rder No. 209 as amended by Exec. Order No.

227)

TITLE 1. MARRIAGE (ARTS. 1

17. Acebedo vs. Arquero,

A.M. # P-94-1054, Mar. 11,
2003
18. Espinosa, et. al. vs.
Atty. Julieta A. Omana, A.
C. # 9081, Oct. 12, 2011
 19. Vda. de Avenido vs.
Avenido, G.R. # 173540,
Jan. 22, 201421.

20. Calimag vs. Heirs of

Silvestra N. Macapaz, G.R .
# 191936, June 1, 2016
CHAPTER 1. REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE (ARTS. 1-34)
21. Republic vs. Albios, G.R
22. Santiago vs. People, G.R
23. Kho vs. Republic G.R. #
24. Niñal, et. al. vs. Bayad
25. Republic vs. Dayot, G.R

26. De Castro vs. De Castro,

27. Tupal vs. Judge Remegio
28. Uy vs. Sps. Lacsamana,

29. Morigo vs. People, G.R.

FOREIGN DIVORCE OBTAINED BY ONE SPOUSE (ART. 26 par.2)

30. Lavadia vs. Heirs of Luna

31. Republic vs. Orbecido II

32. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, e

33. Republic vs. Manalo, G.
34. Galapon vs. Republic, G.

CHAPTER 3. VOID and VOIDABLE MARRIAGES (ARTS. 35-54)

Adm. Matter No. 02-11-10 SC. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (effective March 15, 20
35. Capili vs. People, et. al
36. Cariño vs. Cariño, G.R.

37. Quiazon, et. al. vs. Bele

38. Iwasawa vs. Custodio,
Pulido vs. People, G.R. # 220149, J

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY (Art. 36)

40. Mallilin vs. Jamesolami

41. Gantan vs. Gantan, G.R

42 Tan-Andal vs. Andal, G
43. Datu vs. Datu, G.R. # 2

RE-MARRIAGE DUE TO ABSENCE OF SPOUSE (Arts. 41-43)

44. Republic vs. Sareñogon,
45. Republic vs. Quiñonez,

46. Santos vs. Santos, G.R.

47. Tadeo- Matias vs. Repub

ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES (Arts. 45- 54)

48. Almelor vs. RTC of Las

49. Republic vs. Villacort

TITLE II. LEGAL SEPARATION (Arts. 55 – 67)

Adm. Matter No. 02-11-11-SC on Legal Separation (effective March 15, 2003)
50. Bugayong vs. Ginez, G.

51. Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio, ,

52. Ong vs. Ong, G.R. # 15

TITLE III. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

(Arts. 68 – 73)
53. Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio –
54. Valino vs. Adriano, et.

TITLE IV. PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

(Arts. 74 – 146)
55. Domingo vs. Sps. Molin
56. Spouses Carlos vs. Tole
57. PNB vs. Garcia, et. al.,
58. PNB vs. Reyes, G.R. # 2

59. Spouses Anastacio Sr. v

60. Malabanan vs. Malaban

CHAPTER 7. PROPERTY REGIMES OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

(Arts. 147 – 148)
61. Agapay vs. Palang, G.R.
62. Cariño vs. Cariño, G.R.
63. Paterno vs. Paterno, G.
64. Perez, Jr. vs. Senerpid
TITLE V. THE FAMILY (Arts. 149 – 151)
65. Alvarez vs. Ramirez, G.R
66. Hiyas Savings & Loan B

CHAPTER 2. THE FAMILY HOME (Arts. 152 – 162)

67. Ramos, et. al. vs. Pangil

68. Eulogio, et. al. vs. Bell,

69. Patricio vs. Dario III, G
70. Spouses De Mesa vs. Spo
ed by Exec. Order No. 227)

Case Digest
Doctrine: Article 1 of the Family Code states that marriage is “an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
and not subject to stipulation.”
Facts:
- On June 1, 1994, petitioner Edwin A. Acebedo accused respondent Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke’s Point, Pala
immorality.
- Allegedly, petitioner’s wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC Brooke’s Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously coha
husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brooke’s Point. As a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero was born to the two on May 21, 1989.
- By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator recommends that respondent be held guilty for immorality and that he b
suspended from office for a period of one year without pay.
- According to the Office of the Court Administrator, the respondent admitted that he a single man maintained a relationship with Dedje Irader Acebedo
eight to nine months, and attended with sexual union.
- Respondent justified his having a relationship with Dedje Irader Acebedo solely on the written document purportedly a “Kasunduan” or agreement ente
into by the petitioner and his wife, consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to seek any partner and to live with him or her.
Issue:
- Whether or not the respondent is guilty of immorality
Ruling: YES. The Court ruled that respondent Eddie P. Arquero is guilty of immorality.
Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marria
between complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the Family Code states that marriage is “an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.” Marriage is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules established by law wh
cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the parties.
Doctrine: Art 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union. A contract would require the meeting of minds in order to create a union between th
couple, the parties do not have the liberty to agree upon an extrajudicial document that nullifies the same union. Having a marriage be also seen as a soc
institution, the general public has interest in the relationship. Allowing for the dissolution would tarnish the sanctity of the nature of marriage.
Art 45. Enumerates the causes wherein annulment can be commenced. This does not include dissolution of marriage due to a meeting of minds of the sp
which was then unlawfully notarized.

Facts:
* In 1997, Espinosa and his wife (Elena Marantal) sought Atty. Omana’s help in whether or not they could live separately and dissolve their marriage (sole
in 1983).
* Omana prepared the document → “Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay”
* Trusting that the document was valid, the spouses acted on the terms and conditions immediately
* However, Marantal suddenly took all of the belongings + their 3 children which prompted Espinosa to approach his law graduate friend, Glindo, who to
the document was invalid.
* Glindo & Espinosa then filed a case @ the IBP - Commission on Bar Discipline against Omana
* Omana’s defense : she was approached by Espinosa for notary purposes only. She even advised him that it was invalid.
* She even alleged that Espinosa returned on a day that she wasn’t present and had her secretary forge her signature instead
* Omana presented “sinumpaang salaysay” of Marantal + letter of apology from her secretary

Issue: Did Omana violate the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the Notarization of the spouses’ “Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay”?

Ruling: Yes. Omana violated Canon 1.01 → no lawyer shall engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct. She claimed that she was the one who sign
then suddenly disclaimed her authorship then even pointed the blame on her former maid. This eludes that her character is questionable
SUSPENSIOn : 1yr from law practise & 2yrs from notary public
 Doctrine: While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marr
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth cer
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

Facts:
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now deceased.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Pere
on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solem
1942. The fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) and testimony of Eustaqu
sister, that she was present during the wedding. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was n
known. Later on, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be
declared null and void for being bigamous. Peregrina averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio, their marriage having been celebrated in
She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.

Issue:
Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage.

Ruling:
YES. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth cer
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
Doctrine:
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by o
Facts:
the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also compe
testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
Doctrine:
Issue:
Facts:
Ruling:
Issue:
UISITES OF MARRIAGE (ARTS. 1-34)
Ruling:
Doctrine: Art 34

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse mar
accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused cou
be included in the information as a co-accused.

Facts:
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for bigamy. Petitio
pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit.
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who
43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she s
choose someone who was "without responsibility."
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief t
Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be
proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.

Issue: Whether the petitioner should be held liable for the crime of bigamy. (YES)

Ruling: The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them
and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge
previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertaine
petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the
following circumstances: (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with peti
who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal
Santos.
DOCTRINE: When there is sufficient evidence to prove the absence of a necessary marriage license, the presumed validity of the marriage is overcome. In
cases, it becomes the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid and that the required marriage license had been
secured. The Supreme Court held that the marriage in question was null and void ab initio due to the absence of the marriage license, pursuant to Article
the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code.

FACTS: The petitioner in this case is Raquel G. Kho. She filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Veronica Borata. The petitioner's rea
filing the petition is the lack of a necessary marriage license. The petitioner wants the marriage declared null and void ab initio.

1) Respondent filed an Answer in the case, arguing that there was no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation of a lack of marriage license, stating that b
parties obtained a marriage license before their marriage ceremony.

