well as the detailed design of
this research.
Chapter 2 provides an analytical discussion of the current literature on PD. It
summarises a brief history of PD, including its origin, its Cold War application,
and its resurgence after 9/11. The chapter addresses the conceptualisation of PD
from different theoretical approaches, namely realism, liberalism, and construc-
tivism. It also explores several related concepts like soft power, propaganda, and
strategic communications.
Chapter 3 provides an analytical framework that is derived from the literature
review. The framework takes into account contextual variables that are suited to
support the core analysis of Vietnam's PD.
Chapter 4 presents the contemporary discourse in Vietnam on public diplo-
macy and related concepts, including people's diplomacy, cultural diplomacy,
and external information management. This chapter shows that while Vietnamese
scholars and policymakers consider PD to be mainly a state function, they wel-
come conditional citizen participation. Moreover, the domestic public is also per-
ceived as a target of PD initiatives.
Chapter 5 discusses the revamped conceptualisation of PD after Doi Moi in
1986, as a result of Vietnam's new thinking about 'national identity' and 'national
interest.' In effect, it presents two case studies: Vietnam's PD during wartime and
Vietnam' PD for global integration. It argues that the redefinition of Vietnam's
national interests and identities after Doi Moi shifted Vietnamese PD from a war-
time propaganda mode to a more accommodative approach suitable for global
integration. Constructivism provides a more convincing explanation for that
transformation of PD, taking into account the dialectic of 'national interest' and
'national identity.'
Chapter 6 explores the impact ofthe Internet and social media on the Vietnamese
conduct of public diplomacy. It explains why the state essentially rrierges public
diplomacy with public affairs to manage public opinion. The external informa-
tion management of Vietnam's PD now permeates boundaries. Also, the chapter
shows that the participation of non-state actors, whether deliberate or accidental,
is inevitable. It presents three minor case studies to illustrate how public participa-
tion in Vietnam's politics has an impact on Vietnam's PD.
Chapter 7 discusses two primary case studies of this research. The first one is
cultural diplomapy, the most visible component of PD with a national strategy
approved by the party;--state. It shows that cultural diplomacy is at the centre of
Vietnam's PD, with Vietnamese culture being considered Vietnam's biggest soft
power asset. Cultural diplomacy is arguably the most efficacious means to make
the most of citizen participation to promote Vietnam's national image actively.
The second case study discusses PD efforts in relation to the South China Sea
14 Introduction to Vietnam s public diplomacy
disputes. Many PD activities have been conducted by Vietnam for the sake of
crisis management. Notwithstanding the effectiveness, in the context of national
security and other interests, PD has been used to drum up support both interna-
tionally and domestically. For both case studies, the state can reinforce its perfor-
mance legitimacy by playing to public sentiment.
Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, elaborates on the findings of the previous
chapters to collate Vietnamese realities with the ongoing debate in PD studies. The
case studies show that Vietnamese PD, while not completely deviant from main-
stream approaches, has its own distinct attributes that are shaped by Vietnam's
political and cultural climate. The regime's dynamics of maintaining its domestic
legitimacy give rise to the application of PD as a two-pronged tool that addresses
both international and domestic publics. With a state-centric agenda, Vietnamese
PD is characterised by the excessive centralisation of management, disproportion-
ate focus on state actors, and lack of strategy and resources. However, there is also
evidence that Vietnam's PD is adaptive to change. Key takeaways include:

• Vietnam does not officially use the term 'public diplomacy.' However,
Vietnam has long pursued different elements of PD, including many instru-
ments under the umbrella of cultural diplomacy, people's diplomacy, and
external information management.
• Vietnam's conceptualisation of PD was transformed dramatically after Doi
Moi, thanks to Vietnam's socio-economic change.
• Vietnam's redefinition of national interests and identities is the main driver
for the new PD in Vietnam. ICTs, especially the Internet and social media, act
as a catalyst for the intermestic nature of Vietnam's PD- a synthesis of both
domestic and international policy considerations.

Notes
1 Condoleezza Rice was US Secretary of State in the George W. Bush's administration.
See US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Corifirmation Hearing of Condoleeza
Rice, 18 Jan 2005.
2 Bao Chi, "Thu~ong Nguyen Xuan Phuc: Nganh ngoai giao can chu trong den ba nhan
to lon [PM Ng y~n ?(uan Phuc [The Diplomatic Sector Must Pay Attention to Three
Big Factors]," The World & Vietnam Report (2018).
3 Warren, "The Genius of North Vietnam's War Strategy," Daily Beast (2017), https://
www.thedailybeast.com/the-genius-of-north-vietnams-war-strategy; Phung Thi I-loan,
"Doan ket quoc te - phat huy sue manh thoi dai trong khang chien chong My cuu nuoc
[International Consolidation - Promoting the Power of the New Era in the Resistance
War against USA]," Nhan Dan [The People] (2010), http://www.nhandan.eom.vn/
chinhtri/item/5522902-.html; Dinh Nho Liem, "Bay muoi nam hoat dong quoc te va
doi ngoai cua dang ta [70 Yea,rs of Foreign Affairs Conducted by the Party]," ibid., 22
Jan2000. '
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Chinh sach doi ngoai cua Viet Nam trong giai <loan hien
nay [Vietnam's Foreign Policy in the Current Period]," ed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(2004).
5 Some would suggest that even in the United States, public diplomacy has been fading
in the political discourse of top government officials. Gregory, The Paradox of US
 Introduction to Vietnam :S- public diplomacy 15
Public Diplomacy: Its Rise and "Demise, " A Special Report for the Institute for Public
Diplomacy and Global Communication (Washington DC: IPDGC, 2014).
6 Personal communication, dated 30 October 2017.
7 Wang, "Managing National Reputation and International Relations in the Global Era:
Public Diplomacy Revisited," Public Relations Review 32, no. 2 (2006): 91-92; Tucker
and Hendrickson, "The Sources of American Legitimacy," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 6
(2004): 18.
8 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Public
Affairs, 2004), 33-34.
9 Mai'a and Melissen, European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work (New York:
Springer, 2013); Byrne and Hall, "Australia's International Education as Public
Diplomacy: Soft Power Potential," Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, no.
121 (2011).
10 Nye, "Soft Power Matters in Asia," The Japan Times (2005), https://www.japantimes
.co.jp/opinion/2005/12/05/commentary /world-commentary /soft-power-matters-in
-asia/.
11 Minkov and Hofstede, "Is National Culture a Meaningful Concept? Cultural Values
Delineate Homogeneous National Clusters of In-Country Regions," Cross-Cultural
Research 46, no. 2 (2012): 133-59.
12 Pamment, New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy
and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2012); Nye, "The New Public Diplomacy," Project
Syndicate l O (20 l 0), https://foia. state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/HRCEmail
_August_Web/IPS-0065/DOC_0C05767159/C05767159.pdf; Seib, Toward a New
Public Diplomacy, ed. Philip Seib (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Arsenault,
"Public Diplomacy 2.0," in Toward a New Public Diplomacy, ed. Philip Seib (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
13 Melissen, "Conclusions and Key Points about Public Diplomacy in East Asia," in
Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia: Middle Powers in a Troubled Region,
ed. Jan Melissen and Yul Sohn (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 240.
14 William, "The Case for Localized Public Diplomacy," in Routledge Handbook ofPublic
Diplomacy (NY: Routledge, 2008), 212-24; Wang, "Localising Public Diplomacy: The
Role of Sub-National Actors in Nation Branding," Place Branding 2, no. l (2006):
32-42.
15 See Wang, "Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power," The ANNALS ofthe
American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. I (2008): 1094-96; Hall,
"India's New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power and the Limits of Government Action,"
Asian Survey 52, no. 6 (2012); Jang and Paik, "Korean Wave as Tool for Korea's New
Cultural Diplomacy," Advances in Applied Sociology 2, no. 03 (2012): 196-200.
16 Pamment, New Public,Diplomacy in the 21st Century; Nye, "The New Public
Diplomacy"; Seib, Toward a New Public Diplomacy; Arsenault, "Public Diplomacy
2.0."
17 Anonymous communications with the author, dated Dec 2018.
18 See Chubb et al., "Vietnam in the Indo-Pacific: Challenges and Opportunities in a New
Regional Landscape," (Perth: Perth USAsia Centre, 2018); The Lowy Institute, "Asian
Power Index 2018" (Sydney: The Lowy Institute, 2018); Easley, "Middle Power
National Identity? South Korea and Vietnam in US-China Geopolitics," Pacijic Focus
27, no. 3 (2012): 421-442.
19 Pham Binh Minh, "Thanh t\fu dfii,ngo~i 2019: Ban linh va tinh thdn Viet Nam
[Achievements in Foreign Affairs: The Courage and Spirit of Vietnam]" (2019), http://
www.mofahcm.gov.vn/vi/mofa/nr040807l 04143/nrl 11027144142/ns 191231095843.
Pham Binh Minh is incumbent Deputy Prime Minister and former Minister of Foreign
Affairs.
20 Arceneaux and Bier, "Vietnam's 'Underdog' Public Diplomacy in the Era of the
COVID-19 Pandemic," USC Center on Public Diplomacy (2020), https://uscpublicdi-
16 Introduction to Vietnam :S public diplomacy
plomacy.org/blog/vietnam%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cunderdog%E2%80%9D-pub-
lic-diplomacy-era-covid-19-pandemic.
21 Matisott: "Sino-Tibetan Linguistics: Present State and Future Prospects," Annual
Review ofAnthropology 20, no. I (1991): 469-504.
22 London, Politics in Contemporary Vietnam: Party, State, and Authority Relations
(London: Springer, 2014), 2.
23 One can trace elements of PD back to some examples several centuries ago. But those
activities did not enjoy a rigorous guideline or strategy.
24 Batora, Public Diplomacy in Small- and Medium-Sized States: Norway and Canada
(Netherlands Institutes of International Relations, 2005), https://www.peacepalaceli-
brary.nl/ebooks/files/Clingendael_20050300_cli_paper_ dip_issue97.pdf.
25 ICT: information and communications technologies.
26 Entman, "Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case," The International
Journal of Press/Politics 13, no. 2 (2008): 87-102; Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory
of Public Diplomacy," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 616 (2008): 55-77.
27 Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Fifth edition. ed. Los Angeles: SAGE,
2014, 80.
28 Trochim, William M. "Deduction & Induction." https://www.socialresearchmethods
.neVkb/dedind.php (Accessed I April 2017)
29 Gondo, Maria, John Amis, and James Vardaman. "Case Within a Case." In Encyclopedia
of Case Study Research, edited by Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos and Elden Wiebe,
135-36. California: SAGE, 2010.
30 Semi-structured interviews are well-suited for the exploration of perceptions and opin-
ions, which is the focus of this research. See Leech, "Asking Questions: Techniques for
Semistructured Interviews," PS: Political Science and Politics 35, no. 4 (2002): 665;
Louise Barriball and While, "Collecting Data Using a Semi-Structured Interview: A
Discussion Paper," Journal ofAdvanced Nursing 19, no. 2 (1994): 330.
31 National Library of Vietnam. "Nguon luc so hoa [Digitalised resources]." Hanoi:
,National Library of Vietnam, 2019.
32 See, for example, http://www.mofahcm.gov.vn/vi/mofa/cs_doingoai/pbld/
ns050923160500.
33 An example is a piece by Le Hoai Trung, deputy minister of MOFA. See Le Hoai
Truog, "Doi ngoai da phuong gop phan day manh hoi nhap, tang cuong sue manh dat
nuoc [Multilateralism Boosts Global Integration and National Standing]," The World
& Vietnam Report (2019), https://baoquocte.vn/doi-ngoai-da-phuong-gop-phan-day
-manh-hoi-nhap-tang-cuong-suc-manh-dat-nuoc-85683.html.
34 Select events outside of this period are also included to support relevant arguments.
35 Due Thien, "20 paqi internet o Viet Nam - Part 7: Cua ngo cap quang [20 Years of
Internet in Vietpam - Part 7: Optical Fiber Gateway]," Tuoi Tre Online (2017), https://
tuoitre.vn/new:s-20171022161336074.htm; Thuy Van, "Internet Viet Nam: 20 nam phat
trien va nhung buoc tien vuot bac [Internet in Vietnam: 20 Years of Development and
Breakthroughs]," VietnamNet (2017), https://vietnamnet. vn/vn/cong-nghe/tin-cong
-nghe/internet-viet-nam-20-nam-phat-trien-va-nhung-buoc-tien-vuot-bac-412438.html.
36 Dien Luong, "Vietnam Wants to Control Social Media? Too Late," The New York Times
(2017), https://www.nytimes.com/20 I 7/1 I /30/opinion/vietnam-social-media-china
.html.
37 Most interviewees agreed to speak on record, in a personal capacity, and not on behalf
of their respective organisations. Anonymous interviews are noted as such.
38 Moyser, George. "Elite Interviewing." In The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research
Methods, edited by Victor Jupp, 85-86. London: SAGE, 2006.
39 Wendt, Alexander, and James Fearon. "Rationalism v constructivism: A skeptical
view." In Handbook of international relations, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B.
A. Simmons, 52-72. London: SAGE, 2002.
 Introduction to Vietnam :S public diplomacy 17
40 Bjola, "Getting Digital Diplomacy Right: What Quantum Theory Can Teach Us about
Measuring Impact," Global Affairs 2, no. 3 (2016): 345-53.
41 Banks, A Resource Guide to Public Diplomacy Evaluation (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa
Press, 2011 ), http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/legacy/
publications/perspectives/CPD_Perspectives_Paper%209_2011.pdf.
42 Ingrid d'Hooghe, The Rise of Chinas Public Diplomacy (Netherlands Institute of
International Relations Clingendael, 2007), http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/
files/20070700_ cdsp_paper_hooghe.pdf, 36.
43 BBC, "Sharp Drop in World Views of US, UK: Global Poll," (2017).
44 Petty, Richard E, and John T Cacioppo. Attitudes And Persuasion: Classic And
Contemporary Approaches. Colorado: Westview Press, 1996, 262-67.
45 Petty and Brifiol, "The Elaboration Likelihood Model," in Handbook of Theories of
Social Psychology, ed. JohnCTurner, etal., 224-45 (CA: Sage, 2011); Petty, Richard E,
Pablo Brinol, and Joseph R Priester. "Mass media attitude change: Implications of the
elaboration likelihood model of persuasion." In Media effects: Advances in Theory and
Research, edited by Jennings Bryant and Mary Beth Oliver, 141-80. NY: Routledge,
2009.
46 Wu et al., "An Exploration of Social Media in Public Opinion Convergence:
Elaboration Likelihood and Semantic Networks on Political Events" (Paper Presented
at the 2011 IEEE Ninth International Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and
Secure Computing, 2011 ); Pee, "Trust of Information on Social Media: An Elaboration
Likelihood Model" (Paper Presented at the CONF-IRM, 2012).
47 Jun, Yoo, and Choi, "Ten Years of Research Change Using Google Trends: From the
Perspective of Big Data Utilizations and Applications," Technological Forecasting and
Social Change 130 (2018): 69-87.
48 For example, Choi and Varian, "Predicting the Present with Google Trends," Economic
Record 88 (2012): 2-9; Carneiro and Mylonakis, "Google Trends: A Web-Based Tool
for Real-Time Surveillance of Disease Outbreaks," Clinical Infectious Diseases 49, no.
10 (2009): 1557-64; Vosen and Schmidt, "Forecasting Private Consumption: Survey-
Based Indicators vs. Google Trends," Journal ofForecasting 30, no. 6 (2011): 565-78.
49 Ripberger, "Capturing Curiosity: Using Internet Search Trends to Measure Public
Attentiveness," Policy Studies Journal 39, no. 2 (2011): 239-59.
50 Wilson, "Research Methods: Triangulation," Evidence Based Library and Iriformation
Practice 9, no. 1 (2014): 74-75.
51 Ripberger, "Capturing Curiosity," 241.
52 Cho et al., "Correlation between National Influenza Surveillance Data and Google
Trends in South Korea," PLoS One 8, no. 12 (2013): e81422; Dugas et al., "Google
Flu Trends: Correlation with Emergency Department Influenza Rates and Crowding
Metrics," Clinical lnfi:5tioµs Diseases 54, no. 4 (2012): 463-69; Pelat et al., "More
Diseases Tracked by y;sing Google Trends," Emerging lrifectious Diseases 15, no. 8
(2009): 1327. J
53 Facebook, "A Platform Update," news release, 2 July, 2018, https://about.fb.com/news
/2018/07/a-platform-update/.
2 The long road of public diplomacy

