Evolution
or Revolution?
The Rise of UAVs
JEFFREY M. SULLIVAN
Kettering Bug Global Hawk
L
ess than fifteen years after Orville
Wright took flight in December of 1903,
the Army Signal Corps flew its first
pilotless aircraft: the Kettering Bug fly-
ing bomb. Since unmanned aerial vehi-
cles (UAVs) are often included in the ongoing revolu-
tion in military affairs, they are seen as a new concept,
created for the age of “Information Warfare” and “Net-
Centric Operations.” Many identity changes over the
course of almost a century contribute to this im-
pression. Some supposedly revolutionary aspects of
UAVs are actually reframed from previous efforts in
pilotless aircraft, while others truly do have potential for
great change. By examining the history of UAV devel-
opment, we can identify which aspects of this technolo-
gy fall under existing paradigms, and which are revolu-
tionary enough that more attention is warranted.
IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE | FALL 2006
Predator Micro UAV
Trends vs. Revolutions © PHOTOS: NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE UNITED STATESAIR FORCE, US DOD, US
In analyzing the last ninety years of unmanned flight we
can discriminate between trends and revolutions in mil-
itary pilotless aircraft.
In 1918 Charles Kettering developed a gyroscope-con-
trolled flying machine that fell and exploded after the pro-
peller turned a preset number of times. At first, the Army
Signal Corps thought of using Kettering's Bug as a form
of long-range artillery [1, vol. 1]. Since then, pilotless
aircraft have been used in a variety of contexts: the
DOD, & SEIKO EPSOM CORPORATION
Army Air Forces ordered missiles during World War II,
drones have been used for target practice since the
1930s, and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) were
flown over Vietnam to gather intelligence. This wide
variety of applications makes tracking the development
of autonomous technologies difficult, since the idea is
often reframed. For instance, the “drones” of the 1950s
0278-0079/06/$20.00©2006IEEE | 43
became the “remotely piloted vehi-
cles” of the 1960s and 1970s and
changed again into the “unmanned
aerial vehicles” of today.
These frequent re-categoriza-
tions have contributed to confusion
over what is new and what is old,
what is revolutionary and what is
reframed. UAVs have been referred
to as both “unproven, infant tech-
nologies” and “mainstream military
weapons” [2], [3]. Given the myriad
definitions and concepts available
for the term “unmanned aerial vehi-
cle,” both descriptors are accurate.
Terminology
The acronym UAV (unmanned aeri-
al vehicle) refers to any reusable air
vehicle that does not have a pilot on
board. “Missile” refers to a one-
time use vehicle with no pilot on-
board. In this sense, the Kettering
Bug is a missile, not a UAV.
There are some programs that do
not fit cleanly into either category,
such as the craft used in Project
Aphrodite in WWII (see discussion
below under heading “Missiles and
UAV's Split”). Project Aphrodite
aircraft were technically reusable,
since they were converted airplanes,
but they were never used or intend-
ed as such after being repurposed.
“Pilotless aircraft” refers to such
aircraft as well as to the broader cat-
egory of any aircraft with no pilot
on board.
Approach
Rather than appearing abruptly in
a technological revolution, much
of UAV development has been
evolutionary, as can be shown by
identifying clear, strong trends in
thought and technology over time.
Several trends have been behind
the development of UAVs and
missiles. I will show here that,
rather than being a new and revo-
lutionary idea, pilotless aircraft
are a tried and true branch of mil-
itary research and development.
There are possible exceptions
to the evolutionary development
of pilotless aircraft. UAVs are a
44 | IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE
family of technologies that have
revolutionary potential, but not
necessarily due to their adver-
tised characteristics of saving
lives and increasing military suc-
cess. This is not to say that UAVs
do not save lives or increase suc-
cess, but any improvements in
these areas are the result of long-
standing efforts, not revolution-
ary change.
All the arguments in this article
will focus on the United States and
exclude unmanned platforms such
as satellites, ground vehicles, and
unpowered aircraft. A more com-
prehensive view of unmanned tech-
nologies is beyond the scope of this
paper. This discussion will focus
on pilotless concepts, more than
technology, so representative pro-
grams will suffice as examples of
key concepts.
