China and International Norms Evidence From The Belt and Road Initiative

CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS
This book explores the relationship between China and international norms through
the lens of The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Presenting seven case studies, this book highlights China’s stances toward
international norms that govern different international issues. The case studies
reveal that the normative function of the networks built under the BRI is limited
and contains noticeable variations between domestic norms and international ones
in China, resulting in implementation gaps between rhetoric and deeds. Unlike
current literature on this issue, which is scattered in terms of topics covered and
methodology used, it constructs a holistic theoretical/methodological framework
which can be utilized to study a State’s position toward different international
standards.
In light of China’s increasing international influence and proactive and assertive
foreign policy, this study will be of interest to officials and practitioners involved in
foreign policy and international cooperation, and to student and scholars of global
development and international relations.
Mario Esteban is an Associate Professor the Centre for East Asia Studies at the
Autonomous University of Madrid and a Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal
Institute, Spain.
Yue Lin is an Associate Professor the Centre for East Asia Studies at the
Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain.
Routledge Series on the Belt and Road Initiative
Editor-in-Chief: Mehdi P. Amineh
Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, and International
Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden, The Netherlands.
The Routledge Series on the Belt and Road Initiative publishes peer-reviewed
scholarly contributions in the wider context of International Relations, International
Political Economy, Global Governance, Security, Geopolitics, and Geo-economy.
The series offers a venue for monographs and edited volumes making substan-
tial contributions to the ongoing debate on the origin, processes and impacts of
China’s BRI. Examining the related tools of diplomacy, trade, investment, finance
and security and their impact on countries, regions, continents, global governance,
security, international and multilateral institutions, the series draws together key
thinking on the BRI as it continues to development and forge links around the
world.
China’s Communication of the Belt and Road Initiative

Silk Road and Infrastructure Narratives
Carolijn van Noort
The China-led Belt and Road Initiative and its Reflections

The Crisis of Hegemony and Changing Global Orders
Mehdi Parvizi Amineh
The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia, Africa, and Europe

Edited by David Arase and Pedro Miguel Amakasu Raposo de Medeiros Carvalho
Hong Kong Professional Services and the Belt and Road Initiative
Challenges for Co-evolving Sustainability
Edited by Linda Chelan Li and Phyllis Lai Lan Mo
China and International Norms

Evidence from the Belt and Road Initiative
Edited by Mario Esteban and Yue Lin
China and International Norms
Evidence from the Belt and Road Initiative
Edited by
Mario Esteban and Yue Lin
First published 2024
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2024 selection and editorial matter, Mario Esteban and Yue Lin;
individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Mario Esteban and Yue Lin to be identified as the authors of the
editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been
asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 978-1-032-28970-0 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-032-28972-4 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-29938-7 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003299387
Typeset in Times New Roman
by codeMantra
Contents
List of Illustrations vii

List of Contributors ix
List of Abbreviations xv
1 China’s Stances toward International Norms Viewed through
the Belt and Road Initiative 1
MARIO ESTEBAN AND GUANGYU QIAO-FRANCO
2 China and Aid Norms. A Case Study on Ethiopia, Pakistan,

and Sri Lanka 22
MARIO ESTEBAN AND ILIANA OLIVIÉ
3 Distant-Water Fishing under International Norms and

Standards: Implications for China’s 21st-Century
Maritime Silk Road 47
JUAN HE
4 The Belt and Road Initiative and International Climate Governance 67

LARA LÁZARO-TOUZA AND MARIO ESTEBAN
5 The Belt and Road Initiative and Corporate Social

Responsibility Development in China 90
YUE LIN
6 China’s International Perspective on Education and Edtech 111

CLAUDIO FEIJÓO, CRISTINA ARMUÑA AND JAVIER FERNÁNDEZ DÍAZ
vi Contents
7 China and International Agricultural Cooperation

Principles: A Case Study on the Sino-LAC Relationship in
the BRI Era 134
GE GAO AND YUANBO LI
8 Norms and Motorways: The Internationalization of the RMB

through the BRI 159
MIGUEL OTERO-IGLESIAS
9 Variations of China’s Stances toward International Norms in

the Belt and Road Era 179
YUE LIN AND MARIO ESTEBAN
Index195
Illustrations
Figures
4.1 hina’s overseas and BRI green and climate policies. Elaborated
C
by the authors based on data from Ren et al. (2017), Sandalow
(2019), and People’s Republic of China [PRC]. Ministry of
Ecology and Environment [MEE] (2017) 79
4.2 China’s energy investments and construction contracts by sector
in BRI and OECD countries, 2014–2019, percent and US$ billion
(in parentheses) 82
4.3 China’s major policy banks’ energy investment flows in BRI
countries “BRI projects in OECD members are excluded to
ensure consistency with the classification used in Figure 4. This
includes the following data: a 1.381USD billion (or 1.320GW
capacity) investment in coal in Turkey in 2019.” by sector,
2014–2019, US$ billion and GW 82
7.1 China’s outward FDI flows in agriculture, forestry, animal
husbandry, and fishery (USD million) and its annual growth rate (%) 147
Tables
1.1 State’s stances toward international norms 13
2.1 Development cooperation monitoring framework 24
2.2 Main features of partner countries 26
3.1 International agreements and guidelines related to DWF governance 49
3.2 A chronological illustration of China’s DWF-related regulatory
instruments and action 52
4.1 Behavior and international climate norms. Elaborated by the authors 69
4.2 Impact of the BRI in China’s relationship with international
climate norms. Elaborated by the authors 70
5.1 Overview of the contents of the four CSR guidelines 92
5.2 Overall assessment of China’s compliance with international CSR
standards104
6.1 Technology curriculum in China 118
7.1 Tri-dimensional principles for international agricultural cooperation 138
viii Illustrations
7.2 Chinese policy documents and keywords under the

tri-dimensional principles for international agricultural cooperation 141
Boxes
4.1 The UNFCCC 72
4.2 Key elements of the Kyoto Protocol 73
4.3 The Paris Agreement 73
Contributors
Cristina Armuña is a Co-founder of the company Rule Eleven, focused on d igital

transformation of companies and entrepreneurship initiatives. She holds a PhD
in Engineering Management, Telecom Engineer and an MSc in City Sciences.
She has remained linked to Academia, lecturing on entrepreneurship and men-
toring projects in different programs in Spain (UNED) and Shanghai (Tongji
University and UPM). At the UNED, she codirects the program “100 Entrepre-
neurship: developing entrepreneurship competences”, based on the EntreComp,
the Entrepreneurship Competences Framework proposed by the European
Commission, having completed five editions since 2015. Furthermore, she is
a Co-founder of the online program BusinessADN (https://www.businessadn.
com), mainly oriented to stimulate the entrepreneurial thinking of individuals
with limited previous experiences in the field. She has cooperated closely with
Dr. Claudio Feijoo in producing academic results, including but not limited to
“Innovation ecosystems theory revisited: The case of artificial intelligence in
China” (with other co-authors, Telecommunications Policy, 2020), “From stand-
up to start-up: exploring entrepreneurship competences and STEM women’s
intention” (with other co-authors, International Entrepreneurship and Manage-
ment Journal, 2020), and “An academic perspective on the entrepreneurship
policy agenda: themes, geographies and evolution” (with other co-authors,
Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, 2019).
Javier Fernández Díaz defended his doctorate thesis from the University of
Barcelona (UB) in 2014. He has worked in the Education field for more than
a decade in different levels: private sector, secondary school, and universities.
He is specialized in EdTech and innovation in teaching methodology. Currently
recruited by Instituto Cervantes in Tokyo as Head of Culture, he was previously
hired by the Ministry of Education to work in the Spanish Embassy, in the edu-
cation office of China, Japan, and South Korea. As an Academic, he is a member
of the association of the Network of China-Spain Researchers (RICE) as well
as a member of the Japanese research group CANELA, a member of ASELE,
the Association of Teachers of Spanish Abroad, and the International Asso-
ciation of Professionals of Innovation and Management (ISPIM). Due to his
strong interest in exponential technologies, he co-founded the Beijing chapter of
x Contributors
Singularity University in 2017. In China, apart from the Ministry of Education,

he has collaborated with different associations such as the Chinese Association
for Artificial Intelligence – helping with the international section for the uses of
AI in primary and secondary schools – the China Scholarship Council and the
Chinese Education Association for International Exchange (CEIAE).
Mario Esteban is a full-time Associate Professor of East Asia Studies at the
Autonomous University of Madrid and a Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal
Institute. He has been the Principal Investigator of projects funded by the Span-
ish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness, the Spanish Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, and the Korea Foundation. He has also been a Visiting
Professor at the Beijing Foreign Studies University and at the University of
Turku; and a Visiting Researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in
Beijing and at Chengchi National University in Taipei. His research interests are
focused on the international relations of East Asia, EU – East Asia Relations,
and the domestic and international politics of China. On these topics, he has
published articles in academic journals, such as The Journal of Contemporary
China, The China Quarterly, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, African and
Asian Studies, The Chinese Political Science Review, and The European Jour-
nal of East Asian Studies. He is the author of three book chapters published
by Routledge: “Motivations, actors, and implications for the New Silk Road
trains” in Yuan Li and Markus Taube (eds.), How China’s Silk Road Initiative
Is Changing the Global Economic Landscape (London: Routledge, 2019); “The
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Lessons for the New Silk Road” in Carmen
Amado Mendes (ed.), How China’s New Silk Road: An Emerging World Order
(London: Routledge, 2018); and “Chinese financing of Latin American devel-
opment: Competition or complementarity with traditional donors?” in Eckart
Woertz (ed.), Reconfiguration of the Global South: Africa, Latin America and
the Asian Century (London: Routledge, 2016).
Claudio Feijóo holds an MSc and a PhD in Telecommunication Engineer-
ing, along with an MSc in Quantitative Economics. He is a Professor at the
Technical University of Madrid (UPM) where he researches on the future
socio-economic impact of emerging information society technologies, in par-
ticular from an ultra-broadband, mobile, and content perspective. Currently, he
serves as the Co-Director of the Sino-Spanish Campus at Tongji University in
Shanghai. He is also the Co-founder and coordinator of the ICT area in the
International Master’s in City Sciences program, and mainly responsible of the
scientific committee of the International Conference in City Sciences. He is a
Guest Lecturer at IE Business School on digital business and disruptive ICT,
and a member of the board of the International Telecommunications Society. He
has published extensively in numerous journals. His recent publications on AI
and society include “Harnessing artificial intelligence (AI) to increase wellbe-
ing for all: The case for a new technology diplomacy” (with other co-authors,
Telecommunications Policy, 2020), “AI impacts on economy and society: Latest
developments, open issues and new policy measures” (with Youngsun Kwon,
Contributors xi
Telecommunications Policy, 2020), “Innovation ecosystems theory revisited:

The case of artificial intelligence in China” (with other co-authors, Telecom-
munications Policy, 2020), and “Artificial intelligence: a European perspective”
(with other co-authors, European Commission Joint Research Centre, 2018).
Ge Gao is a PhD candidate from the Center for East Asian Studies of the
Autonomous University of Madrid. After completing two postgraduate pro-
grams in Social Sciences and in Philosophy, she has been awarded a doctoral
scholarship by the China Scholarship Council (CSC) in 2022. Her research
interests include, among others, international and regional relations under the
Belt and Road Initiative, with a particular focus on the cooperation between
China and Latin America.
Juan He is an Associate Professor at KoGuan Law School of Shanghai Jiao Tong

University in China. She holds a PhD in Law from the University of Sydney and
a master’s degree in International Law from China Foreign Affairs U niversity.
Juan’s research expertise and interests include international trade law, inter-
national fisheries law, wildlife trade, strategic industry policy, and sustainable
development. Her current research projects and activities focus on anatomiz-
ing and reinvigorating the unique nexus between international trade, fisher-
ies, and environmental regulatory regimes in both national-comparative and
transnational governance contexts. Juan has published widely in national and
international refereed journals across the topics of international trade, seafood
traceability, transnational environmental governance, and aviation industry
policy. Her sole-authored monograph The WTO and Infant Industry Promo-
tion in Developing Countries: Perspectives on the Chinese Large Civil Aircraft
was published by Routledge (Taylor & Francis) in 2014 and reprinted in 2016.
She is also co-author of the monograph China’s Legal Responses to Climate
Change published by China Environmental Science Press in 2010. Her most
recent publications related to her chapter in this book include: “Sustainable Sea-
food Consumption in Action: Reinvigorating Consumers’ Right to Information
in a Borderless Digital World” (Journal of International Economic Law, 2022);
“China Revamping Decades-Old Fisheries Law to Combat Illegal, Unreported,
and Unregulated Fishing: Stimulating the Intersection of Law, Technology, and
Markets” (Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution, 2022); “Enhancing Sustainable
Consumption in China: A Seafood Example” (Chinese Journal of Environmen-
tal Law, 2021); and “Imported Seafood Traceability Regulations: A Mishap for
the WTO’s Disregard for Non-Product Related Processes and Production Meth-
ods?” (Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy, 2020).
Lara Lázaro-Touza is a Senior Analyst in the Energy and Climate Change
Programme at the Elcano Royal Institute in Madrid. She is also a Lecturer in
Economic Theory at the Colegio Universitario Cardenal Cisneros (attached to
the Complutense University of Madrid) and an Adjunct Professor of the Po-
litical Economy of Climate Change at IE School of Global and Public Affairs
in the Master in International Development (MID), a program developed in
xii Contributors
partnership with the United Nations System Staff College. Her research inter-
ests are focused on climate governance and the low carbon transition, envi-
ronmental policy, politics, and economics. Dr. Lara Lázaro-Touza is currently
working as a Researcher on various publicly funded and competitive research
projects: the EU-funded H2020 research project “Market Uptake of Solar Ther-
mal Electricity through Cooperation” (MUSTEC); “the impact of China’s Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) on global governance” funded by the Spanish Minis-
try of Economy and Business analyzing; and AMENET, “The European Union,
Mediterranean and Africa integration in the Global Age”, a Jean Monnet Net-
work, co-funded the by Erasmus+ Program of the European Union, that seeks
to promote studies on Africa, the Mediterranean, and European regional inte-
gration. She is also heading the Climate Governance project at Elcano Royal
Institute, privately funded by the European Climate Foundation. Her latest book
chapters include Lázaro-Touza, L. and Gómez de Ágreda, A. (2019), Integrating
Climate Change Action into EU Security Policy in Conde Pérez, in E. Yaneva,
Z. V. and Scopetelli, M. (Eds.) Routledge Handbook of EU Security Law and
Policy, pp. 239–265. L ondon: Routledge; and Lázaro-Touza, L. (2018), Govern-
ing the Geopolitics of Climate Change after the Paris Agreement. In Considine,
J. (Ed.), Handbook of Energy Politics. pp. 435–482.
Yuanbo Li is an Assistant Professor at the College of Humanities and Urban-Rural
Development of Beijing University of Agriculture, Beijing, China. He holds a
PhD in Agro-Environmental Technology for a Sustainable Agriculture at the
Technocal University of Madrid, Spain (UPM). Before coming to study in Spain,
he studied at China Agricultural University, in Beijing, China. He has been a
Visiting Fellow at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), Italy; a funded participant in the Science Diplomacy and Innovation
Diplomacy course at the Institute of International Relations of the University
of São Paulo, Brazil; and a Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of Public Policy
and Management of Tsinghua University, China. His research interests focus on
sustainable development, global governance in food and agriculture, China and
Latin America, and the global wine industry. His recent publications include
“Sustainable drinking bars in China: Evidence, initiatives, and guidelines based
on the 2030 Agenda” and “The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and
China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the Caribbean” (Sustain-
ability). Besides Chinese, he can speak English, Spanish, Portuguese, and some
Italian and French.
Yue Lin holds a PhD in the Socio-economy of Development and undertook his
graduate studies at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS
Paris). He is currently a full-time Associate Professor at the Autonomous Uni-
versity of Madrid and is attached to the Centre of East Asian Studies. His cur-
rent research interests focus on China’s overseas investment and international
trade both at macro and micro level, specifically Chinese firms’ strategy and
behavior contextualized by cross-border institution frictions. His recent publica-
tions include “Firm heterogeneity and location choice of Chinese firms in Latin
Contributors xiii
America and the Caribbean: corporate ownership, strategic motives and host
country institutions” (China Economic Review 34: 274–292. 2015); “Economic
‘highway’ with three speed tracks and destinations between China and CEE”
in Chen Xin (ed.), The 16+1 Cooperation and China-EU Relations (Budapest:
China-CEE Institute. 2018); and “Made in China 2025 and China’s cross-border
strategic M&As in OECD countries” (Journal of Chinese Economic and Busi-
ness Studies 18 (2): 91–114. 2020).
Iliana Olivié is an Associate Professor in the Department of Applied & S tructural
Economics & History of the Complutense University of Madrid, where she
teaches macroeconomic analysis, theories of development, and economic de-
velopment in postgraduate programs. Apart from earning a PhD in Economics,
she is also a member of the Spanish Council for Development Cooperation (a
consultation body of the Spanish Administration), as well as a Senior Analyst at
Elcano Royal Institute. She works on global development issues, particularly in-
ternational cooperation (global development agenda and European and Spanish
foreign assistance), economic development, and global development finance.
She has participated in over 30 national and international projects and has over
100 publications including academic articles, books, book chapters, reports, and
divulgation articles. She has also collaborated with international organizations
such as the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the European
Parliament. Some of her recent publications include Olivié, Iliana (2022), “How
is aid used to exert power? Gender equality promotion and migration control in
Senegal”, Journal of International Development (DOI: 10.1002/jid.3650), Este-
ban, Mario & Iliana Olivié (2022), “China and Western Aid Norms in the Belt
and Road: Normative Clash or Convergence? A Case Study on Ethiopia”, Jour-
nal of Contemporary China (DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2021.1945739), Olivié,
Iliana & Manuel Gracia (2020) “Is this the end of globalization (as we know
it)?”, Globalizations (DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2020.1716923) and Olivié, Ili-
ana & Aitor Pérez (eds.) (2019), Aid Power and Politics, Routledge.
Miguel Otero-Iglesias is a Senior Analyst at Elcano Royal Institute and a Pro-
fessor of International Political Economy at the School of Global and Public
Affairs at IE University. In addition, he is a Senior Research Fellow at the EU-
Asia Institute at ESSCA School of Management in France. In the past, he was
a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics
(IWEP) at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in China and the Merca-
tor Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Germany; a Postdoctoral Research
Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science and an Ad-
junct Lecturer at the University of Oxford. He holds a PhD in International
Political Economy from Oxford Brookes University and an MA in International
Relations from the University of Manchester. His main areas of expertise are
international and comparative political economy, international and European
monetary affairs, the international financial architecture, global economic gov-
ernance, the power triangle between the United States, the European Union,
and China, and theories of money. He is the author of The Euro, the Dollar and
xiv Contributors
the Global Financial Crisis: Currency Challenges seen from Emerging Markets
(New York, Routledge, 2015). He has published in the leading academic jour-
nals in his field such as Review of International Political Economy, The World
Economy, Journal of Common Market Studies, and New Political Economy;
contributed as a columnist or expert for international media such as El País,
Financial Times, Libération, China Daily, Foreign Affairs, Reuters, Bloomberg,
and The New York Times; and offered policy advice to the Spanish Government,
the OECD, and the European Commission. He is a Co-founder and Coordinator
of the European Think Tank Network on China (ETNC).
Guangyu Qiao-Franco is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at
Radboud University and a Senior Researcher of the ERC-funded AutoNorms
Project at the University of Southern Denmark. Her research interests span
Chinese foreign policy, AI ethics, military AI-related arms control, and ASEAN
regional governance. Her work has been published in International Affairs, The
Pacific Review, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Chinese Journal of
International Politics, Journal of Contemporary China, among others.
Abbreviations
ACP African, Caribbean, and Pacific

ADB Asian Development Bank
AEA Aid Effectiveness Agenda
AI Artificial Intelligence
AOA Agreement on Agriculture
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRIGC BRI International Green Development Coalition
CAITEC Chinese Academy of international Trade and Economic Cooperation
CBDR-RC Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and
Respective Capabilities
CCCMC China Chamber of Commerce for Minerals, Metals, and
Chemicals Importers and Exporters
CCP China Communist Party
CDB China Development Bank
CFIE China Federation of Industrial Economics
CFS Committee on World Food Security
CHINCA China International Contractors Association
CIMMYT International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
CIPS China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System
COP Conference of the Parties
CPEC China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CSA Currency Swap Agreement
CSO Civil Society Organization
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DCEP Digital Currency Electronic Payment
DSR Digital Silk Road
DWF Distant-Water Fishing
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zones
EPC Engineering, Procurement, and Construction
ETF Enhanced Transparency Framework
xvi Abbreviations
EU European Union
FAA Fishing Access Agreement
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FMPRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHG Greenhouse Gases
GIP Green Investment Principles for the Belt and Road
GNI Gross National Income
GPEDC Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
IATI International Aid Transparency Initiative
IB International Baccalaureate
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC International Finance Corporation
ILO International Labor Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMO International Maritime Organization
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPOA-IUU
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ITU International Telecommunication Union
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
IUU Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (fishing)
KP Kyoto Protocol
LAC The Latin America and the Caribbean
MARA Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs
MCS Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MEE Ministry of Ecology and Environment
MEP Ministry of Environmental Protection
MOA Ministry of Agriculture
MOE Ministry of Education
MOF Ministry of Finance
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce
MOOC Massive Online Open Course
MOST Ministry of Science and Technology
MOU Memorandums of Understanding
MSR Maritime Silk Road
NDC Nationally Determined Contribution
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission
NGAIDP Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan
NGO Non-Government Organization
Abbreviations xvii
ODA Official Development Assistance

ODI Overseas Direct Investment
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PA Paris Agreement
PBOC People´s Bank of China
POE Private-Owned Enterprise
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PRC People’s Republic of China
PSMA Agreement on Port State Measures
RES Renewable Energy Sources
RFMO Regional Fisheries Management Organization
RMB Renminbi
SASAC State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
SCIO State Council Information Office
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SDR Special Drawing Rights
SFPA Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement
SLPA Sri Lanka Ports Authority
SOE State-Owned Enterprise
SPFS Special Program for Food Security
SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP UN Development Program
UNEP UN Environment Program
UNESCO UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGC UN Global Compact
UNGP UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
UNIDO UN Industrial Development Organization
UNSC UN Security Council
US United States
VMS Vessel Monitoring Systems
WFP World Food Program
WTO World Trade Organization
1 China’s Stances toward
International Norms Viewed
through the Belt and
Road Initiative
Mario Esteban and Guangyu Qiao-Franco
Introduction
The People’s Republic of China (China or PRC) has experienced a profound trans-
formation over the past 40 years, as the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party
decided to leave behind totalitarianism and initiated a process of economic liber-
alization and internationalization on an unprecedented scale. China has gone from
an isolated, rural country, with a planned economy based on low-added value ac-
tivities, to the world’s largest economic power by purchasing power parity (PPP),
the largest exporter, and a leading technological power in some sectors (Economy,
2018; Shambaugh, 2013).
One fundamental driving force behind this change has been China’s opening to
external markets through a development model based on its insertion into global
supply chains. This has made China heavily dependent on international capital,
technology, and markets. Nonetheless, as China keeps growing after a series of
successful socioeconomic reforms, whose share of the global gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) (PPP) has reached 18.5 percent by 2020, the relationship of dependence
has been converted into one of interdependence. Moreover, this interdependence
tends to run asymmetrically in favor of China, arguably with the exception of the
United States (Nye, 2020). In today’s world, what happens in China impacts almost
every other country in at least one of the following ways: as a privileged economic
partner, a central actor in addressing the main issues on the multilateral agenda,
or as the only country capable of questioning the US’ hegemonic status within the
international community (Allison, 2017).
The unparalleled increase in China’s influence in the international arena has
sparked significant interest surrounding the country’s impact on the rules and
norms that underpin the prevailing international order. This question is especially
pertinent due to the pivot in Chinese foreign policy under its current president Xi
Jinping, who has changed the low-profile approach that prevailed in the aftermath
of the suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests for a more proactive, asser-
tive, and coercive line (Noesselt, 2015; Wang, 2019). In particular, Xi’s signature
foreign policy action, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has exhibited an ambi-
tion to not only increase connectivity around the world but also enhance China’s
DOI: 10.4324/9781003299387-1
2 Mario Esteban and Guangyu Qiao-Franco
normative influence along networks of capital and infrastructure (Hoque & Tama,
2020; Shahriar, 2019). As stated by Xi at the Boao Forum for Asia in 2021:
We will build a closer partnership for connectivity. China will work with all
sides to promote “hard connectivity” of infrastructure and “soft connectiv-
ity” of rules and standards, ensure unimpeded channels for trade and invest-
ment cooperation, and actively develop Silk Road e-commerce, all in a bid
to open up a bright prospect for integrated development [emphasis added].
(Xi, 2021)
Since China was not effectively involved in the deliberations of many established
international norms,1 there is a burgeoning debate regarding whether China will
subvert or accommodate itself to the prevailing international order (Song et al.,
2021). Views among policy circles on this question are often polarized, reflect-
ing competing interests and ideational affinities instead of the actual stance held
by China toward international norms. As seen from the opposing views expressed
in the official rhetoric of the Chinese and US leaderships, the former systemati-
cally presents China as a cooperative actor adhering to international law, whereas
the latter depicts China as a revisionist power that subverts prevailing norms and
standards (PRC State Council Information Office, 2019; US White House, 2017).
Scholars are also divided over the intriguing question on China’s relationship
with international norms. The realist perspective that dominates the international
relations literature views the emergence of China as an element that puts pressure
on established international norms. This claim is largely derived from observa-
tions of the conflicting interests of Beijing and the traditional powers responsible
for establishing these norms (Chan et al., 2019; Mearsheimer, 2006). Meanwhile,
a growing body of scholarship points to China’s intention to maintain some of the
fundamental rules that underpin the existing international order considering it is
one of the principal winners of globalization (Dai & Renn, 2016; Ikenberry, 2008;
Potter, 2007).
This unsettled debate underscores the need for a more nuanced approach that
assesses China’s relationship with international norms beyond a dichotomous dis-
tinction between compliance and non-compliance. Toward this end, this book con-
tributes a sophisticated conceptual framework of norm conformity that informs
the analysis of China’s stance toward international norms across different fields.
Inspired by the insights of Koh (1997) and Foot and Walter (2013), this frame-
work is constructed by three indicators that go beyond a simple evaluation of the
congruence between Chinese domestic norms and their international counterparts.
Instead, it additionally includes a comprehensive examination of the implementa-
tion status of a given international norm in Chinese initiatives as well as the level
of China’s agency in reshaping norms in its own image in a certain field. As will
be illustrated in more detail in the following sections, five different categories to
describe China’s conformity with international norms can be identified: coopera-
tion, compliance, qualification, infraction, and subversion.
China’s Stances toward International Norms 3
This framework is intended to overcome some of the epistemological and

practical shortcomings of widely used binary models (compliance versus non-
compliance). Further, it provides a common basis for the elaboration of China’s
stance toward international norms across fields, which can unite ad hoc creations
by different authors in the extant literature and contribute to building a more coher-
ent and empirically grounded body of theory.
The empirical evidence examined to determine China’s stance toward inter-
national norms discussed in this volume is drawn from seven key areas of the
BRI. They are development cooperation and financing, pelagic fisheries, climate
change, corporate social responsibility, education and educational technology
(EdTech), agricultural cooperation, and currency internationalization. These cases
are selected as relevant as they display various levels of norm conformity. A com-
prehensive assessment of these cases will help identify key patterns in China’s
interaction with international norms.
The rest of the present chapter will illustrate the overarching themes and con-
ceptual framework of the book in more detail. It starts with an overview of the
BRI and its normative agenda as the background for this volume. The second
section builds a dialogue between this study and wider theoretical debates on the
international-domestic nexus in norms research. The third section proceeds to pro-
vide a diachronic review of China’s shifting relationships with international norms.
The fourth section introduces a five-level conceptual framework of norm conform-
ity, which helps operationalize the investigation of China’s stances toward interna-
tional norms. The final section sums up the structure of the book including a brief
overview of the seven case study chapters that constitute the volume.
The BRI and Its Normative Impact

The BRI is an extremely ambitious plan to build trade routes connecting China
with the rest of the world. As of January 2021, it has gathered the support of 146
countries through the signature of Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with
China (GreenFDC, 2022). The mobilization of massive quantities of investment
for infrastructure development is central to this strategy – estimated to reach $1
trillion from 2017 to 2026 (OECD, 2018). The substantial amount of capital mobi-
lized through the BRI has the potential to greatly shape the economic development
of the participant countries. But, its impact goes far beyond the economic sphere.
The BRI, by exporting a “China model” in various fields, is projected to build up
China’s normative power and construct new norms and standards as an alternative
to the prevailing international order (Callahan, 2016).
Before proceeding to examine the BRI’s normative impact, it is necessary to
understand what the initiative really is. The BRI was announced in 2013 in two dis-
courses held by Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan (Xi, 2013a) and Indonesia (Xi, 2013b),
which show that the initiative is based on the idea that a more interconnected
world would be more prosperous and that one of the main obstacles to achieving
this arrangement is the infrastructure deficit of developing countries. Hence, the
emphasis on the necessity to break economic development bottlenecks through

investments aimed at improving infrastructure in those countries.
Two years later, in 2015, Chinese authorities published the Action Plan of the
Belt and Road Initiative, which identified five specific areas of cooperation to boost
connectivity: policy coordination, infrastructures, trade and investment, finance,
and people-to-people exchanges (PRC National Development and Reform Com-
mission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce, 2015). Despite
the progressive expansion of its scope and advances toward its institutionalization,
especially following the first two editions of the Belt and Road Forum for Interna-
tional Cooperation in 2017 and 2019, the BRI lacks a clearly defined organizational
structure. It essentially consists of a network of numerous bilateral agreements
and projects between China and other participating countries, most of which are
economic, and focused on the sectors of energy, transportation, and telecommuni-
cations (Gelpern et al., 2021). According to Xi Jinping:
Infrastructure is the bedrock of connectivity, while the lack of infrastructure

has held up the development of many countries. High-quality, sustainable,
resilient, affordable, inclusive, and accessible infrastructure projects can help
countries fully leverage their resource endowment, better integrate into the
global supply, industrial, and value chains, and realize inter-connected devel-
opment. To this end, China will continue to work with other parties to build
a connectivity network centering on economic corridors such as the New
Eurasian Land Bridge, supplemented by major transportation routes like the
China-Europe Railway Express and the New International Land-Sea Trade
Corridor and information expressway, and reinforced by major railway, port,
and pipeline projects.
(Xi, 2019)
The geographic scope of the initiative has also expanded. Initially, it was focused
on Eurasia, from both a continental (The Silk Road Economic Belt) and a mari-
time perspective (The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road), but it has developed into
a global initiative including 146 countries from seven continents. In just a few
years, this expansion has provided the BRI with enormous visibility both within
and outside of China. For example, the BRI was enshrined into the Constitution
of the People’s Republic of China by the 19th National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party in October 2017, and two editions of the Belt and Road Forum
for International Cooperation have gathered in Beijing, bringing together dozens
of heads of state and government, and key international organizations (PRC State
Council, 2017; Tiezzi, 2019).
Although the rationale of the BRI is a heavily debated topic, overwhelming
evidence shows that this initiative combines both economic and geostrategic
motivations, with strong synergies between them (Esteban & Li, 2019).2 The
official position of the BRI presented by Chinese authorities is that the BRI is
mainly a c ooperative economic initiative, focusing on the socioeconomic ben-
efits that it could bring to China and other participant countries (PRC Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 2017). Along this line, Xi Jinping argued in his speech at the
opening ceremony of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Coop-
eration that:
The joint pursuit of the Belt and Road Initiative aims to enhance connectivity
and practical cooperation. It is about jointly meeting various challenges and
risks confronting mankind and delivering win-win outcomes and common
development. … From the Eurasian continent to Africa, the Americas, and
Oceania, Belt and Road cooperation has opened up new space for global eco-
nomic growth, produced new platforms for international trade and investment
and offered new ways for improving global economic governance. Indeed,
this initiative has helped improve people’s lives in the countries involved and
created more opportunities for common prosperity. What we have achieved
amply demonstrates that Belt and Road cooperation has both generated new
opportunities for the development of all participating countries and opened
up new horizons for China’s development and opening-up.
(Xi, 2019)
The centrality of the economic agenda on the BRI is also reflected at the
institutional level. The Leading Group for Promoting the BRI was established
in February 2015 under the leadership of Zhang Gaoli, the first-ranked vice-
premier and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, whose port-
folio focuses on economic issues. The office of this leadership group has been
placed under the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s top
macroeconomic management agency, granting this commission the leading role
in implementing the BRI. In addition, Chinese media and official think tanks
have been quite vocal against using a geostrategic lens based on zero-sum think-
ing to analyze what they describe as an economic initiative grounded on a win-
win mentality.
However, even if geostrategic considerations are not depicted as a main driver
behind the BRI in official rhetoric, its implementation has significant geostrategic
repercussions. Growing trade and financial links between China and other BRI
participants boost asymmetric economic interdependence among them, making the
Chinese economy more important for the development of those countries than the
other way around. While those states become increasingly dependent on Beijing in
economic terms, China could enjoy greater influence over them at the expense of
their traditional economic partners. Accordingly, Beijing increases its leverage for
influencing those states to accommodate its strategic interests. At the same time,
this diversification of China’s economic relations reduces the leverage of a single
foreign country on the Chinese economy. Hence, those economic links allow China
to resort to the BRI as: a vehicle of soft balancing to undermine the international
influence of other countries; a platform for a bargaining coalition to reshape global
governance in a way that reflects the values, interests, and status of China; and a
platform to promote alternative ideas and norms and to build the role of China as a
normative power (Vangeli, 2018; Zhou & Esteban, 2018).
In this process of utilizing the BRI to present itself as a normative power, Chinese
authorities depict China as a country that can enhance global governance through a
constructive approach toward prevailing international norms and standards. In the
same speech at the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, Xi
Jinping declared that:
The Belt and Road cooperation embraces the historical trend of economic
globalization, responds to the call for improving the global governance
system, and meets people’s longing for a better life (…) We will adopt
widely accepted rules and standards and encourage participating compa-
nies to follow general international rules and standards in project devel-
opment, operation, procurement, and tendering and bidding (…) China is
an active supporter and participant of WTO reform and will work with oth-
ers to develop international economic and trade rules of higher standards
[emphasis added].
(Xi, 2019)
This very approach was reflected the day after in the Joint Communiqué of the
Leaders’ Roundtable attended by 38 heads of state and government plus the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, and the Managing Director
of the International Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde (PRC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2019). The Covid-19 pandemic did not change this approach, as illustrated
by the speech delivered by Xi in late April 2021 at the opening ceremony of the
20th edition of the Boao Forum, whose theme was “A World in Change: Join Hands
to Strengthen Global Governance and Advance Belt and Road Cooperation”:
We need to safeguard the UN-centered international system, preserve the

international order underpinned by international law, and uphold the multi-
lateral trading system with the World Trade Organization at its core.
(Xi, 2021)
Notably, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought grave uncertainty to the BRI
considering both Ukraine and Russia are important members of the initiative and
are part of the ambitious China-Europe rail network. In carefully playing a bal-
ancing act to avoid jeopardizing relationships with both sides, Chinese leadership
emphasizes Beijing’s role to uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter
in contributing to the resolution of the Ukraine crisis. In a more direct statement
on the geopolitical risks facing the BRI (although without directly mentioning
Ukraine), Sheng Qiuping, Assistant Minister of Commerce, stated China will “con-
tinue to promote high-quality global cooperation under the BRI to consolidate the
fundamentals of the initiative and expand new areas of cooperation” (PRC NDRC,
2022).
Some pioneering research has made valuable contributions to elaborate on
the normative impact of the BRI although the number of pieces focusing on this
aspect remains limited, especially if one compares them with the large volume of
academic literature on the economic and environmental sides of the BRI. M oreover,
views on the BRI’s relationship with established norms are highly divided. Coun-
tering Chinese official discourse, some observers portray the BRI as a tool to build
Chinese normative power that systematically subverts the international norms and
standards promoted by the West (Arase, 2015; Callahan, 2016; Fallon, 2015). On
the contrary, some scholars show recognition of the official narrative of the Chinese
and see the BRI as a complement to the existing global order (Jones, 2020; Shan
et al., 2018). A more refined and nuanced understanding of the BRI’s implications
for international norms that accounts for various actors, interests, and agendas re-
mains to be developed.
Besides works that are limited by an acritical approach that buys into official nar-
ratives, there are more in-depth studies that have investigated the normative impact
of the BRI in some ad hoc issue areas. These include, for example, international
monetary policy or private international law (International Monetary Institute of
the RUC, 2019; Sooksripaisarnkit & Garimella, 2018). These single-case studies,
however, have not succeeded in organizing a wide assortment of variables into
a manageable and meaningful framework that allows cross-case comparison and
theorization (Carrai et al., 2020). This volume, by building and applying a com-
mon conceptual framework to examine China’s norm compliance behaviors, offers
the prospect for theoretical integration with relevant studies in different empirical
domains. Further, a comprehensive assessment of China’s stance toward interna-
tional norms and standards is a meaningful step toward finding ways to engage
China constructively in global governance.
The International-Domestic Nexus in Norms Research

Our investigation of the BRI’s normative impact engages with wider theoretical
discussions on the international-domestic nexus in norms research. Norms have
been generally defined as standards of appropriate behaviors although scholars
engrossed by different theoretical and epistemological views often disagree on the
precise definition (Barnett, 1995; Finnemore, 1996; Florini, 1996; Klotz, 1995).
International norms are distinguished from domestic norms in that they entail a col-
lective understanding of standards for behavior among states and non-state actors.
Since interest in norms initially surged in the 1970s, led by a group of regime theo-
rists and then constructivists (Nye & Keohane, 1971; Ruggie, 1983; Wendt, 1994),
the nexus between international norms and the workings of domestic actors have
become a key area of focus across various paradigms in International Relations
(Checkel, 1997; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Although it is beyond the scope of
this chapter to provide a comprehensive review of each body of literature, the fol-
lowing non-exhaustive summary highlights the many ways in which norms enter
the study of international relations.
The academic literature has identified four different paradigms to explain the
interrelation between states and international norms: realist, rationalist, liberal,
and constructivist (Kingsbury, 1998). Realist theories claim that states interact
with global norms based on their own interest, only influenced by the existing
balance of power (Goldsmith & Posner, 2005). From this perspective, international
norms (including international law and institutions) are a mere epiphenomenon of
realpolitik – designed by states to influence other states in accordance with their
interests. For example, hegemonic actors frame norms and standards that weaker
states are forced to follow; or secondary actors which cooperate to establish norms
that limit the level of arbitrariness of more powerful actors.
Although the case studies presented in the following chapters will show how
national interests are a significant factor in explaining how states interact with
international norms and standards, they also show that, in turn, norms influence
states’ behavior. This idea is shared among rationalist, liberal, and constructivist
theories. If international law by itself did not influence how states behave in the
international arena, it would be hard to explain states’ claims against international
law infringements, their commitment to defend themselves against those claims,
and their resort to international law to justify their actions (Guzman, 2002).
Rationalists consider that states only follow international norms when it is in
their interest to do so. They develop rational choice models to demonstrate that,
in general, it is in states’ interests to comply with international norms because this
allows them to earn the necessary reputation to maintain beneficial relations with
other international actors and because it promotes stability. From this perspective,
international norms decrease transaction costs in international relations by lower-
ing verification and sanction costs. Therefore, non-compliance will only occur if
its benefits exceed the costs. The impact of international normative frameworks
on states’ foreign policy would thus be limited, especially if they concern issues
of utmost importance for political authorities. Complex rationalist analyses (Bara-
daran et al., 2013; Mertha & Zeng, 2005), like those used in most chapters of this
book, distinguish the interests of different sub-state actors and how they interact
with other international actors and institutions.
Along the same lines, the liberal paradigm also rejects a monolithic under-
standing of states’ stances toward international norms and standards. From this
perspective, these stances are understood as political aggregations of individual
and group preferences, interests, and values, mediated by domestic and interna-
tional norms and also by the interaction of involved domestic stakeholders with
international actors. The advocates of liberal theories also proclaim that democ-
racies tend to comply more with international norms than authoritarian regimes
(Kingsbury, 1998).
For its part, the idealist paradigm, inspired by Kant, considers that states gen-
erally comply with international law out of a moral obligation and owning to the
legitimacy of such norms. This legitimacy may be procedural, due to its representa-
tiveness, or substantive, based on its compatibility with values like distributive jus-
tice. It is understood that these normative considerations are more significant when
they impinge on issues with little impact on the interests of the actors involved.
This idealist paradigm is quite influential inside the so-called Chinese School of
International Relations (Yan, 2011; Zhang & Chang, 2016; Zhao, 2009).
Finally, according to constructivists, norms condition the conduct of par-
ticipating states by changing their interests, which are not a given, but socially
constructed. Constructivists see norms as principled ideas that establish a funda-

mental distinction between what is good and what is evil. Norms are spread among
states through persuasion, involving the process of changing “hearts and minds”
that are relatively independent of power distributions (Payne, 2001). This paradigm
has been most comprehensive in explaining the processes and mechanisms through
which international norms reach the domestic arena, mainly discussed under the
banner of “norm diffusion”.
While the first wave of norm diffusion scholarship focuses on how transna-
tional agents spread norms through domestic structures (Barnett, 1995; Finnemore,
1996), the second wave of this scholarship draws attention to the agency of norm
recipients in reinterpreting and localizing international norms (Acharya, 2004,
2009; Checkel, 1997). The agency of the receiving actors in reconstructing ideas
has been useful in explaining variations in compliance and interpretation of inter-
national norms in domestic contexts. More often than not, some key characteristics
of the pre-existing normative order are retained rather than displaced wholesale by
international norms. The prospect for diffusion depends on the credibility and ca-
pacity of transnational actors to promote norms, the strength of prior local norms,
and the cultural match between a systemic norm and a target country (Acharya,
2004; Risse-Kappen, 1995).
Whereas studies of domestic actors shaping the constitutive impact of interna-
tional norms (reactive) are well developed, the same cannot be said for a norm dif-
fusion process that simultaneously involves reconstitution of international norms
per se triggered by powerful actors (proactive). Analysis of international-domestic
norm conformity that takes into account both “reactive” and “proactive” interac-
tion dynamics is even more relevant when analyzing the behavior of a rising power
such as China, which plays a fundamental role in the international community from
at least three different perspectives. First, China has the biggest economy by GDP
PPP and is a key economic partner for many countries. For instance, in 2019, it was
the main import partner for 66 out of 193 countries (UNCTAD, 2021a). This has
far-reaching repercussions as evidenced during the first half of 2020 when China
exported almost 29 percent of Covid-related critical goods (World Trade Organi-
zation, 2020). In addition, China has positioned itself as the world’s third-largest
foreign investor, holding 6 percent of the total stock of outward foreign direct
investment (FDI) in 2019 (UNCTAD, 2021b), and as a main source of financing
for many developing countries (Gelpern et al., 2021). Second, China is a key actor
in addressing the main challenges of the multilateral agenda. China is one of the
five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the
second donor to the United Nations (UN) general budget (12 percent) and peace-
keeping missions (15.2 percent) (UN Department of Peace Operations, 2021; UN
General Assembly, 2019). China has also achieved leadership positions in four of
the 15 UN specialized agencies: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Telecommuni-
cation Union (ITU), and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).
Third, China is the only country which could plausibly challenge US hegemony.
Due to the massive increase in its economic, diplomatic, and military capabilities,
China is unanimously recognized as the rising great power of our times (Allison,
2017), even by those who consider that US hegemony is not at stake (Beckley,
2018).
As a result, the way China interacts with international norms and standards has
a direct and significant impact on: the economic interests of the numerous coun-
tries it maintains substantial trade and financial links with, the effectiveness with
which humankind can face some of the greatest challenges like climate change,
and finally, the stability of the current international order (Allison, 2017). A new
framework for understanding norm conformity that is tailor-made to China that
accounts for the more pronounced bottom-up, proactive norm interaction dynam-
ics remains to be developed. The following sections will map out China’s dynamic
stance toward international norms before proposing a comprehensive framework
for analyzing state’s stances toward international norms.
China’s Dynamic Stance toward International Norms

It is quite common for a state to hold an inconsistent stance toward international
norms and standards. Due to China’s increasing capacities, which have resulted in
a more assertive foreign policy, the focus of this debate has moved from a “reac-
tive” to a “proactive” orientation: from the extent/degree of China’s compliance
with extant international frameworks to the level of influence it exerts in the devel-
opment of new behavioral rules.
When conducting a diachronic analysis, it is clear that there have been very
substantial variations over time in the relationship of China with international
norms due to changes in domestic and international contexts. Before it entered
the United Nations in 1971, China was frequently seen as a rogue state because of
its frequent opposition to international standards of behavior, even advocating in
1965 for the abolition of this body. During the 1950s and 1960s, Chinese foreign
policy was greatly influenced by realistic thinking and the maintenance of its sov-
ereignty was valued over the potential benefits of its participation in international
regimes, which were seen as an instrument of great powers to influence less power-
ful countries. From this point of view, Chinese authorities were reluctant to engage
with international regimes because they felt vulnerable to the influence that other
countries could exert on China through them. In summary, the Chinese Communist
Party perceived international regimes as a threat to its own regime, which was still
poorly institutionalized (Lanteigne, 2009).
China’s willingness to be part of the international community increased sub-
stantially with Deng Xiaoping’s reform program in the late 1970s. In 1977, China
barely participated in 21 international organizations, going up to 51 in 1996 and
298 in 2003 (Wang & Hu, 2010). In this context, China began to comply with
international norms and standards much more systematically. It was also argued
that China was engaging in a socialization process in those institutions, where mi-
croprocesses such as mimicking, social influence, and persuasion were fostering
a normative alignment of China with the principles underpinning the norms and
standards emanating from those institutions (Johnston, 2008). Nevertheless, many
authors have later presented robust evidence pointing out that Chinese compliance
with the norms and standards from those institutions frequently did not translate
into actual cooperation with them since the process of normative appropriation
by Chinese stakeholders of their underlying values was limited (Chan, 2013; Dai
& Renn, 2016; Kent, 2006; Potter, 2007). These authors argue that China has
mainly observed a legalistic approach, following the letter of international rules
rather than their spirit. Chinese stakeholders furthermore assume different posi-
tions regarding different international norms and standards. They tend to have a
less positive attitude toward international norms that they perceive as obstacles to
their socioeconomic development, China’s national interests, the continuity of the
regime, or as more favorable to traditional powers than to China (Foot & Walter,
2013; Wu, 2016). Some prevailing norms that illustrate these respective situations
are the Trademark Law Treaty, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNC-
LOS), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies.
Therefore, most of the literature on China’s position toward international norms
before the Xi Jinping era rejects that China should be defined as a country that
systematically violates international norms (Chan, 2006; Chin & Thakur, 2010;
Combes, 2011; Foot & Walter, 2013; Kent, 2006, 2007; Kim, 2004). This pre-
vailing view that China is a country that mostly abides by international norms is
reinforced if its conduct is compared with that of other major powers such as the
United States and if China is considered to be a developing country. Unlike the
United States, China has never withdrawn from a regime that it has joined, nor
has it reneged from a treaty it has signed (Kim, 2004). Moreover, China’s behav-
ior in many international regimes is very similar to that of other countries with a
comparable level of socioeconomic development. Some authors have underlined
that it would be unfair to label those countries as revisionists for not abiding by
international norms as they aspire to have a greater role within the international
community and do not want to compromise their socio-economic development per-
spectives (Chan, 2006; Patrick, 2010).
Nevertheless, the debate on whether China is a status-quo or a revisionist power
has been revitalized as Xi Jinping has moved from Deng’s low-profile foreign pol-
icy to an assertive, proactive, and sometimes aggressive foreign policy whose epit-
ome is the Belt and Road Initiative (Kratz & Pavlićević, 2019; Shan et al., 2018;
Zhou & Esteban, 2018). This issue has been generally analyzed from the perspec-
tive of power-transition theory, taking for granted that China, as a rising state, is a
revisionist power pushing for the substitution of the prevailing norms and standards
by others that better reflect its interests (Chan et al., 2019). This view claims that a
rising China is alienated by dominant international institutions since it played no or
limited role in their creation, whereas this normative framework reflects the values
and interests of the hegemonic US power. This perspective assumes a simplis-
tic and deterministic approach equating the international power distribution with
international order, ignoring the possibility that China may have benefited from,
and socialized into the prevailing international norms and standards (Ikenberry,
2008; Johnston, 2008), and may be more eager to challenge the balance of power
than the normative framework of the current international system. Instead of echo-
ing that narrative and taking for granted that a rising China must have a revisionist
stance toward international norms and standards, we follow an empirically based
approach and consider that a state, also rising states like China, can have dynamic
and different stances toward different international norms.
A Common Theoretical Framework for Analyzing Norm Conformity

To provide an accurate understanding of how China interacts with prevailing inter-
national norms through the BRI, it is necessary to resort to a theoretical framework
that sheds light on the complex relationships that states establish with said norms.
The most common categories used to understand how states relate to international
norms and standards are compliance and non-compliance although some scholars
have elaborated classification schemes that go beyond dichotomous terms. As an
example, Acharya (2004) examines the selective responses of ASEAN to interna-
tional security norms along a spectrum ranging from wholesale adoption, adapta-
tion, localization, to rejection.
However, the definitions and classifications of norm compliance developed in
this literature have three remaining shortcomings (Baradaran et al., 2013; Howse
& Teitel, 2010). First, prior literature disregards that the political implications of
compliance or non-compliance with international norms depend on our interpreta-
tions, overlooking that these interpretations of why states behave the way they
do are contested. Second, states are often treated as a “black box” in past work,
neglecting how the role played by different domestic stakeholders is key to deter-
mine their actual stance toward global norms. Third, the either binary or multiple
categories of norm compliance in this literature are mainly derived from post hoc
evaluations of the congruence between international and domestic norms. These
classifications neglect the will and capacity of a state to influence international
normative frameworks when they are diffused to the domestic arena, as highlighted
in the discussions above.
Moreover, in China studies, the body of literature that is most relevant to this
volume, norm conformity has largely been treated as a dichotomous variable.
There are a few notable exceptions that tacitly discuss China’s norm compliance
behavior as falling on a spectrum but a rigorous definition of norm conformity that
allows cross-case comparisons remains missing (Breslin, 2010; Callahan, 2012).
This simplification does not fully grasp the potential degrees of conformity
or nonconformity toward international norms, which have obvious implications
for international politics. In her influential book on China’s integration into the
multilateral system, Ann Kent (2007) argues that it is necessary to differentiate
between levels of compliance to understand why China reacts differently to various
norms despite the progressive socialization of China into Western-led international
institutions. According to Kent, there are some clear differences in the way China
and traditional powers aligned with some prevailing global norms. In addition, it
is argued that the challenge posed by a state to international law is quite different
when it fails to comply once with a given norm versus when the state systemati-
cally breaks that norm and vocally advocates replacing it.
In order to better capture those nuances, we have identified five different cat-
egories to describe China’s stance toward international norms and standards: coop-
eration, compliance, qualification, infraction, and subversion. This categorization,
shown in Table 1.1, is constructed by three independent variables: the congruence
between China’s norms and international norms, the consistency between interna-
tional norms and the initiatives/projects implemented in the framework of the BRI,
and the level of agency played by China in the creation of norms and standards in
a given field.
States that cooperate with international law do not simply obey it to obtain
specific benefits or to avoid sanctions but rather seek to develop international
law based on the spirit of the prevailing regulatory framework, which they have
internalized within their own value system. Cooperative states actively promote
the deepening and circulation of current norms and standards in their interaction
with other states and in international fora. To incorporate the multiple domestic
stakeholders that influence the relationship between China and international laws
and standards into the analysis, the case study chapters take into account that the
process of internalization of international norms can be social, political, or legal
(Koh, 1997). However, since China has a party-state system where ruling political
authorities exert total control on the legislative system, we put particular emphasis
on the incorporation of international norms and standards into the national legal
system because this indicates a higher level of internalization than mere social
pressure or governmental policies.
States that comply with a norm or standard follow it from a legalistic perspective
as they understand that breaking the norm would be harmful to them. International
norms are also largely incorporated in domestic initiatives. However, states in the
compliance scenario adopt a passive attitude toward the promotion of those norms
Table 1.1 State’s stances toward international norms
Cooperation Compliance Qualification Infraction Subversion
Congruence High High High/ High/ Moderate/

between moderate moderate/ low
China´s low
norms and
international
norms
Implementation High High Moderate Low Low
of the
international
norms in BRI
initiatives
Agency Active Passive Active/ Passive Active
passive
Elaborated by authors.
or standards. They are not willing to actively promote the further development of
external norms as they have no normative attachment to them.
States that qualify or shape international norms and standards try to introduce
minor changes in them so that they better fit state interests and/or values. Unlike
states that cooperate with prevailing international norms, states that qualify those
norms do not try to modify them so that they become more ambitious from the
perspective of their underlying values, but rather they try to limit the ambition of
these norms because they collide with their own national interests and/or values.
States that infringe or subvert international norms and standards skip them
systematically. The main difference between infraction and subversion is that
subverting not only implies breaking international norms and standards quite fre-
quently but also advocating actively for the substitution of the prevailing norms
and standards by alternative ones. Therefore, when states cooperate with, or sub-
vert existing international norms and standards, those that have the capacity to do
so may become creators of international law (rule-makers) although their relation-
ship with prevailing international norms is diametrically opposed at the normative
level.
So defined, this conceptual framework of norm conformity captures the multi-
ple contexts through which China interacts with systemic norms. It will help bring
forward understandings on why some international norms resonate in China’s
domestic political discourse while others do not. In addition to utilizing this
detailed categorization of state’s stances toward international norms and standards,
in order to accurately determine how a state like China relates to international
norms and standards, in every case study chapter, it is also necessary to define the
normative reference in question and to identify a series of indicators for evaluation
(Foot & Walter, 2013). This measurement task is tremendously complex for differ-
ent reasons. International regulatory frameworks are complicated and dynamic and
may have internal inconsistencies. Moreover, not all deviations from international
norms and standards have the same implications. Furthermore, when analyzing
the behavior of large powers, such as China, there may be a problem of endogene-
ity because these countries may have an important role in creating the normative
framework on which we evaluate their behavior. Therefore, it is essential to resort
not only to a quantitative but also qualitative analysis as the case studies presented
in this volume do. The same will happen when calibrating other relevant aspects for
determining the stance of China toward international norms, including the level of
congruence between international and national norms, and the level of implemen-
tation of those international norms in the framework of BRI projects.
Structure of the Book

