Neoplatonism and Indian Though

NEOPLATONISM
AND
INDIAN THOUGHT
Edited by
R. Baine Harris
Old Dominion University
International Society
For Neoplatonic Studies
Norfolk, Virginia
STUDIES IN NEOPLATONISM:
ANCIENT AND MODERN
Volume II
R. Baine Harris
Editor
NEOPLATONISM AND INDIAN THOUGHT
"Buddhi in the Bhagavadgita and Psyché in Plotinus" by A. H. Armstrong and R. R. Ravindra is
reprinted from Religious Studies 15 (September 1979) 327-42 by permission of Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, ©1979, Cambridge University Press.
Published by
State University of New York Press, Albany
©1982 International Society for Neoplatonic Studies

All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
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in any manner whatsoever without written permission
except in the case of brief quotations embodied in
critical articles and reviews.
For information, address State University of New York

Press, State University Plaza, Albany, N.Y., 12246
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Neoplatonism and Indian thought.
(Studies in Neoplatonism ; v. 2)
Includes bibliographies and index.
1. Neoplatonism— Addresses, essays, lectures.
2. Philosophy, indic—Addresses, essays, lectures.
I. Harris, R. Baine, 1943- . II. International
Society for Neoplatonic Studies. III. Series.
B517.N46 186'.4 81-21289
ISBN 0-87395-545-5 AACR2
ISBN 0-87395-546-3 (pbk.)
Contents
Preface ΙΧ
Acknowledgements 3111
Introduction
John R. A. Mayer
Indian Wisdom and Porphyry's Search

for a Universal Way
John J. O'Meara
Plotinus and the Upanisads

Lawrence J. Hatab 27
Proclus and the Tejobindu Upanisad

Laurence J. Rosan 45
Buddhi in the Bhagavadgita and
Psyché in Plotinus
A. H. Armstrong and R. R. Ravindra 63
V
vi CONTENTS
The Plotinian One and the Concept of

Paramapurusa in the Bhagavadgita
I. C. Sharma 87
Phraseology and Imagery in

Plotinus and Indian Thought
Richard T. Wallis 101
Meditative States in the Abhidharma

and in Pseudo-Dionysius
David F. T. Rodier 121
Matter and Exemplar: Difference-in-Identity

in Vijnanabhiksu and Bonaventure
John Borelli 137
Cit and Nous

Paul Hacker 161
Matter in Plotinus and Samkara

. , e
181
F . G / ,
rancisco Garcia Bazan
Sarhkara and Eriugena on Causality

Russell Hatton 209
Union with God in Plotinus and Bayazid

Mohammad Noor Nabi 227
Advaita Vedanta and Neoplatonism

R. K. Tripathi 233
The Concept of Human Estrangement in

Plotinism and Samkara Vedänta
Ramakant Sinari 243
CONTENTS vii
Plotinus and Sri Aurobindo:

A Comparative Study
Pritibhushan Chatterji 257
The Influence of Indian Philosophy

on Neoplatonism
C. L. Tripathi 273
A Survey of Modern Scholarly Opinion on

Plotinus and Indian Thought
Albert M. Wolters 293
Neoplatonism, Indian Thought, and

General Systems Theory
John R. A. Mayer 309
Some Critical Conclusions

I. C. Sharma 323
Index 345
Preface
R. Baine Harris

Norfolk, Virginia
All of the papers in this volume were presented or prepared

for presentation at an international conference on “Neopla-
tonism and Indian Thought" held at Brock University, St.
Catharines, Ontario, Canada in October, 1976. The conference
was sponsored jointly by the International Society for Neopla-
tonic Studies and Brock University, and was largely the
product of the efforts of Professor John R. A. Mayer of
Brock University, who arranged primary funding through the
Canada Council, served as co-chairman of the planning com-
mittee, and handled all local arrangements. President Alan
Earp of Brock University also gave the project his full moral
and financial support. Some one hundred scholars, represent-
ing eight nations, participated in the sessions and the confer-
ence was judged to be a success by its planners, sponsors, and
participants. It stimulated interest in the study of Neopla-
tonism, a major objective of I. S. N. S., and it continued the
long-standing involvement in comparative studies of Brock's
philosophy department.
The conference itself, being the first ever held in any
country on the subject, was a pioneering venture. Relatively
1X
x PREFACE
few books and articles comparing the two intellectual tradi-

tions have been written. Although a few first rate specialized
studies, such as Émile Bréhier’s chapter on “L’orientalisme de
Plotin" in his La philosophie de Plotin (Paris, 1928) and J. F.
Staal’s Advaita and Neoplatonism (Madras, 1961) are avail-
able, no major work dealing with the conference theme in a
comprehensive way has yet been produced. Faced with the
fact of the scarcity of scholars who are experts in both
Neoplatonism and Indian thought, the planning committee
decided to have a conference that would allow for an inter-
change of ideas between specialists in Neoplatonism and
specialists in Indian thought. The end result was that most of
the papers accepted for the conference were written by ex-
perts in the one who were willing to explore some aspect of
its connection with the other, and mainly by Western philoso-
phers and classicists willing to investigate Indian thought and
Indian philosophers and Western Indologists willing to investi-
gate Neoplatonism. Discussions after the papers were excep-
tionally lively, and most participants agreed that the sessions
were a Challenging and creative experience.
Two specific objectives were predominant in the minds of
the conference planners. The first and primary one was a
careful consideration of certain concepts and assertions that
appear to be common to both philosophical traditions. Most
of the conference papers relate to this objective. The second
and lesser one was an investigation of the possible historical
influence of Indian sources upon late Greek philosophy, and
specifically upon the Alexandrine Platonists. Although it was
our intention to consider all aspects of Indian thought, most
of the papers refer only to Hinduism. The conference gave
only minor consideration to Indian Buddhism and the Islamic
Indian tradition and no consideration to numerous lesser
Indian traditions.
The papers in this volume are presented for what they are,
namely, the papers of a conference designed as a serious, but
preliminary investigation of the topic. They do not provide an
adequate, balanced, or definitive treatment of the subject, an
PREFACE xi
achievement that must await considerable further investigation

and reflection that hopefully will yet be done in India, Japan,
the United States, Canada, and Europe. They vary in their
degree of scholarship and level of understanding of the various
intellectual traditions, as might be expected. They are, never-
theless, generally quite provocative and informative. They
should be particularly useful to those students who have a
limited knowledge of either Neoplatonism or the various
Indian traditions and who would benefit from a selective
reading of essays which present them on various levels of
sophistication.
It is the hope of the editor that this volume will succeed in
stimulating further interest in the study of the affinities of
Neoplatonism and Indian thought and will lead to additional
scholarly research on the subject both in the East and in the
West.
Acknowledgements
The editor wishes to indicate his special appreciation for

the various individuals who have assisted in the production of
this volume. Dr. Heinz K. Meier, Dean of the School of Arts
and Letters, and Dr. Warren Matthews, Chairman of the
Department of Philosophy of Old Dominion University have
provided both moral and financial support. They were espe-
cially helpful in providing funding for the preparation of the
manuscripts and camera-ready copy. Gladys Blair, Penny Haws
and Sue Massie served as research assistants in editing the
original manuscripts, and Joseph Winfield did much of the
typesetting. Final editing, production of camera-ready copy,
design of the book, and layout are the work of Tom Rich.
Professor Woodrow W. Moore, of Old Dominion University’s
Foreign Language and Literature Department, generously
translated Professor Bazan’s lengthy article from Spanish into
English.
xill
Introduction
John KR. A. Mayer
Brock University
St. Catharines, Ontario
While the present volume is an edited record of the pro-

ceedings of the Second International Congress of the Interna-
tional Society for Neoplatonic Studies held at Brock Univer-
sity in St. Catharines, Ontario in October, 1976, it is also
much more than that. The Congress had for its theme Neopla-
tonism and Indian Thought, and this for very good reasons.
Firstly, it is the view of the organizers of the meeting that
comparative philosophy is a field of study to which far less
attention has been devoted than it warrants. Philosophical
development can be understood not merely as innovation, the
invention of new and heretofore unthought of systems, meth-
ods and views, but also as recovery of that wisdom from the
past whose significance has become lost, occluded from view,
due perhaps largely to the gradual transformation of the
meaning of key terms in the language in which it was trans-
mitted.
Secondly, throughout intellectual history there has been an
interplay between the unitive vision which has provided a har-
monization of contrasts, revealing the disparate and seemingly
2 JOHN R. A. MAYER
disjointed aspects of experience as grounded in a common ma-

trix, and the analytic scrutiny which searches out contrasts,
criticizes, defines and dissects. The contemporary world is
largely fascinated with this latter act, while the Neoplatonic
tradition invites the contemplative development of the former
state. It is clear that the Neoplatonist understands his tradi-
tion as a healing alternative to the fragmented dualisms, plu-
ralisms, apperceptions of the world as chaos, disorder and ran-
domness. This volume, then, is not merely a scholarly report,
although it is that, too, but an occasion to draw attention to
an often ignored but important tradition.
To quote Simone Weil:
It seems that Europe requires genuine contacts

with the East in order to remain spiritually alive. It
is also true that there is something in Europe which
opposes the Oriental spirit, something specifically
Western, . . . 210 we are in danger of being devoured
by it....
European civilization is a combination of the
Oriental spirit with its opposite, and in that com-
bination there needs to be a high proportion of the
former. This proportion is today not nearly high
enough. We need an injection of the Oriental spirit.!
This book, then, also proposes to be a partial response to

the above call.
Neoplatonists today can be divided into two groups, with a

number of individuals who fit both categories. On the one
hand we have the scholars of the tradition, people interested
in the reconstruction and interpretation of the texts of
ancients, such as Plotinus or Proclus, or of more recent Neo-
platonic authors. On the other, there are those who recognize
the perennial value, and hence modern-day relevance, of a
monistic, non-materialistic, mystically inspired, but intelli-
gently developed and cogently presented system of thought.
They yearn to express such a worldview engagingly so as to
INTRODUCTION 3
bring to a world dominated by materialistic, pluralistic, rela-

tivistic and nihilistic philosophies the challenge and inspiration
of an entirely differently textured approach to the nature and
meaning of experience—both mundane and contemplative.
Most contemporary thinkers are firmly rooted in their convic-
tion of the ontological and metaphysical primacy of the
empirical, sensory and common-sense domain. Life, conscious-
ness, and world-process are understood as composed conse-
quences of insensate ingredients. To this Neoplatonists coun-
terpose the image of a Source, from Whose transcendent
integral center all lesser and determinate forms of being
emanate. Of course there are individual variations and differ-
ences in just how such adumbrations are presented by differ-
ent individual authors. But it is the concern of the second
group to develop interest in this tradition in order to evoke
by means of new and felicitous formulations the recovery and
re-living of the existential basis of the insights of the ancient
sages.
It is salutary to discover that the non-dual tradition has had
a flowering not only in the 4th and 5th centuries of Western
thought, but has had remarkable expression and influence on
the culture and civilization of India. While the probability of
occasional cross-fertilization of ideas cannot be ruled out, it is
nonetheless safe to say that Eastern and Western scholars,
sages and seers developed similar philosophies and claims
largely in isolation one from the other. Their frequently iden-
tical metaphors and similes, therefore, confirm the parallel
character of their traditions.
The general mtellectual climate is not sympathetic today to
the Neoplatonic tradition. And yet, one can find evidence for
the persistency and appeal of the tradition in our own days.
Apart from scholars, Aldous Huxley and Christopher Isher-
wood could be named as influential literary masters commit-
ted to this heritage, as well as the countless young people,
who seek to give content and meaning to their lives by under-
standing its objective as the reunion of the separated
4 JOHN R. A. MAYER
individual with his original source, by means of devotion,

purification and compassion.
Thus, this volume is presented not merely to the world of
scholars, but to the serious layman, to whom it can provide in
addition to information about the past, glimpses of that
future in which educated men and women will consider as
their own not only the narrow confines of the mainstream of
their immediate culture, however productive, but rather, the
breadth of the adventures of the human spirit, throughout his-
tory.
The present introduction did not enumerate and comment
on the individual contributions of this volume, since that task
is ably done by Dr. I. C. Sharma, in the concluding, summar-
izing essay. For those readers who may wish to have a guide
toward a selective reading of this volume, we recommend tur-
ning to it first.?
In fine, the organizers of the Congress, the officers of the
International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, and the contri-
butors to this volume wish to express their gratitude for the
support of those agencies and institutions without which
neither the Congress nor this volume would have been possi-
ble. Notably, the Canada Council, the Universities’ Grants
Commission of India, Brock University and Old Dominion
University should be specified, although many other Universi-
ties assisted by enabling their faculty to participate.
NOTES
1. Simone Weil, Selected Essays, 1934-43, ed. and trans. Richard Rees
(London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 205.
2. See pp. 323ff.
Indian Wisdom and
Porphyry’s Search
for a
Universal Way
John J. O’Meara
University College Dublin

Dublin, Ireland
Porphyry, the disciple of Plotinus to whom we are indebted

for the Enneads, the record of his master’s teaching,
flourished towards the end of the third century A.D. It was a
time when men were concerned with the notion of ‘salvation’!
and were particularly anxious to discover some ‘saviour’, some
mediator between God and man, who would be the vehicle by
which mankind as a whole might be saved. ‘Salvation’ had, of
course, different meanings for different groups, as indeed had
‘sod’ and ‘mediator’. Christianity pointed to Christ as the
Mediator, God become man, the way.
Porphyry rejected the claims made on behalf of Christ and
so attracted the attention of Saint Augustine, who was born
some fifty years after Porphyry’s death. Augustine discusses
the matter towards the end of the tenth book of his City of
God and in doing so quotes passages from a work of Porphy-
ry in which he deals with the return of the soul. It is from
one of these quotations that I take my text:
When Porphyry says... that no single sect had been

found that contained a universal way for the libera-
5
6 JOHN J. O'MEARA
tion of the soul, deriving from some true philoso-

phy, or the mores and disciplina of the Indi, or the
‘ascent’ of the Chaldaeans, or any other way, and
that this way had not as yet come to his notice
through historical knowledge, he without any doubt
admits that some such way exists.’’”
Augustine further asserts that Porphyry held firmly that Provi-

dence could not fail to provide such a single universal way for
the soul’s liberation: for Porphyry it was merely a matter of
finding and identifying it.
It is clear from the context in Augustine (whose claims to
be a Latin-writing Neoplatonist are variously, but must be
seriously, considered) that the liberation of the soul that is in
question is its liberation from the cycle of existences as
understood by Plato and Plotinus. While these, according to
Augustine, accepted that a man might be re-born as an
animal, Porphyry demurred: he would allow only that a man
might be re-born as man.’ He held also that the soul could
escape altogether from the cycle. ‘God gave the soul to the
world so that when it got to know the evils of matter it
would run back to the Father and at length not be held by
the polluted contagion of such things."^ Escape for the indi-
vidual soul, according to Augustine’s report of Porphyry’s
views, became permanent and absolute when it was cleansed
of all evils: it would then be established with the Father and
would never again suffer the evils of this world.
The problem did not arise with the individual who might
follow the way of philosophy. But only a few were capable of
this: some universal way by which the souls of the masses
might be freed from the cycle must, Porphyry held, be pro-
vided by a providence which took such tender care of things
of so much less importance.
Having dismissed philosophy, including his own Neoplaton-
ism, aS a universal way of salvation Porphyry looked for such
a way to the “mores and disciplina of the Indi," the ascent of
the Chaldaeans, and other such systems. His Letter to Anebo,
INDIAN WISDOM AND PORPHYRY’S SEARCH 7
an Egyptian priest, a passage from which is quoted earlier in

the tenth book of Augustine’s City of God is evidence that
among such other systems was the Egyptian, and that in it
Porphyry was disappointed.
The ‘ascent’ of the Chaldaeans requires just a little more
notice here, if only because so much attention is given by
Augustine throughout the City of God to Porphyry’s ambiva-
lent attitude to the Chaldaean oracles.? These oracles, accor-
ding to Porphyry, claimed that demons could purge and
cleanse the spirital or pneumatic soul—but not the real, the
intellectual soul:
You [Porphyry], being a philosopher, we must

assume, can see that for you no such rite of
cleansing by theurgic art is necessary in the least.
Yet for all that you bring in such rites for the bene-
fit of others. . . . you do it by decoying those who
are incapable of becoming philosophers into prac-
tices that you admit are of no value to you, who
are capable of higher things. Evidently you want all
who are turned away from the pursuit of philoso-
phic excellence, which is too lofty for all but a few,
to seek out theurgists on your recommendation, in
order to obtain catharsis at least of their spirital,
though not, to be sure, of their intellectual soul.
And since the number of those who have no
stomach for philosophy is incomparably the greater,
more are forced to resort to your clandestine and
illegal teachers than to the Platonic schools.’
Porphyry, then, did not find the universal way of salvation
in that minor “ascent” of the pneumatic soul only, which was
operated by demons in return for sacrifices made to them and
which was commended by the Chaldaean oracles.
Augustine further reports that Porphyry held it as certain
that only the Principles, the principia, that is, in Neoplatonic
terms, the Father (the One) and the Father's Nous (Πατρικὸς
vous) could cleanse souls so that they could escape rebirth
and abide forever with the Father.?
8 JOHN J. OMEARA
One must emphasize that Porphyry’s discussion of all man-

kind’s escape from rebirth is put in a context by Augustine
which centres on the characteristically Roman pre-occupation
with vita beata. The first five books of the City of God
refutes the claim that happiness in this life is ensured by the
worship of many gods. The next five books, of which the
tenth (with which we are most concerned here) is the last,
refutes the claim, represented, Augustine says, mainly by Pla-
tonists, that happiness in the life after death is ensured by the
worship of many gods. Escape from the cycle of existences is
essential—since, where there is any possibility of a return to
body, happiness cannot be complete and eternal. The nerve,
therefore, of Porphyry’s enquiry, as represented by Augustine,
is escape from palingenesis.
When Porphyry then, according to Augustine, in looking
for a universal way of salvation, turned to the mores ac
disciplina Indorum, he had abandoned the hope of finding it
in any system of true philosophy—with emphasis on philoso-
phy as experienced by himself. He was turning to something
that was not exclusively philosophical. The ‘‘ascent” of the
Chaldaeans was the second such system he specified. The first,
however, was the mores ac disciplina Indorum. According to
the context, what Porphyry was looking for when he turned
to the Indi was a practical system of providing for all man-
kind a way of escape forever from rebirth. This does not in
the least imply either that there was no true philosophy—in
Porphyry’s terms—in India or that Porphyry was not aware of
the position. This is simply the limiting context of the topic.
Indeed insofar as Augustine may reflect Porphyry’s views on
the point, the Indian Gymnosophists were said explicitly to
philosophize: nudi philosophentur, unde gymnosophistae
nominantur.?
It takes even less than my limited acquaintance with Indian
philosophies and religions to know that the /ndi have been at
all times greatly preoccupied with practical methods of escap-
ing from the cycle of existences. Of the six classical systems
of philosophy the Sànkhya, Vai$esika and Mimamsa at least
are reported to have concerned themselves with salvation of

one kind or another. That great Hindu text, the Bhagavadgita,
teaches the three paths to salvation. Jainism aims at isolation
(kaivalya): Buddhism aims at nirvana in which all distinctions
cease to exist.!? Indian systems of religion always had a strong
element also of ritual purification and emphasized, to a degree
not so frequent in the West, a very rigorous asceticism.!!
The notion of the incarnation of a deity to do a service to
mankind is prominent in Indian texts. Thus in one branch of
Hinduism Visnu is credited with ten avatara—as fish, tortoise,
boar, man-ion, dwarf, ParaSurama, Rama and Krsna, the
Buddha and finally (yet to come) Kalki who will descend on
the earth to destroy the wicked and restore purity.!* And in
that development of Buddhism called the Great Vehicle
(Mahayana) the aim of the Buddhist monk is not the old goal
of the arhat, that is illumination and entering into nirvana and
being extinguished, but of the bodhisattva, that is illumination
and the declining, when it is possible, of entering into nirvana
and rather giving oneself to lead others to nirvana by teaching
and example.!?
Finally, the idea of two ways to salvation, one conventional
and visible, the other higher and absolute, is found among the
followers of the Great Vehicle, who associated the absolute
way with themselves, and the conventional with the followers
of the Little Vehicle (Hinayana).'*
| have ventured the preceding remarks solely to indicate
that a complex of notions centring on a universal way of
salvation is very prominent indeed in inherited systems of
Indian philosophy and religion.
But one may ask if Porphyry searching in his day for such
notions could have found them readily? This is the relevant
question for us who are concerned with the historical
confrontation of Indian wisdom and Neoplatonism. On the
matter of the mutual influences of India and the Graeco-
Roman world one must be on one's guard against great gener-
alizations. As Filliozat remarked: ‘Entre temps s'était sub-
stitué au préjugé de l'Inde institutrice du genre humain, celui
10 JOHN J. OMEARA
de l'Inde fermée, de l'Inde ayant créé une civilisation en vase

clos." It is possible, as we may see from Derrett's thesis
that the Questions of Milinda were influenced significantly by
Western thought,!® that our generalizations may now be run-
ning to a full circle. Here, however, I shall keep as far as pos-
sible to facts as hard as I can find them.
It is hardly necessary to dwell on the contacts of Palestine,
where Porphyry was born in 232/3 A.D., or Greece, where he
studied at Athens under Longinus, or Italy where he was the
disciple of Plotinus, with India in the centuries immediately
preceding his birth. Few have not heard of the 120 ships that
sailed eastward to India every year at the beginning of the
Christian era. Trade with the Roman Empire had assumed
great importance in the economic life of southern India, as,
for example, the excavations at Virapattanam (the Poducé of
Ptolemy?) are reported to indicate. But there were many
other marts where Graeco-Roman traders operated, as Tamil
literature attests for the period 70-140 A.D. Direct Graeco-
Roman trade is said—perhaps imprudently " —to have de-
clined from around 200 A.D., that is shortly before the time
of Porphyry's birth. But indirect trade continued through the
Arabians and Persians. Porphyry, born in Palestine, is unlikely,
therefore, not to have some near contemporary and contem-
porary knowledge of India and the Indi. Indeed, as we shall
presently see, we know that he had.
He also had, of course, access to quite a considerable
amount of published material which began to accumulate
after the invasion of Alexander and Nearchus's account of
India and of his voyage, which took place around 312 B.C.
Foremost amongst this was the 'Ivóuca of Megasthenes, who
was for some time resident at the court of Chandragupta in
Patna towards the beginning of the third century B.C. Near-
chus and Megasthenes were used very freely indeed in the
Ἰνδικά of Arrian. who died around 175 A.D. and by others.
The relatively great size and range of the literature available in
the Greek and Latin languages on India and the Indi in
Porphyry's day can very conveniently be judged by English
speakers from the series of compilations of relevant texts in

translation done by J.W. McCrindle towards the end of the
last century. His translations may not always be accurate,
and one must in any case check them against the best texts in
each case now available—but he deserves mention here as one
who did a great service to those who wish to see how the
classical world viewed the world of India. Among pre-
Porphyrian authors quoted by McCrindle on the Indi and
India at some length are the Pseudo-Callisthenes, Diodorus
Siculus, Strabo, Pliny, Dion Chrysostom, Aelian and Clement
of Alexandria.
There is much reference in this literature to the mores ac
disciplina of the Indi. Megasthenes himself made religion and
the customs of India major parts of his treatment. Inciden-
tally he was criticized on the ground that his Greek back-
ground in philosophy and myth made him an unreliable obser-
ver, inventing parallels between two quite different cultures.
We should be suitably warned! We, for our part, have to con-
cern ourselves principally with how, historically, the Graeco-
Romans saw the Indi, not how they ought to have seen them.
The Graeco-Roman world in Porphyry’s own, third, century
is described by Festugiére,!? borrowing the term from Hippo-
lytus, as καταπλάγεις, smitten, by what he calls the mirage
oriental—the idea that the Easterns had better and purer ideas
of the deity, communicated to them in more than just ration-
al ways. Taking his cue from Festugiére, Filliozat, despite his
awareness that Eastern and Western doctrines might develop
independently, attempted to show that Hippolytus of Rome
(died 235) learned the doctrines of the Upanisads through
Christian heretics affected by Eastern ideas, and expounded
them in his Philosophoumena, dated between 222 and 235
A.D.: “ce sont donc les Upanisad, les Upanisad seules, et
spécialement la Maitry-up, qui sont à la source de l'informa-
tion d'Hippolyte sur les doctrines bráhmaniques."?? Hippo-
lytus could not, Filliozat contends, have got his information
from such as Megasthenes: “165 principales données de son
12 JOHN J. OMEARA
exposé, les précisions relatives à la nature du Θεός des Brahm-

anes, ne se retrouvent pas dans les fragments qui nous sont
conservés de Mégasthéne."?! While one might well have re-
serves on Filliozat’s thesis of Christian heretics importing the
doctrine of the Upanisads to the West, it is probably safe to
accept with him that Rome—and a fortiori Alexandria ?? —had
concrete information on the philosophy of the Brahmans. If
the doctrine of the Upanisads was available towards the mid-
dle of the third century in Rome and Alexandria, then
Porphyry can hardly have escaped knowing it.
Here one should at least mention Dihle's interesting
thesis? that every author likely to have had stylistic ambi-
tions avoided any allusion to contemporary or late Hellenistic
India. According to the standards of literary tradition in the
time of the Roman Empire, India was to all intents and pur-
poses the country Alexander subjugated and Megasthenes lived
in, and nothing else. On the other hand India as represented,
for example, in early Christian writings, even in those which
have some literary and stylistic pretensions, exactly corre-
sponds to all the information which had been collected by
sailors and tradesmen during the first two centuries A.D.,
information which had been used by the geographers of the
same period but neglected by the men of letters. If Dihle’s
thesis is correct then Porphyry and his contemporaries could
have known very much more about India and the Indi than
they transmitted to us.
Among the written sources from which Porphyry did draw
his information on the mores ac disciplina precisely was
almost certainly Philostratus’s work In Honour of Apollonius
of Tyana which I shall refer to as Philostratus’s Apollonius of
Tyana. The second and third books of this work deal with
Apollonius’s romanticized visit to India and comprehensive
conversations with the sage Iarchas, who claimed to have been
King Ganges in a previous existence, at a time when the
Ethiopians were still, he said, being an Indian race, living in
India. Porphyry at any rate refers to this work in his own
Life of Pythagoras. This is not surprising since Philostratus’s
life overlaps with Porphyry’s. Philostratus lived in Tyre (which

is either Porphyry’s birth-place or near it) from 216 A.D. and
subsequently went to Athens around 219 A.D., a city where
Porphyry later lived. Indeed the Apollonius of Tyana was
published in Tyre itself, while Philostratus was living there.
We have regretfully no similar reasons for having an opinion
that Porphyry had available to him in any way the Questions
of Milinda, a Buddhist dialogue composed in Pali sometime
after 100 B.C.—but perhaps as late as the second century A.D.
Milinda, probably the person known to the Greeks as Menan-
der, king of a Greek territory in India around 100 B.C. clearly
symbolizes the cultural union of Indians and Greeks. But we
do not know if this very important document on the Greek
and Indian encounter in wisdom was known or indeed linguis-
tically accessible to Porphyry or his Western contem-
poraries.^^ We leave it, therefore, out of account here.
We have, however, the testimony of Porphyry's own de
abstinentia IV.16-18, that he had been briefed, especially on
the Brahmans, by one Bardesanes (Bar Daisan), called the
Babylonian by Porphyry, who is said to have acquired his
information on India from conversing with the members of an
embassy from India, possibly one sent to the Emperor Elaga-
balus who reigned from 218 to 222 A.D. In addition, he lived
at Edessa next to the Persian frontier. Here, therefore, is Por-
phyry himself on the Brahmans and Samanaeans.?? Although
the quotation is rather long it may be excused since it gives in
the clearest and firmest manner an idea of the kind of thing
Porphyry could associate with the mores ac disciplina
Indorum:
But since we have already made mention of one of

the foreign nations which is known to fame, and
righteous and believed to be pious towards the gods,
we shall proceed to further particulars regarding
them.
For since in India the body politic has many
divisions, one of them is the order of the holy
14 JOHN J. OMEARA
sages, whom the Greeks are wont to call the

Gymnosophists, and of whom there are two sects—
the Brahmans and the Samanaeans. The Brahmans
form the leading sect, and succeed by right of birth
to this kind of divine wisdom as to a priesthood.
The Samanaeans, on the other hand, are selected,
and consist of persons who have conceived a wish
to devote themselves to divine wisdom. Their style
of life is described as follows by Bardesanes, a
Babylonian who lived in the days of our fathers,
who met with those Indians who accompanied Dan-
damis on his embassy to the emperor. For all the
Brahmans are of one race, all of them deducing
their origin from one (common) father and one
(common) mother. The Samanaeans, again, are not
of their kindred, but are collected, as we have said,
from all classes of the Indians. The Brahman is not
subject to the authority of the king, and pays no
tribute with others to the state. Of these philoso-
phers, some live on the mountains, and others on
the banks of the river Ganges. The mountain Brah-
mans subsist on fruits and cow-milk, curdled with
herbs, while the dwellers by the Ganges subsist on
the fruits which grow in great plenty on the banks
of that river, for the soil produces an almost con-
stant succession of fresh fruits—even much wild rice
which grows spontaneously, and is used for food
when there is a lack of fruit. But to taste anything
else, or so much as to touch animal food, is held to
be the height of impurity and impiety. They incul-
cate the duty of worshipping the deity with pious
reverence. The whole day and greater part of the
night they set apart for hymns and prayers to the
gods. Each of them has a hut of his own in which
he passes as much time as possible in solitude. For
the Brahmans have an aversion to society and much
discourse, and when either occurs, they withdraw
and observe silence for many days, and they even
frequently fast. The Samanaeans, on the other hand,
are, as we have observed, collected from the people
at large, and when any one is to be enrolled in their

order, he presents himself before the magistrates of
the city or of the village to which he happens to
belong, and there resigns all his possessions and his
other means. The superfluous parts of his person are
then shaved off, and he puts on the Samanaean
robe and goes away to join the Samanaeans, taking
no concern either for his wife or his children, if he
has any, and thinks of them no more. The king
takes charge of his children and supplies their
wants, while his relatives provide for his wife. The
life of the Samanaeans is like this. They live outside
the city, and spend the whole day in discourse on
divine things. Their houses and temples are founded
by the king, and in them are stewards who receive a
‘fixed allowance from the king for the support of
the inmates of the convents, this consisting of rice,
bread, fruits, and pot-herbs. When the convent bell
rings, all strangers then in the house withdraw, and
the Samanaeans entering offer up prayers. Prayer
over, the bell rings a second time, whereupon the
servants hand a dish to each (for two never eat out
of the same vessel) The dish contains rice, but
should one want a variety he is supplied with vege-
tables, or some kind of fruit. As soon as dinner,
which is soon despatched, is over, they go out and
go to their usual occupations. They are neither
allowed to marry nor to possess property. They and
the Brahmans are held in such high honour by the
other Indians that even the king himself will visit
them to solicit their prayers when the country is in
danger or distress, and their counsel in times of
emergency.
Both classes take such a view of death that they
endure life unwillingly, as being a hard duty exacted
by nature, and accelerate the release of their souls
from their bodies; and frequently, when their health
is good and no evil assails or forces them, they take
their leave of life. They let their intention to do so
be known to their friends beforehand, but no one
16 JOHN J. O'MEARA
offers to prevent them; on the contrary, all deem

them happy, and charge them with messages to
their dead relatives, so firm and true is the belief in
their own minds, and in the minds of many others,
that souls after death have intercourse with each
other. When they have heard the commissions
entrusted to them, they commit their body to the
flames with a view to sever the soul from the body
in completest purity, and then they die amid hymns
resounding their praises, for their most attached
friends dismiss them to death with less reluctance
than it gives us to part with our fellow-citizens who
set out on a distant journey. They weep, but it is
for themselves, because they must continue to live,
and those whose death they have witnessed they
deem happy in their attainment of immortality.
And neither among those Samanaeans nor among
the Brahmans whom I have already mentioned, has
any sophist come forward, as have so many among
the Greeks, to perplex with doubts by asking where
would we be if every one should copy their exam-
ple."
This passage was quoted almost verbatim by Stobaeus, and

so must have been considered by him at least to be an
obvious passage for selection from Porphyry—and others—on
what they had to report on the Theosophists of India. The
gist of the passage can be summed up as follows: the term
Gymnosophists is applied to both Brahmans and Samanaeans.
Both are concerned with divine wisdom; both live a life of
righteousness; both are vegetarians; both engage in much
prayer; and both aim at happily freeing their souls from their
bodies as soon as possible, so that they may enter into an
immortality in which they will encounter former friends. The
Brahmans, whether those who live in the mountains or on the
banks of the Ganges, are called philosophers and regard it as
impure and impious even to taste anything other than fruit,
cow-milk, rice or herbs or even to touch animal food; they
live in silent solitude as far as possible and impose fasting on
themselves if they have observed this less than they consider

proper; they spend practically all their time praying to the
gods. The Samanaeans, on the other hand, live in community
outside a city, abandoning all possessions and care of family;
don a special robe and shave off superfluous parts of their
persons; eat only rice, bread, fruit or pot-herbs; spend their
days in discourse on divine things and have formal prayers.
One can then, I think, say that when Porphyry speaks of
looking not to any philosophy taken very strictly but to the
mores ac disciplina Indorum for a universal way of the soul’s
deliverance from the cycle of existences, these were at least
the kind of mores and disciplina that he had in mind. Both
terms, mores and disciplina, apply to the regime of righteous-
ness and purification that Porphyry himself describes in rela-
tion to the Gymnosophists. But the term disciplina can, and
almost certainly does here, imply more. Augustine uses the
term as meaning 'doctrine'—and, of course, this is a frequent
meaning of the term.?" Indian righteousness and purification
were related to philosophical doctrines—the existence of ‘gods’
(however different the Indians were from Porphyry’s ‘gods’),
the duty of worshipping deity, the immortality of the soul
(again however differently that immortality might be under-
stood), and, above all, the possibility of escaping from the
cycle of existences.
Here, then, we have evidence of the impact of Indian
‘philosophy’—loosely considered—and mores on an important
Neoplatonist. If the range of his knowledge of and interest in
Indian wisdom are not altogether distorted by the context
from which we have elucidated them—and this is, of course, a
possibility—then we are here given firsthand and valuable evi-
dence on the theme of our conference.
Since Augustine in the City of God implies that other
philosophers, including specifically the ‘Indi’, hold a number
of philosophical doctrines which he outlined as corresponding
to those of the Platonists, that is, including Plotinus and
Porphyry among others, one is obliged to consider whether
Augustine knew of these doctrines as being held by the Indi
18 JOHN J. O'MEARA
from Porphyry or aliunde. In either case—since Augustine

could claim to be a Neoplatonist too—the matter is of interest
to us.
In the eighth book of the City of God*® Augustine refers
to the philosophy of all nations and isolated for his attention
only those who hold the following doctrines: that there is a
God who is the author of created things, the light by which
things are known, and the good for which things are done;
the principle of existence for us, the truth of doctrine, and
the happiness of life. It is easy to see that this is a very
Platonic presentation of these doctrines, organized as they are
in accordance ultimately with the Platonic classification of
Physics, Logic and Ethics. Moreover Augustine elaborates at
length details of these three great headings, where, in my
view, it would be quite unjustifiable for us here to follow
him. But the general doctrine that there was a creator who is
the source of illumination for us and also is our final good,
even if couched in Platonic terms, is apparently attributed by
Augustine to the Indi and we may accept this with some con-
fidence: among those who hold these propositions he lists
Platonists and Pythagoreans and “in addition such men of
other nations who were regarded as wise men or philosophers
and who were persuaded and taught the doctrines men-
tioned." The other nations then specified are Atlantic Liby-
ans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldaeans, Scythians, Gauls,
Spaniards.
I know of nothing written on Augustine’s knowledge of the
Indi—but I must give here some idea of how independent of
Porphyry he could have been. Of course, he had available to
him quite independently much of the information on the Indi
that was available to Porphyry and some, undoubtedly, that
was not available. It is known, for example, that the accession
of Julian the Apostate, a Neoplatonist also, to the imperial
throne in 361 A.D., seven years after Augustine was born, was
marked with much interest among the Indi. Ammianus
Marcellinus tells us that Embassies from all quarters flocked
to the Emperor, the Indian nations vying with emulous zeal in
sending their foremost men with presents as far as from the

Maldives and Ceylonese. To what extent this stimulated inter-
est in Italy and Africa in India and the Indi we cannot know.
But we might mention, however, for example, that curious
document Περὶ τῶν τῆς Ἰνδίας ἐθνῶν kai τῶν Βραχμάνων
preserved under the name of Palladius?? a Latin translation
of which is attributed to Saint Ambrose.?? Augustine regarded
Ambrose as his spiritual father when he lived at Milan, the
Emperor's see, for some years from 384. Ambrose, moreover,
was at the centre, it is now thought, of a Christian-
Neoplatonist circle at Milan which he probably brought to the
notice of Augustine. If Ambrose did do such a translation,*!
then it would very likely be an important recent source for
Augustine on the mores of the Indi and the Brahmans, even
if, as might appear, it had little to add that was not already
to be read in Porphyry, for example, or Strabo.?? We have
evidence, in any case, that Augustine at least knew of Philo-
stratuss Apollonius of Tyana. He cannot but have known
something of the sections of Philostratus's work that describe
miracles performed by Apollonius, since he received a letter
from Marcellinus—the very person to whom the City of God
is addressed—- (Epistle cxxxvi) in which is set forth an account
of the controversy between Hierocles and Eusebius of Cae-
sarea concerning these very miracles. Moreover in Epistle
cii.32 Augustine refers explicitly to Apollonius of Tyana as a
magus and philosopher and to the wonderful things attributed
to him.
It can be seen, therefore, that when Augustine includes the
Indi in his list of philosophers who hold that there is a God
who is the author of created things, the light by which things
are known, and the good for which things are done, he may
have, but need not have, depended on Porphyry. Such views
are indeed to be found either explicitly or implicitly in the
Classical sources available to both Porphyry and Augustine
that I have indicated. Megasthenes, for example, is quoted by
Strabo as follows:
20 JOHN J. OMEARA
... yet on many points their [i.e. of the Indi] opin-

ions coincide with those of the Greeks, for like
them they say that the world had a beginning, and
is liable to destruction, and is in shape spherical,
and that the Deity who made it, and who governs
it, is diffused through all its parts. They hold that
various first principles operate in the universe, and
that water was the principle employed in the
making of the world. In addition to the four ele-
ments there is a fifth agency, from which the
heaven and the stars were produced. The earth is
placed in the centre of the universe. Concerning
generation, and the nature of the soul, and many
other subjects, they express views like those main-
tained by the Greeks. They wrap up their doctrines
about immortality and future judgement, and kin-
dred topics, in allegories, after the manner of Plato.
Such are his [Megasthenes's] statements regarding
the Brahmans. ??
Megasthenes also reported that among the Brahmans was a

sect that held that “God was light, but not such light as we
see with the eye, nor such as the sun or fire, but God is with
them the Word—by which they mean...the discourse of
reason, whereby the hidden mysteries of knowledge are dis-
cerned by the wise."?^ And, as Porphyry himself reports in
the text from the de abstinentia already quoted, the Brah-
mans spend almost all their working hours worshipping the
deity.??
Despite these more philosophical beliefs which I have been
able only in a general way to describe and only very tenta-
tively to associate from the City of God with either Porphyry
or Augustine, the latter, always bearing in mind his main
thesis, nevertheless includes the Indi among those who, what-
ever their more worthy beliefs, resorted in fact also to the
cult of many gods.
Philostratuss Apollonius of Tyana indeed attests clearly
that the Indi had a range of minor gods in charge of various
INDIAN WISDOM AND PORPHYRY'S SEARCH 2]
divisions of activity: ‘there are many gods in the heavens,

many in the sea, many more in spring and river floods, and
many whose province is earth, and some beneath the
earth." * These gods delighted in sacrifices and various
appellations. Moreover the Indi practised divination: ‘the
devotees of divination became inspired under its influence and
contribute to the salvation of mankind."37 Yet the Apollon-
ius of Tyana, though it purports to give a comprehensive sur-
vey of all Brahman teaching, public and private,?? does not
tell us of any universal way for the delivery of the soul from
the cycle of existences. And although Porphyry is said by
Augustine to have searched for such a universal way in the
mores ac disciplina Indorum he did not find it there.
Joseph Bidez and Franz Cumont in their *Préface" to Les
Mages Hellénisés proclaim that one of the great problems of
the history of ancient thought is ‘celle des rapports de l’hellé-
nisme et de l'Orient'.?? The greatness of the problem is ample
justification for the holding of a conference such as this. It is
also, I hope, some justification for exploring an approach to
the problem on a front even as narrow as I have attempted.
I believe that I have sufficiently alerted you to the fact
that my primary source, Augustine, is interested in the City
of God in what Porphyry has to say about the Indi only in
relation to whether or not the Indi teach some universal way
of delivering mankind from the cycle of existences. He does
not, therefore, refer to all of Porphyry's acquaintance with
the Indi and their wisdom, or even such of this as was per-
haps known to him.
The evidence, however, which I have brought forward sug-
gests, taken by itself, that the Neoplatonist Porphyry, aware
as he was of the traditional Greek regard for the wisdom and
philosophy of the Indi, was strongly impressed by the organ-
ized piety, abstinence, and general ascetic purgation of the
Indi, intended to result finally in a total separation of the
soul from body of whatever kind. He was curious to discover
if they had any practical method of achieving this result for
the mass of men. Later authors, Theodoret (died c. 466),
22 JOHN J. OMEARA
Claudianus Mamertus (died c. 474) and Aeneas of Gaza (died

c. 518) report—in all likelihood, however, using the same
source as Augustine—the same interest of Porphyry, which, of
course, may be an interest peculiar to Porphyry or of a
developing or weakening Neoplatonism. It is, nevertheless, one
perhaps not unimportant or unrepresentative strand in the
evidence that we must use to clarify the great problem to
which Bidez-Cumont refer.
NOTES
1. Cf. Anne-Marie-Esnoul, Colette Caillat, André Bareau, “1.4 forma-

tion des religions universelles et les religions de salut en Inde et en
Extréme-Orient," in Histoire des Religions, Vol. I, dir. H.-Charles
Puech (Paris, 1970), pp. 995 ff.
2. C.xxxii.
3. C.xxx.
4. Ibid.
5. C.xi.
6. Cf. J. O'Meara, Porphyry’s Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine
(Paris, 1959).
7. C.xxvii (Loeb translation with a correction).
8. Cc.xxiii, xxviil.
9. Ciu. Dei, xiv.17; cf. xv.20.
0. Cf. L. Pareti, The Ancient World (London, 1965), pp. 516, 827 ff.
"Le bouddhisme primitif apparaît . . . comme étant essentiellement
une doctrine de salut, la ‘voie de la déliverance’ (vimuktimarga) par
excellence’’— A. Bareau apud H.-Charles Puech, op. cit., 1150.
11. "L'idée de pureté et d'impureté va dominer le brahmanisme et con-
férer un sens particulier aux rites’ —A.-Marie Esnoul, ibid., 999.
"Pour mener à bien ce rude et long combat contre les passions, les
vices, et les erreurs, il faut se soumettre a une discipline sévere et
constante. . . ." —A. Bareau, ibid., 1156.
12. L. Pareti, op. cit., 828.
13. Ibid., p. 833.
14. Ibid.; cf. H.-Charles Puech, op. cit., p. 1038.
15. J. Filliozat, “1.4 doctrine des brahmanes d’apres saint Hippolyte,"
in Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, Vol. cxxx (1945), p. 60.
16. See n. 24.
17, See Franz F. Schwarz, "Neue Perspektiven in den griechisch-

indischen Beziehungen," in Orientalistische Literaturzeitung (Janu-
ary-February, 1972), pp. 5-26 and esp. p. 20 f. (with notes). This
article takes account not only of the important work of the Rus-
sian Nina Pigulewskaja, Byzanz auf den Wegen nach Indien (Berlin-
Amsterdam, 1969; first published in Moscow-Leningrad, 1951),
which gives an account of Western trade with the Orient from the
4th to the 6th centuries, but also refers to a series of valuable arti-
cles by Albrecht Dihle written since 1962. Cf. also J. Filliozat,
*Les échanges de l'Inde et de l'Empire romain aux premiers siécles
de l'ére chrétienne," Revue Historique, 201 (1949), pp. 5 ff.; Les
relations extérieures de l'Inde, (Pondicherry, 1956), and J. Rougé's
edition of the Expositio totius mundi et gentium (Paris: Sources
Chrétiennes 124, 1966).
18. (1) Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian; (2) The
Commerce and Navigation of the Erythraean Sea; (3) Ancient India
as described by Ktesias the Knidian; (4) Ancient India as described
by Ptolemy; (5) The Invasion of India by Alexander the Great; and
(6) Ancient India as described in Classical Literature. These vol-
umes were first published in London-Calcutta in the years
1877-1901 and have, since 1971, been reprinted in New Delhi-
Amsterdam. The fragments of Megasthenes are to be found in E. A.
Schwanbeck, Megasthenis Indica (Bonn, 1846), which McCrindle
follows (and, for convenience of reference here, I also use). But cf.
C. Muller, Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum, 11.397 ff.
19. A. J. P. Festugiere, La Révélation d'Hermes Trismégiste, Vol. I
(Paris, 1944), p. 20.
20. "La doctrine des brahmanes...," in Revue de l'Histoire des Reli-
99
gions, Vol. cxxx (1945), pp. 82, 79.