Evolutionary Development
Evolutionary trends in pilotless
aircraft need to be identified and
put in context. Instead of focusing
on trends in the technical develop-
ment of pilotless aircraft, in this
article the pilotless aircraft con-
cept will be tracked through its
various incarnations over time.
When looking for trends, ideas
are more important than technolo-
gy because real change occurs
when people behave differently,
not when they behave similarly
with different equipment. For
example, Rosen points out that
the tank took fifteen months from
concept to production, but the
officers fighting World War I took
another forty months after the
tank entered service to change the
way the war was fought [5].
If UAVs are going to spark any
revolutions, some break in continu-
ous development must occur. Pos-
sible breaks are analyzed in the
next section, but those discontinu-
ities cannot be analyzed out of con-
text, since their potential for abrupt
change is directly related to the
connection between the present
and the past.
Unified Development:
Interwar Pilotless Aircraft
The early years of pilotless aircraft
saw no distinction between UAVs
and missiles. Rather than debating
single-use versus reusable vehicles,
military planners were investigating
whether pilotless aircraft had any
military purpose at all. The period
from World War I to World War II
was a period of exploration to deter-
mine what was possible, not a peri-
od of focused development.
The U.S. military began research
into missiles during the First World
War, under the idea of the “flying
bomb” or “aerial torpedo.” The gyro-
scope-controlled bombs designed by
Charles Kettering for the Army Sig-
nal Corps and by Elmer and
Lawrence Sperry for the Navy were
stand-off weapons meant to attack
targets, such as German U-boat
facilities, from a distance of up to
one hundred miles [1, vol. 1], [6].
For various reasons, not the least of
which was the fact that they rarely
hit their targets, missiles did not
catch on until much later [7]. Incor-
porating the idea into existing com-
bat categories, the Army thought of
the missiles as long-range artillery;
with this, the confusion over what to
call such weapons began.
Abandoning autonomy for a few
years, the military began conducting
radio control experiments in the
1920s to achieve better accuracy for
the Army's Messenger Aerial Torpe-
do and the Navy's Curtiss N-9. Both
services lost interest in the programs
after a few years, just as they had lost
interest in the autonomous programs
of the decade before. Radio-con-
trolled aircraft re-emerged in the
1930s as target drones; thus, UAVs
gained their first permanent foothold
in the U.S. military. In 1938 the U.S.
Navy began using UAVs, including
the N2C-2 drone, for anti-aircraft
gunnery practice [6].
This new use of pilotless aircraft
marks a shift in thinking about the
platforms. Using their own pilots for
target practice was clearly out of the
question, so UAVs were developed
| FALL 2006
to fill a role that could not be filled
by manned aircraft. Conversely, mis-
siles were a substitute for existing
artillery, and so missile development
was shaped by competition with
established weapons. From this
point onward, UAVs have filled roles
that manned aircraft would not take,
while missiles compete more direct-
ly with other weapons.
Missiles and UAVs Split
World War II prompted a number of
innovations and experiments in pilot-
less aircraft that highlight the differ-
ences between missiles and UAVs.
Project Aphrodite (1944) was
the only major Army use of pilot-
less aircraft during World War II
and it was a general failure. By
using war-weary B-17s stripped of
armor and loaded with nine tons of
explosive, these bombs were more
vulnerable to German air defenses
than manned B-17s. None of the
Aphrodite aircraft ever hit their
targets [7].
The Navy's Operation Option
(1944) was an evaluation program in
the Pacific to examine the use of TV-
guided assault drones. These TDR-1
and TDN-1 drones were flown over
radio control by escort planes, just as
the Aphrodite planes were, but a TV
camera in the nose of each enabled
the operators to hit artillery emplace-
ments, bridges, caves, etc. The Navy's
Operation Anvil loaded war-weary
Navy bombers with explosives and
control equipment. These bombers
met the same fate as those from
Aphrodite despite the more devel-
oped radio control [6].
The goal of Aphrodite and Anvil
was to destroy German missile facil-
ities by flying the bombers into the
hangar doors, as the hangars were
impervious to overheard bombard-
ment. Demonstrating the advantage
of an unusual attack direction, the
projects started the services on the
drive towards cruise missiles for
hard-to-hit targets. This desire for
precision bombing has driven missile
developments for the last sixty years.
The latest incarnations of this desire
IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE
(smart bombs, Tomahawk missiles,
etc.) continue this trend.