2) The RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar granted the petition for nullity of marriage filed by the petitioner. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the de
declaring the marriage valid.

3) The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals, ruling in favor of the petitioner. The Certification from the Civil Registrar and the testimony o
former Civil Registrar were deemed sufficient evidence to prove the absence of a marriage license.

4) Respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or any evidence supporting its issuance. The Certificate of Marriage issued by the officiatin
also did not mention the marriage license.

5) Based on the Certification from the Municipal Civil Registrar and respondent's failure to produce evidence of a marriage license, the Supreme Court co
that no valid marriage license existed and declared the marriage null and void ab initio.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court that declared the marriage between Raquel G. Kho and V
B. Kho null and void due to the absence of a necessary marriage license.

RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the petition filed by Raquel G. Kho and declared the marriage null and void ab initio, based on the grounds of lack of a neces
marriage license. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner's Certifications from the Municipal Civil Registrar and the testimony of the former Civil Re
were sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the marriage license. The court held that the burden of proving a valid marriage and securing the requir
marriage license fell on the party alleging a valid marriage. Therefore, the court granted the petition and declared the marriage null and void
- No. In the case of Pepito and Badayog, they have not lived as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s
marriage was dissolved tot he time his marriage with Badayog, only about twenty months had elapsed. The five-year common-law period was not follow
the 5 year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity. P
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with Badayog. Maintaining the marriage with the first wife even where there was actua
severance of the filial companionship between spouses cannot make cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wi

-No, it actually contradicts Judge Marcos’ ruling on Art 47 of the Family Code. It is in fact, cannot be applied by analogy to petitions for declaration of null
marriage. The Code did not mentioned as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage. It can be questioned but it can only be assailed if e
parties are still alive , in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

Articles:
As stated in Art.53 of the Civil Code, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. However
Civil Code recognizes the five-year common-law period, where a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
wife for five years (without breaking up), they may celebrate their marriage without obtaining the marriage license.

Art.40 expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a secon
marriage.
Article 3 - A valid Marriage license is a formal requisite of a marriage except in cases provided in Chapter 2 of this Title
Article 34 – No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
FACTS:
-Jose and Felisa Dayot were married in Pasay City Hall, on November 24, 1986 (solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza)
-They executed a sworn affidavit (dated the same) attesting that they both have attained the age of maturity, are unmarried, and lived together as husba
wife for the last 5 years
-In July 1993, Jose filed a complaint for Annulment/Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in RTC Binan claiming that there was no marriage ceremony celebra
did not execute the aforementioned sworn affidavit (5 years living as husband and wife), and that his consent to the marriage was obtained through frau
-Felisa denied allegations of fraud and declared that they deferred a husband-wife relationship without marriage because of their age difference
-Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose on June 3, 1993, for contracting marriage with Rufina Pascual on Aug 31, 1990
-RTC declared the marriage of Felisa and Jose valid, stating that any person in the right mind would suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank s
paper
-Jose acknowledged Felisa as his wife in his SALN and Felisa was the emergency contact indicated in his company ID
-Her sister attested that Jose voluntarily signed the marriage contract
-Jose appealed before the CA but found it without merit.
-Jose filed a motion for reconsideration citing that the proper application of the exception from a marriage license under Article 76 of the civil code was n
considered, stating that the legal condition that the man and a woman must be living together for at least 5 years
-On November 7, 2006, CA reversed its decision and declared the marriage void ab initio
-Felisa sought reconsideration but was denied

ISSUE:
W/N the marriage of Jose and Felisa valid
Doctrine:
RULING:
No. The marriage was void ab initio. They failed to meet the requirements needed under Article 76 of the Civil Code. The two only lived together 5 month
Facts:
to the celebration of their marriage when the code expressly provides that no marriage license is necessary when a man and a woman were living togeth
husband
Issue: and wife for five years.

Ruling:
document] admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity."[35] The affidavit of... cohabitation, even if it serves a "public purpose," remains
private document until notarized.

Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents.

Circular No. 1-90's purpose is not limited to documents used to transact "legal conveyancing business." So long as a judge notarizes a document not conn
with his official functions and duties, he violates Circular No. 1-90.

Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in Bacolod City. Failure to certify that law
notaries public are lacking in the municipality or circuit of the judge's court constitutes violation of

Circular No. 1-90.

That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they solemnized does not make the practice legal. Violations of law
not excused by practice to the contrary.

Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary pu
from notarizing documents if the signatory is not personally known to him.

In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him. Judge Ro
not state that the parties were personally known to him or that the parties presented their competent pieces of... evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the parties personally known to him. The parties are supposed t
appear in person to subscribe to their affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at least be acquainted... with them.[45] Interview
contracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the notary public.

Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in good faith.

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires notaries public to personally know the signatory to the document they will... notarize or require the signato
present a competent evidence of identity. These are basic legal principles and procedure Judge Rojo violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirem
nine times is not good faith.

Judge Remegio V. Rojo... is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS.
 Mine
- po manila
After princeofhotelThe
2 decades marriageRTCAttydecided
Luna and theEugenia
case in Luna
favoreventually
of respondents.
agreedUy tofiled an appeal with
live separately the CA but
and dissolve andCA affirmedtheir
liquidate the conjugal
ruling of partnership
the trial court
of
then
property. filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the appellate court. Hence, the instant petition
- On January 2, 1976 Atty Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the court of first instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Re
Issue:
and on the same date married Soledad. Thereafter, they returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Whether
- the Deed
In 1977, of Sale
Atty Luna dated 18a April
organized new law1979,firmexecuted by Rosca
with partners andalone,
calledwithout Uy's consent,
it LUPSICON and was in favor
the of Spouses
managing Lacsamana,
partner and they isbought
valid. a condominium fo
law firm with Atty Luna having 38/100 share. After LUPSICON was dissolved in 1992, Atty Luna’s share over the condominium was stipulated at 25/100.
Ruling:
- Atty Luna later established another law firm with Atty Renato Dela Cruz and used a portion of the condominium office. The law firm lasted until the
Yes. The
Atty Lunamain issue
on July 12,in1997
determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage.
-Marriage Aftermay
Attybe proven
Luna’s by any
death, his competent
son with hisand firstrelevant evidencetook
wife, Gregorio, suchover
as testimony
his share inbythe
onecondominium
of the partiesunit
to the marriage,
including or by
all the lawone of the
books, witnesses
furniture andto
marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. Further
equipments.
-best documentary
Gregorio Lunaevidence
leased out of the
a marriage
25/100 is the marriage
portion contract itself.unit
of the condominium Thetomarriage certificate,
Atty Renato where
Dela Cruz whothe contracting
established hisparties
own law state that they take each
firm.
-as husband
Soledad and wife,
filed must be furnished
a complaint by thepro
for the 25/100 person solemnizing
indiviso the marriage
share of Atty Luna andto the(1)other
either of the contracting
furniture and equipmentsparties, and by
taken (2) Gregorio.
the clerk of
Shethe Municipa
claims that
of Manila or
co-owner the municipal
because secretary
of her marriage of the
with Attymunicipality
Luna where the marriage was solemnized. The third copy of the marriage contract, the marriage licens
-the affidavit
The RTCofruled
the interested party regarding
that the 25/100 share wasthe solemnization
acquired through of the
Atty marriage
Luna’s shalland
industry be kept
that by
thethe official, has
petitioner priest, or minister
no right as owner whoofsolemnized the marr
the condominium an
Uy was not
Soledad
Doctrine: able to present
is declared to be theany copy of
owner of athe marriage
certain 4 lawcertificate
books nor any evidences. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and Ro
-were Both
not legally
partiesmarried
appealed to each
to theother. Based on
CA, Soledad the that
states evidence sheerred
the RTC presented,
in many Rosca was of
aspects able to sufficiently
their ruling whileovercome the presumption
the respondent thatlower
state that the any propert
court e
acquired
their
Facts: whilefor
decision living together
Soledad shall bethe
to acquire owned
booksby the couple in equal shares. The house and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties and she had e
-right The
to sell
CAthe
thensame eventheir
assailed without Uy's consent.
modified decision stating that Eugenia was the legitimate wife of Atty Luna until his death in 1997 and the divorce from
Dominican
Issue: Republic is not valid
- The modified decision was the same from the RTC except that the law books were declared to belong to the Heirs of Luna and the CA denied the
petitioner’s
Ruling: motion for reconsideration
- The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
Issue: (1) WON the divorce of Atty Luna and Eugenia was dissolve validly and (2) WON the marriage of Atty Luna and Soledad had entitled her of any righ
CE OBTAINED BY ONE SPOUSE (ART. 26 par.2)
property

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the modified decision of the CA.
1. No. The marriage of Atty Luna to Eugenia subsisted up to the death of Atty Luna in July 12, 1997.