This chapter presents an overview of the mainstream literature surrounding the

concept and practices of public diplomacy (PD). By 'mainstream literature,' I
refer to the extensive PD scholarship that traditionally centres on westem democ-
racies and a handful of Asian powers, including China, Japan, and South Korea.
This chapter discusses the origin of the concept, the earlier iterations and current
understandings of PD, and the various practices adopted by different practition-
ers. This chapter also attempts to position my research in the broader context of
dominant theoretical stances on PD and highlights the gap between current schol-
arship and the case of Vietnam's PD. Specifically, this chapter will focus on the
three topical debates that dominate PD contemporary discourse: (I) the analytical
contours of PD; (2) the new vs. the old PD; and (3) PD in the east vs. in the west.

From practice to concept

The term 'public diplomacy' was first coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, Dean
of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a former
ambassador of the United States, and was at the time defined as follows:

Public diplomacy ... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the forma-
tion and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of interna-
tional relatio11sbeyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments
of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and
interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its
impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communica-
tion, as diplomats and foreign co1Tespondents; and the process of intercul-
tural communications. 1

While this' despription capture,s the essence of modem PD, it might be the case
that the term itself was Gullion's attempt to steer away from the negativity of
'propaganda,' 2 which was an informational and psychological instrument exten-
sively implemented by all protagonists during the Cold War.
In hindsight, even though the designation of PD is quite recent, the idea of
appealing to the public (and subjects) to cultivate an imperial and aristocratic

DOI: 10.4324/9781003178484-2
 The long road ofpublic diplomacy 19
3
reputation was popular both in the west and in the east in ancient times. In the
Hebrew Bible, an Assyrian messenger, during the siege of Jerusalem in 701
BC, delivered a speech directly to the people of Jerusalem. He made use of both
threats and promises to induce them to surrender. This event is an 'early example
of public diplomacy.' 4 There are similar examples throughout Vietnam's history
and elsewhere. 5 As such, though the concept is recent, public diplomacy can be
considered 'old wine in new bottles. ' 6
Nonetheless, pioneering research into PD started with the case of the United
States, as early as the 1960s, including works by Lee7 and Hoffman. 8 In these
works, the authors announced the emergence of a new form of diplomacy that
should spur further academic scrutiny. Lee, for instance, argues that people-to-
people dialogues are becoming more important than intergovernmental com-
munications and that international opinion can exert a powerful impact.9 These
comments are innovative, given that the Cold War was at its peak and public
opinion only mattered in a propagandistic sense - i.e., to demoralise the other side
of the frontier.
Not until the final phase of the Cold War did several influential studies emerge,
all calling for more attention to PD. Malone10 defines PD as 'public activities
directed abroad, primarily in the fields of information, education and culture,'
while Hans Tuch considers PD as 'a government's process of communicating
with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's
ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and cur-
rent policies.' 11 These authors, who worked at the now-defunct United States
Information Agency (USIA), argued that PD had become essential to the US for-
eign policy at a time when the United States was not prepared for its induction.
The domination of the US case and the USIA experience has significant ana-
lytical and empirical implications for PD research. On the one hand, it shone a
light on a long-established practice, laying the groundwork for PD to become a
field of study. PD, as can be seen in the above works, was understood as a foreign
policy tool that aimed to communicate with and influence international audiences.
The US practice also inspired and facilitated academic input from a multiple of
disciplines. In particular, with 9/11 as a breaking point, PD entered a new phase
when scholars and polig,fmakers grappled with an explanation for the unfavour-
able image of the Unit<yd States across the Islamic world. The rekindled interest in
PD has made this relatively new field of study arguably attract the most attention
in diplomatic studies. 12 According to the Google Ngram Viewer - which quanti-
fies the English corpus mentioning the phrase 'public diplomacy' - there was a
fiftyfold increase in academic output over the last fifty years (see Figure 2.1).
On the other hand, the predominant focus on the United States and other west-
ern players has stifled the developm~nt of theory and methodology. Gilboa notes
that before 2008, most research dealt with the US experiences during the Cold
War. As such, many scholars and professionals equated PD with 'propaganda,
public relations, international public relations and psychological warfare, and
public affairs.' 13 While PD is closely related to those practices, the act of syn-
onymising based on dated evidence is not compatible with new developments in
 N
0

Google Books Ngram Viewer

~
Graph ttiesa comma-separated phrases: ; public diplomacy
I ~-.--..- ·-""
[: ! 2:1' case-insensitive
....
(1:,

(:)
I
between: 1960 'and i 200s: from the corpus English I l§iiN@MiM ~

0.0000450% i
~
0.0000400% public diplomacy (All) 'l:3

0.0000350%
~
.....
(")

~
0.0000300% -e·
B"
0,0000250% M••- Si
~

0.0000200% ~

0.0000150%

0.0000100%

0.0000050%

0.0000000%
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
(cHd(on Dne/la!lel !OrfoCuS. rlgntcllci< to exp;!rnl/conlracl wildca1t!s)

Seareh in Google Books:

~ ~ ~ 2007. 2.Q.OJ! ~~ Engrish

Figure 2.1 Public diplomacy in English corpus. Source: Google, 'Google Books Ngram Viewer' (2019).
 The long road ofpublic diplomacy 21
the field. As of 2013, Jan Melissen observes that a large part of our current knowl-
edge (about PD) 'has taken place within the confines of the west. ' 14 One repercus-
sion is that the current mainstream literature has not fully grasped the central role
of cultural factors in the conduct and performance of PD, including the cultural
congruence between the practitioner and the recipient. 15