The Army JB-2, a copy of the
German V-1 cruise missile, lost the
bureaucratic battle against manned
aircraft before its performance was
even tested in the field. It was an
original production missile, not
converted from war-weary aircraft
as other Army and Navy missiles.
Production was ordered at the rate
of one thousand per month. By the
end of January 1944, production
had been canceled because the
Army refused to shift any personnel
or resources away from bombs and
artillery [7].
Hap Arnold, Commanding Gen-
eral of the Army Air Forces in
1945, predicted that the emphasis
in air power would shift from pilots
to scientists and machinery [5].
Arnold's endorsement of replacing
soldiers with machines was a dis-
tinct break from the past, when
American missile and assault drone
production was not allowed to
interfere with any other elements of
the war effort.
Emerging from World War II
were two different concepts of
pilotless aircraft. The autonomous
missiles used by the Germans were
a weapon, much like artillery, that
could be fired at the enemy from a
great distance and at high velocity.
The U.S. military continued missile
development along those lines,
using cruise and ballistic missiles as
platforms for delivering nuclear
weapons. Second, assault drones,
which were slower and could not
operate outside line-of-sight, lent
themselves to roles in surveillance
where television capability was
used to gather intelligence.
Missile Developments
In recent years, cruise missiles have
acquired sophisticated autonomous
capabilities that will be relevant in
discussions of the future of pilotless
aircraft, so a few salient points will
be reviewed here.
Air-launched missiles took many
forms following World War II. Sig-
| FALL 2006
nificant advances included the
infrared-homing AIM-9 (opera-
tional in 1953), the onboard pro-
grammable AGM-28 (1959), the
anti-radar AGM-45 (1966), the tele-
vision-guided AGM-65 (1973), and
the radar-guided AGM-84A (mid-
1980s) [10].
In addition to using cruise mis-
siles for direct attacks, missiles such
as the ADM-20 Quail were used as
bomber-protecting decoys starting
in 1961. They simulated the heat
and radar signatures of B-52 strate-
gic bombers in order to confuse and
distract opposing air defenses [10].
The Navy's Tactical Tomahawk,
a next generation cruise missile,
uses multiple guidance systems to
find its way to the target and can
even be re-targeted during flight.
This version of the Tomahawk also
has a loiter capability; it can deploy
to an area and wait for further
instructions in the case of time-sen-
sitive or opportunistic targets [11].
Methods for guiding and control-
ling cruise missiles have become
increasingly sophisticated, especially
with the recent additions of loiter
patterns and two-way communica-
tion. The concept of a loitering mis-
sile is similar to the ideas behind cur-
rent UAV weapons platforms, and
this convergence will be examined in
the context of future UAV systems.
From Drones to RPVs to UAVs
Gathering information on the ene-
my is a dangerous task. Current
UAV proponents argue that the abil-
ity to gather intelligence over hostile
areas without risking pilots' lives
will markedly change how the mili-
tary operates. Far from being revo-
lutionary, unmanned reconnais-
sance has been a function of UAVs
since the 1950s.
By building on guidance and
control improvements from cruise
missiles, as described in Newcome
[6, ch. 10], UAVs became more reli-
able and autonomous in their opera-
tion. These technical improvements
were accompanied by changes in
name and concept.
| 45
 During the 1950s and 1960s, the
aircraft were called drones, signify-
ing limited abilities and mindless
flights into enemy fire. The word
“drone” also conjures the idea of
something that can be easily dis-
carded or replaced, unlike a pilot.
One example of an expendable
reconnaissance UAV is the Fire-
bee drone, originally designated
as the Q-2 from Ryan Aeronauti-
cal and flown since 1951. The
Firebees were jet-powered, air-
launched, remotely piloted UAVs
used to gather information over
hostile areas.
Firebees of many types flew over
3400 sorties during the Vietnam
War, with only 211 lost. These air-
craft were primitive compared to the
modern Predator, but had enough
utility to warrant their widespread
use. In fact, their simplicity most
likely encouraged widespread pro-
duction and use [12].
Since the UAV missions over
Vietnam resembled those that a
manned aircraft would perform, the
pilots assigned to fly the Firebees
began referring to them as remotely
piloted vehicles (RPVs) instead of
drones. A piloted vehicle, remote or
otherwise, is expected to show intel-
ligence, innovation, and other
human qualities. This term made the
pilots more comfortable by making
it clear that they were still pilots, not
drone operators [6].