21. Ibid., p. 80.
22. Ibid., p. 83.
23. “The Conception of India in Hellenistic and Roman Literature," in
Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society (1964), pp.
17-20.
24. See J. Duncan M. Derrett, Greece and India: the Milindapanha,
the Alexander-romance and the Gospels," Zeitschrift f. Religions
Geistesgeschichte, 19 (1967), pp. 33-64, and "Greece and India
again: the Jaimini-A$vamedha, the Alexander-romance and the
Gospels,” ibid., 22 (1970), pp. 19-44. Derrett contends that the
Questions of Milinda reflects neither a Greek nor a Sanskrit 'age',
but rather that of the Kushans, and dates therefore from the period
50-200 A.D. Moreover he maintains that the work contains Alexan-
der-romance and Gospel material, thus indicating Indian depen-
dence on the West rather than the opposite. W. W. Tarn, The
24 JOHN J. OMEARA
Greeks in Bactria and India (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 432-6, puts

forward an hypothetical Questions of Milinda written in Greek
which reached Alexandria in Egypt by or before 100 B.C. Even if
the hypothesis were accepted, we would still have no evidence that
Porphyry knew it.
25. Filliozat argues, in *La doctrine des brahmanes...,” in Revue de
55
l’Histoire des Religions, cxxx (1945), p. 84, that Bar Daisan is

speaking not of Brahmans but of Buddhists. A. Dihle appears to
agree that Porphyry’s Samanaeans are Buddhists: art. cit., p. 22.
But see Schwarz, art. cit., p. 13 and n. 2.
26. J. W. McCrindle, Ancient India as described in classical literature,
pp. 169 ff., with minor corrections (=Porphyry, de abst., IV.16-18).
For Samanaean, see A. Dihle, ibid.
27. Cf. de Trinitate, xiv.l: *...scientia dici potest... . Quamuis et alia
notione, in lis, quae pro peccatis suis mala quisque patitur, ut corri-
gatur, dici soleat disciplina."
28. C.ix.
29. Cf. W. Berghoff, Palladius de gentibus Indiae et Bragmanibus
(Meisenheim am Glan, 1967); J. Duncan M. Derrett, “Τῆς History
of ‘Palladius on the Races of India and the Brahmans’,” Classica et
Mediaevalia, 21 (1960), pp. 64-135. Derrett dates the work at 375
A.D. at the latest (78).
30. Cf. Migne, P.L. XVII.1131-1146; C. Muller, Pseudo-Callisthenes III
(Paris, 1846), 7-16; S. V. Yankowski, The Brahman Episode: St.
Ambrose's Version of the Colloquy between Alexander the Great
and the Brahmans of India (text and English translation) (Ansbach,
1962); A. Wilmart, ‘Les textes latines de la lettre de Palladius
sur
les moeurs des Brahmans,' Revue Bénédictine 45 (1933), 29-42.
31. “St. Ambrose could have been the author...of the so-called Vita
Bragmanorum. ... The objections on the grounds of style... may
or may not be substantial"-Derrett, ibid., 101; cf. also 100. Wil-
mart, art. cit., is convinced that the translation found in Ms. Vat.
282 is by Ambrose.
32. Cf. J. W. McCrindle, Ancient India as described in Classical Litera-
ture, 64-74 (=Strabo, Geography, xv.58-68).
33. J. W. McCrindle, Ancient India, as described by Megasthenes and
Arrian, 101 (=Megasthenes. frg. XLI); cf. 103 (=Megasthenes frg.
XLII). Cf. Philostratus, Apollonius of Tyana, XIX.97; Numenius
frg. 9a, p. 130.8, Leemans.
34. Ibid., 120f. (2Megasthenes frg. LIV).
35. "The Greekaryans and the Brahmaryans had identical ideas about
God, creation of the world and soul, -Ramchandra Jain, McCrin-
dle's Ancient India, (New Delhi, 1972), xxiii. The correspondences
between the doctrines of the Questions of Milinda and Greek philo-

sophy, including Neoplatonism, are many and impressive but are
not relevant to my paper.
36. xxxv.113.
37. xlii.117.
38. 1.121.
39. 1.15.
Plotinus
and the
Upanisads
Lawrence J. Hatab

Norfolk, Virginia
The aim of this paper is to present a general comparison of

the thought of Plotinus and the Upanisads. The thinking of
Plotinus serves as a rare vehicle which can productively bridge
the so-called gap between East and West. Within the language
of the western philosophical tradition, Plotinus presents a
striking parallel to the form of thinking predominant in India.
The basis of this comparative investigation is a remarkably
similar four-fold structuring of reality found in Plotinian and
Upanisadic thought. Our method will be to single out basic
elements of Plotinus’s thinking which radically distinguish him
from the mainstream of the western tradition, and then to
analyse, through a point by point comparison, prevalent
themes in the Upanisads which correspond to Plotinus's
world-view. And it is hoped that the emergence of such philo-
sophical similarities in a thinker who worked within the Greek
tradition, and who felt he was being faithful to that tradi-
tion,! will prompt the realization that perhaps thought is not
entirely bound up within a culture, and that a reconciliation
of East and West is not only valuable, but perhaps natural.
27
28 LAWRENCE J. HATAB
The predominant perspective of western thought began

with and grew out of Aristotelian philosophy, where the
proper object of thought and value is the intellectual appre-
hension of individual form, through the discovery of univer-
sals immanent in individual form.’ Plotinus, while not deny-
ing this perspective, nevertheless claims something further,
that the ultimate object of thought and value is something
which transcends form, both individual and universal, which
transcends intellect, and which transcends individual con-
sciousness. With his distinct vision of the One Plotinus under-
mines a principle that had apparently been fundamental to
Greek thought—that the limited and finite is the perfect,
while the unlimited and infinite is the imperfect.? In contrast,
Plotinus claims infinity, unlimitedness and formlessness to be
the One’s nature, and then calls this the ultimate ground. Plo-
tinus here unveils a new awareness in western thinking, that
of a positive infinity, no longer viewing indeterminateness as
an imperfection. And because of this absolute transcendence
of the One, the most appropriate analysis of the One is a
negative analysis.
Generative of all, the Unity is none of all; neither

thing nor quality nor intellect nor soul; not in mo-
tion, not at rest, not in place, not in time: it is the
self-defined, unique in form or, better, formless,
existing before Form was, or Movement or Rest, all
of which are attachments of Being and make Being
the manifold it is....we should put neither a This
nor a That to it. [VI.9.3] 4
The notion of this One as absolute source gives Plotinian

thought the following characteristics which distinguish it from
tradition. First, since the One is all-pervasive, any differentia-
tion is not strict distinction but must be explained through
his emanation-return scheme. The levels of being established
by Plato are not separate or distinct. They are emanations of
the One, the One-in-dispersion. And in ascendence, the soul
PLOTINUS AND THE UPANISADS 29
does not contemplate the Ideas, gazing upon them in a sub-

ject-object distinction. If the soul is to raise itself to divine
intelligibility, it must become Nous. Plotinus’s hypostases are
not therefore objective realms, separate from the soul; they
must be seen as levels of spiritual experience. The soul
ascends to Nous not by *'discovering" it, but by realizing the
ground of Nous within itself. Thus firstly it 15 this mystical af-
finity and unity of aspects of being that distinguishes Plo-
tinus's thinking.
Secondly, the nature of the One requires that it be beyond
even the divine intellect of Nous. The One is an ever-present
source infinitely productive of acts of intelligence. However,
productive activity is intelligence, Nous, not the One, which is
the source of this activity. The true vision of the One is not
in Nous; this vision is undifferentiated and is therefore no
longer intelligence. Rather Nous is oriented toward the One, it
is suspended from and turns toward the One. This
suspension-from and turning-toward is the first moment of
manifestation from the One, resulting in a manifested intelli-
gence, always grounded in the power of the One, with unity
as its principle of operation. Plotinus does not exclude intelli-
gence or deny its importance, but the fact that the One is
beyond Nous, means that Nous must go beyond itself. Nous is
a stage in the realization of that which generates intelligence.
Therefore, the One, or the ground of being, transcends being,
and thus transcends intellect. This is a crucial departure from
the dominant trend in western thought. All intellection is dis-
tinction, a subject-object distinction. And for Plotinus the Pla-
tonist, this is a real distinction, since the objects of thought,
ideas, are realities. There can be no distinctions in the One,
therefore the One has no intelligible or intellectual characteris-
tics; it is above knowledge; it is a higher reality than thinking
and being (III.9.7,9; V.3.11).
Thirdly, with the absolute transcendence of the One, and the
soul's power to ascend to union with the One, the soul ulti-
mately relinquishes its individuality (VI.7.35). Here we are in
conflict again with most of western thought, especially Chris-

tianity. But for Plotinus, this surrender of individuality is not
to be regretted. It is the soul’s very nature to transcend itself;
it finds its true reality in union with the One, just as Nous
fulfills its search for unity through its self-transcendence. This
union could not take place unless soul, intellect and the One
had an ontological affinity, a similitude which allows the
union. This secret affinity between the soul and the divinity is
the basic premise of any mysticism.?
The Plotinian One carries both a mystical and an intel-
lectualistic interpretation.’ The latter sees the One as the
basis of intellect while the former affirms that, since intellect
has its source in the One, then intellect is the One from the
standpoint of intelligence, and intellect must eventually there-
fore transcend itself and become the One, since reality is a
process of emanation and return. Reality could not be a cohe-
sive whole without this circular dynamism.
In sum, it is Plotinus's refusal to give ultimate status to
form, individuality and intelligence that radically sets him
apart from the Greek tradition in which he operated. For the
purpose of transition, let us again locate Plotinus's attitude
toward intelligence. There seem to be two aspects of intel-
ligence. First there is the articulated system of definite
notions, the intelligible order, the fixed model of the sensible
order. This is the Greek and generally the western emphasis.
Secondly we find thought directed toward itself, where sub-
ject-object distinctions disappear, and where finally intelli-
gence is transcended and the self is merged with the universal
principle. This seems foreign to Greek and most of western
thought. The first considers rational knowledge of the uni-
verse, the second considers a mystical union of beings in the
One. The relation of the individual to the universal had al-
ways been a Greek problem. But Plotinus moved to show that
the universal is present in its entirety in all things without los-
ing its universality. He no longer sought rational knowledge of
the universal, but a mystical union where individual conscious-
ness disappears. This is a withdrawal from particular forms,
and all ethical and intellectual aspects of the soul, where the
self is lost in contemplation. And it is generally this emphasis
on contemplation as the ultimate reality that most conclu-
sively connects Plotinus with the thought of India.
The Upanisads? are fundamental to the philosophy of India.
Each different form of Indian thought has always had to
reconcile itself with them. With the coming of the Upanisads,
Vedic hymns and rites were replaced by a search for the one
reality behind all flux. This was also a movement from the
"objective" to the ''subjective."!? The key to the One is
found within the depths of the human self. The Upanisads
often criticize ritualistic religion; liberation is an internal, not
external experience. The goal of the liberated self is not the
bliss of a heaven or rebirth in a better world, but freedom
from the objective, karma, and union with the Absolute,
which is not in any *'state." Vedic knowledge is in itself insuf-
ficient for liberation. One must have that unexternalized, un-
cognitive "knowledge" of the Self. Though Vedic knowledge
can lead to Self-knowledge, knowing the Self transcends the
entire range of human knowledge (cf. the One as the self-tran-
scendence of Nous).
The seers of the Upanisads asked: what is the one reality
multiplicity is reducible to, what is that which persists
throughout change? This ultimate reality is called Brahman,
which comes from the root brh, to grow, burst forth, and sug-
gests a bubbling over, a ceaseless growth!! very similar to the
idea of overflowing power in the Plotinian One. And like Plo-
tnus, for the Upanisads, the world emanates from Brahman
and returns to Brahman, while despite this emanation, Brah-
man remains ever-complete and undiminished. In Indian
thought creation is not ex nihilo; creation is not making but a
becoming, the self-projection of the Absolute, which therefore
does not really create" the world but becomes the world.!2
The Svetàsvatara Upanisad repudiates all the then-held notions
of creation, of it being due to time, nature, necessity, chance,
elements, Person, or combinations of these, and calls creation
simply the nature of the Absolute, tracing the world simply
to the power of Brahman. Creation does not come about for

any “reason,” therefore one cannot determine creation to be
anything other than the self-expression of Brahman. Why does
Brahman create, or manifest? Like the Plotinian One, it is the
very nature of Brahman to manifest. And again echoing Plo-
tinus, 1 Brahman is to ground the manifest, it must be un-
manifest, or without form, so it can ground form, and not it-
self be one of the forms. The Subäla Upanisad (VII.1) tells us
that Brahman is the indwelling spirit, moving through all the
functions and facets of reality and thought, yet these facets
themselves apprehend it not; Brahman is beyond all thingness.
Because of this, the Upanisads too consider the most appro-
priate analysis of Brahman to be a negative analysis.
Absolute Being is not an existing quality or object of
thought. It transcends all attempts to grasp it, as it is the
source of all manifestations. It can only be described negative-
ly, as the formless, nameless, etc. In relation to concrete
beings, it is non-being, but in itself it is the fullness of Being.
But we must still not ascribe any positive determinations to
the unlimited, the undetermined. Brahman is without form
and is beyond sight and the world of objectivity (Svetàsvatara
U. IV.20). Brahman is the all-pervading God, devoid of quali-
ties (ibid., VI.11). The Subala U. gives a long list of negative
descriptions of Brahman (III.1), and also negates even the neg-
ative descriptions by saying that Brahman cannot be said to
be dual or non-dual, mortal, or immortal, internal or external
knowledge, or both, and it partakes of neither knowledge nor
non-knowledge (V.15). In the Maitri U. (VI.3) we find that
Brahman has two aspects, the formless and the formed.
Though Brahman can take form, in the world, the formless is
the fundamental reality, the “‘cause’’ of the formed effect.
And in the Brhad-aranyaka U. we hear the statement at
[V.5.15 that Brahman is neti neti, not this, not that (cf. Enn.
VI.9.3, cited above).
As in Plotinian thought, this absolute transcendence of
Brahman demands that it be beyond intellect. Mind and sense,
which operate through subject-object distinctions, are mislead-

ing, are avidya or "ignorance," if blind to the intuitive level
of vidya or “‘wisdom” which characterizes “knowledge” of
Brahman. If the Real is seen as an object of knowledge, it
cannot be known. True knowledge or vidya is an integral cre-
ative activity of spirit knowing nothing external to it. Truth is
not an expression or reflection of reality, it is reality itself.
Knowledge and being are the same thing, inseparable aspects
of the same reality, indistinguishable in a realm admitting of
no duality. Duality is an otherness, an estrangement, a fallen-
ness. Intellect moves within this sphere of duality. The intui-
tive level of vidya stems from a unity. The Mundaka U.
(I.1.4) distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge, higher
and lower, para vidya and aparà vidya. This distinction seems
to correspond to the Plotinian distinction between “know-
ledge" or vision of unity and knowledge of multiplicity. Para
vidya is a knowledge of imperishable Being; aparà vidya is a
knowledge of perishable beings. The latter is not false; one
can seek Brahman in a particularized manner, yet if it is
sought merely as particular and not grounded in para vidya,
the result is still bondage and ignorance. It seems that apara
vidya culminates in intellect and para vidya manifests as vis-
ion, an experience. Again this corresponds to the difference
between Nous and the vision of the One. One can understand
the Vedas and the teachings on Brahman, but this understand-
ing will always be insufficient without the actual experience
of one’s ground, the vision, the clarity of illumination. One
can know God only by becoming godlike, not by thinking
about God (thus the importance in Indian religion of yoga, or
non-theoretical techniques to further expanded experience).
The Kena U. states that Brahman is the basis of mind, life,
sense and it is not an object subject to these states (I.1-2).
Brahman is beyond thought, life, sensation (1.3), therefore the
impossibility of communication and description. Brahman is
above the known, yet also above the unknown (1.4), meaning
we can “know” Brahman, but not through the mind. And
then we hear the famous paradox concerning Brahman:
To whomsoever it is not known, to him it is

known: to whomsoever it is known, he does not
know. It is not understood by those who under-
Stand it; it is understood by those who do not
understand it. [Kena U. II.3]
The Supreme is one essence with two natures, eternal im-

mutability and unceasing change, stillness and motion. All
motion moves out of its stillness. Unity and multiplicity are
both aspects of one reality. Unity is truth, vidya; multiplicity,
its manifestation, is avidyà, but is false only when viewed in
itself, cut off from its ground. This affirmation of the lower
realms is an important, though rarely stressed aspect of abso-
lutist-type philosophies such as the Upanisads and Plotinus.
Unity upholds multiplicity, though not vice versa, *'the all-per-
vading air supports the activities of beings” (/$a U. 5).
It moves and It moves not; It is far and It is near:

It is within all this and It is also outside all this.
[/sa U. 3]
This is a paradox to express an ineffable reality. Brahman is

beyond the categories of thought, hence it is expressed nega-
tively and contradictorily. And yet it is not a void; all things
are filled with Brahman, which is the basis of reality and can-
not therefore be ascertained in any determinate way. The ba-
sis of all things cannot be a thing (cf. Enn. III.8.10; VI.9.5)
even an immaterial "state." And it is this very transcendence
which allows Brahman's immanence, its presence within all
things.
Brahman's immanence indicates that it is not merely the
unmanifest, it is all the world as well. Brahman sustains the
cosmos and is the innermost self of each individual. Transcen-
dence and immanent universality are both real aspects of one
Brahman; in the former Brahman is not dependent on the
manifold, in the latter it is the principle of the manifold (cf.
the two aspects of the One-Nous relation, i.e., the One in
itself, and the One as the source of Nous). What follows is a
notion found often in the Upanisads concerning levels of

being, where the levels are seen as Brahman in relation to the
world.
In the Svetàsvatara U. (1.1) we find that Brahman is the
cause of all things. But Brahman in its unmanifested nature
cannot be viewed as a cause. So Brahman as cause is Brahman
as I$vara, or Lord, the principle of creation. Previously we
have seen that the absolute source is impersonal Brahman.
I$vara is the creator working through the power of maya. Brah-
man in relation to the world is I$vara; but Brahman’s abso-
lute nature transcends Iévara. This corresponds to Plotinus’s
notion that the One in relation to the universe is Nous, the
divine Ideas as source of the universe.
Brahman is both personal and impersonal, formed and
formless, two aspects of one reality. I$vara is the Absolute
from the standpoint of form. When we find in the Upanisads
mention of a creator, or cause, we must be careful to keep in
mind the distinction between Brahman and I$vara in order to
avoid confusion. The fundamental reality is formless Brahman.
Brahman in relation to the world is Iévara.
Besides Ivara we often come across a notion of a World-
Soul, sometimes called Brahma or Hiranya-garbha," which
seems to represent the creator-God at work in the world. This
World-Soul is not sharply distinguished from I$vara in the
Upanisads, as it is intimately grounded in I$vara and Brahman.
These three principles, Brahman, I$vara, and Hiranya-garbha
are continually referred to, in various contexts, as the basis of
the manifested world. But each is subtly distinct in meaning,
and we must therefore rank them. It is hard to find such
systematization in the Upanisads, though there are suggestions
in the Taittiriya U. and the soon to be considered Mandukya
U. Much of the *systematization" of the Upanisads comes to
us through the later commentaries of men like Samkara and
Ramanuja. However, we can legitimately structure such princi-
ples on the basis of the philosophical assumptions at work in
the Upanisads. Therefore we come across Brahman, the unity
of all, and also a World-Soul, which is subject to the changes
of the world and is therefore effect-Brahman as distinct from

I$vara or cause-Brahman. I$vara is eternally transcendent and
is not subject to world changes. The World-Soul arises at the
beginning of the world and dissolves at the end.!^
Therefore, as the Mandukya U. tells us (2), Brahman has
four quarters; this can be analysed as four levels of being: (1)
A transcendence prior to any concrete reality, Absolute Brah-
man; (2) A causal foundation of all differentiation, Iévara or
cause-Brahman; Iévara is looked on as prajna, a supreme intel-
ligence which holds all things in an undifferentiated condition,
a divine wisdom which sees ८/1 things as a primordial whole,
unlike human reason which sees things in parts and relations;
(3) An interior essence of the world, a World-Soul, effect-
Brahman, called Brahma or Hiranya-garbha. This World-Soul
emanates from Iévara the creator (Svetàsvatara (^ III.4; VI.18;
Mundaka U. 1.1.9); (4) A manifest world of multiplicity, called
viràj. These are four coexistent sides of one reality. The Abso-
lute is not a sum of these, or an elimination of any. It is an
ineffable unity in the midst of which conceptual distinctions
are possible, but only to serve our understanding. Brahman
has strict distinctions only phenomenally.
Now if we look back over these four aspects of reality and
compare them with the Plotinian realms: (1) One, the abso-
lute, undifferentiated, formless source; (2) Nous, the divine
Ideas, principle of creation; (3) World-Soul, the agent of crea-
tion; (4) the sense world—we find a remarkable similarity of
structure.
One of the most famous expressions of this four-fold struc-
ture of reality comes to us in the Mandükya Upanisad. Here
the syllable AUM is seen as representing Brahman. This Upani-
sad views the levels of reality from the standpoint of the
stages of consciousness leading to a realization of Brahman,
and corresponds to Plotinus viewing a metaphysical structure
in terms of spiritual attitudes, the inward ascension of the
soul to the One. First we have the letter A, signifying the
waking state, visva, a cognition of external objects. Next is U,
the dreaming state, faijasa, a cognition of internal objects.
Next is M, the dreamless state, prajna, a mass of cognition,

neither internal nor external. Finally there is the transcenden-
tal state, turiya, the silence surrounding the syllable 4 UM, the
unity and basis of all, with no cognition whatsoever, pure
Being. Prajna is a unity, but thought becomes one, wisdom.
Turiya is beyond thought, it is the source of thought. Prajna
is the basis for creation, and hence manifest, though still a
unity, the unified seed of creation, having multiplicity latent
within it (quite similar to the Plotinian Nous). Turiya is the
ground of this creative basis. It is the stillness out of which
emanates the creative principle. Here we are givena distinc-
tion between the Absolute and God, Brahman and I$vara, the
Unmanifest and Manifest. Creation is a secondary phenome-
non. The primary phenomenon is the impersonal Absolute,
and the spontaneous emanation out of its stillness. The crea-
tive principle, though a unity, is still a manifestation of the
Absolute. This Absolute, as furiya, is characterized as being
not internal, not external, not a mass of cognition, not the
cognitive, not the non-cognitive, the unseen, ungraspable,
unnamable, unthinkable, the non-dual (Mandükya U. 7).
So the levels of being as described in the Upanisads can be
expressed through the following equations:
l. A = vi$va = waking state = external objects = viraj =

world;
2. U = taijasa = dream state = internal objects = Hiranya-
garbha = World-Soul;
3. M = Prajna = dreamless state = mass of cognition, wis-
dom = /§vara = creator;
4. Silence = turiya = transcendental state = source of all =
Brahman = peace.
And these levels can easily be seen to correspond to Plotinus’s

Stages of reality:
1. Sense world and the individual soul immersed in its ex-

ternality;
2. World-soul creating the world from within itself;
3. Nous, the creative principle, unity of divine Ideas;

4. One, undifferentiated source of all.
As in Plotinus, the levels of being found in the Upanisads

are not "other" than the Absolute Brahman, but they them-
selves are not the ultimate reality. To reach the Absolute, one
must penetrate to the formless Brahman. This is accomplished
by the self journeying within to its innermost depths where it
is one with the Absolute. In the Upanisads there is a kinship
between Brahman and that which seeks Brahman, the self of
man. This kinship is explained through the notion of Atman,
the principle grounding individual consciousness. In the early
prose Upanisads, Atman was the ground of individuality as
distinguished from Brahman, the supra-personal ground of the
cosmos. Soon this distinction diminished and the two were
identified. Brahman is the transcendent other and the spirit
residing within man. Brahman is known through Atman. This
whole world is Brahman and this self within me is Brahman
too (Chandogya €^ III.14.1,4). In order to find the divine
one must look within the human soul (Enn. V.3.9). Brahman
and Atman are two aspects of one reality.
The Upanisads thus teach the intimate unity of the self of
man and Brahman. The wise see God abiding in their self
(Svetasvatara U. VI.12). The knower of Brahman becomes
merged with Brahman (ibid., I.7). The individual self sees its
true reality as the source of all (Kaivalya U. 20-23). It is the
task of the individual self to become the Universal Self, and
this is not attainable through the Vedas, intellectual know-
ledge, discipline or brain power (Subala U. IX.IS), but only
through a union. Every individual self has the power to break
the veil of separateness and achieve unity, become the Abso-
lute Self. Liberation, moksa, is different than an existence in
paradise, $varga, which is still a part of the manifest, still an
individual existence in time. Liberation is not a departure to
another "world," nor an expectation of a future state, but the
experience of the timeless, placeless presence of Brahman, it is
this presence.
LLL PLOTINUS AND THE UPANISADS 39
This union is the transformation of the soul, the absorption

in the divine, seeing one’s self in all beings and all beings in
one's self (Usa U. 6). One who realizes this is released from
Sorrow, as all sorrow results from duality (ibid., 7). The self
loses itself, casting off all name and form it enters into the
Unmanifest (Mundaka U. 111.2.8). Such is a release from the
cycle of birth and death, the wheel of time and change, the
achieving of the state kaivalya, aloneness (Kaivalya U. 25). All
of this of course corresponds to Plotinus's flight of the alone
to the Alone.
In its initial condition, sometimes the soul is depicted as
wandering about, thinking itself different from Brahman,
looking on multiplicity as its sole reality (Svetàsvatara U. 1.6).
This is quite similar to Plotinus's image of the soul wandering
through the sense world. Union with Brahman cures the soul
of this avidyä, or individuality seen in itself independent of its
ground, and brings about vidya, or awareness of Brahman.
This avidya-vidya scheme is somewhat comparable to the Plo-
tinian fall-return imagery. Sorrow is seen as the helplessness
resulting from being lost in the objective world; salvation
involves getting beyond object-thinking to the realm of pure
Being (Svetasatara U. IV.7). `
With the ecstasy of divine union, the world is looked upon
as a troubled dream, as illusion, maya. The world is a covering
of untruth which hides or veils the truth (Chàndogya U.
VIII.3.1-3). But it is a mistake to assume that an indifference
to the world or a world-denial necessarily results from {1113.1९
Both the Absolute and Personal God are real; manifestation is
not denied. One must 'negate" the world to reach Brahman
but only to return and redeem the world (ध U. 18). The
world is Brahman, not its own reality. The meaning of maya
is that the world is not its own meaning. Avidyà is ignorance,
viewing the world as its own meaning, as ultimate, as not
grounded in Brahman. Maya is a cosmic creative principle, but
also the possibility of avidya. Avidya is the subjective pheno-
menon of ignorance arising from the mistaken attribution of
ultimate reality to maya, seeing the play as real, as in itself.
Hence the manifestation of primordial Being is simultaneously

a concealment of its original nature. This concealment is avid-
ya. Therefore the world is not unreal, it is merely not inde-
pendent. There is nothing without Brahman; the unreality of
the world is the world seen in itself.
On this point, at times Plotinus accounts for the world
through a fall of the soul, resulting from a spiritual pride, tol-
ma, forsaking unity for particularity. This seems to be a deni-
al of the value of the world. But in other instances Plotinus
sees the descent of the soul as a metaphysical necessity, part
of the emanation of the One." The world cannot be denied
if the One is ever-present and immanent. Perhaps what Plo-
tinus intends here is what is suggested in the Upanisads. Per-
haps an embodied soul is not evil, but a soul attached to a
body is evil. So perhaps the world is not evil, but attachment
to the world is evil. So the descent into the world is good, is
a metaphysical necessity; but this descent allows the possibility
of becoming attached to the world, concealing the true reality
of the divine realm (the nature of the One defines detachment
in a sense). It is this aspect of the world, this aspect of the
descent which must be modified and which must be consider-
ed unreal and valueless. Blind absorption in the world, not the
world itself, is that which Plotinus seeks to overcome.
In the Upanisads, overcoming mäyä means overcoming
worldliness, valuing the world in itself. The meaning of maya
is not concerned with the existence of the world, but with
the meaning of the world, not the factuality of the world, but
the way we look upon the world.!5 At times the Upanisads
say the world is appearance, and only Brahman is real; some-
times it is said that the world is real, though not independent
of Brahman. Either way, the world is not false or evil, it is
merely unfundamental, not being its own ground. This point
concerning the status of the world is an important one,
needed to counter accusations of nihilism and world-denial
thrown at both Plotinus and Hinduism.
We have been able to see deep similarities of thought
between Plotinus and the Upanisads. We find the soul initially
PLOTINUS AND THE UPANISADS 4]
trapped in a fallen awareness, attending to multiplicity and

change as the only reality. The task of the soul is to purify
and deepen its awareness to reveal the absolute, formless
source behind these manifestations. And this awareness is not
external but internal, found at the depths of the soul. The
soul is this Absolute at its depths, hence its individuality is
transcended, individuality as an ultimate principle is transcen-
ded. The world is an emanation (immanence) of a formless
ground (transcendence); form is not the ultimate reality, it
must ultimately deny itself, transcend itself, and return to its
ground. This is the process of reality, that of emanation and
return, reflected in the thought of Plotinus and the Upanisads
in a noticeably similar fourfold organization.
In closing, let me very briefly address the question of

Indian influence on Plotinus. I must admit to a certain
amount of disinterest in the issue of influence or inter-cultural
contact in this regard. I have to say that I like the idea of the
independent development of Plotinian thought, viewing it as
the consequence and fulfillment of certain fundamental ten-
dencies inherent in Greek philosophy.!? But I see this ‘‘inde-
pendence" as a modified one, closer to the independence of
identical twins separated at birth. There may therefore be a
common origin, but one which has nothing to do with cultur-
al or historical contact, but which rather has to do with the
necessary depths of thought itself, which thinkers of depth
will apprehend similarly. I am somewhat suspicious of influ-
ence-theories. They can be seen to stem from either of two
far from dispassionate intentions: (1) The impulse to preserve
the sanctity of western rationalism by determining non-
rational elements to be of external origin; (2) More generally,
from the standpoint of historical determinism, which disclaims
the possibility of spontaneous creation, thereby diluting the
essence and effect of genius, and which therefore cannot
claim to be sober philosophical analysis but rather the specta-
cle of lesser minds dragging greater minds down to a more
negotiable level, 1.e., subject to external influences. Even
though all thought works with an inheritance, genius is char-

acterized by its autonomy, innovativeness and self-radiance.
After being exposed to the genius of Plotinus, I find it hard
to believe that he would have sought or needed outside help
in articulating his: vision. Plotinian and Indian parallels should
prompt not a search for historical influences, but rather a re-
evaluation of the supposed philosophical distance between the
East and West.
NOTES
For discussions of the relation between Plotinus and Plato see: ८.५९.
Dodds, *The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neopla-
tonic One," Classical Quarterly, 22 (1928), 129-42; C. De Vogel,
"On the Neoplatonic Character of Platonism and the Platonic Char-
acter of Neoplatonism," Mind, 62 (1953), 43-64; J.N. Findlay,
“The Neoplatonism of Plato," in The Significance of Neoplatonism,
edited by R. Baine Harris (International Society for Neoplatonic
Studies, 1976), pp. 23-40.
Categories, 3b.5.10; Metaphysics, VII.17.1041b.5-10.
Two exceptions should be noted: the priority given to the apeiron
by Anaximander, and Plato's provocative description of the Good
as "beyond being" (Republic, VI.509b).
This and all translations are taken from Stephen MacKenna, The
Enneads (New York: Pantheon, 1969).
See Emile Bréhier, The Philosophy of Plotinus, translated by
Joseph Thomas (University of Chicago Press, 1958), Chapter IV.
The self-transcendence of the intellect is a common feature of west-
ern mysticism. Even the transcendence of individuality is found in
Sufism and Christian mystics like Meister Eckhart. Many western
philosophers also fit this model. For a discussion of Spinoza in this
regard, see my "The Non-rational Dimension in Spinoza's Ethics,"
Journal of Studies in Mysticism, Autumn, 1979.
See Bréhier, op. cit., Chapter VIII.
Ibid.
OO
Translations are taken from Radhakrishnan's The Principle Upani-

sads (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
10. Ibid., p. 49. A better distinction would be that between the exter-
nal and the internal, since "subjective" suggests individual selfhood,
which is not intended.
11. Ibid., p. 52.
12. Ibid., p. 82.
13. Ibid., p. 60ff.
14. Ibid., p. 62.
15. Ibid., p. 77.
16. Ibid., p. 79.
17. The main texts on emanation are: V.1-5; III.2,3,8,10; IV.8,6;
VI.8,18. See A.H. Armstrong's discussion in The Cambridge History
of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy.
18. See Radhakrishnan, op. cit., pp. 78-90.
19. For a discussion of the non-rational and the formless in Greek
thought, see my Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence (University Press
of America, 1978), pp. 1-30.
Proclus
and the
Tejobindu Upanisad
Laurence J. Rosan
Miami Beach, Florida
This paper is an essay in comparative mysticism. The word

"mysticism" is being defined, for the purposes of this paper
at least, as (1) a philosophical doctrine, namely, that the con-
scious individual can and should experience a uniting with
‘the divine’, that is, the Ultimate Reality. Thus mysticism is
both a psychology and an ethics, but naturally these in turn
presuppose an underlying metaphysics; and this is generally
that of absolute, monistic idealism, since if the individual is
consciously to unite with the One Reality, that Reality itself
must be a kind of consciousness. (Other, non-monistic meta-
physics, where the object of union is the highest but not sole
reality, are also possible though not of concern to us here.)
But mysticism is also (2) a subjective experience for the
individual mystic. The mystics of all times and places have
spoken of their experiences, though with a great range of dif-
ference in the degrees of their introspection, thoroughness of
their descriptions, and so on; some have simply alluded,
others have been voluble but vague, others have indeed tried
to be precise. Now in modern terminology the effort to re-
port on one's own experience in a self-aware and somewhat
45
46 LAURENCE J. ROSAN
philosophical way has been called “phenomenological descrip-

tion," or simply *a phenomenology.” (Although sometimes
this word is interpreted as if it implied a universal validity,
actually, by definition, it can only pertain to some indivi-
duals subjective experience, though objectively reported.)
Therefore, as an individual's subjective experience that is
reported to others, mysticism may also be called phenomeno-
logy. And this paper will be an essay, not in philosophical doc-
trine or historical web of mutual influence, but in the com-
parative phenomenology of mysticism.
For this purpose I have selected two examples, the Neopla-
tonist Proclus, and the Tejobindu Upanisad. The selection of
Proclus is no accident since my doctoral thesis (The Philoso-
phy of Proclus, the Final Phase of Ancient Thought, New
York: Cosmos Greek-American Press, 1949) was a general
survey of his whole philosophy; but Proclus is peculiarly apt
for this purpose. He stands practically at the end of develop-
ment within Neoplatonism, which was of course abruptly
truncated by the unfortunate intolerance of Christianity, but
which might have further advanced into startlingly new direc-
tions had it been given the chance. There's no telling what
stimulating, even profound ideas would have been provided by
a Neoplatonism that had complete freedom to evolve. Proclus,
standing just before the truncation of ancient Neoplatonism,
offers the clearest example of the novel and suggestive con-
ceptual trends that might have become more fully developed
by such a freedom.
To focus on the phenomenology of mystical experience, I
will select only those elements in Proclus which seem to bear
directly on this theme. They are:
(1) Proclus’s intuition (novel for a Neoplatonist) of the

organic unity of all levels of reality, as expressed through two
ontological principles: (A) “All things are in all things, though
in a befitting manner," and (B) the interaction between ‘‘pro-
vidential (benevolent) love" and its correlative, “‘returning
(yearning) love”; and,
| LLL PROCLUS
PROCLUS AND
AND THE TEJOBINDU
TEJOBINDU UPANISAD ὁὁ — ^f
47
(II) Proclus’s unusually subjective approach to the mystical

experience, which I suggest may be called "the integrative
immanence of the One Reality."
I. (A) It is well known how, starting with an earlier, sim-

pler cosmology of the World-Soul, World-Mind and the One,
Neoplatonism gradually developed further levels of reality,
possibly as a reflection of individual mystical experience, but
in Proclus more likely as a kind of 'Aristotelian' desire for
precision in cosmological relationships. Thus Proclus interpo-
lates “‘Finiteness” and "Infinity" immediately after the One,
together with a whole nearly-infinite series of individual uni-
ties or “henads’” which mediate between the Absolute Unity
and everything else. (Proclus further interpolated other levels
of reality, but these lower levels will not concern us here.)
Now since every Idea, if not every thing, has its own unity or
henad, clearly this highest characteristic of the universe, that
is, ‘oneness’, exists on all lower levels also, although in a man-
ner befitting that level. Conversely, by a unique doctrine, Pro-
clus maintains that the Absolute One, as the sole Cause of the
universe with its many mediating henads, in some sense
contains all other things within Itself where they remain, that
is, where they exist logically prior to their “proceeding forth"
or emanating. Therefore everything is found within the High-
est One Itself, although in a manner befitting Its absolute
transcendence. Because this pattern applies to every level of
reality, it is clear that “all things are in all things, but in a
befitting manner" (Πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, οἰκείως), that is, the
higher are in the lower and the lower are in the higher.
Now since the goal of the mystical experience is to achieve
unity with the One, yet each and every thing already has
some aspect of unity to it—its own henad- Proclus suggests a
Kind of aesthetic technique by which to initiate the mystical
experience: concentrate on the unity of some thing or idea,
intuitively experience this sense of unity, and then transfer
this intuition of oneness to one's own self and its relationship
with the One Reality. This aesthetic technique is not the same
as the mystical experience itself; but Proclus’s mystical

consciousness will have been influenced by this prior effort to
grasp the sense of unity, partly by means of sensory percep-
tion and using so-called material objects, and partly by medi-
tating on sacred names and/or symbols. In fact Proclus speaks
highly of *theurgy or theosophy" (respectively, “ ‘working
with the gods’ or ‘wisdom about the gods’ "; but the term
"gods" simply refers to the unities or henads themselves, since
the One Reality, ‘the Divinity," produces its mediating
henads or ''divinities," that is, “‘gods’’). All that the term
"theurgy or theosophy" should denote, strictly speaking, is
this aesthetic technique of obtaining a feeling of unity from
sensory perceptions of material objects or meditation on
evocative ideas. Nevertheless, living at the end of an evolution
within ancient Neoplatonism, Proclus had been influenced by,
e.g., Iamblichus's effort to preserve the values of classical
polytheism by incorporating many popular religious customs
into Neoplatonic practice, even theory. Thus Proclus addition-
ally alludes, for example, to a ritual of burning figurines made
of several substances so that the resulting smoke will “‘unify
what was previously a mixture," an act which of course can
be utilized by an aspiring mystic but which undoubtedly had
prior existence as a popular religious practice! Therefore,
whatever the actual content of Proclus's mystical experience
as such, it must have been pervaded by the memory of having
made these aesthetic and religiously theurgic efforts, including
(1)(a) visual aesthetic contemplations of objects of nature (cf.
the Taoist/Zen spiritually-oriented aesthetics, or Berkeley's
statement, “We do at all times perceive manifest tokens of the
Divinity —everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by
Sense being a sign or effect of the power of God"); and also
(b) what might analogously be called **tmantric" meditations
on divine names and ‘‘mandalic” concentrations on symbols.
But further there would have been the memory of (2) reli-
gious or ritual acts such as mentioned above; and I suggest
(on the basis of Marinus's Biography of Proclus, written only
a year after Proclus's death), that Proclus's attitude included
LL LLL PROCLUS AND THE TEJOBINDU UPANISAD 49
piety towards ancestors and departed teachers, an intense

loyalty to the besieged and dying Greek polytheism, and a
resultant nostalgia for the glories of the philosophic and reli-
gious past whose doom could be easily and sadly forecast.
(B) Regarding Proclus's mystical experience itself, we
should consider his twofold meaning of the word “‘love.”’
First, in common with the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition
in general, *love" means the yearning, aspiring movement of
the inferior consciousness as it ‘returns’ towards the sources
of its being after having emanated from them to begin with.
But, as mentioned above, by his unique doctrine of all things
‘remaining’, that is, pre-existing in their higher causes, not
only can Proclus say that the higher causes contain their
lower effects, but also that they "know these effects before-
hand," that is, they fore-know (Gr. mpo-voeiv, Lat. pro-videre).
And this foreknowledge is also a kind of love; it is indeed the
"providential love" (ἔρως mpovontikos) by which the higher
causes in a sense benevolently fore-know and even care for
their effects. Here we are only concerned with the highest
Reality, the One Itself, and so we can specifically say that the
One Reality loves everything else in the universe, which is
contained within Itself, by a providential kind of love. And as
the knowing consciousness moves upwards by means of the
aspiring, returning kind of love, it ever more clearly becomes
aware of this continually-flowing benevolent, caring love that
comes from the Absolute One above. This interaction, even
Teciprocation', of the returning and the providential types of
love, therefore, constitutes a very important content of the
mystical experience as Proclus might have phenomenologically
reported it. (In other Neoplatonists not only would the idea
of the One Reality's providential, benevolent /ove be absent,
but also the feeling that there is an interaction, even recipro-
cation between the two kinds of love.) Obviously this is a
personalizing of the One Reality which might seem surprising
in as abstract a philosopher as Proclus who, in e.g., the (€
ments of Theology and the Platonic Theology, always refers
to the One Reality as “It” (ro ἕν). But as remarked above,
Proclus sincerely followed the leadings of Iamblichus and his

own teacher Syrianus in making every effort to integrate clas-
sical polytheistic piety with the most precise kind of meta-
physics. (Thus in his Chaldean Philosophy and Hieratic Art,
he can even use the metaphorical term “Father” of the One.)
And so we must assume that if Proclus had phenomeno-
logically reported on his mystical experience, he would have
had to acknowledge that a considerable portion of it consisted
of a feeling of personal interaction and almost loving recipro-
cation with a very transcendent entity. (We should be careful,
however, not to interpret this in traditional theistic terms.
The personal gods of Greek adoration were to be elevated and
legitimized by their identification with the One Reality; in no
way was the One being lowered by /ts embracing of their
anthropomorphic and culturally diverse qualities.)
(11) As mentioned above, the technique by which anything