Multidisciplinary approaches to an ever-

evolving concept and practice
At the turn of the 21st century, despite multiple earlier attempts at defining the
concept, there has been virtually 'no consensus on its analytical boundaries' for
PD as both an academic field and an instrument of statecraft. 16 Scholars have
debated the connotations of both 'public' and "diplomacy' in the term 'public
diplomacy.' What are the roles of the public? What does 'diplomacy' entail?
Such a conceptual challenge may be explained by at least three underlying
reasons. First, PD has in the past couple of decades attracted academic contribu-
tions from a multitude of fields, most notable of which are international relations,
public relations (PR), marketing, and communication. As such, PD is considered
'one of the most multi-disciplinary areas in modem scholarship.' 17 The downside
of this is that PD scholarship has become fragmented. Second, cmTent literature
on PD is largely descriptive, examining a particular PD player or exploring a
specific aspect of PD. Only a handful of scholarly works aim to conceptualise and
theorise PD. 18 In fact, the entire field of diplomacy 'has received surprisingly little
attention among political scientists specialising in international relations. Indeed,
diplomacy has been "particularly resistant to theory."' 19 Finally, as the conduct of
PD has attracted more and more players and initiatives, theory often has to play
catch-up with practice. Consequently, both scholars and practitioners have con-
stantly contested new developments in PD research. 20
The ever-evolving understandings of PD are in response to critical develop-
ments in the international system, especially the three major revolutions in com-
munication technologies, politics, and intemational relations. 21 The technological
revolution, featuring the expansion of the Internet and social media, has provided
non-state actors like NGOs with wider access to information. Access to informa-
tion, in tum, gives th~m ampler opportunities to discuss and engage in world
affairs. The political revolution, also known as 'the third wave,' has transformed
many authoritarian regimes to democracies or semi-democracies, allowing for
more civic participation in politics. 22 The IR revolution after the Cold War reno-
vated the conduct of foreign affairs from zero-sum competition to cooperation.
As Gilboa puts it, 'Favourable image and reputation around the world, achieved
through attractibn and persuasion, have become more important than territory,
access, and raw materials, tradition;_lly acquired through military and economic
measures. >2 3
Nowadays, it is generally accepted that PD distinguishes itself from traditional
diplomacy in terms of target audiences. PD targets the publics, while traditional
diplomacy is built on government-to-government relations. There was also a
22 The long road ofpublic diplomacy
paradigm shift in the past couple of decades in the west that moved PD further
away from a state-centric and hierarchical model to a 'new' model based on peer-
to-peer networking involving a multitude of actors with a view to collaboration
and relationship-building.24
For the purpose of this research, which is to examine PD as a statecraft tool,
IR theories play an indispensable role. But in PD research, it is counterproductive
to break away from other disciplines, especially communication-related fields.
As such, to illustrate the multidisciplinary understandings of PD, the following
section briefly discusses the most significant contributions from the fields of com-
munications, public relations, and international relations.

Communications and public diplomacy

The paradigm shift that diversified the number of PD actors was first incorporated
into communication studies. This broad discipline thus far has probably been the
most prolific contributor to PD research. From a communication theory perspec-
tive, one of the critical components of diplomacy is communicatiou. 25 In fact,
the field defines 'diplomacy' as a communication system among representatives
of state and other transnational stakeholders for the sake of their interests. 26 As
that definition shows, traditional diplomacy limits this communication to state or
state-equivalent actors, namely diplomatic corps, other governmental delegates,
and intergovernmental representatives. In the 1990s, Hans Tuch considered PD
to be a communication process initiated by a government towards foreign publics
(G2P), in order to inform and influence those publics for the benefit of national
interest and foreign policy. 27 After 9/11, communication scholars argue for the
inclusion of and the assignments for non-state actors in PD. Nancy Snow, for
instance, noticed that there has been a gradual acceptance that PD can also involve
non-state actors communicating with a foreign public (P2P) to bear on another
government's policymaking decisions. 28
The shift from G2P to P2P denotes a radical change in modern diplomacy and
communication. According to R.S. Zahama,29 the transformation underlines two
perspectives of communication. The 'tough-minded perspective' tends to view
PD as an informa,fon~l instrument that assisted with manipulation or persuasion.
This version of ,PD is often linked to propaganda, as well as the primacy of the
state and state-centric terms. Also known as strategic PD, it is founded on theories
of strategic political communication. 30 Accentuating top-down processes, this PD
considers the publies as target and instrument of foreign policy, taping on human
motivation and behaviour to achieve strategic policy objectives. 31 This model of
PD entails competitiveness- it is part ofa full set of strategies that serve a state's
interests while competing witq other states aimed at a common target audience. 32
The 'tender-minded' perspective of communication, however, viewed PD as
a 'social process of building relations and fostering harmony.' 33 This view was
largely prompted by globalisation and the rise of non-traditional actors in inter-
national politics, which contributes to steamrolling the traditional boundaries and
roles in IR. State actors, especially foreign ministries, may still be dominant, but
 The long road ofpublic diplomacy 23
no longer have a monopoly. 34 The emergence of non-state actors required conces-
sions from the state, in the form of collaboration for the greater good. As Hocking
puts it, the new PD, based on non-hierarchical networks, is where competition is
accompanied by collaborative strategies and where new stakeholders are viewed
'less as targets or consumers of government-generated messages than as possible
partners and producers of diplomatic outcomes. ' 35 As Robert Cooper posits, for a
postmodem state, success in the international system means 'openness and trans-
national cooperation. ' 36 It is within this view that PD is more and more defined as
diplomacy by the publics rather than of the publics. 37
Besides the advocacy for non-traditional actors in PD, communication scholar-
ship also pioneered in analysing the potential impact of the media on PD practice.
A PD practitioner reaches out to its intended audiences using either non-mediated
(i.e., face-to-face) or mediated communication. It is easy to see that mediated
PD - via means of mass communication - can achieve much wider coverage.
Communication researchers pay attention to what content to deliver and how to
deliver it. There are three theoretical models of political communication - agenda-
setting (i.e., placing emphasis on certain issues to make them appear important
than others), priming (suggesting a series ofrelated issues in a way that alters peo-
ple's considerations of the subject matter), and framing (telling a piece of news
from a specific angle that affects how people interpret the news). 38 Adopting these
models, the mass media can shape people's perceptions ofan event. The combina-
tion of PD and mass communications can have the same potential. As such, some
argue that mediated PD is a process in which national actors attempt to gain the
favour of the media in foreign countries that involves dominating agenda-building
and frame-building. 39
Among the new communication technologies, PD scholars are especially inter-
ested in the application of Web 2.0 - referring to online technologies that allow
for interaction between content creators and consumers.40 Netizens actively par-
ticipate in content creation and dissemination as part of a borderless online com-
munity, which means content delivery is no longer linear. As Fisher puts it, online
technologies create a 'community that is based on common interest and ability
- not a hierarchy that is based on power. ' 41 That is why PD 'should evolve from
one of speaking to one 9:f phrtnering around issues with those abroad and at home
who share the same objectives. ' 42
Underscoring mediated PD, online or offline, is not to discredit face-to-face
efforts. Wider coverage does not guarantee deeper connectivity. According to
Taylor, communication experts all agree that the most effective way of commu-
nication is face to face. 43 Technologies excel at maintaining and supplementing
direct contact with the publics, but no technology can replace human interaction. 44
That is why communication scholfµ"ship contends that there is no substitution
for 'the language-capable, media-savvy, policy-wise, accessible and persua-
sive Foreign Service officer who understands the country in which he or she is
serving. ' 45
In short, communication scholarship establishes PD as a transnational com-
munication process. 46 The digitised and globalised public sphere becomes a venue
24 The long road ofpublic diplomacy
where various actors, state or non-state, use PD to project their values and ideas
transnationally. 47 Communication studies help to p1.1t a spotlight on the indispen-
sability ofICTs to the modem nature of PD.

Public relations, marketing, and public diplomacy

Scholars in the two related fields of public relations and marketing advance PD
research by importing their respective theories and models from the corporate
world and testing them in an IR environment. They tend to look for convergences
between their fields and PD so that they can scale up specific tools and instruments.
A major point of discussion is the similarities between PR and PD. With both
aiming at maintaining a positive public image, Signitzer and Coombs believe that
PR and PD have a reciprocal relationship, and knowledge from one field is ben-
eficial to the other. 48 The main difference between them is arguably optimal use
cases. PR theory used to be more relevant to explaining communication patterns
of 'ordinary' organisations, while PD is better suited to the relationship between
a nation-state and its foreign audiences. 49 However, the convergence of PD and
PR has taken shape gradually, partly thanks to the induction of the concept of
global PR. Wilcox et al. define global PR as 'the planned and organised efforts
of a company, an institution, or a government to establish and build relationships
with the publics of other nations. ' 50 Such a definition resembles PD work. From
a theoretical angle, L'Etang, for example, found that PR and PD share three main
functions - representational, dialogic, and advisory. 51 As such, she suggests that
PD be regarded as PR for nations 52 and that merging PR and PD perspectives can
further 'our understanding of relational processes in public communication.' 53
There is also a heated debate on PD and propaganda. Some scholars see PD
merely as an offshoot of propaganda. Propaganda, especially during the Cold
War, encompassed many activities that nowadays fall under the concept of PD.
This belief is buttressed by several broad definitions of propaganda, such as the
following by Welch:

Modern political propaganda can be defined as the deliberate attempt to influ-

ence the opini9ns of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values
for a specific/persuasive purpose, consciously designed to serve the interest
of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly. 54

By this definition, propaganda is a tool of persuasion that serves the propagandist.

That is why it can be 'over or covert, black or white, truthful or mendacious.' 55 As
Taylor argues, 'As a process of persuasion, [propaganda] is value-neutral ... it is
the intention b~hind the propag?nda which demands scrutiny, and it is that inten-
tion which begs value judgements not the propaganda itself. ' 56
Nonetheless, most scholars call for a distinction between propaganda and PD.
Grunig defines 'propaganda' as 'one-sided, usually half-truthful communication
designed to persuade public opinion.' 57 Noting that propaganda has long lost its
neutrality, Jowett and O'Donnell associate the term with 'spin, alternative facts,
 The long road ofpublic diplomacy 25
58
and fake news.' The distinction between PD and propaganda markedly shows
in their patterns of communication. Though propaganda can be black, white, or
grey, propaganda has always been one-way messaging that excludes any fonn
of dialogue throughout social history. 59 Admittedly, one-way communication is
also associated with specific versions and purposes of PD, like strategic com-
munications efforts that the United States conducted after 9/11 across the Arabic
world. 60 But PD also embraces two-way communication. As Melissen recaps, PD
is 'similar to propaganda in that it tries to persuade people what to think, but it is
fundamentally different from it in the sense that [PD] also listens to what people
have to say.' 61
From a marketing point of view, nations need to sell a positive image in a
highly competitive global market. Nations, not unlike corporates and products,
are viewed as brands with unique characteristics that can determine a nation's
success.62 Michael Porter, for instance, holds that 'differences in national values,
culture, economic structures, institutions, and histories all contribute to competi-
tive success. ' 63 Simon Anholt, often referred to as the founder of 'nation brands,'
considers the synthesis of PD and brand management as underlining a nation's
competitive identity which helps that nation thrive in a globalised world. 64 He
used to argue that PD is a subset of nation branding in that nation branding pre-
sents and represents a nation in its entirety, while PD seems to project government
policy to international audiences like an international version of public affairs. 65
However, he later admits that his narrow view of PD was partly prompted by a
common perception among marketing specialists - that 'management for a nation
(or city, or region) is simply a matter of marketing or promoting the place.' 66
The above confusion illuminates the ·overall challenge scholars encounter in
their quest to converge nation branding with PD. Szondi67 identifies five different
views on the relationship between PD and nation branding across a spectrum.
On the extreme ends, they are either unrelated or synonymous. Between these
two possibilities, they are interrelated at different levels of integration, as seen in
Figure 2.2.68 Notably, as Szondi argues, both PD and nation branding are deeply
ingrained in western approaches, assuming that 'what works in the west should
also work everywhere else. ' 69
Academic hurdles no,twithstanding, PR and marketing-related studies contrib-
ute to PD research by i,{cluding diplomacy within corporate relations. They point
to the fact that PD entails, among other things, the need to manage public opinion
and promote a positive image. Using specific corporate strategies, a PD actor can
achieve desirable results.