Following this introductory chapter, there are seven case study chapters that focus
on divergent issues areas of the BRI. For the sake of conceptual and methodological
coherence, the structure of the case study chapters shares four recurrent sections:
an introduction to the traditional stance of China toward the specific international
norms and standards covered by that chapter, emphasizing the level of congruence
between China’s domestic norms and those international norms; an examination of

the level of implementation of those international norms and standards by China
through BRI projects; a description of the agency of China and whether it plays an
active or passive role in the creation of international norms and standards through
specific BRI ventures; and finally, an assessment of whether China cooperates,
complies, qualifies, infringes, or subverts the analyzed international norms and
standards through BRI projects.
We will start with Chapter 2 on China and aid norms, the issue perhaps mostly
debated in the international fora. Through China’s BRI projects in Ethiopia,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, Mario Esteban and Iliana Olivié explore China’s relation
with prevailing international cooperation norms, reflected in the Aid Effectiveness
Agenda (AEA). They find that despite China’s progressive inclusion of certain
elements of the AEA, it still infringes the four principles of effective cooperation
(ownership, transparency and accountability, inclusive partnerships, and focus on
results), without promoting alternative norms. China’s attitude is linked with its
own understanding of aid principles, an approach based mainly on interests instead
of values, but also host countries’ limited commitments toward AEA principles.
A similar infraction position is also observed in Chapter 3 on China’s stance
toward “distant-water fishing” (DWF) governance alongside the Maritime Silk
Road. Apart from the identification of so far limited progress and major gaps in
terms of normative congruence, Juan He unearths empirical evidence to assess
China’s up-to-date record of compliance with and implementation of international
fisheries norms. While China’s domestic normative congruence with the interna-
tional DWF standards could be labeled as “moderate”, its performance at the level
of implementation remains “low”, which implies the potential to amplify the strains
on the vulnerability of nature through its expanding port infrastructure construction
projects along the African coasts.
Nevertheless, China doesn’t systematically infringe all issue-specific in-
ternational norms. Once we turn to China’s attitude toward the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) studied in Chapter 4, Lara Lázaro-
Touza and Mario Esteban argue that China has overall complied with international
climate norms u nder the UNFCCC framework but stressed its identity as a devel-
oping country to limit its climate duties. This not fully cooperative stance makes
the BRI a novel challenge regarding China’s relationship with international climate
governance. Despite China’s efforts to green the BRI, this initiative could be seen
as qualifying international climate norms because most energy investments and
power capacity additions by BRI projects have heretofore been fossil-fuel based.
More empirical evidence is still needed to see whether China is moving closer to its
de-carbonization promises along the BRI with a new round of initiatives to make
the BRI more environmentally friendly.
The ambiguous qualification stance is further highlighted when issue-specific
international norms contain universal cross-sectional principles that China tends
to interpret by its own way, such as the meaning and implication of human rights.
However, the BRI together with the associated concept of “Community of Com-
mon Destiny for Mankind” sometimes make China develop specific normative
framework that is relatively more congruent with international norms under the
BRI. Both Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate how this happened. In Chapter 5, Yue
Lin points out the emergence of a dual yet disparate regime on corporate social
responsibility (CSR) in China, demanding Chinese companies to fulfill their over-
seas CSR more strictly; while in Chapter 6, Claudio Feijóo, Cristina Armuña, and
Javier Fernández tell us how China is engaged in the international Edtech govern-
ance using discourses more aligned with the international expectation. Neverthe-
less, in both cases, the normative congruence has not translated into a systematic
and holistic improvement at the implementation level, making the authors argue
that China would remain as a qualifying actor in their respective normative areas.
The implementation gap is also a salient feature as noticed in Chapter 7 con-
cerning China’s role in the international agricultural cooperation. Through a case
study on China’s collaboration with Latin American and Caribbean countries in
different areas such as agricultural trade, investment, and technology, Ge Gao and
Yuanbo Li indicate that China’s stance generally adheres to the international norms
of agricultural cooperation but presents different outcomes in fulfilling the norms
under the tri-dimensional principles of fair trade, responsible investment, and
local benefiting technology cooperation. Additionally, the BRI provides a platform
where China hopes to foster a collective “South-South” agricultural cooperation
framework but fails to consolidate it, thus weakening China’s normative power.
Finally, in Chapter 8, Miguel Otero-Iglesias raises the question on how to under-
stand and judge China’s moves to internationalize the RMB within the neoliberal
economic order, which, however, faces the challenges about its underlying prin-
ciples after the 2008–2009 financial crisis. He argues that China has never fully
accepted the neoliberal “holy trinity” (of free capital flows, floating exchange rates,
and independent central banks), but neither has it adopted a confrontational or sub-
versive strategy. The BRI nevertheless allows China to bypass neoliberal principles
to a limited degree by building what can be called currency “motorways” (currency
swap agreements, an interbank payment system, and the digital Yuan). As a conse-
quence, instead of complying with existent questionable neoliberal principles, the
BRI leads to their qualification, or even, subversion.
The book will conclude with Chapter 9, co-authored by Yue Lin and Mario
Esteban, which summarizes the empirical findings on the seven topics formerly
mentioned, highlighting the complexity of China’s current stances toward different
international norms and standards. The concluding chapter also contextualizes the
findings in the broad normative theory, calling for future research on normative
changes and China’s normative power, as well as a prudent and meticulous policy
design from other international actors in order to engage China more constructively
in the global governance.
Notes
1 We follow authors such as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and Ruggie (1998) in adopt-
ing an inclusive conception of international norms, which broadly refer to standards of
appropriate behaviors for states. They contain (1) implicit ideas of broad significance,
(2) relatively specific and institutionalized operating principles, and (3) formal, written
rules embodied in international law that impose legal obligations.
2 For an updated discussion on the literature about the BRI, see Hale, Liu, and Urpelainen
(2020).
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2 China and Aid Norms. A Case
Study on Ethiopia, Pakistan,
and Sri Lanka
Mario Esteban and Iliana Olivié
Introduction
In line with the general objective of this book, the aim of this chapter is to e xplore
China’s attitude toward global norms in the specific domain of international
development cooperation conducted under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Aid
norms are here taken from the Aid Effectiveness Agenda (AEA), a set of global tar-
gets on the features of the donor-partner countries political relation, how aid should
be delivered, and development achieved. Though such set of norms arose in the
context of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
(therefore, exclusively reflecting Western donors’ views), they have evolved into
a common understanding on how aid should be managed, institutionalized in the
Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC),1 subscribed
by a wider range of stakeholders, including China, emerging donors and non-State
actors such as private businesses and civil society organizations (CSOs).
These norms are now classified into four general principles. Ownership refers
to the partner countries’ capacity and margin of maneuver to implement their own
development agendas (and having the donors’ community align with them). The
principle of inclusive development partnerships underlines the need to involve
non-State actors, namely, private businesses and CSOs, in aid and development
activities. Transparency and accountability refers not only to the availability of
information on aid and development but also to the existence of systems for
holding the parties involved in aid delivery accountable. Lastly, f ocus on results,
a self-explanatory principle, mainly refers to development results in partner
countries.
Chinese attitude toward aid being compliant would mean that China accepts,
in general terms, the whole pack of orthodox aid norms. In case of cooperation,
it would go further beyond, pioneering initiatives in order to push forward the
principles of ownership, inclusive partnerships, transparency, and accountability,
or focus on results. On the contrary, if qualifying, it would comply moderately and
unenthusiastically with the bulk of the agenda.
Some voices have acquired visibility by depicting Chinese development coop-
eration as subversive (Naim, 2009), meaning that China, in addition to not com-
plying with prevailing global standards on development cooperation, also takes
DOI: 10.4324/9781003299387-2
China and Aid Norms 23
a normative stand against them and actively pushes forward an alternative aid
agenda. However, the academic literature reveals a more nuanced picture and sug-
gests that China simply does not comply with global norms without framing, in
parallel, a new or different approach to aid norms anchored in an alternative and
unorthodox set of values (Bräutigam, 2012; de Haan & Warmerdam, 2013; Dollar,
2018; Jones, 2020; Russel & Berger, 2019). The present analysis of three BRI
countries supports this latter approach, highlighting that the BRI infringes, but does
not subvert, the prevailing normative framework for development cooperation.
China’s attitude toward aid norms in the BRI is here explored through three
representative country case studies which are Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
All three countries are relevant partners of China in the framework of the BRI
but also hold ties with the community of traditional donors, a needed feature of
selected countries insofar as such community might be pushing, to some extent,
at the country level, for AEA as the normative approach to aid. We conducted
55 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with members of the donor community in
China, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; officials from those countries; staff from
the traditional multilateral financial institutions; diplomats from OECD countries;
representatives from Chinese business and financing institutions; and Chinese,
Ethiopian, Pakistani, and Sri Lankan experts. Three of those interviews were con-
ducted online, while the remainder took place in Karachi and Islamabad in April
2016, in Colombo in August and September 2018, and in Addis Ababa and Beijing
in April, August, and September 2019. Interviews addressed informants’ views of
the development initiatives in the partner country (e.g., national or sector develop-
ment strategies), China’s behavior regarding aid effectiveness principles, and their
assessment of aid effectiveness principles in terms of whether they are actually
implemented in BRI projects and whether they lead to greater aid effectiveness.
The information obtained from the meetings has been triangulated with data from
official documents and secondary literature.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section depicts the main fea-
tures, origin, and evolution of the AEA. This is followed by the criteria guiding the
selection of the three countries of the case study, both in terms of their relationship
with China and their links with the traditional donors’ community. The third sec-
tion describes China as a donor, emphasizing its normative approach toward aid.
The following four sections analyze AEA principles one at a time: how these are
addressed, from the normative viewpoint, by China, both in general terms, and in
the three particular cases of Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The last section
concludes.
The Aid Effectiveness Agenda

As already mentioned, the aim of this book is to assess China’s attitude toward
prevailing multilateral norms. China can cooperate, comply, qualify, infringe, or
subvert such norms. Therefore, the first methodological challenge is to identify the
political agenda that encapsulates globally accepted multilateral norms in the aid
domain.
24 Mario Esteban and Iliana Olivié
Defining aid norms is particularly challenging since, on the one hand, global
and local cooperation agendas are far from mandatory and, on the other hand, these
have strongly evolved in the last two decades (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2020; M awdsley,
2018). In spite of this, previous academic studies have identified the AEA as a
good proxy for multilateral aid norms (Brown, 2020; Grimm & Hackenesch, 2017;
Keijzer & Black, 2020).
The contents of the current AEA are the result of a process of evolution that
began at the Rome high-level forum promoted by the OECD in 2003. In that first
meeting, the main principles of aid were outlined: alignment with partner coun-
tries’ procedures and goals, and a focus on the impact and results of development
cooperation. With nuances and re-interpretations, these have remained as the back-
bone of the AEA until now (see Table 2.1). After the 2011 Busan meeting, the
AEA was institutionalized in the GPEDC, a multi-stakeholder platform integrating
both donor and partner countries (including, particularly, Brazil, China, and India)
alongside multilateral organizations (Abdel-Malek, 2015). The AEA lost traction
after that (Brown, 2017; Esteban & Olivié, 2022; Holzapfel, 2016; Karini, 2016;
Keijzer & Black, 2020; Keijzer et al., 2020; Owa, 2015; Sundberg, 2019) but still
encapsulates the prevailing orthodox thinking regarding aid norms (with a vis-
ible Western bias) (Brown, 2017; Gutiérrez-Goiria et al., 2017; Keijzer & Black,
2020). This is shown, for instance, in the importance of ownership, partnerships, or
transparency in the current 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) (Keijzer & Black, 2020).
Table 2.1 Development cooperation monitoring framework
Focus on results
1b Countries strengthen their national results frameworks

1a Development partners use country-led results frameworks
Ownership of development priorities by developing countries
5a Development cooperation is predictable: annual predictability
5b Development cooperation is predictable: medium-term predictability
9a Quality of countries’ public financial management systems
9b Development partners use country systems
10 Aid is untied
Inclusive development partnerships
3 Quality of public–private dialogue
2 Civil society organizations operate within an environment that maximizes their
engagement in and contribution to development
Transparency and accountability to each other
4 Transparent information on development cooperation is publicly available
7 Mutual accountability among development actors is strengthened through inclusive
reviews
6 Development cooperation is included in budgets subject to parliamentary oversight
8 Countries have systems to track and make public allocations for gender equality
and women’s empowerment
Source: Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation.
Why Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka?

China’s attitude toward aid norms can be analyzed at the multilateral level since
this is a global agenda (Janus & Tang, 2021; Reilly, 2011). Nevertheless, previ-
ous studies have identified the attitude and features of local governments and
administrations in partner countries to be key players in China’s behavior regarding
the AEA (Kondoh, 2015; Kratz & Pavlićević, 2019; Reilly, 2011). Therefore, case
studies, conducted in selected partner countries, can provide relevant information.
Such countries should comply with a series of features to be suitable as case stud-
ies. First, they need to be of particular political interest for China but must also
record links of varied intensity with traditional donors since the latter are expected
to apply or, at least, represent or normatively defend the AEA agenda that China
will, eventually, cooperate with, comply, qualify, infringe, or subvert. Moreover,
aid must also be an important source of external resources, to guarantee a strong
interaction between locals and donors.
Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are all part of the Belt and Road Initiative
and play a significant role in China’s foreign policy (Esteban, 2018; Small, 2015;
Tesfaye, 2020). Official data for Chinese aid and other financing in developing
countries are rather scarce. The two most recent Chinese white papers on aid include
aggregate figures showing an annual spending of around $7,000 million during the
2010s (Cichocka et al., 2021; People’s Republic of China [PRC]. State Council
Information Office, 2014; 2021). However, more specific regional or country-by-
country information is not included. This statistical vacuum is trying to be filled by
several academic initiatives attempting to quantify these flows, such as AidData and
the data project on Chinese overseas finance by the Boston University. According
to these, there are strong Chinese debt investments (climbing up to nearly $40,000
million in Pakistan in only ten years) as well as Official Development Assistance
(ODA)-like spending (of, for instance, over $2,000 million in Ethiopia, in only one
decade and a half) in all three countries (see Table 2.2).
Traditional donors are also present in these three countries. Moreover, some of
the main donors are the same in all of them, which is the case with the World Bank
and the United States. Also, the United Kingdom is a major donor in both Ethio-
pia and Pakistan, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in Pakistan and Sri
Lanka. This feature of aid allocation somehow guarantees that a similar approach
and interpretation of the AEA might prevail in all three development cooperation
scenarios.
The traditional donors’ community links with the partner countries are of very
different intensities. Ethiopia, a donor darling, received, on average, almost $5
billion between 2018 and 2020. With an ODA/Gross national income (GNI) ratio
as high as 5.26 percent (on average, in 2018–2020), it is a highly aid-dependent
country, well above the average for all developing countries (0.61 percent for that
same period) and for sub-Saharan Africa, that stands at 2.69 percent for those same
years. Much on the contrary, Pakistan’s aid dependency ratio falls to 0.82 p ercent in
2018–2020. Lastly, traditional donors’ presence in Sri Lanka is much less intense.
With an average of around $54 million a year, the aid dependency ratio falls to 0.09
percent of Sri Lankan GNI. As with Pakistan, a great deal of such ODA is devoted
to the provision of economic and social infrastructure.
Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka also record different degrees of financial
dependency toward China. The very strong presence of China in Ethiopia results in
$5.64 of ODA-like and $5.65 in loans per person. Both ratios increase in the case
of Pakistan, to $17.87 and $18.34 respectively, and jump to $21.63 and $35.95 in
Sri Lanka. In short, Ethiopia combines a very intense presence of traditional donors
with strong ties with China; Pakistan has a moderate aid dependency with regard to
traditional donors and a fairly strong involvement of China, and, lastly, Sri Lanka,
with a very marginal presence of traditional donors, has received massive invest-
ments from China (see Table 2.2). The very different dependency levels of these
partner countries toward both traditional donors and China allow for a comparative
study where local authorities can be analyzed as a key factor explaining the attitude
of China toward AEA.
Table 2.2 Main features of partner countries
Ethiopia Pakistan Sri Lanka
Traditional donors
Aid volume (2018–2020 Very high: 4,973 High: 1,977 Low: 54
average net ODA, $ millions)a
Aid dependency (2018–2020 High: 5.26 Average: 0.82 Low: 0.09
average ODA as percent of
recipient GNI)a
Main donorsa World Bank (mainly), Four main Japan, World
followed by US, donors: World Bank, ADB,
UK, and EU Bank, ADB, US
institutions US, UK
Sector distributiona Balanced distribution, Concentration on economic and
stronger focus on social infrastructure
humanitarian aid
and health
China
Aid volume (2000–2014 ODA- 2,003 1,224 476
like finance, completed
projects, $ millions)b
Aid dependency (2000–2014 aid Strong: 5.64 Very strong: Extremely high:
volume per capita)a, b 17.87 21.63
Loans commitment in volume 13,700 (2000–2019) 39,800 8,700
($ millions)c (2008–2017) (2008–2018)
Chinese loans dependency 5.65 18.34 35.95
(annual average loans volume
per capita, $)a, c
a
OECD;
b
Dreher et al. (2021);
c
Ray et al. (2021).
China and Ethiopia have a variety of ties, including diplomatic relations and
investments. Moreover, similarities in development approaches and visions may
have cemented bilateral relations and shaped Chinese aid in the country (Tesfaye,
2020). Ethiopia has traditionally approached development strategies with a strong
sense of the role of the State in growth processes, very much in line with Asian mod-
els, particularly China (Fourie, 2015; Mosley & Watson, 2016). As a result, both
countries have historically maintained strategic relations (Adem, 2012; B räutigam
& Tang, 2014; Cabestan, 2012; Cheru, 2016; Endaylalu, 2018; Giannecchini &
Taylor, 2018; Lin & Wang, 2017; Nicolas, 2017). Indeed, as Fantu Cheru has docu-
mented, Ethiopia-China relations encompass trade and investment, skills transfers,
and experience sharing. Chinese investment in Ethiopia includes foreign direct
investment (FDI) projects: in contrast to other African and Latin American coun-
tries, Chinese FDI in Ethiopia is focused on manufacturing and the telecommuni-
cations sector. China has also provided loans for infrastructure projects in sectors
such as transport and power, which have been linked to the BRI.
The development relations between China and Pakistan are framed under
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a massive regional connec-
tivity project through the construction of an infrastructure link from Kashgar,
in Xinjiang, to the deep sea port of Gwadar in Pakistan. It includes gas pipe-
lines, railways, highways, special economic zones, and fiber optic networks and
could cost over $60 billion to be invested in the 2015–2030 period (Ali, 2021;
McCartney, 2018).
The increased intensity of Sri Lankan and Chinese ties is fairly recent. After
the end of the Cold War, and also given its transition from low-income to middle-
income status, and allegations of gross human rights violations, Western global
players lost interest in Sri Lanka, as shown in aid volumes in Table 2.2. Given Sri
Lanka’s increasing stress regarding external financial needs, this opened the door
to closer ties with China, also in the framework of the BRI. With a strong focus on
the transport and infrastructure sectors, the BRI manifested in Sri Lanka in a major
intervention in the port of Colombo. A decade ago, a joint Sino-Sri Lankan venture
was created to build and manage (initially for a period of 35 years) a cargo terminal
in this port. This initiative is considered a total success since it has allowed for a
dramatic increase of the capacity of the port, which has become the first port in
South Asia by business volume. This successful project has eased the way for other
similar initiatives involving Chinese funds and companies, such as in the port of
Hambantota.
China’s Aid Model and Principles

Chinese aid model must be understood in a historical perspective. Traced back
to its independence in 1949, China’s aid was initially motivated by South-South
solidarity, membership of the Non-Alignment Movement, and diplomatic com-
petition with Taiwan. More recently, in the context of China’s adherence to the
globalization process – the “Going Out” strategy – foreign aid was increasingly
used to support the internationalization of the Chinese economy via the promotion
of China’s foreign direct investment, or easing the access to key natural resources
(Kondoh, 2015).
Foreign assistance has therefore been governed by the Five Principles of Peaceful
Co-existence, strongly rooted in China’s aid political fundamentals: mutual respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference
in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexist-
ence (PRC. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Furthermore, given the economic
shift of China’s foreign assistance, Eight Principles for China’s Aid to Third World
Countries were adopted, which also framed the narrative of Chinese aid: mutual
benefit, no conditions attached, avoiding a debt burden on partner countries, sup-
porting partner countries’ autonomous development, priority to countries in need
of less capital and quick returns, aid quality, technological spillover, and equality
between Chinese and local workers (Jiang, 2011).
China’s approach to aid has also been made explicit in the country’s white papers
on aid. The 2011 official document on China’s foreign aid states that this emerg-
ing donor will be “adhering to equality and mutual benefit, stressing substantial
results, and keeping pace with the times without imposing any political conditions
on recipient countries” and, therefore, that “China’s foreign aid has emerged as a
model with its own characteristics” (PRC. State Council Information Office, 2011).
Three years later, the 2014 white paper states a similar approach:
“China adheres to the principles of not imposing any political conditions,

not interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries, and fully
respecting their right to independently choosing their own paths and mod-
els of development. The basic principles China upholds in providing foreign
assistance are mutual respect, equality, keeping promises, mutual benefits,
and win-win.”
(PRC. State Council Information Office, 2014)
The more recent official publication on foreign aid, the 2021 China’s International
Development Cooperation in the New Era (PRC. State Council Information Office,
2021), shows signs of evolution of the Chinese aid model that could be interpreted,
to a certain extent, as a convergence with AEA principles. Indeed, according to
Cichocka et al. (2021), this white paper alludes to aid effectiveness principles in
various ways. First, as for ownership, the official document insists, once more, on
the absolute priority given to the development strategies of participating countries.
This goes very much in line with previous statements and with what China has tried
to anchor as the defining feature of its foreign aid, in a South-South cooperation
approach to development. Much on the contrary, references to the need for greater
accountability are novel in the Chinese discourse. China has committed to more
“clearly defined project management rules and regulations” as well as to “establish
a tendering system focusing on high quality and competitive pricing” (Cichocka
et al., 2021).
Ownership of Development Priorities

The principle of ownership is probably the aid rule that has attracted more atten-
tion in this battle of ideas on how to approach development cooperation from a
normative standpoint. Indeed, it is a key pillar of both the AEA and Chinese nar-
rative on aid. Eight out of 15 direct or indirect references to aid principles in the
recently published white paper on China’s aid refer to ownership, underlining anew
its importance as the backbone of China’s political discourse on aid (Cichocka
et al., 2021). The controversy lies in the very different interpretations, on the part
of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), on the one hand, and
China, on the other hand, of what ownership exactly means (Chandy & Kharas,
2011; Gulrajani & Swiss, 2020; Harpaz, 2016; Liu & Tang, 2018; Mawdsley, 2018;
Regilme & Hartmann, 2018; Reilly, 2011).
The AEA approaches ownership from a democratic perspective: aid effective-
ness indicators measure the relevance of civil society participation (see indicator
2 in Table 2.1) and the role of parliaments (indicator 6 in Table 2.1) in the agenda.
The importance of ownership in the eyes of donors is also well captured by indica-
tors covering aid predictability and the quality of national management systems.
However, it also touches on two questions: whether the partner country has na-
tional or sector-level development strategies and whether donors (either traditional
or emerging) are willing to accept such strategies and align with them. Similarly,
another indicator of ownership is the extent to which aid is untied. If donors trust
the capacities of partner countries to advance their own development processes,
resources should be, insofar as possible, local (indicator 10 in Table 2.1).
In Chinese aid, ownership is defined from the perspective of South-South
cooperation, inter-State dialogue, and non-interference in domestic affairs, putting
the initiative and leadership over the projects on the shoulders of the recipient
countries (PRC. State Council Information Office, 2021: 6, 8). From this perspec-
tive, DAC and/or Western donors’ political conditionality inherent in some pro-
grams and projects directly undermines partner countries’ autonomy and, hence,
ownership.2 In the words of Hu Jintao: “the path of successful development lies in
a country’s independent choice of the path and mode of development suited to its
national conditions” (Reilly, 2011: 74).
In the interviews, Chinese stakeholders expressed the belief that their coop-
eration in these countries has higher standards of ownership of development pri-
orities than cooperation implemented by traditional donors. For the interviewed
Chinese officials, practitioners, and experts, the cornerstone of ownership is
that local a uthorities are in charge of projects implemented in their own coun-
tries. They emphasize how China’s experience as a developing country allows
Chinese a uthorities to understand other developing countries that also want to
play a leading role in their own development. They praise Chinese-supported
South-South Cooperation for being horizontal and respecting the preferences
of the political authorities involved (South Centre, 2009). In contrast, Chinese
stakeholders o ften denounce Western cooperation as patronizing and limiting
the capacity of the host country authorities to make sovereign decisions on the
projects implemented by Western-led institutions in their countries (Regilme

& Hartmann, 2018). As one interviewee explained, “unlike Western countries,
China does not impose its own solutions on others, but helps them to imple-
ment their own solutions”.3 This argument has been echoed systematically in
interviews with Ethiopian, Pakistani, and Sri Lankan officials and experts, who
praised China for treating their countries as “partners” instead of just “recipi-
ents”, “beneficiaries”, or “students”.4 Even officials and experts from bilateral
and multilateral members of the traditional donors community in those countries
recognize that, in some instances, Chinese cooperation has grasped better than
their own some of the developmental demands of the authorities, such as energy,
industrialization, transportation, and communication.5
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that Chinese development cooperation
stakeholders hold a pyramidal conception of ownership, concentrated on the cen-
tral authorities of the partner country. This understanding matches the view of
most of the political authorities of the countries analyzed here, but conflicts with
the inclusive and decentralized conception underpinning the AEA, as reflected in
indicators 2 (civil society participation) and 6 (oversight role of parliaments) in
Table 2.1. This concentration of the ownership of the cooperation projects in a very
limited number of actors, in addition to the lack of transparency and accountability
discussed in other sections, has favored criticism against Chinese BRI cooperation
and speculations about China’s capacity to impose its own preferences on BRI
countries. One of the most repeated examples has been the leasing of Hambantota
port for 99 years to a Chinese-led consortium, which has been frequently presented
as a Chinese imposition on Sri Lanka through via so-called “debt trap diplomacy”.
This notion was forcefully debunked by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe
in the Sri Lankan Parliament (Perera & Siriwardana, 2018). His speech is part of
the mounting evidence showing that this idea originated in the Sirisena admin-
istration and aligned with its economic agenda of transforming a white elephant
into a profitable venture (Bräutigam, 2020; Esteban, 2018). This is consistent with
the description made by different local and Chinese officials and diplomats of the
functioning of bilateral cooperation between China and Ethiopia, Pakistan, and
Sri Lanka, who argued that most of the Chinese cooperation in those countries is
driven by the demand of the central authorities of the host countries.6 Even critical
voices with BRI cooperation recognize that BRI projects reflect the developmental
priorities of the host governments, and therefore, BRI cooperation frameworks are
being retooled to accommodate the priorities of changing administrations in host
countries. For example, after Prime Minister Imran Khan took power, the focus of
BRI projects in Pakistan experienced a relative shift from big energy and transpor-
tation projects to agriculture, industrialization, and socio-economic development
(Rafiq, 2019).
This example does not imply a constant accommodation of Chinese cooperation
to the priorities of the authorities of other BRI countries. Continuing with the case
of Pakistan, a high-ranking Pakistani official privy to the details of the meetings
of the Joint Coordination Committee of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
explained to one of the authors that the Chinese side insisted on giving priority
to the Eastern and Central alignment of the corridor over the Western alignment.
The reason for this was that Chinese stakeholders wanted to use a relatively quick
success in BRI cooperation in Pakistan as a showcase to attract other countries for
joining the BRI and, therefore, wanted to pick the low hanging fruit by implement-
ing projects in the safest and more developed parts of the country.7
In addition to a pyramidal conception of ownership, another element of the
Chinese understanding of the AEA principle of ownership that infringes this prin-
ciple is the economic conditionality linked to most BRI projects in the analyzed
countries. According to the GPEDC, if donors trust the capacities of partner coun-
tries to advance their own development processes, resources should be, insofar
as possible, local (see indicator 10 in Table 2.1). However, a significant share of
Chinese aid and financing is tied to the use of products and services offered by
Chinese companies (Ali, 2018; Omoruyi et al., 2017). This condition imposes limi-
tations on the decision-making capacity of the authorities of the host countries of
BRI projects, reducing their ownership of Chinese-backed projects. Even the most
enthusiastic supporters of BRI cooperation among the public administration and
civil society in the analyzed countries, including officials involved in managing
Chinese development projects, complained about this situation and hope that China
would untie its cooperation.8
In conclusion, although Chinese BRI cooperation confers significant ownership
to the authorities of its partnering countries, it does infringe the principle of owner-
ship as understood by the AEA in two ways: by not giving ownership to a wider
spectrum of local stakeholders and by tying most of its cooperation to the provision
of goods and services by Chinese companies.
Inclusive Partnerships
Inclusive development partnerships were more recently adopted as an AEA prin-
ciple. They appeared as one of the four principles during the 2011 Busan meeting
and partly as the result of the incorporation of non-State actors (NGOs and private
companies) into the process and the agenda that resulted in the creation of the
GPEDC, therefore, expanding the narrower limits of the inter-Sate dialogue within
the OECD.
In fact, inclusive partnerships are monitored with two indicators referring to
private-public dialogue and to local political space for NGOs (see Table 2.1). The
need for more inclusive partnerships was also articulated on the basis of the lessons
learned from the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
agenda and the way forward to the SDGs, which actually include a goal specifically
devoted to the creation of multi-stakeholder alliances. In short,
“in a multipolar world, we must harness and harmonize the resources of a

diverse range of actors involved in development – including civil society,
businesses, philanthropists, local governments, and parliaments – recognizing
their differences as well as the comparative advantage of each.”
(Killen, 2015: 52)
In more general terms, non-State actors and private businesses have played a much
more significant role in the economic development of Western countries than in
China and these different domestic development experiences have led to different
stances on inclusive partnerships. Moreover, given the interpretation of the owner-
ship principle depicted in the previous section, such inclusiveness is obviously not
part of the Chinese approach in its discourse on foreign aid. It should, therefore,
come as no surprise that China does not once mention this principle, nor a similar
one, not even in the most recent white paper that includes a total of 15 implicit
and explicit references to AEA principles, and a specific section on the Chinese
approach to aid (PRC. State Council Information Office, 2021).
In addition, in Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, the private sector and civil
society have played (and still play) a modest role in the development processes.
As a result, the level of compliance with this AEA principle in all three countries
is almost nonexistent.
In the case of Ethiopia, with former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his suc-
cessor Hailemariam Dessalegn using China as an economic model (Cabestan,
2012; Fourie, 2015), this is particularly evident. Chinese stakeholders in Ethiopia
see neither normative nor practical value in conducting thorough social risk analy-
ses for their projects in Ethiopia since they assume that the host government has the
capacity to impose its priorities on the local population.9 This means that they do
not establish significant relations with Ethiopian NGOs and that the local input in
their projects is centralized via the Ethio-China Development Cooperation Directo-
rate of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation and high-level political
dialogues. However, interviewees also consistently praised the Ali Administration
before the Tigray War for creating more political space for civil society than its
predecessors, as well as highlighting the potential and effective contradictions in
the preferences of political authorities and local communities. In that same vein,
there seems to be a growing awareness among Chinese stakeholders of the prag-
matic benefits of direct engagement with Ethiopian civil society at the political and
practical levels to reduce civil protests against Chinese projects (Iacoella et al.,
2021). Chinese stakeholders recognize the difficulties they face in engaging con-
structively with Ethiopian civil society, due to their lack of experience in this area
and the lack of human resources, since China does not have resident development
cooperation experts in Ethiopia and only has a limited number of development
workers or volunteers on the ground; a fact that should change with the consolida-
tion of the China International Development Cooperation Agency.
The situation in Sri Lanka is similar. Even very sensitive topics for civil society
are dealt with exclusively via a state-to-state approach. This is the case with envi-
ronmental issues related to Chinese port projects, which are the responsibility of
the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA). A local economist and former public official
signaled that rejection to Chinese interventions is, by far, milder than that of a
potential Indian presence:
“There are some incidents and tensions due to higher Chinese presence in
Sri Lanka, but Indian investment or workers would provoke a public outcry
because India is regarded as meddling in the domestic affairs of South Asian

countries and China is regarded as non-interfering.”
However, there are several records of civil society protests. Interviewees pointed
out that the popular opposition against more casinos (rooted in the Buddhist posi-
tion toward gambling) actually redirected the Government’s decision. Additionally,
the opening of Hambantota industrial zone, in January 2017, resulted in a violent
clash between demonstrators and the police. Finally, former president Mahinda
Rajapaksa considers the 99-years lease to Chinese partners on Hambantota instal-
lations to be excessively generous and to impinge on Sri Lanka’s sovereign rights
(Chung, 2018).
Like in Ethiopia, Chinese-aid programs in Pakistan are characterized by a lack
of institutionalized and relatively deep communication with civil society. However,
there are some recent signs of communication between the two parts. A Pakistani
expert consulting for the Planning Commission identified the lack of engagement
with local communities as a major weakness of the BRI implementation strategy:
“if you involve local communities as stakeholders, they will embrace the projects
and even guarantee their security. This would even be the case for Baluchi nation-
alists”.10 This idea is also backed by academic studies (Sayed, 2019; Wolf, 2020):
“There is a lack of will among Pakistan’s national leadership to improve rela-

tions with regions and local communities, especially with those doubting the
benefits of CPEC. Both civilian and military leaders are determined to realize
the CPEC at any cost.”
(Wolf, 2020: 146)
As a result, the CPEC is being identified as an instrument of exploitation of Baloch

resources and suppression of legitimate local resistance. Recently, there has been
a slight change of approach, with a stronger focus on social aspects in CPEC
development and implementation. Chinese state-owned companies are engaging
in corporate social responsibility initiatives and are now providing grants cover-
ing education, health, vocational training, drinking water, and poverty alleviation
projects (Rafiq, 2019). This cannot be framed, however, as part of a response to the
aforementioned problems and was actually a turn implemented by the Imran Khan
government.
In short, the lack of compliance with the AEA principle of inclusive partnerships
can again be depicted as an infringement of the norm on the part of China. And
here, too, this attitude is partly explained by the level of commitment on the part of
partner countries with this principle.
Accountability and Transparency

Although accountability has been a key part of the AEA since the very begin-
ning, transparency was explicitly upgraded to a core principle only recently.
Several indicators refer to these two (sometimes overlapping) principles. While
making transparent information on development cooperation publicly available

(see indicator 4 in Table 2.1) clearly refers to the principle on transparency, includ-
ing development cooperation in budgets, so these are subject to parliamentary scru-
tiny, establishing systems to track gender equality approaches in public allocations,
and establishing systems of mutual accountability among development actors refer
to both principles in parallel.
China’s lack of transparency, both in general terms and specifically concern-
ing its aid activities, has been extensively pointed out. The Aid Transparency
Index, published every year, ranks China last among a series of both DAC and
non-DAC donors.11 This “very poor” performance – 47th position, a score of only
1.2 points – is explained by different factors. First, Chinese institutions have not
joined the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), a global initiative
aimed at improving aid transparency via the regular publication of all commit-
ted and implemented individual aid projects and programs by all sorts of donors.
Moreover, although China has published several organizational documents on aid
(namely, the three white papers), these are not published and updated on a regular
basis (seven years passed between the second and the third official document).
Additionally, China does not publish detailed and disaggregated information on
its aid activities. There is no comprehensive listing of all projects publicly avail-
able. Despite some improvements between the 2014 and the 2021 white papers,
lack of transparency is still being pointed out as one key weakness of China as a
donor (Cichocka et al., 2021; Zhang & Tang, 2021). In this more recent document,
Chinese authorities include some aggregate data on international assistance tools,
the income categories of partner countries, the geographical allocation by regions,
the number of completed projects by topics or sectors, and some informative boxes
on specific initiatives (PRC. State Council Information Office, 2021). Nonethe-
less, once more, no precise data is provided on individual projects of country pro-
grams. This is also the case for the websites of the embassies of China in Ethiopia,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The scarce quantity and quality of the information pro-
vided by those sites on the cooperation projects developed by China in these coun-
tries contrasts with the specific information provided by the traditional donors.12
Despite infringing the principle of transparency of the AEA, China does not
subvert it since it does not challenge the principle from a normative perspective,
but merely for instrumental reasons. Chinese development stakeholders do not
consider that opacity is a better value than transparency but are willing to sacrifice
the latter for the sake of political and business interests.13
Although Chinese stakeholders in Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka feel some
pressure from traditional donors and local actors to be more transparent about their
activities, they are not willing to release country-specific, let alone project-specific,
information.14 They are worried about how that data could be used by Western
countries to censure China for not providing enough aid to developing countries;
by Chinese public opinion to criticize their government for not investing those
resources in improving the conditions of the most disadvantaged groups at home;
and by developing countries to ask for more Chinese support, triggering a rush of
assistance requests to China, a situation replicable in most Global South donors.
This concern among Chinese stakeholders about the consequences of increased

transparency regarding their cooperation activities materializes into requests from
Chinese officials to officials of the host countries to not disclose detailed informa-
tion about bilateral cooperation.
This lack of transparency on BRI cooperation projects has been systematically
criticized by the international and local practitioners and experts interviewed in
Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. This is the case even for voices which generally
praised BRI cooperation in those countries and work closely with their national
governments, who complain that this lack of transparency prevents the elaboration
of proper cost-benefit analysis of BRI projects.15 Similar examples can be found
in the literature,16 but none of them received as much attention as former governor
of the State Bank of Pakistan, Ashraf Mahmood Wathra (Shah, 2019). In Pakistan,
domestic pressure for greater transparency on BRI cooperation has been so intense
that the government created some mechanisms for transparency and accountabil-
ity (Wolf, 2020). Regarding transparency, the two most significant developments
were the creation of two websites, the CPEC Portal and a website for the CPEC
Secretariat (Pakistan). Nevertheless, they only provide basic information since the
agreements related with BRI cooperation are confidential and the Right for Infor-
mation Act does not apply to them. This situation also significantly limits the moni-
toring role on BRI projects that the Parliamentary Committee on the CPEC and the
Special Committee of the Senate of Pakistan were supposed to play.
From this perspective, the reluctance of Chinese officials to form part of a
mutual accountability mechanism is only natural. Despite being invited, they do
not participate in the Development Assistance Group meetings held regularly in
Addis Ababa, Colombo, and Islamabad to coordinate the activities of its mem-
bers in those countries. This systematic infraction of the principle of transparency
and unease toward mechanisms of mutual accountability do not prevent Chinese
development cooperation stakeholders from recognizing the need to improve the
mechanisms for international accountability. Whereas Chinese officials from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM),
staff from two Chinese policy banks, and experts linked to the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China maintained that transparency does not help – or hardly
helps – to improve the quality of development financing, they also advocated for
improving accountability standards to tackle mismanagement and corruption that
hinders the efficiency and effectiveness of Chinese cooperation programs17. These
Chinese stakeholders showed very limited normative attachment to transparency
and accountability, but they are increasingly embracing the latter due to practi-
cal reasons. These findings are in line with the 2021 white paper on international
development cooperation, which puts much more emphasis in improving account-
ability than transparency (PRC. State Council Information Office, 2021).
Focus on Results
The AEA interpretation of focusing on results is limited to development results for
the partner countries. In line with this, monitoring indicators for this principle refer
to strengthening recipient countries’ national results frameworks and using these as

the main guide for development activities (see Table 2.1).
Under the South-South Cooperation approach, and departing from its own
recent development experience, focus on results has always been at the forefront of
Chinese rhetoric on international cooperation. With six explicit references to this
principle, the more recent 2021 white paper includes focusing on results among
the top four strategic objectives highlighted in the preface: “China is committed
to pursuing the greater good and shared interests and upholding the principles of
sincerity, real results, affinity, and good faith for developing relations with other
developing countries”. Focus on results is also part of the more specific list of aid
principles by means of “ensuring delivery and sustainability” and because increas-
ing the quality and effectiveness of cooperation is needed for “advancing with the
times and breaking new ground” (PRC. State Council Information Office, 2021: 3,
7–8). According to this official document, China is also aiming at achieving bet-
ter results in its development activities in Africa and Asia in the framework of the
BRI and, in more general terms, in its reforms and new management procedures.
However, despite this emphasis on focusing on results, and in line with the lack of
transparency highlighted above, Chinese cooperation lacks country-specific strate-
gic publications that may allow aid monitoring from a focus on results perspective.
Another relevant issue regarding this AEA principle is the exact definition
of which results aid should target. Since its early days, the Chinese approach to
development cooperation is supposed to be based on mutual benefit and is, thus,
also explicitly expected to benefit China (Zhou, 1964). This means that besides
development results for Ethiopia, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka, Chinese aid is also
expected to generate returns of some type for Chinese stakeholders. This links this
AEA principle with this guiding idea of Chinese aid of mutual benefit, or mutual
interest, historically anchored in South-South Cooperation. Despite its origins, and
similar to other Western or Chinese aid principles, the conceptualization of mutual
benefit has evolved over the past decades. At some point, mutual benefit was under-
stood as a win-win principle that would provide China with markets for trade and/
or investment in exchange for economic development in partner countries (Keijzer
& Black, 2020; Kondoh, 2015; Reilly, 2011). More recently, at least in the rhetoric,
this principle could have developed into an understanding of collective and shared
results, something similar to global public goods or global commons (Janus &
Tang, 2021).
The prioritization of these interests over development results, together with
the emphasis on respecting the sovereignty of partner states, means that Chinese
cooperation places all responsibility for the development impact of its projects on
the authorities of partner countries. Under this framework of cooperation among
equals, China’s duty is limited to adequately complying with the agreed projects,
an approach that frequently leads to sustainability problems (Li et al., 2014).
Development goals of Chinese aid in Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka
include the creation of industrial zones; a target much in line with the objec-
tives of national authorities. Excluding the development of smart cities (Ekman
& de Esperanza Picardo, 2020) and the deployment of digital infrastructure and
technologies under the Digital Silk Road (Kurlantzick & West, 2020), indus-
trial parks may be seen currently as the higher stage of the BRI, above infra-
structure and energy projects, which ultimately provide the necessary logistics
and resources to connect and power them (Eder & Mardell, 2019). Industrial
parks offer economic opportunities for China and Chinese firms while also being
expected to favor BRI countries’ economic development and value chain climb-
ing.18 However, at present, their d evelopment across BRI countries varies sig-
nificantly (Chow, 2020), as highlighted by the cases of Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and
Ethiopia, which total 28 projects.
Sri Lanka’s only industrial park is to be developed in Hambantota,19 but, at the
time of writing, the port remains mainly an underused logistics hub. A first invest-
ment agreement in the port’s industrial free zone was signed in November 2020
with the Chinese manufacturer Shandong Haohua Tire.20
In Pakistan, a privileged recipient of Chinese investments,21 most industrial
parks – mainly developed in the nine Special Economic Zones under the CPEC
framework – are yet to be completed,22 and only the Gwadar Free Zone (Ansari,
2021) and the Haier-Ruba Economic Zone (Haier, 2019) registered industrial
activity (China Daily, 2018). As underlined by a prominent Pakistani business rep-
resentative, former leader of the Central Bank and of Karachi Stock Exchange,
in reference to the pace of development of such zones, “There is a lot of talk, but
almost nothing concrete on that”.23
On the other hand, Ethiopia has already reached a more advanced stage. By
Spring 2022, the 13 industrial parks24 constructed or operated by Chinese firms, 11
were already o perational, and the remaining two were completed in 2020, but were
still not at work.25 However, their exports have periodically underperformed,26
partly because of the impact of Covid-19, and the country is still far from achiev-
ing the targets set by the Growth and Transformation Plan, with the share of its
manufacturing sector in total GDP and total exports failing to take off, according
to World Bank data.
As mentioned above, the Chinese strategy with industrial zones fits well with
partner countries’ development strategies. Industrial zones are expected to solve bot-
tlenecks, boost industrialization, and boost exports (in a somehow mid-20th century
approach to development). This shows in national development strategies, such as
Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan, and, to some extent, in Sri Lanka’s
2030 Vision and Strategic Path since economic upgrading and FDI attraction are part
of the development goals (Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka [Sri Lanka].
Presidential Expert Committee, 2019). Additionally, the Hambantota Municipal
Council Area Development Plan (2019–2030) specifically includes BRI initiatives
(Sri Lanka. Urban Development Authority Hambantota District Office, 2019).
This convergence of interests also arose during our interviews held in the field.
In a meeting conducted with a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Commerce
in Pakistan, the interviewee stressed that
“CPEC will strengthen the weak linkage between Pakistan domestic com-
merce and exports, would boost exports and investment, bring innovation
in products and services. This will also contribute effectively in GDP of the
country by a multiplier effect in taxation and help the country increase its
spending on social sectors like education, health, and basic amenities.27”
This view is shared by a representative of an international NGO also based in

akistan: “Where there is a road, there is development. People get opportunities
P
and access to the market (in and out)”.28,29
In short, in Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, the development approach through
industrial zones is aligned with development strategies according to both official
documents and stakeholders. In addition, this sector of economic infrastructure is
not usually targeted by bilateral and multilateral traditional donors, resulting in a
perfect fit for Chinese aid.
However, the slow pace of project implementation shows the non-compliance
with the AEA principle of focus on results. It could be argued that this pace is
faster than that of Western donors, at least in the early phases of the development
project. For instance, regarding Hambantota Port, the authorities of Rajapaksa
presented the project to Chinese aid in 2006, a financial agreement was signed in
2007, work on the ground started in 2008, and the official inauguration was held
in 2010. Furthermore, key informants blame local Sri Lankan authorities for the
slowness in having the projects fully operating: the Hambantota port and airport,
exceptions in this sense, were quickly designed and implemented given the need
of then President Mahinda Rajapaksa to show immediate development results
to his home constituency in the area. In any case, the final result is that there
is a significant delay in implementing the bulk of a great deal of development
projects, therefore jeopardizing the focus on results. Further evidence is found
in the Pakistani CPEC, vastly documented by academic literature. In this case,
doubts regarding the focus on results are also based on the scale of the project,
relative to the development needs and size of the country and taking into a ccount
Pakistan’s pre-existing industrialization and growth record. Studies point out
that a well-designed industrial policy and a wider development plan framing
this infrastructure initiative would provide better results. Moreover, the expected
results in terms of, for instance, job creation are not widely shared (McCartney,
2022; Rafiq, 2019).
Transitioning from the general approach (the aid in industrial zones-development
nexus) to a specific results orientation is far from guaranteed. On the one hand, as
mentioned above, China lacks country development strategies monitoring devel-
opment results in partner countries. On the part of recipient partners, and more
specifically Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, there are no monitoring systems in
place that might allow for tracking of the development results of Chinese aid. This
might explain, at least partially, the evidence in the lack of results orientation. So,
here too, China does not comply with this AEA principle. It goes without saying
that it does not cooperate or even qualify. However, it does not subvert it: there is
no clear rejection of the principle with an alternative interpretation and paradigm
on the need (or lack of it) to achieve development results. It could be said that
China merely infringes this principle.
Conclusions
This chapter has explored China’s attitude toward aid principles (ownership,
inclusive partnership, transparency and accountability, and focus on results) in
three major BRI partners which are Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. It finds that
China infringes all four principles in all three country case studies. These results
raise a series of conclusions.
First, our results provide nuance to a number of analyses on China’s attitude
toward orthodox global norms that depict China as a subversive global actor, aim-
ing at shifting the current paradigm toward a new one, more aligned with its own
set of values and interests (Naim, 2009). As shown throughout this chapter, while
not complying with AEA norms, China is not resorting to the BRI to impose or pro-
pose a new set of rules on development cooperation. The only principle that could
escape this general conclusion is that of ownership, where China has explicitly
rejected the Western practice of politically conditioning aid reforms (for instance,
in the areas of human rights or gender equality). However, it could be argued that
political conditionality is not strictly part of the AEA agenda. In fact, the indicators
meant to track the completion of this principle by the GPEDC are aid predictability,
the quality of partner countries’ public financial management systems, the use of
such systems on the part of donors, and untied aid (see Table 2.1). Therefore, when
proposing a different approach to ownership, Chinese authorities are not contest-
ing a global norm, they are contesting the interpretation and implementation of the
norm on the part of some traditional donors.
Second, and in relation to this, the main reason why China infringes aid norms
is, to a great extent, for the sake of its own national and domestic interests: owner-
ship is not accepted, nor implemented so that aid can be tied; transparency is not
improved and private partners are not included in order to avoid social and political
domestic conflicts; development results are not always the focus so that obtaining
returns (of different sorts) for Chinese stakeholders may remain a priority. With
this very pragmatic approach, based on interests rather than on values, infringing
rather than subverting norms seems simply logical.
Third, and lastly, despite the very homogeneous approach of China to aid norms,
this study has also shown some evolution. For instance, in the case of Ethiopia,
and again, due to pragmatic reasons, CSOs have been increasingly incorporated
into Chinese aid implementation. In Pakistan, the incoming government has also
demanded greater transparency on the part of its Chinese counterparts. This raises
an interesting question which is to what extent the current state of AEA principles
in China’s relation with its BRI partners is the result of Chinese attitude (anchored
in its own interests) only, or also of that of its partners, for whom AEA principles
might not be that relevant, either, from the normative point of view.
Notes
1 For more details on the governance of the GPEDC, see United Nations Development
Programme (2020).
2 On the Chinese understanding of conditionality see Mattlin and Nojonen (2015).
3 Interview by authors, Beijing, August 28, 2019.