- Atty Luna’s marriage to Eugenia was solemnized in the Philippines in 1947 and the law in force at that time was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopt
nationality rule, and the Civil Code continued to follow it. Philippine laws relating to family rights, duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to this, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty Luna and
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.

2. No. Atty Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous was void thus the properties acquired during their marriage were governed by the rules of
ownership

- Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or bef
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgement rendered in a proceeding
- A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio
Doctrine:
Article 26 - All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid t
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

Where(click
Facts a marriage
niyo lang between a Filipino
may content to)citizen
*Jesse* and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating
On April 2005,him or her to
husband remarry,
Corpuz the Filipino
(filipino spouseCanadian
who acquired shall haveCitizenship
capacity tothrough
remarrynaturalization),
under Philippine waslaw. (As amended
married by Executive
to St.Tomas a FilipinoOrder
who he 227)
caught ha
affair with another man.
Facts: returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The SC of Justice in Ontario, Canada granted Corpuz a petition for divorce on December 8,200
Corpuz
- On Maydecree
divorce 24, 1981,
tookCipriano
effect a Orbecido
month later. III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City
- In 1986,
After Cipriano’s
2 years, Corpuzwifehas left
foundforanother
the United States
Filipina to bringing along to
love. Wanting their son his
marry Kristoffer.
Filipina Apartner,
few years later,aCipriano
he filed petition discovered that his wifefor
for judicial recognition had been natura
foreign divorc
an American
and/or citizen.of marriage to dissolve with the RTC. Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestati
declaration
- Sometime
the in 2000,
trial court. Cipriano
Allegedly, learned
it is also her from
desirehis toson
file that his wife
as well, had obtained
however a divorce
due to financial decree and
difficulties andthen married
personal a certain Innocent
circumstances. Stanley.
She, thus, requested she be
- Cipriano thereafter
considered filed with the
as a party-in-interest trialsimilar
with court prayers
a petition tofor authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was
Gerbert.
Finding merit
October in the
30,2008, thepetition,
petitionthe wascourt
deniedgranted
by RTC. theBeing
same.a The Republic,
Canadian herein
citizen had petitioner,
made him an through the Office
improper party to of institute
the Solicitor
the General
action for(OSG), sought
judicial recognition
reconsideration
foreign but it was
divorce decree. denied.
Only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy.
- The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriag
Issue
is, a marriage
W/N celebrated
the Art.26,Par.2 between
of the FamilyaCode Filipino citizen
extends toand an the
aliens alien. Thetoproper
right remedy,
petition a courtaccording to the OSG,
of this jurisdiction foristhe
to recognition
file a petitionoffor annulment
a foreign or for
divorce legal
decree.
separation.
W/N the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation in the civil registry.
- The areckoning
W/N point isdecree
foreign divorce not theis citizenship
recognizedof forthe
theparties at the time
cancellation of theofentry.
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Ruling
- However,
No, the alienrespondent hereincan
spouse (Corpuz) must prove
claim no his
rightallegation
under the that his wife
second was naturalized
paragraph of Art.26asofan
theAmerican citizen.
Family Code Likewise,
as the beforeright
substantive a foreign divorce decree
it establishes ca
is in favor
recognized
Filipina by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
spouse.
No, petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in
*The petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief.
registry
Yes, the petition for review on certiorari was granted. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree was recognized under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
Issue: Given
subject a valid
of special marriage between
proceedings to establish two theFilipino
statuscitizens,
or rightwhere one party
of a party is later naturalized
or a particular fact. It canasalso
a foreign
serve as citizen and obtainsadversarial
the appropriate a valid divorce decree by
proceeding
capacitating
the him of
applicability or the
her foreign
to remarry, can the
judgment can Filipino spouse likewise
be measured remarry
and tested under
in terms Philippine law?
of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice of the party, collusion, fraud, o
mistake of law or fact.
Ruling: The petition is GRANTED.
Articles:
Article.26 of the Family Code- bestows no rights in favor of the aliens- however the second paragraph does not necessarily strip Corpus of legal interest t
petition the RTC for the recognition of his divorce decree, provided that he follows Sec24, Rule 132 of the Rules of the Court.

Sec24,Rule 132 of the Rules of the Court:

(1) official publications
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be:
ponDoctrine: Article 26, paragraph 2. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse shall have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. No. 227)
Facts: - On January 10, 2012, the respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan
Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
- On October 15, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied the petition on the ground that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized
on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living ab
they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos’ family rights and duties, together with the
determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages.”
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals overturned the RTC decision. It ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable even if it was Ma
who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him
remarry.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not a Filipino national has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law where a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitat
her to remarry
Ruling: YES. The Court ruled that the instant case is within the purview of paragraph 2 of Article 26. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision and
partially denied the petition.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the P
does not allow divorce.
Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognized a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., o
custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.
 Doctrine: Article 26, paragraph 2. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obt
abroad by the alien spouse shall have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. No. 227)
Facts:
-Cynthia Galapon (Filipina) married Noh Shih Park (Korean) in Manila
-Marriage ended with a divorce by mutual agreement in South Korea
-Cynthia filed before the RTC (Nueva Ecija) a Petition for the Judicial Recognition of a Foreign Divorce
-RTC finds petition sufficient in form and substance and issued an order, setting the case for hearing
-OSG filed a Notice of Appearance as counsel for the Republic of the PH
-Abigail Galapon (Cynthia's sister; attorney-in-fact) testified and averred that Cynthia could not personally testify because her Korean visa expired upon h
divorce with park; claimed that Park intended to marry his ex-gf and that Cynthisa was forced to agree to the divorce coz Park threatened her life
-RTC GRANTED the Recognition Petition; Cynthia is legally capacitated to remarry under PH Laws (Art 26, Par 2 of The Family Code)
-OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that (1) the Recognition Petition should have been filed in Manila RTC coz the marriage and record there
happened there; argued that absolute divorce is not allowed in the PH; (2) considering that the divorce was not obtained by the alien spouse alone, but b
-OSG Motion for Reconsideration DENIED by RTC citing Sec 2 Rule 4 of Rules of Court which requires personal actions to be filed at the place where eithe
plaintiff or defendant resides; RTC cited that divorce decree obtained by mutual agreement of both parties, it does not preclude its recognition in PH juri
-OSG appealed to the CA
-CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC Nueva Ecija; Cynthia's Recognition Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit
-CA found no merit in the first contention of OSG; however, it agreed with OSG's second contention, reiterating that Sec 2 of Att 26 is clear that the divor
have been initiated and obtained by the foreigner spouse, not by both coz Cynthia is still covered by the nationality principle in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, a
against absolute divorces considered contrary to PH concept of public policy and morality
-CA found that the RTC erred in taking Abigail's assertion as truth that the divorce was obtained through Park's threat on Cynthia's life just to establish th
Park initiated the divorce
-Cynthia filed the present petition for review on certiorari with the SC against the CA decision
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying the recognition of the divorce decree obtained by Cynthia and foreign spouse, Park
Ruling: Cynthia's petition GRANTED. She is capacitated to remarry under PH law
NOTES: Par 2 of Art 26 has been clarified that it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained. It does not demand that the alien spouse should be
one who initiated; does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding wherein the div
was granted. Purpose of the said provision is to avoid absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse even after the divo
whichrendered the alien spouse divorced and allowed to remarry.

