IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. ___________

[To come],

Plaintiff,

v.

AILEEN MERCEDES CANNON,

Defendant.

COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

Comes now Plaintiff TBD, in propria persona, stating the following in support of this

Complaint and Jury Demand:

INTRODUCTION

1. In a manner eerily reminiscent of National Enquirer chairman David Pecker’s crim-

inal scheme to “catch and kill” salacious stories about Donald Trump to aid him in his 2016

run for the Presidency, on information and belief, Defendant Judge Aileen Mercedes Cannon

is attempting to “catch and kill” the Government’s case against criminal defendant and

1
former President Donald J. Trump (“Mr. Trump”) for stealing sensitive documents, styled

Trump v. United States, Case No. 9:23-cr-80101-AMC (S.D.Fla. filed 2023), for the express

purpose of aiding him in his 2024 run for the Presidency.

2. Section 455(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides: Any justice, judge, or

magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which

his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” (emphasis added).

3. On or about May 13, 2024, during an impromptu ‘press conference’ conducted at the

close of the day of another of his many trials, Mr. Trump questioned the impartiality of New

York Supreme Court Justice Juan Merchan:

“But we have a corrupt judge. We have a judge who’s highly conflicted, keeping me
from campaigning. He’s an appointed judge. You know who appointed him? Democrat
politicians. He’s appointed. He’s a corrupt judge, and he’s a conflicted judge, and he
ought to let us go out and campaign, and get rid of this scam….”

Trump Posts Videos of Himself FREAKING OUT after Trial (video), Meidas Touch, May

14, 2024 at 1:00, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjKag8tI404 (repost of Fox News

broadcast, aired at 4:28 P.M. EDT).

4. On or about May 14, 2024, with a time stamp of 7:03 A.M. local time, Mr. Trump

posted another tweet on his Truth Social platform, whining that “The problem with this

Judge, Merchan, is TOTALLY COMPROMISED, CONFLICTED, AND CORRUPT, MAK-

ING BIG MONEY OFF THIS SCAM AND ITS OUTCOME. He can’t render a fair deci-

sion, too much is at stake for him and the Democrats.” Donald J. Trump, Tweet, Truth Social,

May 14, 2024 (time stamp at 5:03 A.M. MDT; copy retained, emphasis in original).

5. On information and belief, Defendant Cannon accepted at least two all-expenses-paid

vacations at a luxury hunting lodge and failed to file the required Privately Funded Seminar

Disclosure Reports in a timely manner, creating a self-evident appearance of conflict:

2
 “Cannon, however, somehow forgot to [file the report], so anyone who might be
interested in learning who was paying for Cannon’s vacations and the nature of her ju-
dicial education would have been out of luck.

So why do we suppose Judge Cannon was so shy about who’s paying for her luxury
trips and what she might have learned there? Oh, I don’t know … might it be because
she didn’t want anyone to know about her links to the Leonard Leo wing of legal theory?
Could it have been that she didn’t want it known that she had taken money from an
organization that was in large part funded by billionaires friendly to the man whose case
she was presiding over?

I mean, 10 grand or so in first-class air travel and luxury accommodations and bot-
tomless trips to the luxo-resort’s “local produce” salad bar and steak pit might start to
look like a bribe when you pay attention to what was actually being discussed between
float trips down the Yellowstone and hikes through the mountains, don’t you think?

Wouldn’t you love to see the thank-you notes Cannon sent to Leonard Leo and his
pals? I would. But until NPR called up Judge Cannon and asked her about her journeys
out to the Montana luxury resort, nobody knew a thing about who had tried to curry
favor with her. That was when she hurriedly filled out the forms and posted the disclo-
sure she had actually been required to post within 30 days of returning from her trip. So
now we know what she was concealing, but we didn’t know where she had been or who
she had been listening to when she first got the Trump case and made the rulings —
later overturned by judges of the 11th Circuit — that many legal experts had said were
ridiculously favorable to Trump.”

Lucian K. Truscott IV, Judge Cannon's secret right-wing getaway: Why didn't we know about

this?, Salon (May 7, 2024), at https://www.salon.com/2024/05/07/cannons-secret-right-

wing-getaway-why-didnt-we-know-about-this/

6. Even Mr. Trump would be forced to concede that a judge who was (1) appointed by a

defendant and (2) improperly interfered in a criminal investigation (3) in a matter where the

outcome would have a substantial likelihood of affecting her career prospects and (4) failed

to disclose lavish partisan ‘gifts’, see Overview of Privately Funded Seminars Disclosure

System, United States Federal Courts (website), at https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judge-

ships/privately-funded-seminars-disclosure/overview-privately-funded-seminars-disclosure

3
(accessed May 14, 2024), is one in which “[her] impartiality might reasonably be ques-

tioned.”

