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Routledge Studies in Asian Religion and Philosophy
CHRISTIANITY AND
RADICAL DEMOCRACY IN
THE PHILIPPINES
BUILDING A CHURCH OF THE POOR
Christopher Moxham
Christianity and Radical Democracy
in the Philippines
25 Christianity in India
The Anti-Colonial Turn
Clara A. B. Joseph
Christopher Moxham
First published 2023
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,
an informa business
© 2023 Christopher Moxham
The right of Christopher Moxham to be identified as author[/s] of this
work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
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or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
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List of Illustrationsviii
1 Introduction 1
From the air the water is tranquil, motionless, at once calming and unnerv-
ing. The hum of the engines and the rattling fuselage offer some semblance
of basic reality. Far below the window the tankers are small and seemingly
insignificant—individual progress on the water is infinitesimal, but their
cumulative effect is part of a wider narrative that began nearly 500 years
ago. Boats ride above ocean currents that rise up from the depths in con-
trasts of blue and green. Thin-slick oil deposits on the surface crisscross one
another as if stitched in silk. Slivers of sunlight ripple across the water as we
circle to the south of the largest island and begin our descent. Looking fur-
ther south, more of the islands of the archipelago can be seen—wide plains
of crops, conical mountains jutting up from the ocean floor, reefs, beaches,
coves, rivers, and deltas. Some islands are enormous, with scattered settle-
ments along coasts and river ways and vast tracts of agricultural produc-
tion carved geometrically into the landscape. Other islands are the size of
schoolyards and seldom see a human visitor.
We pass over a large inland lake that resembles a stylized W with an elon-
gated island in the middle. The lake water is the colour of silt, and there is
a daily release of industrial and agricultural pollutants along the shore and
shed. Small fishing boats dot the surface, and long stretches of the coast
are squared-off for aquaculture. Industrial buildings along the shoreline are
hedged in by dense human settlements, makeshift communities of labour
surrounding localized centres of capital. At the far end of the lake the fresh-
water drains down a river towards the capital city. The metropolitan area
sprawls out from a large bay along waterways and roads that lead into the
hills. In the distance there are a few substantial business centres where tow-
ers stretch perpendicular to the landscape and mingle among the smoke and
haze that lingers yellow and brown in the morning light. Wealth and moder-
nity are expressed in architecture, hillside communities, and a mesh of roads
that, from the sky, could be Los Angeles, Lima, or any other port metrop-
olis. But with descent into Manila, the city becomes its own, and tracks of
rust-coloured land are revealed to be sprawling shantytowns framed in by
major traffic corridors, business districts, and the walls of wealthier com-
munities. These roughhewn neighbourhoods—vibrant centres of culture,
DOI: 10.4324/9781003302780-1
2 Introduction
family, community, and commerce—are home to the overwhelming major-
ity of the 21 million inhabitants of the greater Manila area, people living
together 18,000 to the square kilometre. Not an unoccupied piece of land in
sight, and even the outer walls of the airport along the runway serve as one
firm structure against which to build entire communities.
The Philippines is a country of diversity and extremes, both in terms of
landscape and social groups. With over 7000 islands it is the second largest
archipelagic state, after Indonesia, and the islands are rich in topographic and
climatic variability. Added to the physical diversity are approximately 110
ethnic groups and 170 spoken languages, as well as highly uneven economic
activity, with wealth concentrated around the capital, a few adjacent regions,
and a handful of cities on other islands. Unequal wealth distribution is one of
the realities of uneven economic activity. With an income Gini Ratio of 42.3
(2022), the Philippines ranks 37th among countries with the highest levels of
inequality in the world. By official estimates, nearly 30 percent of Filipinos
live below the poverty line, although official numbers tend to be conserv-
ative. The country registers a value of 0.718 on the Human Development
Index, 107th out of 169 countries, and this value is derived from a life expec-
tancy at birth of 71.2 years, adult literacy rates of 93.7 percent, a combined
primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment ratio of 79.6 percent, and
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of USD 3485.
Public debt in the Philippines is 39.9 percent of GDP, and external debt
is USD 210 billion (CIA 2021). The accumulation of debt accelerated after
World War II when the Philippines borrowed money to finance economic
development and rebuild after the War. In 1980 more loans for develop-
ment were secured from the World Bank, but as a condition the government
agreed to neoliberal programs of structural adjustment—market-oriented
fiscal and welfare changes designed to increase economic efficiency and
decrease the role of the state in the economy. Over the last few decades the
Philippines has passed through three distinct phases of structural adjust-
ment: from 1980 to 1983, reform focused upon trade liberalization; from
1983 to 1992, debt repayment became the operating principle; and since
1992, a free-market ideology and neoliberal governance have steered the
country towards an investment-friendly, deregulated, and privatized m arket
free-for-all (Bello et al. 2005).
It is within this jurisdiction of state-level policies that regions, munici-
palities, and local communities must operate, and this is the backdrop to a
varied landscape of cultural production and resilience. Unfortunately, and
similar to the situation in many developing countries, the search for mean-
ingful community development in the Philippines is considered, by the state,
secondary to national economic growth (see Holden et al. 2017). Factors
involved include the burden of international debt, foreign investment pol-
icies, and factions of the national elite that tend to serve and protect their
own interests. In terms of the latter, market-oriented policies favour both
foreign and domestic investors, while state bureaucracy is controlled by a
Introduction 3
limited number of landed families who have manoeuvred government to
maintain their historical entitlement. In general, the Philippine situation is
but one instance of the many ways that powerful global processes transform
states, making them more easily and effectively utilized by certain inter-
ests that seek to maximize capital accumulation on the world stage. And
as a typical modern state with territorial claims to land and people, the
Philippines acts as an intermediary between the ever-monopolizing core
and the laissez-fair fringes of globalization, a mediator for its own bordered
citizens and borderless capital. This role has profound consequences for a
majority of the population.
In the Philippines, inequity and poverty among the masses, particu-
larly in rural areas, have not been ameliorated by moderate levels of
national economic growth. Because of this, locally derived alternatives
to state development plans have mobilized through the Catholic Church
at the diocese level and among small faith-based groups referred to as
Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs). Comprising local families who first
gathered to study the liturgy, many dioceses and BECs now work towards
participatory grassroots development. This community action can be at
loggerheads with local government, the state and international actors,
whose own development plans often include primary resource extraction
in mining, forestry, and plantation agriculture, and other capital-i ntensive
industries where the overwhelming bulk of profits are repatriated to
investors who do not live in affected communities. These types of devel-
opment often have little positive impact in terms of community welfare
and long-term sustainability, as well as significant negative effects on the
environment in a country where many people continue to live off the land.