could achieve unity with the One Reality requires the inter-
mediary of its own unity or henad. So of the human con-
sciousness which, in its journey towards the Absolute has
been primarily using its own intuitive mind (vovc), we would
expect that its springboard to the One Reality would be the
highest unity that this mind could conceive. Proclus indeed
discusses this possibility. The unity or divine henad of any
individual mind he calls the *'flower" of that mind, a poetic
way of referring to the intuitive feeling of the unity of our
highest thinking. But Proclus specifically rejects this idea and
substitutes something even more total: the "flower," that is,
the unity or henad of our whole ‘soul’ or personality; that is,
the unity of our whole existence. By this Proclus means all
our conscious power, opinion as well as knowledge, daily and
mundane experience as well as philosophico-religious aware-
ness. Notice how different this becomes subjectively. In the
case of reaching the One through the unity of our intuitive
mind alone, there must be a total withdrawal from all sensory
distractions, mundane thoughts, etc., and the most intense
PROCLUS AND THE TEJOBINDU UPANISAD 51
concentration upon the unity of our highest ideas as a spring-

board to the One Goal, a technique that emphasizes Its trans-
cendence. But in the case of the “‘unity of our whole exis-
tence,’ there's very little that we must really withdraw
from—perhaps at the most from the minutiae of daily living,
but not from our fundamental desires, attitudes, even weak-
nesses. Here there would be no pinpointing of attention, but
rather an immanent, integrative feeling of self-identity which
would therefore suggest an immanence of the divine object, at
least at the moment of the mystical union. So though the
One Reality is, as Proclus says, ‘“‘Absolutely Transcendent,"
by approaching It through the “unity of his whole existence"
he must have experienced a sense of divine immanence as all
aspects of his ‘soul’ or personality were being integrated with
this now-very-close universal Reality. Perhaps the expression
"integrative immanence of the One" may be helpful in sugges-
ting the phenomenological nuance intended here.
At least two other Proclean terms regarding the mystical
experience, *'faith" and "madness," should be considered. The
first word, “‘faith” (πίστις), is defined as a "kind of pseudo-
belief." Like belief, it is not based on firm knowledge or
intuitive grasp, but unlike belief, which is on a lower level,
faith pertains to the highest knowledge, the awareness of the
One Reality which is higher than the intuitive Mind. The
word ''faith" therefore refers to a technique of feeling unity
with the One Reality but, following its specific connotation,
by a distinctive means, namely (I suggest) the effort to yield
oneself, to give oneself up entirely to the awareness of Its
integrative immanence in the whole personality. So far "faith"
is simply a single term for a complex mystical effort. But in
line with Proclus's sincere loyalty to the classical religion, it's
very possible to regard this word as additionally filled with
traditional late-Greek polytheistic nuances. The second word
to be considered is “μανία, generally translated since Plato as
"divine madness." This would seem to connote that enthu-
siasm, that energy and joy which resuits from the mystical
union once achieved. But Proclus does not further elaborate

about divine madness, an omission which we should regret.
Let me summarize therefore a hypothetical phenomeno-
logical report given by Proclus on his mystical experience: “I,
Proclus Diadochus (that is, Successor" in the Golden Chain
of the Platonic tradition), having already sought to increase
the feeling of unity within myself by contemplating the
unities of particular natural objects, names and symbols, and
by employing the pious theurgic or theosophic rituals of the
religious tradition to which I remain loyal, have now by these
means become strengthened in the sense of my own unity. I
gather together all my conscious faculties, ideals, desires, in
short, all the elements of my soul or personality, into a
feeling of total, integrative unity which I know is caused by
the One Reality already close to me. Receiving Its overflowing
providential and caring love which reciprocates my own aspir-
ing, yearning love for It, I give myself up to Its absolute
Oneness by an act of ‘faith’, as it were, and am rewarded with
that inexpressible enthusiasm, energy and joy, that ‘divine
madness’ which has been so long reverenced by the Golden
Chain of Platonic Successors.”’
My reasons for selecting the Tejobindu Upanisad are, of

course, very different from those in the case of Proclus.
Having read nearly all the 108 Upanisads in one or another
modern language, I have found Chapters 2 and 3 of the
Tejobindu to contain the uninterruptedly longest litany of
first person singular consciousness. A “‘litany” (originally a
series of supplications) has come to mean any recital of ideas
having the repetitive qualities associated with the original
litanies. “‘First person singular consciousness,’ when put into
writing, refers to declarative sentences which start with the
words “I am" or which can be easily translated into such
sentences. Such litanies of first person singular consciousness
are found in the Chandogya, Atmabodha, Maitreyi, Maha,
Subala, Adhyatma, and Mahavakya Upanisads, and particularly
in the Brahmavidya (verses 8111); while Chapters 4 and 5 of

the Tejobindu contain four separate litanies whose content
reflects that of Chapters 2 and 3. But these passages are
mostly only short paragraphs, while the Tejobindu litany of
Chapters 2 and 3 runs to over fourteen pages in the English
translation (The Samanya Vedanta Upanisads, tr. into Eng. by
T.R. Srinaväsa Ayyangar, on the basis of the commentary by
Sri Upanisadbrahmayogin, and ed. by Pandit S. Subrahmanya
(Sastri, Madras: Adyar Library, 1941)). And since this passage
directly pertains almost exclusively to the mystical union, that
is, to the unity of the knowing Self (Atman) with the One
Reality (Brahman), the Tejobindu offers a rich source for a
phenomenological report of a certain kind of mystical experi-
ence. It is in fact a wonderful monument in the history of
absolute subjective idealism!
One difference between Proclus and the Tejobindu Upani-
sad is that the former was a highly individualistic person
whose life is authenticated down to the smallest details,
whereas it is well known that the actual writers of the Upani-
sads are anonymous much more often than not. To be sure,
Chapters 2 and 3 of the Tejobindu begin with the sentence,
*Kumara asked his father ...and he, the venerable Parame$-
vara replied... ." But this is reported in the third person, so
the actual writer would be neither Kumara nor Parame$vara.
Also, “‘Kumara’? can be a common noun meaning “‘son”’ or
"prince" in general, as well as being the proper name of at
least a half-dozen Vedic figures, while *Parame$vara" can be
the common noun “‘illustrious personage,” as well as the
proper name of another several people in Vedic literature.
(*Parame$vara" could also refer to the Supreme Lord" but it
is very unlikely that the writer of the Tejobindu intended a
personal God to speak in the first person as if none of this
Upanisad's great affirmations could be made by any merely
human consciousness, which would be totally contrary to the
monistic and mystical teaching of the Vedantists in general
and the Tejobindu in particular.) Our conclusion is that the
actual writer of the Tejobindu is unknown or merely pre-

sumed by ascription; we have no biographical data nor firm
date. This means that the material for a phenomenological
report must be obtained entirely inductively from the text
itself.
This text falls into distinguishable sections. The first (all of
Chapter 2), though not directly in the first person singular, is
a litany of metaphysical affirmations which pertain almost
exclusively to subjective experience. The second (most of
Chapter 3) is the great “I am” litany which may be con-
sidered the heart of the whole. The third is a one-page litany
on the falsehood of everything but the knowing conscious-
ness, and the fourth is a more traditional litany on the value
of the affirmation “I am Brahman.’ What all these pages have
in common is that they are part of a single litany, a constant-
ly repeated affirmation of closely related ideas, and it is
almost a certainty, stylistically as well as in content, that this
whole uninterrupted litany was the work of one author.
The metaphysical section of Chapter 2 has two sub-
divisions. In the first, every sentence has the expression “Indi-
visible One Essence," in the Sanskrit (from the 708 Upani-
sads, in Sanskrit (Bombay, 1895)), ‘‘akhandaikarasa(m)”, that
is, a-khanda-eka-rasa: not-fragmented/one/inner-sap or essence
—we will use the term “Undivided One Essence." In the
second subdivision every sentence has the expression “utter
consciousness," Sanskrit ‘“‘cinmatra(m),” that is, cit-matra:
thinking-mind/element(al) or nothing-but—we will use the
term "Consciousness itself." These two subdivisions are tightly
connected by several sentences specifically equating the
Undivided One Essence and Consciousness itself as one and
the same thing. Indeed there is no conflict here since “Undivi-
ded One Essence" is an abstract expression, denoting the One
Reality without suggesting Its nature, while ‘‘Consciousness
itself" is the most immediate of all intuitions since we cannot
even conceive something which is “not part of our conscious-
ness," except by extrapolating into it our ideas of *dreamless
Sleep,” etc., ideas however which are known only to our con-
9
scious memory! To identify the Undivided One Essence with

Consciousness itself is simply to give an intuitively rich predi-
cate to a metaphysically abstract subject. Therefore both sub-
divisions of Chapter 2 constitute one doctrine, that of abso-
lute idealism, in this case, however, still ‘objectively’ pre-
sented.
We can analyze Chapter 2 by taking all the characteristics
applied to the “Undivided One Essence" and/or ‘‘Conscious-
ness itself’? (in many cases the same characteristics are applied
to both), and by arranging them into certain classes of ideas;
(please keep in mind that the sequence of these ideas does
not reflect the textual sequence but rather the logical
sequence of meanings). First, the Undivided One Essence
which is nothing else than Consciousness itself (and which we
may find useful to call “‘the One Undivided Consciousness") is
said to include all existence, the whole world near or far, our
bodies, indeed Matter itself! Clearly this is absolute idealism
(and closely related to the doctrine of Proclus in which
Matter is itself only a final emanation from the One Reality).
The One Undivided Consciousness includes all actions, all
desires (also detachment), all social ideas such as home,
friends, wealth, even religious merit and its opposite or sin.
All ideas in fact, all knowledge and the objects of knowledge,
whether true or false, all meditation, introspection, the very
distinction between “‘you” and “I’’—these are nothing but
Consciousness itself. The traditional gods and the sacred
Vedas, the syllable “Om” and the final Vedanta, past, present
and future, indeed—and here we reach the highest idealistic
affirmations—the One Undivided Consciousness includes both
what exists and what does not exist; outside of It nothing can
be conceived, there is no leaving this Reality. It is that which
has no origin, the imperishable, and transcendent; it is Atman,
the Self “‘who Thou art, who I am”; it is Brahman. Sum-
marizing: although Chapter 2 is not itself a first person singu-
lar statement, it is easily translated into such (as demonstrated
below), though so far metaphysical and best re-stated by the

familiar affimation “1 am Brahman.”
The core of the Tejobindu litany is the five and one-half
pages (in the English translation) of pure “I am" affirmations.
(It is interesting to note how much of the modern “‘New
Thought Movement” such as Unity, Christian Science, Reli-
gious Science, etc., makes constant use of first person singular
affirmations; it’s also noteworthy that Proclus has almost no
statements of this type.) Now whereas in the preceding para-
graph we started from the most concrete and moved to the
most abstract characteristics, in the case of “व am" statements
we should use the reverse technique, since the more concrete
the qualities assigned to the “I am" the more distinctive and
revealing it will be for a phenomenological report. Here there-
fore is the list of “1 am" characteristics in the order of their
concreteness: first, “1 am Brahman" (said no less than eight
times); “I am of the form of the transcendent Brahman,”
absolute eternal being, the Undivided One Essence (twice); “‘I
am imperishable and changeless’’; “I am Consciousness itself”?
(very many times), being all wisdom, knowledge, the form of
introspection, the absolute Turiya consciousness (which is
deeper than dreamless sleep) and even beyond the Turiya;
naturally, "I am Atman" (several times) and the ‘‘form of the
Atman." (At this point the very frequent expression “form
of" (rupa) should be analyzed: in an Aristotelian or dualistic
doctrine the form of a thing is not identical with that thing
itself, but in idealism the 'form' in the sense of essence is the
thing itself. Probably what is meant here by 'form' therefore
is the appearance which naturally may be different from the
essence. Thus “I am of the form of Atman" would mean “I
am not only the One Self, I am also everything that this Self
appears to be." This could hold for every other instance of
the term ‘form’ occurring above or below.)
The next group of characteristics are put entirely in the
negative form (and will be re-echoed in the short section on
"falsehoods" discussed below). Thus: “I have no form," no
qualities; I transcend all mind or mental faculties such as
speech, sense perception and the objects of that perception;

“T am devoid of body," having neither beginning, nor end, old
age nor death; I am devoid of all feeling such as passion,
anxiety, all desires, including those for wealth, wife and
children, and even desires that would result in either bondage
or liberation.
Adding a deeper and more emotional content are the “Bliss
and Light" affirmations: “I am Bliss" (said many times); “I
am the appearance of the Bliss of the Atman, the non-dual
Existence, Consciousness and Bliss" (the famous “‘sat-chit-
ananda" triad which is repeated a half-dozen times); “I am
the luminosity, the radiance (Mahas) of the Atman : I am of
the form of Brightness, I alone am of the form of the Sun of
Consciousness in the Ethereal Sky of the heart"; “I am ever
wakeful and pure; I am pure liberation and salvation"
(Moksa); indeed, “T am absolute Goodness” and—very interest-
ingly showing some similarity with Proclus—“‘I am absolute
Love."
Very different, however, is another class of positive attri-
butes of the “I am" which might puzzle any Neoplatonist,
Proclus included; and from this moment an important diver-
gence between Proclus and the Tejobindu appears which will
become even greater as we proceed. For the Tejobindu affirms
“T alone appear like everything else"; that is, I am the appear-
ances of all things as well as their Reality. Thus: “Nothing,
including the earth itself, has been given up by Me," for
"whatever is beyond Me is nothing"; “Of my own accord I
manifest myself, the Atman" ; “T am satisfied by the Atman, I
am the form of complete satisfaction"; “1 revel in my Atman,
| revel in Myself"; “I revel in the delightful kingdom of my
own Self; taking my seat on the throne of my Self I shall
conceive nothing but my Self”; *I am the essence of exquisite
nectar; I am of the form of extreme emotion”; “1 have no
need for study or reflection, for I am everywhere the enjoyer
of pleasure; 1 am possessed of delights far and near!”
We must assume that the writer of the Tejobindu is speak-
ing after many mystical experiences have sunk deeply into his
consciousness. His intuitions are the fruition of these experi-

ences, and the Tejobindu here is the phenomenological report
of this great subjective-monistic-idealistic experience of his. He
is already the Absolute Itself because what we ordinarily call
the individual knower has come to feel himself as the One
Undivided Consciousness which is all of Reality, and no
longer sees any barriers between one thought and the next,
including every materialized appearance. The asceticism which
is so generally traditional in idealism, and in fact necessary to
remove our attention from worldly distractions, has here
disappeared into an all-embracing integration, analogous to
but rather more total than the integration of personality
mentioned by Proclus. Just as it is said that Brahman engages
in play by producing Maya or “illusion,” so here the
knowing Self is totally free to enjoy even the worldly
"delights far and near" that up to this moment of victory
would have been distractions from the goal of concentration
(more on this below).
The one page of “falsehoods” that follows the “I am"
litany contains thirty-seven sentences declaring different things
to be "false," while seven sentences repeat that only / am
Reality. In line with the previously-mentioned ‘“‘negative
characteristics’ all appearances of mind, or whatever has
form, in other words whatever is seen, heard, tasted or
smelled—all this is declared to be false. All living creatures,
all beings, past, present and future, in fact “everything is
false" compared to the One Reality which alone is true. Very
interestingly, an antinomian factor is introduced by the
specific rejection of many traditional values: teacher and
pupil, and “‘what does not turn from the path of righteous-
ness" are false; “‘whatever is wholesome" and all scriptures,
the whole Vedas, etc. are false; indeed “all truth is false."
And applying this antinomianism to conventionally ‘bad’ as
well as ‘good’ things: right and wrong action, good and bad
conduct, victory and defeat, desire, enjoyment and satiation—
all these are also false. This antinomian quality in the Tejo-
bindu goes much beyond a merely metaphysical kind of rejec-
tion of everything except the Self; on the contrary, the wnter
has specifically chosen traditionally revered values to reject as
‘false’. Nor should we shrug off the Tejobindu's language as
merely symbolic, for it is affirming that the One Undivided
Consciousness which is the maker, manipulator and enjoyer of
all Its thoughts, has the specific right to deny the claim of
any particular thought to Its reverence.
Antinomianism (or the rejection of traditional patterns on
the basis of a higher mystical experience) has been a very
frequent concomitant of both Eastern and Western mysticism.
The fact that it does not seem to appear in Neoplatonism (or
in Proclus) may result from the absence in late classical poly-
theism of any heavy burden of moral prescriptions or pro-
scriptions (aS compared, say, to the Old Testament or the
Code of Manu). But the Zejobindu’s antinomianism is not so
much an indication of the burden of Vedic requirements as it
is of the thoroughness of the author’s mystical experience.
What in Proclus is simply alluded to as “‘divine madness," that
enthusiasm, energy and joy which follows from the mystical
union with the One Reality, here becomes expanded and
totally realized. To appreciate this, let me suggest the possi-
bility of Tantrism, that is, the interweaving of mystical experi-
ence with sexual experience. I mention Tantrism not because
I believe it to be a really important element in the Tejo-
bindu’s composition—although the combination of the Self
reveling in all Its creations plus the specific rejection of any
inhibiting proscriptions does constitute a sufficient basis for
its existence—but rather because it is the ultimate touchstone
(considering the traditional attitudes in both East and West
towards sexuality) of the seriousness of any mystic’s claim to
be united with the One Undivided Reality of Consciousness.
To make such a claim and then become disturbed by conven-
tional moral proscriptions which are after all nothing but the
creations of one’s own divine consciousness to begin with, is
to reach the pinnacle only to slip back again. The author of
the great Tejobindu litany has not slipped back! “1 revel in

the delightful kingdom of my own Self; I am everywhere the
enjoyer of pleasure, I am possessed of delights far and near.”
And, as if to leave no doubt about it, he adds: “Know that
right and wrong action is false, good and bad conduct is of
falsehood; know that all scripture is false, all the Veda is
always false.”’
Summarizing, I suggest that the writer of Chapters 2 and 3
of the Tejobindu would have given a phenomenological report
of his mystical experience somewhat as follows: “1 am identi-
cal to the One Reality, the Undivided Consciousness Itself;
therefore I possess all the perfections and qualities that 7
deem desirable. And since nothing is alien to Me, being part
of My One Consciousness, I am the maker, the manipulator,
the enjoyer indeed of every thought, of every delight far and
near. The phenomenological report of my mystical experience
therefore is identical to the report of my total experience,
whatever I choose to make this be, as long as I continue to be
aware that I indeed am the sole Reality.” This suggested
report by the Tejobindu’s writer has not included the
methods by which his mystical experience had been attained,
as in the case of Proclus, because we are not told just which
Yogic (etc.) techniques he may have employed. Rather this
report centers on the results of the mystical experience, the
fearless absorption into the all-embracing unity of the
knowing Self of every thought and appearance including those
that heretofore might have seemed distracting and/or alien to
the One. Conversely, Proclus’s phenomenological report was
more detailed on the steps leading to the mystical unity. What
Proclus and the Zejobindu have in common is their emphasis
on the importance of integrating and unifying all one’s facul-
ties, though the Tejobindu carries this further. Finally, the
Tejobindu gives a more detailed paean of praise to that enthu-
siasm, energy and joy that comes from the mystical union
which in Proclus is summed up simply by the famous expres-
sion “divine madness."
(Almost as an appendix, the Zejobindu litany closes with

about one and one-half pages on the affirmation (mantra) “1
am Brahman.’ Certainly this is a ‘correct’ affirmation,
although “I am the Undivided One Essence," “I am Con-
sciousness itself," etc. would be equally correct. And what is
claimed to be the results of this constant affirmation, such as
ending the false appearance of duality, destroying grief, re-
incarnation, even disease, etc., are also correctly deduced from
the basic principles of this philosophy. But the level of
consciousness here is not as high as before nor an outpouring
of the author’s own mystical experience.)
This paper has been “fan essay in the comparative pheno-
menology of mysticism,” but some readers may object that
the emphasis has been on exposition rather than actual
comparison. This is as it should be. First, our “‘phenomeno-
logical reports” have been only hypothetical, particularly in
the case of Proclus; but even in the case of the Tejobindu,
which has provided so many directly first-person statements,
there is much that might have been said by its author that we
do not know. Secondly, enough actual comparison has been
given to provide a basis for anyone wishing to do further
work in this area. Finally, all those who recognize the One
Reality, generally known as “absolute idealists,’ constitute a
kind of world-wide brotherhood whose similarities are much
more important than their differences. The Tejobindu stands
as a wonderful monument in the history of subjective monis-
tic idealism, a minority type within idealism in general; the
Tejobindu is a victorious, fully accomplished statement.
Proclus stands as an interesting example of movement from
the strictly objective idealism of earlier Neoplatonism into the
sphere of greater subjectivity; he does not, however, offer ‘a
victorious, fully accomplished statement" but rather presents
himself to us with an almost self-conscious poignancy, for he
was at least partly aware of the impending truncation of the
Platonic Succession’s Golden Chain. Perhaps some modern
student/philosopher could extrapolate from what Proclus has
left us to construct a “new Neoplatonism" which would
continue that evolution into greater subjectivity which Proclus

had ventured, explored, and to some extent achieved.
Buddhi in the
Bhagavadgita and
Psyché in Plotinus
A. H. Armstrong
and
R. R. Ravindra
Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
Introduction
The Bhagavadgita is the most important text in the smrti

(what is remembered) literature of India, as distinct from the
Sruti (what is heard) literature which is traditionally regarded
as ultimately authoritative. The Bhagavadgita has been
assigned a date ranging from the fifth century B.C. to the
second century B.C. The Indian religious tradition places the
Gita at the end of the third age of the present cycle of the
universe and the beginning of the fourth, namely the Kali
Yuga to which we belong.
The Bhagavadgita opens on the battleground of dharma
(order, law, duty, righteousness) which is concretised at an
instance of time at KurukSetra. Krsna had earlier attempted to
reconcile the two feuding families of cousin brothers, namely
Pandavas and Kauravas. However, when war appeared inevi-
table, and both sides wanted his help, he proposed that one
side could have all his armies with their weapons, and the
First published in Religious Studies 15 (September 1979): 327-42.
63
64 A. H. ARMSTRONG—R. ΗΕ. RAVINDRA
other could have him without any weapon. The Kaurava

chief, Duryodhana, had the first choice. In choosing the
armies he showed little discrimination and intelligence, and no
understanding of the true nature of Krsna. Arjuna rightly calls
him durbuddhi (one whose buddhi is bad; B.G. 1.23). The
Pandavas were overjoyed to have Krsna on their side, for he is
no ordinary man; as he declared himself later, he is the
Supreme Person who pervades and sustains all the worlds
(B.G. 15.17-19). For the purpose of the battle, Krsna became
the charioteer of the greatest Pandava warrior, Arjuna.
Before the actual fighting begins, Arjuna asks Krsna to take
his chariot into the middle of the two armies so he could sur-
vey all the assembled warriors. From there he sees his teach-
ers, brothers, uncles, cousins, sons and other relatives and
friends arrayed in battle on both sides, ready to kill and be
killed. Seeing his own kith and kin on both sides, parts and
parcels of himself, Arjuna is bewildered about right action and
he turns to Krsna in despair, at the end of his human tether,
to seek guidance. Krsna’s instruction, in response to Arjuna’s
need, is not only about his particular duty in this particular
situation at KurukSetra, but about dharma in general; hence
about the end of dharma, namely, moksa, unconditioned free-
dom, which is Krsna’s own mode of being, as well as about
the paths by which Arjuna’s being may be transformed so
that it may draw closer to Krsna’s. Krsna places the specific
situation of Arjuna in a larger context, viewing it from above,
as it were, suggesting that every situation has cosmological
foundations and every act has universal implications. The dia-
logue between Arjuna and Krsna, constituting the Bhagavad-
gita, is as Krsna himself says at the end (B.G. 18.70), about
dharma. 1
A few general remarks about Plotinus and his writing may
be useful in showing the possible fruitfulness and the possible
limitations of a comparison with the Bhagavadgita. The
Enneads, like the Gita, set the being, thought and action of
man in the largest cosmological context. The path by which
Plotinus always tried to lead his hearers and readers is a path
BUDDHI IN THE BHAGAVADGITA 65
from ego-centred particularity to the universality, a path

which leads on to something very like moksa, that union with
the One or Good which lies beyond the true universe of
Nous, the highest our thoughts can reach. But the Enneads
are a body of various treatises written on different occasions,
and perhaps for varying purposes, put together somewhat arti-
ficially by their editor, and not like the Gita, a sustained
exposition of doctrine taking its start from one particular
situation which it rises and expands from but never com-
pletely leaves behind. Nor did Plotinus ever claim to speak
with anything like the authority of Krsna. Though a pro-
foundly original and independent thinker, whose thoughts
were solidly based on his own experience, he never professed
himself to be more than an exegete, trying to bring home to
those who would listen to him in his own time, as clearly and
forcibly as possible, the meaning of the one true ancient
philosophy (that is to say, the one true way of liberation into
the divine) which found its best expression in the Dialogues
of Plato. And outside the immediate circle of his friends and
disciples he did not exercise, and never has exercised, author-
ity in any form of the Western traditions. Very many people
down the centuries have read him, and if they read him
seriously the results have often been overwhelming and last-
ing, and his influence has been very great. But in no tradition,
either of Christians, Muslims or even later pagan Neopla-
tonists, has he ever been a teacher of unchallenged authority,
whose doctrine must be assumed to be always right. Perhaps
his influence on the Western traditions has been so wide
because in a way he stands a little apart from them.
There are, therefore, great differences as well as great simi-
larities between the Enneads and the Gita. But the differences
are not so great as to make a comparison between them
unfruitful, as we hope this paper will show. In each we have a
body of mature doctrine, based on tradition and living experi-
ence, which points by different ways to the same goal. And
we should not make it too difficult for ourselves to see this
by making much of inappropriate later Western disjunctions,
66 A. H. ARMSTRONG—R. R. RAVINDRA
which would not correspond exactly to any distinction the

author of the Gita or Plotinus would be likely to make
between ‘scripture’, or ‘revelation’, and ‘rational metaphysics’,
or between ‘theology’, or ‘spiritual teaching’, and ‘philoso-
phy’.
9
Buddhi in the Bhagavadgita
The place of buddhi in the Bhagavadgita is central. Krsna

advises Arjuna to "seek refuge in buddhi" (B.G. 2.49). “To
them who are constantly integrated worshipping me with love,
I give that buddhi yoga by which they may draw near to me”
(B.G. 10.10). Later in the process of summing up his entire
teaching, Krsna says again, "Renouncing mentally all actions
to me, making me your goal, relying on buddhi yoga, become
constantly mindful of me. Mindful of me, you will overcome
all obstacles by my grace. But if because of self-centeredness
you will not listen, you will perish” (B.G. 18.57-58).
What is this buddhi yoga, the path of buddhi, that leads to
Krsna? It is both integration of the buddhi and integration by
the buddhi, in a mutually supportive evolution. And further-
more, it is the self-transcendence of buddhi.
Buddhi derives from the root budh meaning “to wake up,”
in the sense of discerning, becoming awake and realizing. In
the Gita, buddhi is clearly distinguished from manas (mind)
which is the faculty of thinking. Manas stands in an hierar-
chical order of subtlety and priority between senses and
buddhi. It is fickle, unsteady, impetuous, and difficult to
control—as difficult as the wind (B.G. 3.42; 6.34). It can,
however, be controlled and brought to rest in the self by
buddhi, by arresting and reversing the usual order, which by
itself is quite lawful and follows Krsna’s lower nature.
Ordinarily, the senses are drawn outward by the sense-
objects, and manas follows them. Attachment of the senses to
the objects of pleasure gives rise to desire, desire to anger,
anger to bewilderment which causes the mind to wander. This
lack of steadiness in the mind in turn results in the deteriora-

tion of buddhi. Once buddhi is destroyed, man is lost. In such
a man without purpose there is a dispersion of buddhi into
many branches, for only a resolute buddhi is single. (B.G.
2.41, 62, 63).
He who will follow the spiritual path should draw in his
senses, aS a tortoise draws in its limbs. He should renounce
samkalpa (imagination, inclination), without renouncing which
no one can engage in yoga. Then he can be free of desires,
which have their origin in samkalpa, and can control the
senses with manas. Manas can, in its turn, be slowly anchored
in the self by buddhi established in steadfastness. When
buddhi functions in this right internal order, from above
below, it has a quickness which can bring the unsteady mind,
driven hither and thither by rajoguna, the passion principle in
nature, back to stillness in the self. Such a yogi, whose mind
is stilled and who is free of blemish, enjoys highest bliss and
becomes brahman, a part of Krsna’s higher nature (B.G. 6.2,
24-27).
The initial integration, according to the Gita, consists in the
unification of buddhi. For this purpose, essentially three
renunciations are recommended. First is the renunciation of
inaction, for Krsna himself, although he needs to do nothing,
is constantly engaged in action; if he were to stop working, all
the worlds would perish. The second renunciation is that of
anxiety about and attachment to the fruits of action. One
must do what needs to be done for sustaining the world,
understanding the principle of reciprocal maintenance between
gods and men, as sacrifice and worship (yajña), casting all
actions on Krsna (B.G. 3.11-12, 19-25).
The third renunciation has already been mentioned, namely
the renunciation of samkalpa which is imagination and desire-
will. “The wise men consider it to be renunciation: to give up
works dictated by desire" (B.G. 18.2).
Corresponding to these three renunciations, three defini-
tions of yoga are given in the Gita, indicating different
instructions for and stages of transformation of man. (It
hardly needs mentioning that these stages are in no sense

linear or mutually exclusive.) Yoga is skill in action, it is
equanimity in failure and success, and it is the disconnecting
of the connection with duhkha (suffering), the connection
that is forged by desire and imagination (B.G. 2.48, 50;
6.23-24).
Works done according to yoga, i.e., in accordance with the
above interior renunciations, will gradually lead to a weaken-
ing of the sense of egoism and of the craving for acquisition.
Along with this, buddhi, which was so far dispersed in multi-
ple wishes and projects, now emerges unified and attuned
(i.e., in samadhi) to the higher self (afman). This integrated
buddhi is now able to bring about a proper (1.e., according to
the right order) and a harmonious functioning of the whole of
one's psychosomatic organism, effecting the second integra-
tion of the buddhi yoga.
Buddhi in the Gita is a faculty which needs to be trained,
purified and unified, and which in turn can integrate the
whole of one’s self, body, heart and mind. This faculty alone,
which functions rightly only when educated by yoga, can
have higher knowledge (wana, as distinct from vidya, which
generally means mental knowledge), higher feelings (such as
Sradha, faith, and bhakti, love-and-dedication) and higher will
(as contrasted with desire-will). Buddhi is thus the discrimina-
tive intellect which perceives correctly and acts accordingly; it
is intelligent and sensitive will in harmony with dharma.’
The really important function of buddhi in the Bhagavad-
gita is to provide a perceptual link between what is higher
and what is lower. It is a crucial agent in the transformation
(bhavana) of the being of man. The whole process of develop-
ment is symbolized by Arjuna, who is once called kapidhvaja,
one whose banner is a monkey (B.G. 1.20). In this first chap-
ter, which is full of names, descriptions, and multiple laws,
Arjuna is deeply despondent and assailed by many doubts. He
is overcome by pity and self-pity and is paralyzed. He is
confused about dharma, and refuses to fight. In the last chap-
ter, his confusion is destroyed, his doubts are dispelled and he
has recollected himself. He is now a different person; he sees,

understands and acts differently. Realizing his own and
Krsna’s true nature, Arjuna takes refuge in Krsna and does his
bidding.
Krsna declares the five gross elements—corresponding to the
five senses in man the microcosmos—as well as mind (manas),
ego (ahamkara) and buddhi to be the eight components of his
lower nature. Beyond this is his higher nature, source of life,
by which the whole cosmos is supported. A part of his higher
nature is brahman, which in an individual is called his essen-
tial nature or inner being (svabhava). By itself brahman is
neither being nor not-being; within all beings, yet it is without
them; although undivided it appears as divided among beings.
This higher nature is more or less equated with purusa
(person), as distinct from prakrti which refers to Krsna’s
lower nature.? Purusa is not bound by the three fundamental
qualities (guna) of prakrti, namely, sattva (beingness, affirma-
tion, light), rajas (passion, redness) and tamas (passivity, resis-
tance, darkness) (B.G. 7.4-5; 8.3; 13.12-23).
Prakrti and all its manifestations—such as the gross ele-
ments, senses, mind, ego, buddhi, thought, desire, hate,
pleasure and pain—are together also called Sarira (body) as
well as ksetra (field). KSetra is distinguished from ksetrajna
(knower of the field). Krsna declares himself to be the
knower of the field in every field. Then he says that true
knowledge consists in knowing both the field and the knower
of the field (5.6. 13.1-6).
We see that buddhi itself, although the highest part of any
particular being, belongs to nature. Therefore, it is subject to
the three gunas which can, depending on which quality pre-
dominates, give it different colourations. The buddhi which
knows the correct distinction between activity and cessation
Of activity, between right and wrong, between danger and
security, between bondage and freedom is säftvic; the buddhi
which is unclear about these and understands them incorrectly
is rajasic; and the buddhi which thinks all things in the
reversed fashion is tamasic (B.G. 18.29-32).
However, although buddhi itself is a part of the lower

nature, it is only through purified buddhi that one can go
beyond prakrti. The function of yoga is in a way a reversal of
the natural emanations of prakrti expressing itself in a hierar-
chy of material manifestations, which in man range from
buddhi to the senses, farther and farther away from the
primal source. By following the path of yoga, the sensual
man, at the periphery of the expanding circle of emanation,
moves inwards to become a man of buddhi. For this purpose
Krsna advises the use of the chief creative force of prakrti
responsible for giving rise to different states of beings, namely
karma (action, work, deed), rather than renouncing it. By an
interiorization of the renunciation of karma, in offering the
fruits of karma to Krsna, the generative force of prakrti can
be used to move beyond prakrti itself; moksa can thus be
approached through karma (B.G. 3.31; 8.3).
From the level of the purified buddhi, the movement is in
a wholly different dimension. In that state in which the senses
are quietened and thought ceases, one can experience the
boundless joy of the transcendent realm of àtman. This joy
cannot be perceived by any of the other senses or by the
mind but only by buddhi. Having seen and overcome the
process of emanation, the yogi stands stilled in brahman,
attaining to the sight of brahman in which he can see all
beings and all things without attachment. He is now beyond
all dualities and without a sense of ego or possession. Now he
is not anything or anyone in particular, for his own being
(svabhava) is merged with Krsna’s being (madbhava). There-
fore, he is no longer reborn as this or that (B.G. 6.20-25; 14.
19-26).
Here Krsna feels it necessary to remind Arjuna that prakrti
is also a part of Krsna and that it operates by his own crea-
tive and magical power (maya), although it does not constrain
and limit him. Krsna urges him to fight, for Arjuna must do
his part in the cosmic drama; he must become an instrument
for Krsna’s purposes. Taking his stand in his own brahman
nature, he should act without attachment, renouncing all
works to Krsna, self-recollected, without expectation, without

acquisition and without agitation, to bring about order in the
world (B.G. 3.25, 30; 11.32-33; 14.12).
It is as if the circle of eternity and the circle of time
almost touched each other in buddhi but not quite. Well-
honed and purified buddhi functions as the antenna for
receiving messages from the other shore, as a lookout into the
non-personal spiritual dimension of atman-purusa-brahman,
and as the guiding will of the individualized prakrti.
Having led up to brahman, the task of buddhi yoga is
essentially finished. It has made possible jñana of the trans-
cendent realm. It has done so by a creative synthesis and
balancing of four distinct, yet interdependent, yogas. The
path of action or karma yoga, the path of love or bhakti
yoga, the path of meditation or dhyàna yoga,^ and the path
of knowledge or jAàna yoga constitute the four limbs of the
buddhi yoga of the Bhagavadgità which integrates them into
an organic whole? Each of these yogas is taught and empha-
sised in its place, without losing sight of the others. The
unformed Arjuna, like linear thinkers before and after him, is
anxious to have Krsna tell him one definite and clear path,
clear that is to his untrained (akrta) and ordinary mind.
Krsna, however, is less intent on giving Arjuna a one-
dimensional, logical consistency or mental clarity. He plays a
veritable symphony of yogas, and himself uses wisdom, tact,
love and terrifying form to help Arjuna become attuned to a
higher wisdom. This higher wisdom is not of his personal
intelligence, although it is within him. Nor is this jñana any
mere speculative theory. The characteristics of jñana include
absence of pride, non-violence, patience, self-control, lack of
identification with I, unfailing love-and-dedication to Krsna,
and constancy in the knowledge of self (B.G. 13.7-11).
Jnana is a way of life, it is a yoga; one who follows the yoga
of knowledge lives this way. All other yogas complement and
aid this one, just as it complements them.
Krsna himself is still beyond. For he is the foundation of
imperishable brahman, of eternal dharma and of absolute bliss
(B.G. 14.27). He declares in B.G. 18.54-55: “Having become

brahman, with tranquil self, a person neither grieves nor longs;
regarding all beings alike he attains the highest love-and-
dedication (bhakti) to me. By love-and-dedication he comes to
know me as [ really am, how great I am and who I am in
truth; then knowing me as I am, he enters me forthwith.”
A simile given in the Katha Upanisad says that the body is
a chariot of which atman is the owner; buddhi is the chario-
teer, mind the reins and the senses are the steeds (.3.3-4).
Since the teaching of the Bhagavadgita is most closely related,
of all the Upanisads, to the Katha Upanisad, we may be justi-
fied in extending this simile to the situation in the Gita. For
Krsna to become Arjuna’s charioteer at Kuruk$etra is a
perfect symbol of Krsna having manifested himself in prakrti
in order to give Arjuna buddhi yoga by which he may come
to know himself and Krsna as they really are. Then Arjuna
can love Krsna and act in accordance with his word.
Psyché in Plotinus
Psyché in Plotinus, like buddhi in the Gita, has a very long

history behind it. But we cannot incorporate a complete
history of Greek psychology into this paper, so psyché will be
described here as we find it in Plotinus, with only brief
indications of the most important points of doctrine which he
owes to or has in common with his predecessors. Even so,
only a sketch of his doctrine can be given here, as it is
immensely rich and complex, and his statements about psyché
contain a good many formal inconsistencies.? These inconsis-
tencies are partly due to varieties and incompatibilities in the
traditions which he inherited, Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic,
already interacting and combining in various ways before his
time: and partly, perhaps, to the fact that “he wrote his
treatises straight down as if he was copying from a book”’ and
never revised them or looked them over again;’ and the
treatises are not parts of a planned exposition of a system,
but occasional works written for wider or narrower groups of
friends and collaborators in his rather informal circle (which

was never any kind of officially recognised academic institu-
tion). But there may be a much deeper and more important
reason. Plotinus wrote out of his own lived experience: and
he would always rather get in all the deliveries of that experi-
ence than attain formal consistency by selection, omission or
distortion of any part of it. Further, he derives from Plato,
and perhaps carries further, a certain scepticism about the
adequacy of language to express what he finds within: at the
higher levels this scepticism about language becomes total: he
knows he cannot say what he sees, however hard he tries,
though he does his best. And being a philosopher of late
antiquity, he feels bound to use the language and concepts of
his school tradition, the Platonic, which was complex and at
times incoherent, and to avoid novelties of expression as far
as possible (though in fact his language is at times highly
original).
The first thing to observe about psyché in Plotinus is the
enormous range of its functions and sphere of activity. This is
something which he owes in great part to the tradition which
he inherited. To oversimplify crudely, the concept of psyché
which he inherited results from a combination of the oldest
Greek conception of psyché known to us, the Homeric, in
which it is the breath of life which leaves the body at death
as a mindless ghost, and the Pythagorean-Orphic belief that
the psyché was a spiritual being fallen from a higher sphere
into the cycle of birth and death, capable of wisdom and
good conduct, or the reverse, and able eventually to return to
its original state by the exercise of wisdom and virtue (or the
appropriate ritual way of life in the Orphic version). These
come together before Plato: and into Plato’s thought about
psyché there enters too, after much development and differen-
tiation, the conception of the earliest Greek philosophers that
the stuff which makes itself into the universe is alive with a
life analogous in some ways to psyché in man, and sometimes
with some kind of intelligence. Aristotle’s attempts to delimit
psyché at the top by marking it off from pure, divine or god-

like thought, nous, in a way Plato had not done (in Plato
nous is a function of psyché) created further complications
for later Platonists, to be considered in due course. So psyché
in Plotinus is what makes everything live and grow; it is the
principle of physical locomotion and the sensations and appe-
tites which prompt and guide it; it is the principle of all
emotions; it is that which thinks discursively; and at its
highest reach we discover that it is an eternal inhabitant of
the world of divine intuitive thought, the nous which is the
Platonic Forms or Ideas, and shares its activity and life, and
its power of self-transcendence and return to its source
beyond thought, the One or Good. And because of its range,
it has a cosmic dimension. The psychology of Plotinus differs
from most modern psychology (except perhaps that of Jung)
in not being exclusively concerned with men. It is a geologi-
cal, botanical, zoological, demonological, astronomical and
theological as well as an anthropological psychology. Every-
thing in the universe of the philosophers of late antiquity is
living organism. The earth, the heavenly bodies, and the
universe as a whole are ensouled organisms. The life of psyché
is a continuum reaching from living rock to living gods. Man
is not, in fact, very important or exalted in rank among
beings possessed of psyché. He is rather near the lower end of
the continuum in his normal empirically observable this-
worldly state. He has, of course, all the levels of psyché
within him and, by reascn of the participation of his highest
psyché in the eternal life of nous, he has the eternal intelligi-
ble world within him too. “We are each of us an intelligible
universe," Plotinus says (III.4[15].3.21-22; cp. V.7[18].1.
9-10 and VI.7[38].6.23). All psychai are in a sense one,
though differentiated (to various degrees at different levels) in
their unity, and in the eternal intelligible world in which
psyché at its highest is a permanent inhabitant, the unity-in-
difference is far more intimate, the interpenetration of parts
more complete. “Light is transparent to light." “The sun here
is all the stars and each star the sun and all the others" (V.8
[31].4.6, 9-10). Our psyché has no absolute limits other

than those of universal psyché, though its lowly state may
make it more difficult to overcome its limitations, and it has
limitations which the psyché of a god, for instance, has not.
And the limits of universal psyché, horizontal and vertical, are
no narrower than the limits of all existence. Further, there is
something in us, though it may be better to call it “self”
(autos) than psyché at this level, which can transcend exis-
tence and attain union with its unknowable source, the One
or Good.? (The rather baffling variations and inconsistencies
in the statements of Plotinus about the relation of our psyché
to nous wil be mentioned later.) By being psyché we are
inevitably part of this vast continuum which extends from the
depths to the heights and spreads out to the limits of possible
being: we cannot drop out of our psychic universality, or
really lose or get rid of anything in it. Of course most men
are unconscious of most of what is within us (or, better, what
we are within) most of the time, and none of us is conscious
of all of it all the time—the sort of consciousness in which we
can objectify ourselves and talk about the psychic level we are
on is not very important or desirable to Plotinus: it is an
epiphenomenon dependent on the satisfactory functioning of
the compound of lower psyché and body. But we can choose
on what level we will live: we are not confined to the ordi-
nary empirical-human level of being anthropos, "man." We
can and should aspire to rise above it, and we can, and prob-
ably most men do, fall below it, to live on what is really an
animal or vegetable level. And if we do, this will have conse-
quences. Plotinus, like all Platonists, believed in reincarnation,
and unlike some, thought a human psyché could be reincar-
nated in an animal or vegetable body. So if we live on a
vegetable level in a human life, we may find in our next
incarnation that we “have taken the trouble to turn ourselves
into trees" (LIL4[15].2.23-24). But we can also (though
few do) take the much greater trouble necessary to rise to the
highest divine level. If we do, our psyché will not, as long as
we are in an earthly body, stop functioning on all our lower
levels: in fact it seems likely that it will quite spontaneously

function better on the levels of discursive thought, and when
required participate in virtuous and beneficent action. The
material, space-time universe is in the thought of Plotinus
everlasting, without beginning or end, and on its own level
real, beautiful and valuable, though only a phantasm or reflec-
tion of the intelligible world, and with its characteristic
dispersion and separation, leading to conflict, which is not
found above. But its existence forever is good and necessary,
being the last and lowest self-diffusion of the Good, and it
depends immediately, both in general and in its particulars,
for its existence, formation and ordering, on psyché. Plotinus
says that our first step in our return to the Good, which is a
matter of “waking up" and understanding who we really are,
is to understand that we, as psyché, make, animate and direct
the material world (VI[10].2). Psyché of all sorts therefore
must always have the capacity to act on all its lower levels,
and must so act when the order of the universe requires.
Cosmic and divine psyché always does so without, in the
normal thought of Plotinus, any disturbance of its unbroken
intuitive, noetic contemplation, without calculation, planning
or willing, by a spontaneous projection of images and activi-
ties which is, so to speak, the reflex of its contemplation.
And the ideal state of man for Plotinus seems to be one in
which his individual psyché behaves as like cosmic psyché as
possible. And he seems to have lived up to his ideal very well,
if we are to accept Porphyry’s account. Porphyry’s biography
is a hagiography, with a tendency to idealize the Master, but
Porphyry had known him intimately in the last years of his
life, and is sober and truthful as hagiographers go, and his
account of Plotinus at the relevant points here rings true to
many Plotinian scholars.? Plotinus went further than some of
his Platonist contemporaries and successors in preaching with-
drawal from the rather futile political and social life of the
time to wealthy Levantines and Roman aristocrats in his circle
of friends, sometimes successfully, but never seems to have
recommended or practised withdrawal from human company
or the real human duties which it imposed. In a fine phrase of