In 1976, the Air Force acquired
the AQM-34V to perform electron-
ic warfare ahead of manned attack
aircraft. Up to eight of these Fire-
bee UAVs could be controlled
from one DC-130. By 1987, 13
existing UAV models were used
for surveillance while only one
had an attack role [12].
One of the Air Force goals for the
future is “Maintain Global Aware-
ness” of the activities and capabili-
ties of potential enemies [13]. Most
UAV programs give prominence to
information gathering.
The High-Altitude Endurance
UAV Advanced Concept Technolo-
gy Demonstration program, which
46 | IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE
resulted in the Global Hawk UAV,
represents the latest stage in the dri-
ve toward more altitude and longer
endurance times for reconnaissance
UAVs. The concentrated effort to
develop high-altitude long-
endurance (HALE) UAVs began in
the late 1960s in order to combine
the safety of a spy satellite with the
flexibility and higher resolution of a
manned spy plane [6].
Global Hawk and similar surveil-
lance systems are attractive because
they are “24-hour-a-day capable and
are adverse-weather capable” unlike
manned aircraft that must refuel
more often and land to change crew
[14]. Another advantage to pilotless
aircraft is that they can continue to
operate after being damaged without
posing a risk to any operators [15].
Rather than being a new develop-
ment, however, UAVs have been
considered as U-2 replacements
since Gary Powers was shot down
over the Soviet Union in 1960. Con-
ceptually, these vehicles are not dif-
ferent from their manned counter-
parts; they perform similar missions
in similar ways.
The change from RPV to UAV
denotes a move away from direct
piloting of the reconnaissance vehi-
cles to semi-autonomous control
with the goal of one operator control-
ling multiple vehicles simultaneous-
ly. The Predator UAV, for instance,
currently has three operators for each
vehicle. It is popular in the CIA as
well as in the Air Force not only
because it gives a bird's eye view but
also because it can be safely operat-
ed from halfway across the world.
“Although the Predator was uninhab-
ited, it was very much 'manned' in
the sense that a soldier controlled its
every move, seeing what it saw and,
ultimately, pulling the trigger” [16].
After the Firebee drone and its
descendants showed the capability
to penetrate dense air defenses and
perform limited missions over Viet-
nam, it was suggested that UAVs
would be gradually absorbed into
the USAF force structure. Howev-
er, over 25 years after the predic-
tion of gradual absorption was
made, UAVs have still made little
headway into standard operations
in the Air Force [17].
UCAVs and Smart Munitions:
Unified Development Once More
If UAVs are incorporated into the
U.S. military, their digital tethers to
human operators will not be cut. As
cruise missiles gain two-way com-
munication and UAVs are again
thought of as weapons platforms,
not just eyes in the sky, their devel-
opment tracks have begun to merge.
Search-and-destroy missiles are
the current missile focus for suppres-
sion of enemy air defense missions.
This goal typically entails the most
dangerous part of an air campaign
[18]. Undertaking this operation
along with the two-way communica-
tion technology incorporated into the
Tactical Tomahawk leads to weapons
systems that can search territory, send
gathered information to the base sta-
tion, receive changes in orders, and
destroy targets. These are often
referred to as “smart munitions.”
The latest “smart” UAV is the
Boeing X-45 unmanned combat air
vehicle (UCAV). The goal of the
project is to “demonstrate the tech-
nical feasibility, military utility and
operational value of a UCAV sys-
tem to effectively and affordably
prosecute 21st century lethal and
non-lethal suppression of enemy air
defenses and strike missions within
the emerging global command and
control architecture” [19]. Accord-
ing to Boeing's X-45 program man-
ager, the UCAV is not meant to
compete with any manned plat-
forms [20]. If the X-45 is not com-
peting with bombers, then it must be
competing with missiles.
These visions of smart munitions
and UCAVs are similar in nearly
every aspect, with the main differ-
ence being that the former systems
are designed for one-way trips. The
smart munition has even been
described as “a small UAV ... with
kill power” [21]. In some future pro-
jects, the merging of UCAV and
| FALL 2006
missile concepts, not just technology,
is explicit, such as the AC-17 “Moth-
er-ship.” This is a large aircraft that
carries and launches a dozen UCAVs
at distant targets. This is the current
concept of operations for cruise mis-
siles, except that air-launched cruise
missiles do not return to pick up
another bomb [22]. While the tech-
nological challenges in building an
airborne launch-recovery station for
UCAVs are substantial, the concep-
tual leap would be a small one.