This book is a case study of BEC-driven social action in the Diocese of
San Carlos on the island of Negros, where church officialdom, the net-
work of BECs, and lay affiliates work towards community empowerment
and social development throughout the diocese. It is a story of modest
progress, with faith-based actors involved in healthcare, education, live-
lihood, and infrastructure, as well as contestation over market and state
development plans.
The BEC concept has existed in the Philippines for a number of decades,
but the focus on poverty and disempowerment, as well as action, found new
momentum during the presidency and dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos
(1965–1986). Marcos promoted marketization and foreign investment, and he
implemented massive infrastructural projects, all of which fostered growth
in terms of GDP. On the political front, however, corruption, nepotism, and
the military suppression of dissent were rampant, and his presidency can
be understood as an enormous pauperization of the state, whereby pub-
lic revenues were used like a personal piggybank (McCoy 2009; Pomeroy
1992). In the end, uncounted billions (USD) were diverted into private bank
accounts, with some of the stash used famously by his wife, Imelda, to fill
closets with 3000 pairs of shoes. Plunder aside, it really is the general extent
4 Introduction
of political oppression that stirred popular dissent, and Gaspar (1997)
claims the Church was the only organization to stand up to Marcos during
the period of martial law (1972–1981); it began to mobilize people around
ideas of political justice, peace, and livelihood. Since then there has been
a marked shift in approach and goals as the BEC movement has evolved.
Originally, the social development agenda incorporated a rationale of capi-
talist integration, hoping to bring about meaningful change by emphasizing
Christian values in business endeavours. This approach had a predominant
emphasis on scriptural reflection, and a mere emergent focus on the individ-
ual as a basic unit for effecting social change—individuals were expected
to be actively evangelical, scripturally reflective, and politically informed
(Picardal 2005). Today the push for change is better understood from a
collectivist perspective, and BECs seek a communal alternative to capital-
ist society, wherein members work together to meet common needs, using
resources derived from their immediate environment. Most importantly,
the basic scale of change moves beyond the individual to encompass the
social community, offering a bottom-up approach to tackling social prob-
lems in hope of founding ‘a new society based on ecologically sustainable
modes of production in connection with new forms of political and social
relationships’ (Nadeau 2005: 324).
Thus today many BECs can be understood as cultural approaches to
community development, empowerment, and defence of place: ‘Poverty and
their faith urge their members towards solidarity with one another, action
for justice, and towards a vibrant celebration of life’ (CBCP 1992: 52). BECs
are present in nearly all of the scores of dioceses in the Philippines and
can include anywhere from 5 to as many as 100 families. There is a grow-
ing body of literature devoted to them, and the national church believes
in the concept, actively encouraging their formation. Indeed, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines has its own social-action branch, the
National Secretariat on Social Action (NASSA), and it takes BEC forma-
tion as integral to social development:
The concept has three core components: (i) the cultural roots and growth of
the liturgical group, (ii) socio-economic development through cooperative
participation in capital markets, and (iii) the political transformation of the
greater Filipino society (Gabriel 2008).
Introduction 5
At present the majority of BECs are predominantly liturgical or Bible-
study groups, but some have ventured into the realm of social action and
community development. Those that have challenge local patterns of capi-
tal accumulation and offer social alternatives to development grounded in
an ecclesiastical belief in living God’s word (Nadeau 2002). Much inspira-
tion for the movement can be traced to the Second Vatican Council (Vatican
II), which convened over the years 1962–1965:
The poor are a by-product of the system in which we live and for which
we are responsible. They are marginalized by our social and cultural
world. They are the oppressed, exploited proletariat, robbed of the fruit
of their labor and despoiled of their humanity. Hence the poverty of the
poor is not a call to generous relief action, but a demand that we go and
build a different social order (Gutiérrez 2003: 20).
Although the movements have many historical ties, BECs in the Philippines
should by no means be equated with liberation theology, and informants to
this study are adamant that the Philippine experience is completely different
from South America, where political extremism often has boiled up into
outright violence:
the more radical the person is, the more fully he or she enters into reality
so that, knowing it better, he or she can better transform it. This indi-
vidual is not afraid to confront, to listen, to see the world unveiled. This
person is not afraid to meet the people or to enter into a dialogue with
them. This person does not consider himself or herself the proprietor
of history or of all people, or the liberator of the oppressed; but he or
she does commit himself or herself, within history, to fight at their side
(Freire 2000: 39).
Peripheral development
The emergence of BECs and their subsequent social action is a story of
peripheral development in a world of global capitalism, peripheral in the
sense of combinations of geographic, political, ideological and economic
marginality. Although the focus of this study is rural communities, the con-
cept of peripheral development eliminates the rural-urban spatial dyad that
has been privileged in mainstream development parlance. Thus, in terms
of this case study, rural is an intrinsic designation with little extrinsic con-
nection to an essentialized urban other, and data produced contributes to a
broad conceptual myriad of spatial instances of differential access to wealth
and power. In so doing, cases of peripheral development can be envisioned
as both independent and transcendent—existing between and within rural
areas, between and within urban areas, and at the interstices of rural and
urban. Once these instances of marginality are brought into focus and inter-
rogated, they can be measured against the mainstream-economic bench-
mark that has informed development policy for the better part of the last
150 years.
The concept of local development on the margins of the greater world
economy has been a central concern of critical development studies over
the last few decades, and perhaps the most liberating discourse to emerge is
postdevelopment theory. It presents an ideal concept of community devel-
opment, locally organized and locally cooperative in terms of production
and distribution. Postdevelopment is not about finding the latest academic
approach to developing people; rather, it encompasses the idea of new sys-
tems of community action—new ways of imagining and practicing devel-
opment—and this makes it a good theoretical starting point for the present
research. Indeed, the BEC movement and literature does reframe local
development, community and church within a unique language, and this
new discourse of community action is shaping, and being shaped by, local
practices throughout the country. What remains to be seen, however, is if
certain affinities between postdevelopment and BECs leave us with a positive
confirmation of postdevelopment or novel complications to be considered.
Finally, we must consider connections to recent literature on faith-based
organizations and how they are asking important social questions and
engaging with social problems. Recently scholars have been documenting
the myriad ways by which faith based groups are finding empowerment as
they participate in officially secular matters, representing a resurgence of
religion in everyday life and a revitalization of religious identity (Berger
1999; Clarke 2006; Holden et al. 2017; Moxham 2017). Today, ‘the meanings
and expressions of lived religion—as identity, belief, practice, and cultural
process—continue to be decisively public issues’ (Olson et al. 2013: 1422).
8 Introduction
Thus, in a world system of geographical differences, extreme economic
diversity, and political disempowerment, there seems much fertile ground
for the kind of civic action and belonging embodied in wider communities
of faith. As will be seen, this case study of BECs in the Philippines is a con-
tribution to the discourse of social and economic justice in a postsecular
world.