D and VOIDABLE MARRIAGES (ARTS. 35-54)

02-11-10 SC. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (effective March 15, 2003)
Doctrine: Art. 35 : The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41.

Facts: The petitioner was charges with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.In response, Capili filed a Motion to Suspen
Proceeding alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y.
Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil cas
declaration of nullity of the second marriage constituted as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.

Issue:Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case bigamy.

Ruling: No. It is clear that the petitioner and private respondent entered into a second marriage on December 8, 1999, while the petitioner’s first marria
Karla Y. Medina-Capili was still valid, having been contracted on September 3, 1999. The RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the second marriage to be bi
in nature. Therefore, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage’s bigamous nature does not prevent the prosecution of the petitioner fo
crime of bigamy.
 Doctrine: Art 40 states that the validity of any subsequent marriage can only subsist when a judgment regarding the nullity of the first marriage is final. T
purpose of the declaration of nullity is an all important condition in order to remarry.

Facts:
SP04 Cariño → 1st marriage w/ Nicdao + 2 children (1969), 2nd marriage w/ Yee + 0 children (1992)
SP04 Cariño passed away in 1992 under the care of Yee
Both wives filed for claims for monetary benefits
Nicdao = Php 146,000 (MBAI, PCCUI, NAPOLCOM, Pag-Ibig)
Yee = Php 21,000 (GSIS & SSS)
Yee then filed an instant case for Nicdao to give her atleast ½ of the death benefits (Nicdao failed to answer = default)
Yee contends that she did not know until the funeral + void ab initio kay Nicdao due to lack of marriage license & civil registrar records
Court ruled in Yee’s favor + give her Php73,000 + Php5,000

Issue: WoN Yee has the right to claim for the monetary benefits

Ruling: No.
Nicdao’s marriage to the deceased = void ab initio because :
No marriage certificate
No records in civil registrar as to the license
Was given opportunity to present but did not
HOWEVER : this does not give rise to Yee having the rights to the monetary death benefits because
The first marriage should be first declared as “null and void” before any of the parties can enter into a subsequent one (if not, VOID)
EFFECTS OF NULLITY : separation of property
Property Regime on Unions w/o Marriage
Art 148 : (ie biagmous, polygamous, adulterous, concubinage etc)
Doctrine:
→ if both contributed to it then common property
Doctrine:
Death
Facts: benefits were in no way contributed to by Yee, hence, she is not entitled to any part of it (not being the wife)
Doctrine:
Art 147 : no marriage or void → common prop all
Facts:
*if one is bad faith = forfeited to heirs
Issue:
Facts:
Court orders : Yee to return the Php 73,000 + Php5,000
Issue:
Ruling:
Issue:
Ruling:
Ruling:

INCAPACITY (Art. 36)

 advances from their company.
3. Ma. Samantha was admitted to the hospital due to dengue fever, and Mario failed to take care of the child. He prevents nurses from administering pre
medications to his daughter.
4.
Doctrine: Uses drugs (marijuana)
ARTICLE
Article 36
36. around Ma. Samantha. factsHe escaped rehab, is jobless, and relapsed into his drug use.
DOCTRINE:
-Psychological Art. 36.
Rosanna presented A(please
marriage
Dr.
seecontracted
Garcia,
below
a
aboutby any
physician-psychiatrist
and
party issues)
who,
as at thewitness.
expert time of She the interviewed
celebration, Rosanna,Ma.
was psychologically Samantha, incapacitated
and Jocelyn to comply
(Rosanna’s withSister)
the essentia
marital obligationsincapacity,
of a ground
marriage, shall tolikewise
void marriagebe void under
even Article
if such 36 of the Family
incapacity becomes Code, is a legal,
manifest onlynotafter
a medical,
its concept.
solemnization. As such, it is enough thatfor Ma
partie
data
that
Facts:anRobert and marital
enduring history.
part of
Mallilin filedDr.
their Garcia
a complaint declared
personality that:
forrenders
declarationthem of incapable
nullity ofofmarriage
performing undertheir essential
Art. 36 of the marital
Familyobligations.
Code. He alleged That the thatpsychological
at the time of incapacity be ro
the celebrati
1.
a
their Rosanna
particular
marriage, ispsychological
capacitated
Luz to
Jamesolamin comply
illness is
was nowith her necessary.
longer
suffering essential
from marital obligations.
psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to compl
FACTS:
2. Mario wasobligations
diagnosed and withresponsibilities.
narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance
Facts:
its
Bernardine essential S. Santos-Gantan filed a petition He
for disclosed
declaration thatof Luz wasofalready
nullity marriage living in abuse
againstCaliforniadisorder
Johnrelational
Ross
withmarried
andC.had
Gantan,
psychotic
her an
features.
American.
husband, on theHe also
groundsrevealed
of Johnthat wh
Ross'
3.
•were Mario does
Alfredo not
and have
Irene ego
were strength
married to on effectively
December self-regulate
15, 1980; 2 and face
children the marital task and stressors.
alleged psychological incapacity. Bernardine seeks the nullity of their marriage based on the argument that John Ross is psychologically incapacitated tohc
still engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in
•duties
with On
hisbothJanuary 3, 2005,
as a obligations
marital wife and as Alfredo
a mother. filed before the RTC a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity
Mario
•BeforeDuring countered:
the SC, trial, Alfredo
Robert arguedtestified
that the thatsexual
he was formerly employed
indiscretion of Luz with bydifferent
the United men States Navywith
coupled in 1978 but that
the fact was discharged
she failed to14function
monthsas later for medical
a home maker to andh
1.Rosanna
psychiatric
family and was
as a the
reasons; one
found
housewife who to
to ishim
bepsychologically
suffering
incapacitated from incapacitated.
schizophrenia
her from accepting and complying with her essential marital obligations. For said reason, he asserts that t
1)
2. Bernardine presents atried
psychological report fromwhichDr. Martha Johanna Dela Cruztotoher. support her claim of John Ross's psychological incapacity.
•of claimed was that
Luzafter not aRosanna
his discharge,
mere case to
hisoffriendscommit
sexual abortion,
atinfidelity,
church but clearlypushed
introduced him
an illness himthat
to Irene toand propose
waswentrootedto the
on latter’s boarding house
some debilitating and ended
psychological up sleeping
condition which together
incapacitated her
3.Rosanna
•carry Upon would
seeing box and kick
Alfredo in of him
Irene’s whenever
bed, Irene’sthey argued.
sister demanded that thethe
twototality
getismarried; they had their infidel
civil marriage oneand
2)
4. Theout trial
Rosanna’s
the responsibilities
court granted
uncontrollable. the She
a married
petition
would
woman.
forbang
nullity
her of Robert
the marriage
head
avers that
on tables,based
a sex
doors,on
maniac
etc, and would
not just
ofeven a mere
evidenceconflict
sexual
presented,
corporalbut
but Court
the
punishment
whoofeventually
on
is suffering
Appeals
Ma.
had
reversed
Samantha.
their
from church
a deep
this decis
wedding
psychological
stating that the problem.
evidence failed to establish John Ross's psychological incapacity.
5.
• He Alfredo claimedcited that he worked to
incidences support
where Irene the family,her
violated thatmarital
he always went home
covenant by notand never slept
submitting out.being a nagger and materialistic to which Alfredo did n
to him,
6.
peace He claimed that he voluntarily committed himself
and contentment in his marital life;this was supported by Alfredo’s aunt fot detoxification at the Medical City and completed his rehabilitation in Seagulls.
ISSUE:
-•Issue: The RTC found that Rosanna discharged the burden of proving Mario’s incapacity. Thus, voided Mario’s and Rosanna’s
The Alfredo
main issueoffered
Whether in notin
orthe Luz
caseevidence
was
is whether the expert
psychologically
or not opinion
John of isclinical
incapacitated
Ross topsychologist
comply with
psychologically Dela Cruz stating
the essential
incapacitated thatwith
obligations
to comply Alfredo’s
ofhis judgment
marriage
marital wasmarriage,
warranting
obligations. impaired and
dueawarded
the annulment custody
to schizophrenia
of their marr
Ma.Samantha
that to Rosanna,
(NO)there’s no cure to the said illness with Mario having visitation rights.
-The
• CA
Dela reversed
Cruz also RTC’s ruling:
stated thattheythe found
letter sent Dr. Garcia’s
by Irenepsychiatric
declining the evaluation
psychologicalto be unscientific
test, Irene was andsuffering
unreliable, fromsince she diagnosed
shared Mario without intervie
psychotic disorder
him,
•Ruling: and that
According she
As correctly was
to Irene, working
foundAlfredo on
by thewas pure
CA, not suppositions
sexualable to comply
infidelity and second-hand
to an agreement
or perversion information fed
where 60% ofdohis
and abandonment to her by
salary
not, one side. Thus,
would be given
by themselves, the marriage
as monthly
constitute groundsis still
forvalid
support andled
which
declaring subsisting.
a her to su
marriage
RULING:
her
based own onkids; she was able
psychological to claimRobert
incapacity. $400 for beingthat
argues Alfredo’s
the series legalofwife
sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of the psychological defect tha
Issues:
•was Irenefound
suffering didwithin
not want
her her marriage
person, which voided
could be because the
considered financial support
as nymphomania she’d
orthatbeen receiving
"excessive sexGantanmightisbeOther
hunger." cut offthan hispsychological
allegations, however,
The
-W/N Court
legalrendered that
separation the
may totality of evidence
be considered apresented
asthat symptom sufficiently
or manifestation established of John
psychological Ross
incapacity. afflicted with incapacitynothat other
hinde
•convincing
from RTC
fulfilling evidence
his the
was
marital marriage
adduced
obligations null
to to and
prove void
Bernardine due
theseto Alfredo’s
sexual
Santos-Gantan. psychological
indiscretions
The were
court incapacity
grave,
emphasized to
deeply assume
that rooted,
expert his essential
and marital
incurable
testimony on obligations
within
the the term
psychological to ofthe defendant
psychological
state of the inca
parties
-W/N
•embodied the CA
Irene in is correct
filed a
Article Motion
36. on for
reversing
New the to
Trial rule of the
which one RTCof the grounds is fraud stating that Alfredo is faking his sickness and that other documentary eviden
be accorded weight and considered decisive evidence in cases of nullity of marriages. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of Bernardine Santos-Gantan.
not state that Alfredo was suffering from schizophrenia; the motion was denied
•To stress,
IreneRobert’s
filed fortestimony
Petition for Certiorari
alone stating that
is insufficient Alfredo
to prove thehaving
existence schizophrenia
of psychological incapacity. The Court reiterated that the act of living an adultero
Rulings
Issue:
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shownisthat promiscuity was a traitThe
already
ACCORDINGLY,
Yes, as long asisofthethespouse
Petitionis isnot GRANTED.
performing Thetheir
marriagemarital of duties
Bernardine well S. Santos-Gantan
enough and John-Ross
it canobligations
be considered as a C.Gantan
grounds fordeclared
annulment. VOID AB INITIO. Courtexisof A
W/N
the Alfredo
inception
Decision dated psychologically
marriage.
June 29, 2015The incapacitated
petitioner
and Resolution must to
datedcomply
be able
June to with
3, the
establish
2016 essential
in that
CA-G.R. the marital
respondent’s
CV No. 100277 are of marriage
unfaithfulness
REVERSED was
and a manifestation
SET ASIDE. The of a
trial disordered
Court's personality,
Decision dated
No, theher
Ruling:Yes. findings
Althoughof Dr.psychological
Garcia to aredischarge
reliable,
incapacity and
the is have
not been
a medical subjected
illness toand cross-examination
will not make by Mario’s
Alfredo counsel and were based incapacitated
on documentstowritten bywitM
made
February
himself.
completely
23,
Rosanna 2012cited unable
in Civil
SuazoCasevsNo. 13-0-2010
Suazo, whereas
essential
FC, a declaring
person
obligations
to the
be
of
marriage
declared
the marital
between state.
psychologicallyBernardine S.automatically
incapacitatedSantos-Gantan
need
psychologically
not and
be John-Rossinterviewed
personally C. Gantan asby comply
void
the ab initio
clinician
essential
REINSTATED obligations under Articles 68-71 of the Family code, he is still psychologically incapacitated in the sense that his illness led him to do clear acts o
court to nullify the
dysfunctionality thatmarriage.
undermined So long Irene as the
and totality
their family.of evidence proves the spouse as psychologically incapacitated. Rosanna adds that PI is incurable, but
necessarily
Doctrine: in medical sense. For her, incurability
He believed that he is the son of God, his refusal to live with Irene is manifested by ingrained
and to livebehaviour manifested
with his family is God’s during thebelieved
will, he marriagethat by the
he canPI spouse.
have as many wives as
which is not only illegal but disrespect of his marital vow to Irene.
Facts:

Issue:
UE TO ABSENCE OF SPOUSE (Arts. 41-43)
Ruling:
 A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappe
being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.

Facts:
Doctrine:
On July 27,ART.
2007, 41.the
A marriage
Regionalcontracted
Trial Court by any person
of Tarlac during the
City declared subsistence
petitioner of a previous
Celerina J. Santos marriage
(Celerina)shall be null anddead
presumptively void,after
unless
herbefore the celebratio
husband, responden
subsequent
Ricardo marriage,
T. Santos the prior
(Ricardo), hadspouse had been
filed a petition forabsent for four
declaration ofconsecutive years and thedeath
absence or presumptive spouseforpresent had aof
the purpose well-founded
remarriage on belief that
June 15,the absent
2007. spo
Ricardo
already dead.
remarried In case of disappearance
on September 17, 2008. where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code
absencealleged
Ricardo of only thattwo heyears shall be
exerted sufficient.
efforts to locate Celerina. Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition si
Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.
For November
On the purpose 17,of2008,
contracting
Celerina thefiled
subsequent
a petitionmarriage under the
for annulment precedingbefore
of judgment paragraph, the spouse
the Court present
of Appeals on themust institute
grounds a summary
of extrinsic proceeding
fraud and lack of as juri
pro
this Code
She argued forthat
theshedeclaration of presumptive
was deprived deathwhen
her day in court of theRicardo,
absentee, without
despite his prejudice
knowledge toof
the effect
her true of reappearance
residence, of the absent
misrepresented spouse.
to the court that she was
resident of Tarlac City. According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had been
Facts: Remar
Ricardo's Quiñonez
conjugal and since
dwelling Lovelyn 1989 areuntil
husband
Ricardoandleft
wife
in with two children
May 2008. living
As a result ofinRicardo's
Bislig City. Sometime in2001,
misrepresentation, Lovelyn
she left to meet
was deprived relatives
of any in Manila
notice of and
three-monthtovacation.
opportunity oppose Within the first
the petition 3 months
declaring her theywere able to
presumptively contact each other thru cellphone. Their communication eventually tapered off until
dead.
thecommunication
Celerina claimed that between the spousesofceased
all the allegations Ricardo altogether.Remar
were fraudulent,thought
that shethat hisresided
never wife justinlost herand
Tarlac cellphone, so to
never left hework
inquired
as aabout her helper
domestic from their relatiF
abroad.
BisligCity.
she Someone
also claimed thatinformed
it was not himtruethat hisshe
that wife was
had thenabsent
been alreadyforcohabiting
12 years. It with
wasanother
he whoman andconjugal
left the would nolonger
dwellingbe in coming
May 2008 back
to out of shame.
cohabit with another
OnNovember 2003, Remar's uncle informed him that Lovelyn was in Bislig City to visit their children.However, Remar was not able to meet her. He also f
woman.
find Court
The her when he wentissued
of Appeals back the
to Manila
resolutionandthen
dated toNovember
Batangas and 28, Cavite in the summer
2008, dismissing of 2004.OnFebruary
Celerina's 27, 2013,ofafter
petition for annulment almostfor
judgment ten (10) ayears
being wrong of mode
trying o
about theAccording
remedy. whereabouts to the ofCourt
his wifefrom
of Appeals, theirthe
relatives
properproved
remedyfutile,
was toRemar
file a filed
sworn a Petition
statement for before
Declaration of Presumptive
the civil Deathher
registry, declaring before theRTC. The
reappearance in latte
acco
granted
with the 42
Article petition.Subsequently,
of the Family Code. Celerinathe Republic
filed of the Philippines
a motion (Republic) filed
for reconsideration a Petition
but the same wasforCertiorari
denied. before the CA seeking to annul the RTC. The Re
argued that Remar failed to establish that he "exerted proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain Lovelyn's whereabouts and whet
not sheis still alive." The petition was denied.Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained jud
Issue: Thepresumptive
declaring sole issue fordeath.
the Court's resolution is whether the CA erred when it found sufficient legal basis to uphold the declaration of Lovelyn's presump
death.
Ruling:
Ruling:
Yes. ThePetition
provision Granted.
on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse w
The Decision
declared and Resolution
presumptively deadrespectively
from availing dated
otherJune 29, 2017
remedies and January
existing 31, 2018
in law. This courtrendered by the
had, in fact, Court ofthat
recognized Appeals in CA-G.R.marriage
a subsequent SP No. 07581-MIN
may also be areterm
REVERSED
by filing "anand SET in
action ASIDE.
court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effect
Necessarily,
contends that the Judgment dated
reappearance is notApril 11, 2016remedy
a sufficient issued by the Regional
because Trialterminate
it will only Court of Surigao City, Branch
the subsequent 32, in but
marriage Special Proceedings
not nullify No. 7669
the effects is declaratio
of the also REVE
and SET ASIDE.
presumptive Consequently,
death the petition
and the subsequent of respondent Remar A. Quinonez to have his wife, Lovelyn Uriarte Quiñonez declared presumptively dead for
marriage.
purpose of
Celerina remarriage
is correct. Sinceis an
DENIED.
undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriag
be considered
Doctrine: legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages." If it is terminated by mere
reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment decl
presumptive
Facts: death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. Thus, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullify
effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's cho
file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
Issue:

Ruling:

VOIDABLE MARRIAGES (Arts. 45- 54)

 dismissed.
Ruling
Yes. Bugayong and Ginez slept together and had sexual intercourse as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day when they met in Pangasinan while he wa
-aware The
Doctrine: burden
of the of proofand
accusations to show theadultery
alleged nullity ofthat
marriage restsdoing.
Ginez was with Leonida and why
The reason no sufficient
the lowerproof
Courtwas presented
dismissed thetocomplaint
substantiate
wasthe allegations
because that Ma
of condoning
acharges
homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage.
of adultery that the husband had preferred in the complaint against his wife. The reconciliation between the two occurred almost ten months a
came
Facts: to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
-Doctrine
Homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation (Art 55). It is the concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage. Concealm
this
Issue: is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud.
case
Art 100, Civil Code- The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adul
Condonation-
Ruling: it is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or, “conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband o
of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed”.
EPARATIONShackleton
(Arts. 55 – vs
67)Shackleton- “condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity, such acts necessary implied forgivenes
02-11-11-SC on Legal
entirely Separation
consonant with(effective
reason andMarch 15,that
justice 2003)
if the wife freely consents to sexual intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband’s guilt, her co
should operate as a pardon of his wrong.”

Doctrine: Article 56
Facts: - On August 18, 1953, the petitioner Carmen o. Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against the respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio. - The petiti
and the respondent were married civilly and canonically in 1934. They had lived together as husband and wife and that they had no child.
- In 1943, the respondent abandoned the petitioner and the latter discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa
Manila in March 1949.
- The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a legal separation decree against the respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio and be deprived of his share of the conju
partnership profits.
- In his counter-affidavit, the respondent prayed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground that of his prior a
subsisting marriage with Go Hiok which was celebrated according to Chinese law and customs.
- Before the trial could be completed, the petitioner died in a vehicular accident in May 1969.
- The respondent moved to dismiss the “petition for legal separation” on two grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the
year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
- The counsel of the petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen with her father, Macario Lapuz. However, the counsel of the respondent oppos
motion.
Issue: Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in action for legal separation, abate the action? If so, will abatement also apply if the
involves property rights?
Ruling: YES. The death of the plaintiff in action for legal separation abated the action.
- An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this
jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) t
legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree
legal separation already rendered.
- An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree o
separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these c
are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical a
definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
 Doctrine: Art 55 Par 1 of the Family Code: A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or g
abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner.
Facts:
-William Ong married Lucita Ong in Manila in July 13, 1975; 3 children are no longer minors
-Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Art. 55 Par 1 of the Family Code with the RTC Dagupan, alleging that her life with WIlliam was marked
physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct
-After 3 years of marriage, almost everyday, they would quarrel with William verbally abuisng her, slap, kick, pull her hair, bang her hair against concrete
throw anything at her; reasons for fights were petty things regarding their children or their business
-William also beat their children
-Lucita left the house on Dec 9, 1995 after being badly beaten and threatened with a gun; had her injuries treated by her parents' doctor.
-William denied all of Lucita's allegations
-RTC decreed legal separation with dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties
-William appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC decision on the grounds that Lucita's and witnesses' testimonies were uncontroverted and credible,
William did not explain, instead made a general denial. Between general denial and affirmative assertion, weight must be accorded to the affirmative ass
-William filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was DENIED by the CA
-William filed the present Petition for Review with the SC seeking the resversal of the CA and RTC decisions
Issue:
-Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in disregarding clear evidence that the petition for legal separation was instituted by Lucita just to rem
William's control and ownership of their conjugal properties and to transfer these to Lucita's family
-Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in disregarding clear evidence rejecting Lucita's claim of repeated physical violence and grossly abusiv
conduct of William
Ruling: William's petition DENIED for lack of merit; costs against William
Relevance sa doctrine: Although Lucita abandoned the family, she did so due to William's abusive conduct. Such does not fall within Art 56 Par 4 of the F
Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation, which William argued. The abandon
referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year.
NOTES: (di relevant sa doctrine, pero isasama ko, just in case) William's petition was denied because questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. CA upholds findings of fact of the trial court.
The only instances when SC reviews findings of fact are:
1. When findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
2. When inference made is manifestly mistaken
3. When there is grave abuse of discretion
4. When the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts
AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
of their marriage, they had 6 children.

On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children,
and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug pre
by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.

On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition 10 for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano
due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.

On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged th
respondents11 refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano

Issue:May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss?

Ruling:No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

a Writ Of Habeas Corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one en
thereto. The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
 than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator.

Facts:
1955, Atty Adriano & Soriano got married and had 6 children (2 sons, 3 daughters + 1 adopted daughter)
Turned sour and “separated-in-fact”
Atty Adriano courted his client, Valino and cohabited as husband and wife but still provided support to Soriano & children
1992, Atty Adriano died. Valino paid for the funeral expenses.
Soriano was in the US w/ the kids but when she came to know of his death, she called Valino requesting to delay the internment.
Valino did not heed the request and carried on.
Soriano filed for damages (ground : Deprived of attendance to the burial) + his body be relocated
Valino’s Defense :
Soriano and deceased were separated for 20yrs already
He introduced her as her wife to everyone
She took good care of him + expenses
Although she admitted that he still gave support to Soriano and their children
RTC : ruled in favor of Valino (bc Soriano did not care for him)
CA : favored Soriano as wife
Art 305 of Civil Code = Wife has duty and right to arrange for the funeral
Did not ask for damages bc Valino was in good faith

Issue: Who is entitled to the remains of the deceased?

Ruling: Soriano as the legal wife.