Porphyry's (Life, Chapter 8), *he was present at once to him-
self and others.” He never relaxed his unbroken contempla-
tion, but this did not prevent him writing and lecturing
continually and being *'at the disposal of all who had any sort
of acquaintance with him" (Life, Chapter 9). He answered
Porphyry's interminable questions, sent him away for a holi-
day when neurotic depression was driving him to suicide,
found a valuable necklace which a lady friend had lost, heard
the lessons of his numerous wards and looked after the
accounts of their estates, and acted as arbitrator in petty legal
disputes. (And he may, for all we know, have done more
frivolous things, which his solemn biographer would not have
recorded as unworthy of a Sage—he may even have played
with the children of whom his house was full.) His withdrawal
from the world was primarily an inner withdrawal. He lived
austerely and simply enough, though in a great and well
populated house. But he did not live as a solitary ascetic or
monk. And this perhaps helps to give a more vivid and
concrete idea of how he thought psyché should be in the
world.
We now have to consider briefly some puzzling features of
the various accounts which Plotinus gives of the relationship
between psyché at its highest and nous.!? There are passages
in the Enneads where the situation appears quite simple and
straightforward. Plotinus has, so to speak, an official doctrine,
which he propounds in many places, particularly when he is
explaining how many hypostases or levels of reality there are.
In this, below the One or Good which transcends thought and
being, there is the One-Being, nous, which is at once intuitive
eternal thought and Platonic Forms or Ideas in the most
perfect thinkable unity, and below this again there is psyché,
whose characteristic activity is discursive thought and whose
function in the great self-diffusion of the Good which consti-
tutes the universe is to transmit as much as it can of the rich
and varied plenitude of being which nous holds in unity in its
eternal contemplation to the material, space-time, world
which psyché contains and to which it gives such reality as

the material world can have. In one important passage (III.7
[45].11) the wilful tendency of a ‘part’ or ‘power’ of cosmic
psyché to discursive reasoning is said to be the origin of time.
Individual psychai (though not cosmic soul, even in its lowest
activities when it functions as “nature” (physis) giving form
and life to bodies, or divine embodied souls) can, though they
need not, when they are embodied be carried away by their
involvement in the material and bewitched and entrapped by
this world into an egocentric concern with the needs and
desires of their lower individual selves and bodies, though
their highest part can never fall or be affected by their lower
activities. This seems fairly straightforward and consistent. But
when we read further in the Enneads we discover that the
sharp distinction made between the hypostasis nous and the
hypostasis psyché in the official account becomes blurred, and
even tends to disappear altogether. There is a long and impor-
tant work, divided by Porphyry into two treatises, On the
Reason Why Being is Everywhere All Present, One and the
Same (VI.4-5 [22-23]) in which it is not at all clear for a
great deal of the time what hypostasis Plotinus is talking
about, and it does not seem to matter very much. In his
greatest work on psyché (again divided by Porphyry), written
not long afterwards (IV.3-4[27-28]) and a number of other
places, we discover that cosmic psyché and the soul of the
embodied gods do not think discursively but noetically or
intuitively, just like nous. This is often stated in conscious
opposition to the fundamentalist Platonist and Judaeo-
Christian doctrine of *'artisan" creation, which Plotinus consis-
tently disliked, in which God plans or designs the universe
and then proceeds to carry out his plan. Further, as we have
seen, the individual human psyché at its highest is an inhabi-
tant of the world of nous and thinks intuitively, not discur-
sively. The position is complicated here by the fact that a
nous in the individual psyché is several times referred to,
which is distinct from the hypostasis nous but functions in
harmony with and is illuminated by it; and probably, by the
dependence of the individual human psyché on an individual

nous-form which is a full member of the intelligible world,
being a Platonic Idea in nous.!! There are even a couple of
passages where psyché and its characteristic activity of discur-
sive reason seem in danger of being ‘‘squeezed out" altogether
and the intelligible and sensible worlds and intuition and sense
perception left immediately juxtaposed (V.8(31].7; VI.7
[38].7.29-31). Plotinus never seems very enthusiastic about
discursive reason (dianoia) though he admits its necessity and
place in the hierarchy of mental activities. Finally, nous itself
becomes at times curiously "psychic." The distinction
between the two hypostases is never simply one between the
static and the mobile. The eternal being of nous seethes with
the intensest and most vivid life and movement (see especially
V.8[31].3-4 and VI.7[38].1-15). And it is not quite as easy
as the "official" scheme and tidy-minded accounts of Ploti-
nus's thought might suggest always to distinguish noetic and
psychic activity as "eternal," (in any generally accepted
meaning of eternity) and “temporal” respectively.!? There are
times when the Plotinian interpreter feels that Plotinus might
have managed better if he had abandoned the distinction
between the two hypostases which he derived from the
Aristotelianized Platonism of some of his predecessors and
returned to something more like the authentic position of
Plato, with nous as the highest, divine or godlike function of
psyché (to discuss the reasons why he did not do so would
take us too far from our subject here). This tendency of
higher psyché to fuse with nous may mean that we shall have
to take both into account in our comparison with buddhi.
Conclusion
Similarity between the Bhavagadgita and the Enneads is

striking as far as the general movement of the self (autos) is
concerned, from its being centered in the ego, with a disinte-
grated preoccupation with particular needs and desires of
one's lower nature, to being centered in the One or Krsna.
However, there are significant differences between them in the

demarcation of the various parts of a human being and the
emphasis placed on different methods of integration and
transformation.
Psyché in the Enneads ranges over the entire lower nature
of Krsna and does not correspond exactly to buddhi alone
which is only a part of prakrti, albeit the highest. In the Gita,
discursive thought does not occupy a significant place in the
attainment of πα or true knowledge. Manas is considered
one of the senses, although it can control other senses when it
is functioning properly. The fickleness, unreliability and
limitations of manas are strongly noted. In the higher,
contemplative intelligence of buddhi,!? manas ceases its activi-
ty and is quietened, so that a vision of the transcendent realm
may be possible. On the other hand, discursive reasoning is
the characteristic activity of psyché. The relationship between
manas and buddhi sometimes looks like that between the
"middle" part of the human psyché, and the higher part
which is eternally in touch with, and an inhabitant of, the
world of nous. Plotinus does not stress the unreliability of
discursive thought as much as the Gita does of manas. Never-
theless, Plotinus himself seems to have had much less use for
analytical reasoning than might be supposed. Cosmic and
divine psychai do not think discursively, or deliberate or plan
in carrying out their creative and ruling activities. And human
psyché at its highest can and should think and act like them.
Plotinus often seems to be making great efforts (especially in
V.8 and early chapters of VI.7) to get his readers to think
"noetically," not “‘dianoetically” or discursively about nous.
This is possible because our higher psyché does not ‘come
down” and can be broughtto see nous in the proper way
“from the inside” and as nous itself (VI.7.15, end). There is a
striking likeness between the meaning of the root budh and
Plotinus’s repeated exhortations to wake up and realize who
we really are and where we belong. This realization of our
true nature, which is μα and nous both, is not an outcome
of discursive thought either in the Bhagavadzgitä or in the

Enneads.
However, buddhi, unlike the higher part of human psyché,
can be disintegrated, distracted and dispersed. It needs to be
purified and trained. The higher psyché, on the other hand,
does not descend; what we have to do is to become aware of
It and let it direct us. (This is not easy!) At this point the
Gita is closer to the later pagan Neoplatonists after Iamblichus
as well as the main Judaeo-Christian tradition. But higher and
middle psyché together are like buddhi the means of control
of what is below them. Besides, higher psyché, like buddhi, is
our “lookout” on the higher world.!^ Roughly speaking we
could say that the unintegrated buddhi corresponds to the
middle psyché, which can be attracted upwards or down-
wards, and the purified and integrated buddhi corresponds to
the higher psyché, attuned to the nous. 15
Nous corresponds fairly well to the higher self of man,
namely atman-purusa-brahman. What is said of the man who
has become brahman agrees almost exactly with what Plotinus
says about the man who has become nous. And a man
becomes brahman or nous because he always was so. It is
only that now he realizes it; this seeing or realizing is the
same as becoming it. Further, jñnana is the sort of knowledge
nous has and we have in it.
The line of demarcation between the hypostases of psyché
and nous is vaguer and more variable in the Enneads than that
between buddhi and brahman in the Gità. However, even in
the latter, there are considerable variations: àtman-purusa-
brahman is sometimes imperishable, wholly transcendent and
unmanifested; sometimes it is perishable and unmanifested;
sometimes it appears entangled with prakrti. It is likely, as
said both by Plotinus and Krsna, that these distinctions in
the level of being are too subtle to be grasped without the
eye of nous or jüàna. One can truly see nous or brahman
(which is the object of jAàna) only by becoming nous or
brahman.
8 2 A. H. ARMSTRONG-—R. R. RAVINDRA
In addition to jnana yoga, three other types of yoga,

namely dhyana yoga, bhakti yoga and karma yoga, constitute
the four limbs of the buddhi yoga of the Bhagavadgita. We
have already said a little about the counterpart of jnana yoga
in Plotinus. As far as dhyana yoga, namely the yoga of medi-
tation, and the concomitant physical postures are concerned,
there are no traces of these in the Enneads. Indeed it is diffi-
cult to discover them in any pagan Greek philosopher. The
later pagan Neoplatonists may have practised something of the
sort but the evidence is not at all clear.!ó The Gità is here
closer, and the other Indian traditions which have further
developed dhyana yoga perhaps closer still, to the monastic
and non-monastic Eastern- and Western-Christian traditions of
"methods of prayer."
Although Krsna is beyond being and non-being, beyond
personal or non-personal existence, one of the yogas he
recommends is bhakti yoga, the yoga of love and dedication
to him. It has often been remarked that a sense of pious
devotion to a personal God is missing in Plotinus. This may
be true at the level of lower bhakti which is little more than
conventional piety directed to God. But we wonder if it is
true at the level of higher bhakti, which is a way, perhaps the
way, of coming to know the essence of Krsna and uniting
with him (B.G. 18.54-55). There is the most intense love
(eros) of the Good, given by the Good, running through the
whole Enneads. And though the Good is neither personal nor
impersonal, the final union is often described in personal
terms. !?
For both the Gità and Plotinus prakrti is good and real, in
its own degree. The Platonist will miss in the Gita what is
central to all forms of Platonism, the conviction that the
lower world is the image of what is beyond. This relation of
image to archetype may sometimes mean that the lower world
of prakrti is relatively spectral, inauthentic and inferior. But it
may also mean that the two worlds are brought very close
together, so that the world of nous is seen as an inner world
BUDDHIIN THE BHAGAVADGITA 83
rather than another world, as this world glorified and appre-

hended sub specie aeternitatis. This is very evident in the
great descriptions of nous in V.8, 34 and VI.7, 1-15. These
passages seem to be based on direct experience, where dialec-
tic passes beyond itself into vision.
However, both the Gita and Plotinus are basically con-
cerned with what is beyond prakrti and therefore beyond
action and becoming. Still, work in prakrti is necessary, and
inaction is no way to go beyond action. Action according to
one’s dharma, based on one’s own essential nature (svabhava),
is certainly more emphasised in the Gita. This, however, may
simply be due to the fact that the Gita is intending to deal
with a more absolute sort of inaction and withdrawal from
the world than any Greek seeker of truth ever practised.
If a person takes Krsna’s buddhi yoga seriously, he must
above all attempt to wake up to his own indwelling essential
nature, his svabhäva, and act out the law of his inner being,
his svadharma, with a resolute and a quiet mind, without self-
pity or self-importance. Arjuna’s way was that of a warrior,
Plotinus’s that of a teacher and a spiritual leader. Each acted
out his svadharma admirably. The Gita stresses the importance
of discovering and living by one’s own dharma and not some-
one else’s. Samkara and Ramanuja, following their dharma,
wrote and taught like Plotinus. And other Platonists of late
antiquity understood their svadharma differently from
Plotinus, for example, the nearest equivalent to Arjuna in the
history of pagan Platonism, the Emperor Julian.
NOTES
1. For the thesis that the root meaning of dharma, as the upholding
of the orderly relatedness of all that is, as established in the Rg
Vedas, the most ancient fruti text, has a demonstratable continuity
in the Bhagavadgita, see P. W. R. Bowlby, “The Lotus and the
Chariot: A Study of the Root Meaning of Dharma in the Indian

Religious Tradition” (Ph.D. Thesis, McMaster University, London,
Ontario, 1975).
In the religious traditions of India, there seems to be a consensus
that the root cause of human bondage and suffering is ignorance,
and that what is needed is true knowledge; action is not generally
stressed as an avenue to freedom. In the Judeo-Chnistian traditions,
on the other hand, the mainstream emphasis is less on knowing
reality; truth has been revealed, the challenge for man is whether
he can act according to the revelation and gain salvation. The Gita
imbues buddhi with both discernment and will. Its teaching and
setting insist that right knowledge and right action are inseparable.
In addition to the ordinary meaning of purusa as man, there are
three distinct kinds of purusa mentioned in the Gita (15.16-19):
the perishable purusa, the imperishable purusa, and purusottama—
highest purusa who is other than these both and is also called
paramatma, the supreme self. Krsna declares himself to be purusot-
tama which does not exclude his being the other purusas as well;
they are also his and they are in him, but he is still beyond. Simi-
larly, in addition to purusa, other labels referring to the constitu-
ents of the higher nature of Krsna, namely brahman and atman,
also have further divisions. These, however, need not be distin-
guished for our purposes here.
It is the same word from which Japanese zen is derived by a
phonetic shift, through the Chinese tchan. Dhyana yoga is also
sometimes called raja yoga (royal yoga), although raja yoga is not
any specific kind of yoga; it is yoga per se.
The various Indian schools of religious thought and practise, before,
after and contemporaneous with the Gita, seem to have shown a
distinct preference for one or the other of these yogas. In the
process they usually became one-sided and lost the wholeness of
spiritual life and the organic balance and tension characteristic of
the Gita. Krsna himself says that he taught his eternal yoga, which
is a supreme secret, to Vivasvat, a sun god, who taught it to Manu,
the first among humans. Taught from one to another, this yoga was
known by sage-kings; but with the lapse of time this teaching was
lost on earth (B.G. 4.1-3). Krsna then taught this yoga to Arjuna.
The merciless time has undoubtedly again done its damage.
The best detailed studies of psyché in Plotinus at present available
are those by H. J. Blumenthal, Plotinus’s Psychology (The Hague,
1971), and the two papers, "Soul, World-Soul and Individual Soul
in Plotinus," in Le Neoplatonisme (Paris, 1971), pp. 56-63, and
“Nous and Soul in Plotinus: Some Problems of Demarcation,” in
Plotino e il Neoplatonismo (Rome, 1974), pp. 203-19. The full

commentary by R. T. Wallis on the Fourth Ennead (which is
entirely concerned with psyché) will be of the greatest value.
Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, Ch. 8.
On this see G. O’Daly, Plotinus’s Philosophy of the Self (Shannon,
Ireland, 1973).
It is perhaps important to remark here that, though Plotinus writes
a great deal about the spoudaios, the perfectly wise and good man,
the Sage or Mahatma, in the Enneads, there is no evidence in the
Enneads or Porphyry’s biography that he himself claimed to have
attained this perfection, any more than any other great Greek
philosopher. They all thought of themselves as philosophoi rather
than sophoi. It was their disciples, like Porphyry, who thought of
them as Sages.
10. At this point we depend very much on H. J. Blumenthal’s second
article (see n. 6). See also, for what might be called “‘psyché-like”’
characteristics of nous, A. H. Armstrong, "Eternity, Life and Move-
ment in Plotinus’s Accounts of Nous,” in Le Neoplatonisme (see
same note), pp. 67-76, which Blumenthal at some points construc-
tively criticizes. Much further work is in progress about the prob-
lems raised in this paper.
11. This is a much disputed question. Reasons for the view adopted
here (with an account of previous discussions) are included in a
lecture, ‘“‘Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus," reprinted in A.
H. Armstrong, Plotinian and Christian Studies (London: Variorum
Reprints, 1979), chap. XX.
12. On this see Blumenthal’s and A. H. Armstrong’s articles cited in n.
10. There are plenty more to come, notably from Dr. Peter
Manchester.
13. Buddhi is traditionally located in the heart rather than the head.
Although this is not specifically mentioned in the Gita with respect
to buddhi, Krsna declares himself to be located in the heart of
every being. On the other hand, Platonists were rather peculiar
among Greek philosophers in making the brain the organ of intelli-
gence. The traditional seat of all thought for Greeks was in the
heart (or earlier the phrenes, the diaphragm and the organs above
it) and Aristotelians and Stoics maintained this position. Plato had
placed intelligence in the head for symbolic reasons in the Timaeus,
and the nobler passions in the heart, and later Platonists like Ploti-
nus thought that the Master’s doctrine had been confirmed by the
discovery of the nervous system by Erasistratus and Herophilus in
the 3rd century B.C., whose discovery had been restated and made
widely known by Galen in the 2nd century A.D. See Plotinus IV.3
[27].23.9-21, and A. H. Armstrong, ad. loc., in the Loeb Plotinus,

Vol. IV.
14. Cosmic and divine psychai are altogether of the higher world; intui-
tive, unchanging, infallible and impeccable.
15. This was the guess made by one of us in a footnote a few years
ago. See R. Ravindra, "Self-Surrender: The Core of Spiritual Life,"
in Studies in Religion (Spring, 1974). On psyché and self (autos)
see G. O’Daly, Plotinus’s Philosophy of the Self (Irish University
Press, 1973).
16. See A. Smith, Porphyry’s Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition (The
Hague, 1974), pp. 97 ff. and 115 ff.
17. This whole question of love for God, and also God’s love for man,
in the Enneads and the Bhagavadgita is very important. However,
we cannot dwell on it here any longer without being sidetracked
from the subject of this paper.
The Plotinian One
and the Concept of
Paramapurusa in the
Bhagavadgita
I. C. Sharma
Cleveland State University

Cleveland, Ohio
Plotinus was essentially a mystic philosopher. It is therefore

important that his original contribution be kept apart from
the external influence on his thought. He no doubt studied
Plato and other earlier philosophers, but his reference to them
in his work aimed at clarification, elucidation, and confirma-
tion of his own vision and experience. Any examination of his
concepts without reference to the mystical experience, which
is the core of his philosophy, is a misinterpretation, if not a
distortion. Elmer O’Brien, in his work The Essential Plotinus,
has committed this fallacy in saying that the historical
approach is necessary. Even though he agrees that Plotinus
never knew the writings of Philo, yet he imagines that the
Plotinian One is the expression of Plotinus’s own mystical
experience arrived at through contemplation or meditation.
O’Brien, a typical historian of philosophy, further comments
that Plotinus’s meditation shows the influence of Plato.
Supporting this contention, he cites Porphyry:
First published in Ohio Journal of Religious Studies 6 (April 1978):

3-12.
87
88 Il. C. SHARMA
Porphyry again is our informant that it was by

meditation and by the method that Plato teaches in
the Banquet that Plotinus ‘“‘lifted himself ...to the
first and all-transcendent divinity." The reference is
to the passage wherein Socrates retails the words of
Diotima, the wise woman of Mantinaea. The
method taught there is that of a twofold purgation
of the mind, one qualitative, the other, quantita-
tive.!
Even if we were to accept that Plotinus borrowed contem-

plative method from Plato, the experience that he had was
that of the Transcendent One and was his own VISION OF
THE TRUTH. Moreover, the meaning of contemplation as
understood by Plotinus is different from that which is foisted
on him by critics like O'Brien.
It seems important to clarify the meaning of contemplation
with reference to Plotinian philosophy. Contemplation as
meditation in Plotinus, leading to the experience of the One
through Intelligence, bears a strong parallel to its meaning and
significance in the Bhagavadgita. The thought of the Bhaga-
vadgita is no doubt a philosophical exposition of the mystic
experience of Paramapurusa—the Supreme Self—the One,
which is both immanent and transcendent. This immanence of
the Transcendent One has been recognized by Plotinus in the
eighth chapter of the third Ennead. There he states that even
nature contemplates. It should be remembered that the only
way of being aware of the One, according to Plotinus,
whether on the part of the individual soul or the World Soul
or the Intelligence (Nous), is contemplation. The Bhagavadgita
consistently advocates contemplation (Yoga) as the sole means
of attaining the Supreme Self (Paramapurusa). The Gita is
older chronologically than the Enneads and propounds the
manifestation of the World Soul, the Individual Souls, and the
Nous or the Intelligence which is designated as Aksara or the
Indestructible Purusa. Nature, Prakrti in the Bhagavadgita,
stands for the material creation as well as the divine Energy
which is immanent in nature. The highest forms of natural
THE PLOTINIAN ONE 89
manifestations have been mentioned in the Gifä as objects

worthy of contemplation for spiritual realization. Having
attained identification with Paramapurusa, Krsna says to
Arjuna: |
In my unmanifested form I am immanent in the

entire creation. Everything rests in Me, but [ am not
in them?
This immanence of the Transcendent One in nature has

been described by Plotinus as well:
That [which] is called nature is a soul, the offspring

of a superior soul with a stronger life; that it
quietly holds contemplation in itself, not directed
upwards or even downwards, but at rest in what it
is, in its own repose and a kind of self perception,
and in this consciousness and self perception it sees
that what comes after it, as far as it can, and seeks
no longer, but has accomplished a vision of splen-
dour and delight.?
Although Plotinus places contemplation before the attain-

ment of mystic experience as an intellectual means to the end
of understanding the One, yet in essence and in effect
contemplation is the same thing as the Yoga of the Bhagavad-
gità. Later we shall show how the Buddhi Yoga, or the Yoga
of the Intellect, has been regarded as the highest in the Gita.
However, it is important to give the: meaning of this term in
Sanskrit. This word was derived from the root Yuj, which
means *'to unite" or *'10in." When we unite ourselves with the
Source, the Goal, the One, we are said to be in Yoga or in
contemplation. Thus Yoga is the means of the union of the
soul with the One as a technique, and it is also the state of
that union itself. This union is the main theme of the Bhaga-
vadgità. At the end of every chapter recurs the statement that
the Bhagavadgità is a Yoga Shastra or the science of Yoga.
As a technique Yoga is an activity, and, most accurately, it
90 I. C. SHARMA
is the highest activity of the intellect or the Buddhi. As a

state of mind, Yoga is an attainment of the highest mystical
experience which a Yogin or contemplator can ever achieve.
In this state the Yogi may be outwardly inactive because he
becomes the source of all activity. But it must be remembered
that without the highest intellectual activity no Yoga is possi-
ble. According to the Bhagavadgita, Yoga means efficiency in
activity (Yoga Karmasu Kausalam). In this sense, the entire
creation has been designated as the Yogamaya or the Creative
Energy of the Paramapurusa. It has also been referred to as
the Lila or the play of God. Plotinus as well talks about play
in reference to contemplation. In the Upanisads, which are
the warp and woof of the philosophy of the Bhagavadgita,
creation is the play of Brahman, the Supreme Being.
The Vedas, which include the Brahmanic and the Upani-
sadic literature, propound the fourfold aspects of Brahman:
1. Avyaya Brahman— Infinite Beyond, Beyond Being, with-

out any qualifications, not even One (because One is a limita-
tion)
2. Aksara Brahman—Indestructible One, the Ultimate
Cause, not yet differentiated from Pure Existence
3. Atmaksara Brahman—The Cosmic Self with the poten-
tialities of creation, preservation, and destruction, not yet
manifested in Cosmic Creation; as such Brahman is the
Creator in the same sense Nous is
4. Visvasrit Brahman—the Projection of the Atmaksara into
the entire creation of time, space, causality. As such Brahman
is the Cosmic Form—the World Soul. This fourth is also called
Virat Purusa.
The first three aspects of Brahman are transcendent, but all

three combined are immanent in the World Soul and in the
Cosmos consisting of material nature and the individuated
souls. The entire creation is the play of just one part of the
Cosmic Self which should, in fact, be called Acosmic Self.
The ground, the cause, and the creator, which as transcendent
realities are ‘beyond’ the cosmos, combined ‘partially’ in the
THE PLOTINIAN ONE 9]
manifested World Soul, are ‘immanent’ in the spatio-temporal

world. This is the basic metaphysicis of the Vedas, which the
philosophy of the Bhagavadgità attempts to explain through-
out. Before elaborating on the comparative analysis of the
concepts of the Plotinian One and the Paramapurusa, let us
consider the relationship of play with contemplation as
Plotinus sees it:
Well, as the discussion has arisen among ourselves,

there will be no risk in playing with our ideas. Then
are we now contemplating as we play? Yes, we and
all who play are doing this, or at any rate this is
what they aspire to as they play. And it is likely
that, whether a child or a man is playing or being
serious, one plays and the other is serious for the
sake of contemplation; and every action is a serious
effort towards contemplation; compulsory action
draws contemplation more towards the outer world,
and what we call voluntary action, less, but all the
same, voluntary action, too, springs from desire of
contemplation. . . . Let us now talk about the earth
itself, the trees, and plants in general, and ask what
their contemplation is, and how we can relate what
the earth makes and produces to its activity of
contemplation, and how nature, which people say
has no power of forming mental images or reason-
ing, has contemplation in itself and makes what it
makes by contemplation, which it does not have.*
This paragraph especially needs the attention of those who

consider Plotinian contemplation merely as empirically intel-
lectual and dialectically discursive.
Our study reveals that contemplation, Yoga, and mystic
experience are to be understood in the same sense. The phi-
losophy of the Bhagavadgita is the outcome of the mystic
experience of the Vedic and Upanisadic sages, re-affirmed by
the self-realization of the king of the mystics, Yogiraj Sri
92 I. C. SHARMA
Krsna, who declared the Yoga of Intelligence to be the

integrated Yoga.
Since Yoga means ‘‘union with the One," the entire Bhaga-
vadgità expounds this union in every chapter, each one of
which is a Yoga of one kind or another. The emphasis of
Plotinus on contemplation is parallel to the concept and
understanding of the Paramapurusa through Buddhi Yoga in
the Bhagavadgita.
We can throw more light on the comparison by analyzing
the nature of God as accepted in the Gita. The analysis
presented here, based as it is on Brahmanic literature, is
different from sectarian interpretations of the Gita. The
sources of this analysis have not yet been published in the
English language. All the commentaries on the Bhagavadgita,
including that of Samkarácárya, brought to the West by
scholars like Radhakrishnan, have generally overlooked the
fact that the metaphysics of the Gita is the same as that of
the Vedas so far as the concept of God is concerned. The
concept of Brahman, with its four aspects as stated above, is
basic for understanding the peculiar nature of Mayda as Crea-
tive Energy and as an emanation from Paramapurusa. A lack
of understanding of Maya, caused by their not referring to the
Vedic literature, has been responsible for the conflicting
conclusions arrived at in different sectarian interpretations.
It has already been stated that the nature of the Brahman
is fourfold. The Avyaya Brahman, the Infinite Ground, the
nameless, is the highest and is parallel to the One of Plotinus,
when he calls it "beyond all names." The Aksara or the
Indestructible Absolute may correspond to the good and
sometimes to the One of Plotinus. The Atmaksara corresponds
to the Nous and the Visvasrit, or the Immanent Brahman,
manifested in the entire spatio-temporal cosmos and yet
beyond it, corresponds to the World Soul of Plotinus.
By referring to this fourfold nature of Brahman we see that
the Bhagavadgità is the science of Yoga, as it is stated at the
end of every chapter. In the words of Plotinus, we could call
it the science of contemplation on the One. The above inter-

pretation of the Bhagavadgita has been given by two great
contemporary Orientalists, Sri Madhusudan Ojha and his
pupil, Sri Motilal Shastri, neither of whom knew the
English language. The two works of these great scholars, Brah-
man Vijnana, the Science of Brahman, by Ojha, and Gita
Vijnana Bhasya, the Commentary on the Science of the Bhaga-
vadgita, by Shastri, are perhaps the two most monumental
works ever published in the Hindi language.
According to Motilal Shastri, the Bhagavadgita as Yogashas-
tra is a most valuable dictionary of the Jnana (comprehensive
knowledge) and Vijnana (scientific knowledge) of India. It
may be called the index of the definitive terms used in the
science of the Vedas from the point of view of comprehensive
and scientific knowledge. (For the sake of accuracy, I use the
terms Jnana and Vijnana instead of their English versions.)
These words have been used in the same senses in the
Bhagavadgita. The significance of these terms is so great that
the seventh chapter of the Gita is entitled “Jnana Vijnàna
Yoga.” Similar is the significance of the words Aksara
Brahman; the eighth chapter is entitled “‘Aksara Brahman
Yoga." The concept of Paramapurusa, which is closely
connected with these two chapters, is explained in the fif-
teenth chapter, entitled ‘“Purusottama Yoga" (Purusottama is
a synonym for Paramapurusa). It is therefore important to
clarify the terms Jnana and Vijnàna in the present context.
In the Vedas there are two independent subjects, Brahman
and Yajna. The word Yajna has been poorly translated as
“sacrifice.” Thus, there are two types of definitions of tech-
nical terms in the Vedas: (1) Definitions which analyze or
explain Brahman (the One) as a reality; and (2) those which
explain Yajna (the pluralistic evolution or expansion) as the
reality. Unitive Brahman comprehensively knowable as One
through Jnana has been accepted as the ground and founda-
tion of pluralistic Yajna knowable through Vijnana. In the
words of Satapatha Brahmana: “brahma vai sarvasya
pratistha" (Brahman is the ground of all existence).
94 I. €. SHARMA
This is in fact what is called the eternal natural divine

Yajna. According to the Vedas this pluralistic, scientifically
analyzable, and knowable cosmos has evolved from and is
grounded in that Brahman which is knowable as One through
Jnana.© Thus Jñäna (the unitive knowledge of the One) and
Vijnana (the pluralistic knowledge of the manifold cosmos)
are significant because they presume the metaphysics of the
fourfold Brahman.
Since the seventh chapter of the Bhagavadgita is devoted
entirely to these two terms, it is evident that the metaphysical
and the cosmological assumptions of this work are Vedic. In
the seventh chapter of the Gita, Sri Krsna says:
I will explain to you the reality in detail through

the methods of unitive knowledge, 7744 and divi-
sive science, Vijnana, having understood which
nothing else remains to be known.’
It is needless to emphasize the significance of this verse in

the face of the facts stated above. Almost all the sectarian
and uninformed translations of the Gita have neglected the
significance of Jna, which refers to the acceptance of the One
the Paramapurusa, who as immanent of the World Soul is
called Purusa cnly, and, as the transcendent indestructible
Absolute, is called Aksara as well as Beyond, Beyond One
Similarly, the significance of divisive scientific knowledge of
the pluralistic spatio-temporal cosmos has been overlooked.
The pluralistic manifold material nature is described in this
very chapter and designated Apara Prakrti or inferior nature.
The individual souls are called Para Prakrti or superior spiri-
tual nature, which is the ground of the weaker or inferior
material nature. Plotinus, too, explains matter as privation and
as weaker emanation of the One in the same strain.
According to the Bhagavadgita, the immanent World Soul,
Purusa, itself is rooted in Paramapurusa (Nous according to
Plotinus). However, Paramapurusa as transcendent is beyond
Nous as well. The World Soul is the source of individual souls
or of life. In this sense, the One is the beginning as well as

the end of all beings. All beings are strung on it as beads are
strung on a thread. The sixth and seventh verses of the
seventh chapter read:
I am both the origin and dissolution of all the

material and spiritual beings. O’ Arjuna, there is no
being superior to Me; everything is rooted or strung
in Me as the pearls are strung on a thread.?
In these verses the material nature and the individual souls,

as well as the World Soul immanent in the cosmos, are
associated with Paramapurusa, who is the Supreme Self
beyond all distinctions, and as such is the One.
The Plotinian notion of the One is a similar “‘unity in diver-
sity." In the sixth Ennead Plotinus says:
As the One does not contain any difference, it is

always present and we are present to it, when we
no longer contain difference. The One does not
aspire to us, to move around us; we aspire to it, to
move around it. Actually, we always move around
it, but we do not always look.... we are always
around The One. If we were not, we would dissolve
and cease to exist. Yet our gaze does not remain
fixed upon The One. When we look at it, we then
attain the end of our desires and find rest. Then it
is that, all discord passed, we dance an inspired
dance around it.
In this dance the soul looks upon the source of life,

the source of The Intelligence, the origin of Being,
the cause of the Good, the root of The Soul.?
The last paragraph here is almost a paraphrase of the four-

fold nature between Brahman or Paramapurusa. It points out
the relation between the individual souls, including all natural
life, (Visvasrit), the Nous (À tmaksara) and the One which
also is referred to as the Good. It has already been stated that
96 I. C. SHARMA
Brahman as ground is the Beyond and Brahman as the One

Indestructible is the Cause. The One of Plotinus is sometimes
the Brahman as the ground and sometimes the Brahman
depending on the context in which he uses the term.
Brahman as the ground is indefinable. In the Upanisads it
has been called the transcendent Being which is indescribable,
Anirvacaniya. The sages have tried to describe it in negative
terms, “Neti, Neti"—not this, not that. Plotinus follows the
same methods when he says:
The awesome existent above, The One, is not a

being for then its unity would repose in another
than itself. There is no name that suits it, really.
But, since name it we must, it may appropriately be
called ‘One’, on the understanding, however, that it
is not a substance that possesses unity only as an
attribute. So, the strictly nameless, it is difficult to
know. The best approach is through its offspring,
Being: we know it brings The Intelligence into exis-
tence, that it is the source of all that is best, the
self-sufficing and unflagging begetter of every being,
to be numbered among none of them since it is
their prior.!?
Plotinus tries to point out that the One, the transcendent

in the sense of being prior to the Good, the Intelligence, the
Soul, and the material nature, is yet the begetter of its entire
offspring. He arrives at this conclusion and understanding
through contemplation. The Bhagavadgita aims at the under-
standing of the same One, the Paramapurusa, as One who
knows everything, who is the oldest, who is the controller,
who is smaller than the smallest, who is the sustainer of
everything, who is beyond material conception, who is
unthinkable, who is luminous like the sun, who is beyond
material nature and is transcendent.!!
The same transcendent One pervades the universe and is
eternal. Clarifying this aspect of the One, Sri Krsna says:
Remember that Being is eternal and true

Which pervades everywhere and manifests too:
No one can ever annihilate
That Being Immortal Indivisable and Great."
Since man is regarded as miniature Brahman, the Bhagavad-

gita, like the Vedas, accepts that the totality of man is
constituted by the body, the mind, the intellect, and the soul,
corresponding to the manifested World Soul in the form of
the cosmos, the cosmic Self as the potential Creator, the
indestructible One as the cause, and the infinite beyond
Being, as the ground. Thus the real soul is beyond senses,
beyond mind, and beyond intellect. Referring to this defini-
tion of soul (which has incidentally been accepted by Plato as
well), the Bhagavadgità says:
Senses are of subtle kind,

Subtler than senses is mind;
Subtler than mind is intellect great;
Soul is beyond intellectual state.!?
The word “God” in the Bhagavadgità is not used in an

anthropomorphic sense. It is used in the Vedic and Upanisadic
sense as 14 (Immanent), Sarvajna (Omniscient), Parah Purusa
(Beyond Being), etc. The fifteenth chapter, “The Yoga of
Purusottma or Paramapurusa,” has great significance from this
point of view. It points out that all three transcendental
aspects of Brahman, the Ground, the Cause, and the Creator,
are present in the cosmos as material destructible nature
called Ksara Purusa, the indestructible Aksara Purusa in the
form of spiritual nature, and Uttama Purusa in the form of
the Ultimate Soul (Paramatma). This has been clarified in the
following verses of the fifteenth discourse:
There are two Purusas in the cosmos, viz: Ksara, the

material nature, and Aksara, the spiritual nature; all
the material as well as the spiritual beings are con-
tingent so far as their manifestation is concerned.
98 I. C. SHARMA
They are therefore Ksara Purusa. The immanent

unitive Soul is the indestructible Aksara Purusa.
There is the other Supreme Self, Uttama Purusa
(Paramapurusa), the Excellent Self, who has been
called the Ultimate Soul, who is Infinite and who,
having entered the three dimensional cosmos of
space, time, and causality, sustains all existence.!^
This description of the Immanent Ultimate Soul fits quite

well with Plotinus's description of the Soul. The Soul as parti-
cipant unity, Visva Srit, the Ultimate Soul within the cosmos,
has been construed in the Bhagavadgità as the presence of the
One and has been called Paramapurusa as well as Paramatma
(Ultimate Soul). Plotinus points out that the unity of the
Soul is derived from another source (the One). In fact,
although the expression is different, the truth expressed by
Plotinus and by the Bhagavadgità is the same. In the words of
Plotinus:
The Soul, while distinct from The One, has greater

unity because it has a higher degree of being. It is
not The One. It is one, but its unity is contingent.
Between The Soul and its unity there is the same
difference as between body and body's unity.
Looser aggregates, such as a choir, are furthest from
unity; the more compact are the nearer; The Soul is
nearer still, yet—as all the others—is only a partici-
pant in unity.!°
To sum up, the Plotinian concept of the One and that of

the Paramapurusa are methodologically and metaphysically
the same. Many Western thinkers have said that Plotinus's
approach is psychological. The truth is that it is contempla-
tive, Yogic, and intellectually mystic. He uses the word “Intel-
ligence" in a sense which is not common. Intelligence, accor-
ding to both Plotinus and the (714, is next to the One. In
man, it is next to soul. Though the One is beyond Intelli-
gence, yet it is closest to the latter. Both Plotinus and the
Bhagavadgita are metaphysically monistic and methodo-

logically contemplative and ethical. A deeper study of the
Yoga of the Bhagavadgità shows that the method of Yoga
which brings union of the soul with the One is not limited to
the path of knowledge, the path of selfless action, and the
path of love or devotion. There is the fourth and highest path
called Buddhi Yoga, the path of Intelligence, which in fact is
the essence of the philosophy of the Gita, Sri Krsna has
emphatically stated that the Buddhi Yoga is the highest and
most efficacious path, because it is all inclusive. It is the sum
and substance of the Bhagavadgita, both as a metaphysical
exposition and as the science of Yoga. The Buddhi Yoga is a
golden mean between the two extremes of asceticism and
unrestrained indulgence in sensuous satisfaction. So is the
philosophy of Plotinus.
This comparative study reveals that mystic experience is
not antagonistic to practical life. Intelligence being nearest the
One, the way to the mystic experience of oneness is via Intel-
lect. Thus contemplation in the Buddhi Yoga and in Plotinus
justifiably brings about the union of the empirical and the
mystical, the psychological and the logical, the metaphysical
and the ethical aspects of philosophy.
NOTES
1. Elmer O’Brien, The Essential Plotinus (Indianapolis, Indiana:

Hackett Publishing Co., 1975), p. 16.
2. Bhagavadgita, from the Sanskrit (Gorakphur: Gita Press, 1970),
IX.4. All translations from the (ठं are my own (unpublished).
3. Plotinus, Enneads VIII.4, trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 371.
4. Ibid., III, VIII.1, pp. 361-2.
5. Motilal Shastri, Gita Vijnàna Bhäfya, trans. I. C. Sharma (Jaipur:
Manava Ashrama, 1955), p. 3.
6. Ibid., p. 4.
7. Bhagavadgita VII.2.
100 | I. C. SHARMA
8. Ibid., VII.6-7.
9. O’Brien, The Essential Plotinus, p. 84 (Enneads VI.9.9.1-3).
10. Ibid., p. 80 (Enneads VI.9.5).
11. Bhagavadgita VIII.9.
12. Ibid., 1.70.
13. Ibid., VIII.9.
14. Ibid., XV.16-17.
15. O’Brien, The Essential Plotinus, p. 74 (Enneads VI.9.1).
Phraseology and
Imagery in Plotinus
and Indian Thought
Richard T. Wallis
University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma
The existence of significant resemblances between Neopla-

tonism and Indian thought,! despite the presence of perhaps
equally important divergences between them,’ can hardly be
questioned; it is, indeed, a necessary presupposition of this
colloquium. The question that naturally arises is whether we
have to do with mere parallels between them, or whether one
culture is borrowing from the other, and, if so, which is the
borrower. The existence of abundant opportunities for cultu-
ral contact between the two civilizations both before and
during the Neoplatonic period does not guarantee that bor-
rowing actually took place, since equally impressive parallels
can be found in cases where only the most foolhardy scholar
would accept the existence of contact; Dr. Joseph Needham,
for instance, observes significant resemblances between fifth
and fourth century B.C. Greek scientific theories, notably in
Aristotle’s biology, and almost contemporary Chinese develop-
ments.? It may be, therefore, that we must rest content with
tracing the similarities and differences between the two tradi-
tions and leave the question of cultural contacts unresolved.
101
102 RICHARD T. WALLIS
Moreover, as Dr. Conze observes, after noting the resem-

blances between Judeo-Greek and Indian ideas on wisdom, to
explain these by "borrowing" ignores both the equally impor-
tant question of the motive of the borrower and the fact that
the concept of wisdom in both traditions “‘grew quite natu-
rally out of the preceding tradition, and is in no conflict with
any of their basic concepts."^ Admitting all these cautions, I
wish to suggest here a methodology for approaching the ques-
tion of “influence” and to apply it to one of the parallels
which in my view affords the strongest evidence for interac-
tion of ideas, namely Neoplatonic and Indian ideas on divine
activity, in particular, the views of Plotinus and those ex-
pressed in the Mahayana Buddhist work Uttaratantra or Ratna-
gotravibhàga.?
First of all, in considering possible parallels between two
systems of thought, we must examine their nature. We may,
first, have to do with parallels of experience, especially, in the
case that interests us, of mystical experience. In my paper,
presented to the first of these colloquia in 1973, I drew atten-
tion to the parallels between the experiences underlying
Plotinus’s two higher Hypostases and those of Hindu and
Buddhist mysticism.? The resemblances between the accounts
given by the mystics the world over is a commonplace, and
while cultural contact may explain some such cases, it is
clearly inapplicable to mysticism as a whole. Secondly, there
are resemblances of ideas or philosophical theories. These may
or may not be concerned with the interpretation of experi-
ence; thus in progressing from the “ineffability” of his experi-
ence to the construction of a "negative theology" the mystic
has already advanced from experience to interpretation, and,
to give a more specific case, remarkable parallels exist
between Neoplatonic criticisms of the Aristotelian view of
Intelligence as the highest hypostasis and the debate between
the Màdhyamika and Yogäcära (or Vijnanavada) schools of
Mahayana Buddhism over whether the absolute can be
described as "thought."" Of a more abstract kind are the
parallels between the Greek and Indian ideas on reincarnation.
PHRASEOLOGY AND IMAGERY 103
Here we are on more uncertain ground, but must always keep

in mind the possibility that we have to deal not with influ-
ences, but simply with similar minds viewing the world in
similar ways. This is less likely the closer the verbal parallels
between the formulation of such theories; in particular, and
this brings us to our third class of parallels, significant resem-
blances between the images used by different authors in illus-
tration of these theories or experiences deserve the closest
attention. Even here, whether borrowing is involved is often
uncertain, since, whether or not we accept Jung’s theory of
‘archetypes,’ there is no doubt that certain images tend to
occur spontaneously to the human mind. Thus Plato’s simile
of the sun (Rep. V1.507-9) has very definite parallels in
Indian religion literature, including the Uttaratantra,® but
there is no doubt that the use of sun and light as symbols of
Ultimate Reality and the illumination it affords is a natural
one and widespread throughout the world. The same need
not, however, apply to all particular applications of the sun
simile, and it is from one of these that I propose to start. In
line with the methodology proposed above, I shall deal with
parallels both of imagery and of conceptual formulation. It is
clear from what has already been said that my method in-
volves a large measure of subjectivity. Yet even if I am wrong
and we have to do with "parallels" rather than “influences,”’
these are nonetheless of considerable interest. I must finally
confess that my knowledge of Indian philosophy is far from
complete and my knowledge of Indian languages virtually
non-existent, and I hope that others here may be able to sup-
ply texts unknown to me to round out my account.
In his famous account of Emanation in Enn. V.1.6. Ploti-
nus stresses its spontaneity; the One he declares, produces
‘without inclination, will or movement," but, while it remains
unmoved, a radiation proceeds from it like that of light from
the sun.? Similarly the modern Hindu sage Ramana Maharshi
declares that “not from any desire, resolve or effort on the
part of the rising sun, but merely due to the presence of his
rays, the lens emits heat, the lotus blossoms, water evaporates
and people attend to their various duties in life. . . . The three-

fold activity of creation, preservation and destruction...
takes place merely due to the unique presence of the su-
preme Lord....The Lord himself has no resolve; no act or
event touches even the fringe of his being. This state of im-
maculate aloofness can be likened to that of the sun, which is
untouched by the activities of life, or to that of the all-
pervasive ether, which is not affected by the interaction of
the complex qualities of the other four elements."'!? The ether
comparison, as we shall see, has an extremely interesting
anticipation in the Bhagavadgtta,'' but, for the rest,my knowl-
edge of Hindu philosophy is too scanty for me to know what
anticipations of the Maharshi's account of divine activity exist
there. Moreover, since the Maharshi had numerous Western
disciples, some of whom must have had at least a superficial
acquaintance with the Enneads, we may wonder whether he
could not have derived the idea from them. This need not be
so, however, since very precise anticipations thereof exist in
Indian thought, namely the Mahayana Buddhist conception of
the Buddha's activity—the Buddha, at this stage of Buddhist
thought, being conceived as a cosmic principle, identical with
Ultimate Reality, of which the historical Buddha is a mere
appearance. More precisely, he is conceived as having three
"bodies," the Dharmakäya (identical with Ultimate Reality
and sometimes termed the “‘Cosmical Body"), the Sambhoga-
kaya (the “Community” or “Bliss Body," the ideal form in
which he appears to beings more advanced than ourselves) and
the Nirmanakaya (or "Transformation Body") the phantom
body in which he appears on earth. J. Przyluski has noted the
obvious resemblance to the Neoplatonists’ three Hypostas-
tes,!2 but details of the doctrine, especially of the inter-
mediate Sarmbhogakaya, are hard to come by, and the sections
of the Uttaratantra that discuss the Sambhogakäya show few
Neoplatonic affinities.? In any case, the parallels with which
I shall deal are less controversial.
The account of the Buddha’s activity which interests us

occupies the fourth chapter of the treatise traditionally enti-
tled Uttaratantra, made up of a sequence of verses, ascribed
to Maitreyanatha, the founder of the Yogäcära school of
Mahayana, together with a prose commentary ascribed to his
disciple Asanga. Maitreyanatha’s dates, assuming him to be a
historical figure (which is not universally granted), are tradi-
tionally given as A.D. 270-350 and Asanga is said to have
flourished around the latter date.!* Recent research, however,
has identified the work with the Ratnagotravibhaga of Sara-
mati (or Sthiramati), a later Yogäcarin commentator, who is
generally dated between 350 and 450 A.D.! Any of these
dates, it will be observed, would make the work post-Plotinian
in composition and one is therefore tempted to conclude that,
if influence is at work, it is of Neoplatonism upon Buddhism
rather than the reverse.!ó Uncertainty is, however, added by
the fact that the Uttaratantra (as we shall call it for conveni-
ence’s sake) appeals for authority to various Sutras, or dis-
courses ascribed (mythically, it need hardly be said) to the
Buddha." The dating of these texts is even more uncertain
than that of the Mahayana philosophers, and all that can
safely be said is that they must have been composed during
the early centuries A.D.!? Hence uncertainty concerning the
origin of the ideas in question must persist.
The sun simile is one of the nine used in the chapter in
question to illustrate the view that the Buddha’s activity takes
place ‘without effort and uninterruptedly."!? Or, as the
Tibetan writer Gampopa (1079-1153) summarises the doctrine
in the final chapter of his Jewel Ornament of Liberation,
"when a man becomes a Buddha, habit-making thoughts and
forced effort cease for him. Therefore, whatever is, or is
thought to be, necessary for sentient beings happens all the
time of its own accord."?? Hence, without effort or discur-
siveness the Buddha's voice proclaims the Dharma simply
because it is good for those so fortunate as to listen to it."'?!
In the Uttaratantra (IV.61 ff.) the sun simile appears as fol-
lows:
IV.61. Warmed by the sun, at one and the same time,

The lotus flower expands and the Kumuda folds its
leaves:
But the sun, it has no searching thought
About the qualities and the defects
Of the water-born flowers as they open and fold.
Similar to that is the saint (in his acts).
62. Free from any searching thought,

The sun, expanding its light, simultaneously,
everywhere
Makes the lotus flower unfold its leaves
And causes to ripen (other kinds of plants).
63. Similar to that is the sun which is the Buddha

With its rays—the highest of doctrines.
Free from a searching thought, they are directed
Upon the concerts resembling lotus flowers.
64. Arising in the leaves of Enlightenment

As the Cosmical Body and the visible forms,
The sun of Omniscience costs the rays
Of divine wisdom over all living beings.??
In another simile (IV.56-57) we read:
IV.56. As Brahma, without moving from his abode,

In all the regions of the gods
Demonstrates his apparition without effort.
57. In a similar way, in all the regions of the world

The Lord, though motionless in his Cosmical Body,
Shows himself in apparitional forms,
Without effort to those. who are worthy.??
In short:
The Buddha does not search, nor does he reflect

(about the character of the work to be done). How-
ever, he does act, and this his activity free from
search and reflection manifests itself miraculously

and without effort.” ?^
The Perfect Supreme Buddha is motionless, he does

not reflect, nor does he speak, nor search, nor inves-
tigate. He neither searches, nor investigates (the
past), nor does he reflect (about the present), nor
has he any thoughts (and desires regarding the
future).” 25
V.3. Who and by what means is to be converted,

What is to be the aim, and at what place and time,—
Without having any constructive thought regarding
all of this,
The sage always acts completely free from effort.
4. Indeed he does not give himself up to thoughts

As to what may be the constitution of the convert,
Which of the many means of conversion is to be used,
Where and when it is to be accomplished, the place,
and the time.” 26
Similar ideas are expressed at many places throughout the

treatise.??
We thus find that in the Uttaratantra the Buddha (a) abides
unmoved, like the One in Plotinus’s account of Emanation
(the familiar Neoplatonic principle of “undiminished giv-
ing"?5); similarly, the Buddha’s Cosmical Body is ‘not sub-
jected to augmentation and decrease.”292 (b) Secondly, “the
Buddha acts uninterruptedly, as long as the world exists" and
"is characterised as neither becoming originated nor disap-
pearing (anew). Being thus immutable, he cannot be regarded
as acting (in the ordinary sense)." ?? Similarly in Neoplatonism
the divine Hypostases' activity constitutes an eternal process, .
like the outflow of light from the heavenly bodies. ?! It fol-
lows that the Timaeus' account of divine deliberation cannot
be taken literally, since there was no time at which such
deliberation could have taken place.?? Hence, in both systems
divine activity proceeds (c) effortlessly and (d) without discur-

sive thought. As Sallustius summarises this teaching, once
again introducing the sun simile: ??
We must consider that the gods bestow all this

attention on the universe without any deliberation
or toil: just as bodies with a function do what they
do merely by existing, as the sun lights and warms
merely by existing, in this way and much more so
does the providence of the gods benefit its objects
without involving toil for itself. Hence the questions
of the Epicureans are answered: their contention is
that what is divine neither is itself troubled nor
troubles others. 34
As Sallustius goes on to observe, the doctrine of the effort-

lessness of divine providence constitutes the Neoplatonic
answer to Epicurus’s objection?? that exercising providence
would be a burden for the gods. That the Hypostases do not
deliberate is equally rooted in earlier theological debates. Jean
Pépin has well brought out that it was essential to Aristotle’s
account of deliberation that such a deliberation constitutes a
search for knowledge of which one is initially ignorant,26 and
I myself have shown, briefly in my Neoplatonism?" and at
greater length in a paper to appear in Aufstieg und Neidergang
Der Romischen Welt how the Sceptics had turned this point
against popular conceptions of divine wisdom. δ As Plotinus
Observes, to regard deliberation as essential to divine wisdom
confuses the search for wisdom with its actual possession and
ranks God with the apprentice rather than the master of an
art. For the process of deliberation ceases with the achieve-
ment of wisdom, and beings whose wisdom is eternal have no
need to resort to it at all.?? Finally (e) both the Neoplatonists
and the Uttaratantra agree that divine activity proceeds unin-
terruptedly and that the variability of its reception by inferior
beings is due to their own weakness, not to any change in the
illumination bestowed upon them from above.^?
Leaving the Uttaratantra for a moment, I wish to note

another remarkable parallel between Plotinus and Buddhist
thought, their views concerning the omniscience of the world-
soul in the former case, of the Buddha in the latter. As Conze
observes, Buddhist scholasticism, while upholding the Bud-
dha’s omniscience, normally refrains from delineating the
nature of that omniscience too precisely.*! He notes, how-
ever, that Asanga’s younger brother Vasubandhu in his Abhi-
dharmakosa,*? a work written before Asanga converted him
to the Mahayana and one which forms the most systematic
compendium of the philosophy and psychology of the Sarvas-
tivadin School of Hinayana Buddhism, expounds the view that
*the Buddha knows the future not by inference, or by various
portents or omens which allow fortune-tellers to guess it, but
by seeing it before his own eyes."?? Likewise, Plotinus, in
refuting any idea of divine deliberation, declares that the
world-soul's knowledge is not like that of diviners, but of the
man responsible for an action, who has full control over its
outcome and therefore no doubts concerning it. Hence the
world-soul knows the future, as it knows the present, in an
unchanging vision and thus need not resort to reasoning.^?
We learn elsewhere that this is a fortiori true of Nous, where
the future is already present; or rather temporal distinctions
have no meaning there, but become operative only with the
unfoldment of the sensible world.^? That the idea is of Stoic
origin is shown by Cicero's De Divinatione,*® where we read
that, since the world unfolds from its causes according to the
law of Fate, one who knows all causes thereby knows all
effects. Such knowledge however, is possible only to the gods,
who, we learn elsewhere in the treatise, know the universe
since they are its cause.^" For man, however, it is possible
only to draw partial inferences from partial effects (artificial
mantic exemplified by astrology or the inspection of omens)
or at best to observe some of the world's causal principles
directly when his mind is freed from the body's influence in
prophetic ecstasy or sleep (natural mantic). This distinction
between two kinds of mantic was to have great influence on
later thought.*® All that concerns us here, however, is that

Plotinus’s contrast between divine knowledge and the infer-
ences of human diviners exactly parallels Vasubandhu’s, with
the exception that the idea of divine causal knowledge is
absent from the latter, since the Buddha, unlike the Stoic or
Neoplatonic God, is in no sense the world’s cause or crea-
tor.^?
We have thus a further remarkable parallel between Neopla-
tonism and the Buddhist circles within which the Yogäcara
arose. We may now examine some further parallels with the
Uttaratantra itself. It is essential to Neoplatonic emanation, as
opposed to Christian creation, that beings “‘are not thrown
into existence by an external creator without any choice on
their part. On the contrary, they come forth voluntarily from
this source and shape themselves."5? Hence the later Neopla-
tonists’ description of them as αὐθυπόστατα. a concept whose
origin has recently been brilliantly illuminated by Professor
Whittaker>! who observes that “the main objective behind
the introduction of self-generating secondary principles
was...that of preserving unimpaired the immobility of the
first principle, if the first principle is to remain immobile it
cannot generate, and in consequence any secondary principle
must proceed from it rather than be generated by it."5? As
Whittaker shows, while the term ἀυθυπόστατος is not found
before Iamblichus, the notion of a self-generating deity was a
"theological common-place of the Roman Empire" and syno-
nymous terms are widespread throughout its religious texts.
And though such terms are absent from Plotinus, the notion
itself is a necessary corollary of his system. उ Hence the
Uttaratantra's use of the term *'self-sprung" or equivalent
phraseology affords yet another parallel to the Neoplatonic
and contemporary Greek systems, the most revealing example
being at IV.59 (at the end of the Brahma simile):
IV.59. As owing to the vows of Brahma himself,

This vision is perceived without effort,
so is the apparitional form (of the Buddha),

which becomes originated by itself. 54
The other main analogy used by the Neoplatonists to

express the emanation concept was that of the Logos, where-
by "just as external speech (logos prophorikos) constitutes the
external expression of internal thought (logos endiathetos), so
an hypostasis flows forth from its prior and expresses it under
conditions of greater multiplicity.">>
In the Uttaratantra (1.143) a similar analogy is used of the
relation of the Buddha's teaching to the Dharmakaya: “The
cosmical body is to be known in two aspects: It is the Abso-
lute perfectly immaculate and its natural outflow, the word
which speaks of the profound (highest truth), And (of the ele-
ments of the Empirical World) in their variety.”°°
I pass over other resemblances between the two systems,
which seem to me less significant. Thus, the idea that Ulti-
mate Reality transcends conceptual thought is common to
mystics the world over.? More doubt may be felt over the
use, by both Plotinus and the Uttaratantra of the simile of
cleaning gold or a statue that has fallen into प्त, as a
symbol of spiritual purification, but on reflection the simile
seems one that might occur independently to two minds. I
will therefore pass to two final uses of the sunlight analogy,
which seem to afford better evidence of contact between the
two systems. The first concerns the Neoplatonists’ use of
light, based on Parmenides 131B, as an illustration of how
True Being can be simultaneously present in its entirety at
every part of the sensible world.°? Similarly in the Uftara-
tantra we read:
1.83. It is the Cosmical Body, it is the (Buddha)—one

with the absolute,
It is the Highest Truth and point of saintliness, and it
is Nirvana,
Just as the sun and its rays, so are its properties,
indivisible,
Therefore, there is no Nirvana apart from

Buddhahood. ...
85. (It is the Cosmical Body, since)

The properties of the Buddha are indivisible
(manifesting themselves in all that exists).9?
And further on:
The Divine Knowledge of all the objects of cogni-

tion... penetrates into all the objects cognizable in
all their forms; it is thus akin to the net of (the
sun’s) rays which is spread (over everything percep-
tible) ... All these properties [viz. Analytic Wisdom,
Divine Knowledge and Deliverance from Defile-
ment] constitute the indivisible nature of the abso-
lute, therefore they resemble (the light, the rays and
the disc of the sun) in their indivisible character. 9!
Yet both the Neoplatonists and the Uttaratantra recognize

the limits of the analogy, since the sun is a physical body of
limited dimensions occupying a definite place. Hence, Por-
phyry observes the sun is not present everywhere that its light
reaches in the way that the soul, not being circumscribed by
spatial dimensions, is simultaneously present at every point in
the body.” Likewise the Uttaratantra remarks that the sun’s
light cannot penetrate all the different worlds and all regions
of the sky in the way that the Buddha’s illumination pene-
trates everywhere and extinguishes all ignorance.9? Yet more
revealing is the work’s comparison (IV.77) of the absolute to
space:
IV.77. Although it [sc. space] is experienced (as

divisible)
In higher and lower (parts),
This is not its true nature,
Which is that of being one whole.
Similarly, though the Buddha is seen in all his
different forms,
He is not such as we perceive him

(Being unique and undifferentiated).
An explanation is necessary at this point of the Sanskrit

term dkasa, here rendered "space" and sometimes alterna-
tively translated "ether." Not merely does the term denote
"space" in our sense; as Conze remarks: “At the same time,
and without any sense of being inconsistent, the Buddhists
treat akasa as something which has a material and positive
nature, as a finely material, ethereal fluid which is eternal and
omnipresent. The ether is itself unsupported by any-
thing...but it supports all the other primary elements. First
the element of air rests on it, and then again water and earth
rest on the air below them. Finally the ancient traditions of
India induced the Buddhists to treat this ether as self-
illuminating, and to derive the word àkàsa from the root kas,
"to shine." Aryadeva tells us that the absence of matter is
called a-kas-a because things therein "shine brilliantly," and in
this sense Saramati can say that Buddhahood shines brilliantly
like the sun or the ether."9?
This resemblance between àkàása, as so conceived, and Aris-
totle's fifth element, or light in the Neoplatonic universe, is
evident. Conversely we may recall that Proclus, according to
Simplicius, identified space with light, partly on the ground of
the latter's indivisibility and impassibility.°© And it is precisely
these two qualities that form the basis of the Uttaratantra's
comparisons between äkä$a and the absolute. The former we
have already noted. With regard to the latter we read
(I.61-62):
61. The Spiritual Essence is like space,

Being uncaused and unconditioned.
It is devoid of the complex (of producing factors)
And knows no birth, destruction, and (temporary)
stability.
62. The Spiritual Essence which is pure and radiant

Is unalterable like space
And cannot be polluted by the occasional stains.

Of desire and the other (defiling forces)
Which arise from the wrong conception (of
existence).9"
The Neoplatonists similarly use the analogy of the union of

light with air to illustrate how the soul’s presence in the body
involves no substantial intermixture (contrary to Stoic belief)
and hence leaves the soul unchanged and unaffected by the
passions of the psycho-physical organism.®® It will be recalled
that the passage quoted earlier from Ramana Maharshi used
the ether analogy to make a similar point,?? and here, we
observed, there was a precedent in Hindu tradition, namely
Bhagavadgita [3९ .4-9. The relevant verses, in Zaehner’s transla-
tion, are as follows:
IX.4. By me, unmanifest in form, all this universe

was spun: in me subsist all beings, I do not subsist
in them. ...
IX.6. As in [wide] space subsists the mighty wind

blowing [at will] ever and everywhere, so do all con-
tingent beings subsist in me. ...
IX.9. These works (of mine) neither bind-nor-limit

me; as one indifferent I sit among these works,
detached.
With this we may compare Enn. IV.3.22.1-7:
"Ap' οὖν οὔτω φατέον, ὅταν ψυχὴ σώματι παρῇ:

παρεῖναι αὐτὴν ὡς τὸ φῶς πάρεστι τῷ ἀέρι, καὶ
γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο παρὸν οὐ πάρεστι καὶ δι᾽ ὅλου
παρὸν οὐδενὶ μίγνυται καὶ ἕστηκε μὲν αὐτό, ὁ δὲ
παραρρεῖ" καὶ ὅταν ἔξω γένηται τοῦ ἐν ὦ τὸ φῶς.
ἀπῆλϑεν οὐδὲν ἔχων, ἕως δέ ἐστιν ὑπὸ τὸ φῶς,
πεφώτισται, ὥστ᾽ ὀρϑῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἐνταῦϑα λέγειν,
ὡς ὁ ἀὴρ ἐν τῷ φωτί, ἤπερ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῷ ἀέρι.
The two passages thus agree on the following points: (a)

the union (of soul with body in one case, of God with the
world in the other) resembles that of light (or ether) with air
in that (b) the air blows through the ether (or flows
by—rapapper), while leaving the latter detached or unmixed;
hence (c) we should not say that the soul is in body (or God
in the world), but the reverse.
In light of such parallels I find the hypothesis of cultural
contact hard to resist. The question remains, if this is so,
which system is influencing the other. In favour of the prior-
ity of the Neoplatonic texts, we may observe (a) that they
antedate the datable Mahayana philosophers we have men-
tioned and (b) that, while the Mahayanists generally state
their views dogmatically and appear to regard them simply as
following from the nature of the Absolute, Plotinus generally
argues his position at length and usually takes as his starting-
point the arguments of earlier Greek philosophers."? On the
other hand, we saw that the Buddhists allude to earlier scrip-
tures of uncertain date; hence the fact that I have not found
their views argued anywhere in as much detail as those of the
Neoplatonists may be due simply to my own ignorance, or to
gaps in our current knowledge of the Mahayana’s develop-
ment. We may likewise observe that, while the text quoted
from the Bhagavadgita is obscure in the extreme, Plotinus’s
meaning can be grasped without undue difficulty. Yet it
would be hard to assign a post-Plotinian date to the Gita as a
whole,’! though the possibility of later interpolations cannot
definitely be excluded. In short, the question which tradition
is influencing the other must for the moment remain uncer-
tain and the possibility of influences both ways must be
borne in mind."? I hope, at any rate, that the present paper
has provided at least a start towards the investigation of this
question and offered some guidance as to how it can most
profitably be pursued.
116 RICHARD T. WALLIS ©
NOTES
The most complete study so far is J. F. Staal’s Advaita and Neopla-

tonism (Madras, 1961); cf. especially his survey (pp. 235-49) of
earlier scholars’ views on possible connections between Plotinus and
Indian thought. More recently, cf. E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Chris-
tian in an Age of Anxiety, p. 88, and A. H. Armstrong, Cambridge
History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, p. 201, n.
1.
Cf. J. M. Rist, Plotinus, the Road to Reality, pp. 228-9, criticizing
E. Bréhier’s excessive assimilation of Plotinus’s thought to Advaita
Vedanta.
Science and Civilization in China, Vol. I, pp. 150-7, esp. pp. 150,
155. The whole section (pp. 150-248) forms a most valuable survey
of cultural contacts between China and the West.
Buddhism; Its Essence and Development, p. 143. For further para-
llels, cf. the same author’s Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, pp.
49-50, 170-2, 207-9, and 217-20.
E. Obermiller, trans., Acta Orientalia, 1X (1931), pp. 111-296; cf.
below, p. 105.
“Nous as Experience," Neoplatonism, Ancient and Modern, Vol. I,
pp. 121-55.
Cf.: Santideva, Bodhicaryavatara, 1X.17 ff., and pp. 113 ff. of
Marion L. Matics' introduction to his translation; Gampopa, Jewel
Ornament of Liberation, trans. H. V. Guenther, pp. 209-11; T. R.
V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 317 ff. Note
especially the charge, which Guenther (op. cit, p. 227, n. 20)
regards as unjust, that the Yogäcärins identify the absolute with
"Thought cognizing itself"; cf. Plotinus's criticism of Aristotle as
discussed, e.g., by Armstrong, Les Sources de Plotin (Entretiens
Hardt V), pp. 409-11.
Cf. especially Obermiller (p. 135): ‘Just as the sun casts its light
on all the visible objects, in the same way the path makes clear
everything cognizable in all the different aspects."
Enn., V.1.6.22-30: τὸ οὖν γινόμενον ἐκεῖθεν où κινηθέντος φατέον
γίνεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ κινηθέντος αὐτοῦ τι γίνοιτο, τρίτον ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου τὸ
γινόμενον μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν ἄν γίνοιτο καὶ οὐ δεύτερον. δεῖ οὖν
ἀκινήτου ὄντος, ev τι δεύτερον μετ᾽ αὐτό, οὐ προσνεύσαντος οὐδὲ
βουληθέντος οὐδὲ ὅλως κινηθέντος ὑποστῆναι αὐτό. πῶς οὖν, καὶ TL
δεῖ νοῆσαι; περὶ ἐκεῖνο μὲν ὄν, περίλαμψιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μέν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ
δὲ μένοντος ° οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν λαμπρὸν ὥσπερ περιθέον, ἐξ
αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ γεννώμενον, μένοντος δέ.
10. A. Osborne, ed., Collected Works, p. 46.
11. IX.4-9, on which cf. below, p. 114.

12. "Les Trois Hypostases dans l'Inde et à Alexandrie," Ann. de Inst.
de Philol. Orientale, IV (1936).
13. Obermiller, pp. 253-4, 263-4. On the obscurity of the Sambhoga-
kaya doctrine, cf. Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, p. 72,
and Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 233-4.
14. Cf., e.g., T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.
107, n. 6. |
15. See Richard A. Gard, Buddhism (Great Religions of Modern Man),
p. 22. Cf. also A. K. Chatterji, The Yogäcära Idealism, p. 53 and n.
3, for the possibility of the existence of several philosophers of
that name.
16. Believers in reincarnation might also note that A.D. 270, the tradi-
tional date of Maitreyanátha's birth, was also that of Plotinus's
death!
17. Cf., e.g., Obermiller: p. 113, n. 2; p. 114, n. 11; p. 115, n. 4; p.
128, nn. 1 and 5; p. 153, n. 3; p. 189, n. 2; p. 269, n. 2; p. 280,
n. 5; p. 284, n. 2; and p. 285, n. 1.
18. Cf. Conze, Buddhism; Its Essence and Development, pp. 29-31, on
the uncertainties of Indian chronology; also, Thirty Years of
Buddhist Studies, p. 19, where, in an article originally published in
1960, he declares that "perhaps five percent of the Mahayana
Sütras have been reliably edited and perhaps two percent intelli-
gibly translated. It is clear that inferences drawn from the scanty
material at our disposal must remain extremely dubious." Clearly,
even allowing for the progress of research since then, the same
general conclusion must hold true.
19. Obermiller, p. 267.
20. H. V. Guenther, trans., p. 271.
21. Ibid., p. 272.
23. Ibid., p. 280.
24. Ibid., p. 115.
25. Ibid., p. 128.
26. Ibid., p. 268.
27. Cf., e.g., pp. 150, 153-4, 250-1, 253 and 267-87 passim.
28. For the doctrine, cf. especially Dodds’ note on Proclus, El, 26-7.
30. Ibid., p. 269.
31. Cf. esp. II.3.18.16-22.
32. III.2.1.16 ff.; VI.7.3.1-6. As I have observed elsewhere (Neopla-
tonism, p. 86), the conclusion of the former chapter (lines 34-45)
brings Plotinus very close to the mysticism of the Far East.
33. De Dis et Mundo, chap. IX, trans. A. D. Nock.

34. The phrase “merely by existing" (αὐτῷ Tw eiva) is not Plotinian.
The closest Plotinian parallels appear to be: III.2.2.42., III.8.3.22-3,
and VI.7.3.9.
35. K.D.,1; cf. Enn., IV.4.12.39 ff.
36. Théologie Cosmique et Théologie Chrétienne, pp. 502-4.
37. Neoplatonism, pp. 26-7.
38. Sextus, Math., IX.167-73; Cicero, N.D., III.38.
39. IV.4.12.1-22; cf. VI.7.1.32-5.
40. For the Uttaratantra, cf. Obermiller, p. 276; relevant Neoplatonic
texts are listed in Dodds’ note on Proclus, El, 140.
41. Cf. e.g., Gampopa, Jewel Ornament of Liberation, trans. Guenther,
pp. 261-2.
42. E. Lamotte, trans., Vol. II, pp. 303-5.
43. Buddhist Thought in India, p. 169.
44. IV.12.22-9.
45. VI.7.1.49-58.
46. De Div., 1.127-8.
47. Ibid., 1.82.
48. lamblichus, Myst., III.1-3, 26-7 and X.3-4 (cf. Neoplatonism, pp.
122-3); Avicenna, Najat, pp. 121 ff. and 251-2 (cf. Averroes,
Tahafut-al-Tahafut, pp. 496-7).
49. Conze, Buddhism, p. 143, notes that Wisdom similarly plays a part
in the world's creation in the Judeo-Gnostic tradition, but not in
that of Buddhism.
50. Neoplatonism, p. 65.
51. Entretiens Hardt, XXI, pp. 193-230; for earlier discussions, cf.
especially Dodds's note on El Th., 40 and Hadot, Porphyre et
Victorinus, Il, pp. 297-330.
52. Op. cit., p. 229; cf. pp. 219-20, where he quotes Syrianus in Met.,
187.6 ff.; Iamblichus, Myst., VIII.2; Porphyry, Hist. Phil., fr. 18, in
support of this position.
53. Ibid., p. 203. The term αὐθυπόστατος is first found at Iamblichus,
ap. Stob., 11.8.45 (II.174.21 ff.). The closest explicit approach to
the concept in Plotinus is his account of the self-generation of the
supreme deity at VI.8.13.50 ff. (quoted by Whittaker, p. 215).
54. Obermiller, p. 280. Cf. p. 225, V.136.
55. Neoplatonism, p. 69. Cf. especially I.2.3.27-30.
57. From the Uttaratantra, cf., e.g., Obermiller, pp. 112, 132-3.
58. For Plotinus, cf. Enn., 1.6.5.42 ff. (cf. ibid., 9.7 ff.), and V.8.3.12
ff. (cf. also Epiphanius 31.20.9); from the Uttaratantra, cf. Ober-
miller, pp. 119-21, 178, 197, and 218-20.
59. Cf. esp. VI.4.7.22 ff.

61. Ibid., p. 211.
62. Nemesius, Nat. Hom., 133.6 (discussed by Dorrie, Porphyrios’
Symmikta Zetemata, pp. 74-9); cf. Plotinus, Enn., V.3.9.7-20, and
VI.4.7.45-8.
63. Obermiller, pp. 276-7.
64. Ibid., p. 284.
65. Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 164-S.
66. Simplicius in Phys., 611 ff., discussed by Sambursky, The Physical
World of Late Antiquity, pp. 8-9. For space’s indivisibility, cf.
612.7 ff.; on its impassibility, ibid., 20-1; cf. also 613.15-20.
Sambursky (op. cit., p. 9) compares the modern physicists’ concep-
tion of "ether"; similarly, Conze (op. cit., p. 165, n.) compares the
Buddhist conception of space with the Cabbalistically influenced
view of Henry Moore; he further notes the influence on Einstein of
the Cabbala's ideas on light and space.
67. Obermiller, p. 188; cf. pp. 186-91.
68. Cf. the passage of Nemesius cited above (n. 62); also, Enn., I.1.3.10
ff. and IV.3.22.1-9, discussed below. Dôrrie notes (op. cit., p. 75)
that the union of light and air had been used by Chrysippus in sup-
port of the Stoic view (SVF II.473, p. 155, line 38; cf. Alexander,
de Mixt., 218.6). The same text (ibid., p. 155, lines 30-2) also uses
the analogy of the penetration of iron by fire; it is interesting that
this analogy is used by Ruysbroeck to illustrate the soul's union
with God (cf. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, pp. 222-3), and by
Samkara (Viveka-Chudàmani, 530) to illustrate how the union of
Buddhi (intellect) with consciousness gives rise to the senses. We
thus have (a) one more remarkable parallel between Greek and
Indian thought and (b) an example of how both ''monistic" and
*theistic" mysticism can use the same analogy in support of their
respective positions!
69. Cf. above, p. 103 f.
70. Cf. above, p. 108, for the Epicurean and Sceptical influence on
Plotinus's view of divine activity; p. 109, for the influence of the
Stoic account of divine omniscience; and p. 111, for the influence
of Parmenides, 131.B.
71. Laehner's dating of the Gita (introduction, p. 7) between the fifth
and second centuries B.C. probably represents the general view.
72. Nemesius, 129.9 (Dorrie, op. cit., p. 54) ascribes the Neoplatonic
view of the soul-body union to Plotinus's teacher Ammonius
Saccas. While the hypothesis that Ammonius was himself an Indian
missionary (Seeberg, Ztschrif. Kirchengeschichte 61 (1942), pp.
136-70; E. Benz, Abb. Mainz (1951 no. 3), pp. 197 ff.) deserves no
credence, the analogy in question might suggest some Indian influ-
ence on his thought.
Meditative States
in the Abhidharma
and in
Pseudo-Dionysius
David F. T. Rodier
American University
Washington, D.C.
The thesis of this paper is that some problems in the

Buddhist philosophy's Abhidharma tradition can be illumi-
nated, if not solved, by a comparison with the account of
meditative states in the Neoplatonic mysticism of Pseudo-
Dionysius. There are three specific problems which I shall
consider in this paper. These are: (1) the reason for the
inclusion of the four formless meditative states
(arüpadhyänäni) in the Abhidharma typology of meditative
states; (2) the relation of the formless meditative states to the
form meditative states (rüpadhyänäni); and (3) the structure
of the formless meditative states and their internal relations.
In this paper I shall pursue my thesis as a systematic rather
than historical problem. In so doing I shall attempt totally to
avoid the vexingly complex and extremely murky question of
the existence or extent of contact between the Buddhist
schools of India and the Neoplatonic academies of the Roman
world. Furthermore, since my concern is systematic rather
than historical I shall utilize quite indifferently both ancient
and modern expositions of the Abhidharma tradition, requir-
ing only that my authors be attempting to present traditional
121
122 DAVID F.T. RODIER
Buddhist categories, rather than claiming to reinterpret those

categories in contemporary Western terms. For simplicity of
exposition I shall be quoting mainly from the Pali Abhid-
harma literature with only occasional reference to the Sau-
trantika formulation of the Abhidharma as it is preserved in
the Sanskrit and Tibetan commentarial tradition based on the
Abhidharma kosa and I shall ignore the Sarvastivada materials
preserved in the Chinese Tripitaka. As a further aid to simpli-
city of exposition I shall only use the Mystical Theology as
my source for Pseudo-Dionysius’s typology of meditative
states and I shall not consider how a detailed reading of the
entire Dionysian corpus might affect the interpretation of the
typology of the Mystical Theology. It must be understood
that I am not unmindful of the differences between the vari-
ous Abhidharma traditions nor uninterested in the more
general problems of interpreting the Mystical Theology in the
wider context of Neoplatonism. However, this paper is essen-
tially exploratory. It is only concerned to suggest that certain
comparisons might be illuminating. If it does succeed in
creating an initial plausibility for the claim that such a
comparison of the accounts of meditation in Neoplatonism
and in Buddhism could be fruitful, then, perhaps, the more
detailed exploration of each tradition required to develop the
comparison might seem to someone to be worth the effort.
For the purposes of exposition I shall first discuss the basic
categories of the Abhidharma which are necessary to under-
stand its account of the formless meditative states. Then I
shall be able to state more specifically the three questions
which this account raises. I shall then discuss several tradi-
tional interpretations of the typology and show how they fail
to answer the questions raised. I shall then discuss two non-
traditional modern suggestions for reinterpreting the tradi-
tional accounts and show how they do not quite answer the
questions I raise. Next, I shall briefly sketch the account of
meditation given in the Mystical Theology. Finally, I shall
suggest a possible comparison between that account and the
MEDITATIVE STATES 123
formless meditative states and show how such a comparison

might illuminate the three questions I raised initially.
I. Meditative States in the Abhidharma Tradition
According to the Abhidharma tradition of Buddhist philo-

sophy there are only four ultimate entities: citta (mind);
cetasika (mental concomitants); rüpa (matter) and Nirvana.!
Of these four, mind is by far the most important for it is by
control of the mind that Nirvana is realized; it is the mind
which is the foundation for the mental concomitants (ceta-
sikas); and it 1s mind, not matter, which determines the struc-
ture of Buddhist cosmology.
Buddhist cosmology views the world as divided into three
realms: (1) the realm of desire (kamaloka); (2) the realm of
form (rupaloka); and (3) the formless realm (arupaloka). This
three-fold classification is based on the Abhidharma's triple
classification of mind into ordinary consciousness and the two
forms of meditative consciousness (jhànas), 1.e., the form
meditative state (rupajhana) and the formless meditative state.
Of these three, ordinary consciousness and its field of opera-
tion, the desire realm, occupies much of the discussion in the
Abhidharma tradition; for the understanding of ordinary
consciousness in moral or immoral, resultant or causally
neutral states together with the number and strength of the
mental concomitants found in each of these states not only is
crucial for understanding the phenomena which occur in the
initial stages of meditation practice but such an understanding
also provides a framework within which the mental events of
daily life can be understood and thus regulated. Likewise, the
desire realm which is the field in which ordinary conscious-
ness operates with its heavens and hells, its humans, animals,
gods, demons and hungry ghosts, is common to iconography
and popular story.^ However, despite their significance, it is
not the ordinary states of consciousness but the meditative
states which are our concern here. The meditative realms and
the meditative states of consciousness are strictly correlated,
124 DAVID F. T. RODIER
for it is by cultivating a given meditative state that awareness

of the corresponding meditative realm is obtained.
The first group of meditative states, the form meditative
States (rupajhanani) has a structure which is both logical and
easily grasped. The first form meditative state has five factors.
These are: (1) vitakka [vitarka]; (2) vicàra; (3) piti [pritil;
(4) sukha; (5) ekaggata (ekàgratà].? These five factors may be
translated roughly as follows: vitakka by “initial application
to the object of meditation"; vicara by "sustained application
to the object of meditation"; piti by "joy"; sukha by “happi-
ness," and ekaggata by "'single-pointedness."^ A more detailed
explanation of these terms according to one commentarial
tradition is as follows. Here vitakka is being used not in its
usual literal meaning of “‘thinking” or "reasoning" but in its
special sense as a mental concomitant found in many mental
states, whose function is to direct the concomitant states
towards the object. ("Arammanam vitakketi sampayutt
adhamma abhiniro petiti vitakko." “Just as a King's favorite
would conduct a villager to the palace, even so vitakka directs
the mind towards the object.")? Like vitakka, the second
factor, vicara, is not here used in its usual sense, that of inves-
tigation. It means instead the sustained application of the
mind to the object. According to the commentary, vicara is
that which moves around the object. Examination of the
object is its characteristic. Vitakka is like the buzzing of a bee
towards a flower. Vicara is like its buzzing around it. As jhana
factors they are correlates." Piti is the factor whose presence
inhibits the arising of vyàpàda (ill-will or aversion) in this
meditative state; while the presence of sukha inhibits the
arising of both restlessness (uddhacca) and brooding (kukkuc-
ca). "Piti creates interest in an object, while sukha enables
one to enjoy the object. Like the sight of an oasis to a weary
traveller is piti. Like drinking water and bathing therein is
sukha.’’’ The final factor, single-pointedness (ekaggatà)
prevents the arising of sensual desires in these meditative
states.
All five factors are present in the first or lower of the form
meditative states and by progressively eliminating factors the
meditator rises to the higher form meditative states. These
higher states are usually listed as four.? The second state has
eliminated the first two factors (initial and sustained applica-
tion) and is characterized only by joy, happiness and single-
pointedness. The third state has eliminated not only initial
and sustained application, but also the third factor, i.e., joy,
and is characterized only by happiness and single-pointedness.
The fourth and highest of the form meditative states elimi-
nates all of the five factors except the last and so is charac-
terized only by equanimity—upekkha [upeksa], the neutral
state left when joy and happiness are transcended—and single-
pointedness.
Essentially, then, the account of the form meditative states
is the description of various stages of meditation distinguished
by the increasing simplicity of the act of concentration. In
contrast to this easily grasped, logical structure the account of
the formless meditative states provides no simple reason for
their structure. These states are distinguished by the object of
the meditative consciousness rather than by the nature of the
consciousness involved. Thus the Abhidharma tradition lists as
the ascendingly higher formless meditative states: (1) aware-
ness of infinity of space (akäsanancäyatana); (2) awareness of
infinity of consciousness (vinnanancayatana); (3) awareness of
nothingness (akincannàyatana); and, (4) awareness of neither
perception nor non-perception (nevasannanasannayatana).
This fourfold classification of the Abhidharma tradition is
found even in that strata of the Pali canon which Western
scholarship holds to be the oldest, 1.e., the Nikäyas. Although
in fairness it must be noted that while the form meditative
realms are usually explicitly termed jhanas (dhyanas), the
formless realms, although frequently mentioned (and uni-
formly given in their Abhidharma order) are rarely explicitly
termed jhanas (dhyanas) in the Nikäyas. The following
description of the four formless meditative states from the
Anguttaranikaya is representative:
And how has a monk won access to the Imperturb-

able (anejja)? Therein a monk, passing utterly
beyond all consciousness of objects, by ending the
consciousness of reaction, by disregarding conscious-
ness of diversity, thinking, “Infinite is space,”
attains and abides in the sphere of infinite space.
Passing utterly beyond the sphere of infinite space,
reading the sphere of infinite consciousness, think-
ing, "Infinite is consciousness," he abides in the
sphere of infinite consciousness. Passing utterly
beyond the sphere of infinite consciousness, think-
ing, "There is nothing at all," he attains and abides
in the sphere of nothingness. Passing utterly beyond
the sphere of nothingness, he attains and abides in
the sphere of neither consciousness nor unconscious-
ness. Thus has a monk won access to the Imperturb-
able.?
In the Vibhanga (one of the seven books comprising the

Pali Abhidharma canon) the formless meditative states are
described as follows:
With the complete surmounting of perceptions of

matter, with the disappearance of perceptions of
resistance, with non-attention to perceptions of vari-
ety, [aware of] “unbounded space," he enters upon
and dwells in the [meditation] base consisting of
boundless space.
By completely surmounting the [meditation] base

consisting of boundless space, [aware of] ‘‘un-
bounded consciousness” he enters upon and dwells
in the base consisting of boundless consciousness.

consisting of boundless consciousness, [aware that]
"There is nothing," he enters upon and dwells in
the [meditation] base consisting of nothingness.

consisting of nothingness he enters upon and dwells
in the base consisting of neither perception nor
non-perception.!?
Given these descriptions of the four formless meditative

states, we are now in a position to see the problems raised by
their inclusion in the Abhidharma account of the varieties of
consciousness. To begin with, the radical difference between
their structuring in terms of object and the form meditative
states structuring in terms of the factors present in the state
gives rise to the questions of why the former are considered
separate. This question seems especially acute since the Abhid-
harma tradition is quite clear that as far as the factors are
concerned there is no difference between the fourth form
meditative state and the four formless meditative states. This
identity of factors leads naturally to the question of what is
the precise relation between the formless meditative states and
the form meditative states—especially the fourth one of the
latter group. Finally, there is the question of what is the rela-
tionship which obtains between the four formless meditative
states. Even if we grant that they do occur in this order—why
do they so occur?
There are several possible ways of answering at least this
third question given in the traditional literature. One way that
the objects of the four formless meditative states could be
related is given in Buddhaghosacariya's Visuddhimaggo :
Of these [four formless states], the first is due to

surmounting signs of materiality, the second is due
to surmounting space, the third is due to sur-
mounting the consciousness that occurred with that
space as its object. So they should be understood as
four in number with the surmounting of the object
in each case.!!
In this account it would appear that the reason for the

series is that each lower stage provides the basis for the next
higher stage. Thus the elimination of the object which is the

focus of the highest form meditative state gives the infinity of
space which is the base of the first formless state. The elimi-
nation of the space leaving only the consciousness gives the
second formless state. The elimination of consciousness gives
the third and the elimination of the disappeared consciousness
gives the highest formless state. However, a different explana-
tion of the relationship between these states is also found in
the traditional literature. Thus, in the ninth chapter of
Anuruddhacariya’s Abhidhammatthasangaho their relationship
is described as follows:
Now, to one who practises concentration on space

abstracted from any kasina excluding the akasa
kasina, thinking, “This is infinite," there arises the
first arupa jhana. To one who practises concentra-
tion on that very first arupajhana, thinking that, ‘Tt
is infinite," there arises the second arüpajhana. To
one who practises concentration on the non-
existence of the first arüpa-consciousness, thinking,
"There is naught whatever," there arises the third
arupajhäna. To him who practises concentration on
the third arupa-consciousness, thinking, ‘It is calm,
it is sublime," there arises the fourth arüpa jhàna."?
In this account, both the second and third formless medita-

tive states are based on the first, while the fourth is based on
the third. This ordering of the formless meditative states is
developed in more detail by Anuruddhäcariya’s modern sub-
commentator, The Venerable Narada Thera, in the following
passage:
The Yogi who has developed the Rapa Jhanas and

who wishes to develop the Arüpa Jhänas now
concentrates on the Patibhäga Nimitta [concep-
tualized image]... . As he does so, a faint light, like
a fire fly, issues from the Kasina object. He wills it
to expand until it covers the whole space. Now he
sees nothing but this light pervading everywhere.