4 Interviews by authors, Islamabad, April, 2016; Karachi, April, 2016; Colombo, August–
September, 2018; Addis Ababa, April, 2019.
5 Interviews by authors, Islamabad, 6, 8 April, 2016; Colombo, 28, 29, 30 August 2018;
Addis Ababa, 8, 9, 11 April, 2019.
6 Interviews by authors, Islamabad, April, 2016; Colombo, August–September, 2018;
Addis Ababa, April, 2019.
7 Interviews by authors, Islamabad, April, 2016.
8 Interviews by authors, Islamabad, April, 2016; Karachi, April, 2016; Colombo, August–
September, 2018; Addis Ababa, April, 2019.
9 Interviews by authors, Addis Ababa, 9, 11 April, 2019.
10 Interview by authors, 7 April, 2016.
11 For more information on the Aid Transparency Index, see Publish What You Fund
(2020).
12 For example, contrast the webpages of the Chinese embassies in Ethiopia, Pakistan, and
Sri Lanka with those of Germany, Japan, and the US in the same countries.
13 Interviews by authors, Colombo, August–September, 2018; Addis Ababa, April, 2018;
Beijing, August, 2019.
14 Interviews by authors, Islamabad, April, 2016; Colombo, August–September, 2018;
Addis Ababa, April, 2019.
15 Interviews by authors, Addis Ababa, 10 April, 2019; Colombo, 28 and 29 August, 2018;
Islamabad, 5 and 6 April, 2016.
16 See for example Ali (2020) and Sayed (2019).
17 Interviews by authors, Colombo, August, 2018; Addis Ababa, April, 2019; Beijing,
August, 2019.
18 For the case of Ethiopia, see Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Ministry of
Finance and Economic Development (2010, 61, 2016, 135–137, 143–145). For Paki-
stan, see Government of Pakistan Ministry of Planning, Development, and Reform, and
People’s Republic of China National Development and Reform Commission (2017,
16–17).
19 The industrial component of the Colombo Port City project is less clear. This is why it
is not considered as an industrial park in this chapter. See CHECH Port City Colombo
(n.d.).
20 See the website of Hambantota International Port.
21 According to data from the American Enterprise Institute (2020), Pakistan has been the
top recipient of Chinese investments among BRI countries, with more than $49 billion
over the 2013–2020 period. Other estimates for the CPEC alone total $62 billion (Afzal,
2020).
22 See the CPEC website.
24 Namely, Adama Industrial Park, Arerti Industrial Park, Bahir-Dar Industrial Park,
Debre-Birhan Industrial Park, Dire Dawa Industrial Park, Eastern Industrial Zone,
Hawassa Industrial Park, Huajian Light Industry City, Jimma Industrial Park, Kombol-
cha Industrial Park, and Mekelle Industrial Park.
25 Bole Lemi II Industrial Park, and Kilinto Industrial Park.
26 See figures for 2019 in Ethiopian News Agency (2019), and a drop in 2020 in Africa
Business Networking (2020).
29 It should be mentioned, however, that a top Chinese expert on South Asia alerted that
China should go beyond the provision of hard infrastructures: ‘Most of the finance goes
to energy and transport, which is good for breaking bottlenecks, but maybe not enough.
China should do more in term on software (transfer of knowledge), not just hardware’
(Interview by authors, 26 February, 2016).
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3 Distant-Water Fishing under
International Norms and Standards
Implications for China’s
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road
Juan He
Introduction
Fishing endeavors beyond a sovereign State’s national waters have developed a
centuries-long history. When free access to fish ignited interstate conflicts from
the 1970s, the activity was significantly circumscribed by States’ unilateral claims
for exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which were extended up to 200 nauti-
cal miles from coastal baselines (Tickler et al., 2018). The notion of EEZs was
officially recognized by the international community with the adoption of the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (United Nations
[UN], 1982). The international disciplines on distant-water fishing (DWF) per se
have, nevertheless, been short of normative accuracy. Absent a universal defini-
tion, DWF is broadly described as a subset of wild-capturing fisheries occurring
outside and non-adjacent to a nation’s EEZ, that is, operating chiefly in foreign
EEZs and the high seas (Grainger & Garcia, 1996). Accordingly, the UNCLOS sets
forth the responsibilities of coastal States and intergovernmental regional fisher-
ies management organizations (RFMOs) or arrangements to manage and conserve
such “propertied” sea areas, respectively.1 Under Article 62 of the UNCLOS, fish-
ing access payment is left to be negotiated between flag and coastal States where
“surplus” fish may be ceded in distant EEZs. Besides, DWF States are obliged to
a holistic suite of compliance measures aimed at preventing their flagged vessels
from involvement in illegal or overfishing activities (UN, 1982).
Against this backdrop, China as a flag State has grown from an infant to a
major DWF nation since the 1980s (Shen & Huang, 2021). In the wake of the 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), the country has accelerated its exports of fish-
ing and coastal infrastructure capacities to partner nations’ seas, ports, and harbors
(Lokanathan, 2020). Due to the lack of regulatory transparency, limited studies
exist to analyze the interplay between China’s DWF and MSR infrastructure-
building agendas. This chapter tentatively fills the knowledge gap based on publicly
available data sources and independent scholarly reviews. More empirical studies
are warranted to facilitate the examination of China’s long-awaited transition to a
sustainable fishing economy within its maritime power resurgence vision. Section
“The Evolving Patchwork of International Norms and Standards to Discipline
DOI: 10.4324/9781003299387-3
48 Juan He
DWF” presents an overview of the international legal and policy framework to

foster nation-states’ responsible and sustainable management of DWF. Section
“China’s Internalization of International Norms and Standards to Discipline DWF”
probes China’s development of fisheries law and policy to give life to DWF-related
international disciplines domestically. Section “China’s Implementation of Interna-
tional DWF Disciplines along the African MSR” further analyzes its implementa-
tion to date to confront the unique challenge of reconciling DWF expansion with
environmental and social sustainability imperatives along the MSR route. Section
“The Potential of China to Fully ‘Comply’ or ‘Cooperate’ with International DWF
Norms” explores the willingness and potential of Chinese fishery agency to observe
and add value to international DWF norms. Section “Conclusion” ends by conclud-
ing that, by far, China’s efforts in absorbing and applying DWF international norms
and standards are “moderate” (level of congruence), “low” (level of implementa-
tion), and “passive” (level of agency), falling under the category of “infraction”
as defined for this book. It, therefore, advises on how China’s legal and political
approaches to the DWF-MSR linkage can seek to strike a healthy balance between
marine resource exploitation and conservation over time.
The Evolving Patchwork of International Norms and Standards to

Discipline DWF
As shown by Table 3.1, the legal order of international fisheries has long been a sub-
ject of intersecting regulatory regimes, including the United Nations, RFMOs, and
specialized agencies, such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Labor Organization
(ILO), and the UN Environment Program (UNEP). Led by the 2030 UN Agenda
for Sustainable Development, in particular Goal 14 “Life under w ater” (UN, 2015),
these separate regimes have marched into a systematic process of normative coor-
dination and institutional cooperation. Similar sustainability-oriented momentum
is witnessed in other fora of international law-making, such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) tailor-making new disciplines on fisheries subsidies, and the
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) constraining cross-border
trade in endangered marine species. Different international governance bodies
are equipped with distinct and complementary expertise, making common strides
toward securing a sustainable seafood future for humankind.
Arguably, there is no lack of concrete norms and institutions to scrutinize the
legal provenance and sustainability features of marine captured fish. Despite the
achievements contained in Table 3.1, the persistent void of a DWF-targeted solu-
tion under international law is particularly noteworthy. For one thing, a crucial
impediment to the development of specific international norms lies in the industry’s
notoriously opaque status, with inadequate or inaccurate official data to support a
rational and scientific evaluation of hotspot species or regions (California Environ-
mental Associates [CEA], 2018). For another, the state of play is attributable to the
industry’s overlaps with many other pressing issues, including illegal, unreported,
and unregulated (IUU) fishing2 (Temple et al., 2022), harmful fisheries subsidies
(Sumaila et al., 2019), human trafficking and labor abuses (Belhabib & Le Billon,
Distant-Water Fishing under International Norms and Standards 49
Table 3.1 International agreements and guidelines related to DWF governance
Year of Title of instrument and DWF-related arrangements Number

adoption of parties
(membership of
China: Yes/No)
1973 IUCN Convention on International Trade in Endangered 184 (Y)

Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) – with 16 fish
species listed in Appendix I, 224 in Appendix II, and 19
in Appendix III
1982 UNCLOS – Arts. 61–73 (EEZ fisheries); 116–120 (high 168 (Y)
seas fisheries)
1993 UNEP Convention on Biological Diversity – Aichi 196 (Y)
Biodiversity Target 6 (sustainable, legal, and ecosystem-
based fisheries) and Target 11 (10 percent of marine
protected areas in the world)
1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 45 (Y)
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing
Vessels on the High Seas (FAO Compliance Agreement)
– flag State responsibilities for high seas fisheries
1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of 92 (N)
the UNCLOS of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks
Agreement) – RFMOs’ responsibilities for high seas
fisheries
2001 FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and 17 National and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing 1 Regional
(IPOA-IUU) (FAO, 2001) – flag, coastal, port, market, Plans of Action
and all State responsibilities to fight IUU fishing (N)
2001–2022 WTO rule-making negotiations to eliminate harmful 164 (Y)
fisheries subsidies, with an interim Agreement on
Fisheries Subsidies adopted on 17 June 2022 and subject
to further negotiations
2007/2016 ILO
2007 Work in Fishing Convention 21 (N)
2007 Work in Fishing Recommendation; Guidelines for N.A.
Port State Control Officers Carrying out Inspections N.A.
under the Work in Fishing Convention
2016 Guidelines on Flag State Inspection of Working and
Living Conditions on Board Fishing Vessels
2009 FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, 73 (N)
Deter, and Eliminate IUU Fishing (PSMA) – port State
responsibilities to fight IUU fishing
2009–2017 FAO guidelines N.A.
2009 Guidelines for the Ecolabeling of Fish and Fishery
Products from Marine Capture Fisheries
2014 Voluntary Guidelines for Flag State Performance
2017 Voluntary Guidelines for Catch Documentation
Schemes
2012 IMO Cape Town Agreement of 2012 on the Implementation17 (N)
of the Provisions of the 1993 Protocol relating to the
Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of
Fishing Vessels, not in force
50 Juan He
2022), and protein and revenue losses (Petrossian & Clarke, 2020), where interna-
tional rule-making has largely lagged behind worsening realities. Presumably, not
until the more tangible issues are settled, will DWF as a multifaceted subject be
reviewed and treated holistically in the global policy agenda.
With respect to high seas fisheries, currently, approximately 40 RFMOs or
arrangements exist to oversee the exploitation and conservation of high-value
straddling and highly migratory pelagic species, such as tuna, herring, mackerel,
and sardine. Most other ocean areas, particularly the deep sea abound with demer-
sal species, such as cod, hake, and sole, are essentially left in a legal vacuum with-
out relevant RFMO competency.3 The authority of RFMOs to regulate high seas
fisheries has been undermined by their common deficiencies in geographical or
member coverage, consensus-building processes, and group enforcement measures
(Haas et al., 2020). Whereas a full range of socio-economic issues are identified by
their institutional mandates, the vast majority of RFMOs have elected to subordi-
nate marine resource conservation to the primacy of fishing interests, which were
historically upheld by their participating States (Cullis-Suzuki & Pauly, 2010).
With respect to EEZ fisheries, pursuant to Article 61 of the UNCLOS, it is
the primary duty of the coastal State to determine the allowable catch within its
EEZ based on available scientific evidence. In return, Article 62(4) obligates ves-
sels flagged to DWF States to comply with the applicable laws and regulations of
the coastal State before they can travel long distances to harvest there. Despite a
requisite balance of rights and obligations enshrined in Article 62(4), no binding
mechanism exists to check and ensure that developing countries’ fisheries regula-
tion is comprehensive and rigorous enough to curb foreign violators. DWF fleets
operating in the vicinity of developing country coastlines should also comply with
bilateral fishing access agreements (FAAs) negotiated vis-à-vis more powerful flag
States, such as the European Union Member States, with scant international legal
surveillance. The terms and conditions of FAAs are rarely easy to know or evaluate.
The only publicly accessible database is provided by the European U nion cover-
ing the 3rd generation of FAAs, i.e., Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements
(SFPAs) mainly entered with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries.
Regional empirical studies have come to caution that the number of FAAs is sig-
nificantly correlated with the likelihood of illegal fishing and underreporting of
marine catches (Petrossian & Clarke, 2020). Moreover, foreign DWF vessels are
found to increasingly reflag to coastal States or to establish local joint ventures as
the vehicle to avoid stricter local regulation and higher tax (Stimson Center, 2019).
Since the turn of the new century, the international regulatory patchwork has
been partly amended by the all-encompassing IPOA-IUU and supportive fish-
ery agreements, notably, the 2009 PSMA (see Table 3.1). They have specifically
targeted the prevalent instances of IUU fishing for which DWF is considered a
principal cause. The IPOA-IUU places a policy emphasis on regulatory integration
– shared responsibilities and joint action taken by flag, coastal, port, and market
States alongside RFMOs and international organizations – to prevent illegal and
unsustainable fish from infiltrating into global commerce. The PSMA is a legally
binding and enforceable agreement to combat IUU fishing through rigorous port
State inspections. Under Part 2 “Entry into Port”, a State party is obligated to: (1)
designate and publicize the ports with sufficient capacity to conduct inspections
to which fishing vessels may request entry (Article 7); (2) require and examine an
advance set of vessel and catch information before granting port entry (Article 8);
(3) deny port entry with sufficient proof that a vessel has engaged in or supported
IUU fishing (Article 8); (4) deny the use of ports for landing, transshipping, pack-
aging, and processing of fish, and refueling, resupplying, and other port services
if violations are discovered after entry (Article 11); and (5) make its decisions
and information available to the public, private stakeholders, flag States, relevant
coastal States, RFMOs, and other international organizations (Article 19).
On 17 June 2022, the 12th Ministerial Conference of the WTO adopted the
interim Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies to propose binding disciplines on all
164 Members and their national subsidy programs relating to fishing and fisher-
ies (WTO, 2022). The Agreement will become effective as soon as two-thirds
of Members deposit their instruments of acceptance with the WTO. Pursuant to
the new international arrangement, national governments should not maintain or
introduce, and withdraw without delay, any type of fisheries subsidies that are in
the capacity to contribute to IUU fishing or fishing of overfished stocks (Articles
3.1 and 4.1). Specific fuel subsidies and other capacity-enhancing subsidies that
have been the driving force for DWF development are not a priori excluded, pro-
vided that they fall within the category of prohibited subsidies. The prohibition is
broad insofar as only limited exemptions are permitted for developing countries to
transform local fisheries upon international best practices within a two-year transi-
tional period (Articles 3.8 and 4.4).
As can be seen, to maintain strictly quota-based fishing access, DWF States
today must comply with a multiplicity of international, regional, and coastal disci-
plines spawned to ameliorate fish stocks collapse, marine environmental degrada-
tion, fishermen’s welfare, and local food security loss. As legal risks and opportunity
costs have largely increased for DWF operators, their flag States accordingly need
to apply more comprehensive and precautionary strategies, to balance short-term
economic gains against global environmental and social demands at stake. To this
end, the membership to RFMOs and international conventions constitutes only the
first step for DWF States to assume responsible marine stewardship when fishing
in the high seas and the EEZs of third States. As shown in the right-hand column
of Table 3.1, China still faces many critical gaps toward achieving international
policy alignment. It is, thus, held that comparable national legislation and effective
enforcement together provide the indispensable enabler to turn China’s commit-
ments into real domestic changes. A more detailed country-level assessment in this
regard is provided in the section that follows.
China’s Internalization of International Norms and Standards to

Discipline DWF
The rapid development of DWF can be depicted as a hybrid product of the con-
fluences and conflicts of China’s slow-paced international policy integration, as
52 Juan He
described in section “The Evolving Patchwork of International Norms and Stand-

ards to Discipline DWF”, and its outward-oriented food security strategy. For too
long, Chinese DWF has been treated as a strategically important industry to meet
the ever-increasing domestic demand for premium protein (Crona et al., 2020).
Hence, the government’s traditional approach to DWF has allowed it to follow a
growth trajectory of economic pragmatism underpinned by lex specialis, i.e., more
Table 3.2 A chronological illustration of China’s DWF-related regulatory instruments and

action
Year of Title of regulatory instrument or action

adoption
1986 Fisheries Law, revised four times between 2000 and 2013 – no strict disciplines
but various financial support and tax exemptions for DWF
2001 National observers first dispatched to Chinese DWF vessels fishing in RFMOs’
competency areas; standardized under the 2016 Implementation Rules for the
Administration of National DWF Observers
2002 Provisions on the Administration of Fishing Licenses, revised five times between
2004 and 2020 – basic DWF vessel inspection, licensing, registration, and
equipment requirements
2003 DWF Supervisory Regulation, revised in 2004, 2016, and 2020 – DWF
promotion; tightened qualification, annual review, and reporting requirements;
pilot blacklist and penalty practices on law-breaking DWF managers and
skippers from 2016; pilot use of fishing logbooks from 2008; electronic
logbooks encouraged on DWF vessels
2006 Fuel subsidies provided to DWF; selectively cut and replaced by vessel
modernization, scrapping, and standardization subsidies from 2016
2006 Pilot satellite-based DWF vessel monitoring systems; standardized under the
2014 Measures for the Administration of DWF Vessels Position Monitoring,
revised in 2019 – 24-hour round and hourly reporting of vessel position to the
central Fisheries Administration Bureau
2012 National DWF Association established, sponsoring National Data Center for
DWF of China, DWF International Performance Research Center, and DWF
Services Platform; certifying the legal provenance of Chinese exports of
captured fish
2015 Implementation Plan for the Construction of Marine Ecological Civilization
(2015–2020)
2017 13th DWF Development Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) – a total of Chinese-
flagged DWF vessels capped below 3,000
2018 Port entry denial of IUU fishing vessels blacklisted by RFMOs to which China
is a party
2019 Proposal of a Maritime Community with a Shared Future
2020 Designation of national landing ports for domestic and DWF catches
2020 A three-month summer moratorium of squid fishing by Chinese vessels in
designated Southwest Atlantic and East Pacific high sea areas
2021 China’s DWF Performance White Paper published – a “zero” tolerance attitude
toward IUU fishing
2021 Advance and post reporting of high seas transshipments by Chinese vessels to
the Fisheries Administration Bureau
Sources: People’s Republic of China [PRC]. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs [MARA] (2021);
Shen and Huang (2021); Yu and Han (2021).
lax and preferential rules applied to DWF than to domestic fisheries. Nowadays,
situated in a global environment significantly reshaped by the UN sustainability
agenda, it is no surprise that China’s DWF policy and practices have become the
center of legal and political interrogations (Poseidon Aquatic Resource Manage-
ment Ltd. And Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Packard
Foundation, 2020; Pitcher et al., 2009). In this context, Table 3.2 presents a chrono-
logical overview of the concrete regulatory responses China has undertaken within
the global trend of legal and sustainable management of DWF.
As can be seen, the government of China has gradually taken a more serious and
respectful attitude toward its international commitments relating to DWF manage-
ment, in general, or the global call to eradicate IUU fishing, in particular. There
is no lack of diversity in the regulatory tools and action, ranging from tightened
qualification thresholds, technical and capacity building for remote monitoring,
to administrative sanctions and penalties. However, a major problem lies that the
overall legal structure has regulated DWF less rigorously than internal fisheries
despite the challenge that DWF vessels and their crew members operate far away
from the national surveillance radar. As indicated in Table 3.2, the DWF-targeted
regulation, i.e., the 2003 DWF Supervisory Regulation, was adopted as a sub-law
and nearly two decades after the top Fisheries Law was promulgated in 1986. Since
then, the government’s regulation has been narrowly focused on addressing illegal
fishing, as a subset of IUU fishing, in violation of domestic rules concerning fishing
gear regulation, vessel management, and summer moratorium (He & Zhang, 2022).
In the subsequent years until 2006, China came to rely on local pilot projects,
incremental vessel trials, and sub-law amendments to continue leniently treating
and separating DWF from the ever-tightened legal strictures on domestic fisher-
ies. From the 2010s, an advanced set of regulatory instruments were progressively
introduced to the DWF sector after years-long and government-funded industrial
adaption, such as on-board observers, electronic fishing logbooks, vessel monitor-
ing systems (VMS), vessel blacklists and penalties, and domestic port closure to
IUU landings when alerted by RFMOs to which China is a party (see Table 3.2).
In more recent times, China’s advancement of some of the DWF legal disciplines
aims to satisfy its supervisory duties under selected RFMOs, so as to retain access
to valued fishing grounds in the high seas. It is within such limited scenarios that
Chinese fishing operators should have complied with RFMOs’ fisheries manage-
ment and conservation rules which are more rigorous than corresponding d omestic
rules. By comparison, Chinese DWF vessels operating in RFMO-covered regions
have discharged relatively better due regard for fisheries legality and sustainability
than in developing countries’ coastal zones, which are often subject to lax con-
trol and unequal FAA terms (see section “China’s Implementation of International
DWF Disciplines along the African MSR”). It is, thus, argued that the ruling phi-
losophy of China’s DWF governance is more of a reactive rather than proactive
nature and closely related to food security strategies. The reactive nature is also
evident in the first-ever publication of a DWF Performance White Paper in 2020,
acting as an immediate response to the accusation of China as a significant con-
tributor to IUU fishing and labor abuses by the United States (US Department of
Labor, 2020). In many instances, China’s growing sense of marine stewardship
54 Juan He
has been promoted by practical market access hindrances (e.g., the need to install
VMS for monitoring, data reporting, and recordkeeping to access Western country
markets); overseas violation scandals (e.g., penalties on DWF managers and skip-
pers for non-compliance and even violent incidents in foreign EEZs); and negative
international publicity (e.g., RFMOs’ blacklists of Chinese-flagged fishing vessels)
(He & Zhang, 2022).
Meanwhile, it is the use of fisheries subsidies, not company productivity, which
has been found to hold the hidden lifeline of most of the world’s DWF operators
(Tickler et al., 2018). Fossil fuel subsidies and other capacity-enhancing subsidies
are widely in use among competitors like China, the European Union, Japan, and
South Korea (Sumaila et al., 2019). Given its sizable fishing capacity and sea-
food import dependency, China’s recognition of State responsibilities to correct
egregious exploitation of marine resources will only become more crucial in the
years to come. On sensitive global policy agendas, e.g., the elimination of harm-
ful fisheries subsidies and the CITES listings of living marine species, its political
stance has shown the potential to “make or break” any meaningful consensus. Such
potential has largely aggravated the dubiety of China’s quest for developing coun-
try exemptions under the WTO rules on prohibiting harmful fisheries subsidies
(Zhang, 2020). A minimalist approach taken by China to fulfill the basic require-
ments of selected RFMOs and other market access requirements stands to dilute
the prospect of consensus-building and global policy alignment.
More profoundly, the crux of China’s fisheries management system is rooted in
the dearth of a sustainability cornerstone in the overall legislative and operational
design. A scientific and ecosystem-based approach is noticeably missing in the re-
lated domestic instruments (see Table 3.2), leading to China’s rather low ranking
in the global assessment of national fisheries management progress (Pitcher et al.,
2009). Moreover, as shown in Table 3.1, China is not legally bound by the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement, the PSMA, and several IMO and ILO conventions that are
widely upheld as the pillars of fisheries and social sustainability. In consequence,
its recognition and utilization of international governance frameworks have been
considerably self-restrained. Focused on either fisheries subsidies or IUU fishing,
China’s patchy and pragmatic law-making efforts are found to result in norma-
tive fragmentation, lack of inter-agency coordination, and enforcement loopholes
(Goldstein, 2013; Shen & Huang, 2021). Despite the announcement of a “zero tol-
erance” stance against IUU fishing in the DWF Performance White Paper, there is
no sure indication of how and under what timeframe China will eradicate nationals’
involvement in such activities, given the absence of a comprehensive plan of action
to specifically echo the IPOA-IUU (He, 2016).
China’s Implementation of International DWF Disciplines along the

African MSR
The stated priority of China’s MSR is to foster three key economic belts that extend
from the eastern and southern edges of the national territory (PRC. State Council,
2017). Despite the lack of official data from China, global automatic identification
system tracking of vessel movement has identified intense Chinese DWF presence
in the Central Pacific and along West and East African coasts (Stimson Center,
2019). The Sea Around Us project reaffirms a similar extent of concentration of
China’s DWF vessels in West and East African waters (Pauly et al., 2014). Hence,
China’s MSR and DWF agendas have predominantly overlapped along the China-
Indian Ocean-Africa-Mediterranean Sea Blue Economic Passage, which covers
most part of the eastern coastline of Africa.
African coasts, as the world’s most vulnerable regions for illegal fishing,
have considerably suffered from loss of economic revenue, chronic diseases,
and deaths incurred by malnutrition (Petrossian & Clarke, 2020). When bilat-
eral FAAs are negotiated with DWF nations, it is cautioned that rent-seeking
behaviors have run rampant whereby poor countries are inclined to sell rather
than domesticate their priority fishing rights, especially when the licensing fee
accounts for a significant proportion of public revenue (Gagern & van den Bergh,
2013). Hence, the weak capacities of coastal governments to discipline foreign
DWF render a significant loss of sovereign control of their nearby oceans and
marine resources. Governmental failures are also accountable for corruption
in fisheries institutions, migratory slavery, fish smuggling, and notorious labor
conditions that are often pervasive in local fishing communities (Sumaila et al.,
2017). A vicious cycle of trading healthy oceans for wealthy oceans implies that
lip service has been paid to the UNCLOS vision of environmental sustainability
and economic reciprocity going hand in hand.
West Africa borders the East Central Atlantic, known as FAO Fishing Area 34,
which tops the world in attracting IUU fishing vessels originated from Europe and,
increasingly, from Asia (Petrossian & Clarke, 2020). Several loosely structured
RFMOs exist in the proximity of West Africa, which have attempted in vain to
harmonize and coordinate State actions against IUU fishing.4 Bottom-up estima-
tions reveal that China has reported only 8 percent of its total West African catches
between 2000 and 2010. The total quantity of legal catches is estimated to be 11
times higher than the reported level, and illegal catches by Chinese fleets have
averaged at about 761,000 metric tons per year (Belhabib et al., 2015). Underre-
porting of substantial harvested volumes consequently translates to a considerable
underpayment of fishing access fees, which only equals 4 percent of the actual
value of Chinese landings (Belhabib et al., 2015). A destination breakdown dem-
onstrates that approximately two-thirds of Chinese harvests have flowed to de-
veloped country markets and a surging domestic market for high-value seafood,
leaving low-quality fish to be landed locally (CEA, 2018). China is an outstanding
player in African fisheries not only because of its fleet size but also its infrastruc-
ture leverage to integrate fishing, shipping, processing, and trading dynamics into
a holistic industrial cluster.5 China-led supply chain integration opens a window of
opportunity for local value addition. This is because shore-based fish processing
is far less expensive than on-board processing, which is curtailed by limited space
and workforce. Furthermore, infrastructural rehabilitation creates new jobs, skill
diffusion channels, and export earnings. A critical move to land and process fish in
coastal communities, instead of shipping them away for foreign markets, is a sound
56 Juan He
indicator of economic and social engagement, which is symbolic of China’s BRI

regional connectivity strategy.
In East Africa, China’s DWF presence has proliferated in the fishing grounds
close to Mozambique, Madagascar, and Mauritius. A hallmark of China’s DWF-
MSR strategy in this region is the so-called infrastructure-for-access deals, whereby
coastal States may cede fishing rights to Chinese industrial vessels in return for in-
vestments in port and processing infrastructure improvement (Saumweber, 2020).
Compared to other parts of Africa, the East coast sees greater opportunities to
integrate with the land-based BRI Economic Corridors which traverse Central and
South Asia to reach Africa. Although it is not clear how many ports and harbors,
in what cooperative forms, and upon what financial terms Chinese investors have
engaged in exchange for local fishing permits, these port infrastructure projects
have amplified host country port capacity to handle DWF needs. Taking China’s
engagement in the Beira Fishing Port Rehabilitation project of Mozambique as
example, this demonstration project for strengthening DWF-MSR linkages has
transformed the old fishing port into a modern landing and processing hub for
China’s DWF catches offloaded from the East African Sea (Club of Mozambique,
2019).
The western coast of Africa, albeit not directly linked to China’s eastward MSR
route, has also attracted increasing Chinese investment in the upgrading of landing
ports and processing facilities (Devermont et al., 2019). This is due to the fact that,
out of the world’s top 20 fishery EEZ zones, Guinea, Mauritania, Sierra Leone,
and Congo all lie along Africa’s western coastline (CEA, 2018), and West Africa
hosts three out of the five most frequently visited ports, including Dakar (Senegal),
Conakry (Guinea), and Nouadhibou (Mauritania), for foreign DWF vessels to
refuel, resupply, and offload their catches (Stimson Center, 2019). Therefore, the
port capacity to accommodate high-tonnage vessels and provide equipment and hu-
man resources to process raw fish is critical to sustaining the operation of long-haul
DWF fleets. According to the Stephenson Ocean Security Project, similar bilateral
fishing base agreements such as the one signed between Mozambique and China
are being negotiated or concluded between China and Angola, Mauritania, Ghana,
Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, and Somalia, implicating comprehensive port services to
facilitate Chinese DWF operators around the regional maritime spaces (Saumwe-
ber, 2020).
In 2017, the Chinese government rolled out a new wave of construction plans
to deploy multipurpose fishing bases along MSR coastlines, with the purpose to
provide resupplying and rescue services to nearby Chinese DWF vessels as well
as transit commercial vessels (PRC. MARA, 2017). Extending control of a fish
supply chain from capture to downstream sectors poses enormous regulatory chal-
lenges to fisheries, customs, police, and other public authorities of local govern-
ance. On the bright side, localization implies more catches are landed and inspected
in local ports, whereas monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) is far more
difficult and technically demanding for at-sea patrols. The establishment of pro-
cessing plants and trade channels also compensates local communities with techni-
cal and economic upgrading opportunities, apart from one-off fishing access fees
(Belhabib et al., 2015). On the regulatory side, however, industrial integration does
not necessarily slow down a race to fish by large industrial vessels. This is because
neither China nor many of its African partners have ratified the PSMA to cooperate
as flag and port States in denying the entry of IUU catches into local landing points.
Under the PSMA, port entry is a crucial checkpoint on IUU fish landings. If not
effectively utilized, it can also end up creating grey-area channels for illegal wild-
life to enter the commercial market. The European Union, the United States, and
Japan have adopted more rigorous port controls based on minimum PSMA stand-
ards to cast IUU catches out of their landing ports and domestic markets (He, 2018;
Japan National Diet, 2020). China was identified by the United States as a negli-
gent flag State for IUU fishing as early as 2009 and stayed on the watchlist until
2019 (US Department of Commerce, 2009; US National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration 2019). Dozens of Chinese-flagged vessels have appeared on the
blacklists of RFMOs and the International Criminal Police Organization.6 Of the
26 countries that received a “yellow card” under the EU anti-IUU regulations, five
were from West Africa (Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo) and one
was from East Africa (Comoros). Although a few States made regulatory improve-
ments to be delisted, Comoros was finally blacklisted, and Sierra Leone is still
closely monitored.7 These indicators are critical to understanding how the seafood
supply chain has evolved along MSR corridors and, in response to that, where the
issues of legal enforcement should be tackled directly. When port, coastal, and flag
States are tasked with jointly safeguarding seafood legality and sustainability, hav-
ing the political will and capacity to crack any entry points for IUU landings holds
the key to unlock their responsible fisheries partnerships.
To reorient DWF-MSR development toward sustainability goals, a coordinated
action plan by country grouping is more advisable, given that China’s fishing and
investment portfolios have varied among African regions. On the west coast of
Africa, a fast-track mode of international engagement is likely for China to join,
comply with, and contribute to regionally agreed fisheries management and conser-
vation rules, including taking part in group enforcement forces against IUU fishers.
On the east coast, China may explore a more active role by building positive and
transparent linkages between MSR infrastructure networks and the engagement
of local economic sectors and workforce. Chinese project developers’ role as a
builder, funder, or operator across different areas should determine the most ac-
cepted mode of localization and industrial engagement, according to the varying
needs and societal realities.
The Potential of China to Fully “Comply” or “Cooperate” with

International DWF Norms
The central administrator of fisheries laws and regulations in China is the Min-
istry of Agriculture (MOA), known as Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs
(MARA) since 2018, through its executive arm, the Fisheries Administration
Bureau. Combating illegal fishing has become a formally pronounced goal of the
MOA since 2006, with the adoption of a policy document to target domestic fishers
58 Juan He
switching fishing gear to circumvent the summer moratorium arrangement (PRC.

MOA, 2006). The Ministry was not mandated to launch a parallel anti-IUU cam-
paign in DWF until the DWF Supervisory Regulation was tailor-made in 2003
and overhauled in 2020. As shown in Table 3.2, the MOA started to hold IUU
fishers accountable to the rule of law by publicizing a nationwide IUU blacklist
from 2016, covering an initial batch of 264 IUU fishing vessels owned by 78 DWF
companies registered in China. In addition to disqualification of firms and opera-
tors from entering the business, DWF-supportive subsidies valued at RMB 700
million were revoked or withheld by the MARA in cooperation with the Ministry
of Finance (MOF) (Shen & Huang, 2021). In the following years, the number of
reported IUU fishing vessels has declined until stabilizing at the two-digit level,
along with capacity reduction programs to cap the total number of Chinese-owned
DWF vessels under 3,000. The various ad hoc punitive mechanisms were eventu-
ally codified in the 2020 DWF Regulation to become standard legal practice. The
Regulation heightens attention to IUU fishing by specifying 12 types of activities
that are presumptively considered illegal (Article 39). Also included is a whole new
chapter dedicated to punishing IUU vessels, operators, and their controlling firms
(Chapter 7).
Moreover, it is notable that the MARA expertise has been actively involved in
the Chinese delegation to negotiate multilateral fisheries subsidies norms under
the auspices of the WTO since 2001. At the juncture of global policy reform,
the MARA has the critical task to reconfigure the right policy incentives (e.g.,
improved working conditions and income tax reductions for crew members) and
disincentives (e.g., fuel subsidy reductions on loss-making DWF companies), and
combine theirs uses through the force of law. A promising development in the
right direction is the 2021 joint outline of the MARA and the MOF to propose
substituting marine stewardship subsidies for fossil fuel subsidies appropriated to
near-shore fisheries, as a positive response to the new WTO subsidy norms (PRC.
MARA and MOF, 2021). The provinces of Shandong and Fujian are among the
earliest pioneers to formulate concrete transitional arrangements and timeframes
to give effect to the central policy agenda (Shandong Provincial Department of
Agriculture and Rural Affairs, 2021; Fujian Provincial Department of Ocean and
Fisheries, 2022). Granting of the marine stewardship subsidy is strictly dependent
on each 12-meter-long-and-above vessel’s compliance with seasonal closed fishing
and a range of sustainable and responsible fishing practices, inter alia, the use of
designated landing ports, port entry, exit and at-sea location data reporting, protec-
tion of ocean wildlife, and avoidance of juvenile fish catch. Hence, the subsidy
reform is closely tied to and conducive to the modernization of China’s coastal
fishery monitoring and legal governance. Pending implementation and tangible
results, there remains hope that the domestic subsidy reform will bring forth valu-
able experience and insights to accelerate the alignment of China’s DWF fisheries
subsidies with the global policy trend.
The pledge of China’s leadership for Marine Ecological Civilization and a Mari-
time Community with a Shared Future posits the fishery agency at the threshold of
a major change in how it discharges regulatory responsibilities for Chinese-flagged
DWF vessels. For decades, the priority given to the DWF sector aims to achieve
short-term goals related to economic development and food security. If DWF pro-
motion proceeds in an economically exploitative and politically assertive manner,
increased Chinese MSR investments and infrastructure building may end up mag-
nifying the negative externalities on local livelihoods and ocean wildlife. With the
adoption of a “zero tolerance” stance against IUU fishing under the recent DWF
Performance Whitepaper, the primary focus needs to steadily shift to promote legal
and sustainable management of DWF in the longer term. There exist two major
ways for China to fully “comply” or even “cooperate” with international DWF
norms.
In the first place, China could promote effective in personam jurisdiction of
DWF practices by Chinese nationals. In terms of discharging flag State respon-
sibilities, DWF nations should have borne a weightier obligation than currently
stipulated under the UNCLOS for the ocean areas they have benefitted from the
most, from the past to the present. Drawing upon the classic “polluter pays” prin-
ciple enshrined in environmental law, an augmented “fisher pays” liability seems
plausible to address problematic fishing conduct in the EEZs of developing coun-
tries. Such legal accountability is firmly premised on each flag State’s legitimate
control of its citizens, firms, and vessels operating anywhere and anyhow in the
world. In other words, the domestic fisheries law and policy of the home State form
the very basis for exercising adequate and effective in personam jurisdiction, i.e.,
jurisdiction over nationals, to more than complement the loose jurisdiction of poor
coastal countries. In the BRI context, a positive example is China’s accelerated
steps to export and apply home State standards on carbon emissions reduction in
offshore investment and construction projects. On 26 October 2020, five govern-
ment ministries jointly issued the “Guidance on Promoting Investment and Financ-
ing to Address Climate Change” to promote the shared responsibility of funders
and investors in meeting China’s climate targets. Under the coordinating role of the
Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE), domestic financial institutions led
by the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank are recog-
nized as the key financial lever to minimize climate risks arising from China’s BRI
outbound investments (PRC. MEE et al., 2020).
It follows that China’s gradual awakening to flag State responsibilities has the
equal opportunity to solidify into a restrictive and indiscriminate approach toward
national IUU conduct occurring anywhere, e.g., in domestic waters, foreign EEZs,
and the high seas; and in any form, e.g., illegal poaching, misreporting, and mis-
labeling of harvested catches. Despite their location and means of operation,
Chinese-flagged DWF vessels should not only abide by coastal laws and regu-
lations to maintain temporary fishing access, but also, preferably, more rigorous
domestic rules that have a lasting bearing on fishing practices, maritime safety, and
marine environmental protection. Noting that about 70 percent of Chinese DWF
vessels are now privately owned (Mallory, 2013), the MARA must institutionalize
and operationalize a legal baseline to sufficiently police private DWF footprints
worldwide that fall under China’s flag State jurisdiction. To this end, the under-
staffed Fisheries Administration Bureau is in urgent need of institutional capacity
60 Juan He
building and technological upgrading to turn the idea of remote and real-time
onitoring into a reality (He & Zhang, 2022).
m
Second, China could promote sustainability-oriented and locally driven FAAs.
The flag State’s secondary duty over nationals operating in foreign EEZs, as
opposed to the coastal State’s primary jurisdiction, is also accountable for the FAA
bias against coastal developing countries. It is a global imperative to actualize the
legal balance under the UNCLOS provisions by mandating genuine accountabil-
ity of DWF nations for IUU fishing and accruing benefits on just terms to coastal
developing States. Their EEZs deserve to be protected by collaborative flag and
coastal State jurisdictions, as under Article 62.1 of the UNCLOS allowing other
States to access surplus fish aims to “promote the objective of optimum utilization
of the living resources” (UN, 1982). The EU’s model of SFPAs lends a suitable
comparator in this regard. Since the European Union remains liable under interna-
tional law for Member States’ fishing conduct, it has recently tightened control of
DWF activity via, for example, Union-level vessel authorization and direct liaison
with ACP countries on the grant of fishing permits (Guggisberg, 2019). Despite
such centralization efforts, SFPAs are still considered essentially business-type
deals. Unequal distribution of fishery benefits and detrimental effects to local live-
lihoods are found to continually compromise the sustainability criteria endorsed in
the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (Okafor-Yarwood & Belhabib, 2020).
The DWF Performance White Paper explicitly announces China’s flag State
commitments to contributing to local value-added activities, such as market
infrastructure building, marine resources investigation, local fisheries develop-
ment, and job creation (PRC. MARA, 2021). Therefore, there is ample space for
Chinese MSR participants to engage and reward local employees and communities
instead of infrastructure-for-access deals alone. Like the EU SFPAs, China’s FAAs
could earmark meaningful financial compensations for regulatory and sectorial
improvement, for example, advanced inspection equipment and the construction
of sanitary control laboratory (CEA, 2018). Oceanic institutions and universities
from China can also provide targeted training, education, scientific research, and
stock assessment assistance. Besides, a sustainability-oriented financial system is
an emerging driver to reboot China’s BRI. A significant amount of BRI funds and
preferential loans can be reallocated to enhance DWF companies’ management
efficiencies of green ports, green vessels, and energy-saving processing facilities.
To empower local port capacities, China could also consider exporting valuable
regulatory assets, such as MCS expertise, VMS equipment, and satellite-based
information capturing systems, to partner States and agencies. The flag State’s
marine stewardship should be understood to incorporate the various aspects of ac-
countability to local governance and livelihoods enrichment. This is because the
best deployment possibilities of sustainability are inside the regulatory framework
of the host State to manage and protect the zone and food resources it relies on for
a sustainable living.
The MSR’s win-win vision implies farsighted and mutual gains for China to
engage partner States on just and respectful terms. Coastal countries should be
treated as equal and long-term collaborators, not as mere aid recipients. To this end,
the terms and conditions of FAAs should not be left to the dictation of large DWF
companies but subject to the legal purview of their home State to indiscriminately
regulate domestic and outbound fishers on the same parameters of fairness, reci-
procity, and environmental accountability. For one thing, the Chinese legal regime
on DWF management warrants closer alignment with leading international gov-
ernance frameworks, as summarized in Table 3.1. For another, the current lenient
approach toward DWF relative to domestic fisheries should be steadily discarded.
By that time, the effective enforcement of international benchmarks on DWF will
be critical to ensuring that the sector follows the same global rules. Whether this
is about complying with a host State’s catch limit or fishing moratorium, China as
the flag State has the compelling obligation to cooperate with supportive domestic
rules and sufficient penalties. Finally, it is worth noting that increasing the publicity
and accessibility of FAAs will be a critical leap forward. Having a level of regula-
tory transparency is conducive to China making convincing claims about the legal-
ity of its wild catches and seafood companies’ commercial credibility. A reliable
seafood portfolio will need to include a cohesive chain-of-custody of information
about how and where fish were caught, transshipped, landed, and how the fishers
and processors were treated in that process.
Conclusion
In line with the research purpose of the book, this chapter has explored China’s
legal and political approaches to international norms and standards applicable
to DWF governance along the dynamic MSR development path. First, in view
of normative congruence, China has shown a progressive and respectful attitude
toward an expanding array of international legality and sustainability disciplines on
marine capture fisheries, including taking part in negotiating multilateral fisheries
subsidies reform. It is party to an increasing number of RFMOs or arrangements
that manage and conserve straddling and highly migratory fish stocks across the
vast high seas. Yet, the government has not signed or ratified certain international
instruments, including the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the PSMA, several IMO
and ILO conventions, which are essential to safeguard environmental and social
sustainability against short-term economic gains.
Second, the implementation process inside China to put global commitments
into practice has achieved incremental and partial success. It is largely attributable
to the DWF sub-law which has long served to exempt DWF from ever more strin-
gent regulations adopted to transform internal fisheries. Consequently, a requisite
plan of action to fight against IUU fishing is still lacking in one of the most influ-
ential DWF States on the planet. The MARA’s recent movement to ramp up legal
strictures on DWF has practically served to secure quota-based access to RFMOs
fisheries, as well as Western seafood markets.
Third, in terms of agency building, China’s gradual awakening to flag State
responsibilities demands large-scale technical upgrading, including but not limited
to the use of electronic fishing logs, on-board observers, and satellite-based VMS
monitoring systems. The DWF White Paper has missed the opportunity to design
62 Juan He
concrete implementation steps and timeline to eliminate IUU activities conducted

anywhere and anyhow by Chinese entities. As a result, neither a special agency nor
task a force has been designated to specifically tackle the problem in the years to
come. To summarize, China’s evolving stance toward DWF international norms
and standards can be considered “moderate” (level of congruence), “low” (level of
implementation), and “passive” (level of agency), falling under the broad band of
“infraction” as described in Chapter 1.
China’s reactive and pragmatic approach to regulating DWF has far-reaching
implications for the world, in general, and the re-orientation of its MSR agenda
toward UN sustainability goals, in particular. A set of policy advice is, therefore,
outlined below to assist in a paradigm shift from negative externalities to posi-
tive collaborations along the MSR. First, treating MSR partners on equal terms
warrants a radical mindset change among Chinese leaderships and competent
agencies. This is by no means made easy by the insatiable appetite for premium
protein among Western and rising middle-class Chinese consumers. However, to
label Chinese seafood as credible commodities on the global market, a transparent
regulatory fashion and robust benefits-sharing mechanisms have both figured as
the must-have ahead.
Second, DWF industrial fleets should be disciplined on universal legal terms
and to the highest possible level under international fisheries law despite their
nationality or location. In this sense, China is expected to launch a formal proce-
dure to ratify and enforce the PSMA sooner rather than later; join, support, or even
lead the formation of competent RFMOs in the discussed regions; and regain full
legal control of nationals operating overseas by use of advanced monitoring tech-
nologies and techniques.
Finally, China’s involvement in global fisheries is starting to show a distinct
advantage in local value addition. That potential should herald parallel financial
durability, technical sufficiency, and social safeguards through local upskilling
and community engagement. One-off fishing access fees are far from sufficient to
empower marine conservation and industrial modernization in developing States.
During the 2nd Belt and Road Forum in April 2019, the green and sustainable
development of the BRI started to take center stage, leading to the establishment
of the BRI International Green Development Coalition administered by China’s
MEE. Foreseeably, under the renewed BRI agenda aimed at a greener prospect,
China will show strong initiatives and political resolve to the world regarding how
it will live up to international commitments and sustainability-based criteria in the
management of nature-dependent MSR commodity chains.
Funding: It is acknowledged that this chapter is part of a research project funded

by China’s National Social Sciences Foundation (22BFX110).
Notes
1 RFMOs are intergovernmental organizations made of three or more countries sharing
fishing interests in a specific ocean area. Some of them manage all the fish stocks found
in that area, while others focus on certain migratory species like tuna.
2 IUU fishing is broadly defined under Article 1.2 of the IPOA-IUU to target at such
fishing vessels which: (1) operate in violation of applicable international, regional and
national laws and regulations aimed at the conservation and management of marine
capture fisheries; (2) do not report or misreport harvested catches to competent national
authorities or RFMOs; or (3) operate stateless or non-party fishing vessels in RFMO
competence regions or in other manners detrimental to living marine resources on the
high seas.
3 The only exception is the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources with specific resolutions on bottom trawl fisheries. See Commission for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Conservation Measures 22-05, 22-
06, 22-07, and 22-09.
4 Examples include the Sub Regional Fisheries Commission, the Fishery Committee for
the Eastern Central Atlantic, the Atlantic Regional Convention for Fisheries Coopera-
tion, and the West African Economic and Monetary Union that operate different compe-
tence areas across African national waters and adjacent high seas.
5 A recent online information mining of China’s overseas port projects by Li et al. (2019)
suggests that, within the 40-year period from 1979 to 2019, at least 33 ports have been
constructed by Chinese companies in Africa before or as part of the MSR.
6 See Trygg Mat Tracking. “Combined IUU Fishing Vessel List”, available at https://iuu-
vessels.org/.
7 See EU, ‘Illegal fishing’, available at https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/fisheries/
rules/illegal-fishing_en.
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4 The Belt and Road Initiative
and International Climate
Governance
Lara Lázaro-Touza and Mario Esteban
Introduction
China’s global energy and climate weight has materialized through its domestic
energy and infrastructure investments as well as through the Belt and Road Initia-
tive (BRI) – the world’s great connectivity initiative. China’s domestic energy use
represented 20.6 percent of final energy consumption globally in 2017. Its energy
dependence is significant, making it the world’s largest importer of coal, oil, and
natural gas (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2019). China has also been the
largest investor in renewable energy sources (RES) globally in the past decade with
$785 billion invested between 2010 and the first half of 2019 (Frankfurt School –
UNEP Centre and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2019). Additionally, China
emitted over 25 percent of global greenhouse gases (GHG) in 2018. Its per capita
emissions are 40 percent above the global average (United Nations Environment
Program [UNEP], 2020) and it has emitted 11.6 percent of all GHG emissions from
1850 to 2010 (den Elzen et al., 2013). China’s cumulative and current GHG emis-
sions make it a key player in the global climate regime. The Asian giant is also a
major player in energy and infrastructure development, especially in Eurasia and
Africa.
Internationally, the Chinese-sponsored BRI currently spans 146 countries and
covers over 60 percent of the global population, over a third of the world economy,
over half of global energy consumption, and more than 59 percent of GHG emis-
sions (Chai et al., 2020; International Monetary Fund, 2020). The BRI is expected
to generate an additional $1 trillion in investments in “foreign infrastructure”
between 2017 and 2026 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment [OECD], 2018). Jun and Zadek’s (2019) analysis of 126 BRI recipient coun-
tries estimates that under a Business as Usual (BAU) scenario BRI countries’ GHG
could amount to 66 percent of global emissions by mid-century. Even if non-BRI
countries followed a 2°C development path, BRI countries’ development could
derail global temperature targets even in the most optimistic decarbonization sce-
narios analyzed by Jun and Zadek (2019). Hence, it is paramount to green the
BRI and scale up climate finance substantially to achieve the goals of the Paris
Agreement.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003299387-4
68 Lara Lázaro-Touza and Mario Esteban
In this context, there is increasing interest and emerging research regarding the
impact of the BRI on climate change. Some of the questions posed in recent litera-
ture refer to whether the BRI is helping limit global mean temperature increases
to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and whether it fosters or hinders
the alignment of financial flows with climate goals (Ascensão et al., 2018; Jun &
Zadek, 2019).
As for the alignment of financial flows with climate goals as a key lever of
climate action (Whitley et al., 2018), Article 2.1.c of the Paris Agreement seeks
to strengthen the response to climate change by, among other measures, “making
finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and
climate-resilient development” (United Nations [UN], 2015: 3). Both Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) and decision 18/CMA.1 of the Katowice rule-
book on guidelines for the transparency framework of the Paris Agreement could
arguably provide the space for reporting on the extent to which China provides
financial support for mitigation and adaptation to developing countries through
bilateral, regional, and multilateral channels, public funding, or other sources
[emphasis added] (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC],
2018; Whitley et al., 2018), which could potentially include reporting on BRI
projects.
Despite the theoretical space for reporting on the alignment of financial flows
with climate goals under the Paris Agreement, the impacts of the BRI investments
are unlikely to be reported under the UNFCCC. This expected lack of reporting
is mainly because “while the UNFCCC includes tracking provisions for public
finance provided and private finance mobilized for climate action in developing
countries, there are currently no requirements to track broader finance” (Whitley
et al., 2018: 26).
Understanding the impact of BRI on the norms enshrined in the Paris Agree-
ment, and hence providing a broader analysis of China’s alignment with current
international climate norms, would require analyzing the extent to which green
BRI development guidelines are being implemented at the project level. It would
also require tracing the impact of BRI investments on recipient countries’ Nation-
ally Determined Contributions.
Recent research projects have analyzed the impact of BRI investments on coun-
tries’ NDCs priorities between 2014 and 2017, arguing that energy and transport
investments were not aligned with BRI countries’ NDCs priorities (Zhou et al.,
2018). Prospective analyses have also sought to discern how BRI projects could
foster a 2°C scenario (Jun & Zadek, 2019). Looking at future BRI-climate scenar-
ios, not even the most carbon efficient growth in history would be enough to align
BRI countries with a 2°C pathway at the mid-century point. Additional greening
brought about by future BRI (and other) projects would be needed for BRI coun-
tries to effectively contribute to meeting globally agreed temperature goals under
the Paris Agreement (Jun & Zadek, 2019).
Building on the above-mentioned analyses, the current chapter seeks to under-
stand China’s stance toward international climate norms by drawing on existing
research regarding major powers and international climate norms as well as on
The Belt and Road Initiative and International Climate Governance 69
primary research – semi-structured elite interviews – conducted in both BRI and

non-BRI countries.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section “Theoretical Framework”
introduces the theoretical framework, specifying the criteria to be met to consider
China as cooperating, complying, nuancing (qualifying), infringing, or subverting
global climate norms. Section “Methodology” briefly discusses the methodology.
Section “China and Global Climate Norms” analyzes the extent to which China
has conformed to global climate norms, from the UNFCCC convention to the Paris
Agreement. It additionally discusses how the BRI can shape China’s stance to
global climate norms by analyzing the BRI guidelines as well as investment and
capacity additions in the power sector from 2014 to 2019. The chapter will then
discuss the reasons behind investment and capacity additions according to elite
interviewees that reflect on domestic and international drivers for action. Section
“Conclusions” concludes.
Theoretical Framework
Given China’s relevance in the development and implementation of the interna-
tional climate regime, this section seeks to analyze (1) how China relates to global
climate norms as enshrined in international climate treaties: the UNFCCC, the
Kyoto Protocol (KP), and the Paris Agreement and (2) the extent to which the BRI
energy projects financed by the Chinese policy banks affect China’s relationship
with international climate norms.
As is the case for other chapters in this book, we define China’s relationship to
international norms as potentially fitting the categories detailed in Table 4.1: coop-
erates, complies, nuances (qualifies), infringes, or subverts climate norms.
In order to then understand how the BRI can affect China’s relationship with
climate norms, we additionally define the characteristics of the BRI (as regard the
Table 4.1 Behavior and international climate norms. Elaborated by the authors
Characteristics
Cooperates China helps develop ambitious international climate norms. It

recognizes climate action as the widely accepted normative
framework. International climate norms are applied (internalized)
domestically. High social legitimacy of the norms allows proactive
international development of said norms. The country can be a
rule-maker.
Complies The country abides by international climate norms, but it is not willing
to develop them further. China, hence, follows the letter but not the
spirit of international climate norms.
Qualifies Irregular abidance of international norms. China seeks to insert
(limited) changes to international norms to serve its interests.
Infringes China does not abide by international climate norms.
Subverts China does not abide by international climate norms and suggests
alternative climate norms. The country could be a rule-maker.
Table 4.2 Impact of the BRI on China’s relationship with international climate norms. Elab-
orated by the authors
Characteristics Implications
Cooperates China develops climate norms to align BRI energy investments are
the BRI with the Paris Agreement. aligned with recipient countries’
China only finances energy projects decarbonization goals. China
that are aligned with the goals of encourages countries to strive
the Paris Agreement and uses its for Paris-compatible NDCs. It
diplomatic clout to help align encourages other global project
finance for energy projects with the developers and funders to follow
Paris Agreement worldwide. suit. China helps establish
international norms for energy
projects.
Complies China only invests in Paris-aligned BRI energy investments are
energy projects along BRI countries aligned with recipient countries’
but would not go beyond the norms decarbonization goals.
established in the Paris Agreement.
China does not use its diplomatic
weight to convince other countries
to align their international energy
finance with the Paris Agreement.
Qualifies Most of Chinese energy investments BRI energy investments are not
along the BRI are allocated to aligned with recipient countries’
fossil fuel projects, but the Paris decarbonization goals.
Agreement is not called into
question.
Infringes Chinese energy investments along BRI energy projects are a barrier for
the BRI are solely fossil fuel based. recipient countries’ achievement
China does not question the Paris of decarbonization goals.
Agreement.
Subverts Chinese energy investments along the BRI energy projects are a barrier
BRI are solely fossil fuel based. for the achievement of recipient
China questions the principles countries’ decarbonization goals.
enshrined in the Paris Agreement. China works to prevent the
It uses its diplomatic weight greening of international energy
to campaign against the Paris investments.
Agreement.
alignment of financial flows and power capacity additions with climate goals as
applicable to energy projects) (Table 4.2).
Methodology
This paper draws on a review of the literature that analyzes China’s relation-
ship with international climate norms. It also discusses recent literature on the
impacts of BRI and its greening guidelines on China’s relationship to interna-
tional climate norms. Primary research complements the literature review through
22 semi-structured elite interviews. Foreign and Chinese officials, experts, civil
society organizations, and business representatives were interviewed. The infor-
mation obtained from elite interviews has been triangulated with data from official
documents (grey literature) and secondary research. Experts interviewed work at

the following institutions: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Natural Resources Defense
Council, the German Corporation for International Cooperation, the China Coun-
cil for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, the Development Research Center, the China Interna-
tional Contractors Association, the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs,
the Greenovation Hub, the International Institute of Green Finance, the China
Development Bank, the Silk Road Fund, the United Nations Development Pro-
gram (UNDP), the Delegation of the European Union to China, Greenpeace, Tsing
Hua University, the National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International
Cooperation, the Spanish Climate Change Office, the Ministry for Ecological Tran-
sition and Demographic Challenge of Spain, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China, and the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
As there is no comprehensive database on either BRI projects or Chinese
energy-financed projects, China’s Global Energy Finance database from Boston
University (Gallagher, 2021) is used, which covers all the energy projects financed
outside China by China’s two global policy banks, the China Development Bank
and the Export-Import Bank of China. To analyze the impact of the BRI on China’s
relationship with global climate norms, two sub-periods are analyzed. The first
period covers from 2014 to 2016, prior to both the entry into force of the Paris
Agreement and the announcement by Xi Jinping of the BRI International Green
Development Coalition (BRIGC) at the international level. The second period
encompasses 2017–2019 and includes a host of domestic initiatives in China to
green the BRI.
China and Global Climate Norms