International rejations and public diplomacy

While PD was born out of the desir~'to manage international relations, it was not
until Joseph Nye's introduction of 'soft power' 70 that PD became a household
moniker among IR researchers. Since then, soft power has become perhaps the
most relevant concept to the understanding of PD. Soft power is Nye's key con-
cept to explain the gradual translation from the realist fixation on defining power
26 The long road ofpublic diplomacy

(1) (2) (3)

NATION
BRANDING

(4) (5)
Figure 2.2 Public diplomacy and nation branding.

merely in terms of material resources. 71 It is the power to achieve one's objectives

by means of persuasion, rather than coercion.72 By associating PD with power - a
central concept in IR, Nye has mainstreamed PD in IR scholarship.
For long, PD has been considered one of the principal instruments to pro-
mote soft power as- both converge along the pathway of reputation. PD is a call
for attention to thihgs one has to offer, which is thought to have the potential to
improve one's r6putation, and eventually, raise its soft power profile. As such,
many think that the linkage between public diplomacy and soft power is organic.
However, the incorporation of soft power has raised several theoretical concerns.
First, as much as soft power has gained currency across the academia and the
policymaking world, there has been confusion and conflation in the understand-
ing of the term. Soft power is often identified with its resources, though resources
alone cannot wield any real p,ower. In one of the most influential works on the
concept of power, Robert Dahl notes that the base ofan actor's power, including
all the resources in their possession, is passive, and must be exploited in some
manner to alter the behaviour of others. 73 Nye's latest update for the concept of
soft power says that the source of attraction can vary, as attractive power is even-
tually in the eye of the beholder.74 Soft power, in that broad sense, is close to
 The long road ofpublic diplomacy 21
75
the third dimension of power proposed by Steven Lukes - the power to shape
others' perceptions, beliefs, and preferences.
In one of the very few attempts to conceptualise how soft power works, Lee
Yong Wook suggests that soft power is a form of productive power. 76 A concept
proposed by Barnett and Duvall, productive power works through 'diffuse social
relations of constitution. ' 77 From a constructivist perspective, considering soft
power as productive power means 'potential sources of soft power (whatever they
are) become real souTces of soft power only when a receiver voluntarily develops
a policy interest in importing and emulating them through prior socialisation pro-
cesses. ' 78 That means soft power only works if there is compatibility between the
sender and the receiver in terms of sociopolitical preferences - something govern-
ments find hard to control. Tying soft power to its resources instead ofits potential
impacts or its mechanisms seems to limit the implications of the concept. 79
The second issue with the concept of soft power is its twofold interpretation.
In a narrower sense, soft power is equated to cultural influence. 8° China, in par-
ticular, subscribes to this sense of soft power, coining the new term of 'cultural
soft power.' 81 In a broader sense, soft power consists of any source of power sans
the use of force. A nation's soft power, according to Nye, 82 lies primarily in its
resources of culture, political values, and foreign policies. Unpopular policies can
undercut cultural prowess. 83 Unlike hard power that is mainly based on economic
or military resources, soft power is more intangible and harder to measure, since
such recourses as culture or values are much less quantifiable. However, as Nye
noted, even the military can help generate soft power, as some are attracted to
military might, while others fear it. 84
Adding to the complexity, soft power studies spawned the introduction of
other related concepts, including sticky power, smart power, and social power -
all of which claim PD as their primary instrument. Mead contends that economic
capacity, from resources, institutions to policies, can have an attracting effect like
soft power, but also possesses a trapping effect that holds the attracted hostage
- the sort of power that Mead aptly names 'sticky power. ' 85 Nye develops the
term 'smart power' to underline the need for a combination of soft power and
hard power tools for optimal outcomes, as soft power alone cannot produce effec-
tive foreign policy.86 H~iconcludes that PD is 'an important tool in the arsenal of
smart power, but smartpublic diplomacy requires an understanding of credibility,
self-criticism, and the role of civil society in generating soft power. ' 87 Peter van
Ham crafts the concept of social power based on a constructivist view that empha-
sises reciprocal social interaction. Accordingly, social power 'involves discursive
power, drawing attention to the impact of framing, norm advocacy, agenda-set-
ting, the impact of media and communications, as well as lesser-known practices
like place branding and public diplopiacy. ' 88
As noted above, power in IR is multifaceted and contested, and so is PD. On
that note, some have questioned why there is a trend for the integration of PD
and soft power. PD does not exclusively subscribe to soft power. States have
promoted soft power resources without the need for PD. Exchange activities can
be intergovernmental, such as between embassies. Yet PD, as a behavioural and
28 The long road ofpublic diplomacy
social tool, seems to be an unsurpassed apparatus to draw public attention to those
soft power resources. 89 Also, few nations have soft power jn the form of 'good
wine needs no bush' - i.e., something naturally good needs no advertising. As
Hocking alleges, it may be the 'lack of soft power of hegemonic proportions that
energises the public diplomacy strategies of many governments.' 90
Building on Mark Leonard's discussion of PD's time horizons, 91 Nye considers
PD to have three important dimensions - daily communication, strategic commu-
nication, and relationship-building. 92 Nye later on revisits both concepts consider-
ing the profound impact of the information revolution. He argues that access to
information has diffused power away from the state to non-state actors and that
while states remain the most powerful actors, non-state actors can compete in the
realm of soft power. 93
All of these power-based understandings of PD, however, seem to highlight the
ability to influence, rather than dialogue and relationship-building - what commu-
nication scholarship emphasises with the expression the 'new' or relational PD. 94
Therefore, there is also a debate on the ethics of public diplomacy, on whether
it is ethical to see foreign publics as just means to self-interested ends. 95 From
a relational perspective, some scholars believe that ethical practices necessitate
dialogue in which the publics are patticipants in a process that fosters mutually
beneficial relations.% As Nelson and Izadi put it, it is ethical to nurture 'long-term
relationships with stakeholders through two-way communication strategies with a
symmetrical perspective as a viable framework. ' 97 However, it is still a long way
before PD becomes entirely relational,98 not less because potential ethical and
political problems may arise around the current bureaucratic structures of foreign
affairs, especially foreign ministries. 99
In summary, IR studies advance our understanding of PD as a state or state-
equivalent function. PD is particularly usefttl as a tool to promote a nation's per-
ceived power, be it soft, smart, sticky, or productive.

The new public diplomacy and expanded

role of non-state actors
As discussed in Jlie ~hove section, despite the various approaches from differ-
ent disciplines, all related academic fields agree there are two main development
milestones of PD. According to top-down approaches, entailing lin1ited interac-
tion, traditional PD is identified with political advocacy and propaganda via the
use of mass media channels like the radio, television, and newspapers. 100 In this
approach to PD, professional diplomats take charge of what is considered the
de facto communication wing of a nation's foreign policy to the targeted public
while there is only a limited rqle for input or action by domestic and international
non-State actors. lOl
However, thanks to quantum leaps in our era, contemporary PD has outgrown
traditional diplomacy. Nowadays, while government officials and career diplo-
mats are still the most prominent PD actors, non-state actors possess certain capa-
bilities that can be of great service in achieving well-defined PD goals, at both
 The long road ofpublic diplomacy 29
home and abroad. To start with, private entities are one of the main drivers behind
new technologies and social networks that have greatly facilitated global inter-
action. Free of excessive bureaucracy, private organisations and individuals can
swiftly master and apply such communication advances, which give them an edge
over state actors in terms of public outreach. The number of Twitter and Facebook
followers of many US celebrities, for example, is ten times greater than that of the
State Department. 102
With such popularity and agility, some private actors are a force to be reck-
oned with in terms of rapid engagement with domestic and foreign publics, espe-
cially when there is a common perception that postmodem state authorities are
not trustworthy, and some NGOs are more dependable than governments. 103 Non-
state actors can also form and engage in extensive networks online and oftline,
multiplying their presence and sphere of influence. Furthermore, informational
power, gained through access to and control of information, 104 becomes available
to non-state actors, thanks to the World Wide Web. Traditional actors, including
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, continue to struggle with insufficient funding and
human resources to optimise their PD activities. 105
These new developments give rise to new understandings of PD. First, PD
scholars believe that PD should be a collaborative effort between governments
and non-state actors. 106 Second, PD programs are more sustainable if they target
long-term rapport with and impact on the publics, rather than pursue short-term
informational purposes. Influence and attraction will be short-lived if PD practi-
tioners leave no room for relationship-building. Third, PD should not always be
used as a means for competitive advantages. Power-based competition should be
complemented by network-based collaboration. 107 Melissen names this relational
tum of PD the new public diplomacy (NPD). 108 Other scholars, from specific com-
municative perspectives, call it relational, networked, or collaborative PD. 109 In
the absence of a universal definition, it would still be more holistic to see PD,
according to Gregory' s definition, as 'ways and means by which states, associa-
tions of states, and non-state actors understand cultures, attitudes, and behaviour;
build and manage relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance
their interests and values.' 110
How to form a colli:iborative relationship between state and non-state actors
therefore becomes an /ssential question. The non-hierarchical, peer-to-peer net-
work modellll presents an ideal scenario where all PD stakeholders maintain a
balanced relationship and work towards a common interest with tasks assigned
based on their expertise and resources. In reality, most countries apply a hybrid
version of hierarchical and peer-to-peer networks, in which state actors are usu-
ally the initiator/sponsor/supporter/coordinator of PD programs, but they also
work in close cooperation with a ne!_Work of both state and non-state actors. 112
As shown in Figure 2.3, Wang suggests a collaboration scheme at different
levels of engagement in response to PD objectives.11 3 Accordingly, subnational
actors, including local governments and non-governmental actors, can act as spon-
sor, facilitator, or communicator of PD programs, depending on the objectives
of such programs. Generally speaking, if a program has nation-wide objectives,
30 The long road ofpublic diplomacy

National policies and goals

National ideas and values

EJ National and
sub-national

Sub-national
Mutual
Understanding/Trust/Collaboration

Figure 2.3 Dimensions of public diplomacy and levels of engagement.

the national government should initiate it, and devise a coordination plan so that
subnational actors can act efficiently and without conflict. If a program is locally
defined, e.g., a sister cities initiative, subnational actors can act at their discretion
and play the three roles mentioned above as they see fit. In any case, national
actors may find it best to take charge of the strategy to render its tactics as syner-
gistic as possible.