This developed space is not a reality but a mere
concept. ...On this concept he concentrates, think-
ing, “Infinite is space," until he develops the first
Arüpa Jhana—akasadnancayatana.... Again he con-
centrates on the first 470८ Jhàna— Vinnanancàya-
tana. To develop the third Arüpa Jhàna —àkincanna-
yatana—the Yogi takes for his object the first Arüpa
Jhàna consciousness and thinks, ‘“‘Natthi Kinci,"
‘There is nothing whatever." The fourth Arüpa Jha-
na consciousnesss is developed by the taking of the
third Arupa Jhàna consciousness as the object. The
third Arüpa Jhana is so subtle and refined that one
cannot definitely say whether there is a conscious-
ness or not. As he concentrates thus on the third
consciousness he develops the fourth Jhàna.??
Venerable Narada goes on to summarize the differences

between the form dhyànas and formless dhyänas as follows:
The five Rupa Jhanas differ according to the Jhäna

factors. Those four Arupa Jhanas, on the other
hand, differ according to the objects of concentra-
tion. The first and third have two concepts (Pannat-
ti). They are the concept of the infinity of space
and the concept of nothingness. The second and the
fourth Jhàna consciousness[es] have for their ob-
jects the first and the third consciousness[es]
respectively.!^
In sharp contrast with this analysis of the relationships

among the four formless meditative states is the Venerable
Paravahera Vajiranana’s reiteration of Buddhaghosacariya’s
scheme:
... emerging from the fourth [form] jhàna, con-

sidering its tranquility as gross, being based on form
object, . . . [the meditator] removes it entirely from
his mind, thinking the calmness of the formless
state is higher.
Recognizing this weakness [viz., the possibility that

form perception may supervene], the Jhayi
[meditator] thereafter proceeds to the second stage.
The thought arises within him that consciousness
which can embrace infinite space, must itself be
infinite. This thought brings him to the second
stage, that of infinite consciousness. Continued repe-
tition of the thought leads him into the sphere of
infinite consciousness, in which he experiences a
calm more protound than that of the previous stage.
But this stage of infinite consciousness is over-

shadowed in its turn by that of infinite space; and
again realizing that this is a possible source of weak-
ness, since his mind may revert to the sphere of
infinite space, the Jhayi determines to proceed to
the greater calm of the stage of nothingness. He
then establishes the thought, ‘There is nothing,"
and continues this thought until his mind rests upon
nothingness—the annulment of his previous thought
concerning the infinity of consciousness... .
But there still remains the possibility that the

thought of the infinity of consciousness may
intrude and the mind may slip back to the sphere
of infinite consciousness. The Jhàyi, therefore, rea-
lizing that he has not yet reached the highest, pro-
ceeds to the fourth and last stage at which he enters
the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception.
This is achieved by the removal of the third stage;
and there now remains an inexpressibly subtle trace
of perception....since this lingering trace of per-
ception concerning the third stage produces no
result, there is said to be no active perception with-
in him. This is the condition known as that of
"neither perception nor non-perception."P
We may sum up our discussion thus far by saying that not

only do the traditional accounts provide no solid reason for
the inclusion of the formless meditative states in the Buddhist

meditative scheme but they even disagree radically as to their
Structure. Since this is the case let us turn to two modern,
Western accounts to see whether they provide any illumina-
tion.
In his “Buddha on Meditation and States of Conscious-
ness,’’'© Daniel Goleman attempts to develop a “framework of
landmarks" for “‘methodical laboratory tests of meditation
and meditative states of consciousness"! on the basis of the
Visuddhimagga. As might be expected his explicit following of
Buddhaghosacariya leads him to hold that “with the formless
jhanas the complete removal of one state constitutes the next
attainment."!5 However, since Goleman prefers to see the
formless meditative states as merely a continuation of the
form states (a classification not unknown in the Abhidharma
tradition), and even goes so far as consistently referring to the
four formless states as the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth
jhanas, he sees the four formless states as merely increasingly
subtle states of concentration: "All the formless jhànas share
the factors of one-pointedness and equanimity, but at each
level these factors are progressively refined."!? This interpreta-
tion has the disadvantage of not only merely repeating the
traditional reasons for the inclusion of the formless meditative
states—thevy’re the same but more subtle—but it totally disre-
gards the discontinuity between the formless and form states
which is stressed as much as their similarity in the traditional
accounts. Further, Goleman completely avoids our basic ques-
tion concerning the structuring of the formless meditative
States.
In his very suggestive essay, “ΝΟΥΣ as Experience, 5520
Richard T. Wallis directed attention to the possibility of clari-
fying certain aspects of Plotinus's teaching by directing our
attention to parallels in non-Western traditions including the
Buddhist tradition. In that essay Wallis not only provides a
brilliant justification for the claim that Plotinus's account of
the Intelligible World has an experiential base, he also makes a
number of suggestions as to detailed parallels between the
Plotinian account and those of other traditions. One of

Wallis’s suggestions is particularly relevant to our discussion,
for although he does not discuss the formless meditative
states, he does see a striking similarity between Plotinian Nous
and the form meditative states.?! However, this suggestion
would need to be rejected on grounds which Wallis himself
notes,** namely, that despite its clarity, the form meditative
state is characterized by a sensory object, rüpa, and this
object is further characterized by its discreteness, separateness,
from all other objects, which makes the Buddhist forms quite
different from the forms of the Plotinian Nous, each of which
contains all others. However,. let us accept Wallis’s basic
premise and see whether or not there might not be other
parallels between the Neoplatonic and Buddhist accounts of
meditative experience which might be illuminating.
II. Meditative States in Pseudo-Dionysius
Initially, it might seem that the familiar triadic structure of

Neoplatonism would frustrate any attempt at a comparison
between the four formless jhänas and the stages of mystical
ascent described by Pseudo-Dionysius, since the structures of
the Buddhist meditative states are tetradic and it is a
commonplace that all Neoplatonic structures are militantly
triadic. This initial impression only would be strengthened by
a reading of the introduction to the Mystical Theology, for
there, in urging the pursuit of mystic contemplation, the
author defines such an activity to be leaving "the senses and
the activities of the intellect, all things that the senses or the
intellect can perceive, all things in this world of nothingness
and in that world of being”?* and straining towards a “union
with Him whom neither being nor understanding can con-
tain.^?^ Here we quite clearly have three stages of conscious-
ness which correlate with the usual Neoplatonic triad of Soul,
Nous and the One; since the realm of sensation and the sensi-
bles are the creations and activities of Soul, that of being and
the intellect is clearly the noetic hypostasis, while that which
is beyond sensation and intellection, being neither the noth-

ingness which is a physical object, nor the being which is an
intelligible, is the One. This same insistence on the triad of
sight, knowledge and vision or the realms of perception,
understanding and the “Darkness which is beyond Light," is
reiterated at the beginning of the second chapter of the Mysti-
cal Theology. It likewise is the basis for the division of the
three kinds of theologies in chapter one, viz., that which
describes “‘the Transcendent cause of all things by qualities
drawn from the lowest order of being"; that which imagines
that God is adequately known by human understanding; and
the true, negative theology.
Of course not all the analyses of meditative states in the
Mystical Theology are triadic. The account of Moses’ stages of
initiation seem to fall most naturally into a five-fold structure
of purification, separation, vision, negation, and union—
although these could, perhaps without too much difficulty, be
reduced to an essentially triadic structure of purification of
the senses followed by abstraction from the senses; noesis and
abstraction from the noetic realm, a final “‘passive stillness of
all the reasoning powers" followed by an “unfolding in that
which is wholly intangible and invisible, a belonging wholly to
Him that is beyond all things.’?> In a similar fashion the
complicated meditation of chapters four and five in which
Dionysius systematically negates all concepts and entities in
the scale of reality from those of physical objects and their
qualities up to unity, light and truth—this structure, although
orderly, is hardly triadic. However, even if it were insisted
that the triadic structure is fundamental to the typology of
meditation found in the Mystical Theology, some correlation
might be possible. Thus when we remember that the extreme
clarity of the object in the form meditative states—a clarity
which has misled many interpreters into considering these
states to be “higher states of consciousness’’—is but the clarity
of seeing a sensory object without any of the distortions
introduced by the preconceptions and inattentiveness which
characterizes our ordinary consciousness. (In fact the Buddhist
distinction between perceptible objects as viewed by ordinary

consciousness and by consciousness in the form-meditative
state is very reminiscent of the Platonic distinction between
eikasia and aisthesis.) If this is so, then the state of soul as it
directs its attention towards Nous is that of the form medita-
tive realms—characterized by increasing degrees of unity-,
while the first formless meditative state—characterized by a
disappearance of any object and the infinity of space left
behind—is the darkness of Soul. The second formless medita-
tive state, that of infinite consciousness, would correspond to
Nous with the realm of nothingness being the darkness of
intellect which precedes the final mystic vision.
If this analysis is correct then not only does the parallelism
between meditative accounts based on radically different
metaphysics suggest that each account might have a common
factual basis—a suggestion so brilliantly developed by Wallis—
but the structuring of the Neoplatonic account provides an
answer to the inclusion of both the form and formless medita-
tive states in the Buddhist scheme as well as suggesting that
the account given by Buddhaghosacariya of the structure of
the formless meditative states is preferable.
However, any significant comparison between these dif-
ferent accounts of meditative states can not remain on this
level of establishing correspondences between numbered sub-
divisions. Attention must be given rather to the underlying
principles. An initial approach to comparison might note that
the cultivation of the formless jhanas is not distinct from
the form jhanas in the Buddhist accounts. In fact, conven-
tional treatments of meditation in the Theravada tradition
normally follow the Visuddhimagga and interpose the cultiva-
tion of the Brahmaviharas—the unlimited, purified emotional
states of loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and
equanimity—between the cultivation of the form jhänas and
the cultivation of the formless jhànas. In effect, then, the
general structure is that of disciplining the mind to refrain
from wandering among many objects of attention, of puri-

fying the emotions of a mind so restrained, and finally, with-
drawing the mind from any sense-contact whatsoever and
allowing it to rest in its own pure nature—a process remark-
ably similar to the usual development in Western mysticism of
purgation, illumination, and union. Nevertheless, a basic dif-
ference between the meditation techniques of the Abhidharma
tradition and those of Neoplatonism would seem to frustrate
any attempt at meaningful comparison. This is the fact that
the fundamental technique of Neoplatonism is ‘‘simplifica-
tion"—the emptying the mind of all content—a process of
detaching consciousness from any object. The basic technique
of Buddhist meditation, in the Abhidharma tradition at least,
is “‘restraint’’—focusing the mind on a single object. But this
contrast in meditative techniques arises only if these tech-
niques are viewed in isolation from the total context of
mental discipline. The process of simplification presented in
the Mystical Theology explicitly presupposes the mental disci-
pline of the Divine Names and the general higher degree of
control of mind which the analogical arguments of Symbolic
Theology require. In the same way the fixing of the mind on
the meditation object, which is characteristic of the form
meditative states, is in the end supplemented by the series of
negations which characterize the formless states. Thus the ulti-
mate significance of presence of the formless states in the
Buddhist meditative scheme may well be that it shows that
the Buddhist tradition regards the focusing of the mind as, in
essence, preparatory to the detaching of the mind from the
sensory world. In any event, the exploration of this kind of
comparison lies outside the scope of this paper. It is enough if
I have rendered plausible the claim that such further explora-
tion might be a not quite fruitless enterprise.
NOTES
1. “Tattha vuttäbhidhammatthä
Catudhä paramatthato
Cittam cetasikam rüpam
Nibbänam iti Sabbathä.”
Anuruddhäcariya, Abhidhammattha Sangaha, ed. Narada (Colombo,
1968), cittasangahavibhago.
2. Cf. the familiar Bhavacakra mandala.
3. Anuruddhäcariya, loc. cit.
4, These are the translations (conventional equivalents, to be sure)
used by Venerable Närada in his translation of the Abhidham-
mattha Sangaha (Colombo, 1968).
Närada, op. cit., p. 50.
tA
Ibid., p. 51.
ON
Ibid., p. 52.
—
Depending on whether the first two factors are considered as being

©
eliminated simultaneously or not.

9. Anguttara Nikaya IW.xix.190, trans. F. L. Woodword, Gradual
Sayings, Vol. II, p. 192.
10. Trans. Nànamoli.
11. Op. cit., ix.58 (trans. Nànamoli).
12. Närada, op. cit., p. 393.
13. Ibid., pp. 58-9.
14. Ibid., p. 59.
15. P. Vajiranàna, Buddhist Meditation in Theory and Practice (Kuala
Lumpur, 1975), pp. 336-8.
16. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, Vol. I.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Richard T. Wallis, “ΝΟΥΣ as Experience," in The Significance of
Neoplatonism, ed. R. Baine Harris (Norfolk, 1976), pp. 121-53.
21. Ibid., p. 138.
22. Ibid., p. 139.
23. MT., Chapter 1.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
Matter and Exemplar:
Difference-in-Identity
in Vijnanabhiksu
and Bonaventure
John Borelli
College of Mount Saint Vincent

Riverdale, New York
The major Indian conception of material causality can be

both a reason for confusion and a source of insight. Transla-
tors and interpreters of Indian religious thought have identi-
fied with some consistency the term upadana karana as the
"material cause," which represents a significant factor in the
Sankhya, Yoga, and Vedanta thought schemes. Indeed, the
material cause denotes the substrate out of which a thing is
made; however, in these three Indian schools the term
"material cause" connotes two important ideas which are
lacking in the precisely defined meaning of material causality
in European thought traditions. These are, namely, that an
effect is simply a transformation of its cause and hence that
the material cause is not separate from the efficient cause.
These connotations are brought together in the Sankhya-Yoga
term sat-karya. Often this term is interpreted as the preexis-
tence of an effect in its cause, which ultimately implies the
emanation of everything of experience from prime matter or
nature (prakrti). Gerald Larson in a recent article on sat-
-kàrya makes the following conclusion:
137
138 JOHN BORELLI
In conclusion, therefore, the notion of satkärya, in

my view, has little to do with Aristotelian material
cause or the notion that the effect preexists in the
cause in this sense. Rather, satkärya appears to
function as an explanatory principle for maintaining
prakrti as a closed, transforming, self-regulating,
intelligible (but not intelligent) whole. ... 2
For Vedanta theologians the nonseparation of material

causality and efficient causality is a characteristic of Brahman.
The correlative of sat-karya is parinama or transformation.
Through its own essential energy Brahman transforms itself
into the world of matter and souls. Brahman is both the ulti-
mate substrate and the efficient cause which orders creation.
The transformation of cause into effects and the nonsepara-
tion of material and efficient causes gave rise to a particular
interpretation of the relationship between Brahman and the
world known as difference-in-identity (bhedabheda). Not all
Vedanta thinkers followed such an interpretation. The San-
kara school emphasized the ultimate identity (abheda) of
everything with Brahman, and the Madhva school stressed the
absolute difference (bheda) between God and creation. The
principal text of Vedanta is Badarayana's Brahma Sutras, and
the difference-in-identity interpretation of it has been noted
already as the most accurate.?
Not all difference-in-identity Vedàntins agreed on specifics.
Bhàskara believed that the transformation of Brahman into
the world is due to temporary conditions, Nimbärka posited
certain essential yet distinct energies within Brahman as the
source of transformation, and Rämänuja resorted to a doc-
trine of Brahman being the soul of a body which it causes to
expand into the world. In the context of this study there is
no finer difference-in-identity thinker to discuss than Vijnana-
bhiksu (fl. ca. 1575) for two reasons: (1) in his commentary
on the Brahma Sutras he explained well the Vedanta notion
of nonseparation especially as it applies to Brahman being
both the material and efficient causes (in fact, he called his
MATTER AND EXEMPLAR 139
school of Vedanta “‘Nonseparate Nondualism’’); and (2) he is

recognized as an apt interpreter and synthesizer of the Sankh-
ya and Yoga schools from which the notion of sat-karya is
derived. I am well acquainted with Vijnanabhiksu’s writings
since he was the subject of my doctoral dissertation.*
It is also my belief that the Indian legacy to religious
thought in general is the completeness to which this triple
Classification of interpretations of the relationship between
God and the world unfolded: identity, difference, and differ-
ence-in-identity. Within each of these three large metaphysical
frameworks or models a variety of theologies resulted from
dialogues and debates. The specific contribution of Hinduism,
and especially Vedanta, to western thought traditions is the
collection of theological and philosophical formulations within
the third framework: difference-in-identity.
This triple scheme can be applied elsewhere, and although
identity positions are not very numerous in European
thought, difference-in-identity interpretations are not uncom-
mon. In my opinion, Bonaventure’s theology is a difference-
in-identity synthesis, and this is clear when his notion of
exemplary causality is examined. The function of Christ as
the supreme Exemplar is similar to the function of Brahman
as the material cause in Vedanta. Both the formal cause of
Bonaventure and the material cause of Vijfianabhiksu are not
separate from the efficient cause. Both theologians ultimately
state a doctrine of difference-in-identity between God and
creation.
This study, therefore, is first of all an examination and
clarification of the highly misleading term “material causality”’
when applied to a specific category of the Sänkhya, Yoga,
and Vedanta schools. Secondly, in this study I will show that
what material causality allowed certain Vedanta theologians,
especially Vijnanabhiksu, to assert in regard to God and crea-
tion, formal causality permitted Bonaventure to state.
140 JOHN BORELLI
Material causality according to Sankhya, Yoga, and Vedanta

implies that the effects are simply modifications of the
material cause. A real cause produces out of itself equally real
effects which are in some way identical yet different from it.
The notion of the effect being a transformation of a cause
(sat-karya) involves the other Sankhya doctrines of matter,
the manifest, the unmanifest, the three qualities, and emana-
tion. Nonexistence cannot be produced, and therefore what is
real is (1) manifested and evolved, (2) unmanifested yet
evolved, or (3) unmanifested and unevolved. Every potentially
existing is an actually existing in the material cause.
The classical formulation of the doctrine of transformation
of the cause into real effects is in the Sankhya Karika by
I$vàrakrsna which was probably written in the first few centu-
ries of the Christian era? Sankhya Karikà 9 states: Because
nonbeing does not cause, because of the need for a material
cause, because it is impossible for all things to come from all
things, because a thing can only produce what it can produce,
and because of the nature of a cause, the effect exists (sat-
kàryam)."? The ultimate source of all things is matter which
is unmanifest in a preemanation state and is fully manifested
as the world of experience. Through a series of emanations
twenty-three other principles of being emerge.
Matter is one of two first principles, with spirit being the
other, but spirit is necessarily conscious, witnessing, and
passive. Energy and activity belong solely to matter and its
evolutes because of three constituent qualities of matter as
stated in Sankhya Karika 12: “The qualities, whose natures
are pleasure, pain, and indifference, serve to manifest, acti-
vate, and limit; they successively dominate, support, activate,
and interact with one another”? All manifest and evolved
things are composed of these qualities and result from their
interaction. This is the teaching of Sankhya Karika 15-16:
"Because of the transformation of particular things, because
of homogeneity, because of the power which emerges, because
of the distinction between cause and effect, because of the
nonseparation of all things, the unmanifest is the cause, and it
functions by the interaction of the three qualities due to the

specific nature of each quality as in the case of water."'?
From the above references, it should be evident that matter
is the material cause and that the qualities are the efficient
cause. These qualities are not separate from matter, and so in
a sense they are identical with the material cause. Gaspar
Koelman made this equation in his book on Yoga:
The true ultimate efficient cause is identical with

the substrative cause, since only that out of which a
thing is made and in which it is latent can effi-
ciently draw out that effect of which it is pregnant.?
Yoga thinkers took over the Sänkhya scheme and developed

methods for retracing the effects back to matter in order to
isolate the pure awareness of spirit from the remaining factors
of experience. The greatest expositor of Yoga was Vyasa, and
in his commentary on Yoga Sutras 4.12 he stated something
similar:
An efficient cause is capable of making only an

actually existing result present, but not of produ-
cing something new. The efficient cause, when fully
established, gives aid to the ordered manifestation
of its object, but it does not cause it to be created
anew .10
Through the ceaseless activity of the three qualities more and

more effects appear out of the material substrate and return
to it.
Vijnanabhiksu did not write a commentary on the Sankhya
Karika, but he did produce one on the much later Sankhya
Sutras, which he called the Sankhya Pravacana Bhäsya, and a
summary of Sänkhya entitled Sankhya Sara. Furthermore,
Bhiksu amplified Vyàsa's commentary on the Yoga Sutras in
his Yoga Varttika and summarized Yoga in his masterpiece
the Yoga Sara Sangraha. | can continue, therefore, to discuss
142 JOHN BORELLI
the Sänkhya-Yoga notion of material causality through Vijna-

nabhiksu’s own words.
In his commentary on Sankhya Sutras 5.60 Bhiksu defined
the sat-karya theory, much like Vyasa did, as the making
present of something: “If a manifestation is said to be the
acquisition of the present state by breaking up the past state,
then this is the doctrine of the transformation of a real
effect.”!! Past and future states of a cause, manifested in
effects, are simply the breaking up and the not-yet-existing
respectively of these effects. The implications of this theory
for Bhiksu were significant, namely, the ultimate nondif-
ference of cause and effect and the validity of the world of
experience. From the Buddhists and the followers of San-
kara’s Nondual Vedanta a challenge had been issued to other
Vedanta theologians that, because of the ultimate nondiffer-
ence of all things, this world is illusory. Bhiksu saw in the
same Scriptures and dogmatic statements a teaching of the
transformation of real effects:
It is taught in Scripture that prior to production

there is no difference between cause and effect.
This means that since the effect is real, its produc-
tion is not unreal. For if the effect is unreal, then
the identity of what is real with what is unreal is
inconclusive. These Scriptures teach the identity of
cause and effects before production: "Truly at that
time this world was unmanifested" (Br.U. 1.4.7);
“In the beginning, my dear, this world was just
being" (Ch.U. 6.2.1); “‘Verily, in the beginning this
world was just darkness" (Mait.U. 5.2); and “In the
beginning this world was just water" (Br.U.
5.5.1).13
For Sankhya, Bhiksu admitted, the root cause is matter as

he stated in reference to Sankhya Sutras 1.67: “In respect to
a root, a root is rootless by not having a root; matter, the
root material of the twenty-three principles, is without a
root."!^ As the root cause, matter is the first cause in which
all effects are immanent: “When the former goes away, the
latter cannot survive because an effect is apprehended as
immanent in the material cause." The author of the
Sankhya Sütras clearly states in aphorism 1.41 that mere ante-
cedence is not a sufficient definition for material causality,
and Bhiksu in his commentary remarks that both the material
cause and the efficient cause are antecedent and ‘that the
distinction between the material cause and the efficient cause
is accepted by everyone.’!® Later, when commenting on
Sankhya Sutras 1.81, he explained this distinction further:
"The actions of the efficient cause are not the root cause
because what is the material cause does not conform to the
substances known as the qualities.’’!”
In Sankhya-Yoga, cognition and materiality are not entirely
distinct for in the instinctive principle, matter’s first evolute,
is the capacity for discrimination. To explain the makeup of
all instances of materiality, whether cognitive or physical, the
three qualities were used. These qualities are the kinds of
elements which constitute the things of experience: intelli-
gence, energy, and mass. In physical matter the predominant
elements are energy and mass while in cognitive structures the
predominant element is intelligence.
Bhiksu explained intelligence, energy, and mass as causal
substances making up matter and as having many manifesta-
tions with varying amounts of their "stuff." His argument was
that there would not be any similarity or dissimilarity
between the things of the world if they were merely effects
of the three qualities. Things are in fact alike and different
because they are composed of actual amounts of these three
substances. What is at the bottom of this interpretation of the
three qualities as substances is an attempt to explain psychic
energy, physical energy, and the lack of them in all the cogni-
tive and physical manifestations of matter:
The three qualities, formed of the substances of

intelligence and the rest, are found here; hence the
triad of qualities. Therefore, intelligence and the
144 JOHN BORELLI
other qualities abide in entities, like the instinctive

principle, in the form of a cause; the same intelli-
gence and the others abide in matter in the form of
the triple quality composite like trees in a forest.
This is how we are to understand it.!?
The three qualities act as causal substances in matter and

each of its evolutes in the form of intelligence, energy, and
inertia but also act as qualities of matter and its effects as
luminosity, motion, and heaviness. The three qualities in
causal form, therefore, are the genuine efficient cause as
Bhiksu stated in his Yoga Varttika 4.3: “Since the causal
reason for impelling is due generally to just the qualities,
matter’s independence is established.’’!? In the Sänkhya vision,
no god acts as the first efficient cause. Furthermore, the
qualities are not separate from matter but can be distin-
guished conceptually as the efficient cause apart from the
material cause. The material cause, therefore, has its own
ordering intelligibility, its own energy to transform itself into
things, and its own principle of limitation in the three quali-
ties respectively. Matter, as cause and effect, is in European
scholastic terminology both natura naturans and natura natu-
rata.
Sankhya is an atheistic school in its classical formulation.
In Yoga, God is not a creator but a most excellent spirit who
is a grace-giving model for aspirants. In the Yoga Varttika 4.3
Bhiksu stated matter’s nonseparation from its effects in a way
suitable to Yoga thought:
Hence matter alone, joined with its effects, in

respect to transformation is established as the cause
and independent.... Therefore matter alone is the
cause of the world, but time, action, and God are
brought forth as energies generating the effects of
matter.?°
One of Vijnanabhiksu's great achievements was a theological

reconciliation of Sankhya, Yoga, and Vedanta. He was cer-

tainly not the first Hindu theologian who attempted to recon-
cile various orthodox schools, but scholars writing on Sankhya
and Yoga must take his interpretations of these two schools
into account. This is some measure of his success.
Vijnanabhiksu was primarily a Vedanta theologian, and in
his commentary on Brahma Sutras 1.1.2, which runs nearly
40 pages and which I translated in my doctoral dissertation,
he stated the Vedanta views on material and efficient caus-
ality in respect to Brahman. Bädaräyana’s second aphorism of
his Brahma Sutras reads with the following additions: ‘‘(Brah-
man is that) from which the origin and so forth (existence,
development, maturation, deterioration, and destruction) of
this (world proceeds).”?!
The first major step which Vijnanabhiksu took in his
commentary on the second aphorism was to identify Brahman
as the supporting cause (adhisthana karana) of the world.
Bhiksu defined a supporting cause as “the one from which the
material cause is not separate and by which the latter, being
supported, is transformed into the mode of an effect.”** This
is the root cause in his system, and it upholds everything
which is derived from the material cause by being the sole
witness of matter.
In the primordial, unmanifested state everything exists in
Brahman through a union of nonseparation. This kind of
nonseparation is a precausal condition before cause and effect
are distinguished, and hence in this state Brahman is unmodi-
fied. The material cause, on the other hand, which has been
transformed into an effect of the supporting cause, is a modi-
fiable cause with its three qualities as nonseparate constitu-
ents. Matter is also qualified by its evolutes which in a
pristine condition are nonseparate too. Already, then, the
theologian has distinguished two kinds of nonseparation—
between constituents and between cause and effect.
Even though Brahman is pure consciousness, it can also be
considered the material cause of the world and identical with
the world because both the material cause and the world are
146 JOHN BORELLI
its nonseparate effects; however, the world does not directly

emanate from Brahman. Brahman, then, is not the immediate
source of imperfection and evil because: the things of the
world only indirectly emanate from the supporting cause. At
the end of his discussion on supporting causality Bhiksu
remarked that he would refute later in his commentary on the
Brahma Sutras the theory of the direct transformation of
Brahman. He was well aware that if the things of the world
are direct transformations of Brahman, then the problem of
evil would be devastating to his theology.
Not only is material causality indistinguishable from Brah-
man as the supporting cause, but so too is efficient causality.
Vijnanabhiksu considered that he was positing a fourth cate-
gory with his supporting cause. The other three causes are
constituent (samavayi), nonconstituent (asamaväyi), and effi-
cient (nimitta). As the support of all these, Brahman is non-
separate and hence identical with the efficient cause too.
Once the efficient cause is distinguished from Brahman, then
that cause is modified by Brahman's essential power as an
attribute. Brahman the creator is then the modified Brahman.
These three causes, constituent, nonconstituent, and effi-
cient, are categories belonging not to Sänkhya, Yoga, or
Vedanta, but to three other schools of thought: Nyäya,
Vai$esika, and Mimämsä. The constituent cause is more prop-
erly what is termed “material cause" in European thought for
it is the substrate in which a change takes place. Nyaàya-
VaiSesika held a doctrine of asat-kärya or that the effect is
not a transformation of a cause. The efficient cause is still
that by which a change takes place while the nonconstituent
cause is an aid to the material cause. For example, yarn is the
material cause of cloth, the weaver is the efficient cause, and
the texture and color are nonconstituent causes.
Intrinsic difference has a special place in the theology of
Vinanabhiksu: "The relationship between support and sup-
ported existing in the self prior to any attachment of modifi-
ers cannot be postulated without an intrinsic difference.”??
Nonseparation in the individual self is much the same as it is
with Brahman which is the supreme Self. As the supporting

cause, Brahman is the substance of the world. First by a
separation of its various energies and then by their modifica-
tion to perform as different causes, Brahman gives rise to the
various conscious and unconscious things in the world. Every-
thing remains substantially identical with Brahman.
In his commentary on Bädaräyana’s second aphorism,
Bhiksu clearly stated that the principal meaning of the term
Brahman ‘is completely different from matter and spirit.”?^
Since Bhiksu believed that Sänkhya’s doctrine of the distinc-
tion of spirit from matter was the ultimate truth for self-
liberation and since he accepted, for the most part, Sankhya
metaphysics, the relationship between Brahman and matter
and spirit was one way in which he presented his doctrine of
Brahman.
Matter and spirit are energies and their causal function is
defined through material causality. Matter remains the materi-
al cause and root cause of the twenty-three principles because
it is the source of the unfolding of the world. Matter is acti-
vated through its joining with spirit, and because spirit is the
silent witness of these emanations, matter acts for the benefit
of spirit’s observation. God is the efficient cause of the world
through its uniting of matter and spirit: “Now I maintain that
the joining of matter and spirit is effected by God. ..."?5
This is a definite departure from the twenty-five principle
system of the Sankhya Sütras, twenty-three evolutes plus
matter and spirit, and an opting for a theism with twenty-six
principles. Furthermore, the three qualities become secondary
or instrumental causes, since Brahman effectively joins matter
and spirit and orders creation.
Brahman, therefore, is equated with both material and
efficient causality because it supports these two and shares
their functions. Vijianabhiksu concluded in connection with
this: “‘Brahman is the universal cause through its various attri-
butes because it is endowed with all energies." 25 Hence, it
may be assumed that Brahman's main attribute is power,
composed of various nonseparate energies, matter and spirit
148 JOHN BORELLI
clearly being two such energies, and that this essential power
is manifested as a quality of the modified Brahman, or God,
who effects the conjunction of matter and spirit.
This interpretation of Brahman as the supporting cause, and
therefore as the efficient and material causes of the world, is
not only a statement of the ultimate nonseparation of the
material cause from the efficient cause and a reiteration of
the Sankhya doctrine of transformation. Essential to Bhiksu’s
theology is a difference-in-identity relation between God and
the world. Even the Nondualist Sankara, who departed from
the difference-in-identity characteristic of Vedanta religious
thought, admitted the similarity between Sänkhya and
Vedanta on the notion of causality: “It (Sänkhya) approaches
Vedanta since it admits of the cause not being different from
the effect.”’?7 Bhäskara, a difference-in-identity Vedäntin,
whose writings represent the first known refutation of San-
kara’s Nondualism, restated the transformation theory: ‘An
effect is only a state of the cause; both are different and non-
different. ...”’28 All effects are inherent in Brahman which is
not only their source (material cause) but their intelligent
source (efficient cause). In both Sankhya and Vedanta the
efficient cause, being the three qualities in Sankhya and Brah-
man the creator in Vedànta, is nonseparate from the material
cause.
Another difference-in-identity Vedantin, Ramanuja, stated
it this way:
Brahman is not just the efficient cause, but also

only Brahman is the material cause. If Brahman was
just the efficient cause of the world, then the whole
world would not be known from a knowledge of it.
An effect is not a different substance but the cause
obtaining another state.??
Rämänuja argued against several other difference-in-identity

interpretations, but he did formulate the same kind of posi-
tion. The entire universe of souls and matter and its evolutes
constitute a body, and Brahman is the soul of this body.

From this perspective he has given one of the most concise
and marvellous descriptions of transformation:
This is how transformation is explained. The

supreme Brahman is concentrated goodness, being
wholly adverse to evil, distinguished from all beings
other than itself. It is all-knowing, the realizer of all
wishes, possessed of all its wishes, unlimited and
sovereign bliss. Having for its body the entire uni-
verse of all conscious and unconscious things, which
subserves its cosmic play, it is the soul of that
body. This universe which is its body survives as an
extremely subtle unconscious reality, known as
heaviness, through the successive regression of
matter’s evolutes, the elements, the ego, etc. With
this body of heaviness, now arrived at an extremely
subtle form, such that it cannot be considered as
differentiated, then the supreme Brahman attains a
condition of oneness. Through the thought ‘may I
become the world body constituted of the uncon-
Scious and conscious being, distinguished as before
by name and form," it transforms itself into this
world body through entering one evolute of matter
after another. This is the teaching of transformation
in all the Scriptures. ??
नैः * नैः
Bonaventure’s (1221-1274) doctrine of exemplarism is con-

structed on the difference-in-identity model too. Unity and
plurality in God is resolved through a coincidence of oppo-
sites because God is both pure Being and self-diffusive Good.
Through the generation of the Son, who is the supreme
Exemplar and the total expression of all that is possible, the
unity and plurality of the world is resolved in God too.
These works are the major sources for this discussion of
Bonaventure: Breviloquium, Collationes in Hexaémeron,
Commentarius in Primum Librum Sententiarum, Itinerarium
150 JOHN BORELLI
Mentis in Deum, Opusculum de Reductione Artium ad Theo-

logiam, and Questiones Disputatae de Scientia Christi and de
Mysterio Trinitate. The suggestion of difference-in-identity,
which is made here, has already been proposed by a present-
day scholar of Bonaventure. 5}
Using the name in Exodus 3:14, Bonaventure stated that “‘I
am Who am" is the most perfect name for God.?? Because all
things depend on him, God is the ground of everything and
therefore is the first principle of being. God is perfect and
pure Being which is an indivisible unity, but Bonaventure
realized that this concept of unity expands to include the
indivision and simplicity of what originates and the complete-
ness and inseparability of what is originated:
For indivision is unity; however, unity exists in the

originating and in the originated, in universals and
in particulars, in the will and in nature. Unity in the
originating is simplicity; in the composite or in the
originated it is wholeness or fullness; in universals it
is conformity; in particulars it is countlessness; in
the will it is unanimity; and in nature it is insepara-
bility.°°
Already the language of difference-in-identity is recogniz-

able. The relationship between God and the world under the
aspect of God as pure Being has been set up. There is origina-
ting, universal, and willing being, and there is originated, parti-
cular, and ordered or created being. Hence being can exist in
two ways: as subsistent, self-modeled, and self-intended or as
contingent, modeled after another, and tending towards
another. Also God operates in three orders: origination,
exemplification, and termination.** These three orders corres-
pond to the functions of the Trinity of Persons respectively,
and the two aspects of the first principle, as the pure Being
and as the Trinity, coincide.
The explanation. of the one God and the Trinity by
Bonaventure repeats the teaching of Brahma Sutras 1.1.2:
Brahman is the origin, preservation, and destruction of the
world. The first principle through the two modes of perfect

emanation, which are generation and spiration, unfolds into
God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. They stand for the effi-
cient, exemplary, and final principles of the world. The divine
essence remains the same in the double emanation. It is one,
simple, eternal, immutable, yet it includes fecundity, likeness,
and inseparability.
A closer examination of the generation of the Son further
elucidates the dual aspect of God and his relationship with
the manifest world, because for Bonaventure Christ is the
metaphysical medium and through him the three orders of
being are related: emanation, exemplification, and return. *
From all eternity the Father begets the Son, who is his like-
ness and also expresses all that he can do. This total expres-
sion of his Being in the image of the Son is called divine art
by Bonaventure.°° Therefore the nature of God is the same,
but the mission and manifestation of each Person is different.
The Father sends the Son and expresses the totality of
creation through him while the Son, being the Exemplar of
everything, is the cause of the return of everything to God in
the Spirit.
Bonaventure did not use the same language to describe the
relationship between God and the world as the Hindu theolo-
gians of the Vedanta school. Although God's essence is pure
Being and is all-inclusive, God is not the essence of every-
thing; nevertheless, he is the most excellent, universal, and
sufficient cause of all essences. God's essence is one, but it is
infinite and multiple in its effects." If the difference-in-
identity theme is operative in the relationship between God
and the world in Bonaventure's theology, then it should be
discernible in his doctrine of exemplarism.
In his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,
Bonaventure made the formal connection between divine
fecundity and the Person of the Father.?? The Father is
primarily fecund, but this fecundity is expressed throughout
the Trinity because the three Persons are God who is the pure
Being and self-diffusive Good. Therefore, we can distinguish
152 JOHN BORELLI
two fountains of being: the Father who is the source of the

Trinitarian processions and the Trinity as a whole which is the
source of creation.?? What Bonaventure has done is to make a
real connection between the fullness of the Trinitarian
processes of self-expression and return and the fullness of the
creation of the world.
In his Trinitarian theology Bonaventure described the gene-
ration of the Son as the production of an equal and consub-
stantial likeness. The generation is a production from the
nature of God, and the Son shares the essence of the Father.
Also the Son has all the power and potentiality of the Father
because the Father not only communicates his likeness to the
Son but also expresses all the things which he could make:
"For the Father, as it is said, generated one similar to himself,
namely the Word, coeternal with himself, and he expressed his
own likeness and, consequently, expressed all the things which
he could express."7°
Christ is the eternal art of the Father and is not separate
from him. The created effects of God, which constitute the
world, are distinguished from one another through their
forms, and hence the creative art involves the giving of a form
and individual properties to each thing. God necessarily
possesses the ideal forms.^! God, therefore, is both a first
cause and an immediate cause of everything. By possessing all
the ideal forms, God is the exemplary cause, and this estab-
lishes an intimate relation between God and the world. The
world is a pattern of the divine art and is most real in its
ideal form as the eternal divine ideas.
In discussing the relationship between God and the crea-
ture, Bonaventure used these terms: image, trace, likeness,
shadow, echo, and representation. For example, he stated that
the universe is like a book reflecting and representing the
Trinity on three levels: the trace, the image, and the likeness.
All creatures are traces while all intellectual creatures are
images. Although at times the term "'likeness" is used in
special reference to the Son, Bonaventure also used it for
those who are *'God-conformed," these intellectual creatures
who spiritually conform themselves to God. Thus an ascen-

ding scale of representation is indicated with the most
material creation at the base and the most spiritual at the tip.
In the /tinerarium he described traces as material, temporal,
and external while images are everlasting, spiritual, and inter-
nal ^ Later in the same book he listed these terms as
synonyms for the creatures in the sensible world: shadow,
echo, image, vestige, likeness, and representation.43 All these
terms refer to what is produced from the divine art, which is
the efficient, exemplary, and final cause.
Bonaventure's language of likeness, shadow, image, etc.
should not be confusing to us. When I mentioned earlier that
there is an intimate relationship between God and the world
due to the whole of creation being totally expressed in the
Son who is the locus of the ideal forms or divine ideas, I
meant that all of creation is real because it exists in ideal
forms. Anything is real because it exists in the divine ideas:
...for the exemplary likeness more perfectly

expresses the thing than the caused thing itself
expresses itself. On account of this God more per-
fectly knows things through their likenesses than he
would know them through their essences; and angels
more perfectly know in the Word than according to
their own kind.”
These ideal forms are not just universals, but the Son’s
embrace of the totality of creation in the divine ideas includes
individual things in their own peculiarities.* Bonaventure
could be no clearer when he says that due to the exemplary
mode of being things actually are in God: “Likewise it can be
said to follow that things are actually in God in the exem-
plary order and potentially according to the order of creation
because they can be produced.’’*® In the light of his mystical
theology Bonaventure was prompted to say: “I will see myself
better in God than in my very self."7
Bonaventure employs the language of difference-in-identity
in his descriptions of the relationship between God and his
154 JOHN BORELLI
creatures. The divine essence is all-present, surrounding, pene-

trating. It is the center and the circumference of all things.
Being simple it is wholly interior to all things, but being
Omnipotent it is entirely exterior to them. Furthermore,
because God is all-inclusive, he is all-in-all. Although things are
many and God is one, there is in his simple unity all power,
all exemplification, and all communicability. God, there-
fore, is a differentiated unity in two senses: (1) a Trinity of
Persons; and (2) an Exemplar of the whole of creation both
generically and specifically. Bonaventure’s doctrine of exem-
plarism does not, therefore, set up a polarity between God
and the world, but it represents an attempt, and a thoroughly
Christian one, to define the relationship between God and his
creatures in such a way as to encompass the relationships of
identity and difference.
Difference-in-identity systems of thought in India rest upon

the notion of the material cause being more than an inactive
substrate in which change takes place. Ultimately this meant
for Vedanta a borrowing of Sankhya's notion of real transfor-
mation. Matter possesses various qualities and is the material
cause which is not separate from the efficient cause. In the
Vedanta systems which were truly statements of the differ-
ence-in-identity between Brahman and the world, matter
retained its qualities of intelligence, energy, and inertia; but
they no longer were seen to function as the primary efficient
cause. That was Brahman in its aspect as the creator. Yet
material causality was not separate from efficient causality.
What material causality did for Vedanta theologians like
Vijnanabhiksu, exemplary causality did for Bonaventure. The
exemplary cause is not separate from the efficient cause
through the Son. Both are rooted in the nonseparation of
Persons in the Trinity. Through this Bonaventure was able to
state a position which respected both the unity and the differ-
ence between God and creation. Creation is not an absolute
separation from God because all things exist really and

immanently in the exemplary condition of the Trinitarian
processions and in the Son who is the Supreme Exemplar.
NOTES
Betty Heimann, Facets of Indian Thought (New York: Schocken