The norms to evaluate China’s behavior as regards international climate governance
are discussed in this section and include (a) the signature, ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol (KP), and the Paris
Agreement (PA) as indicative of domestic acceptance of climate norms (UN, 1992,
1997, 2015); (b) meeting the objectives, supporting the principles, and responding
to the requirements enshrined in the UNFCCC, the KP, and the PA to analyze the
effective implementation of international climate norms by China (i.e., domestic
relationship with the rules of international climate treaties). As for China’s relation-
ship with global climate governance under its Belt and Road Initiative, this section
will also discuss (c) China’s policy initiatives to green (and incorporate climate
change in) the BRI and (d) implementation of BRI projects through the analysis of
energy investments and power capacity additions in 2014–2019.
Domestic Acceptance of International Climate Norms
China has signed and ratified the UNFCCC, the KP, and the PA (UN, n.d.). As
such, it can be argued that it has vetted the goals, principles, rules, and commit-
ments enshrined in these institutions. According to the UN treaty database, China
signed and ratified all three global climate frameworks early on after their adoption
and has participated in all the annual climate gatherings (known as the Confer-
ence of the Parties, or COP) (Hart et al., 2018). Ratification of climate treaties
and continued COP attendance signal early and continued engagement with the
global climate regime. In fact, the support, signature, and ratification of the Paris
Agreement by China (alongside the United States and later on the European Union)
enabled the entry into force of said agreement less than a year after its adoption
(Lázaro-Touza, 2018).
Box 4.1 The UNFCCC
1 Objectives:
To stabilize the concentrations of greenhouse gases in order to prevent a
dangerous interference with the climate system, enable the ecosystems to
adapt, guarantee food production, and allow for sustainable development.
2 The UNFCCC Principles:
• Differentiation: “The Parties should protect the climate system for
the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the
basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differenti-
ated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC).
• Equity: the needs of the developing countries must be catered for,
especially the needs of the most vulnerable ones.
• Precautionary principle: Parties must act against climate change. Lack
of complete scientific certainty must not be used as an excuse for inac-
tion. However, the cost of climate action must be taken into account.
• Sustainable development: Parties have the right to sustainable
development, economic growth being a key aspect in the fight
against climate change.
• Promoting international trade: the economic system must be open
to encourage the fight against climate change. Actions in climate
matters must not be used as a pretext to limit international trade.
3 Requirements:
• Parties shall provide information about their emissions via the
national emission inventories.
• Parties shall draw up, publish, and update their climate action pro-
grams, including actions in the energy, transport, industry, agricul-
ture, forestry, and waste management sectors.
• Parties shall encourage the conservation and increase of sinks,
including woodland and oceans.
• Parties shall cooperate in adapting to climate change.
• Parties shall incorporate climate change into the sectorial policies,
minimizing the potential negative effects of mitigation policies.
• Parties shall promote research into climate change and will exchange
information about it. They shall also promote public awareness.
• Parties that are developed countries shall take the lead in reduc-
ing emissions and shall support developing countries in presenting
the information required by the UNFCCC. Furthermore, the devel-
oped countries shall support technology transfer to the developing
countries.
• Action taken by the developing countries will depend on the tech-
nology and financial aid coming from the developed countries.
Source: United Nations (1992).
Box 4.2 Key elements of the Kyoto Protocol
1 Objective:
• Promoting sustainable development through reducing greenhouse
gas emissions.
2 Principles:
• The KP is guided by the principles of the UNFCCC (see Box 4.1)
3 Requirements:
• Developed countries shall reduce greenhouse-gas emissions by at
least 5 percent in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol
(2008–2012) when compared with the 1990 emission levels (gener-
ally the base year, except for fluoride gases, whose base year could
be 1995).
• The countries shall show progress toward meeting their quantified
emission reduction commitments in 2005.
Source: United Nations (1997).
Box 4.3 The Paris Agreement
1 Objectives:
• To limit the average increase in mean global temperatures to well
below 2°C when compared with the preindustrial era, trying to keep
temperature increases to 1.5°C.
• To improve resilience and the capacity to adapt.
• To make financial flows consistent with a pathway toward low
greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.
• To reach the peak in emissions as soon as possible and to reduce
emissions thereafter in order to balance anthropogenic emissions
and removals by the second half of the 21st century.
• To reduce the losses and damage caused by climate change.
2 Principles:
• The Paris Agreement is guided by the principles enshrined in the
UNFCCC (see Box 4.1) and makes specific references to the prin-
ciples of “equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances”.
3 Requirements:
• Parties will develop NDCs and shall pursue domestic measures in
order to comply with their commitments.
• Parties shall inform about their NDCs every five years which will
represent a progression compared with the previous NDC reflecting
the maximum ambition and subject to the principle of CBDR-RC.
• All Parties should formulate and inform about their long-term emis-
sion reduction strategies.
• Parties shall develop, as appropriate, adaptation plans in which they
will assess the effects of climate change and the vulnerabilities and
should submit adaptation communications.
• Parties that are developed countries must provide developing countries
with financial aid to implement their mitigation and adaptation activi-
ties. This aid shall amount to $100,000 million per year since 2020
(an amount agreed upon in 2009 in the context of the Copenhagen
Agreement). This amount will be reviewed upward in 2025. Financ-
ing sources will be both public and private. Developing countries that
are in a position to do so are also encouraged to help other developing
countries. Parties are urged to allocate international climate finance in
a balanced manner between mitigation and adaptation.
• The Agreement establishes that the Parties must boost their capaci-
ties for achieving its targets.
• The Paris Agreement establishes a framework of transparency to en-
courage trust between the Parties. This framework of transparency
will be flexible depending on the level of development of the Par-
ties and will be based upon the UNFCCC transparency system. The
information to be submitted includes the greenhouse gas emission
inventories, progress in complying with the commitments (NDCs),
the effects of climate change, actions taken in matters concerning
adaptation and the support given or received (financial, technology
transfer, or for capacity enhancement), whichever is relevant. The
information received will be assessed by experts.
• A Global Stocktake (GST) examination will be conducted to assess
progress toward the objective of stabilizing the mean global tem-
perature in the long term. The first Global Stocktake will be carried
out in 2023.
Source: UNFCCC (2015).

Domestic Relationship with the Rules of International Climate Treaties
The objectives, principles, and requirements of the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement
constitute the norms according to which China’s behavior is analyzed (UN, 1992,
1997, 2015). Key objectives include, among others, preventing dangerous interfer-
ence with the climate system, striving for sustainable development, limiting global
mean temperatures to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, boosting adapta-
tion, balancing emissions and absorptions of GHG, and aligning financial flows
with climate-resilient development.
As for the principles enshrined in the UNFCCC and later embedded in the KP
and the PA, they include, among others, differentiation through the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-
RC), equity, and the precautionary principle.
Some of the key requirements of international climate treaties include report-
ing obligations,1 developing plans and programs for climate action, and promoting
research and adaptation. Commitments to concrete reductions in GHG emissions
as per the KP were only applicable to developed Parties and for a given period. As
for the PA, there are procedural requirements such as presenting NDCs every five
years and presenting long-term strategies, among others. There is also a commit-
ment from developed countries to provide international climate finance of $100
billion annually and an Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) to evaluate pro-
gress toward the goals established in the Paris Agreement.
It should be noted, however, that neither China nor any other country on its own
can deliver the objectives set out in those agreements. Rather, China’s behavior can
exhibit different degrees of norm consistency with the objectives, principles, and
requirements, even after having ratified these international climate frameworks.
Academic literature (Hart et al., 2018; Heggelund, 2021; Hilton & Kerr, 2017;
Kopra, 2019; Zhang et al., 2017) and elite interviewees both confirm that China’s
top priorities in international climate negotiations have included promoting dif-
ferentiation thorough the principle of CBDR-RC, limiting ambition, reporting and
oversight requirements for developing countries, and demanding international cli-
mate finance from developed to developing countries (UNFCCC, 2009).
Limited ambition and flexible reporting requirements for developing countries
are congruent with national rules and regulations in China. Hart et al. (2018) con-
tend that China’s national climate policies are, in fact, more ambitious than its
NDCs, which would arguably limit reputational risks as China is expected to meet
the goals set in its NDC. China is known to over-comply with its commitments.
Hence, the achievement of Chinese climate commitments under the UNFCCC and
the KP is unsurprising.
One international climate negotiator interviewed stated that the principle of
CBDR-RC was, in fact, introduced in the UNFCCC at China’s behest. China
would, hence, be taking an active stance toward the development of some of the
principles that govern international climate treaties. Another international climate
negotiator highlighted the fact that China still holds on to the differentiation prin-
ciple and has historically “hidden” behind G-77 countries to systematically limit
ambition during international climate negotiations. Given that China helped craft
and defended some of the key principles of the UNFCCC, which are embedded in
the KP and the PA, if only to limit its responsibilities, it could be argued that China
has qualified international climate norms as regard principles.
Despite China’s agenda and technical negotiation positions, it is also important
to remember that China has gradually stepped up its climate action in the interna-
tional arena since COP 15. In 2009, for the first time, China pledged to reduce its
emission intensity (emissions per unit of Gross Domestic Product, GDP) by 40–45
percent by 2020 (compared with its 2005 levels). It also committed to increasing
its share of non-fossil fuels in its primary energy consumption to 15 percent and to
significantly increase its forest cover and forest stock (Finamore, 2010). In 2014,
China pledged to reach its peak in energy-related emissions by 2030 and reduce its
emissions intensity (emissions per unit of GDP) by 60–65 percent by 2030 (com-
pared with 2005 levels). The share of non-fossil fuels – including nuclear – in
primary energy consumption would increase to approximately 20 percent, with
significant increases in forest stock.
More recently, China pledged to (a) reach the peak in its CO2 emissions ahead of
2030; (b) achieve carbon neutrality before 2060; (c) lower CO2 emissions per unit
of GDP by over 65 percent from 2005 levels by 2030; (d) increase the share of non-
fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 25 percent; (e) increase the
forest stock volume by 6 billion m3 from 2005 level; and (f) bring China’s level of
installed wind and solar capacity to 1,200 GW, up from 530 GW installed in 2020
(Min, 2021). A recent analysis of China’s latest pledges has described them as his-
toric, given China’s carbon peak and carbon neutrality commitments. Furthermore,
the impact of meeting China’s pledge could amount to reducing global mean tem-
peratures increases, as projected prior to China’s announcement, between 0.2°C
and 0.3°C (Climate Action Tracker, 2020a).
Additionally, it was the joint Sino-American climate leadership that played a
key role in the adoption of the Paris Agreement. In November 2014, the two coun-
tries decided to jointly present their emission reduction targets for 2025 and 2030,
respectively (United States of America [US]. White House, 2014a). These targets
were later included in their intended NDCs, setting the stage for other countries
to announce their own contributions (US. White House, 2014b). Chinese leader-
ship on climate change is argued to be aligned with the pro-active foreign policy
pursued by Xi Jinping, partly oriented to increasing the international prestige of
China and its leaders (Esteban, 2017). China can be an international climate leader,
whereas this is not the case not in other areas such as civil liberties and political
rights.
While the Obama-Xi binomial of 2014–2015 made the adoption and entry into
force of the Paris Agreement possible, the requirements for China have remained
limited ever since the entry into force of the UNFCCC, given its developing coun-
try status. These limited substantial and procedural requirements in terms of ambi-
tion, transparency, and accountability have made compliance with international
climate norms technically and politically feasible for China. There is, hence, a
good fit between international climate norms that ask little of China and domestic
norms that prioritize economic growth over climate action.
Given the above, it is argued that overall, China complies with international
climate norms while successfully qualifying some norms. China abides by interna-
tional climate norms while uploading some rules on the climate change regime that
limit its ambition, reflecting Chinese interests and values. China has adopted inter-
national climate norms by signing and ratifying international climate treaties (UN,
n.d.); China has helped craft some of the key principles that govern international
climate treaties. It has embedded differentiation in the principles of the UNFCCC
that apply to the KP and the PA. China introduced flexibility for developing coun-
tries in monitoring, reporting, and verification of emissions and has complied with
said flexible reporting requirements (UNFCCC, 2009);2 China has also pushed for
international climate finance, albeit with limited success given the current interna-
tional climate finance gap.3 Finally, China has increased the importance of adapta-
tion in the international climate agenda, especially in the Paris Agreement (Hart
et al., 2018). All the agenda items supported by China arguably limit its own com-
mitments at present. Hence, China’s cooperation with the goals of international
climate treaties, especially with the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement
(Climate Action Tracker, 2020b), is arguably missing at present.
While the above-defined norms apply to domestic behavior, it is argued that
the BRI can impact the ability of third countries to meet their own NDCs (Jun &
Zadek, 2019; Zhou et al., 2018) which could, in turn, impact the ability to jointly
meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.
BRI and Global Climate Norms
This subsection will address a question that is largely left unanswered when nar-
rowly looking at China’s relationship with international climate norms as en-
shrined in the UNFCCC, the KP, and the PA, namely, the impact of the BRI on
China’s stance as regard global climate norms. In order to undertake this analysis,
guidelines to green the BRI will be discussed. Additionally, the power capacity ad-
ditions and investments in BRI countries in 2014–2019 will be presented. It should
be noted that, although ideally this section would seek to discern the impact of BRI
projects on BRI countries’ NDCs fulfillment, it is not possible to undertake such an
analysis at present due to the deadline for meeting countries’ first NDCs being set
at either 2025 or 2030 (UNFCCC, n.d.b), as well as due to the lack of a compre-
hensive and updated BRI projects database.
Prior to the announcement of the BRI, China issued green crediting guidelines
in 2012. Said guidelines sought to compel Chinese banks to follow BRI recipient
country guidelines and international norms in their lending practices. China rati-
fied the Paris Agreement in September 2016, two months ahead of its entry into
force. Subsequently, Chinese authorities released key documents in 2017 to foster
a green BRI such as “Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road”, the “Belt
and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan”, and the “Vision and
Actions on Energy Cooperation in Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and
21st Century Maritime Silk Road”. These initiatives incorporated climate action in
the BRI through measures such as the promotion of low-carbon infrastructure and
renewable energy sources.
Chinese calls to green the BRI have been issued at the highest political level.
During Xi Jinping’s 2019 speech at the opening ceremony of the Second Belt and
Road Forum for International Cooperation, he stated:
We need to strengthen international development cooperation so as to cre-

ate more opportunities for developing countries, help them eradicate pov-
erty and achieve sustainable development. In this connection, China and
its partners have set up the Belt and Road Sustainable Cities Alliance and
the BRI International Green Development Coalition, formulated the Green
Investment Principles for the Belt and Road Development, and launched the
Declaration on Accelerating the Sustainable Development Goals for Children
through Shared Development. We have set up the BRI Environmental Big
Data Platform. We will continue to implement the Green Silk Road Envoys
Program and work with relevant countries to jointly implement the Belt and
Road South-South Cooperation Initiative on Climate Change.
(Xi, 2019)
Hence, as mentioned above, climate principles were further incorporated in the

BRI in 2019 with a new round of Chinese co-created initiatives such as the Green
Investment Principles and the BRI International Green Development Coalition.
The latter included thematic partnerships that help identify areas for improvement
and cooperation. Some of the topics covered in these partnerships are green fi-
nance and investment, green energy and energy efficiency, climate change govern-
ance, and green transformation (Green Belt and Road Initiative Centre, n.d.). These
initiatives have produced more documents detailing how to make the BRI more en-
vironmentally friendly. The one released in March 2022 by the NDRC, China’s top
economic planner in charge of the supervision of the BRI (NDRC, 2022), stands
out. These guidelines urged Chinese stakeholders to develop their projects accord-
ing to international rules and standards and “to strengthen the connection with the
green standards” of BRI countries instead of just abiding to host countries’ stand-
ards and regulations. Nevertheless, the most consequential normative indication
might be Xi Jinping’s pledge to the UN General Assembly on 22 September 2021
that China will not build new coal power plants abroad.
Chinese policy and major commercial banks involved in the BRI – like the
China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim) –
have committed to tackle climate change and deliver sustainability. The CDB and
the Exim Bank have recently adopted green frameworks for investment (see Figure
4.1) while increasingly resorting to green financial tools such as green bonds. In ad-
dition, some Chinese financing institutions, such as the People’s Bank of China and
the Industrial and the Commercial Bank of China, are proactive in leading global
initiatives on green finance and climate change disclosure such as the Network for
Figure 4.1 China’s overseas and BRI green and climate policies. Elaborated by the authors based on data from Ren et al. (2017), Sandalow (2019),
and People’s Republic of China [PRC]. Ministry of Ecology and Environment [MEE] (2017).
Greening the Financial System and the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial
Disclosures, respectively.
Given the BRI greening guidelines, principles, plans, initiatives, and actions
depicted in Figure 4.1, it could be argued that China is striving to co-create climate-
consistent norms for the development of projects along the BRI. However, as will
be shown below, an overall analysis of the BRI in the energy sector from 2014 to
2019 shows that existing high-level regulation has not, over all, led to a change in
paradigm for BRI projects toward a green or Paris-aligned BRI. According to the
in-depth elite interviews conducted in China in 2019, initiatives included in Figure
4.1 are mainly conceived as voluntary guidelines to be adopted by the relevant
Chinese financing and corporate stakeholders. In the absence of mandatory actions
regarding greening investments by the Chinese central government, the prefer-
ences of BRI host governments are key to understanding why fossil energies are
fostered along the BRI. This has been documented in detail for Pakistan, the main
receptor of BRI projects (Downs, 2019). It remains to be seen how more recent and
positive normative developments, such as the pledge not to build coal power plants
abroad, will impact BRI energy projects, considering that no enforcement mecha-
nism has been announced to secure their effective implementation and the lack of
transparent information on BRI projects (Kan, 2022).
Implementation of BRI Projects
Chinese projects along the BRI have a mixed track record on environmental, s ocial,
and financial sustainability (Jiang, 2019; Kirchherr et al., 2017), indicating limited
implementation of BRI greening norms to date. Focusing on energy investments,
the BRI has historically been agnostic as regards the type of energy mix that BRI
recipient countries develop, promoting both renewable energies and fossil fuels.
China had argued that they heed the energy needs and investment demands of said
countries (Hale et al., 2020), which in turn has allowed excess Chinese capacity
under China’s “new normal” development model to be deployed internationally.
Hence, despite the quest to green the BRI enshrined in the above guidelines, initia-
tives, plans, and frameworks, fossil fuels (especially coal) have received the lion’s
share of BRI energy finance (Eder & Mardell, 2019).
Zhou et al. (2018) show that, between 2014 and 2017, BRI investments were
largely fossil fuel-based for syndicated loans financed by the China Development
Bank, the Export-Import Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank
of China, the China Construction Bank, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China. Syndicated loans (in which various banks participate) between 2014 and
2017 allocate 90 percent of funds to the energy and transport sector, with 72 per-
cent going to oil, gas, and the petrochemical industry, and 17.9 percent to power
projects, 54 percent of which were fossil fuel based. As for loans exclusively fi-
nanced by the CDB and/or the China Exim Bank, 61.3 percent of investments went
to fund fossil fuels. The Silk Road Fund allocated 92.3 percent of energy sector
loans to oil, gas, petrochemicals, and fossil fuel energy generation. State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) invested over 90 percent in fossil fuel energy generation, oil,
gas, and petrochemicals. State-owned companies’ preference for fossil fuels is

due to structural factors like an inclination for large projects, prior experience in
implementing these projects, higher regulatory predictability, and easier access to
finance (Zhou et al., 2018). The above could potentially lead some countries to lock
in high-emission trajectories for decades to come.
This lock-in risk is heightened for BRI countries where the bulk of Chinese
investments goes to non-renewables in sharp contrast with countries from the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which offer a
more balanced picture between renewables and non-renewables, arguably due to a
higher level of economic and environmental governance in OECD countries. If the
data are broken down between BRI and non-BRI countries, China’s investments in
the energy and construction sectors in BRI recipients between 2014 and 2019 are
again skewed in favor of fossil fuels compared to Chinese investments in OECD
countries. This picture becomes more balanced if the data are divided into two sub-
periods, corresponding to the years 2014–2016 and 2017–2019 (see Figure 4.2).
In Pakistan, the biggest beneficiary of BRI financing, 75 percent of the new
power capacity generation built and financed by China is coal-fired (Downs, 2019).
Private-Owned Enterprises (POEs), which finance smaller projects, are argued to
be a better fit for renewable projects. This is the case between 2014 and 2017 when
approximately two-thirds of their investments funded renewable power generation.
In sum, approximately 80 percent of financial flows to the energy sector along
the BRI from 2014 to 2017 were allocated to fossil fuels. Zhou et al. (2018) also
highlight that NDC renewables requirements for BRI recipients analyzed would
amount to 327 GW of RES power in 2030 (costing $469 billion). Meeting NDC
requirements along BRI recipient countries would require a complete overhaul of
BRI energy investments in favor of RES.
To the authors’ knowledge, to date there are no analyses of the period spanning
from 2017 to 2019 or analyses that compare investments in the two sub-periods
analyzed, 2014–2016 and 2017 onwards. As a preliminary (and incomplete) proxy,
the China Global Energy Finance Database from Boston University has been used
to analyze investment trends and power capacity additions from 2014 to 2019 in
both BRI and OECD countries. Future research could analyze whether syndicated
loans by the six Chinese banks, the Silk Road Fund, and Chinese SOEs have con-
tinued funding mainly fossil fuels and whether POEs’ support for RES continues.
For investments exclusively financed by the CDB and the China Exim Bank
since 2017, the share of investments allocated to fossil fuels has converged with
that of RES (see black, blue, and purple lines in Figure 4.3). However, capacity
additions of fossil fuels are above RES for the entire period analyzed for both sub-
periods (2014–2016 and 2017–2019), tripling those of RES in 2019 according to
the China Global Energy Finance Database (see rectangular bars in Figure 4.3).
The above analysis shows that major policy banks – CDB and Exim – channeled
more funds toward non-renewable sectors, mainly coal, although the share of non-
renewables is decreasing between 2017 and 2019 (see Figure 4.3).
Between 2014 and 2019, fossil fuel investments in BRI recipient countries
financed by the main policy banks amount to just under two-thirds of energy
Figure 4.2 China’s energy investments and construction contracts by sector in BRI and
OECD countries, 2014–2019, percent and US$ billion (in parentheses).
Source: American Enterprise Institute (2020). BRI projects in OECD members are only included in
the “OECD” category to avoid overlap. Over the period, data in question amounted to $5.39 billion in
seven countries: Chile, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Turkey. Arguably, China’s invest-
ment breakdown in these countries is closer to OECD figures than BRI figures.
Figure 4.3 China’s major policy banks’ energy investment flows in BRI countries “BRI
projects in OECD members are excluded to ensure consistency with the clas-
sification used in Figure 4. This includes the following data: a 1.381USD bil-
lion (or 1.320GW capacity) investment in coal in Turkey in 2019.” by sector,
2014–2019, US$ billion and GW.
Source: Gallagher (2021).
investments. If the analysis is divided into two distinct periods, 2014–2016 and
2017–2019, it shows that, after the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, the
announcement of the BRIGC, and the publication of several policy documents on
greening the BRI, Chinese investments in fossil fuels have declined, whereas the
percentage of investment in renewables has increased. In 2019, the last year for
which data are available from the China Global Energy Finance Database, although
finance for fossil fuel energy along the BRI is still greater than finance for renewa-
bles, the difference has shrunk. In terms of installed capacity, however, Figure 4.2
shows that coal capacity installed along the BRI almost triples that of RES (mainly
hydro). These preliminary analyses seem to indicate that, while the concerns about
BRI are empirically backed, there might be some hope for a future (greener) BRI if
the investment trend in 2017–2019 of the main policy banks continues and expands
to the rest of financing instruments and institutions.
The repercussions of Xi Jinping’s pledge not to build new coal-fired power
plants abroad also point to this positive direction. In the eight months after Xi’s
announcement, a total of 12.8 GW of Chinese overseas coal projects were canceled
(Kan, 2022). This is not to deny some problems in enforcing Xi’s commitment as
19.2 GW of BRI coal projects that had secured financing are now in a grey area,
and at least two new BRI coal-fired power plants have secured construction and
purchasing agreements from Chinese firms after Xi’s pledge (Ibid.).
As regard China’s active or passive role (agency) in the development and
deployment of international climate norms through the BRI, elite interviews show
that, while the political message and the institutions created and fostered by China
around the BRI seek to strive for sustainability and climate action, implementa-
tion is voluntary. Strategic decisions regarding BRI projects tend to be made at the
highest political level, where sustainability concerns are often trumped by immedi-
ate economic concerns and domestic stakeholder interests (SOEs, financing institu-
tions, and contractors). The key sustainability advocates in BRI projects tend to be
civil society, the media, and environmental departments or ministries with limited
power. Knowledge limitations and lack of sufficient personnel on the ground to
monitor projects further limit accountability for BRI projects (Hale et al., 2020).
China is not perceived by elite interviewees as campaigning for or against fossil
fuel projects along the BRI, which would amount to taking a passive stance in pro-
moting the norms it has co-created or supported.
BRI projects are essentially demand-driven according to interviewees, a state-
ment that is also confirmed by recent literature for most damaging environmental
projects such as the deployment of coal power plants and oil and gas pipelines
(Ibid.). The limited procedural requirements for developing countries under the
Paris Agreement and the bottom-up nature of NDCs – whose objectives do not
have to be met for a given Party to comply with the Paris Agreement – make non-
renewable investments congruent with current requirements of said agreement,
even if additional investments in new oil, gas, and coal developments will endan-
ger the achievement of its temperature goals.
Given the analysis above, it could be argued that while China can be seen as
cooperating with the Paris Agreement through the development of various norms
to green the BRI, their soft guidance, and voluntary nature render these initia-
tives insufficient for overall norm-consistent behavior. Instead, it is argued that
BRI projects implemented thus far have nuanced (qualified) international climate
norms. This is so as most Chinese investments along the BRI in the energy sector
have been allocated to fossil fuels. While the Paris Agreement is silent regarding
countries’ specific projects, science makes it clear that compatibility with the tem-
perature goals of the Paris Agreement requires full decarbonization of the econ-
omy, balancing emissions, absorption of GHG by the second half of this century
(McGlade & Ekins, 2015; Rogelj et al., 2022; UNEP, 2020) and no new oil, gas,
and coal developments from 2021 onward (IEA, 2021).
Elite interviews highlight the difficulty in aligning financial flows with climate
goals in a path-dependent BRI that seeks to deploy Chinese excess capacity abroad
and serve BRI recipient country demands. It is, therefore, argued that a green BRI
is far from materializing, but it could be understood as an aspirational goal since
Chinese central authorities are resorting to soft guidance for steering Chinese
financing institutions and corporations involved in BRI energy projects toward less
carbon-intensive projects.
Conclusions
China’s early engagement in the international climate regime, its co-creation and
defense of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, its staunch
advocacy of flexibility for developing countries, and its active demand for interna-
tional climate finance can be seen as signs of cooperation with the international cli-
mate regime if only due to the scant demands said regime has historically made on
China. China’s defense of the Paris Agreement after the 2016 American elections
(Xi, 2017a, 2017b), its impressive record in the investment and deployment of
renewable energies (Frankfurt School – UNEP Centre and Bloomberg New Energy
Finance, 2019; IEA, 2019), and a broad domestic climate policy portfolio (PRC.
MEE, 2019) signal the internalization of global climate norms and, hence, China’s
norm-consistent behavior.
However, China has not, in general, sought to establish international climate
regulations that allow for more ambitious climate goals than the prevailing inter-
national climate change norms. Instead of cooperating, China has qualified climate
norms. It has combined high compliance of flexible norms as applicable to devel-
oping countries with uploading asymmetric norms such as the principle of CBDR-
RC that inherently limit demands on China. Some of the reasons for this stance
toward international climate governance can be based on its social and political sta-
bility being grounded on economic growth rather than on sustainability, powerful
industrial actors’ support of high-emissions activities (Hale et al., 2020), citizens
concern for climate change being low compared with concern seen in the European
Union and the United States (Liu et al., 2019), and climate change ranking lower as
a foreign policy priority compared with some EU countries and the United States
(Elcano Royal Institute, 2017).
In fact, China has not pursued a leadership role in the last COPs. More spe-
cifically, Chinese negotiators have been criticized as having sought to reopen
differentiation debates that had been closed with the adoption of the Paris Agree-
ment in 2015. They have also blocked progress on mitigation and transparency,
they have offered lukewarm support for the latest IPCC reports, and they have
aligned themselves with less ambitious positions defended, among others, by the
group of Like-Minded Countries. This is consistent with the response of the Chi-
nese government to tackling the slowdown of the Chinese economy in the after-
math of the Covid-19 pandemic, prioritizing pro-growth policies at the expense of
sustainability.
As for the impact of China’s BRI on international climate governance, a
nuanced picture emerges once again. China has developed BRI greening strategies
that theoretically apply to overseas lending and has pledged to abide by interna-
tional norms. It has published guidelines, plans, and principles for a green BRI.
Hence, this chapter argues that the alignment of Chinese financing with the Paris
Agreement along the BRI is not mere propaganda, but an aspiration facing mul-
tiple challenges. These challenges include the shifting and contradictory interests
of different Chinese stakeholders, a preferred carbon-intensive development path
by many BRI host governments, the lack of detailed NDCs to guide investments
in BRI recipient countries, and the lack of knowledge and personnel to implement
green BRI guidelines. Jun and Zadek (2019) identify other barriers in greening the
BRI such as scant climate legislation (both legislative and executive initiatives) in
BRI countries, patchy implementation of existing legislation, limited acknowledg-
ment of exposure to climate-related risks and asset stranding, and public support
for BRI projects.
This chapter has also shown that past energy projects and financing along the
BRI were overwhelmingly been allocated to fossil fuels between 2014 and 2017. A
somewhat brighter picture emerges in the (partial) analysis of the period from 2017
to 2019 although capacity additions financed by the China Development Bank and
the Export-Import Bank of China were still skewed in favor of fossil fuels. Fulfill-
ing the aspiration of aligning finance and climate goals is imperative to reverse cur-
rent patterns of high-carbon energy and infrastructure development that are clearly
incompatible with the 2°C objectives (Jun & Zadek, 2019). Hence, China is seen
as abiding by global climate change norms while qualifying those norms due to the
voluntary nature of climate-related BRI guidelines and the lack of internalization
of these norms in BRI energy projects.
The lack of a comprehensive dataset for BRI projects, along with the fact that
the Paris Agreement entered into force over 5 years ago, calls for further research
regarding whether a greener BRI could be effectively emerging and whether China
will comply, or even cooperate, with international climate norms. Future research
could analyze in greater depth the level of implementation of relatively recent nor-
mative changes, such as the pledge not to build new coal-fired power plants abroad,
and whether interstate bargaining at a global level and increasingly detailed NDCs
will help guide investors and policy-makers toward a greener BRI. The interplay
of this increasingly green-favoring international mandate and domestic needs to
provide both cheap energy to BRI recipients and business opportunities to high
emitters in China will have to be studied to test whether a green BRI can be more
than a mere aspiration.
Notes
1 Reporting requirements differ across developed and developing countries as they are
bound by the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respec-
tive Capabilities (CBDR-RC). The Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), whose
guidelines were finalised in Glasgow in November 2021, foresee a convergence in
the transparency process from 2024 onwards while allowing some flexibility to least
developed countries (UNFCCC, n.d.c). Note that China has presented, with the financial
support of the Global Environmental Facility, its second Biennial Update Report and its
third National Communication in 2018.
2 See China’s 2000, 2012, and 2019 National Communications (PRC, 2019; UNFCCC,
n.d.a).
3 The OECD recently estimated that the international climate finance gap amounted to
$21.1 billion vis-à-vis the annual $100 billion mark that was pledged in 2009 for 2020
onwards (OECD, 2020).
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5 The Belt and Road Initiative and
Corporate Social Responsibility
Development in China
Yue Lin
Introduction
As Chinese companies have become key actors in carrying out the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), the debate around the corporate governance of Chinese compa-
nies has resurfaced in political and academic circles. This chapter explores one
dimension of China’s engagement with international norms: corporate social
responsibility (CSR). The main research questions are what is China’s position
toward the prevailing international norms and standards on CSR and how does
it influence the latter through BRI initiatives. In order to answer these questions,
we will resort to the theoretical-methodological framework outlined in Chapter 1.
Both primary and secondary material will be used. Political documents, regula-
tions, guidelines, as well as prior academic research constitute our second-hand
data, while the semi-structured elite interviews realized between June and July of
2019 with main actors in Beijing, including government officials, banking practi-
tioners, industrial association leaders, company managers, and academics, provide
more insights to the perceptions and practices of CSR after the launch of the BRI.
One of the main weaknesses of the literature on compliance with international
norms and standards is its focus on states despite the fact that other actors, such
as companies, play a key role in determining the effectiveness of those norms
(Baradaran et al., 2012). Hence, we include that factor in our analysis. Through a
systematic comparison between China’s domestic norms and international ones at
three levels, namely the level of regulatory congruence, the level of implementa-
tion, and the level of China’s participation as an agency to influence international
CSR standards, we argue that China might be currently described as a “qualifier”
of international CSR norms due to its selective adoption of relevant international
standards, the uneven development of diverse CSR issues, and the implementation
gap witnessed in practice. In this context, the BRI is worth paying special attention
to as it has placed Chinese companies in the spotlight, with evident repercussions
on the international reputation of China.
This chapter will be structured as follows. The first section traces the develop-
ment and internationalization of modern CSR and identifies six major CSR aspects
through the comparison of the four most influential international standards. The
second section documents the evolution of domestic CSR norms in China and the
DOI: 10.4324/9781003299387-5
The Belt and Road Initiative and CSR Development in China 91
rise of a parallel overseas CSR framework. The third section discusses the obsta-
cles to CSR implementation under a top-down approach both at home and abroad.
The fourth section analyzes China’s initiatives to promote international coopera-
tion on distinct CSR issues under the BRI framework. The chapter concludes with
an overall assessment of China’s current position vis-à-vis selected international
CSR standards.
The Development and Internationalization of Modern CSR

Since its birth, the concept of CSR has sparked heated debate in the academic world,
regarding what the term should encompass, and in the business world, regarding
the concrete actions that should be taken to incorporate CSR into company strat-
egy. The development of the concept of CSR was initially based on moral responsi-
bility, and the relevance of companies’ objectives going “beyond their obligations”
to shareholders. Such a perspective, according to Nobel laureate Friedman (1970),
is incompatible with the economic responsibility of corporations to maximize prof-
its. He insisted that corporate social responsibility should be limited to increasing
profits. However, other researchers emphasize the importance of the social envi-
ronment in which companies are established and operate. This gave rise to the inter-
pretation of CSR as the social contract between companies and the society in which
they operate. According to Donaldson (1982), it is society that allows companies
to use the human and natural resources needed to carry out their activities, and in
return, the company signs a social contract, which legitimizes society’s demanding
of CSR. Those who negotiate such a social contract with companies form an inter-
est group that is affected by corporate activity. Such a focus on stakeholder rights
and relevance became consolidated in the 1990s, thanks to the works of Clarkson
(1995) and Donaldson and Preston (1995), who distinguish stakeholders with a
formal contract with the company (owners, shareholders, employees, unions, con-
sumers, or suppliers) from those without a contractual relationship but who interact
with the company (citizens, government, competitors, or the local community).
Perhaps the greatest advancement in the literature from the stakeholder perspective
was the correlation between CSR and the economic and financial profitability of
a company, which responds to Friedman’s criticisms and motivates companies to
voluntarily adopt a CSR strategy in their own interests. From this perspective, CSR
is not a moral responsibility, but rather a strategic tool for generating competitive
advantages and even improving economic and financial performance, as shown in
the work of Pava and Krausz (1996), Waddock and Grave (1997), Fassin (2009),
and Harrison et al. (2010).
In short, the development of the CSR concept in the Western world moved
from moral suasion to more sophisticated arguments of its value from the busi-
ness angle. Werther and Chandler (2010) described three types of business benefits
derived from CSR. First, the long-term operational legitimacy according to the
social contract. Second, the minimization of operating risks by avoiding possible
conflicts with regulatory bodies, or via the guarantee offered by CSR in the event
of unwanted accidents occurring. Third, the generation of competitive advantages
92 Yue Lin
Table 5.1 Overview of the contents of the four guidelines
OECD ISO 26000 UNGC UNGP
Human rights 5 issues 9 issues 5 issues 4 issues

Labor 9 issues 11 issues 5 issues 5 issues
Environment 6 issues 10 issues 3 issues Not applicable
Economic and business 5 issues 8 issues 2 issues 2 issues
Consumer 5 issues 8 issues Not applicable Not applicable
Community development 6 issues 7 issues Not applicable Not applicable
Source: Compiled by the authors, based on Gradert and Engel (2015).
through the reputational effect, the anticipation of society’s concerns and d emands,
and the improvement of the production process, for example, investment in
energy-saving technology. Given the voluntary nature of CSR implementation at
the company level, internal appreciation of the value of CSR rather than external
imposition could ensure the strategic incorporation of CSR into business activities,
both national and transnational.
This does not mean that states and multilateral organizations have no role to
play in promoting CSR. In fact, today there are several international standards used
by companies and commonly accepted by economic and social agents worldwide.
Four guidelines stand out: the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), the United
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP), the Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization (ISO) 26000 Guidance Standard on Social
Responsibility, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Companies. The four guidelines share many
common factors and are basically built on the same international conventions, dec-
larations, and principles, making them jointly our benchmark to evaluate China’s
performance in CSR. Six fundamental dimensions of CSR are identified through
the comparison of these four international guidelines, with notable differences in
the number of CSR issues covered (see Table 5.1).
Advancement of CSR Norms in China
Evolution of Domestic CSR Norms in China
The development of the “modern” concept of CSR in China has a relatively short
history. A limited version of Chinese socialist CSR was diluted by the reform
and openness program launched in 1978. A parallelly developing private sector,
while lifting millions of rural residents out of poverty, led, at the same time, to
the rise of many labor abuse issues (Harvey, 1999; Shafer et al., 2007). As long as
Chinese political elites considered economic efficiency and capital accumulation
as their priority goals, sweatshops were treated as a necessary evil in the process of
development, thus rendering CSR absent in political and public discourses. Para-
doxically, since such a lax regulatory environment regarding labor rights attracted
foreign companies, especially those in labor-intensive sectors, Chinese companies
became more integrated in the international supply chains and exposed to modern
CSR norms, standards, and practices.
It was in the mid-1990s, at a time where “anti-sweatshop” campaigns were
taking place in their home markets, that multinationals began to extend Western
CSR norms and standards to their Chinese suppliers, through private codes of
conduct, extensive factory audit systems, and sometimes external auditable cer-
tification systems such as SA8000. This externally imposed notion of CSR with
respect to labor rights was not accepted easily by Chinese actors. Yin and Zhang
(2012), thus, describe the early days of CSR in China as characterized by ten-
sions between the Chinese suppliers’ business practice based on profit maximiza-
tion, and foreign buyers’ demand for social standards, best practices, morality, and
other “Western values”. It is worth noting that the stigmatized “Western values”
are somehow legitimized by the inclusive consultation and participatory definition
by multi-stakeholder bodies that draw together public, private, and civil society
involvement (Long et al., 2010). Even the private codes of conduct established by
multinationals are drafted on the base of relevant International Labor Organization
(ILO) conventions and UN human rights conventions (Liang, 2018). Nevertheless,
neither procedural nor substantive legitimacy of existing international initiatives
was sufficient to pave their way into Chinese market. Concerned about possible
erosion of its state sovereignty in relevant areas, the Chinese government didn’t
approve SA8000 certification in China, and several foreign certification agencies
were denied licenses to certify Chinese companies within the country (Gugler &
Shi, 2009). Instead, Chinese authorities introduced in 2005 a softer, home-grown
audit of the textile industry to certify company compliance with minimum working
conditions, the China Social Compliance 9000 for Textile and Apparel Industry
(CSC9000T). This marked the end of the early phase of China’s CSR development,
characterized by an initial passive and defensive reaction in the face of interna-
tional CSR standards, giving preference to internal sources of legitimacy for fake
compliance or non-compliance with externally imposed ones, a common practice
employed by countries without strong normative power (Noutcheva, 2009).
It was around 2003–2004 that the Chinese government demonstrated clear inter-
est in the proactive promotion of CSR. The background for this were the mount-
ing social pressures that put the Party’s claimed highest priority – social stability
and harmony – at jeopardy. The shift of the official tone on CSR began with the
“Scientific Development Concept” proposed by then President Hu Jintao in 2003,
and the 2006 “Construction of a Harmonious Society” idea, which encouraged
“corporations to establish modern business values and to assume social responsi-
bility” (People’s Republic of China [PRC]. State-Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission [SASAC], 2008). Following this policy adjustment,
CSR, rather than being a protectionist threat to Chinese competitiveness, could
now be used as a tool to contribute to social sustainability (Zadek et al., 2012).
The pragmatic recognition of CSR by the state gives rise to state-sponsored guide-
lines and standards, which, together with state-endorsed guidelines from stock
exchanges, industry associations and academic institutes, constitute China’s CSR
regulatory framework.1
94 Yue Lin
The official recognition of the CSR notion was accompanied by a more posi-
tive stance toward international CSR norms and standards, especially those con-
sidered largely uncontroversial, voluntary, and supported by the majority of the
world community, such as UNGC (Ip, 2009). Considering UNGP, China also made
a milestone move in 2011 by endorsing it at the UN Human Rights Council. In
the meantime, China also voted in favor of the ISO 26000 in 2010 and formu-
lated corresponding national standards (GB/T36000/36001/36002) in 2015. Thus,
the Chinese government has by far acknowledged and endorsed three of the four
international CSR principles used as our benchmarks in this text. Nevertheless, the
general endorsement of international principles does not necessarily lead to the
full-scale congruence of national CSR norms constructed in the Chinese context
with the international ones. Quite the contrary, due to the salient feature of a top-
down approach to promote and consolidate CSR in China by the state, the govern-
ment not only encourages but also controls the development of CSR, resulting in
uneven development of CSR issues (Lin, 2010). From the stakeholder perspective,
the Chinese government, taking advantage of its regulatory power, maneuvers CSR
issues in the way that is best aligned with the Party’s interests.
The developments on labor rights and labor relations, traditionally consid-
ered critical to the social peace (Lin et al., 2016), illustrate this point. A relatively
integrated labor law system mainly consisting of the Labor Law and the Law on
Employment Contracts has been adopted, along with the administrative regulations
enacted by the State Council, and the ministerial rules and the judicial explanations
of the Supreme People’s Court on detailed rules concerning various aspects of em-
ployment (Zhong & Qian, 2014). However, labor-related CSR in China is currently
limited to formal employee welfare, work-site safety, and employment equality,
without touching civil and political rights such as the freedom of association.2 This
narrow interpretation of human rights is also reflected in China’s national standard
based on the ISO 26000, which does not apply to the public sector and emphasizes
its “relativity” (Hao, 2015), as well as in the implicit omission of human rights
from the government’s official CSR measures, such as the SASAC Guidelines on
CSR Fulfilment by Central-Level Enterprises, where most topics included in inter-
national CSR standards are covered, with the exception of human rights (Whelan
& Muthuri, 2017).
CSR progress in China has been a top-down process largely determined by their
relative congruence with the national economic and political priorities as defined
by the state. There exist, therefore, inevitable cognitive discrepancies between Chi-
nese companies and their international peers about the scope and the scale of CSR,
which would be the major challenge as they increasingly enter into the global mar-
ket, where they cannot as easily circumvent globally accepted norms and values
such as human rights, transparency, and rule of law as they did in the home market.
Rise of a Parallel Overseas CSR Framework
While internal drivers gradually overtake “imported external pressures” as major

shaping factor of China’s domestic CSR framework, both the Chinese government
and Chinese companies also become exposed to “exported challenges” (Liang,