7. 18 U.S.C. § 3 provides: “Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States

has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or

prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.” There is no

known exception for the official acts of federal judges.

8. The Framers’ Constitution contained an array of effective remedies for abuse of gov-

ernmental power in general, and judicial power in particular. Where a judge acts corruptly,

an ordinary citizen can remove him or her from the bench under the Article III Good Behav-

iour Clause. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.1

9. English law sourced in Coke, Blackstone, and the Year Books defines this seemingly

abstruse term of legal art with remarkable precision. By making a public official subject to

removal for violating it, the condition of “good behavior” defined the powers of any given

office. Coke and Blackstone listed four separate grounds for the violation of good behavior

tenure relevant to judges: abuse of office, nonuse of office, willful refusal to exercise an

office, and oppression and tyrannical partiality.2

1
Article III judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. “It cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction
is inadmissible, unless the words require it.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).
2
Coke listed three grounds for forfeiture of good behavior tenure: abuse of office, nonuse of office, and willful
refusal to exercise an office. R. v. Bailiffs of Ipswich [1706] 91 Eng. Rep. 378 (K.B.) (corporate recorder for-
feited office for failure to attend corporate meetings); Henry v. Barkley [1596] 79 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1224 (K.B.);
see generally, Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behavior” Tenure, 79 Yale L.J. 1475 (1970);
Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 Yale L.J. 72, 88-128 (2006).
Blackstone adds "oppression and tyrannical partiality of judges, justices, and other magistrates, in the admin-
istration and under the colour of their office." 4 Wm. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *140
(1765). When an Article III judge is elevated to the federal bench, s/he swears an oath to "administer justice
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and ... faithfully and impartially
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon" him or her, 28 U.S.C. § 453, thereby defining the scope
of his duties and obligations.

4
 10. The oath of judicial office, 28 U.S.C. § 453—which has not changed since 1791,

Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (Sept. 24, 1789)—provides federal judges with fair notice

of their constitutional obligations.3

11. “It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without

effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.” Mar-

bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).

12. "When an office held ‘during good behavior’ is terminated by the grantee’s misbe-

havior, there must be an ‘incident’ power to ‘carry the law into execution’ if ‘good behavior’

is not to be an impotent formula." Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Prob-

lems, 2d ed., 132 (Harvard U. Pr. 1999).

13. Congress previously concluded that neither it nor the President has power to enforce

good behavior tenure.4

3
As Coke and Blackstone was the Colonial lawyer’s Bible, this understanding was common currency among
the Framers. In the Federalist, in arguing against judicial removal by the legislature via the power of address,
Alexander Hamilton observed that “the standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial
magistracy, ... [is] the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and
impartial administration of the laws.” The Federalist No. 87, 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (I. Kramnick ed. 1987).
“Brutus,” though expressing his misgivings, agreed that “judges holding their commissions during good be-
havior [was] a proper provision provided they were made properly responsible.” “Brutus,” The Power of the
Judiciary, New-York Journal, Mar. 20, 1788.
4
During debate over the Chase impeachment, Congress acknowledged its inability to enforce good behavior
tenure. Senator Hemphill recounted the Framers’ intent that "the words in the Constitution rendered the judges
independent of both the other branches of government." 5 Elliot’s Debates 444 (remarks of Sen. Hemphill (F-
PA). As the right to decide what is or is not "good behavior" sua sponte is a de facto power of address, it does
not appear to have been the intent of the Framers to entrust that power to Congress. This view was reinforced
a established a century ago in the investigation of Judge Emory Speer of the District of Georgia, who was
charged with "despotism, tyranny, oppression, and maladministration" in the course of his judicial decision-
making. Charles Geyh, When Courts and Congress Collide: The Struggle for Control of America’s Courts 160
(U. Mich. Press 2008). Specifically, the congressional committee concluded that "a series of legal oppressions
[constituting] an abuse of judicial discretion" did not constitute an impeachable offense, id. at 160-61 (quota-
tions omitted), despite their being self-evident serial violations of his good behavior tenure. Moreover, had the
Framers intended to foreclose enforcement of good behavior tenure, they would have retained the power of
address, and not imposed the condition.