Methods
This research presents little of statistical value, instead reliant upon broad
themes and categories that emerged through dialogue with informants,
analysis of programs, and participant observation. Primary data was pro-
duced in the Diocese of San Carlos during one field season in 2010, with
subsequent clarification and updates from key informants over the years
2011–2016. Three rural villages welcomed me over the course of field-
work, and I also spent time in San Carlos City, which is the headquarters
of both Church and social action for the diocese. Primary data was pro-
duced through a number of qualitative methods, including in-depth, semi-
structured interviews, focus group discussions, and participant observation
of community dynamics, particularly in regards to the cooperation of labour
and spiritual commitments. Perhaps the most significant tool at my disposal
was the open-ended question, an important method for gaining access to
the diverse perspectives of participants in a study. Central to the process
was informal conversation and a set of interview questions that served as
a guideline but in no way inhibited spontaneity or natural flow. Narratives
of environment, life history, and personal aspiration proved most valuable,
allowing the voices, actions, and concerns of the participants to weave a
story of local livelihood, community, development, and faith in one diocese
in the Philippines. I hope that a useful picture of local culture, geography,
and history has emerged.
The bulk of informants to this study remain anonymous, with pseudo-
nyms assigned. The reason is twofold. First, the use of real names requires
a participant’s signature on a piece of paper that is kept as a record. Due
to army, landlord, government, and corporate abuses in the past, includ-
ing land dispossession, incarceration and murder, informants expressed
apprehension about putting their names on a piece of paper. From the
outset, the paper was a bone of contention, and I quickly stopped bring-
ing it to interviews. Second, some informants, particularly in the clergy
where official opinions can be mandatory, admitted that they would be less
likely to express themselves fully if they knew that future readers would
be able to identify them. Five of the key participants, however, insisted
upon being identified: Father Edwin, my lead contact and the social-
action director for the diocese; Bishop Joe; Sisters Daisy and Helen, who
run a mission school in the mountains; and Sister Milla, who operates a
community centre.
Introduction 9
A last note regarding my affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church is
necessary. Other than being godfather to one child born in Canada, I have
no affiliation with Catholicism and I never have. Nor am I affiliated with
any other Christian denomination or world religion. I entered the field a
detached observer, compiling data on a social movement that just happened
to be organized by the Catholic faithful. After travelling throughout one
diocese committed to building a Church of the Poor, I left the field an opti-
mistic believer in the power of faith-based communities and the value of
social programs designed by the Church.
Chapter layout
Chapters 2–6 present a synthesis of important literature, historical back-
ground, and new data produced on BECs. Chapter 2 elaborates upon the
philosophical roots of BECs, beginning with the Second Vatican Council.
Vatican II represents a push towards a Church that is much more concerned
with secular matters, such as the social conditions of the faithful, and all
humanity for that matter. The concept of Church set forth by Vatican II
serves as foundation and inspiration for what many in the Philippine
clergy hope to accomplish with BECs. Following this, the chapter intro-
duces the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines (PCPII), in many ways
the Philippine echo of Vatican II. The Catholic Bishops’ Conference of
the Philippines convened the Council in 1991, and the collected works of the
Conference reiterate clerical reflection upon, critique of, and call for action
to change, poverty and oppression. The remainder of the chapter grounds
the BEC movement within critical development studies, with postdevelop-
ment presented as the conceptual frame.
Chapter 3 has two main sections. The first is an overview of the Republic
of the Philippines that incorporates significant historical moments and eras
within the broader political economy. The second half of the chapter is an
introduction to the island of Negros, the site of fieldwork. Chapter 4 is an
inventory and analysis of the social action and community development
programs directed by the Diocese of San Carlos. The strengths and weak-
nesses of each program are discussed, and what is revealed is a complex
machine of social action with which the diocese is able to spur its own vision
of community empowerment under the banner of BECs.
Chapter 5 scales down to focus upon BECs, in an effort to understand
better the realities of local development action. The BEC discourse speaks
about the power of local communities—lying latent, just waiting to be acti-
vated—and this is measured against local experiences with social action
and community empowerment in the rural parishes. Place-based cultural
cohesion of a number of groups, grounded in bible study, reflection upon
common predicament and neighbourly help, is highlighted as key to the
formation and continuance of BECs. Following this, community develop-
ment and social action are discussed, and a series of political-economic and
10 Introduction
cultural obstacles come to light. This leads into Chapter 6, in which the
most effective scale of faith-based social action in the Philippines is con-
ceptualized. The chapter begins with the level of BECs, and moves up to
the diocese before addressing the discourse itself. In each of these sections,
the potentials of, and limits to, social action are elaborated, and some rec-
ommendations are made. Chapter 6 concludes by tweaking the theoreti-
cal premise of postdevelopment in order to place BECs within the frame of
critical development studies.
References
Bello, W., H. Docena, M. de Guzman and M. Malig. 2005. The anti-development
state: the political economy of permanent crisis in the Philippines. New York: Zed
Books.
Berger, P. 1999. The desecularization of the world: resurgent religion and world poli-
tics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
CBCP (Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines). 1992. Acts and decrees of
the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines. Pasay City: Paulines Publishing.
CIA World Fact Book. 2021. The Philippines. www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/rp.html. Accessed 04/07/2021.
Clarke, G. 2006. Faith matters: faith-based organization, civil society and interna-
tional development. Journal of International Development, 18(6), 835–48.
Delotavo, A. 2006. Ethical considerations on ecclesio-political involvement: a
Philippine people power case. Asian Journal of Theology, 20(2), 221–9.
Freire, P. 2000. Pedagogy of the oppressed: 30th anniversary edition. New York:
Continuum.
Gabriel, M. 2008. Doing theology: Basic Ecclesial Communities. Manila: Anvil.
Gaspar, K. 1997. Abante, Atras, Abante: patterns of the Mindanao Catholic
Church’s involvement in contemporary social issues. In M.C. Ferrer (ed), Civil
society making civil society. Quezon City: The Third World Studies Centre, 149–70.
Gutiérrez, G. 2003. We drink from our own wells: the spiritual journey of people.
Maryknoll, NY: Orbis.
Holden, W. and R. Jacobson. 2007a. Ecclesial opposition to mining on Mindanao:
neoliberalism encounters the church of the poor in the land of promise.
Worldviews, 11, 155–202.
Holden, W. and R. Jacobson 2007b. Ecclesial opposition to nonferrous metals
mining in the Philippines: neoliberalism encounters liberation theology. Asian
Studies Review, 31(2), 133–54.
Holden, W., K. Nadeau and E. Porio 2017. Ecological Liberation Theology:
faith-based approaches to poverty and climate change in the Philippines. Cham,
Switzerland: Springer.
Jorgensen, D. 1997. Who and what is a landowner? Mythology and marking the
ground in a PNG mining project. Anthropological Forum, 7(4), 599–628.