2018) once Chinese companies more actively explore the global market. As rela-
tive newcomers to a competitive global market, Chinese companies have diffi-
culties to adapt their business model to the different institutional environment,
where the power relationship between different stakeholders is distinct from their
home market (Maurin & Yeophantong, 2013; Tan-Mullins & Mohan, 2013). As
a result, China’s business expansion abroad has been accompanied by a growing
criticism regarding the negative impacts of Chinese multinational corporations
on the environment and societies of host countries (Liang, 2018). Conflicts and
resentment between Chinese companies and host communities lead to an unstable
and hostile investment environment that may jeopardize long-term economic and
political interests pursued by the Chinese government and, more importantly, tar-
nish China’s national image as a “responsible emerging power”.
Consequently, China’s central leadership began to stress the importance of
developing responsible overseas investments in their public discourses. The value
of the conceptualization of CSR in Chinese multinationals became even more
accentuated with the launch of the BRI, which is widely conceived as a turn to
an assertive diplomacy of “Chinese values”. However, core BRI concepts such as
“community of common destiny” are vague in meaning and loosely used by China
(Zhang, 2018). The appreciation and the acceptance of this concept as well as the
BRI by foreign countries depend on commitment and concrete actions of Chinese
companies. As a result, there exists a notable alignment between business interests
and diplomacy needs regarding overseas CSR carried by state-owned multination-
als in particular. In April 2016, President Xi Jinping urged Chinese companies to
“value not only economic returns from their investment projects in foreign coun-
tries but also their reputation as law-abiding and responsible entities” (Xinhua,
2016). In August 2018, Xi further asked Chinese enterprises to abide by laws, com-
ply with regulations, take care of environment protection, and fulfill social respon-
sibility, in order to be the “image ambassador of BRI” (Xinhua, 2018).
An overarching concern to preserve a good image for China and a good corpo-
rate reputation for its national companies has resulted in policies and regulations
issued by the Chinese government governing exclusively the sustainable overseas
development of Chinese companies. According to a report jointly published by the
Chinese Academy of international Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC)
and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) on the sustainable devel-
opment of Chinese companies overseas, by 2015, the Chinese government had
released 33 key policies and regulations guiding and governing China’s overseas
business operations (CAITEC, SASAC, and UNDP, 2015).
Digging into the contents of these policies and regulations reveals a three-layer
principle that governs China’s overseas CSR. In the first place, compliance with
local legislation stands out as the baseline principle. Fifteen of the 26 policy docu-
ments explicitly require Chinese companies to follow host-country laws and regu-
lations (Weng & Buckley, 2016). This emphasis is not surprising, given China’s
legislation-centered domestic CSR framework and China’s diplomatic stance in
favor of “non-interference”. However, taking into account the weak regulation and
96 Yue Lin
governance in many developing countries, Chinese companies are also encour-

aged to abide by “soft laws” as a second principle. Such stipulations include “re-
spect the religious beliefs, cultural traditions and ethnic customs of the residents of
the host community” (PRC. Ministry of Commerce [MOFCOM] and Ministry of
Environmental Protection [MEP], 2013, Article 3), “promote integration with the
local community” (PRC. MOFCOM, 2014, Article 20), and “strengthen localized
operations, enhance social communication and improve information disclosure”
(PRC. National Development and Reform Commission [NDRC], 2017, Articles
20, 22 and 25). The reference to international norms and best practices constitutes
the third and implicit principle, as articulated in the White Paper on China and the
World Trade Organization released in June 2018, which states that the Chinese
government “supports Chinese enterprises in carrying out foreign investment and
cooperation in accordance with commercial principles and international practices”
(PRC. SCIO, 2018).
The three-level principle governing China’s overseas CSR is parallel to the sys-
tem regulating China’s domestic CSR in the sense that some international stand-
ards are deemed to be applicable only to guide China’s overseas operations, while
domestic business remains as the sacred domain of state sovereignty. The interna-
tionalization of Chinese enterprises pushed by the BRI has, thus, yet to contribute
to a systematic and holistic convergence between China’s CSR norms and interna-
tional standards and has instead created a disparate policy experimentation space
where some industrial associations enjoy implicitly endorsed liberty to initiate
cooperation with international institutions and Non-Governmental organizations
(NGOs) on CSR-related issues.
The China International Contractors Association (CHINCA) and the China
Chamber of Commerce for Minerals, Metals, and Chemicals Importers and
Exporters (CCCMC) have been most active in finding solutions for sector-specific,
CSR-related challenges by issuing six sector-specific CSR guidelines between 2012
and 2018. All these guidelines share some features that are not observed in other
Chinese CSR documents. In the first place, there is a systematic input of external
intelligence including international institutions and NGOs. In the second place,
there is an explicit reference to international standards and practices, including
some conventions not ratified by the Chinese government, and the OECD Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises which Chinese authorities are hesitant to rec-
ognize. In the third place, there are breakthroughs in amplifying CSR issues and
promoting their implementation through management suggestions, such as human
rights due diligence in conflict-afflicted countries that Chinese government does
not support openly (Buhmann, 2017).
In terms of compliance with international norms, the development of CSR ini-
tiatives at sector level is particularly effective. To some extent, industrial asso-
ciations bridge corporate experience at micro level and policy decision-making at
macro level. It is, therefore, not surprising for the government to “encourage and
support industry associations to continue to play a role in actively exploring the
establishment of social responsibility standards in line with the industry’s reality,
and to guide and promote industry self-regulation” (PRC. SCIO, 2009). From the
perspective of the government, counting on industrial associations to deliver CSR

guidelines in line with international standards is the least risky and the most prag-
matic way to improve the legitimacy of BRI-related overseas investment projects.
Lagging Implementation of CSR
Law Enforcement and Symbolic CSR Implementation within China
In contrast to the emphasis on voluntary actions by the business in the West, the
Chinese top-down CSR approach led by the government has the advantage of rapid
policy and regulatory framework adoption. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily
lead to better CSR implementation at the firm level owing to the lack of effective
enforcement mechanisms. This has been illustrated in several fields, such as labor
(Li et al., 2014) and environmental issues (Institute of Public and Environmental
Affairs [IPE], 2021). What makes the environmental implementation gap more in-
triguing is the so-called “central State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) problem” (Eaton &
Kostka, 2017). SOEs’ defiance of environmental regulations contradicts the com-
mon view that SOEs, driven by the central government, lead the improvement of
CSR in China. The reasons for this dilemma include “central protectionism” when
SASAC tacitly encourages state-owned national champions to prioritize economic
goals over environmental protection (Eaton & Kostka, 2017), the decentralized
implementation and enforcement authority (Tan-Mullins & Hofman, 2014) which
gives rise to “local protectionism” (Li et al., 2019), and the insufficient monitoring
of regulatory compliance (CSR Asia, 2016), especially due to the lack of regula-
tory capacity in the environmental bureaucracy (Eaton & Kostka, 2017). Another
explanation highlights the political nature of CSR in China (Marquis & Qian, 2014;
Patten et al., 2015). Compared with privately controlled firms that have stronger
incentives to respond to government signals, including CSR demands, in order
to cultivate political legitimacy, SOEs arguably have the least need to use CSR
to gain previously owned legitimacy in China. From the perspective of political
CSR, a top-down approach coupled with insufficient monitoring and enforcement
mechanism risks turning CSR into a “window-dressing” or “green-washing” tool.
The CSR implementation gap within China highlights the lack of pressures
from the community, consumers, and competitors on Chinese companies (Lin
et al., 2016; Yin & Zhang, 2012). While the space for civil society activism has
expanded in recent years, “this perceived sharing of power in the decision-making
process is carefully controlled by the state” (Tan-Mullins & Hofman, 2014: 12) in
the sense that only specific CSR issues have witnessed growing public involve-
ment, such as the proliferation of environmental NGOs, which local government
officials even deliberately leverage to check polluting state firms (Eaton & Kostka,
2017). The relative submission of non-state actors to the state in terms of promo-
tion and adoption of CSR policies is further solidified by the marginalization of
media as a major stakeholder in defining and promoting CSR. According to a con-
tent analysis of the CSR coverage in five leading Chinese newspapers, Tang (2012)
concludes that traditional media in China “often adopt an uncritical attitude and a
98 Yue Lin
celebratory tone in their CSR reporting and allow corporations and the government
to dominate the journalistic discourse of CSR” (Tang, 2012: 271). NGOs, despite
their growing activism in practice, have virtually no voice in Chinese newspapers’
coverage of CSR.
The “state-led and society-promoted” reality of CSR development in China
(Hofman et al., 2017) determines entrepreneurial actions that are adapted to rela-
tive power relations between multi-stakeholders. Without independent civil s ociety,
most Chinese companies, therefore, stay at “compliance” stage, sticking to what
the government demands at face value, while their Western competitors mostly
are in the “strategic” or “civil” stage of Zadek’s five-stage framework of CSR
implementation.3 Some companies, due to their high exposure to societal pres-
sures, might head into “managerial” stage, but the lack of long-term CSR strategy/
policy is widely deemed to be the key impediment to CSR implementation in China
(CSR Asia, 2016).
Country-Based and Project-Based CSR Implementation Outside of China
While regulating the conduct of domestic companies at home has been problematic,
persuading Chinese companies to realize their commitment to social responsibili-
ties on a transnational level has proven to be even more challenging, particularly
for small and medium private companies due to their opportunistic and foot-loose
investment pattern. To some extent, it is fair to say that SOEs are more aware of
their social responsibilities in host countries, and the Chinese government has more
capabilities and instruments to monitor and influence SOE investment behavior
abroad. But the three-layer principle that governs China’s overseas CSR has been
plagued by its ambiguity and impracticability.
The baseline principle to comply with local laws and regulations has been
respected by Chinese SOEs, especially those in the construction and mining

sectors. According to our interviews in Beijing, almost all interviewees praised
Chinese SOE compliance with host-country laws and regulations. However, given
the lower-than-average local standards and lax enforcement, sticking to the sole
criterion of abiding by local laws and regulations is not enough to attain “social
license”. To solve this fallacy, the Chinese government demands a double compli-
ance, using domestic laws and regulations to compensate for the regulatory vacuum
in some host countries.4 Ironically, Chinese policies and guidelines are hardly taken
seriously by overseas branches of Chinese SOEs. In the words of a manager that we
interviewed, “the contents of Chinese policy documents are too broad and imprac-
tical to be useful for solving real problems”. This emphasizes the fact that, despite
the proliferation of CSR guidelines for outbound investors proposed by the govern-
ment and industrial associations, these are not legally binding but rather voluntary
initiatives that lack proper consideration for implementation and enforcement.
Few steps have been taken to hold SOEs accountable and strengthen their
adherence to these documents. In the first place, almost all large-scale investment
projects, and those in sensitive regions, require pre-ante approval by Chinese min-
istries. However, the Overseas Direct Investment (ODI) approval system in China
pays more attention to prior approval and lacks effective supervision for the fol-
lowing operation of projects, leading to a situation in which they cannot support
nor enforce companies to cope with social and environmental problems. In the sec-
ond place, The Green Credit Guidelines, announced in 2008 and updated in 2012,
require banks to review and weigh each applicant’s environmental history before
approving credit applications and to comply with international norms for overseas
investments. Nevertheless, an assessment report showed that Chinese banks are far
from satisfactorily meeting expectations to ensure that borrowers comply with rel-
evant environmental and social regulations and uphold good international practices
(Greenovation, 2015). This is echoed in a more recent study by Wang et al. (2019),
who found that the environmental information disclosure system does not send
valuable signals to the market and has failed to become a decision-making tool
for bank-risk management between 2008 and 2016. According to an anonymous
informant that we talked to at Exim Bank, environmental protection requirements
have not yet been fully incorporated into the credit review process for overseas
investment projects, while financial institutions mainly focus on loan risks related
to political stability of host countries.
The second complementary principle that demands the respect of “soft laws”
is even more flexible and ambiguous in its application. Like most multination-
als in their early phase of development, Chinese SOEs seem to be transplant-
ing their archetypal domestic business abroad, treating governments as the most
important stakeholder (Zhong et al., 2018). This leads Chinese SOEs to perceive
their overseas CSR in a narrow and distorted way, by simplifying the engage-
ment with multi-stakeholders to the public relationship management with the host
country government (CAITEC, SASAC, and UNDP, 2015). The degree of CSR
implementation depends, therefore, on the “benevolent” or “predatory” nature of
each host country government, which leads to very distinct outcomes (Tan-Mullins
& Mohan, 2013). In the worst case scenario, Chinese corporate practices may
undermine local legal and political institutions marked by patronage networks,
weak rule of law, and lack of law enforcement capacity, generating concerns re-
garding a potential “race to the bottom”. In the best case scenario, Chinese busi-
nesses may increasingly converge with the Western model for overcoming state
corruption, particularly in countries where non-state stakeholders exist and are em-
powered by local legislation (Tan-Mullins & Mohan, 2013). However, in the latter
case, China’s double and disparate CSR framework becomes a challenging factor
for SOEs to overcome in order to coherently and systematically integrate CSR
into their development strategy, no matter where their operations are located. Over
half of all central SOEs have not yet established a specific department or identi-
fied specific personnel to manage overseas CSR (Zhong et al., 2018). In addition,
one of our interviewees from Syntao, a leading independent consultancy in China
promoting CSR, also highlights the fact that responsibility for CSR issues in most
companies falls to their internal Division for Relations between the Party and the
General Public (dangqun gongzuo bu), which emphasizes the risk mitigation and
image building function of CSR. In such cases, the enforcement of overseas CSR
programs falls exclusively upon on-site managers, whose particular experience
100 Yue Lin
and ability to manage CSR issues leads to ad-hoc and inconsistent responses (Tan-
Mullins et al., 2017).
The third implicit principle that asks for the adherence to international norms
and best practices is essentially project-based, particularly for construction projects
in the form of Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC). As explained
by some member companies of CHINCA, their CSR practices depend on the
conditions set by project proprietors and financiers regarding due diligence, risk
management and mitigation, environmental impact assessment, and relocation and
compensation of local communities. It is, therefore, critical how project proprie-
tors (generally the host governments) use international standards to define contract
terms. In this context, the negotiation of state contracts behind closed doors risks
undermining regulatory implementation. Unfortunately, political support by the
Chinese government has been widely considered as a competitive advantage by
SOEs, which continue to seek it under the BRI. According to Zhong et al. (2018),
more than 80 percent of central SOEs hope to get practical support and protection
from the central government. This implicit importance of government negotiations
for Chinese contractors is evidenced in a less transparent disclosure of information
in their CSR reports. Compared with European, North American, and other Asian
international contractors, Chinese contractors had the lowest level of CSR com-
munication in both dimension and issue levels (Liao et al., 2017).
China as an Agent Influencing International CSR Norms

As a permanent member of the UN, China participates and supports in different
ways CSR norms under the UN framework, namely, the UNGC and the UNGP. The
UNGC has had the longest cooperative relationship with the Chinese government
since 2001. However, the real influence of UNGC on Chinese companies’ behavior
has been criticized due to its voluntary and non-binding nature.5 The flexibility
offered by the UNGC might explain China’s positive attitude toward it, particu-
larly after the launch of the BRI. In 2019, according to Joint Communique of the
Leaders’ Roundtable of the 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Coopera-
tion, the UNGC was explicitly called upon as the main international reference to
be followed by all market players in the Belt and Road cooperation to fulfill their
corporate social responsibility (PRC. Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], 2019).
The role of the UNGC in promoting the sustainability of the Belt and Road Partner-
ship was re-emphasized in 2020 during the High-Level Video Conference on Belt
and Road International Cooperation (PRC. FMPRC, 2020).
Since the release of the UNGP in 2011, China has published two new versions
of its National Human Rights Action Plan. The latest one, covering the period be-
tween 2016 and 2020, has been widely deemed as significant progress, as this is
the first time that China has proposed the concept of human rights due diligence as
a guide for investment decisions in a policy document (PRC. State Council, 2016).
Nevertheless, there is no national policy to promote and implement the UNGP, nor
are they mentioned in China’s National Human Rights Action Plan (2016–2020)
or used by government departments in other policies to guide business practices
(Liang, 2018). Hence, awareness of the UNGP among Chinese companies is

very low.
While a more active and participatory gesture in the international arena has
showcased China’s commitment to sustainability and its desire to be seen as a
responsible nation, the BRI may create a novel platform for China to lead a CSR
discourse that is adapted to the development phase and the priorities of developing
countries. In the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road released
in March 2015, China claims to “support localized operation and management of
Chinese companies to boost the local economy, increase local employment, im-
prove local livelihood, assume social responsibilities, and protect local biodiver-
sity and eco-environment” (PRC. NDRC, FMPRC, MOFCOM, et al., 2015). It is
worth noting that in this flagship BRI document, corporate social responsibilities
are juxtaposed with corporate economic contributions and their commitment to
environmental protection. By doing so, the Chinese government emphasizes the
unique importance of the environmental issue for the BRI and advances relevant
initiatives more consistently.
In December 2016, 19 Chinese enterprises announced the Initiative on C orporate
Environmental Responsibility Fulfilment for Building the Green Belt and Road.
In April 2017, the Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP), the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (FMPRC), the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC), and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) jointly issued the Guidance
on Promoting the Green Belt and Road (PRC. MEP, FMPRC, NDRC, et al., 2017).
In May 2017, the MEP announced The Belt and Road Ecological and Environmen-
tal Cooperation Plan, which aims to establish cooperation platforms with multiple
participation that include governments, enterprises, think tanks, social organiza-
tions, and the public (MEP, 2017). In the same month, at the first Belt and Road Fo-
rum for International Cooperation, President Xi Jinping proposed for the first time
the idea to initiate the BRI International Green Development Coalition (BRIGC),
which was materialized after the 2nd Belt and Road Forum took place in April
2019. By now, the BRIGC has more than 150 partners from more than 40 coun-
tries and has launched ten thematic partnerships. One of the most important coop-
erative projects is the launch of Green Development Guidance for BRI Projects
in 2019, whose Baseline Review Report was issued in 2020. The report not only
establishes the BRI Project Classification System but also proposes key recom-
mendations and solutions for BRI projects based on the practices from China, the
European Union, the OECD, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the
World Bank, among others (BRIGC, 2020). Financial institutions are also taking
action to strengthen the environmental risk management of outbound investment
projects and promote the greening of Belt and Road investments. For example, the
Green Investment Principles for the Belt and Road (GIP) was launched in Novem-
ber 2018 and officially announced at the 2nd Belt and Road Forum in April 2019.
Jointly developed by China’s Green Finance Committee and the City of London
Corporation’s Green Finance Initiative, the GIP have received strong backing from
the global financial community.6 All these initiatives have led to a landmark deci-
sion at practice in March 2021 when China’s embassy to Bangladesh informed the
102 Yue Lin
local Ministry of Finance that “the Chinese side shall no longer consider projects
with high pollution and high energy consumption, such as coal mining [and] coal-
fired power stations”.7 Six months later, Xi Jinping announced, by videoconfer-
ence, at the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly that China “will
not build new coal-fired power projects abroad”.8
In stark contrast to the progress achieved in the environmental domain, Beijing’s
efforts to make its BRI projects socially responsible remain elusive. Main initia-
tives include three Memorandum of Understanding signed with the International
Labor Organization (ILO, 2019), and the Beijing Initiative for the Clean Silk Road
(to combat corruption) announced at the 2nd Belt and Road Forum in 2019 (Xin-
hua, 2019a). However, these initiatives still lack supporting institutions and have
not yet delivered concrete measures for their effective implementation. Before that,
in 2016, The China Federation of Industrial Economics (CFIE) released the First
Chinese-Invested Company Social Responsibility Roadmap for the BRI, proposing
three mechanisms, five principles, and four actions to promote sustainable develop-
ment in the region (Pan, 2016). In September 2018, President Xi Jinping proposed
the establishment of a CSR Alliance of Chinese companies in Africa, the prepara-
tory meeting for which was held in June 2020 (He, 2020). Nevertheless, none of
these initiatives directly involve BRI partners and remain more like an internal
coordinative effort to forge a consensus among SOEs in different sectors. By far,
the drafting of CSR policy under the BRI framework is largely an elite process,
without sufficient participation of multi-stakeholders, especially those with little
voice but whose interests are most affected by large-scale projects, such as local
communities and workers. Under this perspective, the BRI ironically enhances the
hegemony of the ruling elite instead of strengthening the group that postcolonial
scholars call the “Other” or “people who lie outside the influential inner circle of
power” (Munshi, 2005: 60).
Conclusion
In January 2016, President Xi Jinping gave a speech at the opening ceremony of
a seminar aiming at party cadres, stating that “as long as we take the initiative to
follow the world’s development trends, we can not only develop and grow our-
selves, but also lead the world’s development trends” (Xinhua, 2019b). If we take
the rise of the concept of CSR and its internationalization as one of the world’s
development trends, Xi’s words seem to suggest China’s willingness to comply
with international CSR norms and to even take part in the promotion of their
advance. Nevertheless, our analysis does not allow us to generalize China’s CSR
normative improvement and practices in such a simplistic manner.
At the level of congruence between China’s domestic CSR norms and inter-
national ones, we have observed three salient features. First, Chinese authori-
ties selectively adopt international CSR norms at the domestic level, according
to their consistency to China’s own political and economic interests. This leads
to an uneven development across CSR dimensions, with an increasing alignment
to international standards in the labor and environmental aspects of CSR, while
human rights and community development have been largely distorted. Second,
due to operational challenges for Chinese multinationals that set foot in countries
with different development perceptions and state-society power relationships,
China has begun to issue specific laws, regulations, guidelines, and initiatives that
converge gradually toward a separate three-level principle governing China’s over-
seas operations. Theoretically universal, China’s overseas CSR initiatives, espe-
cially those regulating mining and construction sectors, are comparatively more
congruent with international norms. Third, both China’s domestic and overseas
CSR normative improvement follows a top-down approach, in which the state
plays a leading role with carefully managed participation of civil society. China’s
CSR construction is, therefore, largely an elite process led by the state as the most
prominent stakeholder, who claims to represent the interests of the general public.
In terms of implementation, Chinese corporate CSR practices could be described
as disparate and inconsistent. In the first place, the top-down regulatory approach
of CSR at home has not been translated into better compliance due to the absence
of an enforcement mechanism. The gap between CSR regulations and CSR prac-
tices highlights the low level of integration of CSR concept into long-term strategy
by the Chinese business community, which tends to consider CSR commitments
a political instrument of legitimacy. In the second place, different CSR require-
ments that the Chinese government demands for companies’ domestic and overseas
operations have caused some managerial confusion. As long as parent companies
lack the vision and the capacity to engage with civil society at home, CSR fulfill-
ment abroad falls exclusively upon on-site managers, whose particular experience
and capability to manage CSR issues lead to ad-hoc and inconsistent responses.
Finally, regarding agency building, China’s official discourse under the BRI
framework adopts the “triple bottom line” argument and the ESG investment con-
cept (Environmental, Social and Governance), which has been increasingly popu-
larized by international financial institutions picking up products geared toward
so-called responsible investors. Compared with its roughly passive attitude toward
collective management of other societal impacts of the BRI program, China has
much more actively proposed initiatives and cooperative schemes to put forward
its “Green Belt and Road” and “Green Finance”. It seems that the Chinese govern-
ment has singled out the environmental issue from other CSR aspects as the main
domain for China to act as an active agent to influence international standards. This
decision not only is consistent with its internal national policy but also highlights
the Chinese desire to fill the power vacuum left by the United States during the
Trump administration.
While it is hazardous to generalize and definitively assess CSR improvement in
China taking selected international standards as benchmark reference, we still try
to give an overall evaluation using the analytical framework applied in this volume.
As shown in Table 5.2, it is undeniable that China has achieved significant pro-
gress in increasingly aligning its domestic CSR norms with international ones,
particularly those applied exclusively to govern overseas operations of Chinese
companies. Nevertheless, China is no exception to the problem of “incomplete
internalization” (Goodman & Jinks, 2008) or the “decoupling from practice”
104 Yue Lin
Table 5.2 Overall assessment of China’s compliance with international CSR standards
Level of congruence Level of implementation Level of

agency
Domestic Overseas Domestic Overseas
Overall CSR Moderate Moderate/ Moderate/ Moderate/ Active/

high low low passive
Labor High High Moderate Moderate Passive
Environment High High Moderate/ Moderate Active
low
Human rights Low Moderate Low Moderate/ Active
low
Community Low Moderate Low Moderate/ Passive
development low
Consumer Moderate Moderate Moderate/ Moderate/ Passive
low low
Economic and Moderate Moderate Moderate/ Moderate/ Passive
business low low
(Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005), a phenomenon well known by scholars in inter-

national law and a paradox more salient in the case of CSR, whose international
norms are basically under-enforced. China needs to overcome some obstacles that
result from its dual CSR framework in order to achieve an equally visible advance
in CSR implementation. Domestically, enabling institutional developments will be
particularly important in closing the enforcement gap. These developments will, in
turn, require innovations in monitoring and oversight, including means by which
citizens can be better informed and find avenues for more effective participation.
Internationally, the success of the BRI will rely to a large degree on China’s abil-
ity to involve local stakeholders and be more transparent. In recent years, with
the accumulation of international experience, Chinese leading multinationals have
shown their ability to level up their CSR understanding and implementation to
the degree of their international competitors in specific countries and in specific
projects. How these overseas CSR practices might reversely nurture CSR improve-
ment at home is still an open question. It is more likely that they would remain
as anecdotal, project-specific stories unless there are systematic efforts favoring
multi-stockholder participation in defining, monitoring, and supervising CSR at
home. Fortunately, some recent experiments that encourage multi-stakeholder
involvement in domestic infrastructure projects, such as the Dali-Lijiang Highway
(He & He, 2019), are sending promising signals. Before these experiments are rec-
ognized as national standard to follow by all, we would see China as an actor that
qualifies international CSR standards.
Notes
1 By 2018, according to the Sino-Swedish CSR website, there were a total of 79 CSR-
related laws and regulations, policies, and guidelines issued by the National People’s
Congress of China and relevant ministries and commissions of the State Council; 50
CSR-related policies, guidelines, and opinions issued by local governments at all levels;
and 37 CSR guidelines, outlines, conventions, and evaluation systems issued individu-
ally or jointly by industry organizations in China.
2 China only ratified four of the eight fundamental ILO conventions. C087 and C098 con-
cerning the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining as well as C029 and C105 aiming at elimination of all forms of forced and
compulsory labor are not ratified.
3 According to what organizations do and why they do it, there are five stages of CSR
learning: “defensive”, “compliance”, “managerial”, “strategic”, and “civil”. At the
defensive stage, organizations deny practices, outcomes, or responsibilities. At the
compliance stage, they adopt a policy-based compliance approach as the cost of doing
business. At the managerial stage, they embed the societal issues in the core manage-
ment processes. At the strategic stage, they integrate the societal issue into core business
strategies, and at the civil stage, they promote broad industry participation in corporate
responsibility (Zadek et al., 2012).
4 The double compliance is applied primarily to environmental requirements. In 2013,
the MOFCOM and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) jointly issued
Guidance on Environmental Protection for Foreign Investment and Cooperation, which
encourages enterprises to refer to the principles, standards, and practices related to
environmental protection adopted by international organizations and multilateral finan-
cial institutions (see http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/bf/201302/20130200039930.
shtml). According to later explanation by MOFCOM in 2015, this requirement is acti-
vated when “host countries temporarily do not have environmental laws” (see http://
hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/f/202006/20200602977319.shtml). In practice, some
central SOEs, such as Zijing Mining, require their foreign projects to adopt domestic
standards for environmental protection when host countries use standards lower than
Chinese ones (see http://www.zjky.cn/about/yanjiang-detail-118331.htm).
5 One symbolic controversy involves PetroChina, a compact participant, whose parent
company, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), had been complicit in in the
Darfur atrocities around 2009. See https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-
news/pdf-un-global-compact-called-upon-to-influence-petrochina-to-help-darfur-over-
80-organizations-and-individuals-ask-un-global-compact-to-uphold-its-principles/.
6 As of April 2021, 37 institutions have signed up to the GIP, in which 20 foreign financial
institutions, mainly from the United Kingdom, the European Union, the MENA (Mid-
dle East and North Africa) region and Asian countries, and 17 from China, including 11
financial institutions, three non-financial service providers, and three financial institu-
tions based in Hong Kong.
7 Shepherd, C. “China turns its back on Bangladesh BRI coal projects”. Financial Times,
March 11, 2021.
8 Xi Jinping. “Bolstering confidence and jointly overcoming difficulties to build a better
world”. People’s Daily, September 22, 2021. It is worth noting that this commitment is
confined to China’s overseas investment, reflecting again the dual regime as analyzed in
this chapter.
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6 China’s International
Perspective on Education
and Edtech
Claudio Feijóo, Cristina Armuña and
Javier Fernández Díaz
Introduction
China’s education policy has undergone an impressive reform during its rise as
an international economic pole and technology center. This reform not only asks
for the adjustment of the education curriculum to the desired development pattern
based on innovation and the ensuing international education cooperation to reach
this goal but also encourages the application of new technologies in the education
field, leading to the development of Edtech which enhances its capability to project
its perspective on education internationally.
Within this context, there are a number of countries already worried about
Chinese influence in education, this is to say, the China Communist Party’s (CCP)
influence1 and, in particular, its level of agency when it comes to reshaping norms
through specific initiatives in the international sphere. For instance, the State
Department and the Department of Education are already warning about CCP
influence in US higher education (Krach, 2020),2 especially when new China’s
laws, such as the new Hong Kong National Security Law, imply certain extra-
territoriality that curbs academic freedom even outside of China.3 In the meantime,
the exchange of educational activities, such as the organization of international
cultural events and visits to secondary or higher education institutions in China,
also raises concerns, as they usually run up against a very heavy and cumbersome
regime of local authorizations and control, including censorship.
However, there are other countries that see the development of education in
China as positive and see the economic opportunities in connecting with a culture
and education system that has economies of scale and an open door for business,
as the case of Singapore has proven over the years. At the same time, China is well
aware that it still needs a high level of cooperation between its universities and
foreign institutions, particularly those in countries with advanced capabilities in
science and technology (Xinhua, 2020).
Within this context, this chapter aims to investigate the status of education in
China, in particular its norms and policies, and how its educational approach is
extending internationally, through for example the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
To this end, this chapter will follow the analytic framework laid out in the introduc-
tory chapter by analyzing three aspects of China’s education policies and practices,
DOI: 10.4324/9781003299387-6
112 Claudio Feijóo et al.
namely, the level of congruence between international norms and China’s perspec-
tive, the level of implementation of China’s norms in practice, and finally, the level
of agency, that is, China’s capacity to actually reshape international norms in edu-
cation. We expect to extract some lessons of interest and assess the prospects for
areas of possible collaboration and those deemed for confrontation with a view on
international standards.
The chapter is structured as follows. After the next section describes the exist-
ing international soft standards on education and China’s traditional stance on the
issue, the following section will present the state of norms and policies in the edu-
cation sector in China and, specifically, on edtech. The fourth section reports on the
international spillovers of Chinese educational activities, collecting evidence on
the role of education in different international initiatives led by China, in particular,
those linked to the BRI. The final section concludes on whether China cooper-
ates, complies, qualifies, infringes, or subverts the analyzed international norms
and standards in education.
From the methodological perspective, this chapter uses the following sources of
information: (i) desk research of Chinese and foreign analysis of the education sys-
tem in China and new technologies and its international spillovers, (ii) the authors’
direct experience in the education system in China and its innovation ecosystem
as well as in countries where China has an active educational presence, (iii) inter-
views with education stakeholders and visits to schools and universities, and (iv)
participation in conferences on education and new technologies.
Soft International Standards for Education – Sustainable

Development Goal 4
Strictly speaking, there are no internationally accepted norms in education and
edtech beyond some semi-public organization-pushed standards such as the Inter-
national Baccalaureate (IB), and most of the time international education stand-
ards adopt the aspect of joint goals or declarations, mainly orchestrated from the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In
this sense, although hard law on the subject is non-existent, there are several con-
cepts which, when bound together, constitute a type of soft law approach to inter-
national standards in education. This is what the authors term as soft standards in
international education. Following this approach, although without any mandatory
application, the norms and standards proposed by the UNESCO reflect a general
political commitment to strategic lines of action including, among others, equality
of opportunities, rights of children, women and girls’ education, literacy and adult
education, inclusion, or technical and vocational training.
The most prominent goal of international education – and the base for soft
standards in international education – is arguably Sustainable Development Goal
4 (SDG 4) aimed at inclusion and equity in education, quality of education, and
lifelong learning. These four goals of education – inclusion, equity, quality, and
empowerment of individuals during their lifetime – respond to the two fundamen-
tal questions: who does education serve? And, what should education provide?
China’s International Perspective on Education and Edtech 113
These are questions that can be answered differently depending on societal and
political perspectives.
Education, Human Capital, and Poverty Eradication
Nonetheless, trying to achieve some sort of consensus, the UNESCO Education

2030: Incheon Declaration and Framework for Action for the Implementation of
Sustainable Development report (UNESCO, 2015a) highlighted the basic objec-
tives of ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong
learning opportunities for all. This is the base of the soft standards in education and
where there is probably a higher level of congruence between international and
Chinese norms.
From China’s perspective, economic development is a basic objective, both
internal and international, as this is widely considered the key factor to enhance
societal welfare and avoid situations of conflict (González, 2021). Broad Chinese
support to initiatives that link education and economic (sustainable) development
should not, therefore, come as a surprise. To this regard, a relevant example is the
UNESCO Recommendation on Adult Learning and Education (UNESCO Institute
for Lifelong Learning, 2015), which reiterates the significant role of adult learning
and education in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Here, education is considered key to achieve full employment and poverty erad-
ication, completely in line with China’s views on education. The document calls
for policies in all countries that efficiently allocate at least 4–6 percent of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) and/or at least 15–20 percent of total public expenditure
to education, again figures aligned with China’s expenditure and its view on its col-
laboration with other countries within the BRI and, therefore, where a certain level
of implementation has been achieved.
On this, the World’s Bank Human Capital Project investigates learning in low-
and middle-income countries since deficits in education are considered a major
contributor to human capital deficits. Within this framework, Learning Poverty is
an indicator defined as being unable to read and understand a short, age-appropriate
text by age 10. As of 2019, in spite of data shortcomings, this indicator stays at 18
percent for China, 3 percentage points ahead of the East Asia and Pacific regional
average, almost 11 percentage points ahead of the average for upper middle-in-
come countries, but still about 5 percentage points behind the average for Europe
and Central Asia (World Bank, 2019).
Keeping with China’s perspective, economic development is considered to
lie mostly in technological progress and the implementation of innovation. This
explains Chinese interest in the enhancement of higher and vocational educa-
tion, using – and looking for congruence of – international soft standards for this
purpose.
International improvement of higher education is typically governed by the
implementation of direct institutional exchange. However, different recommenda-
tions and conventions have appeared over the last years, all of them oriented to
strengthening and extending collaboration among countries with a view to making
optimal use of their human potential and improving the quality of higher education,
in particular within Africa (UNESCO, 2014) and Asia-Pacific (UNESCO, 2011).
Regarding technical and vocational education, the UNESCO Shanghai Consen-
sus (UNESCO, 2012) recognized the essential role played by this type of education
in tackling youth unemployment and underemployment, supported by a very active
participation from China at this level of congruence. The document pays particular
attention to countries affected by conflict and disaster, as well as to middle-income
countries, looking for adequate platforms for international exchange on policies,
instruments, and approaches. The document was further developed with a specific
recommendation (UNESCO, 2015b), with the aim to empower individuals and
promote employment, decent work, and lifelong learning. Promotion of entrepre-
neurship was specifically mentioned to support self-employment and the growth
of enterprises.
Equal Opportunities, Non-Discrimination, and Human Rights
From a more Western perspective, a key constituent of these soft standards on

international education can be traced back to the Recommendation against Discrim-
ination in Education, which gave way to a line of action in the 1960s (UNESCO,
1960). It addresses the term “discrimination”, including
any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference which, being based on

race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, economic condition or birth, has the purpose or effect of nul-
lifying or impairing equality of treatment in education.
Member States are called to develop and apply policy methods tending to promote
equality of opportunities including making primary education free and compulsory,
secondary generally available, and higher education equally accessible to all based
on individual capacity.
Furthermore, since 1974 (UNESCO, 1974), different recommendations, dec-
larations, and principles have been developed in order to ensure humans rights
into the education framework (UNESCO, 1993, 1995a) and particularly addressing
race and racial prejudices (UNESCO, 1978a); teaching of human rights (UNESCO,
1978b); integration on principles of tolerance (UNESCO, 1995b); democracy,
cooperation, peace (UNESCO, 1997); and cultural diversity (UNESCO, 2001).
Following these developments, the resolution adopted by the UN General
Assembly in 2004 proclaimed the World Program for Human Rights Education
(United Nations General Assembly, 2004). Its objectives include, among others: (i)
the promotion of the development of a culture of human rights; (ii) the promotion
of a common understanding, based on international instruments, of basic principles
and methodologies for human rights education; and (iii) ensuring a focus on human
rights education at the national, regional, and international levels. Seven years later,
another resolution adopted by the General Assembly in December 2011 (United
Nations General Assembly, 2011) reinforced that States should develop strategies,
policies, action plans, and programs to implement human rights education, such
as through its integration into school and training curricula. It was divided into
three stages: 2005–2009, with a focus on human rights education in the primary
and secondary school systems; 2010–2014, oriented to human rights education for
higher education and human rights training programs for teachers and educators,
civil servants, law enforcement officials, and military personnel; and 2015–2019,
focused on strengthening the implementation of the first two phases and promoting
human rights training for media professionals and journalists.
The international community has expressed a growing consensus on the fun-
damental role of human rights education in the realization of human rights. The
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, on behalf of
the International Contact Group on Citizenship and Human Rights Education, has
compiled all existing instruments and documents from intergovernmental meet-
ings, congresses, and conferences.4 However, among the organizations that have
contributed, China is notoriously absent.
As a summary, international recommendations in this area are based in two
main principles: (i) education shall be directed to the full development of the
human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, including that the parents will have the liberty to choose for
their children institutions conforming to minimum educational standards and (ii)
the recognition of the right of members of national minorities to carry on their own
educational activities. However, these principles are problematic from China’s per-
spective and, as such, not congruent with its national norms. Its concept of human
rights is different from that of the West: while China focuses on economic develop-
ment as the foundational human right, the West considers it is freedom and dignity.
Furthermore, national minorities in China, in regions such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner
Mongolia, or Yunnan, are increasingly constricted to a mainstream education, far
from their respective cultures and identities. The arguments used by China mainly
consist of the need to build a peaceful and safe China, avoiding extremism, and
that this is part of its internal affairs management, and therefore, it should not be
subject to international criticism.5 This is also part of its relativism in human rights
protection, where their universality is put into question.
The Case of Education and Artificial Intelligence (AI)
The most recent international development is the application of AI in the field of edu-
cation, leading to so-called E-learning and Edtech. While China’s traditional stance
toward soft international standards for education is two-faced, as mentioned above,
its attitude toward Edtech governance seems more aligned with international expec-
tations. Chinese authorities consider AI and other technologies as effective means,
under proper governance, to reach all four goals of education as summarized in SDG
4. Just as president Xi declared at the UNESCO International Conference on AI and
Education in May 2019: “education transformations triggered by the rapid develop-
ment of artificial intelligence have provided promising potentials to accelerate the
achievement of the SDG 4 Education 2030 Agenda, and to enhance our confidence
in reaching consensus and deepening c ooperation” (UNESCO, 2019a). The most
illustrative case to demonstrate China’s understanding of the relationship between
education and AI is the Beijing Consensus on Artificial Intelligence and Education

(UNESCO, 2019b). This is an initiative launched by UNESCO, sponsored, and en-
dorsed by China’s Ministry of Education (MOE). It is composed of several principles
that represent a good summary of how China perceives the international usage of
technology to enhance education in line with its techno-centric vision. The develop-
ment and implementation of these principles is already taking place in China, and
they are, therefore, ready to be exported as part of its plans to build an international
community with common views on AI and education, providing an opportunity to
expand China’s influence at the level of agency. The document was later expanded in
the International Forum on Artificial Intelligence and the Futures of Education (Miao
& Holmes, 2021), also used below for the summary.
The first point of relevance is the general push for AI technologies, based on tech-
nological optimism, which views technology as an optimizer to enhance education
data collection and processing, making education management and provision more
equitable, inclusive, open, personalized, and introducing new models for delivering
education. The integration of technology – AI in particular – is b elieved to better
review and adjust educational curricula in the new era, including the transformation
of learning methodologies, enabling the evaluation of students’ competencies, and
supporting large-scale and remote assessment. The lifelong learning objective could
be facilitated, as AI platforms are supposed to build integrated systems to enable
personalized learning anytime, anywhere, and potentially, for anyone.
Considering Edtech’s contribution to equal, non-discriminatory, and human
rights-based education, the Consensus document explicitly mentions ensuring ethi-
cal, transparent, and auditable use of education data and algorithms. Elimination of
bias, open access to data, privacy protection, and data security by design are also
mentioned. The text also highlights the usage of AI to promote high-quality educa-
tion and learning opportunities for all, irrespective of gender, disability, social or
economic status, ethnic or cultural background, or geographic location. The devel-
opment and use of AI in education should not deepen the digital divide and must
not display bias against any minority or vulnerable groups. The Forum explicitly
mentions that “we need international standards for data and algorithms, together
with ethical governance and stewardship, all focused on protecting human rights”.
Despite these promising moves that China has made to advance a more coop-
erative pattern in the international education, the effective internalization of these
principles in domestic policy design and practice may diverge from what it has
claimed and is therefore assessed closely in the next section.
Education in China: Context, Norms, and Policies
Context
China has the world’s largest education sector and the largest state-run educa-
tion system.6 Compulsory education is nine years (six years in primary education
plus three years in secondary education). As of 2019, China’s student population
remains stable at about 19 percent of the total population. The national expenditure
in education is over 4 percent of the GDP.7
Standard education in China is nowadays mostly state-run, with moderate pri-

vate involvement.8 School education falls mainly to city, district, and county-level
governments, while the provincial administrative level is, in general, responsible
for higher education.9 The Ministry of Education oversees education in the country
and guides the reforms with legislation, general budget allocation, and adminis-
trative mechanisms. Policies elaborated by the government set general goals and
are then adjusted by local education authorities – including budget amendments
– departments, and bureaus of education, who generate practical guidelines for
implementation. Higher education institutions and schools in China include CCP
organs for supervision which are regularly subject to inspections.
Culturally, education is regarded as being of utmost importance for a better
life (Feijóo & Fernández, 2020). Therefore, families are prepared to make great
financial efforts to use education as a social elevator. According to the authors’
estimations, about one-fifth of their disposable income is spent in their children’s
education.10 Correspondingly, education is also considerably better regarded in
Chinese society compared to other countries.11
The combined push of public policy framework and the spending from families
up to mid-2021 had created a thriving ecosystem of edtech companies that aim to
provide additional education opportunities to students which, like in other industries,
has created huge economies of scale, later of potential use beyond China’s borders.
However, precisely due to the burden on families, the impact on fertility rates and the
danger of disparities in education depending on income within the “common pros-
perity” policy paradigm has dramatically changed the landscape of education beyond
and after regular school since 2021. It is still too soon to appreciate the implications
of yet another change in the education paradigm, but internally, it has caused compa-
nies to close and considerable staff layoffs, as well as a new focus on external – inter-
national – markets not subject to China’s strict regulations on education.
A final relevant element of context is that China is shifting to innovation – and
therefore education in innovation – as a solution for increasing both the quality
of products and productivity, expanding internal consumption to compensate for
external markets while adding value to its economy. This is the dual circulation
economic approach included in the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) and the idea
of a “learning-oriented society” that would help increase the position of China in
the world. Within the education system, learning to innovate requires critical think-
ing, imagination, readiness for change, open-mindedness, and high tolerance for
uncertainty.
However, China’s legacy education system may have difficulties in implement-
ing these objectives due to existing contradictions with the government objectives
of societal harmony, and still considerable resources are spent aimed at finding the
most appropriate policies (Xue & Li, 2022).
Educational Reform
Education in China is a very competitive12 and dynamic system, in a state of almost

permanent change. As of 2021, there is a project to reform the education curriculum
at all levels, basically to move toward a more balanced and elective curriculum,
providing essential knowledge as well as skills for lifelong learning, innovation,

and problem-solving, and with participation and oversight of the central govern-
ment, local authorities, and schools.13
This is part of a more general strategy related with innovation ecosystems, where
China’s government typically conducts many different experiments in new policies
and developments at the local level that, if satisfactory, are extended across the
country (Arenal et al., 2020). This creates a particular type of competition between
different locations, clusters of locations, or even districts within a large city, which
is a main feature of China’s approach to policies, and education in particular (Wang,
2020). This regime of competition extends to people – students – themselves. In
the case of educational reform, there are long-term goals – such as 2035 – but in
practice, the plans and projects are refined and reviewed every two to three years.
In fact, since July 2017, the State Council and local governments in many
provinces have issued a number of policies encouraging non-exam-oriented, in-
novative, and practical education. In December 2017, the Ministry of Education re-
leased the 2017 Curriculum Plan of General High School and Curriculum Criterion
of Subjects like Chinese Language, which formally included content on artificial
intelligence, STEAM,14 and maker’s education (see Table 6.1). On the one hand,
the new curriculum gave great weight to traditional Chinese cultural education.
On the other hand, it added robot design and making, STEAM technology and lib-
eral studies, data management and analysis, and artificial intelligence subjects into
Table 6.1 Technology curriculum in China
High school general technology curriculum structure
Required courses Optional Optional courses

required courses
Modules Tech and Tech and Tech and life Traditional crafts and
design I design II Tech and practice
engineering New tech experience
Tech and career and exploration
Tech and Tech integration and
creations application
Modern agriculture tech
Categories Modules
Required Data and calculation
courses Information system and
society
Optional Data and data structure Preliminary AI
required Internet basics Three-dimensional design and creation
courses Data management and Open source project design
analysis
Optional Preliminary algorithm
courses Mobile application design
Source: PRC. MOE (2017).
the general technology and information technology curriculum. China expects that
education in subjects such as AI will also help cultivate students’ key competences
(Huang, 2021).
In February 2019, the Ministry of Education officially issued an educational
development plan titled China’s Education Modernization 2035, to serve as the
framework for China’s education reform and development. The plan’s main aim is
to improve the quality of education across the country and enhance its innovative
capacity. In a next step, on 9 July 2019, the CCP issued the Opinions on Deepen-
ing the Reform of Education and Teaching to Improve the Quality of Compulsory
Education. It is the first such guideline since the founding of the People’s Republic
of China in 1949. This reform brings the system in the direction of the European
reforms at the end of the 20th century, toward the development of an education
curriculum based on competences. STEAM education, together with new tech-
nologies education such as software and robotics, are the fields of experimentation
to introduce cooperative teamwork and project-based learning in the Chinese sys-
tem. Degree education in China is rather restricted and subject to a long process of
approval, but other areas such as remote degree education, Massive Online Open
Courses (MOOCs), online lifelong learning, and online foreign language learn-
ing are comparatively more open (Australian Trade and Investment Commission,
2018).
Similarly, an entrepreneurship movement has advanced into higher educa-
tion. There is a growing expectation for universities to demonstrate an economic
contribution to the public good by instilling students with entrepreneurialism and
providing guidance for starting businesses. China has launched the Mass Entrepre-
neurship and Innovation Initiative, which requires universities to increase resources
for entrepreneurial activities and for all students to complete an entrepreneurship
education course. However, although many universities conform nominally to the
initiative, in reality, entrepreneurship engagement for undergraduates remains lim-
ited when not misleading adventurous students (Wright et al., 2022).
Therefore, at congruence level, China has prioritized the inclusion of educa-
tional services and has focused on a problem-solving, tech-centric education
approach to improve its labor competences and to accelerate technology catch-
up in the reform era. This is happening in a context where education policies in
China are becoming increasingly nationalistic, covering all fields and aspects of the
education curriculum. For instance, the Ministry of Education of China argues for
“our own economic theory” or “China Economics” in universities in three years,
describing achievements and guiding China’s economic practice (People’s Repub-
lic of China [PRC]. Ministry of Education [MOE], 2020).
Edtech Policies
Regarding edtech, the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan

(NGAIDP) issued in 2017 outlines China’s strategy to become the leading AI power
in both research and deployment by 2030. It advocates for what it calls intelligent
education. Specifically, the plan involves making use of AI to (i) develop a new
education system that involves the reform of educational practices and delivers
intelligent and interactive learning; (ii) carry out intelligent campus construction
and promote AI in teaching, management, and resource construction; (iii) develop
a three-dimensional comprehensive teaching methodology and an intelligent
online learning platform based on big data; (iv) develop AI assistants and establish
a comprehensive educational analysis system; and (v) establish a learner-centered
education environment and achieve personalized education for every learner.
Following the NGAIDP’s release, Chinese tech companies have secured govern-
ment support and investor funding for various AI-related projects, several of which
are being tested in Chinese schools in different schemes of intelligent education.
Within this framework, different levels of government offer financial incentives to
local education bureaus to encourage the use of big data and AI – incentives that
typically cover the installation cost of many of the intelligent education projects.
In addition, also in 2017, China launched the New Information and Commu-
nications Technology Curriculum Standards for Senior High School (PRC. MOE,
2017). This document promotes students’ (i) information consciousness, (ii) com-
putational thinking, (iii) digital learning and innovation, and (iv) responsibilities in
an information society.
In a next step, in 2018, China launched the Innovative Action Plan for Artificial
Intelligence in Higher Education Institutions (PRC. MOE, 2018a), which pushes
forward AI development in universities. It aims to (i) optimize innovation system in
the field of AI in colleges and universities, (ii) improve AI talent training systems,
and (iii) strengthen the application of the science and technology achievements
of colleges and universities in the field of AI. As a result of this plan, China has
built, since 2019, 100 state-level virtual reality education centers to teach scientific
knowledge and skills. It also proposes the establishment of 100 specialization cent-
ers composed of AI and another topic, the publication of 50 world-class teaching
materials for undergraduate and graduate studies, the development of 50 national-
level high-quality online open courses, as well as the establishment of 50 AI facul-
ties, research institutions, or interdisciplinary research centers by the year 2020. It
also planned to nurture more than 5,000 students and 500 teachers in AI from top
universities within five years. By the end of 2020, China also planned to build 10
demonstration zones to showcase innovation and best practices of AI-integrated
education services.
The plan also suggests introducing AI education at the level of primary and
secondary schools. To this regard, Guangzhou has implemented courses in AI for
primary and middle school students since September 2019. The pilot project is
described as covering 100 schools. By 2022, all primary and middle schools in the
city were expected to have AI courses in their regular curriculum.
Online Education Regulation
Aforementioned achievements at the implementation level of China’s new educa-

tion policy have been the results of a top-down, state sponsored, highly super-
vised, and selective approach. Compared with the neutral incentive mechanism
developed in Europe, this approach suggests higher governmental intervention in

education practices, while limiting the freedom enjoyed by other relevant actors in
providing education services. The imposing regulation could be exemplified by the
growing interest of the Chinese government in establishing technical standards for
online education and setting up reliable evaluation systems for institutions, an area
with potential international spillovers.
In fact, in July 2019, the Implementation Opinions on Standardizing After-
School Online Training were issued. They regulated, for the first time, the activ-
ity of online companies beyond classes. Consequently, the vast majority of online
training organizations are under official supervision with the main goal of reducing
the after-school burden on students.
Among other standards, the guidelines require all online training organizations
to teach content suitable for children without obscene, violent, horrible, gambling
content or games. Additionally, the courses offered must match students’ cogni-
tive ability. The organizations are banned from teaching students content beyond
the national syllabuses or above the grades they are on. All training content data
should be stored for at least one year and videos of teaching should be saved for
at least six months. The guidelines also note that training time should be designed
according to students’ ages. Each class is required to be within 40 minutes and
breaks should be at least ten minutes. Live teaching should not be offered during
school hours and training classes for first and second graders should be designed
without homework. Live classes for primary and middle school students should be
conducted before 9 pm.
On July 2021, policy on online and after-classes education moved one step fur-
ther, practically banning the provision of services for profit in the country, but not
abroad. As a consequence, the whole edtech ecosystem has been transformed.15
Most of the startups previously devoted to English for Chinese students have
shifted their business model to teaching Chinese to foreigners.16
Code of Conduct of Teachers, Ethics, and Privacy
No review of the policies relevant for the education system in China would be
completed without mentioning the Code of Conduct for College and University
Teachers in the New Era (PRC. MOE, 2018b). Its first point refers to a political
stance upholding the leadership of the CCP. For foreign (language) teachers, a new
legislation was passed in July 2020. Since then, foreign teachers are ruled by the
same credit system and expectations as nationals, and they should attend a special
training of at least 20 sessions on “Chinese particularities”.17
Regarding ethics, as of 2019, China18 has released the so-called Beijing AI prin-
ciples (Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence [BAAI], 2019), a code of ethics
in AI, rather similar to other ethical frameworks launched in the European Union.
Although their possible impact in areas such as privacy or individual freedoms –
concepts usually interpreted in China in dissimilar ways to the Western countries –
it is still unclear, and the distance from regulation to implementation is also well
known in China, it is a first signal of some willingness to discuss the ethics of AI.
Unlike other codes, the well-being of society is given preeminence compared to

individual rights.
During September 2020, the same organization has released a document on
“Artificial Intelligence for Children” (BAAI, 2020) that states that the develop-
ment of AI should protect and promote the benefits of children, avoid depriving
and harming their rights, and help realize the healthy growth of children. Values for
children mentioned in the document are dignity, free development and diversified
growth of children, non-discrimination, and an overall priority to benefitting chil-
dren. Specific children’s right that should be protected, according to the document,
are physical and mental safety and health, privacy – legal, proper, and necessary
collection of data – more inclusive, fairer, and quality education for children, and
free expression of their opinions and wishes. The document calls for taking respon-
sibilities in the domain of AI for children including developers’ ethics, minimizing
risks, providing transparency and interpretability, developing policies and ethical
norms, and improving the existing legal system. It ends with a call for a
cross-regional, global, and comprehensive AI governance open cooperation

platform […] to share governance experience and methods of AI for chil-
dren, to promote the common development of global governance of AI for
children, and to empower the healthy development of children all over the
world in the era of AI.
Privacy of children is also starting to become an issue in China. The generation

born around 2010 has now started to realize that their lives have been exposed
in publicly shared social networks, in a phenomenon called “over-sharenting”.
Like in many other regions in the world, surveys of 2019 show that parents of
up to 80 percent of children from third to fifth grade have been sharing photos
and assignments online without their child’s consent and have compared their
children with other children. Public opinion and children have started to ex-
press their concerns about the increased stress and security risks.19 Lei Chaozi,
director of science and technology at China’s Ministry of Education has even
pledged to “curb and regulate” the use of facial recognition in schools (Benaich
& Hogarth, 2020).
In summary, China’s new education policy and the reform agenda have
delivered impressive achievements, such as the development of an innovation-
orientated curriculum and the expansion of intelligent education. Nevertheless,
this reform has not radically altered China’s perception on international educa-
tion norms, especially those on human rights, but rather enhances its traditional
stance. On the one hand, edtech has been promoted and encouraged to advance
the national interests in pursuing the shift to a more innovation-based devel-
opment pattern. On the other hand, the reform of China’s education system by
technology means has been monitored, regulated, and controlled closely by the
government at both institutional and personnel levels. As a consequence, the in-
strumental economic value of edtech is highlighted, while its impacts on the
advance of civil rights education are diluted.
Education in China: International Spillovers