Reconnaissance UAV opera-
tional concepts are more difficult to
categorize because they come in
two different forms. The Air Force
operates its Predators and Global
Hawks at medium to high altitudes
(15 000 feet and 60 000 feet) and
uses them to gather photographic
and video information. The pilots
are far removed from the battlefield
(one operations center is in Las
Vegas, Nevada). While soldiers on
the ground may receive the infor-
mation in real time, they have no
control over the flight path or cam-
era orientation, just as with manned
aircraft [23].
The Army and Marine Corps
have their own reconnaissance UAV
programs which are conceptually
different from traditional and Air
Force UAV systems. These will be
discussed in the next section.
Possible Discontinuities
While progress from aerial torpe-
does to autonomous UCAVs has
been smooth, there are a few places
where current or near-future devel-
opments could break sharply away.
In addition, some possibly revolu-
tionary UAV characteristics can be
recast as trends and long-standing
goals of the U.S. military. These
non-revolutionary ideas are touted
as selling points for UAV research
and development, but are really
reframed goals and concepts from
previous UAV efforts. This section
will point out one example from
each category as illustrations of how
to look at revolutionary claims with
a critical eye.
IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE
Tactical Intelligence
Army and Marine Corps UAV oper-
ations have a different structure from
those in the Air Force, and this struc-
ture gives them potential to spark
dramatic changes. When intelligence
is derived from satellite imagery and
high-flying spy planes, there is a long
loop between when information is
requested and when it is utilized.
With Army and Marine Corps sol-
diers gaining direct control over the
UAVs that deliver their information,
this delay has grown small enough to
change how soldiers collect, process,
and act on information [24].
The Predator does provide real-
time intelligence and offers unlimit-
ed control range through use of
satellite relays. By early 2001, the
Predator had acquired a laser desig-
nator Hellfire-C missile launcher,
which it used to destroy a stationary
Army tank [25]. As pointed out
above, however, the Predator is con-
trolled from remote base stations
and the operators must communicate
through proper channels to the
forces they are supporting. While
this standardization of communica-
tions makes incorporating new plat-
forms easier, the soldier on the
ground sees no difference between a
Predator and a manned asset.
Army and Marine units have
much more direct control over their
UAVs which generally fly below
8000 feet [23]. This improves reac-
tion time and also decreases
reliance on other services to fill
their information needs. It also
allows ground forces to increase
the amount of self-observation and
criticism, which could improve
their effectiveness [24].
The Air Force asked in Spring
2005 to become the executive agent
for all UAV programs in the Depart-
ment of Defense. The Army and
Marine Corps fear that “the Air
Force would intentionally or inad-
vertently undermine the needs of its
sister services in the name of com-
monality and savings” [26].
The disagreement is rooted in
two competing methodologies for
| FALL 2006
UAV command and control. Cur-
rently, most Army and Marine
Corps platforms are organic, mean-
ing they are tightly coupled to the
units that use them. The Air Force
vision is of centralized control
under the joint commander to sim-
plify air traffic control and more
quickly shift resources [27]. Under
current Army and Marine practice,
the possibilities for rapid reaction
and adjustment inherent in local
control of UAV assets may spark a
revolution, especially in the tight
quarters of urban warfare. The Air
Force vision would incorporate
UAVs into the existing air power
methods and practices, negating any
revolutionary potential.
No Human at the Trigger
While removing human decision
making from warfare is not some-
thing that should be undertaken
without careful analysis, it has
already happened to a large extent.
Focusing on the UAV “revolution”
as the turning point in automated
decision-making obscures a much
larger trend.
During World War II, bombers
used Norden bombsights to locate
and attack targets. During a bomb-
ing run, the bombardier could actu-
ally relieve the pilot of control in
order to make best use of his judg-
ment [10]. While airmen did not
choose their targets, they were gen-
erally aware of their actions; when
they dropped bombs at night or
through cloud cover, they knew that
reduced accuracy would cause
bombs to fall off-target.