Art 199 of Fam Code provides a hierarchy on who is obliged to give support
1st - spouse
2nd - descendants of nearest degree
3rd - ascendants in nearest degree
4th - siblings
Art 308 of Civil Code reiterates that no body shall be retained, interred, disposed or exhumed w/o consent of those ^^
“SPOUSE” → lawfully wedded spouse (not common law)
The right and duty to arrange for their spouse’s funeral arrangements CANNOT be waived unless expressly said.
Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator.
Valino’s claim that Adriano wanted to be buried @ their Memorial Park was baseless bc other than her testimony, there was no other corroborative evid
Should there be any DOUBT as to the intentions of the deceased, the court will rule in favor of the LEGITIMATE FAMILY
Ex gratia argumenti → w/o legal obligation
Art 307 of Civil Code → formal rites of a funeral (need to be in a form of testamentary document ; not inferred lightly)
Doctrine:
Wishes of defendant on funeral = NOT ABSOLUTE (not contrary to law or morals or public policy)
Corpse
Doctrine:→ outside the commerce of man but it is still a family right
Facts:
Doctrine:
TY RELATIONS
Facts:
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Issue:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Issue:
Ruling:
Ruling:
 Eliodoro
**Article died on Juneto
122 applies 28,debts
2008. were contracted by a spouse and redounded to the benefit of the family. It applies specifically to the loan that respon
-On The petitioners
September 30,claimed
2010, their that
Avegail right of ownership
brought an actionbybefore presenting
RTC for a Deed of Absolute
Annulment Sale and
of Donation that
and thewith
Title landPrayer
was afor solea Temporary
proterty of Juan as he accquired
Restraining Order anditath
wife
inheritance. Lilia contracted,
Thus it wasbut not
sold to the
without mortgage.
without consent from his legal wife Juliana
Preliminary Injunction against Nixon. Avegail alleged that she is one of the children of the late Eliodoro and Adelita. Eliodoro executed solely a Deed of D
involving
3. No, thethe subject property
respondent on the basis ofLaches
the alleged RWRapplyexecuted bythe
herdelay
mother Adelita. She claimed that thebyRWR and DoD are clearly prejudicia
-interest CA concluded that theisDeed
not guilty
offutureof laches.
Absolute Sale between doespetitioners
not where
and Juan is within
is void and of nothe period
legal effectprescribed
(Jaun's sigiture law.
was forged)
As foundbecause by the trialit affected her
court, records show inheritance
that uponorlearning legitime. about the mortgage, respondent immediately informed the bank about his forged signature.
filed
-Issue: Alsothe Complaint
based on TtheforTCT Annulment
56899 from of Certificate
the registryofofSale andthe
deeds Real Estate
land wasMortgage
acquired by against petitioner
Juan back in 1965within
when theheprescribed
was married period to redeem
to Juliana whicha makes
mortgaged the
property;
property and since
presumably respondent
conjugal. filed the Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real Estate Mortgage within the period of redemption presc
1. Whether
law, petitioner thefails
ruling of the CAthat
to convince and respondent
the RTC violated slept the ruleright.
on his on res judicata when they did not treat as final and executory the earlier Decision in the
declaration of nullity of marriage case
Doctrine:
2.
Definition:Whether Article
the CA 151and the RTC erred in ruling that the property regime of Eliodoro and Adelita was still covered by the ACP despite the final decision de
Issue:
their marriage Whethervoid the CA erred in declaring that the subject property is the conjugal property of the late spouses Juan and Juliana.
ab initio.
Facts:
3.
Doctrine:
Laches: Whether thethe
Article
means DoD
148 executed
failure by Eliodoro
or neglect, for aninunreasonable
favor of Nicxon andisunexplained
valid.[33] length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should ha
-been Alberto done Moreno
earlier. It isfiled a complaint
negligence or against to
omission Hiyas Savings
assert a rightand LoanaBank
within Inc., histime,
reasonable wife warranting
Remedios, the spouses Felipe
a presumption thatand
the Maria
party Owe andtothe
entitled Register
assert itArtico
eith
Ruling:
of
Ruling: No. Given
Caloocan for thethe very stipulations
cancellation of it. made during
mortgage contending the Pre-Trial
thatinhethe andnot
did TCT No. 56899,
secure any loanrespondents
from had laid the
the petitioner norpredicate
the signingfor and
the presumption
execution under
of any contrac
Facts:
abandoned
to it or declined to assert that the property was acquired during the marriage of their parents. To overcome the presumption in favor of the coa
As the Court explained preceding paragraphs, the Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 five years
1. beYes.
mortgage
•Rosario's
invoked.
Miguel because Theyhe
Palang
repudiation
had
andwas
of
established
theworking
Carlina
express abroad
Palang were
trust, stillmarried
within in 1949;
the 10-year they had a daughter,
prescriptive periodHerminia
for enforcement
partnership,
2. Yes. petitioners were required to prove the contrary. Unfortunately, petitioners' evidence thatofTCT suchNo. trusts.
56899Thiswasdoes not constitute
registered an unreason
in the name of Juan
•delay
married In
in 1950,
asserting
to Miguel
Juliana one's
and flew
the to
right. Hawaii
saleA delay
from for work
within
the the
previous and even attempted
prescriptive
owner. period toisdivorce
sanctioned Carlina
by in
law Hawaii.
and is He
not came back
considered to
to the
be Philippines
a delay that but refused
would bar to liveLaches
relief with ha
Doctrine:
-3.
•onlyNo. Hiyas
Inthe
in filed
1973, the
absence a motion
then for dismissal
of a63-year
statutory on the
oldprescriptive
Miguel ground
period.that
contracted respondent
another marriage failed
withtoErlinda
comply with the
Agapay (19Article 151 to
years old) of which
the Family Code,awhich
produced states that no suits
son, Kristopher
between
The
• first twotwomembers
months of
issuespriorwillthebesame
to resolved
the family
second shallasprosper
jointly
marriage, they unless
involve
Miguel itErlina
andthe should appear
correctness
jointly offrom
bought the
the alower
parcelverified
courts' complaint
finding that
of agricultural or petition
landtheinearlier that
Binalonan earnest
Marriage effort toward
Nullity
Pangasinan Decisiona declaring
comprom
Facts:
have
and
•Petition been
void the
a house made,
marriage
and but
lot that
were the
betweenalso same haveand
Eliodoro
purchased failed.
but Adelita
solely did notthe
under attain
name finality
of prior to Eliodoro's death on June 28, 2008.Both the RTC and the CA committed
Erlina
patent is hereby
error in theirDENIED.
factual Accordingly,
finding in thisthe Decision dated April 21, 2015 and Resolution datedremained
May 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 9
•are AFFIRMED.
Miguel and Erlinda were convicted ofcase that the
concubinage marriage between
upon Carlina’s Eliodoro
complaint and2 Adelita
and years later, Miguel valid
diedand subsisting until Eliodoro's death on Ju
Issue:
-2008.
• RTC ruled
Carlina andin Herminia
favor of Moreno instituted thus anHiyas
actionfiledfor arecovery
petitionof forownership
certiorari and claiming that the
possession RTCdamages
with erred in seeking
their rulingfor the Riceland and the house and lot al
Nullity
• Decision
Erlinda citedbecame final and
the Article 148 executory
of the family on code
July 6,which
2005,states
as confirmed
that in caseswith offinality in the CAofDecision
cohabitation a man and in the Annulment
a woman of Judgment
not capacitated toPetition,
marry each prior to
othe
Ruling:
Eliodoro's death. Then the marriage between him and Adelita, which was celebrated on December 10, 1975 at Infanta, Pangasinan, was null and void ab
Doctrine:
Issue:
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code as declared in the Marriage Nullity Decision.
Doctrine:
1.
Since
W/N WON
the the RTC
marriage erred
between inMARRIAGE
their
the ruling
Adelita and that
and alotstranger
Eliodoro could
was judicially not invoke
decreed tolack
be of earnest
void effort
ab initio to compromised
or from the beginning, as atheground
RTC and to dismiss
the CA the
herecase involving
in this case cl
PERTY REGIMES Facts:the
OF agricultural
UNIONS land and
WITHOUT house should be awarded to Erlinda
strangers
erred
Ruling:inNo.their rulingwas
Erlinda thatunable
the ACP to regime
prove that governed
she actuallytheir property
contributed relations.
to the purchase of the land given her young age during the purchase and that she is
Facts:
2.
Article
As to theWON
147 ofthe
house RTC
theand committed
Family
lot, Atty. isgrave
CodeConstantino abuse
the applicable of discretion
Sagun provision
testified andin ruling
that the thatprovided
rules
Miguel Artco-ownership
on 151 not
the amoney
ground fortoits
govern dismiss
the the and
property
purchase case involving
acquired
directed stranger
during
that the cohabitation
Erlinda’s name alone or "comm
be plac
Issue:
marriage of Eliodoro and Adelita.
Doctrine:
Issue:
Ruling:
Article The ofSupreme Courts denied the petitionmandates
for lack ofthat:merit.
Ruling: 147 the Family Code, which expressly "Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the prope
1.
acquired No.during
The Court ruled thatand
cohabitation theowned
requirement
in common, underwithout
Art 151the is applicable
consent ofonly thein casesuntil
other, which afterarethe
exclusively
termination between or cohabitation."
of their among members of the same
Therefore, the
Facts:
Ruling:
it necessary
void as this isthat it follows disposition
a prohibited that the same mayArticle
under be invoke 147 ofonlythebyFamily
a party who is a member of that same family.
Code.
2. No. Art 151 – No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earne
Issue:
effort toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
MILY (Arts. 149 – 151)
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to the suit in
Ruling:
members of the same family the law no longer makes it a precedent that earnest effort be made towards a compromise before an action can prosper.