Jorgensen, D. 2006. Hinterland history: the Ok Tedi Mine and its cultural conse-
quences in Telefolmin. The Contemporary Pacific, 18(2), 233–63.
McCoy, A. 1984. Priests on trial. New York: Penguin Books.
McCoy, A. 2009. Policing America’s empire: the United States, the Philippines, and
the rise of the surveillance state. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
Introduction 11
Moxham, C. 2017. Postdevelopment and nonsecularism in an officially secular state:
faith-based social action in the Philippines. Journal of International Development,
29(3), 370–85.
Nadeau, K. 2002. Liberation theology in the Philippines: faith in a revolution.
Westport, CT: Praeger.
Nadeau, K. 2005. Christians against globalization in the Philippines. Urban
Anthropology, 34(4), 317–39.
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ph/?page_id=2. Accessed 08/04/2013.
Olson, E., P. Hopkins, R. Pain and G. Vincett. 2013. Retheorizing the postsecu-
lar present: embodiment, spatial transcendence, and challenges to authenticity
among young Christians in Glasgow, Scotland. Annals of the Association of
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York: International Publishers.
2 Basic Ecclesial Communities
in the Philippines
Philosophical Roots and a Place
in Critical Development Studies
One of the most important reasons for this turn of events is that
development—approached from an economic and modernizing point
of view—has been frequently promoted by international organiza-
tions closely linked to groups and governments which control the
world economy … In this light, to speak about the process of libera-
tion begins to appear more appropriate and richer in human content.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003302780-2
Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines 13
Liberation in fact expresses the inescapable moment of radical change
which is foreign to the ordinary use of the term development (Gutiérrez
1988: 17).
Vatican II
The First Vatican Council (1869–1870), under the leadership of Pope Pius
IX, convened to address certain developments in modern European soci-
ety that were running counter to the teachings of the Church. In general,
the social ills on the continent were chalked up to excessive rationalism,
liberalism, and materialism, each of which was a challenge to the tradi-
tional values and social hierarchy of the times. The Church settled upon
a reactionary path of biblical literalism and medieval scholastic philoso-
phy as a means to counter these potential threats (Hales 1958; Kirch 1913).
In so doing, the Church attempted to separate its teachings and matters
of faith from nonspiritual issues, and it found refuge in an insular, dog-
matic constitution predicated on mystical matters and the infallibility of
the pope. This insularity continued a lineage of Catholic thought dating to
the 16th century, whereby ‘the Church moved through history more or less
unaffected by history’ (O’Malley 1983: 392).
By the 1950s many in the clergy were questioning this path and searching
for a way to make the Church more relevant to the faithful masses living in
modern times. They sought a revived Christianity that would be an active
force in the modern world, one that engaged with social and economic
issues, such as famine, disease, vice, ignorance, and economic exploitation
(McVeigh 1974). The new narrative of action did not appeal to all, however,
and there were clashes among liberal, conservative, and radical clerics in the
upper ranks of officialdom. In 1959 Pope John XXIII, a mere few months
into his papacy, chose to address these concerns and, much to the chagrin
of conservatives in the Church hierarchy, announced a Second Vatican
Council.
The intention of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) was to make
the Church more active in the material lives of the faithful, particularly
those Catholics marginalized by political oppression and/or economic
14 Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines
exploitation. The world over, people were dealing with the harsh realities
of late-modernity: the parasitic reach of capital into distant lands; the con-
version of entire populations into wage labourers; de-colonial encounters
with dictatorship; ethnic conflict and nationalist struggles; and warfare
over resources. Similar to a number of other social movements at the time,
including the US civil-rights movement, feminism, anti-Vietnam war pro-
tests, and the world revolution of 1968, many in the Church felt they could
no longer turn a blind eye in the face of such structured disempowerment.
They wanted the clergy, particularly at the parish level, to move beyond
mere spiritual leadership and become community advocates for meaningful
change: ‘by engaging in temporal affairs and by ordering them according to
the plan of God’ (SVC 1964), new relationships among the faithful would
lead to new methods for solving problems of an economic, social, political,
or cultural character (John XXIII 1961). Concomitantly, many wanted to
see a more active role for the laity, promoting their empowerment as com-
munity activists and local church leaders as well:
the laity have the duty of using their own initiative and taking action in
this area—without waiting passively for directives and precepts from
others. They must try to infuse a Christian spirit into people’s men-
tal outlook and daily behavior, into the laws and structures of the civil
community (Paul VI 1967); Those who are suited or can become suited
should prepare themselves for the difficult, but at the same time, the
very noble art of politics … and should seek to practice this art without
regard for their own interests or for material advantages (SVC 1965b).
The spiritual aspect of the Church, however, is not lost entirely in Vatican
II. On the contrary, much of what is written revolves around mystical issues
regarding the Church, the life and meaning of Jesus Christ, pastoral man-
dates for the clergy, and being a good Christian. Political matters among
denominations are also addressed, particularly Catholic relationships with
the Eastern and Protestant churches, both of whom were allowed to send
guest observers to the Council. In the shadow of these matters, the social
imperatives were carefully inserted into official publications of the Council,
and the use at times of opaque wording and contradictory phraseology
Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines 15
creates a sense of neutrality that leaves certain passages open to interpreta-
tion. Nevertheless, there is much of a material value that can be extracted
from the texts, particularly Gaudium et spes (SVC 1965b), which translates
into Joy and hope. For instance, a general overview reveals a firm commit-
ment to private property and private initiative, and a belief in the power of
free individuals operating within a free market: ‘Private property or some
ownership of external goods confers on everyone a sphere wholly necessary
for the autonomy of the person and the family, and it should be regarded as
an extension of human freedom[;] works produced by man’s own talent and
energy … are a sign of God’s grace and the flowering of His own mysterious
design’ (SVC 1965b). Although the market is presented as indispensable to
the world economy, the Council, echoing Adam Smith, argues that it only
functions under moral guidance: ‘In the economic and social realms, too, the
dignity and complete vocation of the human person and the welfare of soci-
ety as a whole are to be respected and promoted’ (SVC 1965b). Furthermore,
the moral market is one predicated on the equitable redistribution of wealth
among all groups of society, a concept referred to as the ‘universal destina-
tion of earthly goods’ (SVC 1965b): ‘the rights of property and free trade, are
to be subordinated to this principle. They should in no way hinder it; in fact,
they should actively facilitate its implementation’ (Paul VI 1967).