Cruise and ballistic missiles
introduced unintelligent guidance.
The gyroscopes at the heart of most
navigation systems make no judg-
ments, cannot adapt to mitigating
circumstances, and are susceptible
to many sources of error. London
was spared the full force of Ger-
man V-I attacks during World War
II because a double agent con-
vinced the operators to move the
aimpoint, causing most of the mis-
siles to fall in the countryside [12].
| 47
Unlike the bombardier, technicians
could not observe the results of
their actions, preventing self-criti-
cism and removing the actors from
some of the consequences.
The increasing use of fire-and-for-
get missiles has also removed the
human factor from both target selec-
tion and decisions to attack. By their
very nature, fire-and-forget weapons
do not communicate back and so can-
not ask for clarification if the guidance
systems become confused [10]. The
Patriot missile system, for instance, is
notorious for erroneously firing upon
friendly and non-existent aircraft
despite its human operators [28].
Current work in smart munitions
is focusing on missiles that can
change course or target mid-flight.
Even when a human decision is
required to make any of these
changes, the human interface can be
designed to create a “moral buffer
that diminishes a controller's sense
of responsibility and autonomy”
[29]. This automation bias cedes
effective control over the munitions
to the computer, even when human
intervention is technically necessary.
Of most concern is the use of
automation in bombing where civil-
ians may be present. Precision-
guided munitions currently take
two main forms. The first is a laser-
guided bomb, which moves towards
a target designated by a person who
can see the target and thus is aware
of and responsible for the results.
The second type of precision muni-
tion is guided by the Global Posi-
tioning System towards a pre-pro-
grammed set of coordinates. There
is no way for a pilot to determine
what is at those coordinates, so he
can make no intelligent decisions
about whether to abort the mission.
This disconnect became apparent in
May of 1999, when NATO acciden-
tally bombed the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade. The intended target
was a Yugoslav arms agency, “[b]ut
the detailed, two-year-old map used
for targeting did not show the num-
bers of the buildings on that street,
so the officer used the numbering of
48 | IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE
buildings on parallel streets to mark
what he thought was the Yugoslav
arms agency” [30].
The evolutionary development of
stand-off missiles never underwent
such an examination because the
changes were gradual. This led to a
level of autonomy in weapons that
may not be acceptable in a con-
scious design. Since the Predator,
the current armed UAV of choice,
was not designed to carry weapons,
a discussion of the morality and
accountability of pilotless weapons
has still not taken place. There is a
possibility that the X-45 could pro-
voke such a discussion, but with
explicit limits placed on the vehi-
cle's autonomy, this is unlikely.
When concerns arise about who
is responsible for the results of a
combat action, it is too simplistic to
focus on the pilot. In many cases,
modern pilots have no way of veri-
fying that their actions are correct
and justifiable, so we must look fur-
ther afield. A thorough examination
of who would be responsible for the
use of an autonomous attack UCAV
is necessary, and the results would
be applicable to manned platforms
as well. The determination of the
combat-responsible agent is a revo-
lution-in-waiting, but nothing under
near-term development is likely to
spark any such examination.
Most UAV
Development Evolutionary
Most UAV development has been
evolutionary. Current operational
concepts are not radically different
from their predecessors. Even tech-
nology has been recycled and
repackaged; for instance the TV
guidance systems that were used on
WWII drones resurfaced in the
AGM-65 in 1973. Most pilotless
reconnaissance aircraft are flown
just as manned aircraft would be.
Weaponized pilotless aircraft fall
under standard missile concepts of
fire-and-forget. UCAV systems may
be able to change target during
flight, but so can the Tactical Toma-
hawk cruise missile.
The introduction of small, locally
controlled UAVs deviates from most
pilotless aircraft development, since
these vehicles are prompting real
behavioral change in ground opera-
tions based on real-time control of
surveillance assets. This change has a
revolutionary potential because it
focuses on new ways of executing
tasks, not just improving the perfor-
mance of existing methods.
In addition to finding where revo-
lutions are possible, the evolutionary
framework can also be used to
counter specific arguments about rev-
olutionary potential. The idea that
UAVs present a new and unexamined
danger in their autonomous deploy-
ment of weapons has been investigat-
ed and found to be misleading. While
there truly is danger in removing peo-
ple from decisions involving lethal
force, this trend has been underway
for decades, with UAVs only the lat-
est step. An examination of moral
accountability for all weapons sys-
tems is in order, not just for UAVs.