5
 14. The United States Supreme Court’s inherent power and duty of superintendence of

all lower courts extends only to ensuring uniformity of decisions and that judges observe the

limits of their lawful jurisdiction.5

15. “Citizen” is the highest office in the land; the citizenry retains ultimate sovereignty

as tenants-in-common, retaining the common-law duty to “keep the King’s peace.”6

At common law, good behavior tenure was originally enforced by the King. But as the power concerned
only the interests of his subjects, and as the King exercised it only in parens patriae, he was bound by law to
allow the use of it to any subject interested. Blackstone explains:
“WHERE the crown hath unadvisedly granted any thing by letters patent, which ought not to be granted,
or where the patentee hath done an act that amounts to a forfeiture of the grant, the remedy to repeal
the patent is by writ of scire facias in chancery. This may be brought either on the part of the king, in
order to resume the thing granted; or, if the grant be injurious to a subject, the king is bound of right to
permit him (upon his petition) to use his royal name for repealing the patent in a scire facias.”
3 Blackstone, Commentaries at 260-61 (1765) (emphasis added); see, United States v. American Bell Tel. Co.,
28 U.S. 315, 360 (1888) (explaining the process).
5
In a lecture on the nature of courts, Justice (Professor) James Wilson—the principal author of Article III—
explains why a supreme court is an essential feature of any rational system of jurisprudence:
“In every judicial department, well arranged and well organized, there should be a regular, progressive,
gradation of jurisdiction; and one supreme tribunal should superintend and govern all the others.
An arrangement in this manner is proper for two reasons. 1. The supreme tribunal produces and
preserves a uniformity of decision through the whole judicial system. 2. It confines and supports
every inferior court within the limits of its just jurisdiction.
If no superintending tribunal of this nature were established, different courts might adopt different and
even contradictory rules of decision; and the distractions, springing from these different and contradic-
tory rules, would be without remedy and without end. Opposite determinations of the same question, in
different courts, would be equally final and irreversible.”
2 The Works of James Wilson 149-50 (James D. Andrews ed., 1896) (emphasis added).
A survey of state constitutions of the era reveals that most of the larger states bestowed judicial sinecures
subject to the condition of good behavior. E.g., Pa. Constitution of 1776, Ch. 2, § 23 (removable by address);
Pa. Constitution of 1790, art. V. § 2 (1790) (good behavior tenure), N.Y. Const. of 1777, § 25 (good behavior),
Constitution of Georgia of 1777 (jury trials), Mass. Const. of 1780, ch. III, art. I (good behavior and removal
by address). It should be noted that in the Northwest Territory, the only way to remove a judge was for violating
good behavior tenure, as the Continental Congress did not have a provision for impeaching officers. An Ordi-
nance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest of the River Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51,
51 n.a (1787).
6
Under the Lockean paradigm, “government” was a contract between the people, which can be dissolved via
breach. J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690), ch. XIX, § 222. Sovereignty—the jura summa
imperii—was retained by the people, holding it as tenants-in-common. Governments are our authorized agents,
with powers enumerated in and limited by constitutions. Our national Constitution (and its predecessor) is a
treaty between thirteen co-sovereigns, expressly delegating a portion of their delegated sovereignty. See e.g.,
N.H. Const. part 1, art. 7. The citizen retains the ultimate duty to ensure that the rule of law (a/k/a, “the King’s
peace”) be observed, as had been the case in England since Magna Carta [1215].

6
 PARTIES

16. Plaintiff Kenneth L. Smith is a citizen of the United States of America, acting pur-

suant to the common obligation of all citizens “to support and defend the Constitution and

laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” 8 C.F.R. §

337.1. As the only persons who would possess a superior interest in enforcing Article III

good behavior tenure are Mr. Trump (who wouldn’t) and the United States Government

(which can’t), Plaintiff must have standing, or the Good Behavior Clause is rendered nuga-

tory for impossibility of enforcement.

17. Defendant Aileen Mercedes Cannon is a federal district court judge, currently pre-

siding in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, holding her

sinecure “during good behaviour.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

18. Jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to Article III and the Tenth Amendment.

19. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 13617 to compel Defendant Cannon to

immediately recuse herself in the matter of Trump v. United States, Case No. 9:23-cr-80101-

AMC, as "literally, the language of § 1361 would allow a district court to issue mandamus

directly against [even] the Justices of the Supreme Court themselves." Panko v. Rodak, 606

F.2d 168, 171 & n. 6 (7th Cir. 1979).

20. As substantially all actions taken pertinent to this matter occurred within this District,

and on information and belief, Defendant Cannon resides in this District, venue is appropri-

ate in this District.

7
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.

7
 ALLEGATIONS OF FACT

21. On information and belief, former President Trump has been and is engaged in a

conscious strategy of delaying those federal cases for which he is currently under indictment,

relying on the assistance of corrupt and pliant judges to delay his federal trials until after the

2024 Presidential election.8

22. On information and belief, were he re-elected, former President Trump could order

a corrupt Acting Attorney General who answered only to him to abandon said prosecutions,

and pardon all his co-conspirators, even if he was convicted.9

23. On information and belief, Defendant Cannon’s actions were knowingly undertaken

as part of a criminal conspiracy, the aim of which is to effectively overthrow our Republic,

replacing it with a de facto right-wing dictatorship along the lines of Vladimir Putin’s Rus-

sian Federation, with the Trump family as its rulers.