FAMILY HOME (Arts. 152 – 162)

long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment ex
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a)

Facts:
- Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patria
herein petitioners. By Decision2 of April 15, 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the company to pay the aggreg
amount of ₱1,661,490.30.
- As the judgment was deemed final and executory (with no settlement forged), the Labor Arbiter issued on September 8, 2005 a writ of execution which
Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name covered by TCT No. 38978, situate
Pandacan, Manila (Pandacan property).
- Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution, alleging that the property was a family home.
- By Order of August 2, 2006, the Labor Arbiter denied the motion to quash, hence, Ramos and the company appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the La
Arbiter’s Order.
- When Ramos died, Petitioners filed before the NLRC, as third-party claimants, a Manifestation questioning the Notice to Vacate issued by the Sheriff.
- The Labor Arbiter was later to deny, by Decision of May 7, 2009, the third-party claim, holding that Ramos’ death and petitioners’ substitution as his
compulsory heirs would not nullify the sale at auction of the Pandacan property.
- NLRC would later affirm the Labor Arbiter’s ruling,, noting that petitioners failed to exercise their right to redeem the Pandacan property within the one
period or until January 16, 2009. The NLRC brushed aside petitioners’ contention that they should have been given a fresh period of 1 year from the time
Ramos’ death on July 29, 2008 or until July 30, 2009 to redeem the property.
- As to petitioners’ claim that the property was covered by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains and as such only Ramos’ share can be levied upon,
NLRC ruled that petitioners failed to substantiate such claim and that the phrase in the TCT indicating the registered owner as "Ernesto Ramos, married t
Juanita Trinidad, Filipinos," did not mean that both owned the property, the phrase having merely described Ramos’ civil status.
- Before the appellate court, petitioners alleged that Art. 153 of the Family Code was applicable, hence, they no longer had to resort to judicial or extraju
constitution.
- In the assailed Decision of September 24, 2008, the appellate court, in denying petitioners’ appeal, held that the Pandacan property was not exempted
execution, for while "Article 1538 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupie
family residence, [it] did not mean that the article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as
homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code."
- The appellate court went on to hold that what was applicable law were Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code, hence, there was still a need to either judic
extrajudicially constitute the Pandacan property as petitioners’ family home before it can be exempted; and as petitioners failed to comply therewith, th
no error in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution.

Issue:
Doctrine:
- Whether the Pandacan Property which was constituted as a "family home" in 1944 is exempted from the writ of execution and sale at auction based on
Doctrine:
provision of Article 153 of the Family Code.
Facts:
Facts:
Ruling: The petition is DENIED. Since the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988 (effectivity of the Family Code), or as early as 1944, the peti
Issue:
must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code.
Issue:
Ruling:
Ruling:
Doctrines:
Family Code Art 153: The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sa
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Family Code Art 155-3: The famiy home shall be xempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: For debts secured by mortgages on the premis
before or after such constitution
Facts:
-Araceli De Mesa and Ernesto De Mesa purchased a parcel of land (subject property) while they were merely cohabiting (live-in) before marriage. The pa
land was registered under Araceli's name. House was constructed, which they occupied as their family home after they got married
-Araceli obtained a 100k-loan from Claudio Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on the abovementioned property
-Araceli issued a check drawn against China Banking Corp payable to Claudio
-Check was dishonored as the account from which it was drawn had already been closed. De Mesas failed to heed Claudio's subsequent demand for paym
-Claudio filed a complaint for the violation of bouncing check act against De Mesas with RTC-Malolos
-RTC acquitted the De Mesas but ordered them to pay 100k with legal intestest from date of demand until fully paid
-Writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Samonte levied upon the subject property; sold on public auction; Claudio highest bidder and cert of sale was is
him
-Leased the property to De Mesas and Juanito Oliva for 5.5k montly rent; defaulted in payment and the unpaid rent ballooned to 170,500 pesos
-Title transfered to Claudio; filed a complaint of ejectment with MTC of Meycauayan against De Mesas and Juanito
-MTC ordered De Mesas and Juanito to vacate the property as the Title shows Claudio as the owner, contrary to the claim of the De Mesas
-De Mesas never assailed the levy made by Sheriff Samonte
-De Mesas appealed MTC's decision to the RTC, but dismissed; sought reconsideration but denied
-De Mesas filed a petition for review with the CA, assailing the RTC's decision; CA denied the petition
-De Mesas filed a complaint to nullify the TCT No. T-221755 and other documents with damages with the RTC-Malolos; asserted that the subject propert
family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code Art 153: The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time i
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continue
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
-De Mesas argued that the family home could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of execution when they failed to pay C
-RTC dismissed De Mesa's complaint to nullify the TCT, citing Family Code Art 155-3: For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before of after such
constitution
-RTC ruled that even assuming the property is a family home, the fact that it was mortgaged to secure a loan, makes it a subject to execution
-Appealed to CA but was denied and affirmed RTC's disposition
-Sought reconsideration but denied by CA
-De Mesas filed a petition for review on certiorari with SC, praying for the cancellation of the TCT under Claudio's name
Issues:
 Owner

Cabaluna, John Brian

Garbo, Rena
 Contreras, Ken

Rosales, Richelle

Prodigalidad , Ira
Castronuevo, Melvin
Sarmiento, Hannah
Limlingan, Marry Jesse Therese
Belostrino, Joanne Camille

CUSTODIO, JOSE LOPE

Inoncillo, Paula Rhenee
 Jacob, Angel Janica

MAROHOM, HEMANODEN

Jardinel, Jasmine
Fulgencio, Jhoanna Fe

Andal, Gabriella Louise

Cabaluna, John Brian S.
Mijares, Sherelyn
Gonzales, Ma. Niña
 Garbo, Rena

Contreras, Ken
Rosales, Richelle
Prodigalidad , Ira
 Castronuevo, Melvin

Sarmiento, Hannah
Limlingan, Marry Jesse Therese
Belostrino, Joanne Camille

CUSTODIO, JOSE LOPE

 Inoncillo, Paula Rhenee

Jacob, Angel Janica

MAROHOM, HEMANODEN
 Jardinel, Jasmine

Fulgencio, Jhoanna Fe

Andal, Gabriella Louise

Cabaluna, John Brian

Mijares, Sherelyn
Gonzales, Ma. Niña
 Garbo, Rena

Contreras, Ken
Rosales, Richelle
Prodigalidad , Ira
 Castronuevo, Melvin

Sarmiento, Hannah
Limlingan, Marry Jesse Therese

Belostrino, Joanne Camille

CUSTODIO, JOSE LOPE
Inoncillo, Paula Rhenee
Jacob, Angel Janica

MAROHOM, HEMANODEN
Jardinel, Jasmine
Fulgencio, Jhoanna Fe

Andal, Gabriella Louise

Gonzales, Ma. Niña
Mijares, Sherelyn