From an international perspective, China focuses on economic development as the
main tool in its cooperation strategy, as the government firmly believes that the
lack of this development is the ultimate source of conflict. Within this framework,
education is regarded as a key foundation of economic development, and China is
aware of the international opportunities in this domain, in particular given that the
pandemic accelerated the existing challenges in education and has created the larg-
est disruption of education systems in history. From China’s perspective, education
is a fundamental human right, as it relates to economic development, not in con-
flict with its own position on human rights, and perfectly suits its strategy toward
“peaceful (or safe) societies”.
Global Reach
In fact, during the last 20 years, China has been very active in the international
student market and has gradually changed from an exporter of students to one of
the main destination countries, becoming a powerhouse particularly in the interna-
tional higher education sector.20
The development of China’s education for international students, since the
implementation of the Reform and Opening-Up Policy and with the new impulse
from the BRI, has made remarkable progress, boosting the internationalization
process of China’s culture and education. The development of education for inter-
national students in China has also promoted the overseas popularity of Chinese
culture and China’s soft power, created a positive effect on promoting bilateral
relations and attracting foreign investment, facilitated human resources exchange,
and accelerated the internationalization process of Chinese universities (Zheng &
Li, 2021). Currently, the higher education system decidedly continues to further
implement its global strategy to enhance the competence of its students; its high-
end research, the number, and quality of international exchanges; and its global im-
pact. As President Xi declared in December 2020: “China is willing to strengthen
international communication and cooperation in the fields of education and tech-
nology” (CGTN, 2020).
On the subject of quality, in the 2019 edition of the QS World University Rank-
ings, six mainland China universities made it into the world’s top 100. Back in
2017, China launched the Double World-Class Project21 with the aim of having
42 world-class universities and 456 world-class disciplines in 95 universities by
mid-century. This ambitious plan urges Chinese universities to speed up their in-
ternationalization process. For example, in 2013, Tsinghua University, the leading
university in technology in China, also among the best in the world, launched xue-
tangX, a MOOC platform that has since become the largest in China. In April 2020,
the platform launched its international version with an English language interface.
The aim of the initiative is to gather educational resources from other main univer-
sities and offer them to students. From here, Tsinghua is also leading the Global
MOOC Alliance, a small group of top universities in technology with the aim of
covering all geographical regions and provide online joint teaching and capacity
building.
However, after years of efforts, universities with global visibility account for
only a fraction of China’s universities. Reputational stagnation among universities
outside the elite groups is originated at the institutional and political contexts of
university governance, the national strategic focus on high-visibility institutions,
near-exclusive emphasis on university ranking indices, and concerns about aca-
demic freedom and their dissuading effects on research and faculty recruitment
(Hartley & Jarvis, 2021). Furthermore, according to a survey conducted by Weithas
and Berg (2021) among European researchers, there are a number of constraints
and obstacles to internationalization of Chinese universities, mainly (i) linguistic
and cultural barriers; (ii) managerial norms and policies; (iii) lack of comprehen-
sive integration of foreign researchers and professors; (iv) pre-requisites to inter-
nationalization such as free access to knowledge, diversity, plurality of opinions;
and (v) a high level of political ideology and national interests, in particular in
humanities and social sciences.
Aware of this limited capability to lure global talents, China also expresses
interests in international education beyond higher education. China has launched
a special program to identify, capture, and promote talent in secondary education,
leading to the so-called local internationalization pursued by China in pre-university
education. As a main example, up to 11 new international schools (international
branches of local schools or purely international schools) are due to open in the
tech hub of Shenzhen in 2021. During 2020, China opened a total of 53 new inter-
national schools. At the same time, China’s investors are looking for opportunities
in countries with more advanced educations systems, such as the United Kingdom,
and aim to buy independent schools, many of which are in financial distress due to
the Covid-19 pandemic (Wen et al., 2021).
Belt and Road Initiative
From China’s perspective, conventional and online education are, respectively,

part of the BRI22 and the so-called Digital Silk Road (DSR), its digital branch.
The former was launched in 2013 and includes everything from transportation
to (mostly) higher education. The latter was launched in 2015 with the aim of
including new technologies and building a community with a shared destiny in
cyberspace (Blecua & Feijóo, 2020). Fudan University’s Digital Silk Road Centre
divides the DSR’s strategy in five areas: infrastructures, such as 5G; policies, such
as cybersecurity; commerce, including in particular e-commerce; finance, such as
electronic payment systems; and a final area literally translated as people’s hearts,
where social media, videogames, and online education are included (Fudan Uni-
versity Digital Belt and Road Centre, 2018).
To this regard, nearly half of all BRI countries are still in the opportunity win-
dow of the so-called demographic dividend. Here, China follows the logic that the
improvement of health and education levels is necessary to transform the economic
potential of the age structure into this demographic dividend. It has internal as
well as external spillovers. Internally, due to the problems in education resource

allocation in China, especially in tertiary education, the governments in regions
connected with the BRI have designed policies and strategies to promote a west-
ward movement of tertiary education resources (Zhang et al., 2021). Externally,
there are three main instruments for the implementation of this advancement: inter-
national programs for vocational technical education, the creation and opening of
higher education campuses and research facilities in BRI (or expected to become
BRI) countries, and several university alliances with thematic focus.
As a main example in vocational technical education, UNESCO together with
China has launched at the end of 2019 a plan for cooperation in the development
of higher technical education and teachers’ education in Africa (UNESCO, 2019c).
This is also part of UNESCO’s Global Education Coalition that looks for explicit
support from China as a response to the gap left by US cooperation, in particular
in Africa.
As another example of the second type of instrument, Xiamen University, using
its initial private push and its connections with the Chinese diaspora, was the first
university in China to open a campus abroad, in Malaysia. Since then, there have
been several new initiatives in this direction, mostly focused on tapping research
and innovation resources, such as the Tsinghua University Science and Technol-
ogy Park (TUS) facilities in Cambridge University, in Politécnico de Milano, and
in Barcelona (its incubator). More connected with the BRI ambitions and aims at
political influence, there are also plans to open a massive campus, in this case from
Fudan University, in Budapest with the support of the Hungarian government but
with considerable opposition from the independent education system (Szabolcs,
2021).
University alliances typically use the moniker of Belt and Road and try to gather
all type of resources and members to showcase the new approach from China to
international education opportunities. There is a Belt and Road Aerospace Innova-
tion Alliance led by the Northwestern Polytechnic University in Xi’an,23 with no
less than 50 members including universities and other players in aerospace includ-
ing those from countries not usually included in these types of networks, such as
Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, or Pakistan, and it has lately been extending its reach to
Latin America.24 There is also another Belt and Road Alliance on National Heritage
and Technology led by the same university, as well as a Silk Road University Alli-
ance with several chapters, mostly on energy and sustainability, led by Xi’an Jiao-
tong University; and a World Textile Industries alliance led by Donghua University
in Shanghai. There is also a World Alliance of Universities on Carbon Neutrality
led by Southeast University in Nanjing. Even if some of them are promising, focus
on cooperation, and do not impose excellency at all costs, most of these alliances
currently struggle with the lack of expertise of China-based management in multi-
lateral organizations and tend to produce random decisions without broad support.
All in all, along the same lines as D’Hooge (2021), we can say that, from the
perspective of (higher) education, the BRI is used as an instrument to promote
China’s agenda in soft power, science, and technology and, vice versa, interna-
tional cooperation in these areas is used to promote the BRI as well.
Some Conclusions on China and International Standards

for Education
Based on the information presented throughout the chapter, this section discusses
whether China cooperates, complies, qualifies, infringes, or subverts the analyzed
international norms and standards in education through the BRI and other interna-
tional initiatives.
First, the combination of geographical disparity in China, the rapid diffusion
and intensive usage of edtech, its educative practices shaped by an innovation-
focused agenda, and the surge in usage due to the pandemic are creating the condi-
tions for a massive international spillover of China’s approach to education which
is already beginning to take place.25 In particular, the growth in capacity and insti-
tutional quality of China’s own higher education system is likely to place a signifi-
cant downward pressure on student enrolments internationally over the medium
term. In fact, over the next decade, China is likely to consolidate its appeal as a
global destination for higher education.
In terms of congruence, China’s current education system shares the European
vision in terms of education curriculum design, but its nationalist and patriotic
approach keeps exerting influences on educative activities. In terms of implemen-
tation, the rapid adoption of new technologies, such as AI, not only facilitates the
expansion of online education but also enhances its regulation and supervision by
the state. It is also a system that hinders disruptive innovations due to the restrictive
information education environment, but, given the vast number of resources aimed
at fostering innovation, might sustain the technology push.26
The overall result is what the authors have named “the two-television chan-
nel model”. To foreign audiences, China emphasizes openness and cooperation in
education with collaboration in science and technology research, economic devel-
opment as the most valuable human right and demographic dividend as bases; to
domestic audiences, it talks about pushing a particular rendition of Chinese culture,
telling China’s story well and using education in innovation – and vice versa –
to reach world leadership with the objective of qualifying international norms to
adapt them to its own perspective.
From China’s perspective, the picture looks rather different as China consid-
ers it complies with its own interpretation of each and every UNESCO educa-
tional standard, to the extent of hosting and sponsoring main conferences that push
for seemingly contentious issues in China such as human rights in education and
minorities’ rights for an education in their own culture. As Chen Baosheng, the
head of China’s MOE, put it at the conference titled Education Globalization: for
a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind, held in October 2020, the pan-
demic has stressed the need for an international shared approach to education, even
if China is well aware that no single state is likely to be positioned to dominate
standards across all regions in an increasingly fragmented landscape (Feijóo et al.,
2020). The idea of a “community with a shared future for mankind” is a mantra in
any of China’s approaches to human rights and economic development. Authors’
interpretation here is that China sees tremendous strategic value in setting standards
in education even if it is only in the shape of nominal compliance with declarations,
principles, or consensus since those who write the rules are later supposed to influ-
ence how education works (see the introductory chapter in this same book).
Internationally, the offers of cooperation from China’s state-run educations sys-
tem have aroused concerns in those countries not subject to economic dependence on
China. And in many of these cases, some of China’s actions are seen as a planned ap-
proach to subvert existing international norms and standards. For i nstance, the United
Kingdom has called for a robust framework for engaging China in research and higher
education since decoupling seems both unviable and unlikely to be in the national in-
terest (Johnson et al., 2021). The same case from the United Kingdom highlights the
poor quality of data on international education and the need for greater awareness of
its value to the economy and society. The overall result might be increased competi-
tion to shape norms, rules, and institutions related with education, with the outcome
of a more conflict-prone and volatile geopolitical environment, the undermining of
global multilateralism, and a broadening mismatch between transnational challenges
and institutional arrangements to tackle them (Global Trends, 2021).
Looking into edtech in particular, international cooperation is still at a very early
stage and therefore has not progressed to more sophisticated stages of compliance
or qualification. The reality is that few countries or stakeholders are ready. Few
are genuinely engaging with the technologies, let alone exploring the fact that new
technologies may demand a fundamental reinvention of learning. Instead, the dis-
cussion remains rather superficial without properly defining key concepts such as
the “personalization” of learning (Miao et al., 2021).
As a summary, we can conclude, in the same line as Marginson (2021), that
education in China is working toward global norms while remaining nested in na-
tional government, its own views on governance and its interest in reshaping in-
ternational standards, largely incompatible with educational approaches different
from problem-solving and pure techno-centric and economic development visions.
Therefore, China’s stance on international education standards, although appar-
ently looking to compliance, might be at best described as qualification with some
salient and increasing examples of subversion of the international consensus to
create an approach to education “with Chinese characteristics”.
Acknowledgment and Disclaimer
A part of the displayed analysis builds on the report for the Joint Research Centre
of the European Commission on “Educational technologies in China” (Feijóo
et al., 2021). Additionally, another part of the analysis is based on the book “El
gran sueño de China” (González, 2021).
The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in the text belong solely to the
authors, and not necessarily to the authors’ employer, organization, committee, or
other groups or individuals. Usual disclaimers apply.
Notes
1 In particular, in August 2020, the US State Department classified the Confucius Insti-
tute as a foreign mission controlled by a foreign government on the grounds that they
function as an arm of the Chinese state and are allowed to ignore academic freedom. In
this same document, the Confucius Institute is accused of monitoring overseas students’
loyalty to the CCP and undermining freedom of expression and that talent recruitment
plans are aimed at advancing China’s national security interest and not just the advance-
ment of science.
2 Their worries cover four main areas: (i) ensuring academic freedom, (ii) preserving
human dignity, (iii) protecting university endowments, and (iv) safeguarding intellec-
tual property.
3 For instance, studies of contemporary China could violate the new Hong Kong National
Security Law. Consequently, some professors offered to hide their own students’ identi-
ties or allow them to “opt out” of China-related coursework and classroom discussions
in order to protect them from possible prosecution for their statements made in a foreign
classroom.
4 Including treaties, covenants, conventions and protocols, charters, declarations, rec-
ommendations, decisions, resolutions, principles, guidelines, rules, final documents,
commitments, and conclusions or joint communiqués. See https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
Issues/Education/Training/Compilation/Pages/Listofcontents.aspx.
5 Examples abound. For instance, China’s Ministry of Education has stepped up its man-
agement of school textbooks and teaching materials related to the long-term peace and
stability of China. See https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1221608.shtml.
6 It comprises 223,283 primary schools, 11,202 vocational secondary schools, 65,645
high schools, 2,688 universities, and 238 million students – 176 million in secondary
education – according to 2019 figures from China’s Ministry of Education.
7 Funding allocated for student’s education in China has increased consistently since
2011, growing from 1,805 USD in 2011 to 2,110 USD in 2015.
8 Involvement of private institutions mostly happens at preprimary education with more
than half of children enrolled in this type of institutions (Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2019).
9 Some key universities depend directly on the national government –in some cases,
they depend on Ministries other than Education – and not from provinces or
municipalities.
10 Official statistics in China indicate that 12 percent of disposable income is spent in edu-
cation in the case of urban households and 14 percent in the case of rural households,
see National Bureau of Statistics of China (2020). But these figures are averaged for all
types of households. Using data from market analysts (GETChina Insights, 2019) and
publicly available surveys (China Daily, 2018), the authors have estimated the figure for
education spending in the case of households with parents to be between 18 and 20 per-
cent of their disposable income. Other estimations from education companies put this
figure in a range from 20 to 50 percent of disposable income (Chan, 2019) for families
with children attending school.
11 Using Shanghai as an example and according to a 2019 OECD report (Schleicher,
2020), almost 60 percent of local middle school teachers felt that society attached great
importance to their profession, compared with the average of 26 percent in OECD coun-
tries and regions.
12 A phrase typical of murals in schools across China talks about “thousands of soldiers
trying to cross a small bridge”, reminding students of the difficulties and the effort
needed to succeed in education and in life.
13 According to the Ministry of Education, the reformed goal of high-school studies will
no longer be simply getting into a university but also helping students figure out their
interests in life and targets for their future career. For these guidelines to enjoy the
desired effect, experts argue that schools would also need to depart from being graded
based primarily on test scores for university admissions.
14 Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts, and Mathematics.
15 As a main example, during 2021, New Oriental Education’s revenues fell by 80 percent,
it laid off 60,000 employees and incurred losses of 3,000 million dollars. During 2021,
the company released information to express its interest in devoting its resources to edu-
cation in innovation, alphabetization, and digital skills instead of its previous programs
focused on enhancing results for the zhongkao and gaokao.
16 LingoAce, founded in 2017, has received 100 M$ during 2021 to focus in this market.
This is also the case of companies such as Guagua Long, Banyan Fish, Blingo (property
of New Oriental), and Lingo Bus (from VIPKID).
17 China’s MOE explained that the main reason for new legislation has to do with the num-
ber of unqualified teachers – especially for English language teaching – and the need to
raise the bar regarding their level. However, the European Union, and other institutions,
have issued official answers and comments, as individuals and international schools and
institutions may be affected and supervised in ways that could be considered unaccepta-
ble. A summary of the regulation is available at LegalTips (2020).
18 The code was developed, among others, with Peking University, Tsinghua University,
China Academy of Sciences, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent. Although it has no explicit
official support, analysts interpret it as a first experiment in the direction of AI and ethics
in China.
19 The expert Michelle Wolfe estimates that, by the time a student reaches 16 years of
age, “there can be a million points of data or more on a student. That paints a very
comprehensive picture that can be used, or misused, by many different individuals and
organizations”. (Franklin, 2020)
20 In 2017, 2 percent of Chinese tertiary students were enrolled abroad, on par with the
OECD average. However, they made up 23 percent of total incoming students in OECD
countries. English-speaking countries were the most popular destinations: 35 percent
of international students from China were enrolled in the United States, 14 percent in
Australia, and 10 percent in the United Kingdom (OECD, 2019). In the other direction,
in 2018, more than 492,000 international students studied in China.
21 This is the continuation of the 211 Project and the 985 Project, both aimed at improving
the overall quality of China’s higher education system from an international perspective.
22 The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a general framework of international coopera-
tion that President Xi presented at the beginning of his mandate in 2013. The name
chosen for this economic corridor connecting China to Europe has strong historical
connotations and refers to the Golden Age when China was at the center of world trade.
The BRI basically runs on land through Central Asia, via the maritime route across the
Malacca Straits, or combining land and sea communications, from Pakistan. Previously
known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), the most popular name internationally since
2015 has been the BRI although the Chinese name has remained unchanged. The initial
objectives focused on promoting connectivity and coordinating development initiatives
across Eurasia but has expanded to include Africa, Latin America, and even the Arctic.
As is often the case with Chinese policies, while the long-term strategic goals are clear,
its practical definition and implementation are rather lax and flexible, and both its geo-
graphic scope and content have evolved in line with Chinese interests (Blecua & Feijóo,
2020).
23 Most of these alliances, but not all, tend to be based in Xi’an, the origin (or the end) of the
Silk Road, with a powerful aerospace industry. It is also the birthplace of president Xi.
24 See https://braia.nwpu.edu.cn/english/Home.htm.
25 According to the data from China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), the
number of online learners was 342 million (accounting for 34.6 percent of all netizens)
in December 2020, even as primary and secondary schools reopened, a 47 percent in-
crease compared to June 2019. About 68 percent of online learners are from the third-
tier cities and below, where the number of online learners and online learning demand
skyrocketed during 2020 (Zhang, 2021).
26 According to president Xi: “We must [...] encourage free exploration, dare to question
existing theories, and have the courage to open up new directions. [… teachers] must
strengthen their convictions, always stand with the Party and the people, and con-
sciously be firm believers and loyal practitioners of socialism with Chinese characteris-
tics” (Xinhua, 2021).
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JHSS.12107
7 China and International
Agricultural Cooperation
Principles
A Case Study on the Sino-LAC
Relationship in the BRI Era
Ge Gao and Yuanbo Li
Introduction
As a developing country with one-sixth of the world population, China is rapidly
modernizing while at the same time facing the dilemma of food security due to lim-
ited land and water resources. China urgently needs to broaden its growth prospects
outside the nation by seeking external international collaboration in agriculture
beyond its traditional food self-sufficiency strategy, as it faces the challenge of
meeting expanding domestic demand in a timely manner. The Latin America and
the Caribbean (LAC) region is known for its abundant resources and considerable
potential in agricultural production areas, which can be a complementary advan-
tage that could make it an agricultural partner to serve China in achieving its food
security goals.
Based on a classification of the three basic channels of cooperation in agricul-
ture, which are trade, investment, and technology, this chapter examines the Sino-
LAC agricultural cooperation’s compliance with international norms in the context
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By summarizing the standards of multilateral
intergovernmental organizations and forums on agricultural cooperation, we try to
comprehend Sino-LAC agricultural cooperation in the framework of international
norms. Through secondary sources such as literature and data analysis, an attempt
is made to identify the extent to which Sino-LAC cooperation in agriculture is
aligned with the international norms at the level of Chinese policy, its implementa-
tion, and its behavior like an agency, as well as to examine the discrepancy between
policy and practice in order to uncover the more profound and significant barriers
in bilateral cooperation.
On the one hand, China has progressively extended its influence and discourse
in international norms through the BRI in the field of agricultural cooperation. It is
possible to say that China steadily changed its identity from an agricultural govern-
ance recipient to a participant in governance and then to an agricultural issue setter.
On the other hand, with the effective implementation of the BRI, it is impossible
to ignore the financial and technical support that China is giving to the agricultural
efforts of the LAC and that China is constantly acting as a leader in raising con-
cerns in favor of agricultural governance in emerging countries. Our analysis of
DOI: 10.4324/9781003299387-7
China and International Agricultural Cooperation Principles 135
the three principles of Sino-LAC agricultural cooperation shows that China is in

qualification at the level of fair trade and responsible investment, while complying
with the international norms regarding local benefiting technology cooperation.
Further research on China’s behavior is needed to determine the extent to which it
points to the achievement of sustainable or responsible development goals for all
agricultural participants.
The next section of this chapter examines the standards under the international
framework through a historical review of agricultural cooperation and summarizes
three basic principles for assessing Sino-LAC agricultural cooperation by analyz-
ing sixteen international declarations, treaties, guidelines, and reports. The third
section explains China’s policy shift from self-sufficiency to foreign cooperation,
making it an increasingly important and relevant actor in global agriculture govern-
ance. By analyzing documents or declarations on foreign cooperation in agriculture
issued by the Chinese government over the years, the different levels of attention
given to the three basic principles in Chinese policy at different times are clari-
fied. Section 4 details the current state of development of Sino-LAC agricultural
cooperation in trade, investment, and technology in the agriculture sector, as well
as exploring its level of compliance with international norms. The fourth section
analyzes China’s role as an agency to promote international agricultural coopera-
tion between China and the LAC through the Belt and Road Initiative. A thorough
evaluation of China’s policy, implementation, and agency building in the three
channels of Sino-LAC agricultural cooperation is presented in the last section.
Tri-Dimensional Principles for International Agricultural

Cooperation
Ever since “food was transformed from something grown to be eaten into some-
thing bought, sold, and manipulated” (Akundi, 2018: 121), food production and
distribution became means to exercise of power, and the international food regime
has been shaped by the shifts of power in the international system. Historically,
the rise of industrial capitalists, which first took place in Great Britain, backed by
liberal economic thoughts, challenged government intervention in the operation of
the market, including food market, and framed food security no longer as national
issue, but an internationally orchestrated one. However, market rule never rules out
States. From the inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
in 1947 until the mid-1980s, agriculture was effectively exempted from formal
rules governing the global trade regime (Jawara & Kwa, 2003). Even after the rise
of neoliberal economic policies in many countries, negotiations on an Agreement
on Agriculture (AoA) during the GATT Uruguay Round didn’t d eliver an agree-
ment on “liberal Utopia”, but rather a curious mix that demanded m arket-opening
measures in developing countries, while at the same time allowing industrialized
countries to continue to protect their own markets through a range of domestic sup-
port measures (Clapp & Burnett, 2013). Therefore, the creation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) at the completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotia-
tions in 1995 saw an intensification of a highly unbalanced governance framework
136 Ge Gao and Yuanbo Li
for agricultural trade, mediated through the power dynamics of the negotiating
countries.
The example of international trade rules regarding food and agriculture reflected
two contrasting perspectives that were not necessarily compatible: one that accentu-
ates the commodity nature of food and agriculture products demanding liberal flows
within a country or between countries, and one that stresses the “multifunctional-
ity” of agriculture, seeing food as fundamentally different from other commodities
because of its significance for national security and political order. There exist, there-
fore, two rationales asking for food and agriculture governance at the global level:
the economic rationale and the rationale based on welfare and ethical goals (von
Braun & Birner, 2017). In this context, the neoliberal principle backing the economic
rationale alone is not enough to guarantee a sound and fair global food regime, as the
food would be “distributed according to whoever has most purchasing power and not
according to who needs it the most” (Fakhri, 2015: 73). Contrary to what free trade
is for Adam Smith, who presents it as the solution to the problem of unrepresenta-
tive government in the interests of wealthy aristocratic land-owning privileges, it
has actually caused food production and distribution to be engineered by a new nar-
row interest group, giving birth to the so-called corporate agri-food monopoly power
(McMichael, 2020: 1), which peaked in 2015, centralizing market power in each
segment of the industrial food chain (ETC Group, 2018).
In response to the hegemonic ideology of neoliberalism, another type of move-
ment was initiated by small-scale family farmers, consumers, development work-
ers, health professionals, and environmentalists, seeking alternative cooperation at
the international level in the field of agriculture (Clapp, 2012). The international
peasant movement, La Via Campesina (LVC), introduced the right of “food sover-
eignty” at the World Food Summit in 1996, resisting the claim that liberalization of
agricultural trade would “feed the world”. Later, punctuated by the United Nations
(UN) Millennium Assessment (UN, 2005) and the International Assessment of
Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology for Development (IAASTD)
Report (World Bank, 2010), the EAT-Lancet Commission on Healthy Diets from
Sustainable Food Systems reported the threats that global food industrialization
has brought to the climate stability and the ecosystem resilience, calling for “a radi-
cal transformation of the global food system” (EAT-Lancet Commission, 2019).
These concerns about farmers’ interests, environment degradation, ecosystem
sustainability, and technology development have been incorporated into the work
of an array of international institutions, such as the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food Program (WFP), the Interna-
tional Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the Committee on World
Food Security (CFS). Nonetheless, the different types of global organizations also
raise the challenges of coordination among them (World Bank, 2007). The “regime
complexity”, in the shape of diverging rules and norms, has caused conflict and
fragmentation in ongoing efforts to strengthen the global governance of food and
agriculture (Margulis, 2013). Lacking a single authoritative academic institution or
organization that is capable of regulating or evaluating food security governance
(Woods, 2019), the world remains ill-prepared for managing the global dimensions
of agricultural and food systems change, such as the food price crisis in 2008 (Mc-
Keon, 2011).
While all global action in support of the agricultural and food system depends
on the voluntary commitment of national actors to engage in collective action, it is
tough to identify uniform and binding international standards. Nonetheless, for the
aim of this chapter, we go back to the ultimate goals that the human society expects
to reach by the provision of international public goods for agricultural development
and food security in order to identify some least controversial universal principles.
In this regard, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN, 2015) are par-
ticularly important. Goal 2, which aims to “end hunger, achieve food security and
improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture”, is most directly related to
the agricultural and food system, but other goals are also relevant. These include
Goal 12, “Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns”, and Goal 15,
“Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably
manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and
halt biodiversity loss”. In the meantime, according to the World Bank’s develop-
ment report, policy and support for agricultural investment and cooperation are
required in developing countries on local, national, and global levels to provide
new opportunities for millions of rural poor people to escape poverty (World Bank,
2007). It is less arguable that any collective collection in international agricultural
cooperation should serve protection and improvement of human well-being (FAO
et al., 2015), by fulfilling three aims which are food security, poverty eradication,
and ecosystem sustainability. In order to reach these ultimate goals, we then single
out three main areas of action. On the one hand, investments in land and other ag-
ricultural resources, together with the research and innovation in food and agricul-
ture, are key components of the production. On the other hand, trade regimes, food
reserves, and related global information tackle the distribution problem.
For most of the above-mentioned areas of global action, organizations, conven-
tions, and declarations already exist. Apart from intergovernmental organizations
formed under the umbrella of the United Nations, such as the FAO, the WFP, and
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC), other intergovernmental forums also exist, such as the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Group of Seven (G7), or
the Group of Twenty (G20). Accordingly, we conduct content analysis of sixteen
statements, treaties, guidelines, and reports that they issued on agricultural coop-
eration to arrive at three basic principles most frequently referred to for each area
of action (see Table 7.1). It is important to note that each of the six multilateral
organizations or forums mentioned above share the same benchmarks or standards
for international agricultural cooperation, which are to ensure food security and the
reduction of poverty, which provides consistency and homogeneity in harmonizing
and defining the basic norms of international agricultural cooperation.
By fair trade, we mean that the current trade regime not only aims at guarantee-
ing the free and liberal flow of goods but also considers food security and food
sovereignty. In fact, the idea that international integration should ensure that trade
was not only “free” but also “fair” became a central feature of WTO agreements
Table 7.1 Tri-dimensional principles for international agricultural cooperation
Three aims Three channels Three principles
Hunger elimination Trade Fair trade

Food security Investment Responsible investment
Sustainable agriculture Technology Local benefiting technology
cooperation
Source: Elaborated by authors.
(Orford, 2015). Regarding responsible investment, we follow the idea laid out in
voluntary guidelines established by the Committee on World Food Security that
investments in land and other agricultural resources should entail respect for ex-
isting land rights, including customary and common property rights, sharing of
benefits with local communities and environmental sustainability (CFS, 2012). As
for local benefiting technology cooperation, we suggest institutional and incen-
tive systems for transferring technological innovations of relevance to low-income
countries’ farmers and food processors, taking into account the large disparities in
total factor productivity between industrialized and developing countries.
In the following section, we will use these tri-dimensional principles to assess
China’s traditional stance as well as its changing role in international agricultural
cooperation, taking China-LAC relationship as example.
The Evolution of China’s Agricultural Policy and the China-LAC

Relationship
The Transformation of China’s Agricultural Policy: From Self-Sufficiency to

the Going Out Policy
China is a country with a large population and in order to effectively solve the
problem of feeding its people, it has adopted highly targeted policies to ensure food
security in accordance with national and international food conditions in differ-
ent historical periods. Historically, China has been a self-sufficient food producer,
with the country’s reform and opening-up in the 1980s, the Chinese government
implemented the family contract responsibility system, privatized crops to encour-
age people to work, and promoted the growth of rural enterprises. Traditionally,
the food governance issue was excluded from China’s foreign policy; under this
approach, self-sufficiency was considered China’s contribution to maintaining
global food security. Despite this, a complicated situation has evolved and become
a driving force behind China’s decision to reevaluate its approach to food security
in light of rising consumer demand, an expanding industrial workforce, the erod-
ing of land, and the destruction of the natural environment (McMichael, 2020).
The presence of the external factors mentioned above means that China’s ability to
produce enough food to feed its citizens is limited, in addition, as the greenhouse
effect has intensified in recent years, this deficiency in the capacity for food pro-
duction will undoubtedly be exacerbated by the effects of climate change in the
future (Duggan & Naarajärvi, 2015).
As a result, faced by an unfavorable food security dynamic, the government

vigorously supported and encouraged Chinese firms to invest in abroad farmland
and other agricultural resources in the future through the Going Out policy as part
of the food security policy. Since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, its ag-
riculture has seen a combination of “going out” and “bringing in” as a result of
increased multilateral trade interactions, thus, a new era of international agricul-
tural exchange and cooperation has been born (People’s Republic of China [PRC].
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs [MARA], 2009). In 2007, the Commu-
nist Party of China (CCP)’s Central Committee and the State Council of the PRC
presented the No.1 Central Document, the first major document on central policy,
which aimed to encourage China’s foreign agricultural activities. In addition to
exploiting opportunities in the international food system, the policy even aims to
enhance its capacity to compete with international commodity companies (Mc-
Michael, 2020). Meanwhile, to avoid the above-mentioned domestic restricting
factors on China’s food security and in light of the historical lessons of the global
market volatility brought on by the 2007–2008 world food price crisis, the idea that
China should employ offshore cropland and international commerce to improve
food supply security was also strengthened and restated in academic circles (Hoer-
ing & Sausmikat, 2011).
Since 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative has gradually become the new frame-
work for China’s foreign cooperation in the new era and gained a more significant
impact on China’s foreign agricultural cooperation, which is reflected in foreign
agricultural policies. It is worth noting that China’s foreign agricultural coopera-
tion is not focused only on its agricultural development but that the economic and
social development of host countries, especially poverty reduction and food secu-
rity in some less developed countries, are essential goals of foreign agricultural
cooperation (PRC. MARA, 2017). It can be claimed that, by sustaining the goal for
food security, the Chinese government closely monitors the implementation of its
agricultural “going out” strategy and actively encourages Chinese agribusinesses
to expand internationally and safeguard their foreign interests.
China’s agricultural outbound behavior is primarily focused on investment in
domestic shortage products or its own technological advantages in order to ensure
food security. This tendency is becoming more pronounced as investments became
increasingly diversified, spreading from purchasing land and planting grain to the
entire industrial chain and then to the high end of the latter. As a new player in the
world agricultural cooperation arena, by meeting the country’s growing demand
and mitigating the volatility of supply and price, China’s long-standing policy
of inward-oriented food self-sufficiency from domestic farmland production has
gradually adapted to become an outward-oriented approach to food security sup-
ported by, for example, overseas agricultural bases (Lin, 2015).
Documents and Statements Issued by China on Agricultural Cooperation
To further identify the focus of China’s international agricultural cooperation in the

LAC and its main policy directions, the authors analyze more than forty Chinese
international and LAC-specific policy documents, from the No 1 Central Document
issued by the State Council of the PRC in 2005 to the issuance of the 14th Five-
Year Plan on Promotion of Agricultural and Rural Modernization (2021–2025) in
2022, in order to examine the extent to which the Chinese government has internal-
ized the tri-dimensional principles of international agricultural cooperation into its
domestic political documents (see Table 7.2).
Through the policy focus of Chinese official documents on these three princi-
ples, we found that if we take the BRI as a dividing benchmark, China’s agricul-
tural outbound cooperation has mostly maintained its focus on fair trade from the
beginning of the 21st century up to 2013, marking the higher importance given
to the “bringing in” strategy than the “going out” one. Since 2014, the BRI has
strengthened the relevance of agriculture in foreign direct investment (FDI) (Mora,
2019). China is actually accelerating the pace of agricultural “going out” cata-
lyzed by capital, following international norms while actively deploying overseas
markets (Lin, 2015). The Chinese government has placed greater emphasis on the
control of the sustainable development and knowledge exchange dimensions by
domestic enterprises in the process of agricultural “going out”, while maintaining
the original fair-trade base.
As stated in the white book of Food Security in China, the PRC has always pri-
oritized food security in state governance and has been an active part of global food
security governance (PRC. State Council Information Office, 2019). It is claimed
that China has gone from being a net recipient to initiating the agricultural coopera-
tion agenda and leading global agricultural governance (Zhang, 2019). Throughout
this process of taking part in governance, the Chinese government has been work-
ing to improve international agricultural cooperation mechanisms to better meet
developing countries’ advancement needs. In fact, China’s global strategy heavily
relies on the LAC to achieve its goals for food security governance, which makes
the region’s distinctive natural resource advantages a key justification for China’s
international cooperation with the region as well as its creation and establishment
of an alternative framework for international cooperation (Lo Brutto & Rodríguez
Albor, 2020).
Agricultural Relationship between China and the LAC
To ensure domestic food security, China is said to invest in agricultural and food
assets in foreign countries, particularly in underdeveloped states, where few com-
petitors exist; Chinese technology can be used to improve agricultural productiv-
ity, and its import suppliers can be diversified, leading to the projection of China’s
influence abroad. Hence, China’s agricultural cooperation in the LAC is valued and
promoted by the combination of China’s maturing agribusiness industry, growing
financial resources, and increasing levels of policy support (Gooch & Gale, 2018).
Since the creation of New China, and particularly in the 21st century, Sino-LAC
agricultural cooperation has become closer and more frequent, sparking bilateral
commerce, investment, technological exchange, and the development of top tal-
ent. With its abundant natural and water resources, the LAC has a comparative
advantage allowing it to be a major supplier of high-quality, safe, and nutritious
Table 7.2 Chinese policy documents and keywords under the tri-dimensional principles for international agricultural cooperation
Tri-dimensional principles
Document Year Fair trade Responsible Local benefiting

investment technology
cooperation
No 1 Central Document 2005 x

No 1 Central Document 2008 x x
China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean
No 1 Central Document 2009
No 1 Central Document 2011 x x x
The 12th Five-Year Plan for Agricultural Science and Technology Development
China Rural Poverty Alleviation and Development Program (2001–2010)
The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) for National Economic and Social Development
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Popularization of Agricultural
Technology
The 12th Five-Year Plan for the Development of International Cooperation in Agriculture
(2011–2015)
Joint Declaration of the People’s Republic of China and MERCOSUR on Further
Strengthening Economic and Trade Cooperation
The Beijing Declaration of the China-Latin America and the Caribbean. Agricultural
Ministers Forum
The Statement on the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Summit in Brasilia
The Program for Food and Nutrition Development in China (2014–2020)
(Continued)
Table 7.2 (Continued)

cooperation
Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century
Maritime Silk Road

Beijing Declaration of the First Ministerial Meeting of the CELAC – China Forum
Decision of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Winning the Tough
Battle against Poverty
China-Latin American and Caribbean Countries Cooperation Plan (2015–2019)
Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on Accelerating the Transformation of
Agricultural Development Mode
China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean
Outline of the “13th Five-Year Plan” for the development of the grain industry
Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road
Vision and Action on Jointly Promoting Agricultural Cooperation on the Belt and Road
China and CELAC Joint Plan of Action for Cooperation on Priority Areas (2019–2021)
The Special Declaration of Santiago of the II Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC
Forum on the Belt and Road Initiative
No 1 Central Document 2019 x x
Food Security in China

cooperation
Opinions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs on Implementing the Plans of
the CPC Central Committee and the State Council for Key Agricultural and Rural Work
in 2020
Highlights of international cooperation in agriculture in 2020
China’s Progress Report on Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development
China – CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2022–2024)
Joint Declaration of the Second CHINA – CELAC Forum of Ministers of Agriculture
The 14th Five-Year Plan on Promotion of Agricultural and Rural Modernization
(2021–2025)
The Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Comprehensively
Promoting Rural Revitalization in 2022
Source: Elaborated by authors.
food for China, also known as an effective way for China to solve its food security
problems.
In fact, “agricultural cooperation” was named as one of the primary sectors of
economic collaboration between the two sides as early as 2008 in China’s Policy
Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. Subsequently, the Beijing Declaration
of the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Agricultural Ministers Forum may
be regarded as the first formal declaration between the two regions’ agricultural
sectors. Three months later, the grandiose BRI became the impetus and direction
for long-term strategic collaboration between China and the LAC in a variety of
areas, and the agricultural sector was no exception. Since then, the LAC has been
officially referred to as a “natural extension” of the Maritime Silk Road and an
“indispensable participant” of the BRI, which has made international agricultural
cooperation a crucial component of China’s BRI implementation in the area and
its connections with the LAC nations. Meanwhile, it is evident that, with its grow-
ing influence on the international stage, the Chinese government has worked in
recent years to align the focus of agricultural foreign cooperation with interna-
tional norms. A more comprehensive focus on the three principles can be found
in China’s guiding agricultural cooperation documents or joint statements issued
bilaterally on the agricultural sector for the LAC in the previous subsection.
Currently, trade and investment cooperation between China and the LAC in
the agricultural sector has been increasing. Between 2000 and 2013, China has
maintained a nearly 30 percent share of imports of agricultural products from the
LAC (ECLAC, 2015). China’s initiatives to advance international agricultural
cooperation with the LAC and to bring capital and technology to a region rich
in natural resources but less economically developed will not only make full use
of agricultural resources and ensure an adequate supply for international markets
but will also create employment opportunities for locals (Zhou & Tong, 2022).
Hence, bilateral trade agreements and sizable Chinese FDI have given businesses
the chance to compete in a globally competitive market, and the dynamism of trade
and capital flows has reached previously unheard-of heights in most LAC nations
(Josling et al., 2015). This can be seen in the case of soybean production, thanks to
China’s demands and outward investment in acquiring land for overseas expropria-
tion, Brazil, Argentina, and China now produce 54 percent of the world’s soybeans
in recent years, as well as 61 percent of crushed industrial soybeans (Schneider,
2017). Within the framework of the three principles of trade, investment, and tech-
nology exchange, we will explore the historical process and current state of devel-
opment of Sino-LAC agricultural relations in the following section.
China’s Practice of Agricultural Cooperation with Latin America

and the Caribbean
Problematic “Win-Win” Agricultural Trade between China and the LAC
The growth of agricultural trade between China and the LAC was the most visible
proof of the enhancement of Sino-LAC agricultural cooperation in the last decade.
Since the 2008–2009 global financial crisis to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pan-
demic at the end of 2019, total bilateral agricultural trade between China and the
LAC has tripled from US$18.6 billion in 2008 to US$54.9 billion in 2018, with
the LAC’s agricultural trade surplus with China reaching a record high of US$41.9
billion in 2018 (UNCTAD, 2020). The LAC, thus, became an important source of
China’s agricultural imports. While the region accounted for less than 3 percent of
China’s total agricultural imports in 1995, its weight has risen to almost 36 percent
by 2020. Meanwhile, in the year 2000, the LAC’s agricultural sector exports to
China accounted for less than 3 percent of the LAC’s total agricultural exports, a
proportion that has grown to 21 percent in 2019 (Ray et al., 2021).
This impressive achievement has been attributed to the “complementarity” be-
tween China and the LAC, giving rise to a “win-win” scenario, according to which
LAC countries gain export revenue by exploring China’s domestic food market,
while China satisfies and secures its domestic demands by diversifying import
sources of agricultural products. Nevertheless, this discourse, rather than suggest-
ing a new “South-South” paradigm, actually reiterates and reinforces the neoliberal
doctrine, which believes that international agricultural trade should be shaped by
comparative advantages and determined by relative resource endowment of each
State (Sevares, 2007). In this context, trade figures alone are not enough to indicate
whether the recent boom of Sino-LAC agricultural trade is heading toward a “fair
trade”, defined by the informal working group FINE1 as a trading partnership based
on dialogue, transparency, and respect that seeks greater equity in international
trade (Wills, 2006).
A closer look at the agricultural trade structure between China and the LAC
uncovers two primary characteristics of the trade pattern. Firstly, in terms of ac-
cumulated value of agricultural exports from the LAC to China between 2008 and
2018, they are overly concentrated in a few countries. Brazil, Argentina, and Chile
together account for about 90 percent, with the share of Brazil alone reaching 66
percent, more than four times that of Argentina, which ranks second (UNCTAD,
2020). Therefore, China’s seeking of agricultural products from the LAC has not
benefited evenly the countries in the region. Second, even for Brazil and Argentina,
the surge of agricultural trade with China does not necessarily generate greater
equity or benefits in the long term. Their agricultural exports to China are highly
focused on primary products. The share of primary products, as classified by the
UNCTAD, reached 83 percent in 2018, up to 13 percentage points from 2008.
In the same year, the share of primary products in China’s total agricultural im-
ports from the world and the LAC’s total agricultural exports to the world were 55
percent and 67 percent, respectively. This means that the development of China’s
agricultural trade with the LAC over the past decade does not fully correspond
to the region’s comparative competitive advantage in the global agricultural mar-
ket, nor to China’s import needs. This focus on primary products can be attributed
mainly to the fact that China’s demand for soy-based commodities has risen faster
in recent years, directly causing the structure of exports to China from Brazil and
Argentina, two of the world’s leading soy producers, to be skewed toward primary
products (Turzi, 2016).
While this commodity-driven trade model is, to some extent, in line with the
current situation of comparative advantage between countries, promoting agricul-
tural trade and strengthening the interdependence in the short term, it is prone to
create a backlash within the exporting countries, which expect to go beyond the
“complementary” trade pattern2 and avoid falling into the primarization of their
agricultural sector in the long run (Jenkins, 2012). Moreover, despite China’s win-
win rhetoric, major beneficiary countries of China’s agricultural imports witnessed
an enlarging current account deficit with China. For example, Argentina’s trade
balance with China became negative since 2008 and reached US$ – 7.6 billion in
2018. Arguably, Argentina’s move to expand exports of agricultural products such
as soybeans in response to China’s demand has not improved the country’s fiscal
situation. In addition, while farmers in Argentina as well as in Brazil were driven
to soybean production and exports, its expanding cultivation has jeopardized bio-
diversity and incurred severe environmental and social costs (Fearnside, 2001). It
might not be fair to blame China for deforestation, biodiversity threats, or ethnic
tensions in LAC countries because of the advances of the soybean cultivation front-
line. However, if we consider agricultural imports as an indirect means to exploit
the land and water of exporting countries for the interests of importing countries,
then China does share the responsibility to promote and encourage a “fair trade” re-
gime, which is currently absent in the Sino-LAC trade relationship. In other words,
during the past decade, China has joined the globalization of a gricultural produc-
tion and entered the international food market in a conventional neoliberal fashion
without prioritizing equity and sustainability in its agenda.
China’s Agricultural Investment in the LAC
China’s cross-border investment in agro-related businesses in the LAC lagged

behind the rapidly expanding agricultural trade, and the amount of agriculture
enterprises “going out” is still limited. Findings on China’s cross-border invest-
ment in LAC agriculture have varied as a result of missing or inadequate govern-
ment statistics. For instance, estimates of the amount of agricultural land China
has bought or leased in the area range from 70,000 hectares to 1 million hectares
(Margaret & Guo, 2015). Nevertheless, the limited data available reflect one main
characteristic of China’s agricultural investment in the region: a growing interest in
establishing a global supply chain, from production, processing, and manufactur-
ing, to storage, transportation, and market (Cheng & Zhang, 2014).
The focus on creating a China-controlled food production chain was laid out as
early as in 2013. The Beijing Declaration of the China-Latin America and the Car-
ibbean Agricultural Ministers Forum declared the importance of, and the need for,
bilateral Sino-LAC investments in joint agricultural science and technology pro-
jects, cooperation in establishing agricultural demonstration parks, and stimulating
value-added forms of agricultural projects at the source (PRC. Ministry of Agri-
culture [MOA], 2013). It was confirmed and reinforced by President Xi Jinping’s
announcement of the implementation of the $50 million Sino-LAC special agricul-
tural cooperation fund at the Sino-LAC Summit in 2014. In addition to investing
in the agriculture sector between China and the LAC, its purpose is to develop
agro-industrial chains between the two regions (Department of Latin American and
Caribbean Affairs & Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2016). With the policy
support given by the government, Chinese companies have taken a considerable
interest in investing in the agricultural production chain, on the one hand, to stra-
tegically support China’s food security goals; on the other hand, to economically
increase corporate profits and gain access to a broader range of markets, industries,
and technologies in the LAC region (Margaret & Guo, 2015).
According to the 2019 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct
Investment, Chinese companies’ enthusiasm for direct investment in farming, for-
estry, animal husbandry, and fishery has waned in recent years, with the average
annual growth rate in this sector falling from 83.2 percent in 2011 to a negative
growth rate in 2018, which proved that Chinese companies have demonstrated in
practice their interest in investing in other industrial sectors, such as other upstream
and downstream products belonging to the agricultural chain (see Figure 7.1).
While it is difficult to determine the exact form of China’s engagement in con-
trolling the supply chains (Nuñez-Salas, 2022), one may argue that, due to the regu-
latory restrictions put in place by major agricultural powerhouses in the region,3
Chinese companies have mainly conducted mergers and acquisitions rather than
greenfield investment in order to exploit agricultural resources in the LAC. In this
context, for some observers, China is no more than another international power
Figure 7.1 China’s outward FDI flows in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fish-
ery (USD million) and its annual growth rate (%).
Source: Elaborated by authors based on MOFCOM, NBS and SAFE (2020).
that enters into the game of commercial monopolization or foreignization of the

chain for crops, such as soybeans, in the LAC. In other words, Chinese mergers and
acquisitions in agro-related industries in the LAC enhance the current corporate
agri-food monopoly power, which does not present a sustainable investment model
for world food production (Haro-Sly, 2017). For others, China’s transition from
self-sufficiency to self-supporting (Lin, 2015) might mark the start of a new food
regime (McMichael, 2020) due to the fact that the controlling hands of China’s
government over its enterprises, especially state-owned ones, brings back the State
into food governance and may induce an investment pattern beyond purely eco-
nomic interests, benefiting local communities more.
Indeed, as the Sustainable Development Goals progress, agricultural coopera-
tion with the LAC nations under the BRI presents both potential and challenges.
The National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), a phased policy
document for the promotion and protection of human rights, was released by the
Chinese government as early as 2009. It clarifies the necessity for the responsible
exploitation of natural resources, active engagement in international cooperation,
and the development of environments that support human survival and sustain-
able development (PRC. State Council Information Office, 2009). In the recently
issued Human Rights Action Plan of China (2021–2025), the intention to prior-
itize human rights in the context of responsible investment has been clarified and
emphasized. According to the strategy, Chinese businesses should adhere to the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights while making investments
abroad, upholding their social obligations to protect and advance human rights
(PRC. State Council Information Office, 2021). However, despite the enactment
of human rights-related policies and regulations, the social and environmental
repercussions of China’s expanding demand for commodities in the LAC continue
to be worrisome.
In nonagricultural sectors, for instance, many Chinese projects do not consider
the prior and informed permission of indigenous peoples, and Chinese businesses
and governments seldom connect with the local social groups (CICDHA, 2022). In
the agriculture sector, China’s investment has also been criticized for its negative
impacts on the region’s environment and social order (Ray et al., 2015). Most of
these impacts were channeled directly or indirectly through increased agricultural
production induced by investment, which result in higher carbon emissions (Xie,
2019). Due to China’s relatively small scale of direct investment in the agricultural
sector compared to other multinationals from other countries, it might not be fair
to directly blame Chinese companies for environmental degradation in the region.
However, it is also true that they have not done enough to promote more inclusive
and sustainable agricultural production methods (Nuñez-Salas, 2022), as encour-
aged by Chinese authorities. One of the reasons for this is that Chinese businesses
operating in the LAC lack internationalization experience or adequate knowl-
edge of and expertise with local, regional, and international rules and regulations
governing social concerns, labor legislation, and environmental protection (Li &
Zhu, 2019). Another reason is the diversification of Chinese actors in terms of
ownership. According to the Thomson Reuters Corporate Merger and Acquisition
Database, between 2010 and 2019, China completed 16 merger and acquisition
deals in the LAC in the agri-industry, for a total value of US$4,015 million, of
which private companies were responsible for nine merger and acquisition deals.
It is, thus, misleading to suppose that all of China’s agricultural investment in the
LAC has been closely supervised and regulated by the Chinese government, which
may explain the gap between the political guidance on responsible investment and
the implementation at project and company level.
Promising Agricultural Technology Cooperation between China and the LAC
Besides trade and investment, active agricultural technology cooperation is also

taking place between China and the LAC, contributing directly to the improvement
of productivity. Regarding countries with which China has closer trade and invest-
ment ties, such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and Peru, a series of
joint laboratories and research centers in agricultural technology have been estab-
lished to promote scientific and technological innovation and technology transfer.
Among them, Costa Rica, a highlight in recent years, has become the main fulcrum
for the dissemination and transfer of China’s agricultural technologies in Central
America and the Caribbean. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Science and Technology
(MOST) approved the establishment of the “China-LAC Agricultural Science and
Technology Cooperation Promotion Platform” in 2018. The platform is organized
and implemented by the China Rural Technology Development Centre, with the
support of the Department of International Cooperation of the MOST, facilitat-
ing agricultural science and technology exchanges and cooperation between China
and LAC countries under the new situation. It should be noted that this bilateral
technology exchange program is mutually beneficial. On the one hand, China has
gained knowledge and experience from strong agricultural economies. For exam-
ple, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), based
in Mexico, has worked with more than 20 Chinese research institutes since 1970,
increasing China’s wheat output by more than 10.7 million tons (CIMMYT, 2016).
On the other hand, China has also offered technical and knowledge support in
exchange. For instance, the Chile-China Research and Development Center for
Agricultural Science and Technology, established in 2017 in Santiago, has greatly
encouraged the transfer and use of China’s agricultural technologies in Chile as
well as in the LAC market (Xinhua, 2017). In addition, Chinese enterprises also
offer technical assistance by creating research and development centers and or-
ganizing training sessions for agricultural technology demonstrations in hosting
countries.
In its relationship with small- and medium-sized LAC economies, China has
focused on personnel training and agricultural assistance to enhance human capi-
tal and boost the technology’s spillover impact. The exchange of agricultural
technicians is based on a combination of “inviting in” and “going out”. “Invit-
ing in” is mainly done by providing scholarships and training courses in China to
Latin American and Caribbean countries. For example, between 2006 and 2009,
the MARA held five China-LAC agricultural technology training courses for 52
participants from 14 Latin American countries, covering topics such as agricultural

project management, comprehensive training in agricultural technology, fishery
investment and cooperation, livestock breeding, and vegetable and fruit growing
techniques. In addition to training, various forms of activities such as policy train-
ing courses, seminars, and promotion meetings are organized to enhance informa-
tion and policy exchange on agricultural trade and investment in agriculture and to
improve mutual understanding. The main form of “going out” is to dispatch techni-
cal personnel to the LAC to promote and provide guidance for agricultural technol-
ogy. Ten agricultural specialists and technicians from China were dispatched to
the Bahamas, Barbados, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago between 2005 and
2007 as part of the FAO’s Special Program for Food Security (SPFS) and with as-
sistance from the UN World Food Program (WFP). In recent years, China has also
carried out demonstrations and training sessions in the field, including application
of advanced technology in raising animals and cultivating fruit and vegetables,
which attracted local farmers and agricultural authorities to flock to the project’s
demonstration sites to observe and learn.
Even though the LAC is not the largest beneficiary of China’s agricultural aid,
the least developed economies in the region benefited from it to improve their
agriculture-related infrastructure. According to China’s first white paper on foreign
aid, 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean were regular recipients of
Chinese agricultural aid in terms of funds, materials, equipment, facilities, technol-
ogy, training, and services. According to the PRC’s. State Council Information Of-
fice (2014), China provided aid to 19 Latin American and Caribbean countries from
2010 to 2012. Although the White Paper does not specify the country distribution
of agricultural aid disbursement, in accordance with AidData data, between 2000
and 2014, 94 percent of Chinese donations, interest-free or concessional loans di-
rectly involving agricultural and food aid in the LAC, with a total value of approxi-
mately US$570 million, were concentrated in Caribbean countries.
Compared with trade and investment, of which the development largely depends
on the decisions and the actions of agricultural firms, the Sino-LAC agricultural
technology cooperation has been deepened by government-led cooperation chan-
nels. In this context, governments, instead of firms, are responsible not only for
policy formulation but also for effective implementation, guaranteeing therefore
the high level of coherence between policy and practice. It is therefore not surpris-
ing to claim that technology cooperation in the most successful pillar that benefits
local production and distribution of agricultural goods in the long run.
China’s Agricultural Cooperation with the LAC under