24. Upon ascension to the bench, every United States judge takes the following oath:

“I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect
to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.”

28 U.S.C. § 453.

25. [Reserved.]

26. On or about May 10, 2020, Defendant Cannon was nominated for a lifetime sinecure

on the federal bench by the Defendant in United States v. Trump.

8
On information and belief, this strategy was taught to him by legendary disbarred attorney Roy Cohn. Brian
Bennett, How Trump Survived Decades of Legal Trouble: Deny, Deflect, Delay, and Don’t Put Anything in
Writing, Time (Sept. 21, 2022), at https://time.com/6215419/trump-legal-trouble-key-strategies/.
9
See e.g., Gregory Korte, et al., How a Reelected Trump Could Make His Criminal Cases Go Away, Bloom-
berg (May 10, 2024), at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-10/trump-immunity-if-reelected-
he-could-make-court-cases-go-away-without-it

8
 27. On or about November 12, 2020, Defendant Cannon was confirmed by the Senate.

28. At the time of her confirmation, Defendant Cannon was less than 40 years of age.

29. On or about August 22, 2022, Defendant Cannon intervened in a federal investigation

into alleged criminal activity by former President Donald John Trump and co-conspirators,

pursuant to a Motion, styled “In the Matter of the Search of Mar-a-Lago.” Trump v. United

States, 9:22-cv-81294, (S.D. Fla.).

30. In the aforementioned Motion, former President Trump averred, “President[sic] Don-

ald J. Trump is the clear frontrunner in the 2024 Republican Presidential Primary and in the

2024 General Election, should he decide to run.” Id., Dkt. 1 at 1.

31. Acts of obstruction by Defendant Cannon in the resolution of that matter, see gener-

ally, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, included issuance of an Order to the United States Department of

Justice (DOJ) to release the previously sealed detailed property list of materials seized as the

result of a valid search warrant, to halt its review of all seized materials, and the appointment

of Raymond J. Dearie, senior judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New

York, as a special master.

32. On or about December 1, 2022, the Eleventh Circuit ordered the case to be dismissed

because Cannon improperly exercised equitable jurisdiction over it, writing: “This appeal

requires us to consider whether the district court had jurisdiction to block the United States

from using lawfully seized records in a criminal investigation. The answer is no.” Trump v.

United States, No. 22-13005 (11th Cir. Dec. 1, 2022) (slip op. at 2).

33. The Eleventh Circuit further observed that "The law is clear,” reasoning that:

“We cannot write a rule that allows any subject of a search warrant to block government
investigations after the execution of the warrant. Nor can we write a rule that allows
only former presidents to do so. Either approach would be a radical reordering of our

9
 caselaw limiting the federal courts’ involvement in criminal investigations. And both
would violate bedrock separation-of-powers limitations.”

Id., slip op. at 20-21.

34. On information and belief, a reasonably competent federal district court judge would

know that Plaintiff Trump’s request was objectively frivolous.

35. On information and belief, Defendant Cannon knew that Plaintiff Trump’s motion was

frivolous, and that her Orders had no possible chance of surviving appellate review and as

such, her intent was to assist Plaintiff Trump to “hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or

punishment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3.

36. On information and belief, the delay in the eventual indictment of former President

Trump occasioned by Defendant Cannon’s obstruction exceeded four months.

37. On or about June 8, 2023, Defendant Cannon was assigned a criminal case with for-

mer President Donald Trump as a defendant, styled United States v. Trump, 9:23-cr-80101,

(S.D. Fla.).

38. If Mr. Trump were to ascend again to the Presidency, he would be able to nominate

Defendant Cannon for a lifetime appointment to the Supreme Court.

39. On information and belief, Defendant Cannon either knew or was able to discover

via reasonable inquiry that Mr. Trump prized loyalty, and would be likely to reward her if

she were to “do him a solid.”10

10
See, Michael S. Schmidt, Obstruction Inquiry Shows Trump’s Struggle to Keep Grip on Russia Investiga-
tion, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 2018 (“Mr. Trump then asked, “Where’s my Roy Cohn?”). He found his Roy Cohn in
“Coverup General” William Barr. See e.g., Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 442 F. Supp. 3d 37, 49
(D.D.C. 2020) (“[A] review of the redacted version of the Mueller Report by the Court results in the Court’s
concurrence with Special Counsel Mueller’s assessment that Attorney General Barr distorted the findings in
the Mueller Report.”). “Trump sought three things in his judicial appointees, or as he sometimes called them,
“my judges.” First, he wanted justices who would overturn Roe v. Wade. Second, he wanted “jurists in the
mold of Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.” Third, he wanted judges who would
be loyal to him.” David Lat and Zachary B. Shemtob, Trump’s Supreme Court Picks Are Not Quite What You
Think, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2023 (emphasis added).