Vatican II, as a council on temporal issues, also upholds the nation-state
division of the world system. States are considered ‘indispensable to civil
society’ because of legal structures that exist in conformity with the ‘moral
order’ (John XXIII 1963); they are ‘endowed with the power to safeguard
on the behalf of all, security, regard for justice, and respect for rights’ (SVC
1965b). Although the ‘Church and the political community in their own
fields are autonomous and independent from each other’, Vatican II recog-
nizes the need for ‘some universal public authority’ (SVC 1965b) in order
‘to create world conditions in which the public authorities of each nation,
its citizens and intermediate groups, can carry out their tasks, fulfill their
duties and claim their rights with greater security’ (John XXIII 1963). Part
of the reason for officially recognizing nation-state organization is a belief
that inequity and conflict are now rampant on a global scale and interna-
tional action necessitates the coordinated action of states:
As these mutual ties binding the men of our age one to the other grow
and develop, governments will the more easily achieve a right order the
more they succeed in striking a balance between the autonomous and
active collaboration of individuals and groups, and the timely coordi-
nation and encouragement by the State of these private undertakings
(John XXIII 1961); civil progress and economic development are the
only road to peace (Paul VI 1967).
Thus independent states acting freely but in conjunction with one another
are the proper scale of development intervention in an unjust world system.
16 Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines
The common good, or ‘the sum total of social conditions which allow peo-
ple, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfilment more fully
and more easily’ relies upon peace, sound state and judicial power, environ-
mental protection, and a commitment to basic human rights (SVC 1965b).
Scaling down to local people and communities, Vatican II addresses a
number of social issues, including labour relations, property rights, the envi-
ronment, the promotion of peace, and the limits to social action. In terms
of labour the Church emphasized the dignity of the worker, drawing upon
images of Christ at his carpenter’s bench, and called for the wages of labour
‘to be such that man may be furnished the means to cultivate worthily his
own material, social, cultural, and spiritual life and that of his dependents’
(SVC 1965b). It was argued that a just wage must support a natural right to
basic subsistence that takes precedence over the contract between employee
and employer. Then, as if borrowing a page right out of John Locke’s Second
treatise of government (1690), labour is deemed the source of private prop-
erty, as man develops the earth and reaps its fruits through his own efforts.
Private property thus ‘assure[s] a person a highly necessary sphere for the
exercise of his personal and family autonomy and ought to be considered
as an extension of human freedom’ (SVC 1965b). It is an intrinsic right of
all individuals and a means to individual financial stability. However, man
must not take more than what is necessary, for private property is not an
end in itself and is only ever a means to achieve the universal destination
of goods (Paul VI 1967). Thus the right to private property is upheld within
a framework of redistribution among small holders, as opposed to land-
ownership in the hands of the few. And here the affinities with John Locke
taper off, for the Council maintains his original concept of moral property
rights based upon effort and stewardship, but reconfirms its commitment to
redistribution. (Locke, on the other hand, shortly thereafter abandons his
moral economy with the introduction of money, which is used to buy other
peoples’ labour, which in turn produces private property for someone else.)
On the environmental front, resources are determined to be the natural
right of all to share: man ‘received a mandate to subject to himself the earth
and all it contains, and to govern the world with justice and holiness’ (SVC
1965b). Further, the Church is committed to ecological management and
preservation for the next generation:
We are the heirs of earlier generations, and we reap benefits from the
efforts of our contemporaries; we are under obligation to all men.
Therefore we cannot disregard the welfare of those who will come after
us to increase the human family. The reality of human solidarity brings
us not only benefits but also obligations (Paul VI 1967).
Thus, on the economic side: The poverty and destitution of the great
mass of our people are only too evident, contrasting sharply with the
wealth and luxury of the relatively few families, the elite top of our
social pyramid. And on the political side: Power and control are also
elitist, lopsidedly concentrated on established families that tend to per-
petuate themselves in political dynasties (CBCP 1992: 12).
We can see the terrible effects of sin and sinful structures in the many
uncared for and malnourished children of our unjust society, the
wretchedness of the jobless and the homeless, the proliferation of
crimes, the pervasiveness of graft and corruption, the lack of peace and
order, or the horrors of war. Sin shows itself in suffering, in the myriad
18 Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines
suffering faces that demonstrate the degradation of the human person
and human society, and in the destruction of our environment that lays
bare the evil shortsightedness of human greed (CBCP 1992: 34).
In the context of our society today, where the poor and marginal-
ized have little genuine participation, and when the brief but brilliant
moments of our liberation have been made possible because of “people
power,” we realize that the integral development of people will be possi-
ble only with their corresponding empowerment. Today we understand
“people power” to subsume basic ideas that go beyond the mere gath-
ering of people in support of a cause. We understand “people power”
to include greater involvement in decision-making, greater equality in
both political and economic matters, more democracy, more participa-
tion (CBCP 1992: 112–13).
He began with the argument that we whites, from the point of develop-
ment we had arrived at, “must necessarily appear to them [savages] in
the nature of supernatural beings—we approach them with the might
as of a deity,” and so on, and so on. “By the simple exercise of our will
we can exert a power for good practically unbounded,” etc., etc. (Joseph
Conrad 1995).
we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improve-
ment and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people
of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is
inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive
and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them
and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity
Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines 21
possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve suffering of these people.
The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of
industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we
can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are limited. But our
imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing
and are inexhaustible.
References
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Second Plenary Council of the Philippines. Pasay City: Paulines Publishing.
Conrad, J. 1995. Heart of darkness. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Classics.
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The power of development. New York: Routledge, 27–43.
Engels, F. 1987 [1845]. The condition of the working class in England. New York:
Penguin Classics.
Escobar, A. 1995. Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third
World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Escobar, A. 2000. Beyond the search for a paradigm? Post-development and beyond.
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Gabriel, M. 1999. John Paul II’s mission theology in Asia, 2nd edition. Mandaluyong
City: Academic Publishing Corporation.
Gibson-Graham, J.K. 2005. Surplus possibilities: postdevelopment and community
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Gutiérrez, G. 1988. A theology of liberation, 15th anniversary edition. New York:
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Hales, E. 1958. The Catholic Church in the modern world. New York: Doubleday.
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ing and defending the Gospel’s authenticity. L’Osservatore Romano, 21 January.
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father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-
reisocialis_en. Accessed 04/04/2011.
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xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_15051961_mater_en.html. Accessed
04/04/2011.
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04/04/2011.
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ments. Missiology, 2(3), 327–347.
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vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_26031967_populorum_en.html. Accessed
04/04/2011.
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3 Republika ng Pilipinas and
the Island of Negros
Regionalism
The Philippines is an archipelago of 7107 islands. Bordered by the South
China, Celebes, and Philippine seas (Figure 3.1), the total sovereign area
approximates 1.3 million square kilometres, of which 300,000 square kilo-
metres are land. The islands are the result of orogenic forces acting upon the
Pacific Rim of Fire, a belt of geo-tectonic activity that stretches from New
Zealand, through Southeast Asia and Japan, over to Alaska, and down the
west side of the Americas. Over geological time, the islands have formed,
transformed, and collapsed along the faults and fissures of the Rim of Fire.