Public diplomacy 2.0

With the rise of JCTs, the present and future of the new PD is public diplo-
macy 2.0 (PD 2,0).1 14 Public diplomacy 2.0, energised by website interactivity
and social media, concerns itself with reactive and proactive strategies of public
engagement based on ever-expanding communication networks and informa-
tion flows. 115 Publicity becomes essential to most, if not all, diplomatic efforts
nowadays. Career diplomats have to get acquainted with popular social platforms
to engage with netizens. On the plus side, social media allows for almost real-
time connectiv,ity with netizen,.s irrespective of physical locations. Social media
platforms also provide venues for interaction and engagement, thus advancing
PD efforts. 116 The modem infosphere has fundamentally reshaped the conduct of
diplomacy, of which PD seems to be the prime example and the most beneficial.
In Melissen's words, PD has an 'epiphenomenal' essence, 117 in that all the vicis-
situdes to PD accompany and reflect the radical undercurrents of diplomacy.
 The long road ofpublic diplomacy 31
At the same time, the challenges of PD 2.0 are looming large. The openness,
affordability, and instantaneousness of information nowadays challenge tradi-
tional PD thinking. The first challenge is the disruptive effect on policymaking.
The democratisation of information has provided the public with a direct link to
policymaking processes and circles. 118 As a result, PD actors have to be proactive
in their communications, or they risk taking a backseat in information manage-
ment or unpreparedness in dealing with online crises.
Second, online communities are often fragmented, as netizens tend to bond
in closed groups over shared beliefs and identities. 119 Such pocket communities
might lock themselves into virtual "echo chambers' in which they share simi-
lar ideological preferences to the exclusion of contradictory viewpoints. 120 Such
selective exposure can subject people to disinformation, as content creators can
manipulate and distribute 'fake news' under false pretences or under cover of
anonymity. As Nye notes, emotions such as outrage can stimulate engagement,
and there is evidence that faJse, yet outrageous, news engages more people than
accurate news. 121 Also, it would be challenging for PD actors to communicate and
engage effectively if people are not open to diverse opinions.
Third, the abundance of information, besides the selective exposure above,
makes attention a scarcity. 122 The low-cost and massive generation of informa-
tion has overwhelmed people, evidenced by narrower attention spans and shorter
trends. As an example, a global trend on Twitter would last for about 17 .5 hours
in 2013, but only 11.9 hours in 2016. 123 To compete for attention, PD practitioners
would have to tap on innovative communication features, including visual and
emotional aids. 124 Also, there is a problem with turning attention into long-term
engagement and rapport125 - which will be discussed as part of this research's
analytical framework.
The fourth challenge is online security and privacy. Information leakage, hack-
ing, and the culture of anonymity can pose serious threats to the conduct of PD. 126
Wikileaks and, more recently, Kim Darroch's leaked cables 127 show that confiden-
tiality is more and more unattainable in the modern cyberspace, and diplomatic
crises are just around the corner if there is a lack of management or response.
Under the guise of anonymity, anyone can adopt an imaginary persona or even
impersonate others to SPJ'ead disinformation, sow discord, or verbally attack peo-
ple with opposing vie\\JS. That is the so-called Internet trolling that both state and
non-state actors have tised for counter-narrative purposes. 128

Legitimacy and credibility in public diplomacy

All of the above challenges of PD 2.0 bring to the fore the issues oflegitimacy and
credibility. In the context of sociology, 129 legitimacy is 'a generalised perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.' 130
Credibility is 'the degree of shared and generalised confidence in a person or insti-
tution based on their perceived performance record of trustworthiness.' 131 Both
legitimacy and credibility are audience-centred, dynamic, culture-bound, and
32 The long road ofpublic diplomacy
situation-specific. 132 It is clear that by improving a state's international standing
and projecting its soft power, PD can support that state's international legitimacy.
As Zaharna puts it, legitimacy has much to do with 'a state's ability to govern
domestically and to wield its soft power internationally.' 133
At the same time, the above ICT-empowered challenges can jeopardise a
state's PD efforts. Adversarial actors have been known to be adept at using ICT
advances to cast doubt on the credibility and legitimacy of a state, via information
leaking or scandal-mongering politics. 134 Nevertheless, open countering is not
always the best solution, as many governments are facing a legitimacy crisis with
sharply declining public confidence. 135 Zahama affirms that 'adversarial stake-
holders may command more perceived credibility and legitimacy by the public
than the state.' 136 The competition for attention in the new infosphere underscores
the importance of credibility. In the age of 'fake news,' the lack of confidence in
authoritative sources coincides with the spreading of fabricated news on social
media via sharing features because such news travels in circles of contacts that
people trust. Misinformation gains even more legitimacy if it relies on pre-exist-
ing social tension. 137
In the big picture, Nye upholds that information 'that appears to be propaganda
may not only be scorned; it may also turn out to be counterproductive if it under-
mines a country's reputation for credibility.' 138 However, fact-checking requires
both humans and technology, and a concerted effort that spans state and non-state
actors. 139 That is not to mention that authoritarian powers nowadays are actively
asserting 'sharp power' to manipulate information 'pierces, penetrates, or perfo-
rates the political and information environments in the targeted countries' 140• To
respond to sharp power, as Nye maintains, one should not overreact, or they risk
undercutting their own soft power in the eye of the wavering publics. 141 In the age
of social media, emotions are growing in influence as a catalyst to draw attention
to information. 142

Subsets of PD
As mentioned in the session about multidisciplinary approaches to PD, there are
many activities ~{oc:Siated with PD. For this research, three main activities are
considered sub$ets of PD - strategic communications, people's diplomacy (or
citizen diplomacy), and cultural diplomacy - all of which involve a host of instru-
ments and tactics. Furthermore, the research also delves into nation branding, as
it is conceptually comparable to PD.
Strategic communication and public diplomacy have often been used inter-
changeably, but there is still a disagreement as to which concept is broader. 143
This monograph views strategic communication as a subset of PD, thanks to the
fact that it is the original purpose of the old PD, and one of the purposes of the
new PD. Defined as 'the purposeful use of communication by an organization
to fulfil its mission,• strategic communication attracts academic discussion from
six disciplines - management, marketing, public relations, technical communica-
tion, political communication, and social marketing. 144 The United States, for a
Another random document with
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 dedens Abbeville, le roy de Behagne premierement,
le conte d’Alençon son frère, le conte de Blois son
neveu, le conte de Flandres, le duch de Loeraingne,
25 le conte d’Auçoirre, le conte de Sanssoire, le conte
de Harcourt, monsigneur Jehan de Haynau, et fuison
d’autres. Et fu ce soir en grant recreation et en grant
parlement d’armes. Et pria apriès souper à tous les
signeurs que il fuissent li uns à l’autre amit et courtois,
30 sans envie, sans hayne et sans orgueil; et cescuns
li eut en couvent. Encores attendoit li dis rois
[168] le conte de Savoie et monsigneur Loeis de Savoie
son frère, qui devoient venir à bien mil lances de
Savoiiens et de le Dauffinet, car ensi estoient il mandet
et retenu et paiiet de leurs gages, à Troies en
5 Campagne, pour trois mois. Or retourrons nous au
roy d’Engleterre, et vous compterons une partie de
son convenant.

§ 274. Ce venredi, si com je vous ay dit, se loga

li dis rois d’Engleterre à plains camps o toute son
10 host. Et se aisièrent de ce qu’il eurent: il avoient
bien de quoi, car il trouvèrent le pays gras et plentiveus
de tous vivres, de vins et de viandes. Et ossi
pour les fautes qui pooient venir, grans pourveances
à charoi les sievoient. Si donna li dis rois à souper
15 les contes et les barons de son host, et leur fist moult
grant cière; et puis leur donna congiet d’aler reposer,
si com il fisent.
Ceste meisme nuit, si com je l’ay depuis oy recorder,
quant toutes ses gens se furent partis de lui,
20 et qu’il fu demorés dalés les chevaliers de son corps
et de sa cambre, il entra en son oratore. Et fu là en
geroulz et en orisons devant son autel, en priant
devotement à Dieu que il le laiast à l’endemain, se
il se combatoit, issir de le besongne à son honneur.
25 Apriès ces orisons, environ mienuit, il ala coucier;
 et se leva l’endemain assés matin par raison, et oy
messe, et li princes de Galles ses filz; et se acumeniièrent,
et en tel manière la plus grant partie de ses
sens: si se confessèrent et misent en bon estat.
30 Apriès les messes, li rois commanda à toutes ses
gens armer, et issir hors de leurs logeis, et à traire
[169] sus les camps en le propre place que il avoient le
jour devant aviset. Et fist faire li dis rois un grant
parch [près[348]] d’un bois, derrière son host, et là mettre
et retraire tous chars et charettes; et fist entrer
5 dedens ce parch tous les chevaus, et demora cescuns
homs d’armes et arciers à piet; et n’i avoit en ce dit
parch que une seule entrée. En apriès, il fist faire et
ordonner par son connestable et ses mareschaus jusques
à trois batailles. Si fu mis et ordonnés en le première
10 ses jones filz li princes de Galles. Et dalés le
dit prince furent esleu pour demorer, [li contes de
Warvich,[349]] li contes de Kenfort, messires Godefrois
de Harcourt, messires Renaulz de Gobehen, messires
Thumas de Hollandes, messires Richars de Stanfort,
15 li sires de Manne, li sires de le Ware, messires
Jehans Chandos, messires Bietremieus de Broues,
messires Robers de Nuefville, messires Thumas Cliffors,
li sires de Boursier, li sires Latimiers, et pluiseur
aultre bon chevalier et escuier, les quelz je ne
20 puis mies tous nommer. Si pooient estre en le bataille
dou prince environ huit cens hommes d’armes
et deux mil arciers et mil brigans, parmi les Galois.
Si se traist moult ordonneement ceste bataille sus les
camps, cescuns sires desous se banière ou son pennon
25 et entre ses gens. En le seconde bataille furent li
contes de Norhantonne, li contes d’Arondiel, li sires
de Ros, li sires de Luzi, li sires de Willebi, li sires
de Basset, li sires [de[350]] Saint Aubin, messires Loeis
Tueton, li sires de Multonne, li sires Alassellé[e] et
[170] pluiseur aultre. Et estoient en ceste bataille environ
 cinq cens hommes d’armes et douze cens arciers. La
tierce bataille eut li rois pour son corps et grant
fuison, selonch l’aisement où il estoit, de bons chevaliers
5 et escuiers. Si pooient estre en se route et arroy
environ sept cens hommes d’armes et deux mil arciers.
Quant ces trois batailles furent ordonnées et que
cescuns sires, barons, contes et chevaliers, sceurent
10 quel cose il devoient faire et retraire, li dis rois
d’Engleterre monta sus un petit palefroi blanch, un blanc
baston en sa main, adestrés de ses deux mareschaus;
et puis ala tout le pas, de rench en rench, en amonnestant
et priant les contes, les barons et les chevaliers,
15 que il volsissent entendre et penser pour se
honneur garder, et à deffendre son droit. Et leur disoit
ces langages en riant, si doucement et de si lie
cière, que, qui fust tous desconfortés, se se peuist il
reconforter, en lui oant et regardant. Et quant il ot
20 ensi viseté toutes ses batailles et ses gens, et amonnestés
et priiés de bien faire le besongne, il fu heure
de haute tierce. Si se retraist en sa bataille, et ordonna
que toutes ses gens mengassent à leur aise et
buissent un cop. Ensi fu fait comme il l’ordonna. Et
25 mengièrent et burent tout à loisir, et puis retoursèrent
pos, barilz et pourveances sus leurs chars, et
revinrent en leurs batailles, ensi que ordonné estoient
par les mareschaus. Et se assisent tout à terre,
leurs bacinés et leurs ars devant yaus, en yaus reposant,
30 pour estre plus fresch et plus nouvel, quant leur
ennemi venroient. Car tèle estoit li intension dou
roy d’Engleterre que là il attenderoit son aversaire le
[171] roy de France, et se combateroit à lui et à sa
poissance.