10
 40. A competent federal judge—or, any judge who could read newspapers11—would be

aware of the appearance of a conflict.

41. A competent federal judge would have consulted Charles C. Geyh, Judicial Disqual-

ification: An Analysis of Federal Law, 3d. ed. (Federal Judicial Center, 2020), for advice on

the question.

42. In the above-referenced treatise, Professor Geyh observes that “there may be circum-

stances in which the ties between the judge and the public official are so close, and the con-

sequences of a ruling adverse to the official are so dire, that disqualification is appropriate

regardless of the capacity (if any) in which the official is sued.” Id. at 27.

43. The closest analogue Professor Geyh references is a case involving Alabama Gover-

nor Don Siegelman, wherein a federal district judge recused sua sponte on the grounds that

his “‘distant relationship’ to [Siegelman’s political rival] Governor Riley [not a party to the

action], plus mere attendance at private political functions for Bob Riley two years ago,

"could raise some public confidence issues.” United States v. Bobo, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1238,

1240 (N.D.Ala. 2004).

44. Under the Bobo standard, Defendant Cannon had a clear duty to recuse, as her failure

to recuse raises self-evident “public confidence issues.”

11
E.g., Charlie Savage, Trump Appointee Will Remain Judge in Documents Case, Clerk Says, N.Y. Times,
Jun. 10, 2023, at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/10/us/politics/judge-aileen-cannon-trump-docu-
ments.html; Jay Weaver, Some want judge to recuse herself in Trump case. Can and should that still happen?,
Miami Herald, (Jun. 23, 2023), at https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/arti-
cle276631871.html (Calls for recusal “came largely from the political left but also from some legal experts, all
citing Cannon’s controversial decisions favoring Trump in a civil dispute last year over the FBI’s seizure of
government records from his Palm Beach estate”).

11
A. THE REPUBLICAN PARTY: ELECTION THEFT ‘Я’ US.

50. On information and belief, Defendant Cannon’s actions were taken in furtherance of

a larger and ongoing scheme to overthrow the United States Government.

51. On information and belief, Associate Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas

are and have been knowing and covert participants in the aforementioned scheme.12

52. In his dissent from a denial of certiorari review, Justice Thomas wrote: “These cases

provide us with an ideal opportunity to address just what authority nonlegislative officials

have to set election rules, and to do so well before the next election cycle.” Republican Party

of Pa. v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 732, 733 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting from den. of cert).

53. In a companion dissent (joined by Justice Gorsuch), Justice Alito voiced concern for

the need for alacrity in certain matters. Id. at 739 (Alito, J., dissenting from den. of cert).

12
See e.g., Jodi Kantor, et al., Another Provocative Flag Was Flown at Another Alito Home, N.Y. Times, Mar.
24, 2022, at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/22/us/justice-alito-flag-appeal-to-heaven.html. (“In comment-
ing for the Times report last week about the upside-down American flag at his Virginia home in 2021, Justice
Alito said that it had been raised by his wife, Martha-Ann Alito, during a clash with a neighbor.”). This appears
on its face to be a lie.
See also, Ryan Nobles, Read the texts sent by Ginni Thomas to WH official urging overturn of 2020 election,
CNN, Mar. 24, 2022, at https://www.kcra.com/article/texts-between-ginni-thomas-and-mark-meadows/3953.
At the risk of stating the obvious, if you are so close to an insurrection that your wife is being investigated for
her participation in it, you probably shouldn’t be deciding cases relating to it.

12
 55. In an acidic dissent lamenting the official recognition of same-sex marriage,13 Chief

Justice Roberts wrote: “Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is,

not what it should be. The people who ratified the Constitution authorized courts to exercise

‘neither force nor will but merely judgment.’" Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S.Ct.