International Norms
China is a pioneering nation that actively promotes South-South cooperation within
the framework of the WFP and the FAO. In addition, China has actively participated
in the G20, reshaping the structure of global governance in its capacity as the most
important emerging economy and as the leader of developing nations (Duggan &
Naarajärvi, 2015). At the World Summit on Food Security 2009, which was held
by the Council of the FAO, China’s vice premier at the time expressed the nation’s
strong desire to establish an equitable and reasonable international agricultural
trade order that is sustainable and stable, to attach great importance to the impact
of climate change on agriculture and other fields, and to strengthen international
exchanges and cooperation in the field of food and agricultural development (Hui,
2009). The WTO, which China actively supports, is seen as the greatest method to
increase international commerce, including opening up food markets, and China
has long been a major proponent of the multilateral free trade system. However,
China has recently stated that the WTO has to undergo fundamental modifications
and has published China’s Position Paper on WTO Reform. According to the docu-
ment, in order to preserve the multilateral trading system and advance the crea-
tion of an open global economy, the WTO should actively promote the equitable
development of agricultural trade, address the issue of opaque information faced
by businesses making cross-border investments, and strengthen sustainable devel-
opment (WTO, 2019). At the G20 Agriculture Ministers’ Meeting Convenes, Chi-
nese Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China, Tang Renjian, suggested
that G20 nations should support the goal of achieving zero hunger and take a more
active role in preserving a long-term stable and free global agricultural trade and
investment environment and boost global cooperation and assistance in agricul-
tural science and technology (PRC. MARA, 2021a).
Besides the aforementioned efforts taken by China via existing multilateral plat-
forms, the BRI provides China with a novel platform to take the leadership in inter-
national agricultural cooperation, particularly with the LAC nations. It was noted
in the Vision and Action on Jointly Promoting Agricultural Cooperation on the Belt
and Road published in 2007 that agricultural cooperation between China and the
countries along the BRI would focus on five areas, including creating a platform
for agricultural policy dialogue, enhancing agricultural science and technology
exchange and cooperation, optimizing agricultural trade cooperation, expanding
agricultural science and technology cooperation (PRC. MARA, 2017). Consider-
ing the opportunities offered by China’s BRI, the CELAC and China Joint Plan of
Action for Cooperation on Priority Areas (2019–2021), which was jointly issued
by both parties, re-emphasizes the importance of cooperation in technology inven-
tion and transfer, encouraging trade and mutual investment in agriculture and live-
stock, and sustainable agricultural development (CELAC-China, 2018).
Under the continued promotion of the BRI, China and the LAC have formed
a multi-level agricultural cooperation pattern. At the regional level, agriculture is
one of the key areas where China and LAC Countries have established an early
platform for overall communication and cooperation. Before the establishment of
the China-CELAC Forum, China and the LAC had created a platform – the China-
LAC Forum of Ministers of Agriculture – which met for the first time in Beijing in
2013 under the theme of “Mutually Beneficial Cooperation and Win-Win Develop-
ment”. Two sub-forums were created, namely, the Forum on Agricultural Science
and Technology and the Forum on Agricultural Trade and Economic Cooperation.
The celebration of this forum resulted in the Beijing Declaration, which clearly
stated that the two sides would jointly discuss and promote the formulation of a
strategic plan for China-LAC agricultural cooperation; define mechanisms, stra-

tegic objectives, main tasks, priority areas, and major projects for agricultural co-
operation in the near future; and guide the sustainable development of agricultural
cooperation. However, the institutionalization of agricultural cooperation at the
regional level lagged largely behind the rapid development of bilateral agricultural
cooperation. For instance, after its first celebration, the China-LAC Forum of Min-
isters of Agriculture was not held for a second time until 2021 when another joint
declaration was issued but without any significant advance on the Strategic Plan for
China-LAC Agricultural Cooperation (PRC. MARA, 2021b). The awkwardness of
the China-LAC Forum of Ministers of Agriculture highlights the difficulty to reach
consensus and formulate collective action plans even within developing countries
with diversified interests to reconcile.
In this context, China has instead leveraged its agency power to advance agricul-
tural cooperation at the country level. On the one hand, China has signed a series of
intergovernmental documents with LAC countries, covering bilateral cooperation
in agriculture, pastoralism, fishery, forestry, and quarantine and inspection between
China and relevant countries in the region. On the other hand, as of 2016, China had
signed Memorandums of Understanding on intergovernmental agricultural coop-
eration with 16 LAC countries and established joint committees or working groups
on inter-departmental agricultural cooperation with 13 countries. Nevertheless, due
to the asymmetric power between China and any individual LAC country, this
bilateral approach makes Chinese-led regional platforms, such as China-CELAC
Forum, a flexible and loose institutional structure (Jakóbowski, 2018) that enables
a tilting of the “win-win” relationship towards Chinese interests (Abdenur, 2016).
Meanwhile, the prevalence of bilateralism over multilateralism under the BRI also
weakens China’s capability to define or alter international norms.
Conclusion
Nowadays, international norms not only shape the distribution of interests among
countries but also determine the role a country can play in the international
community and judge the legitimacy of its international behavior. President Xi Jin-
ping’s keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the World Economic Forum in
2017 noted that: “Countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are all equal
members of the international community. As such, they are entitled to participate
in decision-making, enjoy rights, and fulfill obligations on an equal basis” (PRC.
State Council Information Office, 2017). For China, the mastery of the discourse
on international norms or standards has become an important form of competition
among global states, which is also reflected in the Sino-LAC agricultural coop-
eration. Therefore, in the context of the BRI, it is worth considering the extent to
which China fulfills the standards of the various levels of cooperation between
China and the LAC in agriculture and its posture under international norms.
From the perspective of policy form, the policy change in Sino-LAC agricul-
tural cooperation is, to some extent, reflected in the dynamic change in the distri-
bution of the attention of the Chinese Communist Party and the state agricultural
policy in different periods, i.e., conservative self-sufficient agricultural cooperation

to ensure domestic food security from the beginning of the new century to the time
when the BRI was proposed, and expansion-led agricultural cooperation from late
2013 to the present. It may be argued that China’s status as a more potent leader of
developing nations on the international scene is closely tied to this change in poli-
cies and expectations toward foreign agricultural cooperation. At the level of the
internalization of international norms on agricultural cooperation within domestic
policies, China has made efforts to express and reaffirm the three fundamental
principles in its policies, stressing the “win-win” trade, investment, and technology
exchanges in the agriculture field. However, China’s “win-win” discourse has not
been backed up by ideational breakthrough to challenge the neoliberal principles
that have shaped current international agricultural trade and investment pattern,
monopolized by agri-business power for the sake of efficiency rather than the just-
ness. Therefore, while China’s new agriculture policies as well as its cross-border
cooperation programs apparently comply with relevant international norms, the
effective level of congruence stays at a moderate level.
China’s moderate and ambiguous attitude toward sometimes idealist princi-
ples proposed by multilateral international institutions regarding global agricul-
ture cooperation is also reflected at the implementation level. In a context where
development at the agricultural trade and investment level depends largely on
decisions and behavior with agribusiness, agricultural cooperation by Chinese
companies without understanding and researching the security situation, political
culture, legal environment, trade unions, and the local community in the different
regions, leads to the inability to accurately accomplish the goals set out in written
policies, and therefore to an inevitable divergence between the expected effects
of cooperation and the actual results of implementation. The so-called win-win
agricultural trade between China and the LAC has been developed based on the
bilateral complementarity argument, enhancing the questionable neoliberal fashion
without prioritizing equity and sustainability. Regarding cross-border Sino-LAC
investments in agriculture, China’s recent interests in building a competitive food
production chain in the LAC could be described as the ongoing exchange of hands
of entrenched business interests between multinational agri-corporates through
mergers and acquisitions. As newly emergent players in the global food business,
Chinese companies have again followed the status quo but highly criticized the
agricultural business model instead of promoting more inclusive and sustainable
agricultural production methods as encouraged by Chinese authorities. In contrast,
the Chinese government did actively promote technology cooperation and knowl-
edge diffusion in agriculture with LAC partners, producing a high level of consist-
ency between policy and practice thanks to government leadership. The exchange
of technology is a successful example of bilateral agricultural cooperation, as it
follows the norms of international cooperation, while, at the same time, benefiting
the production and marketing of local agricultural products.
Through the new platform offered by the BRI, China is now taking the lead in
international agricultural cooperation, especially while working with LAC coun-
tries. For example, the Chinese government has taken the lead in organizing and
establishing the China-LAC Agricultural Ministers’ Forum and preparing a $10

billion China-LAC Cooperation Fund in order to deepen bilateral agricultural
exchanges. It can be argued that China as an agency continuously increases its
voice and influence in the agricultural sector through the BRI, which is also help-
ing significantly advance Sino-LAC agricultural cooperation. Yet China as a major
power is not comparable to the strength of any of the Latin American and Caribbean
countries, not only in terms of trade volume but also in international status, this
kind of unequal relationship not only reinforces bilateralism rather than multilat-
eralism between China and the LAC but also creates a win-win relationship that is
skewed toward China’s interests. In this context, China’s agency power to redefine
international norms falls short, as ambitious BRI-related Sino-LAC agricultural
programs have been frequently reduced to more country-specific subprograms.
Thus, taking Sino-LAC agricultural cooperation as example, China’s stance
toward international relevant norms falls into the “qualification” category, with
moderate/high congruence at the normative level, moderate implementation at the
practice level, and an active/passive dilemma at the agency level. This being said,
it is impossible to ignore China’s efforts and attempts to ensure domestic and inter-
national food security through the global network. So far, China has experienced
great unilateral success and advancement in this area but does not automatically
entitle its partners or the rest of the world to the same advantages. Therefore, the
extent to which its strategic commitments and declarations would be translated into
the fulfillment and implementation of win-win cooperation situations and sustain-
able or responsible development goals will have to be tested and further explored
through future Chinese actions.
Notes
1 FINE is an acronym of the names of the member organizations, comprising the Fairtrade
Labelling Organizations International (FLO), the International Fair Trade Association
(IFTA), the Network of European Worldshops (NEWS!), and theEuropean Fair Trade
Association (EFTA).
2 When Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff was about to take office in 2011, she
announced that she wanted to develop Brazil’s commodity trade partnership with China
into something “beyond complementarity” (Fernandez, 2011).
3 For example, Brazil has amended its law to restrict foreign investors from occupying
agricultural land, which states that the acquisition of rural land more outstanding than 50
MEI (Indefinite Exploitation Module) by foreign individuals and greater than 100 MEI
by foreign entities requires prior approval and authorization by the National Congress
(JonesDay, 2020).
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8 Norms and Motorways
The Internationalization of the RMB
through the BRI1
Miguel Otero-Iglesias
Introduction
It is now more than ten years since the Chinese government actively started to
promote the use of its currency abroad. The trigger for adopting this strategy was
the 2008–2009 global (or more accurately North-Atlantic) financial crisis, which
showed Beijing that it was over-reliant on the US dollar. The Chinese govern-
ment realized that if there is scarcity of greenbacks, which is what happened in the
aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, its trade relations
(even with its neighbors) might be hampered and, if the US government devalues
its currency excessively, through aggressive monetary and fiscal policy, its massive
savings in foreign reserves, which by 2014 reached a record of $4 trillion (and were
mainly in US dollars) would suffer a considerable depreciation. Thus, China found
itself in the same situation as France, Germany, and Japan in the 1970s and 1980s.
It was confronted with US monetary power and its “dollar weapon”, and it needed
to find a way to be more protected against it (Henning, 1998).
As was the case with France, when the Bretton Woods system was falling apart
and Valéry Giscard D’Estaing coined the phrase “the exorbitant privilege” to refer
to the US over-capacity to indebt itself, Chinese officials started to openly com-
plain about the US dollar-led floating (non)system. This was done in 2009, just
days before the important G20 meeting in London, which was key to overcome
the crisis, by Zhou Xiaochuan (2009), the then-governor of the People´s Bank of
China (PBOC), who published an essay entitled “Reform the International Mon-
etary System” that reflected Beijing´s unease about the dominance of the US dollar
in the global economy and the systemic imbalances and instabilities that it had
produced, and continues to generate, over the past decades. But the ruling Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) did not only voice its discontent with words, similar to
what Europe and Japan did in the 1990s with their own currencies, it embarked
on the promotion of the yuan as a reserve currency with relatively early success
(Subramanian, 2011). Based on its strong economy and several satellite offshore
financial markets (especially Hong Kong and Singapore, with London positioning
itself to play this role for the rest of the world), the renminbi (the peoples’ currency,
or RMB, or yuan) moved quickly from not being used overseas at all to be one of
the top ten most used currencies in the world (Lombardi & Wang, 2015).
DOI: 10.4324/9781003299387-8
160 Miguel Otero-Iglesias
The high point of this trend was reached in 2015 when the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) decided to include the RMB in its Special Drawing Rights (SDR) bas-
ket despite the Chinese currency not being fully convertible. This was, and still is,
perhaps the best example of how China has, over the past 25 years, either passively
and/or actively, with its model and actions, (re)shaped the norms of the interna-
tional monetary and financial system. Since the 1990s, these can be summarized
in one general rule and three concrete norms. They were promoted by the US and
European powers to a larger or lesser extent in all key international institutions and
fora, such as the IMF or the G20 (Abdelal, 2009). The overarching rule or doctrine,
which formed the backbone of what became the Washington Consensus and the
neoliberal era, which lasted roughly from the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 until
the global financial crisis in 2008, was that the allocation of capital, and conse-
quently the value of currencies, should be decided by the market. This general rule
would have three norms in money and finance which would be the following: (1)
the capital account should be open so that investments (both direct and portfolio)
can enter and exit freely; (2) the value of the currency should be decided by market
forces, and therefore the best exchange rate regime is a floating one; and (3) politics
should interfere as little as possible with monetary policy, and hence, it is advisable
to have an independent central bank. The theoretical underpinnings of these norms
were, on the one hand, Eugene Fama´s (1970) efficient market hypothesis and the
Mundell-Fleming trilemma (Mundell, 1963), which states that in macroeconomics,
a country needs to choose two out of the following three policy options: (1) free
capital flows, (2) fixed exchange rates, and (3) an independent monetary policy. In
the Bretton Woods period, the dominant norm was to prioritize the latter two with
capital controls, while in the US dollar-led floating (non)system, the second option
was sacrificed in favor of free capital flows.
China, however, has never fully accepted the neoliberal “holy trinity” (of free
capital flows, floating exchange rates, and independent central banks), prefer-
ring the Bretton Woods arrangement, or at least trying to combine all three policy
options, and for this same reason, most scholars have always been skeptical about
the internationalization of its currency. For this to occur, China would need to
open its capital account, make its currency convertible, and thus allow its value to
be decided by market forces. Nonetheless, a more flexible and less conventional
or orthodox analytical framework might include the possibility that China might
be able to internationalize its currency through a less liberal and more dirigiste
approach (McNally & Gruin, 2017). In this regard, the aim of this chapter is pre-
cisely to study how the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the flagship of Chinese
foreign policy since 2013 when Xi Jinping announced it in Astana (Kazakhstan),
might promote in a more “command and control” fashion the internationalization
of the RMB, and how this might, in the end, reshape the norms of the international
monetary and financial system. Or vice versa, and perhaps more accurately, how
the reshaping of the system’s norms might be facilitating the internationalization
of the RMB through the BRI.
The main conclusion presented here is that China has become a “qualifier” of
the norms of the international monetary and financial system, following the five
Norms and Motorways 161
stances toward international norms developed by the editors of this book, and that
this “reshaping of the norms” might at some point favor to a greater extent the
internationalization of the RMB. China is already building what can be called cur-
rency “motorways” (currency swap agreements, an interbank payment system, and
the digital yuan) to lay the groundwork to achieve this goal. However, for now –
and with the available evidence at hand – the internationalization process is going
at a snail’s pace despite the efforts put in the BRI. The reality is that the closeness
of the capital account in Mainland China, underpinned by the domestic stability
culture and political economy, remains the biggest obstacle for greater use of the
RMB overseas.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides the
theoretical framework both for the internationalization of a currency and China´s
stand to the norms in the international monetary system. The third section presents
the state of the RMB in its internationalization process according to three func-
tions of money and China’s stand vis-à-vis the three concrete norms of the system.
The fourth section describes how China is promoting the RMB through the BRI,
including the three motorways, while the fifth summarizes China’s domestic and
international agency over the past 25 years in reshaping the rules of the game. The
sixth section provides the concluding reflections.
Key Concepts, Norms, and Stances

There are many advantages that come with being able to issue an international
currency, and some disadvantages (Cohen, 2012). The biggest cost or risk is that,
by issuing an international currency, the monetary authority loses certain control
of the monetary base in circulation and is, thus, more exposed to inflation and
exchange rate fluctuations. But overall, it is better to have an international cur-
rency. The greatest benefit is that there is greater demand for your money, and
consequently for your sovereign debt, and therefore, there are benefits associated
with “seigniorage” (the difference between the real cost of producing money and
its nominal value) and relatively lower interest rates, which in effect provide more
fiscal room. The corporates and nationals of a country which issues a reserve cur-
rency also avoid the exchange risks in their international economic transactions
and foreign travels. Finally, there are benefits associated with diplomatic prestige
and influence. If monetary power is defined as the capacity to avoid adjustment
costs associated to balance of payments crises, having an international currency
helps in delaying and deflecting some of these costs (Cohen, 2006). As treasury
secretary John Connally told his European counterparts when Nixon delinked the
dollar from gold in 1971, “the dollar is our currency, but your problem”, and this
statement is still valid today.
Requirements for Internationalization
The economics literature tends to reduce the conditions necessary to issue a reserve
currency to six requirements (Cohen, 2012). (1) A large economy. China has it.
It is now the second biggest economy in the world and the biggest in purchas-
ing power parity terms. (2) Well-functioning financial markets. Here, China is still
underdeveloped, and this is one of the main reasons why the internationalization of
the RMB has progressed slowly over the past decade. (3) A stable macroeconomic
framework. In this respect, China has performed much better than most experts
and pundits foresaw. China has produced an impressive Gross Domestic Product
growth record over the past 40 years, with relatively low unemployment and infla-
tion, and small hiccups like the Shanghai stock market corrections in 2007–2008
and 2015–2016. More impressively, China has overcome the last three big global
crises (the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 2007–2008 Financial Crisis, and the
Covid-19 Recession) better than any other country and its per capita income has
risen from under $200 in 1980 to over $12.500 in 2021. (4) A stable political and
institutional framework. If one looks at China from a liberal perspective, a one-
party system, the rule by and not of law, and the lack of institutional transparency
can be seen as shortcomings, but if “stability” is the benchmark, China’s political
system has delivered impressively since the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, even
throughout the Covid-19 pandemic. (5) Network externalities. Currencies function
like languages, the higher the number of people who speak a lingua franca, the
more people are encouraged to learn it. China is now a big trading and investment
nation and is increasing its diplomatic ties with many countries, thanks in part to
the BRI. (6) The active promotion of the currency. China has started to do this to a
greater or lesser extent since the Global Financial Crisis. And finally, there is condi-
tion number (7) usually neglected by the economics literature because it relates to
military power (Helleiner, 2008), and here too China is increasing its potential and
is certainly a bigger player than the Eurozone, which depends on the United States
for military protection.
The Mundell-Fleming Trilemma
So, in principle, China meets almost all requirements to issue an international

reserve currency which should be at the level with the euro, but it is not. As a matter
of fact, as will be shown below, the RMB is still below the Japanese yen and British
pound in international usage. What explains why China is a trade and increasingly
investment giant, but only a “third tier” player in money and finance? The conven-
tional explanation is that China has a relatively closed capital account to secure
macroeconomic and monetary (including exchange rate) stability (Eichengreen &
Kawai, 2014; Miao & Deng, 2019). In the Mundell-Fleming trilemma, it has stayed
with the arrangement of the Bretton Woods period of capital controls to ensure a
fixed (or closely managed) exchange rate and independent monetary policy. This
dampens the demand for RMB abroad because international investors do not have
free access to the Chinese currency, nor can they invest and disinvest freely in
China, especially when it comes to portfolio investments. As long as this feature
persists, the RMB will remain unattractive, mainstream analysis suggests.
Nonetheless, macroeconomic orthodoxy, especially when it comes to money
and finance, has changed over time. During the Belle Epoque of the late 19th
century, dominated by the English Empire and pound sterling, in which interna-
tional finance operated under the gold standard, the prevailing norms were free
capital flows and fixed exchange rates, but this meant that the monetary policy was
determined by gold flows and, therefore, not independent. This was very different
in the Bretton Woods period, which as mentioned, operated under capital controls
to secure fixed exchange rates and monetary independence. Thus, the currency
arrangement of free flow floating exchange rates, and independent monetary policy
can evolve with time. China has tried over the past decades to see the trilemma as
a spectrum of different and flexible options, rather than a triangle of fixed positions
(Yu, 2018). China’s Sino-capitalism has tried to avoid the stark choices of the West
of differentiating between the market and the state and sees things in ranges of
grey (McNally & Gruin, 2017). The aim is to develop “administratively-managed
market equilibria” (a contradiction in terms from a liberal Western point of view),
but the practical approach that China has taken on both its exchange rate regime,
which remains managed and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future, and
its capital account, which can one day perhaps become “fully”, but not completely
“freely” open (Yam, 2011). In other words, the government will always monitor,
perhaps channel and, if necessary, stop the financial flows.
Stance toward International Norms
Until the global financial crisis, there was one general rule and three concrete
norms that determined best practices in international monetary affairs. The general
rule, defended by the United States and the EU Member States, the IMF, and most
of the mainstream economics profession was that the market knows best, so let the
market decide where to allocate resources and the price of currencies. This neolib-
eral era developed in money and finance into three norms: (1) free capital accounts,
(2) free-floating currencies, and (3) independent central banks.
By contrast, traditionally, Chinese authorities see the financial system as a tool
in the development strategy of the government. During the reform and opening
process, this traditional stance seems awkward in front of the norms mentioned
above. Nevertheless, it doesn’t mean that China has not attempted to partially adopt
these norms. Quite the contrary, there have been intense internal debates within the
Chinese government, and more concretely the CCP, about reform in the financial
system (Shih, 2009). At the general level, since the 1990s and the entry of China
in the World Trade Organization in 2001, one can differentiate between the “liber-
als” and the “conservatives” in financial policymaking circles in China (He, 2015).
The liberals tend to call for a more central role of “the market” in China’s financial
system and during the first decade of the 2000s were starting to convince many of
the top policymakers to move into this direction.
At the international level, this period before the 2008–2009 Global Finan-
cial Crisis was a period where trust in “the market” was very high, especially in
developed economies, and the “holy trinity” of US-led financial capitalism was
unquestioned in the West. Although China would always advocate to move away
from dollar centrality, toward multipolarity, and caution about the systemic risks
associated to US-led financial globalization, it was mostly a passive player in shap-

ing the rules and norms of the international monetary and financial system before
the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, not confronting it but rather accepting its
logic and stating that eventually, one day, China too would have a liberalized capi-
tal account and an exchange rate determined by market forces.
However, the move toward financial liberalization was temporarily interrupted
by the 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis and the voices of the conservatives
reigned again. The RMB, which had operated under a more flexible managed float-
ing since 2005, was again pegged to the US dollar, and plans to open the Chinese
financial system were put on hold. But, once the worst of the crisis was over, the
liberalization plans were retaken and there was momentum in the internationaliza-
tion of the RMB, which for many was seen as a strategy of the liberals to convince
the conservatives that certain domestic reforms were needed in order to achieve
this national goal: namely, liberating the interest rates, deepening the financial
system, opening the capital account, and switching from a managed to a floating
exchange rate regime (He, 2015). However, this time the domestic reform was
accompanied by a more active role played by China in shaping the international
agenda and structure.
As mentioned before, the essay published by the then PBOC governor Zhou
Xiaochuan in 2009 was the first time that China publicly voiced its criticism to the
US-led monetary order. The overall strategy has never been to be confrontational
or subversive. But rather to change the system from within, following the norms
“qualification” stand conceptualized in this volume. Emboldened by the failure of
the North-Atlantic financial system, China started to take a more active role in the
governance of the IMF (Momani, 2015). This was achieved by having a single seat
at the executive board and by leading the BRICS group. China was, thus, at the
forefront in demanding a greater voting share for emerging powers and in pushing
for greater geographical and intellectual diversity in new staff recruitments. Fur-
thermore, it encouraged the IMF to move beyond the traditional Article IV consul-
tations and surveillance, focused mostly on domestic problems in each economy,
and to start analyzing the systemic risks that were building up in the US dollar-
led, and fiat money-based, international monetary system. China’s more proactive
stance delivered a milestone success in 2015 when the RMB was introduced in the
IMF SDR basket despite not being a convertible currency. A good example of how
China has “qualified” the existing liberal norms in international finance.
RMB Internationalization from a Liberal Perspective

Since Xi Jinping delivered his first speech on the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013
in Astana, Kazakhstan, there was a general perception that the BRI would help in
the internationalization process of the RMB. As a matter of fact, “finance” was
part of the five areas of connectivity that the project wanted to enhance (alongside
policy coordination, infrastructures, trade and investment, and people-to-people
exchanges). Money is the lifeblood of economic activity, and therefore, one would
expect that the Chinese government would use the BRI to promote its currency and
displace the dominance of the dollar in its region, and the world at large. China was,
during many centuries, much more advanced than the West in the understanding,
production, and use of money. It has early on understood that money is sovereign
debt and that it binds the economic agents to the political authority (Martin, 2013;
Rickett, 1985). The first known study of money, the Guanzi, dates all the way back
to the 7th century BC, and China introduced paper money (flying paper) during the
Tang Dynasty in the 7th century, 1,000 years before it was introduced in Sweden in
the 17th century, which would lead to believe that if it plans an ambitious project
like the BRI, which has marked its foreign policy agenda for almost a decade now,
it would also have a strategy on how to foster the use of its currency.
However, the available data so far show little progress on this front. The RMB
progressed as an international currency at a steady pace and from very low lev-
els from 2009, when the Chinese government started its active promotion, until
the 2015 stock exchange correction, which made the government tighten capital
controls, and since then its global usage has plateaued. In order to analyze more
in detail its evolution, it is convenient to break down its performance in the three
functions of money: as medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value.
RMB Internationalization in Numbers
At the international level, the medium of exchange role tends to be measured by

looking at how much international trade is settled in that country’s currency. Here,
the official numbers provided by the PBOC show that the peak of Chinese interna-
tional trade settled in RMB occurred in December 2015, at 29 percent. By 2018,
this number had dropped to 16 percent, regaining certain pace by 2020, and reach-
ing 23 percent and a new peak in December 2021 (CEIC, 2022). These numbers are
somehow misleading, however, because out of this 23 percent, roughly 80 percent
is with Hong Kong (China Power, 2020), which is still considered by the PBOC as
a “foreign” trade partner, but if we were to include it as part of the greater Chinese
currency area, the percentage of Chinese international trade settled in RMB would
be in the single digits. Indeed, according to the latest SWIFT (2022) figures, the
RMB is the fifth most used currency representing 2.1 percent of the transactions
(up from 1.9 percent in 2019), still below the yen (2.7 percent) and the pound (6.2
percent). Given the size of the Chinese economy, this remains a very low num-
ber. The Bank for International Settlements (2019) survey on the foreign exchange
market from 2019 confirms this by giving the RMB a share of 4 percent, which is
lower than the four most used currencies and even the Australian (7 percent) and
Canadian (5 percent) dollars and the Swiss Franc (5 percent).
If the usage of the RMB is low as a settlement currency, it is very likely that it
is even lower as a unit of account. In other words, in which currency international
contracts are invoiced. Here, the available data are even scarcer, but some evidence
confirms this hypothesis. China settles more trade in RMB than it invoices (Zhang,
2015). The unit of account role also relates to whether a currency is an anchor for
other currencies. Over the past ten years, some studies have suggested that the
RMB is starting to become the anchor currency for its region (Cai, 2020; Li, 2020),
building a RMB bloc, and that this anchor function is even more pronounced for
countries that are in the BRI, but this needs to be qualified by the fact that the RMB
itself is strongly anchored to the dollar, so it is not easy to discern whether the cur-
rencies of the neighboring countries are actually tracking the RMB or the dollar.
They might be linked to a smaller anchor, the RMB, that is itself tied to a bigger
anchor: the dollar.
Finally, there is the role of the store of value. The most relevant statistic is
that of the IMF (2022), which tracks the allocated composition of official foreign
exchange reserves. Here again, the data show that the RMB is at 2.7 percent, now
above the Canadian and Australian dollars, and with a gradual upward trend (in
2016 it was at 1.1 percent), but still well below the Japanese yen (5.5 percent)
and the British pound (4.7 percent), currencies from economies smaller than the
Chinese one. Furthermore, the volume of RMB in offshore deposits is still far from
reaching the peak in 2015 (Global Capital China [GCC], 2018; PBOC, 2020). The
RMB’s performance is also weak in the realm of international debt (a key invest-
ment product). According to a recent report by the European Central Bank (2020)
on the international role of the euro vis-à-vis other currencies, the Chinese currency
does not even appear under this category, while the yen does. The overall picture
is clear. More than a decade since its active promotion by the Chinese government
and almost eight years since the launch of the BRI, the RMB has increased as an
international currency, but it is still way below its potential considering the size and
internationalization of its economy. Incidentally, the RMB is still far away from
the yen despite China overtaking Japan in economic size more than a decade ago.
The Three Norms, but with Chinese Characteristics
While China has always attempted to have all three of the poles of the Mundell-
Fleming trilemma, when the situation demanded it, it has always opted for keeping
political control, and this has meant prioritizing an independent monetary policy
and a fixed exchange rate and sacrificing the free movement of capital. There
would, therefore, always be these discrepancies between the stated goal by Bei-
jing to “reform and open up” the financial system and the pace and depth of this
progress determined by checking balance between liberals and conservatives and
domestic or international financial stability. Thus, for the great majority of scholars
and experts in the field, the relative underperformance of the RMB is due to the fact
that China restricts capital in and outflows (Lombardi & Wang, 2015). This makes
the RMB unattractive for international investors. Related to this is the notion that
China still has quite an underdeveloped financial system. Overly dominated by the
big state-owned banks and relatively protected from market and foreign competi-
tion. In other words, China’s financial system has not adopted the general rule of
the “market knows best” and is still heavily intervened by the state, which in recent
years has also cracked down on the more market-led shadow banking system, with
Alibaba’s Ant Financial the latest case where the state authorities have reigned in
on unfettered market forces.
In finance, the watershed in turning to “more state” and “less market” was pre-
cisely 2015, the year when the Chinese authorities managed to convince a great
part of the international community, including the Europeans, and the IMF staff,
that the RMB should be part of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket currency
of the IMF. Perhaps with the aim to achieve this in the years before, especially
since 2010, when the worst of the global financial crisis was over, the Chinese gov-
ernment had gradually opened its capital account, and this led to a steady apprecia-
tion of the RMB from 6.8 to 6 RMBs to the dollar (produced by stronger capital
inflows). But already in early 2014, for several reasons, including a slow-down of
the economy and the anti-corruption campaign of Xi Jinping, money started to flow
out of the country, and the value of the RMB started to depreciate to the point that
from June 2015 to February 2016 the Shanghai Stock Exchange suffered several
shocks that at some point wiped out 30 percent of the value of its A-shares (Zhang,
2019). This experience shook the confidence of the CCP in “the market”, and since
2017, it has introduced tighter capital controls, while the PBOC is claiming that it
will re-open in a gradual manner.
Indeed, over the past years, especially following pressure from the Trump ad-
ministration, which even labeled China a currency manipulator in 2019, and due to
domestic aims directed to introduce more market competition and attract overseas
investment, China has gradually opened its financial system to private and foreign
capital, with qualified investor programs, even in RMB, that were first capped and
then fully opened. But the reality is that, while boasting that it has the second big-
gest financial system in the world by size after the United States and experienc-
ing an eight-fold increase in foreign ownership of Chinese stocks between 2014
and 2020 (Lardy & Huang, 2020), the reality is that foreign ownership of China’s
banking system remains at under 2 percent and inflow and outflow of investment,
especially portfolio, remains tightly controlled.
This has effects on the exchange rate. By having capital controls, the value of
the RMB is not fully market-determined, and this is even more the case consider-
ing that the RMB is not fully convertible, which means that access to it is limited.
Furthermore, the PBOC still intervenes regularly in foreign-exchange markets to
smoothen short-term movements although in the long term it lets the RMB value
be decided by market forces. There is no doubt, however, that the PBOC would
intervene more heavily if it would perceive that the RMB is moving away from
what it considers market fundamentals or unstable trends or levels. At the end of
the day, the PBOC might have certain technical authority and autonomy, but it is
not independent (Zheng & Wang, 2020). It is under the State Council, and its deci-
sions are discussed and, in many cases, decided by political actors.
Overall then, China is accepting the norms that would lead to further interna-
tionalization of its currency from a liberal point of view. It understands that further
capital account openness, a relatively floating exchange rate and a technocratic
central bank which has credibility in front of the market players are key to increase
the usage of the RMB abroad, but these “norms” are qualified by giving “stability”
the highest hierarchical rank. The capital account is opened to a certain extent, and
to certain investors, the exchange rate is market-driven, but within limits, and the
POBC is technocratic but is certainly not independent, and it does not aim to be.
RMB Internationalization through the BRI

While the overall numbers of RMB usage are relatively low, and there has been
certain stagnation in the internationalization process since the 2015–2016 finan-
cial turbulences, there might be a possibility that China is advancing in using its
currency through the BRI and under the radar of international statistics. China is
known for its opaqueness, and it might be that some of the trade and some of the
loans and contracts with its neighbors might be settled and even invoiced in RMB
without this being public. Logic would suggest that this is the case. It would also fit
with the Sino-capitalist model of currency internationalization not through liberal,
but rather more through state dirigiste, “command and control”, features, which
do not exclude the private sector (McNally & Gruin, 2017). As stated by Standard
Chartered (2019), perhaps the international bank which has invested more capital
in the promotion of the RMB as an international currency:
currency internationalization is driven by trade and outward direct invest-

ment. For the renminbi, the BRI’s central role in China’s foreign policy will
likely buttress that process. Policy banks and China-led multilateral insti-
tutions supporting BRI projects are more likely to give funding priority to
projects under its umbrella.
As a matter of fact, there is now some tangible evidence suggesting that China is
using the RMB in the funding of some of the energy and transport projects related
to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and there is speculation that the next
countries likely to use RMB in their BRI projects with China will be the republics
of Central Asia (Safdar & Zabin, 2020).
Furthermore, there has been news that Russia and Iran have increased their for-
eign reserve holdings in RMB, with Russia reportedly holding one-quarter of all
RMB reserves outside China (Doff & Andrianova, 2019). They have also started
settling their oil and gas sales to China in RMB, among other reasons to avoid US
sanctions (a trend that is likely to have increased since the Russian invasion of
Ukraine in February 2022). The RMB expansion is likely to continue, even with
other countries in the Middle East, like United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia,
considering also that China is already operating a futures oil market out of Shang-
hai in so-called petro-yuan (Kamel & Wang, 2019). An analysis of media reports
of the usage of RMB in some of the most important countries that participate in
BRI shows that the Chinese currency is achieving small advances, either through
penetration at a local level in regions neighboring China, or via clearing banks in
RMB, or through the new payments systems that China is developing. A 2022 sur-
vey by the Union Bank of Switzerland does also show more interest to buy RMB
by a number of central banks (Duguid & Asgari, 2022). These advances are start-
ing to be visible even in areas that are distant, from a Chinese perspective, but are
still included in the BRI, such as Africa and Latin America. The pace of progress
is slow because the dollar has still an inertia advantage. Many countries want to
get Chinese loans in dollars because they operate mostly in the greenback, even
Chinese companies want to be paid in dollars for the same reasons. But a popular
Chinese proverb says that “if you want to get rich, build a road first” and this could
be applied to China’s long-term strategy in regard to a more “dirigiste” approach
to the internationalization of its currency. Three figurative “motorways” need to
be highlighted here: the bilateral currency swap agreements (CSAs) between the
PBOC and other central banks, China’s cross-border interbank payment system
(CIPS) and the issuance of a digital RMB or yuan, which has as its official name
the Digital Currency Electronic Payment (DCEP).
Bilateral Swap Agreements
Since China started to promote in earnest the internationalization of its currency, the
PBOC has started to sign CSAs with its foreign counterparts. According to the last
account, this has now been done with 41 countries, most of them involved in the BRI.
So far, this strategy has predominantly been a diplomatic exercise. As far as it is pub-
licly known, only Argentina, South Korea, and Hong Kong have actually activated
these currency swap arrangements for trade purposes, and foreign reserves bolster-
ing in the case of Argentina. But even under this diplomatic prism, it is interesting
to note that the PBOC has reached CSAs with three other BRICS countries: Brazil,
Russia, and South Africa, but incidentally not with India. That in the Middle East, it
has signed one with United Arab Emirates and another with Egypt, but not with Saudi
Arabia, and that it has signed CSAs with the central banks of the most important
reserve currencies: The Eurozone, Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada,
and Switzerland, but not with the United States. Geopolitical rivalries and alliances
matter here. Both Pakistan and Sri Lanka have a CSA with China.
As mentioned, the real impact of the CSAs on RMB internationalization is still
doubtful, but it shows how China approaches the matter in a different line, being,
thus, a “qualifier” of the liberal norms that have dominated the international finan-
cial and monetary system for decades. Following the developmental state model,
China tries to provide the necessary infrastructure so that the market agents, if they
so wish, can trade with their Chinese counterparts in the Chinese currency. Already
there are some studies that suggest that CSAs have facilitated trade between some
BRI countries and China (Gao & Li, 2020). If this were to be the case, the next
step would be to have more of this trade, and even investment flows, settled and in-
voiced in RMB. It is important to highlight here that this more “dirigiste” strategy
is not incompatible with the more “liberal” approach to gradually open the capital
account in China. Both strategies co-exist and reinforce each other. China is devel-
oping its financial system at home, but it is also establishing the infrastructure, the
roads, to facilitate future RMB circulation.
China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System
The second financial “motorway” that China is building to help the internation-
alization of the RMB is the so-called CIPS, which aims to facilitate the clearing
and settlement of payments conducted by Chinese financial institutions and com-

panies with the outside world in the Chinese currency. This project started in 2015
and was improved in 2018. The network now has 76 direct participants in all five
continents (CIPS, n.d.). By February 2022, more than 1212 indirect participants
had used it, predominantly from Mainland China (44.5 percent), the rest of Asia
(32.6 percent, with Japan taking a predominant role), and Europe (13 percent, with
Russia representing the lion’s share). The volume of cleared transactions has grown
from less than 20bn RMB per day in 2015, when the system was launched, to close
to 385bn RMB in March 2022.
CIPS facilitates payments in RMB in several ways. It connects the RMB clear-
ing banks that China has set up over the years around the world. In addition, for
the first time, China has a 24-hour, around the clock, payment system that operates
the five working days of the week. While before there were problems to translate
Chinese characters to numbers or English codes, CIPS now works under a stand-
ardized international messaging coding system compatible with SWIFT, the largest
clearing system worldwide. As a matter of fact, in 2016, CIPS and SWIFT signed
a memorandum of understanding to generate synergies and operativity between the
two systems (CIPS, 2016). Here, it is important to underline that while “the CIPS
system is not dependent on SWIFT’s services and CIPS accepts participants that do
not have a SWIFT code, the CIPS message standard is now convertible to SWIFT
message standard” (Zucker Marques, 2021: 89). In other words, Chinese operators
are learning from SWIFT on how to build the motorway, but they can become inde-
pendent anytime. This could become important if, at some point, the United States
would want to apply its extraterritorial sanctions on Chinese financial institutions,
banks, and non-Chinese economic agents that want to do business with China, in a
similar fashion that they are applying sanctions on Russian actors after the invasion
of Ukraine (Eichengreen, 2022). Overall, then, the CIPS motorway is a key instru-
ment for China to develop the financial infrastructure in Mainland China but also
to connect it better to the rest of the world in RMB.
E-yuan
The third financial motorway that China is building is the e-yuan, officially called
the DCEP. This is still in an embryonic phase, and thus is the less developed of
the three motorways, but it is generally perceived that the PBOC is one of the
most advanced central banks in creating a digital currency. Pilot tests have already
been conducted in several cities in China, and during the 2021 Spring Festival,
the PBOC arranged lotteries and sent e-yuan gift checks to Chinese citizens to test
the technology. Moreover, in January 2022, the PBOC launched an app to allow
users in ten areas, including Shanghai and Beijing, to use the digital currency and
Tencent announced that its WeChat messaging app would support the digital yuan
(CNBC, 2022). The Chinese population seems to be equipped to accept a digital
legal tender. Seventy-five percent of Chinese use mobile payment systems on a
daily basis (Xinhua, 2021) and digital payments, in general, ascended to $530tr in
2019, five times the volume in the United States (Kynge & Yu, 2021). Furthermore,
Alipay and WeChat, two digital platforms that include payment services, are esti-
mated to have a combined worldwide userbase of around 2bn people, which is a
large ecosystem that spreads all over the world. They have also a monopoly advan-
tage. Given that other social media like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and What-
sApp are banned in China, anyone from the outside world who wants to maintain
its networks with China is forced to use the Chinese platforms.
For now, the e-yuan motorway is to be used only inside China, but this could
change at the snap of a finger, if the Chinese authorities so decided. Both Alibaba
and Tencent, although nominally private companies, are very likely to work under
the command and control of the government, the recent crackdown of the authori-
ties on Ant Financial, the financial arm of Alibaba, goes in this direction, and their
advance technology in digital payments will be incorporated in the state machinery.
This technology could then be deployed in third countries, starting with the closest
allies in the BRI, for example. Nonetheless, to arrive there, the motorway needs to
be finalized. The PBOC still needs to overcome several technical and operational
hurdles to make the e-yuan a reality (Zhu, 2021). There are still many doubts on
how such a move would internally affect the Chinese banking and financial system
at large, and if the e-yuan were to be available overseas, how its use would affect
the capital account. As mentioned before, Chinese authorities prioritize stability
above any other aspect, and it is very likely that they will move slowly and with
the traditional Chinese trial and error modus operandi. It is also doubtful whether
other countries will accept the e-yuan. The fear is that by having access to all RMB
transactions, and thus customer behavior, the Chinese government and many of the
Chinese companies linked to it would be able to use this data for its geopolitical
and commercial advantage (Kynge & Yu, 2021).
China as an Actor in Reshaping Financial Norms

Thus, if one takes the five stances developed by the editors of this book, the
approach of China in regard to the general rule and the three norms in international
monetary and financial affairs explained above – under the context of the BRI –
could be conceptualized as either:
1 Cooperation, which would imply full implementation of the liberal norms at

home combined with transparent, multilateral organizations and initiatives in
BRI countries fostering the international adoption of RMB through market
mechanisms. China would also actively be working with the IMF/G20, and
within its BRI, to promote (neo)liberal principles based on the higher efficiency
of the market.
2 Compliance, which would mean monetary policy liberalization at home that
promotes international adoption of the RMB through a free capital account and
a fully convertible and floating exchange rate regime, and further development
of China’s financial system based on market principles. When it comes to the
BRI, China would be adopting a passive, or even critical, attitude toward other
illiberal models.
3 Qualification, which would suggest a moderate domestic implementation of the

norms. China maintains partial capital-account openness, a managed floating
rate, and a government-led central bank, while stating that it agrees with the
overall principles. This is reflected in the BRI initiative where China combines
market but also state-led mechanisms in the internationalization of the RMB. In
international fora, China also advocates a more flexible approach to the “use of
the public hand” in the application of these norms.
4 Infraction, which would mean that China applies currency manipulation, capital
controls, and political control of the central bank. Through debt-trap-diplomacy
and other coercive means, China would impose a state-led RMB internationali-
zation through the BRI. However, it would take a passive attitude toward other
market-based economic regimes and their currencies and the institutional and
normative framework overall.
5 Subversion, which would suggest open rejection of implementing the liberal in-
ternational norms at home and in BRI initiatives, undermining the current liberal
financial order (its institutions, players, and infrastructure) with the creation of
parallel illiberal international institutions and active promotion of China’s version
of state-led capitalism and its currency as an alternative in monetary affairs.
The next section will show why the “qualification” moniker seems to be the most
appropriate one to explain China’s internationalization of the RMB in the context
of, and through, the BRI, but, at the same time, the behavior of Chinese policy-
makers is fluid, and their final strategy is not set in stone yet. As with the Mundell-
Fleming trilemma, they like to keep their options open.
Overall, the BRI, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, is a clear indication that
China is following a more dirigiste, state-led integration with the rest of the world,
and this is also the case for how it uses its financial resources, how it connects fi-
nancially with global markets, and how it tends to promote the use of its currency,
although, so far, it needs to be said that most of the BRI financing is in dollars fol-
lowing a market approach (we are not in the realms of infraction or subversion),
and this creates vulnerabilities for China in the future because it drains its foreign
reserves (Liang, 2020). This half-hearted, or deliberately ambiguous, embrace of
Western norms and best practices can also be seen in other aspects of the BRI. The
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has tried to follow the international standards
of other established development banks in terms of transparency and protection of
environmental and social standards, it is also operating in the main market-based
international currency, the US dollar, but most of the investment in the BRI is done
through the political banks of China, which comply less with these guidelines, and
might be more inclined to promote the RMB more actively. China is now a large
creditor to a lot of emerging countries. At some point, it might want to settle these
debts in its own currency.
Chinese Influence in Qualifying the Norms
This does not mean, however, that China’s capital account will be completely open
or free. According to Zhu (2021), right now, out of the 43 IMF items in determining
the openness of the capital account, China fulfills 34, which is relatively slow
progress over the past ten years. And if one looks further back, China’s cautious
approach has been vindicated over time. Already in the Asian Financial Crisis of
1997–1998 China demonstrated that having a closed capital account might be use-
ful in times of crisis and, thus, gained considerable reputation and prestige in its re-
gion. Other countries like Malaysia followed the Chinese example and performed
relatively well at the time. The insistence of always having the capital account open
was further questioned in the aftermath of the global financial crisis ten years later,
with a number of countries such as South Korea and Brazil adopting restrictions on
the movement of capital. All these cases, and the gradual questioning of the preva-
lent orthodoxy by the expert community, led the IMF to acknowledge in 2010 that
capital controls were justified under certain conditions of financial and monetary
stress (Ostry et al., 2010), and there is no doubt that the performance and influence
of China had certain weight in this change of doctrine.
A similar evolution can be perceived in the other two iron norms of the neo-
liberal order. After the Global Financial Crisis, direct and indirect intervention in
the foreign exchange markets has become much more prevalent. Many countries
both in Asia and in Latin America, which were formerly operating with a floating
exchange rate regime, intervened in the markets, and this was also done by Japan,
whose currency is also part of the IMF SDR basket and, therefore, should abstain
from interfering in the market. But in the aftermath of the crisis, even respected
Western central banks, which had followed the holy trinity strictly over decades,
changed course. This was the case of the central bank of Switzerland, which had to
peg the franc to the euro in order to avoid damaging appreciation. What was before
seen as heresy, started to be accepted again. In some sense, even the heterodox
policy of quantitative easing, adopted by the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve,
and later by the European Central Bank, and which has become normalized to
overcome the Covid-19 crisis, can be seen as an intervention in the value of the
currency, and so, it was denounced by Chinese officials when it was first introduced
to overcome the global financial crisis.
The use of quantitative easing has become now so normalized and extensive
that even the independence of the central banks is starting to be questioned in the
main economies of the West, including the United States, the Eurozone, and the
United Kingdom. With the levels of debt at a historic high, and great amounts
of this debt now sitting in the balance sheet of the central banks, there are rea-
sonable fears that politics will again encroach on central banks to avoid raising
interests too soon and so establish what is technically called “fiscal dominance”
but, in essence, is trying to monetize sovereign debt through moderate inflation,
or worse, keep stimulating the economy to extreme levels, thus enhancing the
potential for higher destabilizing inflation in the future. With this backdrop, and
the return of the state in the aftermath of the pandemic, the fight against cli-
mate change taking central stage, and the geopolitical rivalry between the United
States and China increasing, it is very likely that the debate on the independence
of central banks will re-emerge also in the West, and even more so if digital sov-
ereign currencies become a reality due to the amount of information that they will
have to manage and safeguard.
Conclusion
Over the past 25 years, starting with its solid performance during the Asian F inancial
Crisis, and ending in today’s discussion about the introduction of a digital yuan,
or RMB, China has been a qualifier of the prevalent norms in the international
monetary and financial system. In the heyday of the Washington Consensus, and
US-led financial globalization, which can be historically pinned between 1989 (the
fall of the Berlin Wall) and 2008 (the fall of Lehman Brothers), there was a general
rule and three concrete norms that defined the liberal order in finance. The rule
was that the market knew best, and therefore should be unfettered, and the norms
were that the capital account should be open, the exchange rate regime should be a
floating one, and the central banks should be independent. While acknowledging,
at least rhetorically, the virtues of these three norms, especially the former two,
China has always been reluctant to embrace them wholeheartedly. It would always,
even rhetorically, qualify them with the reference that the trust in the market cannot
jeopardize social and political stability. Incidentally, the Global Financial Crisis,
and now the Covid-19 pandemic and even the War in Ukraine, have vindicated
China’s more cautious approach and even the IMF is now acknowledging that capi-
tal controls are justified.
The internationalization of the RMB through the BRI follows this same pattern
of caution, and trial and error. So far, if one looks at official international statistics,
the use of the Chinese currency abroad progresses at snail’s pace. The RMB con-
tinues to be less international than the Japanese yen and the British pound although
both economies are smaller than that of China. From a market perspective, the
US dollar is still the dominant currency. And many countries that have received
Chinese investments and loans prefer to receive funds in US dollars because of
inertia effects. Even the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, led by China, oper-
ates in the American currency. However, in the traditional Chinese way of building
infrastructure before increasing business, China has been developing a number of
what can be labeled as “financial motorways” that can be key in the internation-
alization process of the RMB in the future. These motorways are (1) the more
than 40 currency swap agreements signed by the PBOC; (2) China’s cross-border
interbank payment system in RMB; and (3) China’s digital sovereign currency, of-
ficially known as Digital Currency Electronic Payment. All of them receive little
use or are works in progress, but once they are fully operational, they might be a
game-changer in the use of the Chinese currency. They might facilitate for China to
have a capital account or current account deficit, which ultimately will be required
to internationalize further the RMB (Germain & Schwartz, 2017). In particular, a
digital yuan can have great potential in letting RMB in and out of the country in a
controlled fashion.
Already now, certain trade and investment in BRI countries is settled and
invoiced in RMB. This can increase in the future. China is also developing its
domestic financial system, which might not become as free as those of the West
(its state dirigisme is unlikely to fade away in the foreseeable future) but, at
some stage, could be highly attractive for foreign investors. In 2020, year of
the pandemic, for the first time ever China received more FDI than any other
country in the world, including the United States. Hence, in a world shaped over
the past decades by numerous crises, a more stable financial system might not be
unattractive.
The internationalization of the RMB is slow, and it can easily be dismissed
as doomed to failure if China keeps its capital controls in place. But the Chinese
government is known for having a long-term strategy based on trial and error in
terms of how much market and how much state there should be in its development
journey, and with the aim of building on the established power and market struc-
tures, rather than confront them. So far, it has not imposed its currency or openly
rejected the norms of the US-led liberal order; this would bring it into “infraction”
and even “subversion” territory. Its actions can be better described as those of a
“norms qualifier”, which is keen to keep its options open, based on its solid mac-
roeconomic performance, its more pro-active role in international institutions and
fora, or the building of new financial motorways, which will eventually give it even
more structural power in the international monetary and financial system.
Note
1 Special thanks go to Agustín González-Agote, Rossella Leali, Guillermo Alonso, and
Michael Malinconi for their valuable research assistance. Also, a big thank you to Ben-
jamin J. Cohen for his comments on an earlier draft.
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9 Variations of China’s Stances
toward International Norms in
the Belt and Road Era
Yue Lin and Mario Esteban
Introduction
Back when we had the idea to study the relationship between China and interna-
tional norms in 2019, the United States had Donald Trump in the middle year of
his presidential mandate, and China had just celebrated the second Belt and Road
Forum. At that moment, the world was anxious about how the international order
would look like when the United States moved to an “America First” agenda while
labeling China as a “revisionist” State trying to undermine and replace the inter-
national order. Since then, many things have changed, but the narrative battle and
the opinion polarization on China’s relationship with the international order have
not waned. On the contrary, the upscale of bilateral tensions between China and
the United States around economic sanctions, massive human rights violations in
Xinjiang, Hong Kong national security law, and the Taiwan Strait has led some
observers to suggest the coming of a new Cold War (Colby and Mitchell, 2020;
Westad, 2019). In this confrontation between the pro status-quo hegemon and a
rising China, the latter is expected to behave like a revisionist power as “the only
country on the planet with the potential to challenge US power” (Mearsheimer,
2018: 200). This realist approach is based on the assumption that current inter-
national norms and the resulting international order have been mostly shaped by
the global power hierarchy marked by US hegemony, to reflect material interests
of the dominant power. Hence, the United States has no reasons to subvert it. On
the other hand, a rising power like China would inherently be dissatisfied with the
existing norms and rules of international conduct because of the absence of its
voice in shaping them. Nevertheless, this realist rhetoric, so influential in public
discourses, is empirically challenged by the United States’ inconsistent practices
opposing a wide range of extant norms and institutions (Chan et al., 2019) and the
beneficial effect that incumbent international norms and institutions have played in
the reemergence of China (Ikenberry, 2012). This realist perspective is also con-
ceptually questioned by overlooking the constitutive and regulative nature of in-
ternational norms (Raymond, 1997). In fact, any analysis of China’s compliance
with international norms needs to first recognize the difference between conflicts
of interests between the United States and China, on the one hand, and conflicts
DOI: 10.4324/9781003299387-9
180 Yue Lin and Mario Esteban
between China and “international norms”, on the other hand. This brings us to the
basic question: how should international norms be defined?
Constructivist scholars would tell us that international norms refer to “shared
understandings of standards for behavior” (Klotz, 1995: 14) that are “regarded as
appropriate by other significant actors” (Mansbach, 1994: 203). In other words,
norms are social constructs by human agreement. Thus, international norms are
not solely dictated by power but “are collective since many people hold the same
beliefs about proper behavior” (Raymond, 1997: 215). Possessing an intersubjec-
tive quality, international norms are constitutive as well as regulative, compelling
general conformity by the members of the State system thanks to the procedural
and substantive legitimacy gained through different forms of social action. Inter-
national norms defined in this way would free us from the problem of trying to
use the inconsistent practices of the dominant State (basically the United States)
alone as the baseline to measure China’s compliance. However, at the same time,
this definition raises challenges related to normative inconsistency across a wide
range of issue areas, institutions, and norms. As a social construct, international
norms are meant to be in flux rather than fixed. Liberal scholars tend to theorize
the stability of the post-Cold War liberal international order by stressing the insti-
tutional process. Unlike an imperial and purely command-based order, Ikenberry
(2012) argues that the liberal international order is characterized by its openness,
its mutually agreed-upon and rules-based foundation, and its shared leadership or
co-authority. Integration and globalization had undermined the boundedness of po-
litical communities, driving a “communitarian” justice toward a “cosmopolitan”
global one, which is applied among all individuals equally irrespective of national-
ity or citizenship (Caney, 2005; Moellendorf, 2002). However, while post-1945
international conventions and organizations have tried to limit sovereign immunity
and restrain States’ discretion, sovereignty remains the foundational principle of
the modern State system, and the constant tension between State sovereignty and
the so-called “responsibility to protect” has been well documented in international
political study. The tension among principles regarding appropriate international
conduct is so notable that Johnston (2019) suggests a world of multiple functional
orders instead of a single liberal order. We may not go as far as Johnston, but it is
clear that States live with multiple international norms whose underlying princi-
ples are not necessarily consistent. Even some of these norms are internally con-
tested. Thus, China, like any other country, would interact differently with different
norms, supportive of some, unsupportive of others, and partially supportive of still
others. In this context, China’s interaction with international norms cannot be ad-
equately assigned to simple binary categories (revisionist versus status quo) at the
macro level. Rather it would be more fruitful to conduct micro-level, case-specific
analyses to reveal a zone of ambiguity where normative compliance can be better
described in terms of a spectrum or continuum (Margolis, 1990).
In order to present the case studies covered in this volume in a conceptually
valid and generalizable way, we have to solve several methodological challenges.
The first challenge is about the identification of normative references for each spe-
cific issue area. We leave the authors the freedom to define and justify the norms
that matter in the specific circumstances they study, as long as the norms picked
Variations of China’s Stances 181
satisfy both “normality” and “normativity”. On the one hand, for norms to be
“shared understandings of standards for behavior”, they should reflect regularities
of behavior among actors, or as Thomson (1993: 81) put it, “normal state prac-
tices”. On the other hand, for norms to be considered “appropriate”, they should
carry “a sense of obligation” as to what ought to be done (Chayes & Chayes,
1994). This “appropriateness” or “oughtness” seems imply ethic or value judg-
ment that is not easy to incorporate in the positivist tradition of the International
Relations discipline. Here, we follow O’Neill’s suggestion to deduce international
norms from an interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy (O’Neill, 2000). Instead
of being deduced by teleological reasoning from some transcendent moral order
determined by the specific interests and values of democratic citizens, international
norms identified in this volume are rather “products of ordinary practice with a
binding force that derives from consent” (Raymond, 1997: 228). Hence, they are
actually value-neutral, and the degree of compliance of a State with a prescribed
pattern of behavior should not be judged from a moral or values-based angle. Inter-
national norms that satisfy both “normality” and “normativity” could vary in con-
crete forms. Some are relatively specific and institutionalized operating principles,
such as the Aid Effectiveness Agenda (AEA) (Chapter 2); some are formal written
conventions like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) (Chapter 4); some are derived from a web of intersecting regulatory
regimes, like the international disciplines on distant-water fishing (Chapter 3);
some are voluntary, non-binding principles with a substantial number of signatory
parties as in the case of governance of corporate social responsibilities (Chapter 5);
some are “spirit” or ideas of broad significance embedded in written agreements,
as we observe in the case of education (Chapter 6) and agricultural cooperation
(Chapter 7); and even some are just informal agreements and tacit understandings,
such as the neoliberal trinity for currency internationalization (Chapter 8).
Faced with these diversified normative references, we encounter the second meth-
odological challenge on the measurement of China’s compliance with incumbent
international norms and standards. Following the procedure elaborated in Chapter
1 by Mario Esteban and Guangyu Qiao-Franco, the authors of the case studies have
conducted this task through three independent variables: (1) the congruence between
China’s norms and their international counterparts, (2) the consistency of China’s
conduct in the implementation of those norms, and (3) the level of agency displayed
by China in shaping and creating international norms and standards in a given field.
This measurement framework is innovative as it doesn’t treat China as a mere norms
recipient by focusing solely on the normative congruence but develops a more nu-
anced and balanced approach taking into account both the “reactive” and “proactive”
role played by China in norms internalization, diffusion, and evolution. In the follow-
ing sections, we summarize the main findings derived from the case studies at each
indicator level and discuss possible research orientations in the future.
Norms Diffusion and Norms Localization in China