Extensions
There are other characteristics of
pilotless aircraft that can be exam-
ined using this framework. One
example is the idea that deploying
UAVs will save the lives of pilots
who would otherwise be put at risk.
Another is that pilotless aircraft
offer potential cost savings when
compared to manned aircraft, and
that UCAVs in particular are more
affordable than cruise missiles.
While the idea of saving lives
seems straightforward at first, a
brief example drawn from Predator
operations can show that pilots are
generally safe to begin with and
UAVs increase only success rates.
The Predator UAV was designed
as “a rapidly deployable reconnais-
sance and surveillance” aircraft [31].
It flew over 50 sorties during Opera-
tion Allied Force over Kosovo as a
targeting aid using two cameras and
a synthetic-aperture radar [32].
Predators were used to direct smart
bombs using a laser designator from
altitudes of about 8000 feet while
| FALL 2006
manned aircraft flew above an
“artificial deck” of 15 000 feet. At
these altitudes, the manned aircraft
were safe from ground fire, but often
wound up flying above the clouds
with Predators flying below. In these
cases, Predators enabled more accu-
rate guidance for the bombs, but did
not save any pilots from danger; the
pilots flew above the threat zone
regardless of UAV presence [33].
Future Projections
Extending the trends and consider-
ing the possible revolutions present-
ed above must be coupled with a
look at new technologies that may
change the face of pilotless aircraft.
The constant march towards
smaller components has now
enabled mini- and micro-UAVs,
with maximum altitudes of 250 to
350 meters. These platforms could
fill niches that did not previously
exist, including close-proximity
electronic jamming and gathering
information inside of structures.
Micro-UAV proponents exist not
only inside the military, but within
organizations like Unmanned Vehi-
cle Systems International [34].
Recalling that UAVs first estab-
lished a permanent foothold in a
previously unfilled niche, the target
drone, this is one area where UAV
usage may grow substantially.
Should the necessary reductions in
payload weight and increases in
endurance be realized, these vehi-
cles will increase the speed of the
current tactical-UAV revolution.
Development of the Predator,
Global Hawk, X-45, and other large
UAVs will proceed in small steps. The
X-45 will evolve along lines similar to
the more advanced cruise missile con-
cepts, creating competition for cost
reductions and performance increases
in both programs. The Predator did
not spark any revolutions in 1995
when it entered service and similar
platforms in the future will likely be
used the same way. As long as the Air
Force continues to incorporate its
pilotless systems into the existing
command and control hierarchy for
IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE
manned systems, the programs will
not make large waves. We may see
increased use of the Global Hawk and
Predator instead of manned spy
planes, but the UAVs will be used and
tasked in the same way.
Author Information
The author is on leave from the Sib-
ley School of Mechanical and Aero-
space Engineering, Cornell Univer-
sity, Ithaca, NY 14853. Email:
jms276@cornell.edu.
Acknowledgment
The author would like to thank Pro-
fessors Judith Reppy and Kathleen
Vogel for providing valuable com-
ments, insights, and information.
An earlier version of this article
was presented at ISTAS 2005, Loy-
ola Marymount University, Los
Angeles, CA.
References
[1] B.C. Nalty, Ed., Winged Shield, Winged
Sword: A History of the USAF. Washington, DC:
Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997.
[2] C.L. Barry and E. Zimet, UCAVs-Techno-
logical, Policy, and Operational Challenges,
ser. Defense Horizons. National Defense Uni-
versity: Center for Technology and National
Security Policy, 2001, no. 3.
[3] S.I. Erwin, “Pentagon revamps manage-
ment of unmanned aircraft programs,” Nation-
al Defense, vol. 87, no. 593, p. 30, 2003.
[4] J. Pappalardo, “Unmanned aircraft road-
map reflects changing priorities,” National
Defense, vol. 89, no. 617, Apr. 2005.
[5] S.P. Rosen, Winning the Next War. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991.
[6] L.R. Newcome, Unmanned Aviation: A
Brief History of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics, Inc., 2004.
[7] K.P. Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise
Missile. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air
Univ. Press, 1985.
[8] H.F. York, Race to Oblivion: A Partici-
pant’s View of the Arms Race. New York, NY:
Simon and Schuster, 1971.