2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting; citation omitted).14

55. On information and belief, while testi-LYING under penalty of perjury, every sitting

Supreme Court Justice has agreed with the Framers’ sentiment.15

13
For any originalist constitutional exegete, this is a puzzling conclusion. The right to contract is an essential
corollary of the right to own property, as you must be able to acquire and dispose of it to actually own it. In a
secular society, marriage is a mere contract, with default terms drafted by the State. Rights are retained by the
individual unless ceded to the State; all that a State can do is abridge rights and then, only in accordance with
the authority granted to it. As the right to marry is fundamental, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the State
must show a compelling interest in preventing two persons from entering that marriage contract. As the State
cannot show that it is in any way harmed when Fred and Ted decide to wed, it has no colorable authority to
prevent them from doing so. This must be so as long as ours is a constitutional Republic with limited govern-
ment powers. Plaintiff expresses no opinion on the ultimate wisdom of same-sex marriage, pointing out only
that are stuck with the constitution we have and the rules we have with which to apply it.
14
Scalia adds: “This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied
(as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in
the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.” Ober-
gefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15
E.g., Justice Sotomayor notes that the “intent of the founders was set forth in the Constitution. They created
the words; they created the document. It is their words that is the most important aspect of judging.” Confir-
mation Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Sonia A. Sotomayor to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., 245 (1991) (statement of Judge Sotomayor).
Justice Thomas asserted that his job as a judge is “to interpret [lawmakers’] intent, not to second-guess” it.
Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: S.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 102nd Cong., 144 (1991) (statement of Judge Thomas). Chief Justice Roberts adds
that “the Framers were willing to have the judges decide cases that required them to interpret the Constitution,
because they were going to decide it according to the rule of law.” Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination
of John Roberts to be Chief Justice of the United States: S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 161 (2005)
(statement of Judge Roberts). Justice Gorsuch observed that “my job is not to write the law, Senator. It is to
apply the law … Our founders were brilliant. They did not give me all the power. I do not wear a crown; I wear
a robe.” Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Neil M. Gorsuch to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 121, 138 (1991) (statement of
Judge Gorsuch).
When it serves their purposes, the Justices dutifully parrot these limits. E.g., Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,
575 U.S. 433, 135 S.Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2506 (2015) (Scalia,
J., dissenting, with Alito and Thomas). And as the empirical evidence proves beyond cavil, their testimony in
those farcical hearings was demonstrably false and misleading.

13
 56. On information and belief, six current Justices of the United States Supreme Court

(“the Conspiring Justices”) entered into a conspiracy to cement their continued dominance

of the Court for decades to come, in violation of their oaths and numerous provisions of Title

18 of the United States Code.

57. On information and belief, if the Democratic Party were to secure control of both

the Presidency and both Houses of Congress, they could expand the Court to neutralize that

dominance, see 28 U.S.C. § 1, or even strip the Court of all power of appellate review.16

58. In an array of flagrantly partisan decisions, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S.

529 (2013); Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684 (2019); Alexander v. South Carolina

Conf. of the NAACP, No. 22–807 (U.S. May 23, 2024) (overturning a unanimous three-judge

District Court panel below), the Conspiring Justices have been consistently deciding cases

in a way that preserves Republican hegemony.17

59. In Alexander, “the parties asked the justices to render a decision by Jan. 1. After that

deadline passed, the panel said in March that the 2024 election would have to take place

under the map it had rejected as unconstitutional. … In effect, the Supreme Court’s inaction

had decided the case for the current election cycle.” Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Sides

16
Remarkably, there is actual precedent for this: Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868) (“the power to
make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words”). “The judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish,” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, but the only power that cannot be divested from the
Court is that of supervision. Supra n. 5.
17
It is axiomatic that, in any close election law dispute, judges invariably pole-dance for the Party who brung
em. E.g., Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 2000); Gore v. Harris, 772
So.2d 1243 (Fla. 2000); Bush v. Gore, supra (2000 Presidential election); New Jersey Democratic Party, Inc.
v. Samson, No. A-24 September Term 2002 (N.J. 2002) (Democrat-dominated court allowed Democrats to
replace scandal-plagued incumbent Sen. Robert Torricelli on the ballot with then former-Sen. Frank Lauten-
berg); People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003) (striking down a Republican legislative
redistricting plan), Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (no limits on dark
money). The correlation has been near-perfect for two decades. Sheldon Whitehouse, A Right-Wing Rout:
What the “Roberts Five” Decisions Tell Us About the Integrity of Today’s Supreme Court, Amer. Const. Soc’y.
(1999), at https://acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Captured-Court-Whitehouse-IB-Final.pdf

14
 With Republicans Over South Carolina Voting Map, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2024, at

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/23/us/supreme-court-south-carolina-voting-map.html.

60. On information and belief, this is a coup ďêtat, conceived by and participated in by

a large group of people. See e.g., Project 2025. https://www.project2025.org.

B. ANDERSON: THE PREDICATE

61. On or about December 19, 2023, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in

Anderson v. Griswold, 2023 CO 63 (Colo. 2023), holding that Mr. Trump “was disqualified

from holding the office of President18 under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution.” Id., advance note at 1.

62. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:

“No person shall … hold any office, civil or military, under the United States … who,
having previously taken an oath … to support the Constitution of the United States, shall

18
In concluding that the Amendment covered the President, The Anderson majority wrote:

“Senator Reverdy Johnson worried that the final version of Section Three did not include the office of the
Presidency. He stated, “[T]his amendment does not go far enough” because past rebels “may be elected
President or Vice President of the United States.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2899 (1866). So, he
asked, “why did you omit to exclude them? I do not understand them to be excluded from the privilege
of holding the two highest offices in the gift of the nation.” Id. Senator Lot Morrill fielded this objection.
He replied, “Let me call the Senator’s attention to the words ‘or hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States.’” Id. This answer satisfied Senator Johnson, who stated, “Perhaps I am wrong as to the
exclusion from the Presidency; no doubt I am; but I was misled by noticing the specific exclusion in the
case of Senators and Representatives.” Id. This colloquy further supports the view that the drafters of this
Amendment intended the phrase “any office” to be broadly inclusive, and certainly to include the Presi-
dency.”