§ 275. Ce samedi au matin se leva li rois de

France assés matin et oy messe en son hostel, dedens
5 Abbeville, en l’abbeye Saint Pière où il estoit logiés.
 Et ossi fisent tout li signeur: li rois de Behagne, li
contes d’Alençon, li contes de Blois, li contes de
Flandres, li dus de Loeraingne et tout li chief des
grans signeurs qui dedens Abbeville estoient arresté.
10 Et saciés que le dit venredi il ne logièrent mies tout
dedens Abbeville, car il ne peuissent, mès ens ès
villiaus d’environ. Et grant fuison en y eut à Saint
Rikier, qui est une bonne ville fremée. Apriès soleil
levant, ce samedi, se departi li rois de France d’Abbeville
15 et issi des portes; et y avoit si grant fuison
de gens que merveilles seroit à penser. Si chevauça
li dis rois tout souef pour sourattendre ses gens, le
roy de Behagne et monsigneur Jehan de Haynau en
se compagnie.
20 Quant li rois de France et se grosse route furent
eslongiet le ville de Abbeville, environ deux liewes,
en approçant les ennemis, se li fu dit: «Sire, ce seroit
bon que vous feissiés entendre à ordonner vos
batailles, et feissiés toutes manières de gens de piet
25 passer devant, par quoi il ne soient point foulé de
chiaus à cheval, et que vous envoiiés trois ou quatre
de vos chevaliers devant chevaucier, pour aviser vos
ennemis, ne en quel estat il sont.» Ces parolles plaisirent
bien au dit roy, et y envoia quatre moult vaillans
30 chevaliers, le Monne de Basèle, le signeur de
Noiiers, le signeur de Biaugeu et le signeur d’Aubegni.
[172] Cil quatre chevalier chevaucièrent si avant que
il approcièrent de moult priés les Englès, et que il
peurent bien aviser et imaginer une grant partie de
leur afaire. Et bien les veirent li Englès que il estoient
5 là venu pour yaus veoir; mais il n’en fisent
nul samblant, et les laissièrent tout en pais bellement
retraire.
Or retournèrent cil quatre chevalier arrière devers
le roy de France et les signeurs de son conseil, qui
10 chevauçoient le petit pas, en yaus sourattendant. Si
 se arrestèrent sus les camps, si tost que il les veirent
venir. Li dessus dit rompirent le presse, et vinrent
jusques au roy. Adonc leur demanda li rois tout en
hault: «Signeur, quèles de vos nouvelles?» Il regardèrent
15 tout l’un l’autre, sans mot sonner, car nulz
ne voloit parler devant son compagnon. Et disoient
li un à l’autre: «Sire, dittes, parlés au roy, je n’en
parlerai point devant vous.» Là furent il en estri
une espasse que nulz ne s’en voloit, par honneur,
20 point avancier de parler. Finablement de le bouce
dou roy issi li ordenance que il commanda au
Monne de Basèle, que on tenoit à ce jour pour l’un
des plus chevalereus et vaillans chevaliers dou monde,
et qui plus avoit travilliet de son corps, que il
25 en desist sen entente. Et estoit cilz chevaliers au
roy de Behagne monsigneur Charle, et s’en tenoit
pour bien parés, quant il l’avoit dalés lui.

§ 276. «Sire, ce dist li Monnes de Basèle, je

parlerai, puis que il vous plaist, par le correction de
30 mes compagnons. Nous avons chevaucié si avant que
nous avons veu et considéré le couvenant des ennemis.
[173] Saciés que il se sont mis et arresté en trois batailles
bien et faiticement; et ne font nul samblant
que il doient fuir, mès vous attenderont, à ce qu’il
moustrent. Si conseille de ma partie, salve tout dis
5 le milleur conseil, que vous faites toutes vos gens ci
arrester sus les camps et logier pour celle journée.
Car ançois que li darrainnier puissent venir jusques
à yaus, et que vos batailles soient ordonnées, il sera
tart. Si seront vos gens lassé et travillié et sans arroy.
10 Et vous trouverés vos ennemis frès et nouviaus,
et tous pourveus de savoir quel cose il doient faire.
Si porés de matin vos batailles ordonner plus meurement
et mieulz, et par plus grant loisir aviser vos
ennemis par quel lieu on les pora combatre, car
 15 soiiés tous seurs que il vous attenderont.»
Chilz consaulz et avis plaisi grandement bien au
roy de France, et commanda que ensi fust fait que
li dis Monnes avoit parlé. Si chevaucièrent si doy
mareschal, li uns devant et li aultres derrière, en disant
20 et commandant as banerès: «Arrestés, banières,
de par le roy, ou nom de Dieu et de monsigneur
saint Denis!» Cil qui estoient premier, à ceste ordenance
s’arrestèrent, et li darrainier point, mès chevauçoient
tout dis avant. Et disoient que il ne s’arresteroient
25 point jusques adonc que il seroient ossi
avant que li premier estoient. Et quant li premier
veoient que il les approçoient, il chevauçoient avant.
Ensi et par grant orgueil fu demenée ceste cose, car
cescuns voloit fourpasser son compagnon. Et ne peut
30 estre creue ne oye li parole dou vaillant chevalier,
dont il leur en meschei si grandement, com vous orés
recorder assés briefment. Ne ossi li rois ne si mareschal
[174] ne peurent adonc estre mestre de leurs gens;
car il y avoit si grant nombre de grans signeurs, que
cescuns par envie voloit là moustrer sa poissance. Si
chevaucièrent en cel estat, sans arroy et sans ordenance,
5 si avant que il approcièrent les ennemis, et
que il les veirent en leur presence.
Or fu moult grans blasmes pour les premiers, et
mieulz leur vaulsist estre arresté à l’ordenance dou
vaillant chevalier, que ce qu’il fisent. Car sitretos
10 qu’il veirent leurs ennemis, il reculèrent tout à un
fais si desordeneement que cil qui derrière estoient
s’en esbahirent, et cuidièrent que li premier se combatissent
et qu’il fuissent jà desconfi. Et eurent adonc
bien espace d’aler avant, se il veurent: de quoi aucun
15 y alèrent, et li pluiseur se tinrent tout quoy.
Là y avoit sus les camps si grant peuple de communauté
que sans nombre. Et estoient li chemin tout
couvert de gens, entre Abbeville et Creci. Et quant
 il deurent approcier les ennemis, à trois liewes près,
20 il sachièrent leurs espées et escriièrent: «A le mort!
A le mort!» et si ne veoient nullui.

§ 277. Il n’est nulz homs, tant fust presens à

celle journée ne euist bon loisir d’aviser et ymaginer
toute la besongne ensi que elle ala, qui en seuist ne
25 peuist imaginer le verité, especialment de le partie
des François, tant y eut povre arroy et ordenance en
leurs conrois. Et ce que j’en sçai, je le seuch le plus
par les Englès qui imaginèrent bien leur couvenant,
et ossi par les gens monsigneur Jehan de Haynau qui
30 fu toutdis dalés le roy de France. Li Englès, qui ordonné
estoient en trois batailles, et qui seoient jus à
[175] terre tout bellement, si tos que il veirent les François
approcier, il se levèrent moult ordonneement, sans
nul effroy, et se rengièrent en leurs batailles, ceste
dou prince tout devant, mis leurs arciers à manière
5 d’une herce, et les gens d’armes ou fons de leur bataille.
Li contes de Norhantonne et li contes d’Arondiel
et leur bataille, qui faisoient le seconde, se
tenoient sus èle bien ordonneement, et avisé et pourveu
pour conforter le prince, se il besongnoit. Vous
10 devés savoir que cil seigneur, roy, duc, conte et baron
françois ne vinrent [mie jusques à là tous ensamble,
mais l’un devant et l’autre derrière, sans
arroy et ordonnance[351].

§ 278. Quant li rois Phelippes vint jusques sus

15 la place où li Englès estoient priès de là arresté et
ordonné, et il les vei, se li mua li sans, car trop les
haioit. Et ne se fust à ce donc nullement refrenés ne
astrains d’yaus combatre, et dist à ses mareschaus:
«Faites passer nos Geneuois devant et commencier
20 le bataille, ou nom de Dieu et de monsigneur
saint Denis!» Là avoit de ces dis Geneuois arbalestriers
 environ quinze mil, qui euissent ossi chier
nient que commencier adonc le bataille, car il estoient
durement lassé et travillié d’aler à piet plus de six
25 liewes tout armé, et de porter leurs arbalestres. Et
disent adonc à leurs connestables que il n’estoient mies
adonc ordonné pour nul grant esploit de bataille.
Ces parolles volèrent jusques au conte d’Alençon, qui
en fu durement courouciés, et dist: «On se doit
[176] bien cargier de tel ribaudaille qui fallent au plus
grant besoing!»
Entrues que ces parolles couroient, et que cil
Geneuois se recueilloient et se detrioient, descendi
5 une plueve dou ciel, si grosse et si espesse que merveilles,
et uns tonnoires et uns esclistres moult grans
et moult horribles. En devant cette plueve, par dessus
les batailles, otant d’un lés comme de l’autre, avoient
volé si grant fuison de corbaus que sans nombre, et
10 demené le plus grant tempès dou monde. Là disoient
li aucun sage chevalier que c’estoit uns signes de
grant bataille et de grant effusion de sanch. Apriès
toutes ces coses, li airs se commença à esclarcir, et
li solaus à luire biaus et clers: si l’avoient li François
15 droit en l’oel, et li Englès par derrière.
Quant li Geneuois furent tout recueilliet et mis
ensamble, et il deurent approcier leurs ennemis, il
commencièrent à juper si très hault que ce fu merveilles;
et le fisent pour esbahir les Englès, mès li
20 Englès se tinrent tout quoi et ne fisent nul samblant.
Secondement encores jupèrent ensi et puis alèrent un
petit avant, et li Englès [restoient] tout quoi sans yaus
mouvoir de leur pas. Tiercement encores juppèrent il
moult hault et moult cler, et passèrent avant, et tendirent
25 leurs arbalestres, et commencièrent à traire. Et cil
arcier d’Engleterre, quant il veirent ceste ordenance,
passèrent un pas avant, et puis fisent voler ces saiettes
de grant façon, qui entrèrent et descendirent si ouniement
 sus ces Geneuois que ce sambloit nège. Li
30 Geneuois, qui n’avoient point apris à trouver telz
arciers que cil d’Engleterre, quant il sentirent ces
saiettes qui leur perçoient bras, tiestes et baulèvres,
[177] furent tantos desconfi. Et copèrent li pluiseur d’yaus
les cordes de leurs ars, et li aucun les jettoient jus;
si se misent ensi au retour.
Entre yaus et les Englès avoit une grande haie de
5 gens d’armes, montés et parés moult richement, qui
regardoient le couvenant des Geneuois et comment
il assambloient: si ques, quant il cuidièrent retourner,
il ne peurent. Car, li rois de France, par grant
mautalent, quant il vei leur povre arroy, et que il
10 se desconfisoient, ensi commanda et dist: «Or tos,
or tos tués toute ceste ribaudaille: il nous ensonnient
et tiennent le voie sans raison.» Là veissiés
gens d’armes entoueilliés entre yaus ferir et fraper
sus yaus, et les pluiseurs trebuchier et cheir parmi
15 yaus, qui onques puis ne relevèrent. Et toutdis traioient
li Englès efforciement en le plus grant presse, qui
riens ne perdoient de leur tret, car il empalloient et
feroient parmi le corps ou parmi membres chevaus
et gens d’armes qui là cheoient et trebuchoient en
20 grant meschief; et ne pooient estre relevé, se ce n’estoit
à force et par grant ayde de gens. Ensi se commença
li bataille entre la Broie et Creci en Pontieu,
ce samedi, à heure de vespres.