Books, 1964), p. 59, writes: "The causa efficiens, the agent, and
the causa materialis, the material cause, are in Indian philosophy
not strictly separated from each other....In the standard exam-
ples, the threads are shown as the causa efficiens of the effect, the
cloth. ... All effects, both subjects and objects, are potentially
contained in the great reservoir of primary Matter before, and after,
their actual manifestation. Prakrti is their common efficient and
material cause."
"The Notion of Satkarya in Samkhya: Toward a Philosophical
Reconstruction," Philosophy East and West 25, 1 (January 1975),
p. 38.
See Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, 5
Vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922-55), Vol. 2, p.
42: *"...Bàdaráyana's philosophy was some kind of bhedäbheda-
vàda or a theory of transcendence and immanence of God
(Brahman)-even in the light of Sankara's own commentary. He
believed that the world was the product of a real transformation of
Brahman, or rather of His powers and energies (fakti)." Also in
ibid., Vol. 3, p. 105: “The bhedàbheda interpretation of the
Brahma-sütras is in all probability earlier than the monistic interpre-
tation introduced by Sankara." P. M. Modi, A Critique of the
Brahmasütra (3.2.11-4), 2 parts (Bhavnagar, India: by the author,
1943-56), 1.xix-xx, made the same point but more cryptically:
“The most essential piece of information discovered on this point is
that according to the Sutrakdra the Upanisads described the per-
sonal aspect of Brahman with the attributes of the impersonal and
vice versa (Bra. Su. II1.3.37-42). It is on this fact that the Sütrakara
bases his doctrine of two aspects of absolutely equal status and
gives a complete option of choice to a mumuksu to select either of
the two, the immediate goal being the same."
John W. Borelli, Jr., The Theology of Vijnànabhiksu: A Transla-
tion of His Commentary on Brahma Sütras 1.1.2 and an Exposition
156 JOHN BORELLI
of His Difference-in-Identity Theology" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Ford-

ham University, 1976). Translations from Sanskrit and Latin
throughout the present study are my own; some of them can be
found in my dissertation.
See Gerald J. Larson, Classical Samkhya: An Interpretation of its
History and Meaning (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969), p. 157.
"Asadakaranàd upàáàdàánagrahanáàt sarvasambhaväbhävät saktasya sak-
yakaranat käranabhäväc ca satkäryam.”
"Prityapritivisádátmakah praká$apravrttiniyamártháàh anyonyäbhib-
havasrayajananamithunavrttayas ca gunäh.”
"Bhedànàm parimänät samanvayät $aktitah pravrtte$ ca käranakär-
yavibhägäd avibhägäd vai$varüpyasya káranam asty avyaktam pra-
vartate trigunatah samudayäc ca parinamatah salilavat pratiprati-
gunasravy avisesät.”
Patanjala Yoga: From Related Ego to Absolute Self (Poona: Papal
Athenaeum, 1970), p. 74.
10. "Sata$ ca phalasya nimittam vartamänîkarane samartham näpürvo-
pajanane siddham nimittam naimittikasya visesinugrham kurute
napurvamutpadayatiti.”’
11. "Abhivyaktir yady atigatävasthätyägena vartamänävasthäläbha ity
ucyate tadà satkáryasiddhàntah."
12. Bhiksu's commentary on Sankhya Sütras 1.123: “This then is the
difference between the followers of the real transformation of an
effect from those who do not accept the transformation of an
effect. The followers of the real transformation of an effect explain
that the future and the past states of an effect are real since they
represent the not-yet-existing and the breaking up, and the manifest
state called the present is posited as separate from them as in the
case of a pot for there is an experience of all three states with a
pot. But the opposite view is taken by the others."
13. "Utpatteh präg api käryasya kàranàbhedah $rüyate; tasmäc ca sat-
käryasiddhyä näsadutpäda ity arthah. Käryasyäsattve hi sadasator
abhedänupapattir iti. Utpatteh pràk karyanadm käranäbhede ca $ru-
tayah: ‘tad dhedham tarhy avyäkrtam àsit,' ‘sad eva, saumye, ‘dam
agra asit, ‘tama evedam agra áàsit, ‘Apa evedam agra àsur' ityád-
yah.” Sankhya Pravacana Bhasya 1.118.
14. “Mule mulabhavad amülam mülam. Trayo-vimSati-tattvindm mülam
upädänam pradhänam muüla$ünyam."
15. "...Uupádánakáranánugatatayaiva käryänubhaväd ity arthah." Ibid.,
1.39.
16. "Upàdànanimittayor vihägah sarvalokasiddha ity arthah."
17. "...nimittakàranasya karmano na mülakáranatvam; gunànàm drav-
yopädänatväyogät.”
18. “Trayah sattvädidravyarüpä gunä atra santiti trigunam. Tatra maha-

dadisu káranarüpena sattvädinäm avasthänam, gunatrayasamuüharu -
pena tu pradhäne sattva’dindm avasthänam vane vrksavad evävagan-
tavyam." Sankhya Pravacana Bhäsya 1.126.
19. ‘‘Gunatvenaiva sämaänyatah pravrttikäranatvat prakrtisvatantryam
siddham.”
20. "Atah sahakäryaprayuktä prakrtir eva parinàme káranam svantan-
treti siddham ... Tathaiva prakrtir eva jagatkäranam, kálakarmes$var-
ädayas tu prakrteh käryajanana$aktyudbodhakäh.”
21. “Janmädyasya yatah."
22. All remaining quotations from Vijñänabhiksu’s writings are from his
commentary on the Brahma Sutras entitled Vijnandmrta Bhasya
and specifically from his commentary on 1.1.2 unless otherwise
noted. "Tad evàdhisthánakáranam yaträvibhaktam yenostabdham ca
sadupädänakäranam käryäkärena parinamate.”
23. "Na càyam upadhisambandhat pürvam adhistheyädhisthatrbhävo
niramSasya 4tmanah svarüpabhedamvinopapadyata iti."
24. “Prakrtipurusädivy ävrtta.” _
25. "Asmáàbhis tu prakrtipurususamyogah I$varena kriyata ity abhyupa-
gamyate."
26. ‘‘Brahmanas tu sarva-Saktikatvàt tattadupädhibhih sarvakäranat-
vam."
27. '*Sa ca käryakäranänänyatväbhyupagamät pratyäsanno vedänta-
vádasya." Sankara’s commentary on Brahma Sütras 1.4.28.
28. **... käranasyävasthämätram Kkäryam vyatiriktävyatiriktam . . .”
Bhäskara’s commentary on Brahma Sutras 2.1.14.
29. ‘Na nimittakäranamätram Brahma, upädänakäranam ca Brah-
maivety artha. Yadi nimittakäranam eva jagato Brahma, tadä tad-
vijñänât na samastam jagat vijñätam syát. Káranam evävasthäntarä-
pannam käryam, na dravyäntaram iti." Rámánuja's commentary on
Brahma Sutras 1.4.23.
30. "Evam eva parindma upadi$yate. ASesaheyapratyanikakaly4dnaika-
tanam svetarasamastavastuvilaksanam sarvajfiam satyasankalpam
aväptasamastakämam anavadhikatisaya4nandam svaltlopakaranabhüta-
samastacidacidvastujäta$ariratayä tadätmabhütam param Brahma.
Svasartrabhute prapañce tanmäträhañkärädikäranaparamparayä tam-
a$Sabdavaàcyátisüksmácidvastveka$ese sati. Tamasi ca sva$arirata-
yä’pi prthannirdesänarhätisüksmadasäpattvä svasminnekatám äpanne
sati, tathä bhutatamassariram Brahma. Pürvavadvibhaktanämrüpacid-
acinmisraprapancaSariram syämiti sankalpya, apyayakamena jagac-
chariratayáà 4tmanam parinamayatiti sarvesv vedäntesu parinámo-
pade$ah." Ibid., 1.4.27.
158 JOHN BORELLI
Ewert Cousins is the first to interpret Bonaventure specifically

through difference-in-identity. See “1.4 ‘Coincidentia Oppositorum'
dans la Theologie de Bonaventure," Etudes Franciscaines, Supple-
ment annuel (1968), pp. 15-31; ‘The Coincidence of Opposites in
the Christology of Saint Bonaventure," Franciscan Studies 28
(1968), pp. 27-45; *Mandala Symbolism in the Theology of Bona-
venture," University of Toronto Quarterly (Spring, 1971), pp.
185-200; and “Bonaventure and Contemporary Thought," The
Cord 25 (1975), pp. 68-78. The same theme is developed fully in
his book Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites (Chicago:
Franciscan Herald Press, 1978). I should also mention that John C.
Plott has a recent book, A Philosophy of Devotion: A Comparative
Study of Bhakti and Prapatti in Vi$istadvaita and St. Bonaventure
and Gabriel Marcel (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), in which
some comparative work is done between Bonaventure and Vedänta.
32. * ..hoc enim est nomen Dei manifestissimum et perfectissimum,
quia omnia, quae sunt Dei, comprehenduntur in hoc nomine: ‘Ego
sum qui sum.' " Hexaém., XI.1 (V.380).
33. "Est enim indivisio unitas; unitas autem est in principiis et princi-
piatis, in universalibus et particularibus, in voluntate et natura.
Unitas in principiis est simplicitas; in compositis sive principiatis
totalitatis seu plenitudinis; in universalibus conformitatis, in particu-
laribus innumerabilitatis, in voluntate unanimitatis, in natura insepa-
rabilitatis." Ibid., XI.8 (V.381).
34. "Esse ex se est in ratione originantis; esse secundum se in ratione
exemplantis, et esse propter se in ratione finientis vel terminantis;
id est in ratione principii, medii et finis seu termini." Ibid., 1.12
(V.331).
35. “Hoc est medium metaphysicum reducens, et haec est tota nostra
metaphysica: de emanatione, de exemplaritate, de consumma-
tione. . . ." Ibid., 1.17 (V.332).
36. "Pater enim ab aeterno genuit Filium similem sibi et dixit se et
similitudinem suam similem sibi et cum hoc totum posse suum;
dixit quae posset facere, et maxime quae voluit facere, et omnia in
eo expressit, scilicet in Filio seu in isto medio tanquam in sua
arte." Ibid., I.13 (V.331). Also, see Red. art., 20 (V.324).
37. * ..ubi supra arcam sunt Cherubim gloriae obumbrantia propitia-
torum; per quae intelligimus duos modos seu gradus contemplandi
Dei invisibilia et aeterna, quorum unus versatur circa essentialia Dei,
alius vero circa propria personarum." Îtin., c. 5, n. 1 (V.308).
38. "*...Sed quanto aliquid prius, tanta fecundius est et aliorum princi-
pium; ergo sicut essentia divina, quia prima, est principium aliarum
essentiarum, sic persona Patris, cum sit prima, quia a nullo, est
principium et habet fecunditatem respectu personarum." I Sent., d.

2, a. un., q. 2 (1.53).
39. "Haec autem fontalitas quodam modo origo est alterius fontalitatis.
Quia enim Pater producit Filium et per Filium et cum Filio produ-
cit Spiritum Sanctum; ideo Deus Pater per Filium cum Spiritu
Sancto est principium omnium creatorum; nisi enim eos produceret
ab aeterno, non per illos producere posset ex tempore." M. Trin.,
q. 8, ad 7 (V.115).
40. "Pater enim, ut dictum est, similem sibi genuit, scilicet Verbum sibi
coaeternum, et dixit similitudinem suam, et per consequens expres-
sit omnia, quae potuit." Hexaém., 1.16 (V.332).
4]. “Si enim det huic rei formam, per quam distinguitur ab alia re, vel
proprietatem, per quam ab alia distinguitur; necesse est, ut habeat
formam idealem, immo formas ideales. Sic enim in plurali vocantur
a santis." Ibid., XII.3 (V.385).
42. See Itin., c. 1, n. 2 (V.297).
43. Ibid., c. 2, n. 11 (V.297).
44. * ..ila enim similitudo exemplaris perfectius exprimit rem, quam
ipsa res causata exprimat se ipsam. Et propter hoc Deus perfectium
cognoscit res per similitudines illas, quam cognosceret per suas
essentias; et Angeli perfectius cognoscunt in Verbo quam in proprio
genere." Sc. Chr., q. 2, ad. 9 (V.10).
45. "Nam corporalis est similitudo spiritualis, et compositi est simili-
tudo simplex, etiam in creaturis; ideo non oportet, quod una idea
sit altera simplicior vel prior. Similitudo tamen secundum rationem
intelligendi habet proprietatem ideati secundum distinctionem, . . ."'
I Sent., d. 35, a. un., q. 4, con. (1.610).
46. "Similiter ad sequens, dicendum, quod ratione exemplaris res actu-
aliter sunt in Deo; ratione creationis potentialiter, quia possunt
produci." Ibid., d. 36, a. un., q. 1, con. (1.621).
47. *Unde melius videbo me in Deo quam in me ipso." Hexaém., XII.9
(V.386).
48. *Ouia aeternum et praesentissimum, ideo omnes durationes ambit
et intrat, quasi simul existens earum centrum et circumferentia.—
Quia simplicissimum et maximum, ideo totum intra omnia et totum
extra,...—Quia vero est summe unum et omnimodum, ideo est
omnia in omnibus, quamvis omnia sint multa, et ipsum non sit nisi
unum; et hoc, quia per simplicissimam initatem, serenissimam veri-
tatem et sincerissimam bonitatem est in eo omnis virtuisitas, omnis
exemplaritas et omnis communicabilitas....” Jtin., c. 5, n. 8
(V.310).
Cit and Nous
Paul Hacker
University of Munster
Westfalen, West Germany
Neoplatonism has more than once been compared with

Indian philosophy, and especially with that pluriform variety
of Indian thought which is comprised under the designation
of Vedanta, or, as I prefer to call it when speaking of the
later interpretations of the Upanisads, of Vedäntism. Histori-
cal dependence has been asserted especially in the case of
Plotinus. But I wish to state right from the outset that I do
not think that such dependence is proven in any way, though
I would not deny the possibility that Plotinus may have had a
vague and dim knowledge of one or two Vedantic doctrines,
mediated to him through inexact translations or accounts.
Much more important than the fascinating resemblance of
the two spirit-oriented philosophies is the fact that in spite of
the common primacy of the spiritual, the conceptual forma-
tions and structures are so different that the distinctive terms
First published in Paul Hacker, Kleine Schriften. Edited by Lambert

Schmithausen as Vol. 15 of the publications of the Glasenapp-Stiftung,
Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977, pp. 320-337.
161
162 PAUL HACKER
of the Indian school of thought are almost normally misun-

derstood in the West. Let me illustrate this possibility of
misunderstanding by what is perhaps the most striking exam-
ple. There is no doubt that the German Paul Deussen was in
his time the deepest specialist of Vedantism in the West. Now
in this scholar’s book, The System of the Vedanta, published
in German in 1883, we read in a footnote (54, on page 95)
that in a certain passage of Samkara's Brahmasutrabhasya
there occurs “‘the monstrosity of an absolute perception,"
that is, the postulate of “4 subject without an object." It
seems incredible, but it is simply a fact, first, that precisely
this *monstrosity" forms the very center of the system of
monistic Vedantism, of which Deussen undertook to give an
account; secondly, that the most specialized specialist misun-
derstood the most central concept of the subject of his
studies. Now it is this very *monstrosity" which I intend to
elucidate in the following, in confrontation with Neopla-
tonism.
As I have already hinted, this confrontation is not meant to
detect historical influences. It is simply an attempt to clarify
concepts. Such clarification is a necessary prerequisite for a
fruitful. interpenetration of Indian and Western thinking in
metaphysical speculation, nay, it is already a timid beginning
of such interpenetration.
The comparison of Vedanta and Vedantism with Neopla-
tonism is beset with difficulties. One of these consists in the
enormous differences of the conceptual and argumentative
stage of development in the two schools. I will try to explain
what I mean by this statement. In the Upanisads, and | am
thinking here especially of the later ones— Katha Svetàsvatara
Mundaka, Maitri—and a few late passages in earlier Upanisads
in these texts we find concepts which notwithstanding their
profundity are in a way indistinct, so that they are hard to
define. In addition, argumentation is in quite a rudimentary
state. On the other hand, later Vedantism, beginning from the
CIT AND NOUS 163
time of Samkara, i.e., from the 7th century, combines con-

cepts that are clear-cut and definable, though not very differ-
entiated, with a highly developed argumentation. Now in
Neoplatonism, especially in Plotinus, it is extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to define with precision the content even of
the leading terms,! while, on the other hand, conceptual varie-
ty and argumentation are full-grown and refined. So we are
confronted with an incongruity in either case: whether we
compare with Neoplatonism the Upanisads, i.e., Vedanta in
the restricted sense of the word, or Vedantism, 1.e., the philo-
sophy grown on the basis of the Upanisads.
Realization of the difficulties and incongruities is apt to
deter one altogether from undertaking a comparison, and I
frankly confess that in the months while thinking of attending
the congress of the Society for Neoplatonic Studies, I was
often tempted to renounce wniting a paper to be read at the
congress. At last, I took a somewhat desperate resolution. It
had been clear from the time of my invitation that my task
could not be to contribute to the knowledge of Neopla-
tonism, since I am far from being a specialist in this field. |
wish to elucidate an Indian concept before an audience fami-
liar with Neoplatonism. So I eventually resolved to confine
myself, on the Neoplatonic side, to that brief handbook
which recommends itself also on account of the prominent
role it played for many centuries in the history of European
thought. I mean to Proclus’s Stoicheiosis theologike. Starting
from, or on the basis of, or against the background of this
book, with references also to Plotinus, I will try to explain
the difference of those two concepts which may be, and have
been, translated by the same Western word, viz., by "spirit,"
the concepts of Sanskrit cit and Greek nous. This will, of
course, also necessitate digressions to other related concepts
on both sides. In referring to Proclus I gratefully used the
admirable edition by E. R. Dodds, with his translation and
commentary, without, however, sharing his opinion that such
business belongs to the ''Wissenschaft des Nichtwissen-
swerthen," i.e., to the science of that which is not worth
164 PAUL HACKER
knowing. For Plotinus I used the excellent edition, with

German translation, published by F. Meiner.
In the title of this paper I have quoted an Indian and a
Greek term, cif and nous. But this was more or less a make-
shift. The meanings of the two words are connected by little
more than the fact that both are usually translated by one
and the same Western word. Still, I would justify the inclu-
sion of the two words in the title. For, first, both the Indian
and the Greek words do express something like what we mean
when we speak of “Spirit” in philosophy; secondly, I wish to
explain, or at least to make a first attempt at explaining, to
the student of Neoplatonism, what is meant by cit, and to the
Indologist, by what means the Neoplatonist in his maturest
stage tried to give approximate expression to that reality
which the Indian term faces.
We may start from Neoplatonism, but since the meaning of
the Indian term differs very much from that of the Greek
one, it would be bewildering to start directly from the Greek
term. Some metaphysical propositions of Proclus's book seem
to provide promising starting points.
I take proposition 15 as such a starting point: “‘All that is
capable of reverting upon itself is incorporeal]" (Πᾶν τὸ πρὸς
ἑαυτὸ ENLOTPETTLKOV ἀσοματὸν ἔστιν). The notion, occurring in
this proposition, of reverting upon oneself, was perhaps first
conceived by the Stoics? and then taken over by the Neopla-
tonists. Now I could stop short here, remarking curtly that
the Advaitic Vedantist explicitly dismisses the notion of epis-
temological reflexivity as illogical, and that, therefore, further
discussion is pointless because "East is East and West is West
and never the twain will meet."
The concept of ἐπιστροφὲ πρὸς (or: εἰς) ἑαυτόν has sur-
vived in Thomism down to our day. Proclus holds that this
capability of reversion upon itself is an indication of an enti-
ty's being incorporeal, and the same argument recurs in St.
Thomas’ Summa contra gentiles? (1.49 Marietti no. 1254).
The difference between Thomas and Proclus is that for Pro-
clus there are three incorporeal entities, namely the One, the
CIT AND NOUS 165
Spirit, and the Soul, each subordinated to the preceding

(proposition 20), while for Thomas the only incorporeal thing
envisaged here is the intellectus or, more exactly, the soul of
which the intellectus is a part.
Let me first explain why the idea of epistemological reflex-
ivity is alien to Vedantic thought (I am not speaking of
Indian thought in general). At a very early time, probably in
the first half of the last millennium before Christ, at the latest
one or two centuries earlier than 500 B.C., one of those
thinkers whose speculations were handed down in the Upani-
sads conceived a thought that, in my opinion, belongs to the
greatest achievements of philosophy, both Eastern and Wes-
tern. The clearest formulation of this thought is recorded at
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 3.4.2, but similar statements recur in
four passages of the second, third, and fourth books of the
same Upanisad (2.4.14; 3.7.23; 3.8.11; 4.5.15). This formula-
tion reads (with a slight abbreviation): ‘You cannot see him
who sees vision,... you cannot know him who knows know-
ledge" (na drster drastàram pasyeh, .. . na vijnater vijnataram
vijaniyah). 1 think the formulation makes the idea conveyed
appear self-evident. That which makes knowledge possible—
knowledge of all kinds, sensorial perception as well as mental
insight and discursive thinking—the principle which makes this
possible cannot naturally be grasped or comprehended by that
of which it is the very basis of existence. Whatever names we
may give to the principle that makes both mental and sensu-
ous acts or events possible, whether we call it consciousness
or spirit or thought or knowledge, it is absurd to assume that
this principle should need an act of knowledge in order to
attain that state which we call “to be known” or “to be
manifest." It is absurd because that which makes a thing
possible, or is the basis of it, cannot possibly itself be made
possible by the thing which it makes possible. Such an absur-
dity, however, would happen in epistemological reflexivity.
Nevertheless it is inconceivable that the greatest thinkers of
the West should for centuries have acquiesced in a blatant
absurdity. I am convinced that the Greeks who coined the
166 PAUL HACKER
term ‘‘reflection upon oneself" actually faced a reality. But

they did not view it from the same angle as the Indians did
and accordingly expressed it in a linguistic form totally dif-
ferent from the Vedantist term. What Proclus means by *'reflec-
tion upon itself" is the self-manifestation, the self-revealing
nature of the spiritual, which Proclus designates by the nega-
tive term “incorporeal’’—a term which is used by the Vedàn-
tists also. In terms of post-Upanisadic Vedantism, Spirit is not
in need of a subject-object relationship in order to become
manifest.
Precisely for this argument it is helpful for the thinker who
intends to investigate the nature of Spirit, to have, as the
Indians had from very early times, a reflex awareness of the
subject-object relationship as an element of the structure of
reality. For the negative proposition, "Spirit can never
become an object," provides a vigorous support to the posi-
tive statement, “Spirit is self-revealing." The denial of objec-
tivity on the part of spirit naturally involves its proximity to
the subject of knowledge. But according to the theory of
Advaitic Vedantism the actual subject of knowledge is not
spirit in its purity but spirit somehow intermingled with an
objective element. I will revert to this point later.
The self-manifestation of the spirit is expressed by an old
term, stemming from mythic thinking and, through a long
history, eventually developed into one of the finest intellec-
tual achievements of India. Like "reflection upon oneself" its
expression is a metaphor, but, I think, a much more apposite
one, namely “self-luminous,” in Sanskrit svayam-jyotis or
svayam-prakasa. "Light," "shining" is a self-explanatory and
widely used metaphor to denote all acts and states of con-
sciousness and cognition and perception. “Self-luminosity”
implies both the spirit'S awareness of itself and its capability
of making objects, both material and mental, appear in the
range of consciousness. Here we are considering self-
luminosity primarily from the ontological point of view (its
epistemological relevance, in the Vedantist context, will be
studied later).
CIT AND NOUS 167
Taking up the comparison with Neoplatonism, we find that

the light metaphor does not seem to be restricted there to
states and events in the domain of consciousness or knowl-
edge. The word ἔλλαμπσις, e.g., has in Proclus's Stoicheíosis
always a purely ontological sense. However, there is a philo-
sophical aspect that may be called epistemological ontology.
If viewed from this aspect, a most surprising similarity
between cit or àtam and nous becomes perceptible. All the
characteristics of self-luminosity are ascribed to nous in a
treatise of Plotinus (Enn. V.3.8.18-42), and besides luminosity
"seeing" is also predicated of nous, namely, "seeing," which is
also a characteristic of spirit in Vedàntism and of which I will
treat later.
We must, however, bear in mind that the comparability of
the passage presupposes our detaching it from its context. For
the context is purely Neoplatonic: it speaks of the “Intelli-
gible World" and the relationship of Soul to Spirit—two
themes entirely foreign to Vedàntic thought. Nevertheless, the
similarity is surely significant, and the more so because the
contexts in the two cultures are so different.
I will now translate an excerpt from the relevant passage in
Plotinus, omitting ideas to which nothing corresponds in
Vedantism.
It is Spirit which sees [vous δέ 0pa]....He who

has received the light of the true things sees, as it
were, the visible things in a higher degree. . . . The
life and the activity in Spirit are the Primal Light
which primarily shines for itself and is brilliancy to
itself, illuminating and simultaneously being illumi-
nated, the true spirit-content, cognizing and being
cognized, being seen by [or: for] itself and not
being in need of anything else for seeing, to itself
self-sufficient for seeing—for that which it sees is
itself being Known also from our side through even
that, so that even from our side its knowledge
comes to pass through itself. [Enn. V.3.8.34-44]*
168 PAUL HACKER
Even here, where the similarity is so impressive, the differ-

ences between the Vedäntist and Neoplatonic views must not
be overlooked. The light with which Spirit irradiates Soul has
a content, which is the “light of the true things," ‘That
which is truly spirit—content” (0 ἀληθῶς νοητόν), the Ideal
Forms of the Intelligible World. The thought pattern of spiri-
tual reflexivity, too, so foreign to Vedäntism, is not absent
from our passage. Moreover, the concept of life occurring here
does not have any function in the system of later Vedantism.
Nevertheless, the concept of self-revelation or self-luminosity
is brought out with clarity and hymnic admiration. Parallels
like these should be given due attention in ontologico-
metaphysical as well as in epistemologico-metaphysical specu-
lation.
The Neoplatonist’s view that the intelligible light of nous
has a content, nous containing all Platonic Ideas, makes us
understand why in his mind Spirit’s reflection upon itself is
not an absurdity, for Spirit carries, so to speak, its objects of
knowledge within itself. By the same token, the Indian view
of the contentless plenitude of Spirit (cit, atman) can appear
to be an absurdity or a "*monstrosity" to the Westerner.
The same context also accounts for the difference of mean-
ing when both systems describe the Absolute or the Intelligi-
ble as “simple” (ἁπλοὺς, Stoich., prop. 47; asamhate, passim).
In Neoplatonism this “simplicity”? does not preclude spirit
from being the sum of all Ideal Forms (ὅλος μὲν ὁ νοῦς τὰ
πάντα εἴδη, Enn. V.9.8.4; πᾶς νοῦς πλήρωμα Ov εἰδόν:
Stoicheïosis, prop. 177).
The Indian cit, on the contrary, entirely un-Greek and un-
Western, is simple in the strictest sense of this word; it is
spirituality or intelligence abstracted from all contents or
associates. Obviously the thinkers were aware that this ab-
straction, though of enormous philosophical relevance, was
unknown in everyday life and even in other systems of philos-
ophy. So they saw the need for a new term. In order to
denote what they had discovered, they simply chose the root
of a verb which means “to be conscious of," “to think,"
CIT AND NOUS 169
namely, the verbal root cit (with or without the addition of

an -i). The derivation from this root, citta, on the other hand,
denotes the mind in philosophical and non-philosophical par-
lance.
In proposition 47 of his Stoicheidsis, Proclus speaks of enti-
ties that are "*self-constituted" (aÿ0vrooraror).What is ‘‘self-
constituted," is "simple" and ‘without parts" (ἀμερές); on
the other hand, he states that precisely “all that is capable of
reversion upon itself" (προς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιτρεπτικόν., prop. 42) is
*"self-constituted." Now ‘‘self-constituted”” seems to be exactly
the same as what is called in Sanskrit svatassiddha (substan-
tive: svatassiddhi), 1.e., an entity that constitutes itself by it-
self as existent and manifest, an entity that by itself estab-
lishes its existence and manifestation.
If I am right in explaining that the reality intended by the
term ‘‘reversion upon itself" is the same as what the Indians
mean by svayamprakasata or “‘self-luminosity,” then my equa-
tion of the Greek concept “‘self-constituted” with the Indian
svatassiddha is corroborated, the more so because, first, the
two Greek terms are just as closely linked together as the cor-
responding Indian terms and, secondly, because both the
Neoplatonist and the Vedantist ascribe to the reality in ques-
tion the further characteristics of being “‘without temporal
origin" (adyéverov, Proclus prop. 45), ‘“imperishable”
(ἄφθαρτον, prop. 46), “being without parts" (ἀμερές. prop.
47), and ‘‘perpetual” (८6८7, prop. 48)—corresponding San-
skrit terms, for which a number of synonyms could be substi-
tuted, would be aja, aksaya, akhanda or asamhata, nitya. It
would be pointless to cite occurrences, because examples
abound from the time of the Upanisads, i.e., a time earlier
than 500 B.C., down to the present time, since there are still
adherents of Vedantism.
Let us stop here for a while to survey the results we have
so far arrived at in our comparison. We found two points in
which the two systems seemed irreconcilable: first, the wider
sense of the concept of “simple”? in Neoplatonism as com-
pared with Vedäntism. But we will see presently that on this
170 PAUL HACKER
point the divergent views can be harmonized to some extent

if Vedantist cosmology is taken into consideration. Secondly,
we found the concept of cit, which at first sight seemed abso-
lutely unique. However, we succeeded in discovering the con-
cept of self-luminosity in Plotinus also, and this is a bridge
which makes cit accessible, even though Neoplatonism did not
undertake the rigid abstraction which severs cit from citta. On
two other points both the Greek and the Indian system
seemed to have in view the same reality, though viewing it
from very different angles: ‘‘reversion upon oneself" corres-
ponds to “‘self-luminosity’’; "incorporeity" stands for “‘being
spiritual." In addition, there were four terms which are simply
identical: ‘“‘devoid of origin," “imperishable,” ‘“‘partless,”’
"perpetual."
I think these agreements suffice to show that what the
Neoplatonist aimed at was much the same as the Vedantist
intended to reach: incorporeity as a stage of pure spirit in the
case of the Vedantist; incorporeity as a stage reached through
spirit, but since spirit was not understood here with that
purity with which the Indians conceived it, it was felt ulti-
mately to transcend Spirit in the direction of the One, which
is beyond Spirit (as conceived in Neoplatonism) and beyond
Being.
In order to understand both the similarities and the diver-
gencies of the two systems, it may be useful at this point to
form a clear idea of the different ways in which they con-
ceived of the sphere of supreme realities. In both systems the
supreme reality is described as a triad; but Vedàntism (in that
form which we are considering here, which is also called
Advaitism or spirit-monism) conceives of the triad as a sub-
stantial unity in which each of the three constituents, one of
which is cit or spirit, is an ‘aspect of the unity and in reality
totally identical with it—in fact the Supreme Reality itself,
comprising all the three aspects, can sometimes be called “the
One" (exa). Neoplatonism's triad, on the other hand, is sub-
ordinative, with nous being subordinate to the One, and Soul
to nous.
CIT AND NOUS 171
The Indian triad, however, is similar to one of Proclus’s

triads (see W. Beierwaltes, Proklos (Frankfurt am Main: 1965)
p. 93 ff.). Proclus has οὐσία, (06, νοῦς (being, life, spirit; cf.
Proclus, Stoich., prop. 103); Vedantism has “being,” "spirit,"
and “bliss” (sat-cit-ananda). In this compound cit (spirit)
Occurs as the second member. [n the Greek triad which I just
quoted there is not so much subordination as interpenetra-
tion. “Every element of this triad is all the three, but the
three are in each element as themselves and at the same time
after the manner of that in which they inhere" (Beierwaltes,
op. cit., p. 95). The One as such is absent in this triad, which
in its essence is an explication of the nature of the hypostasis
nous (Beierwaltes, op. cit., p. 97), which as such, of course,
remains subordinate to the One.
One of the consequences of the subordinative structure of
the hypostases in Neoplatonism is the different treatment of
the problem of freedom of the Absolute in the Greek system
as compared with the Indian. In Vedàntism, freedom is repre-
sented as being inseparably linked up with the spiritual nature
of the Absolute. The Absolute is shown to be free in two
senses: in the sense of being independent of other entities
(svatantra) and in the sense of not existing for another's sake
(svartha). While the notion of independence needs no elabora-
tion in Vedàntism? which holds the Universal Spirit to be the
Absolute, the concept of svartha is thoroughly discussed
(Samkara's Upadesasahasri, Gadyaprabandha, Chapter 2).
Neoplatonism ascribes freedom in every sense to the One. Plo-
tinus, at the end of a long treatise “On free will and the
One's will," states that the One alone is really free (μόνον
τοῦτο ἀληθεία ἐλεύθερον, Enn. VI.8.21.31). This seems to be
consistent with the structure of the Neoplatonic system,
which teaches two supreme realities, in succession subordinate
to the One, which is rhe Absolute.
Yet, you may pardon me, I find it hard to reconcile with
my Christian and Indian way of thinking to conceive of a
Supreme that is free without being of the nature of spirit—
this via negationis could perhaps become meaningful only if
172 . PAUL HACKER
complemented by a via eminentiae and by the thought-pattern

of the analogy of being. And I find it questionable that there
should be a subordinate hypostasis which is spiritual in an
absolute sense, i.e., to the extent of being self-effulgent, but
which is lacking in absolute freedom. In an earlier study, I
tried to show even within the domain of Hindu philosophy
that it is an incomplete stage of insight if the inseparability of
spirit and freedom has not been perceived.
A feature strikingly common to the Neoplatonic and the
Advaitic idea of spirit is that both normally conceive of spirit
as universal. This seems to be more or less inevitable, con-
sidering the similarity of starting points of the two systems
and, especially, the still greater similarity of their respective
goals. But I cannot enter here into this phenomenon; it would
amount to something like metaphilosophy or theology. The
individual existence of spirit is of course also envisaged in
both systems. The thought pattern by which Neoplatonism
tries to solve the problem of the relationship between the uni-
versal and the individual spirit may perhaps, briefly and with
some simplification, be described as existence of the higher in
the lower, of the universal in the individual. In India, the vari-
ous schools of Vedantism have proposed different solutions.
The system which I am considering, Advaitic Vedantism,
solves the problem in a way totally different from Neopla-
tonism.
We have reached here a point where the two systems radi-
cally diverge. The relationship between the universal spirit and
the individual, the role of spirit in cosmogony or cosmology,
and man's road to union with the Absolute: these are prob-
lems whose treatment bears only very few similarities in the
two systems; nay, the characteristic disparity of the two cul-
tures becomes strikingly manifest here.
I need not enlarge on the relationship between Spirit and
Soul, first, because my audience is better informed of this
subject than myself and I have no insights to contribute to
the knowledge of Neoplatonism; secondly, because there is
absolutely no analogy in Vedäntic thought to the relevant
CIT AND NOUS 173
Greek doctrine. Simply in order not to leave the doctrine in

question quite unmentioned and to provide a contrast to set
off the Indian doctrines which I am going to delineate, I will
quote Proclus’s brief proposition from the Stoicheiosis (193):
"Every soul takes its proximate origin from spirit" (πᾶσα
WUKN 70006८0५ and νοῦ ὑπεστέκεν), and Plotinus’s brief
remark that soul is the spirit’s outgoing activity (ἐνέργεια €x
αὐτοῦ; Enn. VI.2.22.26; cf. V.1.2.5, otov λόγος 0 Ev 7000004).
In Vedàntism, there is no differentiation between Spirit and
Soul. Both words are indeed used in translations and English-
written expositions, with spirit, however, occurring compara-
tively seldom. But the meaning of the words in such transla-
tions of course always depends on the Indian original they
stand for. In speaking of Vedäntism, please note, I leave out
of account other Indian philosophical systems—‘“‘soul’’ is often
used as a translation of Sanskrit atman, but this word is also,
and mostly, rendered by "the self." I prefer this translation,?
first, because it is strictly literal since àtman also performs the
function of the reflexive pronoun in Sanskrit; secondly,
because the word is excellently suited to express the essential
in man, that without which man is not man; thirdly, because
it is devoid of any preconceived content; fourthly, because in
metaphysics the expression “The Supreme Self" easily offers
itself as a term to denote the Personal Absolute by analogy.
The self or àtman is, as I hinted before, a triune entity, in
the monistic system mostly understood to be the Absolute.
Its constituents or aspects or characteristics, each of which is
the whole, are Existence, Spirit, and Bliss (sat-cit-ananda). |
venture to submit that the similarity between this triad and
the Christian Trinity on the one hand as well as Proclus’s
*Being-Life-Spirit" triad on the other hand is no mere chance
but is grounded in reality, the more so since this triad of Pro-
clus does not so much imply subordination as interpenetra-
tion. The greatest divergence which separates the three triads
is, I think, not the fact that they do not totally coincide at
the conceptual level but that the idea of three Persons with
174 PAUL HACKER
an identical substance is unknown to the Indian and rejected

by the Hellenic philosophers.
The prominent characteristic of the Self is doubtless Spirit.
Samkara, the most renowned teacher of the Advaita-Vedantist
school, treats of the Self almost exclusively as Spirit. The
actionless activity, or rather the nature, of the Spirit is des-
cribed by two metaphors: it “sees” and it "shines" or “‘illu-
minates" (see Samkara's Upadesasahasri, Gadyaprabandha,
Chapter 2). What does it illuminate? First of all, it is impor-
tant to note that, like the sun, it shines even if there is no
object to be illuminated (this is what Deussen called a “‘mon-
strosity," as I have noted before). Shining and seeing is its
nature and not an adventitious event. When there is an object
of its illumination, this object is neither the outward world of
things nor an “‘intelligible universe," a κόσμος νοητός. Vedàn-
tist psychology, in this point similar to that of the Sankhya
system, posits a psychic entity which I prefer to call “Inner
Sense" (others call it “Inner Organ"). It consists of subtle,
imperceptible matter. Through the mediation of the senses, it
receives impressions—in the literal sense of imprints—from
what the Neoplatonists call *the Sensible World," κοσμος
ἀισθετός: besides this Inner Sense is also the agent or subject
or substratum of thinking, and in perception as well as in
thinking it takes the form of fluctuations or modifications of
the subtle matter that makes up its substance."
According to Advaitic Vedantism, even these processes are
raised to the level of consciousness only by the Spirit's ‘‘see-
ing" and "illuminating" them. There is no trace of a border-
line, like the one which Neoplatonism draws, between the
"sensible" and the “‘intelligible’? world, and the Vedantist’s
estimation of the sensible world and of pure thought is almost
the reverse of the value-system of all Platonism. Pure thought
is always suspect of being mere fancy.
But I said, "almost" the reverse, because Vedantism, far
from being a pedestrian matter-of-fact philosophy, has devel-
oped such a pure and sublime concept of Spirit as no other
philosophy, be it in India or in the West, has ever succeeded
CIT AND NOUS 175
in discovering. I think it was an enormous achievement to

abstract Spirit not only from its contents but also from those
elements that seem inseparably linked up with it to form the
Ego or the Subject of Knowledge. I may note here in passing
that what Platonism intends to express by the conception of
the “intelligible world," emerges in Vedantism also, but at
quite a different level. For the time being, I think it in place
to try to explain how Advaitic Vedäntism, with its higher
evaluation of direct perception (which it shares with all Indian
systems of thought), could nevertheless attribute such an ele-
vated rank to Spirit.
The argumentation which establishes this rank presupposes
a highly developed awareness of the subject-object relation-
ship. Its starting point is the axiom that the knowledge of a
thing is dependent on the object, i.e., on the object being
there, not on any activity of the knower. This statement is
directed against the view predominant among earlier Vedàn-
tists who sought to attain to union with the Absolute or the
Supreme by different kinds of activity, namely by strict
morality, asceticism and meditation (which is a mental
action). Samkara appreciated all these activities without re-
Straint, but he denied that they could bring about realization
of the Absolute. He contended that this goal implied, or con-
sisted in, Knowledge of the Supreme; knowledge, however, can
never be reached by any activity, mental or bodily. The thing
sought to be known must become manifest: this is the only
practicable method, or rather, there is no method, but knowl-
edge must emerge of itself. Now the Absolute, in this context
called Brahman, is certainly not an object like a thing or even
an idea or a complex of ideas. Rather, it is the knower's own
self.
Here the spirit-monism of the system comes up. A man's
self, whose nature is pure spirit, is of course better known to
him than any object, though this knowledge has not the form
ofa subject-object relationship. Consequently the Absolute is
in reality that which is best known to everyone, because it is
identical with everyone's own self.
176 PAUL HACKER
But why are people not actually aware of it? Here the illu-
sionism of Advaitic Vedantism is introduced. If the Brahman
is, as the system teaches, identical with each man’s self, with-
out man’s being conscious of it, this is the effect of Nescience
(avidya), the Vedantist replies.
Nescience or ignorance is a notion that occurs in all sys-
tems of Hinduism, Buddism, and Jainism. All these systems
intend to show to man the road to everlasting release—release
from the body, with a positive content differently conceived
of in the several systems, and the road to release consists in,
or includes, right knowledge. To some extent, the notion is
known to Hellenic philosophy also. Even Plotinus can occa-
sionally mention ignorance (ἀγνοεῖν, ἄγνοια; Enn. V.1.1) as
one (not the only) cause entering this world.? Advaitic
Vedantism, however, has, in the course of many centuries,
bestowed a tremendous amount of ingenuity on constructing
arguments and theories to demonstrate what nescience is.
As regards Vedantism [ do not hesitate to state that in my
opinion in all the huge literature on nescience and maya (the
Power of Illusion, more or less identical with nescience) I
find, if not absolutely nothing, at any rate very little that is
of philosophical relevance. I will not expatiate on this subject
but mention only so much as seems to be indispensable for
explaining the Vedäntist concept of spirit. The doctrine of
nescience and maya, as well as the monism of the system,
seem to have been the price the Vedantists had to pay in
order to elaborate their doctrine of pure Spirit. I may note in
passing that this price need not be paid, and the truth of the
Vedantist concept of Spirit, if differentiated into individual
Spirit and Supreme Spirit or God, can very well be upheld if,
instead of monism and illusionism, the thought pattern of the
analogy of being is made use of. But I cannot enlarge on this
theme here. I may only note that this is, of course, another
concept of analogy than that which occurs in Proclus and is
referred to by Professor Beierwaltes in his book on Proklos
(pp. 73 ff.). I have now to treat of the doctrine of monism in
so far as it is necessary to understand the Vedantist concept
CIT AND NOUS 177
of spirit, and of the theory of nescience or maya in so far as

it is ancillary to that concept.
To begin with monism, it is largely based on tradition
though there were very different kinds of monism in the
course of time. The system I am treating advocates radical
Spirit-monism. The only rational proof the great Samkara has
given for this theory includes a fallacy. Since in all acts of
consciousness, no matter at what time, in what place, and in
what person they occur, the quality or essence of conscious-
ness is the same, Samkara concludes that all acts of conscious-
ness are also identical in existence (see his Upadesasahasri,
Gadyaprabandha, Chapter 2). By the way, here we see the
value of the medieval distinction between ‘“‘to be (there)" and
*to be thus," or between existence and essence.
As regards nescience or maya (we may skip here the differ-
ences established by some thinkers between the two words), it
is, according to a later, but very common explanation (so that
quotations are unnecessary) an inexplicable entity whose sta-
tus of being can be described neither as existent nor as non-
existent. So far, I am ready to concede a certain philosophical
relevance to the doctrine, for, from the metaphysical point of
view, it is meaningful to distinguish degrees of reality. But
later Vedàntism (Samkara had not yet foreseen all conse-
quences to which the ideas of his system tended) explained
the whole world, all matter, manifoldness, time, space and
even all psychic events, as products of maya, which was des-
cribed as their material cause and as being, like their cause,
neither existent nor non-existent. Maya has two powers, one
veiling and one dispersing. It veils the nature of the Universal
Spirit, and it creates the illusion of a manifold world in space
and time, material and psychic. This is how Vedantism tries
to solve the problem of individualization: it is simply an
effect of maya.
Most remarkable in our context is the fact that even the
Supreme God—called {$vara, “the Lord", for India has devel-
oped different forms of quasi-monotheism, coexisting at a
higher level with the traditional polytheism and in individual
178 PAUL HACKER
cases ousting it more or less—even the Supreme God is asso-

ciated with maya: only in combination with this Power of
Illusion is God the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the
world. I mention this chiefly for one reason. For here we find
a striking analogy to the “intelligible world" of Platonic ideas.
Maya is also called Potency (sakti, St. Thomas’s active poten-
tia)? and this makes creation possible. And, what is most
astonishing, before creation all things exist as objects of the
Highest God's contemplation, 1.e., his ideas (see Samkara,
Brahmasutrabhasya 1.1.5). Surely God is by nature Spirit,
even in his association with maya, but this association makes
an equation with pre-Christian or Christian Neoplatonic ideas
impossible or at least requires adjustment. Nevertheless, there
is a striking similarity in so far as the Vedantist teaches that
things preexist as God’s ideas.
A similar association with maya (in this context preferably
called nescience) occurs in the individual. The most refined
product of nescience is the Inner Sense (designated by bud-
dhi, citta, and other words). Now the close association of
Spirit (cit) and Inner Sense (buddhi) makes up what may be
called the Ego (ahamkartr in Sarnkara’s terminology) or the
Subject of Knowledge. Release presupposes the extremely
difficult mental severance of the spirit from its associate, 1.e.,
the very Ego has to be as it were, dissected. Only then, the
system teaches, can pure Spirit shine forth.
I must now come to a conclusion. In spite of the enormous
disparity of the two cultures we found in the two systems an
impressive number of terms that are partly almost literally
translatable, partly interpretable as different ways of pointing
to the same intended reality. Historical influences from either
side are quite improbable.
In two cases we found remarkable doctrines each of which
is fully elaborated and cleansed from unnecessary associations
in one of the two systems only. The first of these doctrines is
the Platonic concept of Idea, which Neoplatonism has incor-
porated into nous, thus preparing the way for classical Chris-
tian cosmology. If theistic metaphysics is to survive, if the
CIT AND NOUS 179
doctrine of God is not to degenerate into an ideology ancil-

lary to anthropology, it is indispensable that we should up-
hold this heritage of Platonism and Neoplatonism. In monistic
Vedantism, monism, with its corollary, illusionism, made it
indeed hard to explain the origin of the perishable world from
the Absolute; all the more notable is the fact that even in this
system there emerges an adumbration of Platonic Ideas.
As regards the doctrine of Pure Spirit in Vedäntism, it is
certainly one of the greatest achievements of philosophy. It is
not logically necessary to associate it with monism and illu-
sionism. Sarnkara himself has shown this, in demonstrating, in
a passage of his great commentary on the Brahdaranyako-
panisad (4.3.7),? how Pure Spirit is the principle of unity
that makes not only all mental and sensory acts possible, but
whose light binds even vegetative processes, together with the
consciousness-events, into the psycho-physical unity that is
man. Samkara seems here—whether deliberately or not, we
cannot know—to have kept in suspense his monism and illu-
sion. It is deplorable that this fragment of a great spirit-
oriented anthropology was never elaborated. Nevertheless, it
could help us, just with its irrefutable concept of pure spirit,
to defy that materialism which nowadays has almost every-
where discarded the traditional notion of soul.
In these two, and probably even in more respects, the
study of Vedantism. and Neoplatonism, and even more the
comparison of the two systems (as well as the comparison of
classical Indian with classical Western systems of philosophy)
seems to be of great relevance to our time, provided we recog-
nize the value of great tradition in general and metaphysics in
particular.
NOTES
l. Armstrong, in his book The Architecture of the Intelligible Uni-

verse (Cambridge, 1940), p. 49 f., lists no less than six "aspects" of
nous.
180 PAUL HACKER
But cf. also Aristotle, de Anima, 430a3.