Anderson v. Griswold, No. 23-SA-300 ¶ 140 (Colo. 2023) (slip op.).

15
 have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to
the enemies thereof.”

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3.

63. The controlling question is whether the Amendment is self-executing, and the answer

was provided by Chief Justice Marshall, in the first case we all studied in law school:

The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means,

or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when
the legislature shall please to alter it.

If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the consti-
tution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts,
on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

64. On information and belief, there is no support in precedent or logic for the proposition

that a constitutional provision must activated by Congressional legislation to become effec-

tive. E.g., United States v. Stanley (Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“the Thir-

teenth amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without any an-

cillary legislation”), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 524 (1997) (Fourteenth); South

Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 325 (1966) (Fifteenth).19

65. According to the Senator who introduced the Fourteenth Amendment to that body,

Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment was remedial in scope, “enabl[ing] Congress, in

case the State shall enact laws in conflict with the principles of the amendment, to correct

that legislation by a formal congressional enactment.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.,

2768 (1868) (statement of Sen. Jacob M. Howard (R-MI)).

19
While there is no enforceability provision in the original Bill of Rights, that is a function of the fact that they
were not enforceable as against the States. Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
Enforceability provisions were added to every subsequent Amendment.

16
 66. In the Conspiring Justices’ majority opinion, they quoted from the paragraph quoted

above and as such, were on notice as to the framers’ intent. Trump v. Anderson, No. 23–719,

601 U.S. ___ (2024), slip op. at 5.

67. Since time immemorial, it has been the office of the judge “to make such construction

[of a law] as shall suppress the mischief, advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inven-

tion and evasions for continuance of the mischief ... according to the true intent of the makers

of the act.” Heydon's Case [1584] 76 Eng.Rep. 637 (Exch.).

68. At the risk of stating the patently obvious, the purpose of Section 3 of the Fourteenth

Amendment was to disqualify citizens who “engaged in insurrection or rebellion against

the United States” from serving in elected office, subject to a congressional pardon provi-

sion. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3.

69. When it served his purpose, the bribe-engorged20 Justice Clarence Thomas pompously

declared that a court “must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and

means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat’l. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,

253-54 (1992) (citing two centuries of precedent).

20
Though our Justices appear to be for sale, they don’t come cheap. The steady stream of thinly-disguised
bribes—developer Harlan Crow is this generous with all of his friends, right?— aimed at Justice Thomas in-
cludes a $500,000 cash payment to his wife, an undisclosed number of trips on Crow’s yacht and private jet, a
$175,000 library wing named in his honor, several million to turn the cannery his mother worked for into a
museum—a project reportedly initiated by Thomas himself—and the Bible of firebrand Black abolitionist
Frederick Douglass, valued at $19,000. Mike McIntire, The Justice and the Magnate, N.Y. Times, Jun. 19, 2011,
at A-1. Whether it involves attending secretive junkets offered by the Federalist Society, Brian Ross, Supreme
Ethics Problem, ABC News, Jan. 23, 2006, or duck hunting with a litigant during the pendency of a case,
Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J., in cham-
bers) (the value of a bribe is its value to the recipient, e.g., United States v. Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1305 (6th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1983) (business loan to Senator)), see generally,
Justin Elliott, et al., A “Delicate Matter”: Clarence Thomas’ Private Complaints About Money Sparked Fears
He Would Resign, ProPublica, Dec. 18, 2023, https://www.propublica.org/article/clarence-thomas-money-
complaints-sparked-resignation-fears-scotus, our Supreme Court is as compromised as Congress.

17
 70. On information and belief, the Sotomayor “concurrence” in Trump v. Anderson, No.

23-719, 601 U.S. ___ (2024) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) at was in substance a dissent.

71. On information and belief, as our courts are authorized to decide cases as opposed to

writing laws, they are supposed to “avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the

necessity of deciding them.” Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S.

439, 445-46 (1988).