§ 279. Li vaillans et gentilz rois de Behagne,

25 qui s’appelloit messires Charles de Lussembourch, car
il fu filz à l’empereour Henri de Lussembourch, entendi
par ses gens que la bataille estoit commencie; car
quoique il fust là armés et en grant arroy, il ne veoit,
goutes et estoit aveules: si demanda as chevaliers,
30 qui dalés lui estoient, comment li ordenance de leurs
gens se portoit. Chil l’en recordèrent le verité, et
[178] li disent: «Ensi et ensi est. Tout premiers li Geneuois
sont desconfi, et a commandé li rois de France à
yaus tous tuer. Et toutes fois entre nos gens et eulz
a si grant tueil que merveilles, car il cheent et
5 trebuchent l’un sus l’autre, et nos empeecent trop
grandement.»—«Ha! respondi li rois de Behagne,
c’est uns povres commencemens pour nous.» Lors
demanda il apriès le roy d’Alemagne son fil, et dist:
«Où est messires Charles mes filz?» Chil respondirent
10 qui l’entendirent: «Monsigneur, nous ne
savons. Nous creons bien qu’il soit d’autre part et
qu’il se combate.»
Adonc dist li vaillans rois à ses gens une grant
vaillandise: «Signeur, vous estes mi homme et mi
15 ami et mi compagnon. A le journée d’ui, je vous pri
et requier très especialment que vous me menés si
avant que je puisse ferir un cop d’espée.» Et cil qui
dalés lui estoient, et qui se honneur et leur avancement
amoient, li acordèrent. Là estoit li Monnes de Basèle
20 à son frain, qui envis l’euist laissiet; et ossi eussent
pluiseur bon chevalier de le conté de Lussembourc, qui
estoient tout dalés lui: si ques, pour yaus acquitter,
et que il ne le perdesissent en le presse, il s’alloièrent
par les frains de leurs chevaus tous ensamble; et
25 misent le roy leur signeur tout devant, pour mieulz
acomplir son desirier. Et ensi s’en alèrent il sus leurs
ennemis. Bien est verités que de si grant gent
d’armes et de si noble chevalerie et tel fuison que li
rois de France avoit là, il issirent trop peu de grans
30 fais d’armes, car li bataille commença tart, et si
estoient li François fort lassé et travillié, ensi qu’il
venoient. Toutes fois, li vaillant homme et li bon
[179] chevalier, pour leur honneur, chevauçoient toutdis
avant, et avoient plus chier à morir, que fuite villainne
leur fust reprocie. Là estoient li contes d’Alençon, li
contes de Blois, li contes de Flandres, li dus de Lorraigne,
 5 li contes de Harcourt, li contes de Saint Pol,
li contes de Namur, li contes d’Auçoirre, li contes
d’Aubmale, li contes de Sanssoire, li contes de Salebruce,
et tant de contes, de barons et de chevaliers
que sans nombre. Là estoit messires Charles de
10 Behagne, qui s’appeloit et escrisoit jà rois d’Alemagne
et en portoit les armes, qui vint moult ordonneement
jusques à le bataille. Mais quant il vei que la
cause aloit mal pour yaus, il s’en parti: je ne sçai
pas quel chemin il prist.
15 Ce ne fist mies li bons rois ses pères, car il ala si
avant sus ses ennemis que il feri un cop d’espée,
voire trois, voire quatre, et se combati moult vaillamment.
Et ossi fisent tout cil qui avoecques lui
acompagniet estoient; et si bien le servirent, et si
20 avant se boutèrent sus les Englès, que tout y demorèrent.
Ne onques nulz ne s’en parti, et furent trouvé
à l’endemain, sus le place, autour dou roy leur
signeur, et leurs chevaus tous alloiiés ensamble.

§ 280. Vous devez [sçavoir[352]] que li rois de France

25 avoit grant angousse au coer, quant il veoit ses gens
ensi desconfire et fondre l’un sus l’autre, d’une puignie
de gens que li Englès estoient. Si en demanda
conseil à monsigneur Jehan de Haynau qui dalés lui
estoit. Li dis messires Jehan li respondi et dist:
[180] «Certes, sire, je ne vous saroie consillier. Le milleur
pour vous, ce seroit que vous vos retraissiés et
mesissiés à sauveté, car je n’i voi point de recouvrier.
Il sera tantost tart: si poriés ossi bien chevaucier
5 sus vos [ennemis[353]] et estre perdus, que entre
vos [amis[354]].»
Li rois, qui tous fremissoit d’aïr et de mautalent,
ne respondi point adonc, mès chevauça un petit
plus avant; et li sambla que il se voloit radrecier
 10 devers le conte d’Alençon son frère, dont il veoit les
banières sus une petite montagne. Li quelz contes
d’Alençon descendi moult ordonneement sus les
Englès, et les vint combatre; et li contes de Flandres,
d’autre part. Si vous di que cil doi signeur et leurs
15 routes, en costiant les arciers, s’en vinrent jusques à
le bataille dou prince, et là se combatirent moult
longement et moult vaillamment. Et volentiers y
fust venus li rois Phelippes, se il peuist; mais il y
avoit une si grande haie d’arciers et de gens d’armes
20 au devant que jamès ne fust passés, car com plus
venoit, plus esclarcissoit ses conrois.
Che jour, au matin, avoit li rois Phelippes donné
à monsigneur Jehan de Haynau un noir coursier,
durement [grant[355]] et biel. Li dis messires Jehans
25 l’avoit bailliet à un sien chevalier, monsigneur Thieri
de Senselles, qui portoit sus se banière. Dont il avint
que li chevaliers, sus ce coursier, le banière monsigneur
Jehan de Haynau dalés lui, tresperça tous les
[181] conrois des Englès. Et quant il fu hors et oultre au
prendre son retour, il trebucha parmi un fosset, car
il estoit bleciés dou tret des arciers, et là chey. Et y
euist esté mors et sans remède, mès ses pages, sus
5 son coursier, autour des batailles, l’avoit poursievi,
et le trouva si à point qu’il gisoit là et ne se pooit
ravoir. Il n’avoit aultre empeecement que dou cheval,
car li Englès n’issoient point hors de leurs batailles,
pour nullui prendre ne grever. Lors descendi li
10 pages, et fist tant que ses mestres fu relevés et
remontés: ce biel service li fist il. Et saciés que
li sires de Senselles ne revint mies arrière par le
chemin qu’il avoit fait; ossi, au voir dire, il ne
peuist.

15 § 281. Ceste bataille, ce samedi, entre la Broie et

Creci, fu moult felenesse et très horrible. Et y avinrent
 pluiseur grant fait d’armes qui ne vinrent mies
tout à cognissance; car, quant la bataille commença,
il estoit jà moult tart: ce greva plus les François
20 c’autre cose. Car pluiseurs gens d’armes, chevaliers et
escuiers, sus le nuit, perdoient leurs signeurs et leurs
mestres. Si waucroient par les camps, et s’embatoient
souvent à petite ordenance entre les Englès où tantost
il estoient envay et occis. Ne nulz n’estoit pris
25 à raençon ne à merci, car entre yaux il l’avoient ensi
au matin ordonné, pour le grant nombre de peuple
dont il estoient enfourmé qui les sievoit.
Li contes Loeis de Blois, neveus dou roy Phelippe
et dou conte d’Alençon, s’en vint avoech ses gens et
30 desous se banière combatre as Englès, et là se porta
moult vaillamment, et ossi fist li dus de Loeraingne.
[182] Et dient li pluiseur que, se la bataille fust ossi bien
commencie dou matin que elle fist sus le vespre, il y
euist eu entre les François pluiseurs grans recouvrances
et grans apertises d’armes qui point n’i furent.
5 Si y eut aucuns signeurs, chevaliers et escuiers
françois et de leur costé, tant alemans que savoiiens,
qui par force d’armes rompirent les arciers de le bataille
dou Prince et vinrent jusques as gens d’armes
combatre as espées, main à main, moult vaillamment.
10 Et là eut fait pluiseurs apertises d’armes.
Et y furent, dou costet des Englès, très bon chevalier
messires Renaulz de Gobehem et messires Jehans
Chandos. Et ossi furent pluiseur aultre, les quelz je
ne puis mies tous nommer, car là dalés le Prince estoit
15 toute la fleur de chevalerie d’Engleterre. Et adonc
li contes de Norhantonne et li contes d’Arondiel, qui
gouvrenoient le seconde bataille, et qui se tenoient
sus èle, vinrent rafreschir la bataille dou dit Prince;
et bien besongnoit, car aultrement elle euist eu à
20 faire. Et pour le peril ou cil qui gouvrenoient et servoient
le Prince, se veoient, il envoiièrent un chevalier
 de leurs conrois devers le roy, qui se tenoit plus
amont, sus le mote d’un moulin à vent, en cause
que d’avoir aye. Si dist li chevaliers, quant il fu venus
25 au roy: «Monsigneur, li contes de Warvich, li
contes de Kenfort et messires Renaulz de Gobehem,
qui sont dalés le Prince vostre fil, ont grandement à
faire, et les combatent li François aigrement. Pour
quoi il vous prient que vous et vostre bataille les
30 venés conforter et aidier à oster de ce peril; car, se
cilz effors monteplie longement et s’efforce ensi, il
se doubtent que vostres filz n’ait à faire.»
[183] Lors respondi li rois et demanda au chevalier, qui
s’appelloit messires Thumas de Nordvich: «Messires
Thumas, mes filz est il ne mors ne atierés, ou si bleciés
qu’il ne se puist aidier?» Cilz respondi: «Nennil,
5 monsigneur, se Dieu plaist, mais il est en dur
parti d’armes: si aroit bien mestier de vostre ayde.»
—«Messire Thumas, dist li rois, or retournés devers
lui et devers chiaus qui ci vous envoient; et
leur dittes de par moy qu’il ne m’envoient meshui
10 requerre pour aventure qui leur aviegne, tant que
mes filz soit en vie. Et dittes leur que je leur mande
que il laissent à l’enfant gaegnier ses esporons; car
je voel, se Diex l’a ordonné, que la journée soit
sienne, et que li honneur l’en demeure et à chiaus
15 en qui carge je l’ai bailliet.»
Sus ces parolles, retourna li chevaliers arrière, et
recorda à ses mestres tout ce que vous avés oy: laquèle
response les encoraga grandement, et se reprisent
en yaus meismes de ce que là avoient envoiiet.
20 Si furent milleur chevalier que devant, et y fisent
pluiseurs apertises d’armes, ensi que il apparu, car
la place leur demora à leur honneur.