Because of continuous, disjunctive, and uneven oceanic mountain-building
processes over millions of years, the islands of the Philippines show a sub-
stantial degree of diversity, both physiographic and climatic.
The physiography of the Philippines is one of regional variation among
islands. Smaller islands can consist entirely of a flat stretch of arable land or
a rocky cone that juts forth from the ocean. Nearly any blend of landforms
is imaginable between these two extremes and can be found just across the
water on an adjacent island. The larger islands demonstrate their own inter-
nal assortment of regions. For instance, Luzon, the largest island in the
archipelago with 35 percent of the country’s land surface, is comprised of
three mountain ranges that tower to 2700 metres, broad valleys, a central
DOI: 10.4324/9781003302780-3
26 Republika ng Pilipinas and the Island of Negros
plain, a peninsula larger than most other Philippine islands, and the larg-
est inland lake in Southeast Asia, Laguna de Bay. Mindanao, the second
largest island, is irregularly shaped with deep bays and large peninsulas. It
contains five mountain ranges and Mt Apo (2954 m), the highest peak in the
country, as well as steep valleys, two large interior lowlands, and a number
of swampy plains. Other sizable and diverse islands include Samar, Negros,
Panay, and Mindoro.
The physical characteristics of the country in many ways resemble
those of countries on the coast of mainland Asia, with similarities in
Republika ng Pilipinas and the Island of Negros 27
geomorphology, climate, vegetation, and soils. In the Philippines rainfall
varies between less than 100 mm in certain regions and greater than 500 mm
in others, depending upon altitude, latitude, and distance from the coast.
Partly resulting from this discrepancy is a high degree of differentiation in
both vegetation and soil development; local landscapes range from stunted
forests and grasslands to the heaviest and wettest of tropical forests. This
physical variability coexists with regional differences along socio-cultural
lines: ‘basic differences in language, religion, economy, and domestic die-
tary result from a long period of human occupation during which patterns
of life have both yielded to environmental regionalisms and exploited these
regional variations in significant manner’ (Wernstedt and Spencer 1967: 3).
Far from deterministic, Wernstedt and Spencer imply that culture and envi-
ronment mutually articulate with one another, commingling to produce
unique life histories and cultural complexity. It is towards this social side of
regional variation that we now turn.
The Philippines has the 13 largest population in the world, estimated to
have surpassed 110 million (CIA 2021) and divided among 80 provinces. Of
the total population, nearly 90 percent are Christian, 6 percent are Muslim,
and less than 2 percent practice Chinese religions (San Juan 2006). In general
the majority of the population is considered to share the lowland peasant
culture, which is a series of Malay cultures differentiated by pre-Hispanic
culture, geography, and unique encounters with Christianity and Islam (San
Juan 2006). Of this Malay family, there are 27 major ethnolinguistic groups,
and the three largest, the Tagalog, the Cebuano, and the Ilocano, account
for more than 50 percent of the population of the Philippines. Partly due to
the ethnolinguistic variability, as well as the saliency of regional and island
identities, there is little sense of a coherent national identity. Indeed, when
trying to come to terms with Filipino nationalism one must accept a plu-
ralized conception of the nation; there is not one but ‘many nationalisms
across time and space, and with differing collective subjects/actors with
changing state/civil society relationships, and differing meanings and dis-
cursive formations’ (Hogan 2006: 123). Thus the average Filipino is bound
by allegiances rooted in multiple scales of identity formation that stretch
horizontally across the landscape, and this overwhelms any attempt to
invent a national self-referent that is accepted by the masses.
Beyond sub-national identity, Philippine governance can be understood
within a regional theme as well. The country is a presidential republic with
a bicameral legislature, divided into 17 administrative regions. Historically,
however, the authority of the state has been ‘diminished by difficult ter-
rain, fragmented territory and ethnic diversity’ (de Dios 2007: 158). Today,
a descending scale of levels of government includes (i) 80 provinces and 28
independent component cities, (ii) 1500 municipalities and 85 component
cities, and (iii) 41,971 barangays, which are the smallest local-government
unit, similar to villages or wards. Provinces are headed by governors, munic-
ipalities by mayors, and barangays by captains. The authority vested in each
28 Republika ng Pilipinas and the Island of Negros
of these tiers of local government increased after the election of President
Corazon Aquino in 1986. She committed the Philippines to a neoliberal
schedule of decentralization, shifting a fair degree of power, administrative
function, and responsibility away from the state and towards lower levels
of governance. Her policies came with the promise that local autonomy,
innovative participation in local markets, and the discovery of compara-
tive advantage would bring general development to depressed communities
(Legaspi 2001). Thus the Local Government Code of 1991 institutionalized a
new widespread set of relations between the centre and the regions, wherein
previously state-controlled services, such as agriculture, health, social ser-
vices, public works, and environmental management, were transferred to
local government, along with shares of nationally collected tax revenues to
cover operational costs (Legaspi 2001).
But rolling back the state in the name of economic autonomy has not pro-
duced the general results anticipated, and the economy remains dominated
by a handful of regional blocs. For instance, the central plain of Luzon,
which is the largest lowland area, is also the most economically important.
Agricultural production is dominated by large estates, with numerous ten-
ants and few owners, as opposed to the smallholder farms that populate
the mountain areas. As we will see, these circumstances are repeated on
the island of Negros, where a select few families control the fertile plains of
sugar production, and those who live on the mountain-margins subsist for
the most part on smallholder rice production. What is apparent throughout
the country, however, is incredible economic discrepancy between regions
of surplus production and regions of utter deficit, and the particulars of this
trend show very little divergence over time:
Marginality
From the very first inklings of globalization till now, the Philippines can be
understood as a country on the margins, with all that that implies. Indeed, if
the first circumnavigation of the earth, completed by Ferdinand Magellan’s
30 Republika ng Pilipinas and the Island of Negros
crew (1519–22), is accepted as the original act of globalization (Davies
2004), then the original act of anti-globalization just may have been carried
out 27 April 1521, when the warrior chief Lapu-Lapu killed Magellan at
the Battle of Mactan, a small island off the coast of Cebu. But that opening
act of resistance was unable to halt the coming tide of global change, of
which European colonization was a significant part. The first attempt by
Europeans to colonize the archipelago, the Guy Gómez de Villalobos expe-
dition (1543–45), was an outright failure by most estimates, although it for-
ever stamped the inhabitants of the islands with the name of a 14-year-old
Spanish prince (Scott 1982). The real colonial encounter began 13 February
1565, when Miguel López de Legazpi landed and established San Miguel on
the island of Cebu. Once in place, the colony fell under the administration
of Mexico City from the years 1596 to 1821 (excluding a brief interruption
by British occupation, 1762–64). Although originally chosen by the Spanish
for strategic purposes—safe military ports adjacent to Asia, safe portage
for goods travelling between Asia and the Americas—it was later realized
that both the native peoples and the land were resources that could serve
new global markets.