72. In a power grab that would make Vladimir Putin blush, Justices of the Supreme Court

routinely “constitutionalize their personal preferences,” Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567,

568 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from den. of reh. en banc), “rob[bing] the People

of … the freedom to govern themselves.” Obergefell, supra (Scalia, J., dissenting) (slip op.,

at 2).21

21
As Justice Scalia observed, “Judicial decisions, like the Constitution itself, are nothing more than ‘parchment
barriers.’ Both depend on a judicial culture that understands its constitutionally assigned role ... [and] the mod-
esty to persist when it produces results that go against the judges' policy preferences.” Michigan v. Bryant,
562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1176 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). “The Court's temptation is in the quite
opposite and more natural direction—towards systematically eliminating checks upon its own power; and it
succumbs.” Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In two
brief passages, Scalia summarized two centuries’ of judicial misconduct. E.g., United States v. Callender, 25
F.Cas. 239, 257 (D.Va. 1800) (Chase, J., riding circuit) (eviscerating the Seventh Amendment).
Concurrences read like a Brandeis brief. Judge Laurence Silberman of the D.C. Court of Appeals confessed
that he was “in despair” about the United States Supreme Court, noting that every one of the Justices “is guilty,
to one degree or another, of violating the two most basic rules of restrained judicial behavior: ruling only on
questions presented by the case at hand, and interpreting precedents honestly.” Benjamin Wittes, “Without
Precedent,” 296-2 Atlantic Monthly 39 (Sept. 2005). Judge Bork describes the Court as a “band of outlaws.”
Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, 67 First Things 21, 24 (Nov. 1996). Justice Kagan writes that they
“forget that they are judges and that their Court is a court,” Elena Kagan, The Development and Erosion of the
American Exclusionary Rule: A Study in Judicial Method (unpublished Master’s thesis; Apr. 20, 1983).
The academy is no kinder. Professor Karl Llewellyn writes that judges routinely
manhandl[e] ... the facts of the pending case, or of the precedent, so as to make it falsely appear that the
case in hand falls under a rule which in fact it does not fit, or especially that it falls outside of a rule which
would lead in the instant case to a conclusion the court cannot stomach.
Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 133 (1960); accord, Richard A. Posner, How
Judges Think 144 (Harv. U. Press 2008). Alan Dershowitz adds. “[S]ome justices actually cheat. … Trust no
one in power, including—especially—judges. … You will be amazed at how often you will find judges “fi-
nessing” the facts and the law.” Alan Dershowitz, Letters To a Young Lawyer 11 (Basic Books 2001).

18
 73. “In a stunning disfigurement of the Fourteenth Amendment,” the Conspiring Justices

“impressed upon it an ahistorical misinterpretation that defies both its plain text and its orig-

inal meaning.” J. Michael Luttig and Laurence H. Tribe, Supreme Betrayal, The Atlantic,

Mar. 14, 2024.

74. On information and belief, there is no rational way to get from the text of Section 3

of the Fourteenth Amendment and the “strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and

point out their duty in every particular case before them," The Federalist No. 78, at 470, to

the conclusion that “States have no power under the Constitution to enforce Section 3 with

respect to federal offices, especially the Presidency,” Trump v. Anderson, slip op. at 6, given

that there is no such thing as a federal election.22

75. In knowingly acting in a manner intended to assist a thrice-indicted criminal defend-

ant “in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment,” 18 U.S.C. § 3, the

Conspiring Justices have become accessories after-the-fact in his [alleged] crimes.

22
As a matter of definition, there is no such thing as a national election in the United States. Individual States
appoint slates of Electors, chosen “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2. Accordingly, there is no compelling reason why the federal government should ever get involved.
The choice of Electors has always been a matter for each State, and the Electors were free to vote for anyone
they cared to, Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 225 (1952), though States may enforce “pledge laws” restricting their
freedom of action. Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 2316 (2020).
As state courts of general jurisdiction are perfectly capable of applying federal law, Claflin v. Houseman,
93 U.S. 130 (1876), there is no reason why a State cannot answer the question of whether a candidate for high
office has “engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3. And
as state courts generally follow persuasive opinions from other jurisdictions, see e.g., Evans v. Bd. of County
Com'rs, 482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971) (abolishing state sovereign immunity; collecting cases), and the Supreme
Court could fashion a uniform rule where a conflict existed, there was never a compelling need for Congress
to provide guidance on this question. However, if the final resolution by the courts was intolerable, Congress
was empowered to enact remedial legislation. Of course, they presupposed existence of a functional Congress.

19
 76. Justice Sutherland described the rewriting of statutes under the false pretense
of interpreting them as “a flagrant perversion of the judicial power,” Heiner v. Don-
nan, 285 U.S. 312, 331 (1932), and he does not understate the case.

20
 56. When the Supreme Court is confronted with a matter of great urgency, it is fully able

to move with remarkable dispatch. E.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (four days, from

Florida Supreme Court decision to their published ruling).

57. On or about December 11, 2023, the Government filed a Petition for a Writ of Certi-

orari Before Judgment in the matter of United States v. Trump, No. 23-cr-257 (D.D.C. Dec.

1, 2023).

59. On information and belief, the ultimate goal of this criminal conspiracy is to enable

Mr. Trump to regain the Presidency.

21