§ 282. On doit bien croire et supposer que là

 où il avoit tant de vaillans hommes, et si grant multitude
25 de peuple, et où tant et tel fuison de le partie
des François en demorèrent sus le place, que il y ot
fait ce soir pluiseurs grans apertises d’armes, qui ne
vinrent mies tout à cognissance. Il est bien voirs que
messires Godefrois de Harcourt, qui estoit dalés le
30 Prince et en se bataille, euist volentiers mis painne
et entendu à ce que li contes de Harcourt fust sauvés,
[184] car jà avoit il oy recorder aucuns Englès que on
avoit veu sa banière, et qu’il estoit avoech ses gens
venus combatre as Englès; mès li dis messires Godefrois
n’i peut venir à temps. Et fu là mors li contes sus
5 le place, et ossi fu li contes d’Aubmale ses neveus.
D’autre part, li contes d’Alençon et li contes de
Flandres, qui se combatoient moult vaillamment as
Englès, cescuns desous sa banière et entre ses gens,
ne peurent resister à le poissance des Englès; et furent
10 là occis sus le place, et grant fuison de bons
chevaliers et escuiers dalés yaus, dont il estoient
servi et acompagniet.
Li contes Loeis de Blois et li dus de Loeraingne
ses serourges, avoecques leurs gens et leurs banières,
15 se combatoient d’autre part moult vaillamment; et
estoient enclos d’une route d’Englès et de Gallois
qui nullui ne prendoient à merci. Là fisent il de
leurs corps pluiseurs grans apertises d’armes, car il
estoient moult vaillant chevalier et bien combatant.
20 Mès toutes fois leur proèce ne valli riens, car li dessus
dit demorèrent sus le place, et tout cil qui dalés
yaus estoient. Ossi fist li contes d’Auçoirre, qui estoit
moult vaillans chevaliers, et li contes de Saint
Pol, et tant d’autres que merveilles seroit à recorder.

25 § 283. Sus le vespre tout tart, ensi c’à jour fallant,

se parti li rois Phelippes tous desconfortés, il y
 avoit bien raison, lui cinquime de barons tant seulement:
c’estoit messires Jehans de Haynau li premiers
et li plus proçains de lui, li sires de Montmorensi,
30 li sires de Biaugeu, li sires d’Aubegni et li sires
de Montsaut. Si chevauça li dis rois, tout lamentant
[185] et complaindant ses gens, jusques au chastiel de la
Broie. Quant il vint à le porte, il le trouva fremée
et le pont levet, car il estoit toute nuis, et faisoit
moult brun et moult espès. Adonc fist li rois appeller
5 apriès le chastellain, car il voloit entrer dedens: si
fu appellés, et vint avant sus les garites, et demanda
tout en hault qui c’estoit qui buschoit à ceste heure.
Li rois Phelippes, qui entendi le vois, respondi et
dist: «Ouvrés, ouvrés, chastellain, c’est li infortunés
10 rois de France.» Li chastelains salli tantost
avant, qui recogneut la parolle dou roy, et qui bien
savoit jà que li leur estoient desconfit, par aucuns
fuians qui estoient passet desous le chastiel; si
abaissa le pont et ouvri le porte. Lors entra li rois
15 dedens et toute se route, qui n’estoit mies trop grande.
Si furent là jusques à mienuit. Et n’eut mies
li rois conseil que il y demorast ne s’ensierast là dedens:
si but un cop, et ossi fisent cil qui avoech lui
estoient. Et puis s’en partirent et issirent dou chastiel,
20 et montèrent as chevaus, et prisent gides pour
yaus mener, qui cognissoient le pays. Si entrèrent
ou chemin environ mienuit, et chevaucièrent tant
que au point dou jour il entrèrent en le [bonne[356]] cité
d’Amiens. Là s’arresta li rois et se loga dedens une
25 abbeye, et dist qu’il n’iroit plus avant si saroit le verité
de ses gens, liquel y estoient demoret et liquel
estoient escapet. Or revenons à le desconfiture de
Creci et à l’ordenance des Englès, et comment, ce
samedi que la bataille fu et le dimence au matin, il
30 perseverèrent.
[186] § 284. Vous devés savoir que la desconfiture et la
perte pour les François fu moult grande et moult
horrible, et que trop y demorèrent sus les camps de
nobles et vaillans hommes, dus, contes, barons et
5 chevaliers, par lesquelz li royaumes de France fu
moult depuis afoiblis d’onneur, de poissance et de
conseil. Et saciés que, se li Englès euissent caciet
ensi qu’il fisent à Poitiers, encores en fuissent trop
plus demoret, et li rois de France meismes, mès
10 nennil; car le samedi onques ne se partirent de leurs
conrois pour cacier apriès homme. Et se tenoient
sus leurs pas, gardans leur place, et se deffendoient
à chiaus qui les assalloient. Et tout ce sauva le roy
de France de estre pris, car li dis rois demora tant
15 sus le place assés priès de ses ennemis, si com chi
dessus est dit, qu’il fu moult tart, et qu’il n’avoit dalés
lui à son departement non plus de soixante hommes,
uns c’autres. Et adonc le prist messires Jehans
de Haynau par le frain, qui l’avoit à garder et à consillier,
20 et qui jà l’avoit remonté une fois, car dou
tret on avoit occis le coursier dou roy, et li dist:
«Sire, venés vous ent, il est temps, ne vous perdés
mies ci si simplement. Se vous avés perdu à ceste
fois, vous recouverés une autre.» Et l’enmena li
25 dessus dis messires Jehans, ensi que par force.
Si vous di que ce jour li arcier d’Engleterre portèrent
grant confort à leur partie, car par leur tret
li pluiseur dient que la besongne se fist, comment
que il y eut bien aucuns vaillans chevaliers de leur
30 lés qui vaillamment se combatirent de le main, et
qui moult y fisent de belles apertises de le main et
de grandes recouvrances. Mais on doit bien sentir et
[187] cognoistre que li arcier y fisent un grant fait, car par
leur tret de commencement furent desconfi li Geneuois
qui estoient bien quinze mil, qui leur fu
uns grans avantages. Car trop grant fuison de gens
 5 d’armes richement armé et paré et bien monté, ensi
que on se montoit adonc, furent desconfi et perdu
par les Geneuois qui trebuchoient parmi yaux et
s’entoueilloient si que il ne se pooient lever ne ravoir.
Et là entre ces Englès avoit pillars et ribaus, Gallois
10 et Cornillois, qui poursievoient gens d’armes et arciers,
qui portoient grandes coutilles, et venoient entre
leurs gens d’armes et leurs arciers qui leur faisoient
voie, et trouvoient ces gens d’armes en ce
dangier, contes, barons, chevaliers et escuiers; si les
15 occioient sans merci, com grans sires qu’il fust. Par
cel estat en y eut ce soir pluiseurs perdus et murdris,
dont ce fu pités et damages, et dont li rois
d’Engleterre fu depuis courouciés que on ne les avoit
pris à raençon.

20 § 285. Quant la nuis ce samedi fu [toute[357]] venue,

et que on n’ooit mais criier ne jupper ne renommer
nulle ensengne ne nul signeur, si tinrent li Englès à
avoir la place pour yaus, et leurs ennemis desconfis.
Adonc alumèrent il en leur host grant fuison de fallos
25 et de tortis, pour tant qu’il faisoit moult brun. Et lors
s’avala li rois Edowars, qui encores tout ce jour n’avoit
mis son bacinet; et s’en vint o toute sa bataille
moult ordonneement devers son fil le Prince: si
l’acola et baisa. Et li dist: «Biaus filz, Diex vous
[188] doinst bonne perseverance! Vous estes mes filz, car
loyaument vous vos estes hui acquittés: si estes
dignes de tenir terre.» Li Princes à ceste parolle
s’enclina tout bas et s’umelia, en honnourant le roi
5 son père, ce fu raisons.
Vous devés savoir que grant lièce de coer et grant
joie fu là entre les Englès, quant il veirent et sentirent
que la place leur estoit demorée, et que la nuitie
avoit estet pour yaus; se tinrent ceste aventure à
10 moult belle et à grant glore. Et en loèrent et regratiièrent
 li signeur et li sage homme, moult grandement
et par pluiseurs fois celle nuit, Nostre Signeur qui
tel grasce leur avoit envoiie. Ensi passèrent il celle
nuit sans nul beubant, car li rois d’Engleterre ne voloit
15 mies que nulz s’en fesist. Quant ce vint le dimence
au matin, il fist grant bruine et tèle que à
painnes pooit on veoir lonch un arpent de terre.
Dont se departirent de l’ost, par l’ordenance dou roy
et des mareschaus, environ cinq cens hommes d’armes
20 et deux mil arciers, pour chevaucier à savoir
se il trouveroient nullui ne aucuns François qui se
fuissent recueilliet.
Ce dimence au matin, s’estoient parti de Abbeville
et de Saint Rikier en Pontieu les communautés de
25 Roem et de Biauvais, qui riens ne savoient de le
desconfiture qui avoit esté faite le samedi. Si trouvèrent
à male estrine pour yaus en leur encontre ces Englès
qui chevauçoient, et se boutèrent entre yaus, et cuidièrent
de premiers que ce fuissent de leurs gens. Si
30 tost que li Englès les ravisèrent, il leur coururent
sus, et là de recief eut grande bataille et dure. Et
furent cil François tantost desconfi et mis en cace, et
[189] ne tinrent nul conroy. Si en y eut mors sus les
camps, que par haies que par buissons, ensi qu’il
fuioient, plus de sept mil; et se il fesist cler, il n’en
fust jà piès escapés.
5 Assés tost apriès, en une aultre route, furent rencontré
de ces Englès li arcevesques de Roem et li
grans prieus de France, qui riens ne savoient ossi de
le desconfiture. Et avoient entendu que li rois ne se
combateroit jusques à ce dimence, et cuidièrent des
10 Englès que ce fuissent leurs gens: si s’adrecièrent
devers yaus; et tantost li Englès les envairent et assallirent
de grant volenté. Et là eut de rechief grant
bataille et dure. Car cil doy signeur estoient pourveu
de bonnes gens d’armes, mais il ne peurent durer
 15 longement as Englès; ançois furent tantost desconfi
et priès que tout mort, petit s’en sauvèrent. Et y
furent mort li doy chief qui les menoient; ne oncques
il n’i eut homme pris à raençon.
Ensi chevaucièrent ceste matinée cil Englès querant
20 aventures, qui trouvèrent et rencontrèrent pluiseurs
François qui estoient mari et fourvoiiet le samedi,
et qui avoient celle nuit jeu sus les camps, et
qui ne savoient nulles nouvelles de leur roy ne de
leurs conduiseurs. Si entroient en povre estrine pour
25 yaus, quant il se trouvoient entre les Englès, car il
n’en avoient nulle merci, et mettoient tout à l’espée
sans merci. Et me fu dit que, de communautés et de
gens de piet des cités et des bonnes villes, il en y
eut mors, ce dimence au matin, plus quatre tans que
30 le samedi, que li grosse bataille fu.

§ 286. Ce dimence, ensi que li rois d’Engleterre

[190] issoit de messe, revinrent li chevauceur et li arcier,
qui envoiiet avoient esté pour descouvrir le pays, et
savoir se nulle rassamblée et recueilloite se faisoit
des François. Si recordèrent au roy tout ce que il
5 avoient veu et trouvé, et li disent bien qu’il n’en estoit
nulz apparans.
Adonc eut conseil li rois qu’il envoieroit cercier
les mors, à savoir quel signeur estoient là demoret.
Si furent ordonné doi moult vaillant chevalier pour
10 là aler, et en lor compagnie troi hiraut pour recognoistre
les armes, et doi clerch pour registrer et escrire
les noms de chiaus qu’il trouveroient. Li doi
chevalier, ce furent messires Renaulz de Gobehem
et messires Richars de Stanfort. Si se partirent dou
15 roy et de son logeis, et se misent en painne de veoir
et viseter tous les occis. Si en trouvèrent si grant
fuison que il en furent tout esmervilliet, et cerchièrent