The new land that de Legazpi reported to the Spanish crown was one
of small, scattered settlements, primarily located along coastal areas and
rivers—nothing approaching the size of a modern European city or the cit-
ies encountered in Mesoamerica and Asia, let alone a state with military and
bureaucratic control (Anderson 1998). The population of the archipelago in
the 16th century is estimated to have been two million people, and the few
larger settlements that had developed with Chinese and Arab trade, in the
central plain of Luzon and around what would become the national capital,
seldom exceeded a few thousand individuals (Newson 2006). Predominantly
the indigenous islanders congregated in small political communities, or
barangays, held together by ethnolinguistic and kinship ties, and separated
one from another by local terrain:
barangay, a term that stemmed from the Tagalog word for “boat.” The
majority of precolonial Filipino societies had a tripartite class struc-
ture, one with which early modern Europeans could easily identify and
empathize: nobility, their free supporters, and serfs. Each barangay
was ruled by a hereditary datu … whereas the timawa and maharlika
were born free, and the alipin … were considered serfs or slaves (Irving
2010: 34).
Each community was largely self-sufficient and group cohesion was fostered
by a dense network of social bonds (Hill et al. 2007). In barangay society there
was no concept of private property in land; chiefs, or datu, acted as admin-
istrators of the lands, and individuals ‘participated in the community own-
ership of the soil and the instruments of production’ (Constantino 2008: 36).
The pre-Hispanic political organization would prove indispensable to the
Republika ng Pilipinas and the Island of Negros 31
maintenance of social control under colonial rule, and the power vested in
chiefs led to the first indigenous upper class in the colony, the principalía
(de Dios 2007).
Lack of colonial resources in the hinterlands translated into a powerful
role for the Catholic Church, which served as arbiter between the Spanish
authority and the indigenous peoples. Indeed, for two centuries, colonial
subjects had almost no contact with secular administrators, and the friars,
on a divine mission to combat heathenism, were dispersed into subdivided
territories allocated to specific religious orders (Aguilar 1998). As political
intermediaries, the clergy set about learning the numerous local languages
and used them to intercede in colonial affairs as true cultural middlemen,
leaving the Spanish language to officialdom. Inevitably, clerical acumen in
local language facilitated widespread conversions to Catholicism, but it also
was counter-hegemonic to Spanish administration, delivering substantial
power right into the laps of the priests: the ‘monopoly on linguistic access to
the natives gave them an enormous power which no secular group shared;
fully aware of this, the friars persistently opposed the spread of the Spanish
language’ (Anderson 2006: 87).
Incorporating the indigenous into the emerging world system led to a
drastic spatial reordering of the landscape. The policy of reducción relo-
cated many into new larger centres, built around a church and governed
by a local friar and his principalía. This greatly changed indigenous social
structures, and it served as an effective means to control colonial subjects,
especially by dispossessing them of their primary means of production, the
land. Customary tenure all but disappeared under resettlement as commu-
nal lands were transformed into private property, and indigenous social
forms were reconfigured to be more effectively exploitable by the colonizers.
By the 1850s friar lands were the only sites of large-scale agriculture, and
the ‘quarrelling Orders’ of clergy, fighting over parcels of land, ‘pioneered
commercial agriculture’ and laid down the roots of a hacienda system
(Anderson 1998: 195):
Thus the Spanish brought the inhabitants of the Philippines into the
European network of trade and strategic alliance through a political-
economic system centred on large land holdings and the production of cash
crops, such as sugar, tobacco, and copra. As a result, over the course of a
few hundred years most indigenous subsistence bases were eroded and a
new class of landless peasants was created.
32 Republika ng Pilipinas and the Island of Negros
Similar to numerous other European colonial encounters, the colony was
divided socio-politically along racial or ethnic lines. Peninsulars, or whites
of Spanish descent born in Spain, were the original elite, holding military
and colonial-administrative positions, and owning land. Creoles, or whites of
Spanish descent born in the colony, came second and tended to hold govern-
ment and church positions. The mestizos were a mixed population, half indig-
enous and half Spanish or Chinese, and as merchants and cultural brokers
they were third from the top in the social layer cake. Next came significant
immigrant groups, such as Muslims and Chinese, followed by the indio, or
indigenous peoples, who were the lowest class of citizens in Spain’s Las Islas
Filipinas. This hodgepodge hierarchy led to numerous race-relevant skir-
mishes, particularly in larger centres, such as Manila. There, by the 1860s,
‘pride, envy, place-hunting, and caste hatred’ between peninsulars and cre-
oles, and between whites and mestizos, were ‘the order of the day’ (Jagor 1965:
16). Inevitably, one group would come out on top, and by the end of the 19th
century the country’s economy was predominantly controlled by the mesti-
zos, who had become a small class of landed elite with a focus on export crops.
Mestizo wealth culminated in an inter-island mestizo power-bloc rooted
in regional hacienda agriculture, the groundwork for today’s Philippine ver-
sion of democracy:
By the end of the 20th century 44 percent of all arable land in the Philippines
was owned by 5.5 percent of all landowning families, and nearly all elected
offices at the national level were controlled by as few as 100 families
(Vatikiotis 1996). But now we have jumped ahead, for the 20th century in
the Philippines is a complex history that began abruptly in 1901 when the
Americans arrived.
The lure of land and labour on the margins of capitalism must have been
weighing heavily upon the Americans when they colonized the archipelago,
and the sacrifice of 4200 American soldiers and upwards of 200,000 Filipino
civilians was a justifiable cost. By 1902 the two most pressing objectives of
the new American colonial administration were the further development of
plantations and the expansion of the mining industry (Pomeroy 1992). The
Americans upheld the manorial system as a means for American corpora-
tions to gain access to landownership (Nadeau 2005), and exploration geol-
ogists began to identify enclaves of mineral potential, particularly copper,
gold, lead, nickel, silver, and zinc.
Republika ng Pilipinas and the Island of Negros 33
In 1946 the Philippines was granted political independence from the
United States. However, economic interdependence persisted and, in
exchange for helping to rebuild the country after WWII, the US strong-armed
the new republic into accepting trade agreements that essentially made ‘the
Philippines a supplier of cheap raw materials and human resources … and
a receiving ground for U.S.-manufactured goods’ (Schirmer and Shalom
1987: 90). Over the last half century mining has poisoned naturally pro-
ductive areas and displaced communities, renewable stocks of natural
resources such as wood and fish have been decimated, and the average
Filipino has experienced a decrease in living standards. Official unemploy-
ment rates hover just below 6 percent, and at least 16 percent of the popu-
lation lives below the Asia-Pacific poverty line, equivalent to USD 1.25 per
day (CIA 2021). Three quarters of the officially impoverished are rural poor
engaged in agriculture, many of whom are indentured to the landowning
mestizos who dominate government.