[9] L. Davis, “Military significance of Draper’s work
for the Air Force,” in Air Space and Instruments, S.
Lees, Ed. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1963.
[10] M.R. Terry, Historical Dictionary of the Unit-
ed States Air Force and its Antecedents, ser. His-
torical Dictionaries of War, Revolution, and Civil
Unrest. Lanham, MD.: Scarecrow, 1999, vol. 11.
[11] L. Troshinsky, “Program profile: Tactical
Tomahawk,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Rep.,
June 2004.
[12] S.M. Armitage, Unmanned Aircraft, ser.
Brassey's Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Sys-
tems and Technology. London, U.K.: Brassey's
Defence Pubs., 1988, vol. 3.
[13] G.A. Kent and D.A. Ochmanek, A Frame-
| FALL 2006
work for Modernization Within the United States
Air Force. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003.
[14] K. Kresa, “For unmanned systems, the
time has come,” National Defense, vol. 85, no.
560, 2000.
[15] M. Peck, “Global Hawk crashes: Who's to
blame?” National Defense, vol. 87, no. 594, 2003.
[16] J. Matsumura and R. Steeb, “Unmanned
but not untethered: Robots on the future battle-
field,” RAND Rev., Sum. 2005.
[17] S.L. Hall, Weapons Choices and Advanced
Technology: The RPV, ser. Peace Studies Pro-
gram Occasional Papers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Univ., 1978, no. 10.
[18] S.I. Erwin, “Loitering, smart cruise mis-
sile marketed to U.S. Navy,” National Defense,
May 2001.
[19] Boeing Phantom Works, “Boeing/DARPA
demonstrate UCAV interoperability with
manned aircraft,” press rel., Mar. 26 2003;
http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2003/q1
/nr 030326a.html.
[20] S. Erwin, “Unmanned combat aircraft still
in ‘adolescent phase’,” National Defense, vol.
88, no. 599, 2003.
[21] S.I. Erwin, “Air Force wants missiles redirect-
ed in flight,” National Defense, vol. 88, May 2003.
[22] R.M. Clark, “Uninhabited combat aerial
vehicles: Airpower by the people, for the peo-
ple, but not with the people,” Ph.D. dissertation,
School of Advanced Air Power Studies, Air
Univ., Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, June 1999.
[23] E. Schmitt, “Remotely controlled aircraft
crowd dangerous Iraqi and Afghan skies,” New
York Times, vol. CLIV, no. 53175, Apr. 5 2005.
[24] B. West, “Nowhere to hide,” Popular
Mechanics, vol. 182, no. 2, Feb. 2005.
[25] H. Kennedy, “Unmanned aircraft attract
new interest from Pentagon,” National
Defense, vol. 86, no. 575, 2001.
[26] A. Butler and D.A. Fulghum, “U.S. Air
Force wants to be Pentagon’s UAV manager,
but the plan has Army and Navy officials wor-
ried,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, vol.
162, no. 10, p. 22, 2005.
[27] Unattributed, “USAF wants to be Penta-
gon's UAV manager,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, June 2005.
[28] T.A. Postol, “An informed guess about
why Patriot fired upon friendly aircraft and saw
numerous false missile targets during Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom,” Security Studies Program,
M.I.T., Tech. Rep., Apr. 2004.
[29] M.L. Cummings, “Creating moral buffers
in weapon control interface design,” IEEE
Technology & Society Mag., vol. 23, no. 3, pp.
28-33, 41, 2004.
[30] V. Loeb, “C.I.A fires officer over Embassy
bombing,” Washington Post, p. A1, Apr. 9 2000.
[31] J.J. Eash, III, “Plethora of critical combat
systems reaps host of benefits to U.S. forces,”
National Defense, vol. 83, no. 539, 1998.
[32] R. Tiron, “Despite doubts, Air Force
stands by Predator,” National Defense, vol. 86,
no. 577, 2001.
[33] A.H. Cordesman, “the lessons and non-
lessons of the air and missile war in Kosovo,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Tech. rep., 1999.
[34] P. van Blyenburgh, “UAVs - Current situ-
ation and considerations for the way forward,”
in Development and Operation of UAVs for
Military and Civil Applications. NATO
Research and Technology Organization, 2000.
| 49