Through the comparison of the main findings of all case chapters, we have un-
derlined three takeaways regarding the development of China’s domestic norms
under the lens of their international counterparts. The first observation is that there
are noticeable variations across issue areas in terms of the congruence between
domestic and international norms in China. In a spectrum or continuum, the degree
of congruence is relatively high in the case of climate governance (Chapter 4) and
agricultural cooperation (Chapter 7), relatively low concerning development aid
(Chapter 2) and distant-water fishing management (Chapter 3), and moderate in
other cases, respectively, corporate social responsibility (Chapter 5), education and
edtech policy (Chapter 6), and currency internationalization (Chapter 8). To under-
stand this important variation, international norms must be understood as a result
of norm diffusion, which itself can be defined as a consequence of interdepend-
ence (Gilardi, 2013). The relationship of interdependence between States suggests
a mutual normative impact. Even if China is depicted as purely a receiving actor,
international norms are filtered in this country through domestic structures and
norms, resulting in the localization of international norms in its domestic context
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Norm diffusion is, therefore, not equivalent to norm
convergence, which is just one of many possibilities following diffusion. What
are the factors that possibly explain the different outcomes from the diffusion of
international norms? Based on our second and third observations, we conclude
that both the type of norms and the character of the issues that the norms intent to
regulate matter.
Some types of international norms are more easily embraced by China than oth-
ers. A common distinction that separates norms is their degree of explicitness and
institutionalization. Weyland (2007) distinguishes loose templates (“principles”)
from concrete policies (“models”). Principles are general guidelines for an over-
all direction. They are flexible, as their implementation is highly dependent on
circumstances, and voluntary, with a promotional mechanism to assist in their na-
tional transposition and implementation. On the contrary, models are prescriptive
and offer a specific course of action, with an institutionalized capacity to enforce
them. This distinction has implications for the diffusion of international norms.
The diffusion and acceptance of the former group of norms only require modest
departures from what States would have done in the absence of a regulatory treaty
(Downs et al., 1996) and, therefore, is easier than that of the latter group of norms
which requires a qualitative increase in the commitment of States (Donnelly, 1986).
What makes this distinction more relevant is the legitimacy debate derived from
the distribution of agency during the process of creation of these norms. The con-
centration of normative agency in a few like-minded States is more likely to deliver
operationalizable standards with regulatory institution building, while the disper-
sion of normative agency would generate more inclusive but vaguely defined prin-
ciples with loosely constructed structures and less binding mechanisms. Although
one may argue that the concentration of normative agency doesn’t necessarily make
the norms created less legitimate for the sake of representativeness, procedural le-
gitimacy does provide China with a convenient argument to resist the diffusion of
certain international norms. We, therefore, find it useful to first discern different
international norms to understand the divergent diffusion process of relevant norms
in China. In both cases with a relatively low level of congruence, China remains
hesitant to endorse some normative references picked by the authors, which are
either legally binding with third-party monitoring mechanisms or partner-specific.
For example, key norms regarding the governance of aid are drawn from the AEA,
and therefore, as Mario Esteban and Iliana Olivié point out in Chapter 2, “reflect
exclusively Western donors’ views” originally. Even though most of these norms
have been incorporated into a more inclusive Global Partnership for Effective
Development Cooperation (GPEDC), there were worries among the emerging
economies, including China, that the GPEDC was just another form for the tradi-
tional donors to disseminate their normative preferences on development coopera-
tion. Hence, China, among others, has not given its official backing to GPEDC (Li
& Qi, 2021). The situation of distant-water fishing is more complicated because of
the lack of concrete norms and institutions to scrutinize the legal provenance and
sustainability features of marine captured fish. Nonetheless, in Chapter 3, Juan He
highlights recent advances to partly amend the international regulatory patchwork,
such as the 2009 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Elimi-
nate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (PSMA). This is a legally bind-
ing and enforceable agreement to combat illicit fishing through rigorous port State
inspections. One may reasonably suspect that it is its legally binding nature that
causes China to remain absent from the list of signatory parties of the PSMA, while
it has ratified most of other more flexible agreements and conventions on fishing.
Yue Lin also records in Chapter 5 China’s different attitudes in facilitating the dif-
fusion of various international principles regarding corporate social responsibility
(CSR). Of the four guidelines he uses to draw normative references, China has
officially endorsed three. The exception is the Guidelines for Multinational Com-
panies produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), for which China doesn’t identify itself as a bound member.
It is worth noting that while being outside of an international organization, or
an international agreement certainly entails a profound skepticism about the norms
embodied, the opposite is not always true. For example, an international organ-
ization or an international agreement, which defines commitments in an elastic
fashion, is easier to promote around the world. But the interpretation and the ap-
plication of the norms are contingent on the circumstances, such as national condi-
tions, thus breeding divergent understandings of the same “principle”. The debate
around the significance of human rights is perhaps the most illustrative example.
It is fair to say that Chinese authorities don’t question the whole validity of human
rights but put the economic, social, and cultural rights ahead of civil and political
rights. Therefore, while the international “normal practice” treats the two subsets
of human rights as inalienable and equally important, Chinese leaders are not hesi-
tant to curtail individual civil and political rights in favor of the perpetuation of
a one-party state system, which gives priority to collective (national) economic,
social, and cultural rights. As a consequence, whenever China claims to be abid-
ing by the broad concept of human rights, what we often see is the modification
or localization of the concept to retain human rights with Chinese characteristics.
China’s normative congruence then depends on how importantly particular human
rights are for each issue-specific international norm. Three scenarios emerge: (1) if
individual civil and political rights are overarching and underlying, as is the case
of international aid norms, then the degree of congruence is pushed to the low end;
(2) if human rights are not explicitly mentioned or implicitly considered as the
secondary principle, as in the discussion of climate governance and agricultural
cooperation, then the degree of congruence moves to the high end; (3) if human
rights are one of many equally important and possibly alienable principles, as is
the case of CSR and education policy design, then the degree of congruence would
likely remain at the moderate level.
The former discussion may make us believe that the prospect of the diffusion
of an international norm is predetermined. But the whole picture is not complete
unless we take into account the third observation: issue-specific features may moti-
vate China to facilitate to some extent the diffusion of relevant international norms
regardless of their origin. One of such features is the priority of the issue on the
domestic political agenda. From the seven cases studied, except international aid,
in which foreign stakeholders play a key role, the six other issues are predomi-
nantly driven by internal factors. Climate governance is raised for its importance
for China’s sustainable development; CSR is promoted in the context of increasing
social tensions that call for shared responsibility by the corporate sector; RMB
internationalization is coupled with financial liberalization, considered to be a fac-
tor to sustain domestic economic development; and the education reform centered
on edtech is presented as the requirement to lay the ground for an innovation-
driven development model. Even agricultural cooperation and distant-water fish-
ing, which appear to have a more external orientation, gain their political visibility
for their contribution to solve the domestic food security problem.
The domestic political interests of the Chinese government on these issues make
it treat them as domestic concerns rather than international ones. The implication of
this approach is China’s insistence on the sovereign rights that make coercion a less
viable mechanism for external actors to diffuse their norms in China. From this per-
spective, what really makes the diffusion of certain international norms difficult is
not the controversial procedural legitimacy but the enforcing nature of independent
monitoring and accountability mechanisms. Nevertheless, systematic resistance to
the coercion of externally imposed norms application doesn’t necessarily mean that
Chinese authorities lack the motivation to internalize norms themselves without
jeopardizing their authority. For rationalist theorists, international norms would
diffuse through the competition mechanism and the learning mechanism. Accord-
ing to Gilardi (2013: 461), “competition means that countries influence one another
because they try to attract economic resources; learning means that the experience
of other countries can supply useful information on the likely consequences of a
policy”. The competition reasoning is mostly captured by Miguel Otero-Iglesias’s
chapter on the RMB internationalization, where, up to 2008–2009, the Chinese
government deliberately chose not to oppose the neoliberal holy trinity idea to
stabilize the expectations of foreign capital owners and attract capital resources
for its economic construction. The same competition reasoning could be found
in Chapter 6 on China’s education and edtech policy, written by Claudio Feijóo,
Cristina Armuña, and Javier Fernández. There, human capital competition and an
alternative form of innovation competition drive China’s education system to be

more aligned with the European vision in terms of education curriculum design,
focusing more on competence building than on knowledge memorizing. On the
other hand, the learning mechanism is perhaps more important for the issues that
were not politically prioritized but have gained importance as a consequence of
domestic economic and social development. These issues include climate change
(Chapter 4), CSR (Chapter 5), agricultural cooperation (Chapter 7), and distant-
water fishing (Chapter 3). In all these areas, because of the underdevelopment of
relevant domestic normative regimes, there is a noticeable gap between China’s
own limited knowledge reserves and the long-term accumulation of experiences
at the international level. Therefore, just like the advantages provided by later de-
velopment in the economic realm, we argue that China may also enjoy similar
later-development advantages in the normative realm. In other terms, just for the
cost and benefit calculation consideration, China can learn from international best
practices and the records of possible consequences of different political options to
reduce costs incurred in finding the most appropriate path.
All these aforementioned factors, in our opinion, jointly explain the variation
of normative congruence across the issues. We now proceed to check whether the
same pattern of variation can be found at the implementation level.
Lagged Internalization and the Implementation Gap

Most of the prior studies on States’ compliance with international norms rely on
governments’ words as well as their ratification of or accession to international
accords or treaties. This approach claims that a State’s future actions could be pre-
dicted by its decision behavior toward the ratification of international treaties. As
long as “States cannot be legally bound except with their own consent” (Chayes &
Chayes, 1993: 179), a State does not necessarily need to enter into an international
treaty when such treaty does not conform to its interests. From this perspective, a
State only joins international treaties in one of two occasions: either the process
of internalization has already been completed, suggesting the conformity between
domestic values and interests and those underpinning the relevant international
norms, or the internalization process will follow as a State is committed to al-
ter domestic values and interest to meet international standards and recognition.
In both cases, a high degree of implementation of the international norms by the
States that have ratified them is taken for granted thanks to the alignment between
the values of the domestic stakeholders and those underpinning the ratified inter-
national norms. However, as we have discussed in the previous section, norm dif-
fusion, even when materialized through the official recognition and ratification of
international treaties, conventions, or principles, doesn’t necessarily lead to norm
convergence. We must, therefore, refrain from assuming that the so-called inter-
nalization, which is critical for the consistent implementation of norms, will hap-
pen automatically.
This is illustrated in almost all chapters by an implementation gap between
words and deeds in China’s stance toward the analyzed international norms. Oral
and/or written commitments found in political discourses, documents, and regu-

lations would be compromised at the conduct level for two reasons. In the first
place, we argue that the internalization process lags behind the construction of
relevant norms in China due to the rationalist approach adopted by Chinese po-
litical actors. In the literature, there was a tradition to distinguish two behavioral
patterns, namely, the rational choice model and the ideational model. Elster (1989)
contrasts instrumentally rational action that is hypersensitive to consequences
with norms understood as internalized Kantian imperatives. Krasner (1999) dis-
tinguishes consequential actions from “taken for granted”, “deeply embedded”
“internalized” ones. More recently, there was a trend to recognize the coexistence
of consequentialist calculations and normative appropriateness in actors’ choice
making. For example, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 888) proposed the “strategic
social construction” as the logic of political actors vis-à-vis international norms.
Under this eclectic approach, Chinese political decision-makers, on the one hand,
surely behave rationally by calculating material interests they may gain from a
political decision on whether to cooperate with, comply with, qualify, or resist
certain international norms. On the other hand, they also reconfigure constantly
national identities and preferences during the socialization process according to the
expectation of other international actors and the advance of scientific or technical
knowledge accrued in the international community.
This “strategic social construction” is particularly useful to understand some
behavior conducted by China which is otherwise hardly explainable. In Chapter 5,
on CSR, Yue Lin describes the emergence of a parallel CSR framework for Chinese
companies operating overseas, relatively more congruent with international norms
than the existent domestic framework. For example, this overseas CSR framework
demands respect of religious beliefs, cultural traditions, and ethnic customs of the
residents of the host community. In Chapter 6, on education and edtech, Claudio
Feijóo and his colleagues tell us how China, on the one hand, is absent from the
organizations that promote the inclusion of human rights in the national education
program and, on the other hand, hosts the International Forum on Artificial Intel-
ligence and the Futures of Education, during which it explicitly supports the estab-
lishment of “international standards for data and algorithms, together with ethical
governance and stewardship, all focused on protecting human rights”. In Chapter
3, on distant-water fishing, Juan He also mentions how China, facing the accusa-
tion of being a significant contributor to Illegal, unreported, and Unregulated (IUU)
fishing and labor abuses by the United States, published for the first time a deep-
water fishing Performance White Paper in 2020, where a zero-tolerance attitude
toward IUU fishing was presented. In all the cases, China apparently acknowledges
the power of beliefs, ideas, and “appropriateness” of norms held collectively in
constraining its actions. Nevertheless, the “strategic social construction” model is
fundamentally rationalist. It broadens the concept of “utility” to include social and
ideational, as well as material, interests, but doesn’t question the utility maximiza-
tion as the underlying behavioral logic of rational choice approaches. If a State,
like China, treats its international image, brand, or reputation as a productive asset
rather than an ideational obligation, it is believed to instrumentalize the adoption
and implementation of international norms to the extent that utility maximization is

met. By consequence, a minimalist approach would be the most rational strategy to
get what they want without the alignment of domestic and international cognitions
on values and interests. In this context, the so-called internalization process to push
the “logic of consequences” toward the “logic of appropriateness” (Checkel, 2005:
804) would not be complete, just as illustrated in most of the case chapters included
in this volume. Empirical evidence includes the absence of education campaigns to
spread underlying ideas and values of relevant international norms (Chapters 2, 5,
and 6), and the loosely constructed domestic norms without credible enforcement
mechanisms to hold responsible actors accountable (Chapters 3, 5, and 7).
The assumed rationalist approach at the policy-making level has a contagion
effect at sub-national level. We then have our second hypothesis: the salient feature
of a top-down approach in China limits the activities of individuals and advocacy
groups and nurtures unexpected opportunist behavior at the business level. In nor-
mative theories, civil society is commonly considered an important norm promoter
in pursuing their interests or values independent of both public authorities and pri-
vate economic actors (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). However, due to China’s polit-
ical reality, civil society rarely constitutes an analytical unit in most of the chapters.
Saying so, some authors do capture specific aspects of the triangular relationship
between State, society, and business in their analysis. Chapter 5 is perhaps the one
that deals the most with the interaction between the State and civil society. Yue Lin
describes the development of CSR in China as “State-led and society-promoted”.
While the space for civil society activism has expanded in recent years, its ac-
tivities are still carefully controlled and regulated by the State. In general, China’s
civil society remains relatively submissive to the public authority and incapable of
complementing the State to supervise and monitor the implementation of norms by
economic actors. Without being sufficiently pressured by civil interest groups, the
rational choice of business owners would largely depend on their relationship with
the State. This is also reflected in Chapters 2 and 4, as Chinese civil society plays
no significant role in monitoring the performance of Chinese companies involved
in projects supported by China’s development cooperation abroad.
The regulation of the Chinese government on economic agents is both restric-
tive and lax according to a careful consequentialist calculation. On the one hand,
we observe administrative interventions to limit entrepreneurial initiatives when
they are considered to be socially or economically “inappropriate”, such as ban-
ning the provision of online and after-class education for profit in the country since
2021 (Chapter 6), and the crackdown on Alibaba’s Ant Financial (Chapter 8). On
the other hand, there is an ample ambiguous zone crafted deliberately to leverage
business support to fulfill strategic objectives at the national level, such as generous
subsidy programs relating to fishing and fisheries (Chapter 3) and the promotion
of quantitative growth of international agricultural trade as well as overseas agri-
cultural production chain expansion (Chapter 7). The inconsistent governmental
actions regarding the economic liberty enjoyed by businesses generate an uncertain
environment, which fosters opportunist behaviors with short-term visions, espe-
cially among private business owners. One example is the voluntary publication of
CSR reports by Chinese private companies to cultivate political legitimacy instead

of guiding the adjustment of corporate culture to embrace domestic/international
CSR norms (Chapter 5). Therefore, under the unbalanced triangular relationship
between State, society, and business, the rationalist approach is also prevalent
among key stakeholders other than the State, further diluting the normative conse-
quences at implementation level.
Among all the cases, climate governance (Chapter 4) is particularly interesting,
as China has not only advanced in aligning domestic norms with international ones
but has also taken serious steps to fulfill its commitments domestically. However,
this commitment is somehow moderated concerning third parties. In the following
section, we discuss this “inward-outward” divergence together with the proactive
role played by China in shaping international norms at international fora, including
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) platform.
Limited Agency Power

Up to now, we have discussed how Chinese authorities have counted on the respect
of State sovereignty to shape the diffusion process of international norms in the
domestic context and, hence, their implementation. The key element is that Chi-
nese stakeholders often redefine an international issue as a domestic one. While
acknowledging the role of China as a critical actor in some global issues, its leaders
frequently first confine its duties within its territorial boundaries. This is particu-
larly significant considering the dimensions of China. For example, as the country
with the largest greenhouse gas emissions, China has claimed its predominant re-
sponsibility to reduce gas emission in the country to contribute to the global battle
against climate change. The same logic is also found in the issue on agricultural co-
operation. Since China is the most populous country in the world, self-sufficiency
was considered its main contribution to maintaining global food security. In the
case of distant-water fishing, China also first participated as coastal and port State
to manage its own marine resources. However, with the rise of its material power
and the formation of transnational networks of its economic agents, China’s duties
on global issues depend on not only what it does within the country but also what
it does outside the nation. It is a challenge for China to adapt itself to this new
identity.
During the process of learning to be a more influential international “responsi-
ble stakeholder”, the respect of State sovereignty remains the underlying principle
for China to engage with other international actors. But no matter how sover-
eignty could be justified in international politics, in practice an overemphasis on
it causes a series of dilemmas. On the one hand, as noted by Mario Esteban and
Iliana Olivié, it makes China eschew the responsibility to provide normative “pub-
lic goods” by placing all responsibility for the outcomes of bilateral cooperation
on the authorities of partner countries. On the other hand, as stressed in Chapters
2, 4, and 5, given the divergence between countries in terms of governance capa-
bility and regulatory quality, China’s extraterritorial action would be inevitably
incoherent and inconsistent, subject to specific features of partner countries. Taking
climate governance as an example, Lara Lázaro-Touza and Mario Esteban provide

empirical evidence in Chapter 4 to show how China’s energy investment along the
BRI is demand-driven and tailored to the preferences of BRI host governments on
fossil fuel energy.
China’s country-specific behavioral pattern implies that China may qualify rather
than subvert some preexistent issue-specific international regimes characterized by
normative fragmentation. It means, for instance, in the case of agricultural coop-
eration, the enhancement of a questionable neoliberal fashion without prioritizing
equity and sustainability. The enhancement of the status quo is not equivalent to
“cooperation” as defined in Chapter 1. For a State like China to be cooperative in
international norms mutation, it has to soften the normative relativism embedded in
the absolute sovereign principle in order to actively promote the deepening and cir-
culation of those norms and standards deemed appropriate universally. One of such
steps that can help China head toward the “cooperative” scenario is the practice of
in personam jurisdiction, as proposed by Juan He in Chapter 3. In other words, as
long as China’s internal regulatory framework is more congruent with the interna-
tional norms than partner States, the domestic law and policy of China should form
the very basis for exercising adequate and effective jurisdiction over its nationals
no matter where they are. In the issue area concerning environmental protection,
the Chinese government has acted in this fashion. For example, in the case of over-
seas CSR (Chapter 5), Chinese authorities have explicitly demanded its companies
to adopt domestic standards for environmental protection or international rules and
standards instead of just abiding by host countries’ standards and regulations. It
goes even further under the BRI framework, symbolized by the announcement of
Xi Jinping given at the UN General Assembly on 22 September 2021 that China
will not build new coal power plants abroad (Chapter 4). Nevertheless, this kind of
promising gesture is still very limited due to its environmentally-focused applica-
tion and the lack of empirical information to test its effective implementation.
It could be said that China is still learning to play the role corresponding to
its material power and new identities in the international fora. Unlike previous
rising powers, China’s rise has occurred within an institutionalized international
order, which Chan et al. (2019) argue that China has less incentive to upset than a
declining hegemon. However, by transforming into a critical State, without which
the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised, China nowadays
also enjoys the capacity to alter the functions and the continued agendas of these
institutions. This paradox leads China to demand the reform of international gov-
ernance, which, according to Yan (2016), is a requirement of the redistribution of
international responsibilities as well as rights, rather than directly contesting the
existent order or institutions themselves. In order to achieve “differently liberal”
rather than “illiberal” international order, China’s agency is exercised in the first
place within rather than outside current frameworks and forums (Jones, 2018: 4).
It has actively advocated the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibili-
ties and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), and “qualified” international climate
norms by limiting ambition during international climate negotiations (Chapter 4).
It has cooperated with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) to propose the Beijing Consensus on Artificial Intelli-

gence and Education based on its technological optimism on education data col-
lection and processing (Chapter 6). It has supported an equitable and reasonable
international agricultural trade order in the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) and World Trade Organization (WTO) (Chapter 7). It also has successfully
convinced the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to include the renminbi in its
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket despite the Chinese currency not being fully
convertible. All these agency efforts, which could be considered as a strategy to
“reform from within”, follow the internal procedures of these institutions and still
respect certain patterns of public discourse, reasoning, and argumentation.
What really concerns stakeholders from traditional powers is the “reform from
outside”, which aims to create new networks and parallel institutions that may
overlap and compete with existing institutions. In this context, the BRI constitutes
an organizational platform or normative networks where China may play the lead-
ing role as norm entrepreneur for its prominence on development performance.
Despite its open structure, the BRI is relatively more attractive to developing coun-
tries for its development oriented agenda. Therefore, the BRI favors the formation
of a de facto coalition of like-minded States because of their common development
challenges. The normative affinities among many BRI States theoretically would
facilitate that specific norms proposed by China would reach the tipping point of
the norm cascade (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Nevertheless, following the main
findings shared by our chapter authors, we argue that the BRI as a normative net-
work is still at its infant stage, and China has an enormous ideational deficit when
it comes to behaving like an effective norm entrepreneur.
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), the construction of cognitive
frames is an essential component of norm entrepreneurs’ political strategies. China
allegedly launched the BRI partly because of the frustration with the bloc polariza-
tion that divides nations and fosters a zero-sum outlook. China’s recipe is to con-
struct a “community of common destiny for mankind” and to encourage “win-win”
cooperation. While this voice has important implications for normative theorizing,
such as the need to understand and appreciate the diversity of views and visions
founded in different cultural and civilizational contexts, these concepts are not re-
ally new and still lack substantive contents. For example, it is not clear how the
broad principles of “extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits”
would be operationalized to govern different issues. The basic principle of mutual
respect and national sovereignty, which assumes equality between States in shap-
ing action agendas, makes the reach of normative consent at the institutional level
difficult and time consuming, if not impossible. One illustrative example can be
found in Chapter 7, where Ge Gao and Yuanbo Li demonstrate how the China-LAC
Forum of Ministers of Agriculture, a novel platform under the BRI to push forward
collective “South-South” actions in agricultural cooperation, has not functioned
regularly and failed to deliver the originally scheduled Strategic Plan for China-
LAC Agricultural Cooperation. This organizational failure highlights the fact that
participatory States in the BRI, even though sharing the same “developing” iden-
tity, are not homogeneous in what they are pursuing by joining the BRI. As a result,
the abstract principles and norms that China proposed to bind together relevant
interest parties obscure underlying fragmentations in interpretation between States
driven by their respective national interests. For the time being, it is safe to say that
the BRI is not well-institutionalized, but rather loosely constructed to provide an
all-inclusive platform for State and non-State actors to socialize at different levels,
including bilateral negotiations and interactions. It may sometimes open alternative
“motorways”, in the words of Miguel Otero-Iglesias, but these are not necessarily
accompanied by well-defined alternative rules. Pragmatism rather than idealism is
often the guiding approach under which most BRI-related projects and initiatives
have been carried. The challenge is whether this “case by case” and “country by
country” paradigm, repeated enough times under the BRI, could displace the fun-
damental “appropriateness” criterion for international norms.
Toward Future Research on China’s Normative Power

The compilation of seven cases studied under the same analytical framework has a
modest objective: to denounce the binary “status-quo versus revisionist” approach
in order to demonstrate the complexity of norm dynamics in the context of China’s
rise. It leaves us with a series of assumptions that may orientate future research. In
the first place, our assumptions on the importance of types of norms and features
of issues in the diffusion process of relevant norms require more solid quantita-
tive analyses, which systematically compare the diffusion outcomes between care-
fully categorized norms. In the second place, the assumption about multiple agents
rather than a single State one in norms creation, diffusion, and internalization calls
for more qualitative analyses, particularly those concerning the roles played by
China’s non-State actors in persuading and reconfiguring the preferences of their
international actors through the transnational capital and business networks. Fi-
nally, perhaps the most important suggestion is to shift the research question from
the debate of whether China is changing international norms to the one on how
it might be able to do so. This shift emphasizes the dynamic nature of interna-
tional norms, on the one hand, and acknowledges the fact that China is one of the
influential stakeholders and actors that will change the world as we understand
it. Several environmental factors have enhanced China’s normative power in the
international norms dynamic. For instance, neoliberal ideas and norms associated
with the 2008–2009 financial crisis have been partly discredited. As Miguel Otero-
Iglesias discussed in Chapter 8, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the
IMF acknowledged that capital controls were justified under certain conditions of
financial and monetary stress, Asian and Latin American countries have intervened
more frequently in the foreign exchange markets, and even democratic govern-
ments have normalized the use of quantitative easing. All of these instruments have
been routinely applied by China for a long time. In the meantime, current interna-
tional focus on conventional and non-conventional national security has involved
increased expectations of the role of the state in economic and social management
to meet a vastly increased range of needs, claims, and demands, an area that China
may proudly claim it “prominently” experiences. It is, therefore, out of the question
that China could and should contribute to the evolution of international norms.
What remains to be answered is how it would act. Will there be domestic changes
in China that would modify the stance of key Chinese stakeholders toward interna-
tional norms? Will China impose its visions, standards, and rules from a position
of strength? Will it bring the collective weight of other previously less privileged
partners for possible normative persuasion? Or will it rather negotiate the change
of substantive norms from within the current international framework? What kind
of tools might it use to challenge current international norms? Will it reframe exist-
ing debate, raise new issues, constitute new populations, create new institutions,
or the combination of several or all of them? Only based on the answers to these
questions will China and the rest of the world be prepared to constructively interact
for a more legitimate and morally more ambitious political community to emerge.
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Index
accountability 22, 25, 33–35; 59–60 Belt and Road Forum for International
Africa 25, 27, 102, 114, 125; ACP countries Cooperation 4, 7, 78, 100–101
50, 60; East Africa 55–57; Sub- Belt and Road Initiative 3–7, 67; BRI
Saharan Africa 25; West Africa as a normative framework 5–7;
55–57 BRI host countries 30–31, 37,
agricultural cooperation: BRI as a platform 67–68, 81–82, 95, 98–99, 124,
for 151–152; Chinese agricultural 144, 174; BRI International Green
cooperation policies 139–140, Development Coalition 71, 83, 101;
141–143; foreign agricultural environmental impact of the BRI
cooperation 139; principles of 67–68, 80–81; greening the BRI 59,
agricultural cooperation 135–138; 62, 67–68, 70, 77–80; objectives of
see also agriculture the BRI 4–5; see also Digital Silk
agriculture: agribusinesses 139–140; Road; Maritime Silk Road
agricultural training 149–150; bilateralism 152–154
agriculture investment 137–139, Brazil 144–146, 169, 178
144, 146–149; agriculture R&D BRICS 164, 169
149; offshore croplands 139
Aid Effectiveness Agenda 23–24 capital: controls 160, 165, 167, 172–175;
aid: dependency 25–26; eight principles for free flows 160, 163; open accounts
China’s aid to third world countries 160, 162–164, 167
28; see also traditional donors carbon: emissions 59, 69, 78, 81, 148;
Alibaba 166, 172 neutrality 76, 125; peak 73, 76
Alipay 171; see also Alibaba central banks 168–169, 173; independent
ambiguity 15, 98–99, 153, 187 central bank 160, 163, 167; see also
Argentina 144–146, 169 European Central Bank; People’s
artificial intelligence 118, 155–156; AI Bank of China
education 120; AI ethics 121–122; children’s rights 112, 122
Beijing AI principles 121; Beijing Chile 82, 145, 149
Consensus on Artificial Intelligence China International Development
and Education 116, 190; Innovative Cooperation Agency 32
Action Plan for Artificial China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 27, 30,
Intelligence in Higher Education 33, 35, 37–38, 168
Institutions 120; International Chinese banks 77, 81, 99; China
Forum on Artificial Intelligence and Development Bank 59, 78, 80, 85;
the Futures of Education 116; Next Export-Import Bank of China 59,
Generation Artificial Intelligence 71, 78, 80, 85; see also People’s
Development Plan 119–120 Bank of China
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 71, Chinese business expansion abroad 99, 148
172, 174 Chinese Communist Party 111, 119, 139,
asymmetry 1, 5, 84, 152 142–143, 152, 159, 163, 167
196 Index
Chinese culture: promotion abroad Costa Rica 149

123, 126 Covid-19 6, 9, 37, 123–124, 126, 173–174;
Chinese ministries: of Agriculture 57–58; see also financial crisis
of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Cross-Border Interbank Payment System
57–59, 61, 139, 143, 149; of 169–170
Commerce 35, 76, 101; of Ecology currency: anchor currency 165–166;
and Environment 59, 62, 79; convertible currency 160, 165;
of Education 116–120, 126; of currency motorways 161; currency
Environmental Protection 101; swap agreements 169, 174; reserve
of Finance 58, of Foreign Affairs currency 159, 161–163; settlement
35, 71, 76, 101; of Science and currency 166; see also international
Technology 149 currency; yuan
civil society 24, 29–33, 39, 83, 93, 97–98,
103, 187; civil society protests 33 debt 25, 28, 161, 166, 172–173; debt trap
climate change 71, 72–74, 75–79, 84–85, diplomacy 30, 172
138, 151; climate pledges 76–77, Deng Xiaoping 10
83, 85, see also carbon; Common developing countries 3–4, 9, 24, 34, 50–51,
But Differentiated Responsibilities; 68, 190; additional support and
Kyoto Protocol; Paris Agreement; exemptions from international rules
UN Framework Convention on 51; China as a developing country
Climate Change 11, 15, 29, 76, 134, 150–153; CSR
coal 102; coal-fired power plants 78, 80–81, in developing countries 96, 101;
83, 85, 102 54, 72–74, 75, 77, 83–84, 137;
coercion 184 developing country waters 55,
Cold War 27, 180; new Cold War 181 60, 62
Common But Differentiated digital currency see yuan
Responsibilities, principle of 72, Digital Silk Road 37, 124–125
74, 75, 84, 189 distant water fishing 15, 47–48, 181–185;
common prosperity 5, 117 China’s influence on international
Communist Party of China see Chinese DWF norms 57–62; Chinese DWF
Communist Party policy 51–54; implementation
community of common destiny 15, 95, 190 of DWF norms in China 54–57;
Community of Latin American and international DWF norms 48–51
Caribbean States 151; China- dollar 160, 163–165, 166, 169, 172, 174
CELAC Forum 142–143, 151–152 dual circulation 117
company legitimacy 91, 97, 103
competitive advantage 91, 100, 145 edtech 115–116, 127, 184–186; Chinese
conditionality 26, 39, 100; economic edtech policy 119–122; edtech
conditionality 31; non- companies 117; see also artificial
conditionality 28, 78 intelligence
Conference of the Parties 72, 76 education: adult education 112–113;
construction of a harmonious society 93 education and educational reform
constructivism 7–9, 180 in China 116–119, 181–187;
corporate social responsibility 33, 91–93, education cooperation 111,
181–184; Chinese CSR abroad 124–127; education curriculum
94–97, 98–100; Chinese influence 111, 116, 126; education grants
on 100–101; implementation and 33, 38; human rights education
enforcement in China 97–98; 114–115, 116, 126; intelligent
ISO26000 Guidance Standard education 119–120; international
92, 92, 94; reputational impact standards 112–116; learning
90, 92, 95, 100; rise in China poverty 113; non-discrimination
93–94; voluntary nature 92, 94, 97; in education 114–115; online
Western 91, 93, 99 education 120–121, 126; student
Index 197
exchanges 123–124; vocational and five principles of peaceful coexistence 28

technical education 33, 112–114, food: food production and distribution
125; see also Digital Silk Road; 72, 135–136, 146, 148, 154;
edtech; human rights; Sustainable food security 51–55, 59–60,
Development Goals; United 134–138; food security in China
Nations; universities 138–140, 142, 146–147, 153–154;
Efficient Market Hypothesis 160 international food governance
emissions see carbon 135–137, 148; seafood 48, 54–55,
employment 94, 101, 113–114, 144, 162; 57, 61–62
youth employment 114; see also foreign direct investment 9, 27–28, 37, 140,
labor 144, 147, 174
energy 30; energy consumption 67, 76, foreign exchange market 166–167, 173,
80; energy dependency 67; energy 191; foreign exchange reserves 166
efficiency 78; energy investments fossil fuels 80–84; see also coal; oil;
and financing 15, 68, 80–83, 85, renewable energies
102, 189; energy transportation 4,
71; see also fossil fuels; renewable Going Out Strategy 27, 139–140, 146,
energies 149–150
enforcement 51, 54, 57, 60–61, 97–100; gold standard 163
enforcement mechanisms 81, greenhouse gases see emissions
103, 187
entrepreneurship 98, 114, 119, 187 hegemony 9–10, 102, 180
equity 72, 74, 75, 112, 145–146, 189 Hong Kong 111, 159, 165, 169, 179
Ethiopia 25–27, 32, 34–39 human rights 15, 39, 92, 94, 148; human
European Central Bank 166, 173 rights conventions 92–93; human
European Union 50, 54, 57, 60, 72, 84, rights education 114–117, 122, 126;
121, 163 Human Rights Protection Action
Eurozone 162, 169, 173 Plan of China 100, 148; omission,
exchange rate 161–164, 167; floating 16, violations, and relativism 27, 94,
160, 163, 167, 173 103, 104, 115, 179, 183–184; right
Exclusive Economic Zones 47, 49, 50–51, to equal opportunities 114–117; see
54, 56, 59–60 also children’s rights
fair trade 16, 135, 136–137, 141–143, implementation 13–14, 48, 54–57, 154,
145–146 182; BRI implementation 33, 38,
fiat money 164 80–84, 144; implementation gap
finance 26, 71, 81–83, 124, 160–162, 16, 61–62, 97–100, 104, 126,
167; green finance 67–68, 74–75, 171–172, 185; implementation
77–78, 101, 103; see also foreign plans and agreements 49, 52, 143;
direct investment; overseas direct see also enforcement
investment India 24, 32–33, 55, 169
financial crisis: 1997 Asian financial crisis industrial zones 33, 36–38
162, 173; 2008 global financial inflation 161, 173
crisis 16, 145, 159, 160, 162–164, infrastructures 2, 27, 174; coastal
173–174, 191; Covid-19 Recession infrastructure 47, 57; digital
162, 173–174 infrastructure 36–37, 124;
fishing 47–48, 49, 51–52, 183–186; Chinese infrastructure development 3–4,
fishing on African coasts 55–56; 68; infrastructure-for-access
Fishing Access Agreements 50, 53, deals 55–56, 60; see also Asian
55, 60–61; illegal, unreported, and Infrastructure Investment Bank
unregulated fishing 48–54, 57–60, innovation 104, 111, 117–120, 122, 126,
186; overfishing 47, 51, 54, 59; see 184–185
also distant water fishing interdependence 1, 5, 146, 182
198 Index
international currency: benefits and Maritime Silk Road 47–48, 54–57, 61–62,
disadvantages 161; requirements 142, 144; African Maritime Silk
162; see also yuan Road 55–57; see also ports
international development cooperation 22, market: access to markets 36, 54, 56–57,
28, 32, 35, 78; Global Partnership 93–95, 135, 145–147; market
for Effective Development forces 160, 163, 166–167, 174
Cooperation 23–24, 31, 39, 183; media 5, 83, 97, 168
later-development advantage 185 Memorandum of Understanding 3, 102,
International Labor Organization 48, 54, 152, 170
61, 93, 102 Mexico 149
International Maritime Organization 48, 49, Middle East 169
54, 61 Millennium Development Goals 31
International Monetary Fund 6, 67, 160, monetary power 159, 161
163–167, 172–174, 190–191 monopoly 136, 148, 171
international monetary system 159–161, moral responsibility 8, 91
164 multipolarity 31, 164
International Union for Conservation of Mundell-Flemming Trilemma 160,
Nature 48–49 162–164, 166, 172
investment: aid investment 26–27;
agriculture investment 137–139, National Development and Reform
146–149, 153; debt investment Commission 71, 78, 101
25; energy investment 15, 70, national waters see Exclusive Economic
77–84, 189; ESG investment 103; Zones
infrastructure investment 3–4, 37, nationalism 119, 126
56, 59, 67–69; investment in RMB Nationally Determined Contributions 68,
174; responsible investment 16, 74, 75–77, 81, 83, 85
138, 141–143; see also foreign neoliberalism see liberalism
direct investment; overseas direct non-fossil fuels see renewable energies
investment non-interference 28–29, 95
non-state actors: participation 7–8, 22,
Japan 26, 54, 57, 159, 169, 173; Japanese 31–32, 97, 191; private sector 32,
yen 162, 166, 174 92, 168; protests 32–33; see also
civil society
Kyoto Protocol 69, 71, 73, 75–77 norm: legally binding norms 50, 137,
181, 183; lex specialis 52; non-
labor: labor abuses 48, 55, 92–94, 186; binding norms 98, 100, 181–182;
labor law 92, 92–94, 104, 148; norm compliance 2–3, 7–13,
labor rights 92–94; see also 179–185; norm convergence 28,
International Labor Organization 96, 99, 103, 182, 185–188; norm
Latin America and the Caribbean 16, 27, diffusion 9, 181–185, 188, 191;
125, 134–134, 141–143, 144–152 norm infringement 14–15, 39;
liberalism 8, 135, 162–168, 180; norm institutionalization 22, 24,
neoliberalism 16, 135–136, 145– 33, 152, 181–182; norm legitimacy
146, 153, 160, 163, 173, 191 8, 93, 182–184; norm localization
local actors: local authorities 25–26, 29, 13, 51–54, 84–85, 116, 153,
56, 117–118; local benefitting 181–185; norm qualification 14–16,
cooperation 16, 101, 135, 138, 76–77, 84–85, 102–104, 126–127,
141–143; local legislation 95, 154, 172–173, 189; norms as
98–99; local resources 31; local social constructs 180, 186; norm
stakeholders 25, 31–33, 59–60, socialization 10–12, 186; norm
102, 104; local value addition 55, subversion 2, 14, 16, 175, 189; see
60, 62 also relativism
Index 199
normative: normative agency 2, 13–15, south-south cooperation 16, 27–29, 36, 78,
61–62, 83, 104, 152–154, 182–183, 145, 150, 190
188–191; normative inconsistency sovereignty 10, 28, 55, 93, 96, 136–137,
180; normative power 3, 5–7, 16, 184–190; sovereign debt 161,
191–192 165, 173
soy 144–146, 148
oil 67, 80, 83–84, 168 Sri Lanka 33
opportunism 98, 187 State Council of the PRC 35, 94, 118,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 139–140, 142–143
and Development 22–24, 29, 79, state: flag state 47, 49–51, 57, 59–61; heads
81–82, 92, 137; Guidelines for of state 4, 6; port state 49–51,
Multinational Companies 92, 56–57, 59–60; state behavior 7–10,
96, 183 12–14, 47, 180–191; state vs market
Overseas Direct Investment 59, 61, 98, 101 167, 174–175; see also developing
countries; sovereignty; state-owned
Pakistan 25–27, 30–38, 80–81; see also enterprises; top-down
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor state-owned enterprises 33, 80–81, 95–100,
pandemic see Covid-19 102, 148, 167
Paris Agreement 68, 73–74, 75–77, 83–85 status quo power 10–12, 179–180,
People’s Bank of China 78, 159, 189, 191
164–171, 174 STEAM 118–119
ports 15, 27, 32, 49–52, 56–57; Agreement subsidies 48, 49, 51, 54, 58
on Port State Measures 49, 50, 54, supply chains 1, 55–57, 93, 146–147
57, 61–62, 183; Colombo Port 27; Sustainable Development Goals 24, 31,
Gwadar Port 27, 37; Hambantota 62, 78, 137, 143, 148; SDG2 137;
Port 27, 30, 33, 37–38; see also SDG4 112–116; SDG12 137;
Maritime Silk Road SDG14 48; SDG15 137
poverty eradication 33, 78, 92, 113–114, Sustainable Fisheries Partnership
137, 141–142 Agreements 50, 60
precautionary principle 72, 75 sustainable: sustainable agriculture 136–
private-owned enterprises 80–81, 96 138, 148, 151–153, 189; sustainable
Protectionism 93, 97 development 72–74, 83–85, 95,
101–102, 184; sustainable fishing
quantitative easing 173, 191 47–51, 57–62, 183; sustainable
infrastructure 4; see also
rationalism 7–8, 184, 186–188 Sustainable Development Goals
realism 2, 6, 10, 179 SWIFT 165, 170
Regional Fisheries Management systemic risk 163–164
Organizations 47–55, 57, 61–62
relativism 94, 115, 189 technology: technology curriculum 118,
renewable energies 67, 78, 80–83; solar 120; technology transfer 73–74,
energy 76; wind energy 76 135–138, 141–143, 149–151, 153;
renminbi see yuan see also artificial intelligence;
revisionist power 2, 11–12, 179, 191 edtech; yuan
rising power 9–12, 179, 189 Tencent 170–171
risk management and mitigation 59, 75, 91, territorial integrity 28; extraterritorial 111,
99–101, 122 170, 188
Russia 168–170; see also Ukraine top-down 91–94, 97–98, 103, 116–117,
119–121, 126–127, 187
seigniorage 161 traditional donors 23, 25–26, 26, 29
soft law 84, 96, 99–100, 112–116 transnational agents and networks 9, 53, 92,
South Korea 54, 169, 173 98, 127, 188, 191
200 Index
transparency 24, 33–36, 47, 68, 74, 168; United States of America 1, 11, 53, 57, 84,
Enhanced Transparency Framework 103, 159–167, 179; see also dollar;
75; International Aid Transparency hegemony
Index/Initiative 34 universities 111, 113–114, 119, 126;
university alliances 123, 125;
Ukraine 6; 2022 invasion of Ukraine 6, university internationalization 123–
168, 170, 174 125; university rankings 123; see
United Nations 6, 10, 48; Food and also artificial intelligence; edtech
Agriculture Organization 9,
48, 49, 55, 136–137, 150, 190; vessels 47, 49–51, 53, 55–60; vessel
United Nations Convention monitoring 52, 54–55, 60–61
on the Law of the Sea 11, 47,
49, 50, 59–60; United Nations WeChat 170–171
Development Program 71, West 7, 12, 29–38, 54, 61–62, 115, 163; see
95; United Nations Economic also corporate social responsibility;
Commission for Latin America human rights; traditional donors
and the Caribbean 137; United white paper 25, 28–29, 32–36, 52–54,
Nations Educational, Scientific 60–61, 96, 150
and Cultural Organization 112– win-win 5, 28, 36, 60, 144–146,
116, 125–126, 189–190; United 151–154, 190
Nations Environment Program 48, World Bank 25–26, 37, 101, 137
49; United Nations Framework World Trade Organization 6, 48–51, 58,
Convention on Climate Change 135–137, 151, 163, 190
15, 68–72, 72–74, 75–77, 181;
United Nations General Assembly Xi Jinping 1, 3–6, 11, 78, 83, 95, 101–102,
78, 102, 114, 189; United Nations 151–152, 167
Global Compact 92, 94, 100;
United Nations Guiding Principles yuan 159–160; digital yuan 170–171, 174;
on Business and Human Rights internationalization of the yuan 16,
92, 94, 100; United Nations High 159–161, 164–171; special drawing
Commissioner for Human Rights rights basket 160, 190; yuan as
115; United Nations Security medium of exchange 165; yuan as
Council 9; see also Kyoto Protocol; store of value 166; yuan as unit of
Paris Agreement account 165

China and International Norms Evidence From The Belt and Road Initiative

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China and International Norms Evidence From The Belt and Road Initiative

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CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS

China’s Communication of the Belt and Road Initiative

The China-led Belt and Road Initiative and its Reflections

The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia, Africa, and Europe

China and International Norms

ISBN: 978-1-032-28970-0 (hbk)

List of Illustrations vii

2 China and Aid Norms. A Case Study on Ethiopia, Pakistan,

3 Distant-Water Fishing under International Norms and

4 The Belt and Road Initiative and International Climate Governance 67

5 The Belt and Road Initiative and Corporate Social

6 China’s International Perspective on Education and Edtech 111

7 China and International Agricultural Cooperation

8 Norms and Motorways: The Internationalization of the RMB

9 Variations of China’s Stances toward International Norms in

7.2 Chinese policy documents and keywords under the

Cristina Armuña is a Co-founder of the company Rule Eleven, focused on d­ igital

Singularity University in 2017. In China, apart from the Ministry of Education,

Telecommunications Policy, 2020), “Innovation ecosystems theory revisited:

Juan He is an Associate Professor at KoGuan Law School of Shanghai Jiao Tong

ACP African, Caribbean, and Pacific

ODA Official Development Assistance

This framework is intended to overcome some of the epistemological and

The BRI and Its Normative Impact

emphasis on the necessity to break economic development bottlenecks through

Infrastructure is the bedrock of connectivity, while the lack of infrastructure

We need to safeguard the UN-centered international system, preserve the

The International-Domestic Nexus in Norms Research

constructed. Constructivists see norms as principled ideas that establish a funda-

China’s Dynamic Stance toward International Norms

A Common Theoretical Framework for Analyzing Norm Conformity

Table 1.1 State’s stances toward international norms

Cooperation Compliance Qualification Infraction Subversion

Congruence High High High/ High/ Moderate/

Structure of the Book

between China’s domestic norms and those international norms; an examination of

The Aid Effectiveness Agenda

Table 2.1 Development cooperation monitoring framework

1b Countries strengthen their national results frameworks

Why Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka?

Table 2.2 Main features of partner countries

Ethiopia Pakistan Sri Lanka

China’s Aid Model and Principles

“China adheres to the principles of not imposing any political conditions,

Ownership of Development Priorities

projects implemented by Western-led institutions in their countries (Regilme

“in a multipolar world, we must harness and harmonize the resources of a

because India is regarded as meddling in the domestic affairs of South Asian

“There is a lack of will among Pakistan’s national leadership to improve rela-

As a result, the CPEC is being identified as an instrument of exploitation of ­Baloch

Accountability and Transparency

making transparent information on development cooperation publicly available

This concern among Chinese stakeholders about the consequences of increased

to strengthening recipient countries’ national results frameworks and using these as

This view is shared by a representative of an international NGO also based in

3 Interview by authors, Beijing, August 28, 2019.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.

DWF” presents an overview of the international legal and policy framework to

The Evolving Patchwork of International Norms and Standards to

Table 3.1 International agreements and guidelines related to DWF governance

Year of Title of instrument and DWF-related arrangements Number

1973 IUCN Convention on International Trade in Endangered 184 (Y)

China’s Internalization of International Norms and Standards to

List of Illustrations vii

4 The Belt and Road Initiative and International Climate Governance 67

6 China’s International Perspective on Education and Edtech 111

7.2 Chinese policy documents and keywords under the

Cristina Armuña is a Co-founder of the company Rule Eleven, focused on d igital

As a result, the CPEC is being identified as an instrument of exploitation of Baloch

Table 3.2 A chronological illustration of China’s DWF-related regulatory instruments and

education and AI is the Beijing Consensus on Artificial Intelligence and Education

Education in China is a very competitive12 and dynamic system, in a state of almost