Crisis
Crises are an ongoing problem in the Philippines, with roots in both the
perennial political-economic instability and the numerous seasonal natural
disasters. Social crises have often served to solidify the power of the elite
and international organizations over the general Filipino populace, and
Bankoff (1999) goes so far as to argue that the increasing gap between rich
and poor in the Philippines is possibly the result of the frequency and mag-
nitude of natural disasters that exacerbate social inequity. Such disasters
include typhoons, floods, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, and
lahars, and location within a tropical climatic zone along the Rim of Fire is
the primary reason. For instance, the eruptions of Mayon Volcano, the most
active in the archipelago, are the result of the continental Eurasian plate
riding overtop of the Philippine oceanic plate. Another large and active vol-
cano is Mt Pinatubo, whose 1991 eruption was the second largest terrestrial
volcanic event of the 20th century.
Tectonic activity in the region is responsible for earthquakes as well.
Although the islands are affected daily by numerous smaller seismic events,
larger earthquakes, such as the one that hit Luzon in 1990, can be devas-
tating, killing thousands and destroying villages and infrastructure. Also,
earthquakes can generate tsunamis, and a wave slammed into the island of
Mindoro in 1994, killing 62 people and demolishing 800 homes. The trop-
ical climate adds its own variety of disasters. Between 14 November and
4 December 2004 a succession of four tropical depressions and typhoons
slammed into the eastern coast of Luzon, triggering landslides and floods that
killed 1600 people (Gaillard and Liamzon 2007). In 2009 typhoon Ketsana
wreaked havoc on the capital and 25 provinces, causing USD 73,680,000 in
infrastructural ruin, damaging 42,566 homes and killing hundreds of people
(Pulhin et al. 2010). In 2013 Yolanda/Haiyan became the deadliest typhoon
34 Republika ng Pilipinas and the Island of Negros
in Philippine history, and the strongest storm at landfall ever recorded, kill-
ing more than 6200 people and causing USD 1.5 billion in damage.
When nature is not disrupting life the politics of corruption, mismanage-
ment, and cronyism—three realities for which the Philippines is internation-
ally renowned—can be counted on to foment crises. Since independence
from the United Sates, the political landscape is best understood as cacique
democracy (Anderson 1998), wherein an elite group of dynasties, almost
exclusively of mestizo descent, has maintained politico-economic dominance
as a bloc. Within this system the landowning caciques have somehow held
their bloc together while waging an internal war among themselves over gov-
ernment revenue and what can only be described as the private enterprise of
public office. This struggle is presented like celebrity gossip by the country’s
national media, and tabloid-style journalism serves up corruption as a little
joke meant to entertain the masses. Indeed, attention to systemic poverty
and lack of development is deflected by a who’s who of naughtiness among
the ruling elite. But it is not a joke, and much of the political landscape is one
of violent factionalism and regional conflict among elected politicians, war-
lords, and private armies, with deleterious effects on the greater population:
January 2010, an El Niño season unfolding in the Philippines and the roads
along the northeast coast of the island are hot and thick with humidity.
Republika ng Pilipinas and the Island of Negros 35
It is explained that the land is drier already than usual for January. (Within
a mere few months the newspapers will be reporting the billions of pesos
in crop loss and the devastation to the marine fishing industry, rocked by
warm nutrient-poor waters flowing throughout the archipelago.) The air
conditioning inside the truck is freezing cold, but outside on the surface of
the road the heat twists and turns objects into blurry distortions. The road
follows the coastal plain and short hills along the coast, and it curves past
brown beaches, rock points, stream outlets, and coves as it runs north from
San Carlos City to Cadiz (Figure 3.2). The northeast coastline is rugged, the
soils less fertile than the western side of the island where a wide plain of rich
alluvial soil distends from the northern tip to below the city of Kabankalan.
They own the fields, they own the mountains. Now they even own the
water. The fishermen fish for the big boats, the big operators. They don’t
have enough fish and rice for themselves that they are going hungry
(Fr Naldo).
The fields along the road are scattered with sugar workers. Men and women
with tattered clothes and rags wrapped around their heads push through the
sugarcane. There are a few behind the wheels of flatbed trucks that trans-
port the raw product to the mill. Still others tend the many stubble fires:
Along the road trucks over-laden with stocks of stripped sugarcane chug,
and they burp black clouds of exhaust that move through villages and hover
at eye level. Workers hang from the sides of the trucks and sit atop the cane
piles. In one of the villages there is a sharp turn in the road, a truck lies
on its side, and the sugar stocks have spilled through the wall of a house
on the street. The people standing inside the house look unconcerned, and
it does not appear that anyone was injured. The village ends where the
road crosses a shallow river that winds down from the mountains, but it is
the dry season, and the green-yellow water is lifeless. There are men who
work in holes along the banks of the river, digging down and shaking the
soil through screens in search of any recyclables or lost valuables. Some of
the holes are shoulder deep and not one is braced against collapse, but the
scavengers can earn an extra 50 or 100 pesos if they are lucky (one or two
US dollars, more or less). Further down the bank two women wash clothes
in the water and lay them out to dry on large boulders. The women attend
to so many articles of clothing it can be assumed that they are part of a
small laundry service—a labour-intensive business with no capital invest-
ment in machinery.
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Diocese of Glasgow restored by Earl David 375
Bishoprics and monasteries founded by King David 376
Establishment of bishopric of Ross 377
Establishment of bishopric of Aberdeen 378
Monasteries of Deer and Turriff 380
Establishment of bishopric of Caithness 382
The communities of Keledei superseded by regular canons 384
Suppression of Keledei of St. Andrews 384
Suppression of Keledei of Lochleven 388
Suppression of Keledei of Monimusk 389
Monastic orders of Church of Rome introduced 392
Columban abbacies or Abthens in possession of lay abbots 393
Establishment of bishoprics of Dunblane and Brechin 395
Bishoprics of Brechin and Dunblane formed from old see of
Abernethy 397
Suppression of Keledei of Abernethy 398
Failure of Celtic Church of Brechin 400
Failure of Celtic Church in bishopric of Dunblane 402
Failure of Celtic Church in Bishopric of Dunkeld 405
Formation of diocese of Argyll or Lismore 408
Condition of Columban Church of Kilmun 410
Condition of Columban Church of Applecross 411
State of Celtic monastery of Iona 412
A.D. 1203. Foundation of Benedictine abbey and nunnery at
Iona, and disappearance of Celtic community 415
Remains of old Celtic Church 417
CHAPTER X.