Cf. also Liber de causis, prop. 15, with St. Thomas’ comm. lect.
15.
ὁ δ᾽ ékewo TO φῶς τῶν ἀληθῶν λαβῶν otov βλέπει μᾶλλον Ta
ὁρατά... Ἢ δέ ἐν τῷ vo ζωὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια, τὸ πρῶτον φῶς
ἑαυτῶ λάμπον πρώτως καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸ λαμπηδῶν, λάμπον ὁμοῦ καὶ
λαμπόμενον, τὸ ἀληθῶς νοητόν, καὶ VOOUV καὶ νοούμενον, καὶ ἑαυτῷ
ὁρώμενον καὶ οὐ δεόμενον ἄλλου, ἵνα ἵδη, αὑτῷ αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ
ἰδεῖν. καὶ γὰρ 0 Opa αὐτό ἐστι" γιγνωσκόμενον καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν
αὐτῷ ἐκείνω, ὡς καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ 6८ αὐτοῦ
γίγνεσθαι" (Enn. V.3.8.34-44]
Samkara, in his Brahmasütrabhàsya, in most of the occurrences of
svatantra, denies that anything but Spirit can be independent; a
passage where svatantra is directly and positively connected with
atman (which is spirit), is to be found, e.g., at Brahmasutrabhasya
2.3.36, in the end.
The concept of ‘‘real self" is not foreign to Neoplatonism; cf. W.
Beierwaltes and H. U. V. Balthasar, Grundfragen der Myshik (Ein-
siedeln, 1974), p. 13, n. 2.
Here the νοοῦν and the νοούμενον are identical, in spite of Aristotle
(de Anima, 430a3), though the objects can be material and the
Inner Sense in any case consists of (subtle) matter.
Proclus teaches that the philosopher's ascent to the One includes
cleansing from ignorance; cf. Beierwaltes, Proklos, p. 285. What has
been constructed in Advaitic Vedäntism is a frightful fortification
to defend the central mystery of spirit-monism, namely, the doc-
trine that the world is an illusion, neither being nor nonbeing. This
idea looms up, occasionally and in quite a rudimentary form, in
Plotinus also: he can call matter, though in an optativus potentialis
and in a certain respect only, *nonbeing," μὲ Ov (Enn., II.5.4.11).
Dynamis in an active sense occurs in Plotinus, Enn., [1 .8.10.1.
Cf. my paper “A Note on Sarmkara's Conception of Man," pub-
lished in German Scholars on India, Contributions to Indian Stu-
dies, ed. the Cultural Department of the Embassy of the Federal
Republic of Germany, New Delhi, Vol. I (Varanasi: The Chow-
khamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1973), pp. 99 ff., and my articles
(in German and Italian) mentioned in the footnotes of the above-
mentioned paper.
Matter in
Plotinus and
Samkara
Francisco Garcia Bazan
University of Salvador
Buenos Aires, Argentina
In the first two parts of this tripartite essay we shall deal

with the notion of matter in the works of Plotinus and Sarn-
kara respectively. The third part considers the parallels and
analogies which may be established between them.
I. Plotinus!
The Plotinian Notion of Matter
The notion of matter is considered in Enneads II.4.12. It is

not surprising that the notion of matter is treated as a singu-
lar notion, even though the formal object of investigation is
revealed as having two distinct natures. In the beginning of
the treatise, as in many other places in the Enneads, matter is
characterized as ''substratum" or “receptacle.” Matter in the
spiritual and sensible world fulfils the same function, namely
Translated from the Spanish by Woodrow W. Moore, Department of

Foreign Languages and Literature, Old Dominion University, Norfolk,
Virginia.
181
182 FRANCISCO GARCIA BAZAN
as the receptacle of forms, thus permitting the generation of

beings. In the Platonic tradition, Plotinus maintains that mat-
ter must be present both in the realm of spirit and in the
sensible world.
Plotinus investigates the question of what is underlying,
how does it receive in itself that which 15 alien to it, as well
as the quality of that which it receives both in spiritual and
sensible compounds. Thus Plotinus examines two notions of
matter—the spiritual (chaps. 3-5, fundamentally) and the sensi-
ble (chaps. 6-16).
In the examination of spiritual matter three aspects are
raised: first, the possibility of the existence of spiritual mat-
ter; second, its definition; and third, its mode of existence.
Spiritual matter is ‘indefinite’ and ‘lacks form’. Spiritual
beings have a composite character, just as corporeal com-
pounds. The contrast is that spiritual beings are non-spatial
and non-temporal as well as unchangeable, while corporeal
ones are spatial, temporal and mutable. Thus spiritual matter
always possesses and complements the same form, has form
eternally, and is eternally defined?
Spiritual beings, or ideas, exist and are multiple. Each one
has form which particularizes it, and each has something in
common, a substratum. Thus is the diversity and unity of
Spirit accounted for. Spirit is one, in the sense of the recepta-
cle, but multiple in the totality of its beings.
What, then, is spiritual matter? It is the capacity of recep-
tion of spiritual characteristics. And what is Spirit as form or
informer? The determination, the characterizing force. At
their confluence the potencies of donation and reception
constitute Spirit. The donating potency defines, while the
receiver allows itself to be defined: thus the first has the
capacity of multiplication, the second permits the act of
multiplication. Spirit is a multiple unity. As a pure aspiration
to existence, knowledge and beauty it has allowed the birth
of beings, real and beautiful.
The tangible universe, plentiful in its concrete multiplicity,
is an image of the spiritual universe. Thus distinction and
MATTER IN PLOTINUS AND SAMKARA 183
multiplicity must also be present in the spiritual domain, and

so the manner of division must transcend space and time. In
the spiritual also there must be as residue the amorphous or
undefined upon which distinction is based.?
The fact that spiritual matter has the forms eternally and
fully does not preclude the spirit from being a compound.
Just as sensible bodies always reveal themselves to the intel-
lect as informed, having an informing principle and a matter
which is informed, so spiritual being also has a depth
(bathos), like a darkness, upon which the light from logos is
projected.* It would be wrong to believe in the simplicity of
spiritual beings just because in them form and matter are
always united, for after all, the same holds true for sensible
bodies. In the former the unity may be more perfect since it
is eternal it is nonetheless a dual unity.
When spiritual matter is informed, it is a total or true life;
when the same occurs with sensible matter, “information” is
identical, but the resultant is like an *adorned cadaver," a
reflection of spiritual life. Spiritual matter is truly a sub-
stance, because in the realm of Spirit, since everything truly
exists, everything underlying the spiritual compounds is also
illuminated reality.
The origin of spiritual matter can only be examined in light
of the awareness of the eternal nature of Spirit. Spiritual mat-
ter must be engendered, because it has a principle: the One;
but it must also be unengendered because it is beyond time
and always exists. Why is the Spiritual realm both dependent
and eternal? The fifth chapter provides the most acute an-
swer. The Spirit, in order to exist as Spirit must reveal in
itself a presence of a contrast to the limpidity of The One. If
the Spirit exists it must proceed from the One but is a
composite of form and matter in contrast to the simplicity of
the One.
Matter is also related to Otherness. What must have pre-
ceded perfect spiritual existence for it to exist as it does?
Something other than the One, which while wishing to be
other than It, also wishes to be like It. Otherness, then, is
epinoetically movement, having the character of the undefined

(seeking determination by the One). In that sense Otherness is
the character of spiritual matter. Both Otherness and spiritual
matter as such can be thought of (no doubt abstractly) as
"evil," since, as undetermined, they have not yet attained
their part of the Good.
Matter also has been associated with 'audacity', the centri-
fugal coexistent with the aspiration for determination. In this
way it makes sense to speak of Otherness as the principle
which makes the existence of matter possible, giving rise to
the composite.
Thus, matter as substratum is not more than undefined and
ambivalent aspiration, the other than the Good, which neces-
sarily occurs in beings as defined, shaped and illuminated.
Plotinus has taken the supreme categories of the Sophist
and paraphrased them, showing the component elements of
Spirit, thanks to which the sensible world will account for its
image.’
We
then proceed to the examination of the nature of sensi-
ble matter presented as the receptacle or substratum of
bodies. In chapters 6 to 15 Plotinus distinguishes his own
views from those of others (matter as mass, quality, quantity,
mere logical negation, etc.), which, he claims, confuse the true
material nature. In the last chapter he examines in detail
what sensible matter is, namely that part of otherness which
opposes the forming principles, the /ogoi. It has its own reali-
ty which is not annihilated by the /ogoi coming upon it, but
which permits their actualization, thereby revealing itself with
greater clarity as matter—just as a woman makes her femini-
nity more obvious by pregnancy, or earth displaying its fecun-
dity after being seeded. |
Accordingly, matter is analysed as ‘“‘otherness,” always in
need, properly what is evil, ugly, weak and false.
Plotinus's later views on matter will be further discussed,?
but these views, completed in 260-261 A.D., constitute the
basis of his thought.!?
Later he ratifies, and occasionally strengthens his analysis.!!
Matter, clearly, fulfils its fundamental function of compo-

nent and correlation necessary to the second and third hypos-
tases.
The clearest synthesis of Plotinian thought we have is the
"Great Tetralogy” (Enneads [1.8 .30, V.8.31, V.8.32, bellig-
erently ratified in the fourth, II.9.33, the famous ‘“‘Against
Gnostics"). The main aim of the first of these, "Concerning
Contemplation,” is to show how the third hypostasis is gene-
rated. What is of specific relevance here is the description of
the ontological condition of the sensible world, and its pro-
duction. It is the consequence of contemplation by the Spirit
resulting in wisdom pervading even the humblest corners of
the cosmos.
From Ennead [1.8.11 we learn (a) that the Spirit is vision,
and therefore, a realized potency, and as such, composite; (b)
the determinative aspect of the Spirit is a reflection of the
One; but, though the One needs nothing the Spirit is in need,
because it contains an otherness from the One, making it
different;? and (c) in spite of the presence of matter in
Spirit, and, in a way, because of it, Spirit desires the One and
moves toward It. But this desire is adequately fulfilled, lead-
ing to the eternal harmony of form and matter in Spirit. In
Spirit there is neither change nor search for new forms. It has
all of them, and its aspiration is firm and constant for the
truly real, and hence also beautiful.
This is explored in Ennead V.8 in which beauty is shown
to be none other than the perfect adequacy between form
and matter. Thus Beauty itself is rooted in Spirit, and
therefore one can develop a hierarchy of beauty from artistic
or artificial, to sensible or natural, to inner or psychic beauty,
finally to Spiritual beauty, or beauty itself.!^
An analysis of the relationship between spiritual and sensi-
ble beauty follows. After the discussion of Spirit as Being and
Beauty Plotinus examines Spirit as truth and knowledge. The
perfect unity of the knowledge and the known is achieved in
Spirit which always possesses it as its own self-contemplative
reality. It is this knowledge which defines it. Here again the
familiar motif of the matter and form of Spirit, this time in

its gnoseological aspect is described—as what knows and what
is known.
After that follow ontological, aesthetic and gnoseological
analyses of how the sensible cosmos is related to its Spiritual
model, Being, Beauty and Truth. These, then, are shown to
depend on what transcends Being (as well as non-being),
which makes Spirit possible, and which reigns over Spirit.
In several passages of Enneads II.9 Plotinus rejects Gnostic
theories of matter.!* In the Plotinian view sensible matter is
not substantial, nor independent, nor responsible for a uni-
verse alien to the Spirit. Matter is also presented as the origin
of human wickedness, the “other” to being and form. Inas-
much as evil does not occur in the hypostases, it is sensible
matter only which is so charged, functioning in the world of
change, in an ethical plane, affecting the behaviour of man.!?
The condition of human wickedness is exactly its own consti-
tution, in which the evil inheres in the sensible matter. Hence
the call to purification, using the language of ‘‘escape from
the body.’’!8
It is thus demonstrable that every ascending wish as well as
all descending biases have their origin and explanation in mat-
ter, which is an aspect of every composition. But as to the
origin of matter, a mystery remains: matter is simply a datum
drawn from experience, refusing every rational questioning
concerning its own provenance.
The Ontological Image and the Theory of Causality According

to Plotinus
In Enneads III.6 Plotinus addresses the apathy of matter,

revealing his profound comprehension of it. Two ideas stand
out, which will facilitate the comparison with Sarnkara:
(1) Matter as receptacle or substratum, making possible the

concept of image; and
(2) The nature of the intimate constitution of the image—

participation.
While in this text, because of its relation to the soul, the

emphasis is placed on the sensible world, but as that is a copy
of the spiritual, what is said of it will apply analogically to
the latter.
The material receptacle reflects what is presented to it as
does the surface of a mirror. That is, without undergoing any
change of its own constitution it generates, or permits the
birth of reflection. In this way it is the necessary ingredient
of each being. Without matter the One will maintain itself
eternally in its silent non-Being; hence even that which is
without foundation, the /7-SELF by its own ineffable intrin-
sic potence is reflected, and the reflection, the weakening of
the potence is inconceivable without that ground which
permits reflection. There are, then, in Plotinus, two clear,
antithetical concepts of potence; one out of excess, and the
other, out of defect. It is the conjugated unity of both, and
the distinction, which allows their being grasped as the con-
juncture of three hypostases and of the world. It is the
conception of mixed beings which stimulated the precise and
daring expressions used by Plotinus in such places as Enneads
III.6.7.21-43.!? The metaphysical reality of sensible beings is
that they are images, reflections, figures outlined on a
medium always firm in its fallacious nature, and which, for
that reason, can create the illusion that the reflection is the
reflected object. Actually it is but a deceit: the image is not
the truth, the truth is the model that is reflected. Therefore,
Strictly speaking, the sensible being is not authentic reality,
but reality is the determining factor of its projection. We may
keep on with an identical reasoning, and apply our logical
attention no longer to the sensible world, but to the spiritual
universe. We shall prove that the latter encounters in itself the
same relation of image with respect to the first hypostasis
since it deals with the first circumscription, reflection, or
irradiation. From this new perspective, the One, the ulti-

mately unfounded, is beyond the being, the knowledge and
the beauty, or if one wishes to say, non-Being, non-
Knowledge and non-Beauty, because it is the inexhaustible
Principle, the authentic Reality. Thus the Spirit in relation to
It, happens to be as unreal—because of its imaginary nature—
as the sensible universe is with respect to the κοόμοσ νοετικός
(kosmos noetikos). This explains how Plotinus, when referring
to the last aspect of his concept, could have written such
phrases as: “1 must be unique," “‘it is Alone," *to become to
be Alone," **The One is all and it is nothing," etc.??
But, out of logical necessity, the receptacle, the weak
component of the image, moves towards the ultimate meaning
of the compound constitution. The compound is an image;
consequently, from its ontological perspective, the compound
hurls itself towards the cause of its existence, which is sim-
pler. The ontological image is nothing but the mere undula-
tion on the water surface, the image in the mirror, in water or
in the shadow, as the Master himself says. Then, what is the
image? Mere reflection. In what consists its entitative actua-
lity? Simply in reflecting something that is assumed stable and
original. Consequently, even with greater profundity, the
entitative actuality of the image consists in its participating
nature in the model; that improper and ephemeral quality
that has given it the power to reflect. Then we see that the
image as a conjugation of possibilities is properly image and
likeness; image, because of what it appears to be, and likeness
because of what permits it to have the appearance of the lat-
ter, or that being. Image, then, is a luminous reflection, which
nostalgically recalls as its resemblance, its original.?! Who can
doubt, then, that ‘‘only likeness can know likeness,"?? that
matter does not have to be locally separated from form, and
that other assertion— which is a paradox—that Soul never
completely sinks in matter???
The Plotinian theory of participation is another described
aspect of the ontological theory of the image. And the two
conceptions shed light on the other important point of our
writing, its peculiar theory of causality. These together show

us the brilliant manner in which Plotinus was capable of solv-
ving the old philosophical problem of the coexistence of the
One and of the multiple.
The following quotation from Plotinus supports the inter-
pretation of Enneads III.6.7 and permits us to understand
with greater clarity the structure of the ontological image and
the elements it presumes: "The painted portrait is not pre-
cisely the production of the reflection and the image, as
happens with waters, mirrors and shadows” (Enneads VI.4.
10.11-13).?^
Any one of the examples cited is sufficiently illustrative in
itself to illuminate the constitution of the image and to reveal
also that its relation to the model is something necessary and
intrinsic to the nature of the image. But because of a new
reflection on the structure of the ontological image, it is
possible to discover also that upon this conception rides the
Plotinian theory of causality. The model/image duality is the
concise synthesis of his deepest comprehension arising from
the experience of the mystic, as the more refined way to
apprehend reality.??
The model, as it can be considered, is the case of a man and
his specular image. He engenders or originates the reflection,
but in no way is it proper to say that the image in the mirror
forms part of the subject. He produces the image and because
of him, it has an existence and reality, but he is not reflec-
tion; not contained in it. Using other vocabulary, the cause
produces the effect. However, the effect, insofar as the cause
is a totally different reality, is not in the cause. The cause
produces the effect, but in reality the effect does not exist,
autonomously; what truly exists is that on which it depends,
the cause. What most truly exists is the uncaused Cause. This
has been stated by Plotinus on many occasions:
That which is spiritualized (τό voerov) remains in

itself and does not have need of anything....
[Enneads V.4[712.14-15]
Because being the nature of the One is the genera-

trix of all things, it is none of these. [Enneads
VI.918]3.39-40|
The One is not in its products, because it is prior to

them. [Enneads 5.36-37|
Consequently, what is Cause of all things is nothing

from amongst them. [Enneads 6.55]
Because the One is none of these things since every-

thing comes from It, because It is not contained in
any form; yes, the One is alone. [Enneads
V.1[10] 7.2021]
Or, if one wishes, in general:
The One is all and is nothing, for as the Principle of

all things, it is not all, but it is because, so to speak,
all returns there; better still, they are not, but they
shall be. ... What is engendered [=the Spirit] turns
toward IT.... And what the Spirit produces is its
image...the Soul, which engenders an image of
itself. ... [Enneads V.2[11]1 ff.]
In this manner we form a notion of procession as a vital

line made up of a discrete projection of points each of which
is the image of the preceding, yet different from it. The origi-
nary, the One, for that reason, is all, and yet none of the rest.
These latter, the effects, are thus produced by the cause, but
are in contrast with its reality, are relatively unreal. It is this
mystical consciousness of the degrees of reality that consti-
tutes the idea of procession from higher to lower planes of
being. In the ascent back there is the vital experience of
rupture among the diverse levels. Return to the eternally real
is not a metaphor. It is to return to the original from the
image, to what truly is and never ceases to be. In contrast
with the sensible, the One is the No-thingness, the alien whose
stable or ephemeral appearances occur—thanks to matter—in

the reflections of Spirit and the world; it is the mystery of
the image; the One of essential causality; the One of the parti-
cipation in the dream of No-thingness that is our lot to live.
II. Sarhkara
The Samkarian Notion of Matter
We will deal now with the master, Samkara, the Indian

philosopher of the eighth century, who ranks with Ramanuja
as the best qualified interpreter of the Vedänta.? He is an
exegete of the Vedanta or the darshana which places special
emphasis on the reflection concerning the ultimate meaning of
reality or the Brahman. He is a thinker who, as a philosopher,
belongs to the highest order, that of a metaphysician. He
renders his doctrine in the form of a commentary on the
traditional and sacred texts of Hinduism. Thus, his most out-
standing works, and also the most extensive, are the interpre-
tations he has written of ten Upanisads, the Commentary to
the Bhagavadgita and, above all, the Commentary to | Badara-
yana's] Brahma-Sutra. He opposed the interpretations of the
followers of the Sànkhya, the Nyàya-Vai$esika schools, and
some Buddhist schools, pointing out that the aphorisms of
Badarayana not only synthesize the Vedanta doctrine, but, at
the same time—under the Advaita form of non-duality—
constitute the most appropriate manner of conceiving the
traditional teaching of the Vedas.?" Sarhkara has also written
a few minor works, but due to the fact that for the Indian
author we lack chronological knowledge as definite as that
which corresponds to Plotinus, and owing to the fact that not
all the works attributed to him are his writing, we will con-
sider the Commentary to the Brahma-Sütra as the basis of our
exposition. ??
Sarnkara does not have the same propensity as Plotinus for
analysis and discursive exposition. By this, we do not mean to
say that Sarnkara is not analytical in his expositions, since he

examines numerous topics carefully and justifies them with
formidable scriptural erudition. Sarnkara is more of a com-
mentator on the sacred texts than he is a philosopher lectur-
ing before a class. Sarnkara and Plotinus have a comparable
understanding of reality and a similar speculative capacity.
However the impulse of the mystical or ultimate experience
exerts a greater influence on the expositions of Sarhkara.
Therefore we observe in Sarhkara a prevalence of synthesis
which proves detrimental to the analysis. Obviously the west-
ern interpreter misses in Sarnkara these analytical develop-
ments that could be so useful to him for confirming his
exegesis.29
What does the Advaita Vedanta (non-dualism) mean to
Samkara? It means the interpretation of the Brahman as that
which transcends duality and its affirmation as the sole reality
that rises unchangeable before all that exists, or is said to
exist. Evidently, what has been expressed neither rejects
analysis, nor is it proclaimed as a merely dogmatic formula.
Quite the contrary, it is the result of a fundamental experi-
ence, and therefore, has the capacity of being accounted for.
The final part of a brief text by Sarnkara, the Pancikara-
nam, provides us with a good synthesis of its general perspec-
tive:
Now, A, the state of vigil must turn into U, the

state of sleep; U turns into M, the state of deep
sleep. Afterwards, M must fuse into OM, and OM
into the Self. I am the Atman, the inner witness,
the Absolute, who has the nature of pure con-
science. 1 am neither ignorance nor its effects. 1 am
the only Braham, eternal, pure, omniscient, eter-
nally free and real. I am absolute happiness the One
second to none and the inner Conscience. | am
Brahman himself. Remaining in this state of abso-
lute identification is what is called the perfect state
of concentration.°°
Here we find summed up what is provided us in the

Commentary to the Brahma-Sutra as to what the Sarhkarian
doctrine is in essence. At the pinnacle of all reality we find
the supreme Brahman. This first and only reality is beyond
every attribute and qualification; and this is so for the simple
fact that it deals with the support of all and is that which
nothing supports. It is what is devoid of foundation, and for
that reason is the authentic foundation.?! As one might say
technically, it is 'ísatcitananda," that is to say, pure being,
consciousness and happiness.?? It is the synthesis of the trans-
cendentals to which a corrector epithet is applied to make the
unseen one observable, so that, in reality, we are at a point
which is truly more than the simultaneous existence of the
being of truth and beauty. We are above them.?? And pre-
cisely in this case—the experience of reality—it is the language
that betrays it, because the language, although it be in its
most exact form—that produced through metaphysical specu-
lation—has as the basis of its expression the enunciated. The
latter is necessarily analytical in nature, and is enunciated on
the basis of attribution, and all attribution that is assigned to
what primarily rejects it is falsehood. False attribution, the
adhyäsa, is the incorrect application of the attributes (and
what greater mistake than applying them to what by essence
rejects them!) and is the foundation of every mistake. Be on
the alert then, with language, when what we want in reality is
to shelter ourselves in Silence!?^ The latter here referred to is
the plane of true knowledge, the point of view of paràmar-
thika.?5 The normal man is not at such heights, but rather,
he loves, suffers, strives, knows a few things, ignores many
other things, etc., and moreover, he firmly believes that all
these acts and the objects that originate from them have the
most solid reality. In the final analysis—man focuses on his
existence not as a silence, but as a language, in the bosom of
a multiplicity that subjugates him. For that reason, he adopts
error as truth. He contemplates it not from a perspective of
true knowledge, but from a vyavahariki viewpoint.?? For
example, man will give full reality to the objects he experi-

ments with and uses. He will take the cosmos as a unity in its
true self. He will accept his internal order as another truth,
and even with a religious sensibility, he will attribute to it a
governor and creator in which he will discover the most sub-
lime attributes. In all these cases, the common man and the
believing man will be under the shadow of error and will be
taking for reality what is not. Rather, they are merely its
shadows, the diversity which the unique and undivided pro-
jects as the presence of nàmarüpa, names and forms.?" But
how can this be? Why, when the depth of man, when the
Atman, free of veils, re-encounters the Brahman, when the
realization of the ONE-SELF is fulfilled and the sole truth
that explains its fulfillment (“Thou art That’’), the pure light
shines, yet the subject moves from illusion to illusion?*# Only
the maya is ultimately responsible for this situation. But maya
(a word that is repeated so much by Sarnkara) is an elusive
notion, many times thought to have been trapped, but which
indeed, still escapes.3?
There is in fact, a maya avyakta, but also maya vyakta;
there is a maya that is ajnana, but also there is another that is
the “‘divine power.” There also are the powers assigned to it,
the viksepa-sakti and the àvrti-Sakti, and the “mystery. of
maya.” How can one introduce a logical order in such a
varied vocabulary?५०
Let’s see. Already in the beginning of the Commentary to
the Brahma-Sutra, the Brahman is introduced to us as the
Principle, the Something from which the universe proceeds.
The Brahman is the omnipotent and omniscient one from
which all things come forth, and to which all things return.
We find here the affirmation of a subordination between what
is divine and what is worldly, as well as the acceptance of a
difference and opposition between the Brahman and all the
rest.?! Consequently, two levels are presented to us. (1) The
Brahman is the Principle, that is to say, he is as much the
efficient cause as he is the material cause of all beings.*? As a
result, the Brahman does not produce the form in the way a
potter does, for he has to make use of a pre-existent material

and apply his knowledge to it. Brahman generates sponta-
neously—just as a spider sends forth its web, just as light
sends forth its splendor, just as fire sends forth sparks.?^? In
brief, the Brahman radiates to all that is subordinated to him.
Transcending Wisdom emits its rays everywhere. (2) The
production of the Brahman recognizes two fundamental
phases: the unmanifested state (avyakta) and the manifested
(vyakta). The first stage is considered as the stage causing the
second one, as its possibility.^^ In turn, the state of manifes-
tation shows two aspects: the internal aspect of ordination
and direction (mama) and the external aspect of materialized
and ordered realities (rüpa).^^
In order to interpret Sarhkara's cosmological levels in this
manner we must emphasize that the Indian scholar under-
stands the moments of inferior reality as simultaneous planes
of ontological subordination, rather than as principles fol-
lowed by a posterior evolutive development. What is not
manifested is the principle of manifestation. As its productive
power it repels and attracts, and in the universal dissolution,
in the pralàya, that relation of inseparable and permanent
subordination between the orders is shown.
Something similar occurs in the case of the concrete indi-
vidual between deep sleep and his different states of oneiric
sleep and vigilance. When the subject sleeps deeply, there is a
possibility of the other two states. Deep sleep is the origin
and source because of its own indifferentiation, not as germi-
nal virtuality.*°
Everything proceeds from the Brahman. What, then, is the
product in respect to the producer? Well, its specification or
determination, which manifests it in diverse degrees, although
inadequately, at the same time that it manifests, hides it
because it reveals it as what it is not. We find in language a
correspondence to this same debilitated ontological reality,
since judgement, the basis of all discourse, is in essence ad ya-
Sic; it cannot be utilized without employing attribution,
consequently without attributing division to what is undi-

vided.
The product is not reality, it is an illusion. Moreover, we
are dealing with a type of illusion that supplants reality.
Therefore, it is subordinate to it, but also opposed to it, and
the only really metaphysical solution to this opposition shall
be its separation, that is to say, seeing things as they really
are, aS appearances, and thus seeing the true reality hidden in
it. We must pass from the product to producer.
There must be something that makes possible the conceal-
ment or the specification of the Brahman; undoubtedly, the
upadhi, that is, the limiting elements.^? Thus, the /svara, the
Brahman saguna or visistä, that is, the Brahman endowed with
attributes or the qualified One, the cause of the universe, is
no more than the Brahman with the upadhi of the avyakrta
prakrti. The Brahman, limited by the non-manifested matter
and the virat or cosmos, is the manifested matter*® but now
with the upadhi of the viakrta prakrti. It happens in these
cases just as it does with clay, with gold or with space. The
jug made of clay, the adornment of gold, and the space with-
in a pot, are but modifications in appearance of clay, gold or
space, by virtue of the upädhi or the limiting characteristics
of the clay or the adornment or the pot (although clay keeps
on being clay, the gold, gold, and the space, space). These
adopted shapes are a mere illusion that vanishes in its founda-
tion, which is what permits the jug, the ornament and the pot
to exist.^? Each limited appearance of the Brahman is not the
Brahman really. It is, therefore, maya, that is, illusion, mirage.
But this means that there must exist that which sustains the
uphadis and permits the Brahman's limitations, something that
must even possess a capacity for deceiving. Yes, that element
is likewise maya, but now not in regard to an illusory effect,
but in regard to the source of illusion. This radically deceiving
aspect is also called ignorance or lack of knowledge: ajnana,
avidyà or màyà.?? If maya exists as illusion, it is because the
maya also exists as a divine potence, and in the last instance,
it exists as a possibility of deception. The last form of maya
which is fundamental, has man as caught by the illusion (the

mystery of the maya). The illusion should be left to one side
so the Brahman can be recovered, but man, if he is immersed
in the illusion allows it to collaborate in his development by
his not purifying himself from it, though it is not his ultimate
source. Man is responsible for himself and his fellow man, and
when he operates out of ignorance, he collaborates in affirm-
ing his enclosure, and projects his influence on the social
cosmos. But he is not the creator of maya. He, because, of his
own anthropological structure, is already in the illusion, a
product of a ajnana which differs from the personal, which is
not individual, but rather universal.*! And, in fact, it is the
ignorance in the cosmological scope that permits the upadhi
which deceptively encloses the Brahman in /$vara, as the lord
of the creation, in virat, as the cosmos created, and in the
jiva, as the microcosmos that encloses the atman.>?
Therefore it is the ajnana or the mül-avidyà which, in the
causal scope, gives a false image of the Brahman as Isvara or
pradhàna (the cause of the universe). It is the ajnana that
permits the birth of the manifested world of nämarüpa.°* It
is said that the ajñäna/mäyä non-manifested has a dual capa-
city: the power of projection, and the power of mental or
intellectual confusion. That is to say, it is the maya which
permits the Brahman to appear as dispersed, multiplied, and
so offers Brahman , under a nature not his own, but as a
divided whole, which in reality, is not him. On the other
hand, it is also the ajnana/maya that permits the illusion of
the cosmos and the individual beings, but here the projecting
and veiling capacity is seen in the extreme, since in the
manifestation the multiplicity reaches its highest degree and
the mental veiling has the cosmic possibility of engendering a
type of illusion that attributes the true reality, not to multi-
ple unity, but to simple and dispersed space-time unities,
whose sum constitutes the world.**
The ajnana, therefore, belongs to the same nature of the
degrees of derivation of the Principle, but it is man, in so
much as he is also a derived being, who manages to confuse
198 | FRANCISCO GARCIA BAZAN
the moments of derivation with their source. That is why he

overcomes the cosmic maya—from which he is derived as a
compound, his own avidya or tül-avidyà, and engenders, with-
out ceasing, a false reflection of reality: the world which
manifests its; language, full and heavy with false predicates.
Naturally, when the illumined subject recognizes his identity
with the Brahman, he perceives what the true reality is, he
goes from ignorance into knowledge, burns every residue of
materiality (ethical, gnoseological, etc.), and from the correct
point of view, sees each form and each particularity as an
illusion: the rope that appeared to be a serpent shows its
reality as a rope.?? Does this last idea mean that once the
mentioned ‘‘annihilation in the Brahman” has been brought
about, the world disappears, and for that reason, the world is
a pure negation? No. The nature of whatever opposes the
Brahman—which is unreality with respect to the absolute reali-
ty is anirvacaniya, that is to say, indescribable, for it is nei-
ther real nor unreal. What does this mean? Well, let’s take
into account the illustration of mother-of-pearl and silver.
When one perceives, due to the scarcity of light, that a piece
of mother-of-pearl is a piece of silver, and immediately when
the light is increased, one has the assurance that the first was
pure illusion, the illusion of the silver disappears and the
mother-of-pearl appears as real. The possibility of deception
always continues to be real, since it belongs to the same
intrinsic constitution of what produces it, and is therefore
distinguishable from the Brahman; but at the same time, it is
something unreal, since the one who is informed has dis-
covered that its true nature is not what it appears to be, but
rather what is hidden behind it, the Brahman.°® We can
consider the concrete form used by Samkara to refer to the
degrees of reality and their unequal behavior.
The World as Image According to Samkara and His Theory of

Causality
According to Samkara, how does one explain the presence
of the Brahman in /$vara and the world? Or to put it another
way—how does one explain the relation between Unity and

multiplicity? By understanding the second as the image of the
first, says the teacher, the Brahman is nothing more than a
pratibimba. The reflection of the Brahman nirguna, and the
particular entities in the same manner, are reflections of the
Brahman. Beings are images like the sun that is reflected on
the water, even though there be various ponds and the reflec-
tions are multiple, and even though the movement of the
water obscures the brightness of the sun’s reflection, the sun
is not for that reason more than one, nor does its brilliance
lose potency. The weakness and the number of the images
have nothing to do with Brahman, rather, the changes have to
do with affections that are from the images, not from Brah-
man. We confirm that it is the ajñana (matter) which as a
reflecting medium permits the transformations, because it is
also that which collaborates in the existence of the image.??
On the other hand, the equally numerous recourses to the
clay limited by the shape of the pot or bowl, gold and adorn-
ment, space and spaces, sea and caves, may be interpreted in
identical manner. It will not be a question of understanding
the clay, water, etc., like unlimited mass or continent upon
which are fictitiously placed worlds which limit them, creating
in that manner, an internal division of the whole. These illus-
trations will be understood as suggesting that forms and
distinctions are visible elements related to the most superficial
layer of a more profound nature than the manifestation of
those changes which remains unchangeable. The case of the
waves and the sea is the most graphic and familiar example.
In the same way our imagination can operate with the remain-
ing comparisons.
This way of representing the relationship between the One
and the multiple, with the necessary collaboration of matter
or ajnana/maya, and illustrating their mutual behavior through
the theory implied in the Samkarian conception of the onto-
logical reflection—does not contradict the idea of causality
maintained by Samkara. The Brahman is not only the material
and efficient cause of the extant ones, but is also the “Brah-
man second to none," seen from the height of realization.
That is to sav, that from the perspective of the vidya, placed
before the cause, the effect disappears. This can be under-
stood from a theory that presupposes inferior realities, such as
the reflection of the highest reality, since the reality of the
image truly resides in the model.*® According to what was
previously said, it is also valid to maintain that since the
effect is a pure reflection and as effect, it is unreality, no
matter how it is produced by the cause.
The illustration of the spider producing its web gives us a
clarification of the cause/effect relation. In the first place, the
fact that the spider extracts the web from its own organism,
tells us that the producing nature is at the same time an
efficient and material cause since the spider needs neither an
exterior matter to construct its web, nor makes it ignorantly,
but according to a determined natural plan. But although it 15
certain the spider is the productive agent of the web, it would
be arbitrary to affirm that the web as such, forms part of the
spider's essence. No, in the spider resides the faculty to pro-
duce the web, but the spider is not the web. In any given
moment, the means of producing the web is within the spider,
and the web started to exist either formally or inwardly in
order to exteriorize afterwards.°? These moments reveal the
three metaphysical states: the Brahman, the unmanifest and
manifest. Consequently, the truth of the essence of the pro-
ductive cause is rooted here. The cause produces because it
has the potency or the faculty to produce, not because it has
the undeveloped germs which will later become developed. In
the cause—if we look at it well—is the possibility of producing
all the effects and it is in a similar sense that the effect is in
the cause. If the pre-existence of the effect on the cause
should mean its mere germinal existence, the Brahman would
shelter prefigurations, which is impossible, considering his
status of transcendency, and the effect would be in the cause
not as something different from it, but as part of it. This
explains that Sarnkara can talk about the only and true exis-
tence of cause, the Brahman which also is the principle of
dissolution. This does not mean that the manifest is ulti-
mately reabsorbed into the cause, and therewith nullified.
That notion is impossible if the effect is understood as reflec-
tion. Wisdom then is simply the recovery of what is reflected
under its true face.9?
III. Plotinus and Samkara
The order itself in which we have developed this writing

permits us to explore analogies existing between the two
thinkers we have dealt with.
Both Plotinus and Samkara conceive of the Real as the
highest plane of Reality. The One and the Brahman are the
revelation of a mystical experience and both exceed, as pure
Possibility, every attempt of determination. In fact, the de-
limiting includes form, and form cannot exist without matter,
its necessary correlative. Therefore, form and matter are total-
ly alien to the Principle; it is the Nothingness.
Matter/ajnana/maya is the other part of the first Principle,
but it is not independent from It. Consequently Matter surges
from It, as the determining capacity, but without being in It.
Matter is just as much in the spiritual as in the sensible
world, as the ajnana/maya is in the Isvara (what is not mani-
fested) and namarupa (what is manifested).
The One/Brahman irradiates through its own perfection the
remaining characters of reality. These characters, therefore,
are images, which reveal in an imaginary manner the superior
immediate reality, according to the level of reflection. In both
cases, the matter/ajnana/maya constitutes the reflecting
medium necessary for the image to exist.
An equivalent conception concerning the degrees of being,
likewise illustrated by literary images that manifest the same
comprehension of the ontological theory of the image, per-

mits both authors to develop a similar notion of the metaphy-
sical participation, which is based on the recognition of the
superessential identity manifested under the form of the
image. In like manner, the Greek and the Indian philosophers
maintain the same theory of essential causality, in which the
productive cause is the true and sole reality, and the effect,
an irradiation reclaiming its cause, which differs from the
former, in so far as its manifestation and nothing as a reality
since its reality consists in the object it reflects.
In spite of similar doctrinal analogies, both thinkers clearly
Show genuine peculiarities, related to their corresponding
traditions of thought, Greek and Hindu. Both Plotinus and
Sarnkara respond with their central intuitions to the problems
posed by an environment and a set of themes rooted in said
environment. It is due to this that there are differences in the
exposition of the theme. At first glance, Plotinus appears to
be more analytical and coherent, while Sarnkara is presented
as being more synthetic and dispersed. Both are, without
doubt, speculative geniuses of the noblest race, but the relig-
ious tradition that motivates the second man is more philo-
sophically appeased in the first.
There is a question that remains. How has it been possible
for two metaphysicians geographically and temporally so
distant and with such diverse cultural traditions to agree on
the essential points of their doctrines? These reasons could be
pointed out: (a) in regards to the central and supreme intui-
tion of both thinkers, a mystic nature stands out; (b) in rela-
tion to their form of predominant discursive and symbolic
exposition and in relation to their mutual logical demands
displays their similar psychic-speculative and intellectual
temperament; (c) in the posing of the religious problems from
a philosophical perspective in which identical themes and
assumptions arise, one would be able to add the stimulus that
can represent a common civilizing Indo-European background
since it gave rise to the two unique philosophical traditions
that we know: the Indian and the Greek.
NOTES
What follows is a condensed summary of a more ample exposition,

which for reasons of space, have had to be limited. The critical and
bibliographical notes have been likewise reduced to the indispensa-
ble minimum.
Cf. Enn. 11.4.3.1-16.
Cf. Enn. 11.4.4.
¢, ΒΩ
Cf. Enn. 11.4.5.4-8. Here bathos is equal to substratum.

Cf. Enn. 1I.4.5.1-4.
Cf. Enn. 1[.4.5.8 ff., and previously V.4[7].2, VI.9[9].2 and
V.1.10.6-7. Can likewise be seen in comparison with our interpreta-
tion: R. Arnou, Le desir de Dieu (Roma, 1967), pp. 70 ff.; J.
Trouillard, La Procession Plotinienne (Paris, 1955), pp. 14-20; J. M.
Rist, "Plotinus on Matter and Evil," Phron., 6 (1961), pp. 155 ff.;
J. Igal, “1,4 génesis de la Inteligencia en un pasaje de la Enéadas de
Plotino," Emérita, 39 (1971), pp. 129-157; and in the examination
of Ph. Merlan in From Platonism to Neoplatonism, pp. 133 ἢ,
which includes the position of Armstrong and other specialists.
Cf. Enn. V.1[10].4.
Cf. Enn. IL.4.6-15. In support of II.4.11 for the concept of mass,
see also III.6[26].16-17, and from II.4.15.13-37: “45 the archetype
differs from the image," Enn. V.8[31].7.23-24.
See the second paragraph of the paper. There is also in this treatise
a brief examination of the gnoseological status of matter (11.4.10
and 12.26-37), which is consistent with all the Plotinian exposition.
As undefined depth, it is the component of all that can be known
through the spiritual or sensible intuition. Therefore, it is only
apprehensible in the entirety that is experienced and in itself is
unrecognizeable (unknown). But the experience of the cognitive
synthesis allows us to elevate even what the knowledge gives it, or
will stop in the synthesis, to describe logically its constitution; this
latter will be legitimate, but also problematic. Nevertheless, it will
be the capability to be known of the component. Matter is the
limitative (restrictive) case as the opposite to the true knowledge.
Therefore, the introspective activity of the soul will be equivalent
to emptying itself of the positive and residue will be pure possibil-
ity of knowing or a “spurious reasoning," as Plato would say.
10. Negative notions: matter is not body (Enn. IV.7[2].8.1.12-16,28
ff.; V.9[5].3.19-20; 4.8-12; 6.15 ff.; V.1[10].2.23 ff.). Positive
notions: matter in the spiritual and in the sensible (V.9[5].3.19-20;
14; V.1[10].4.26 ff.; and V.17); multiplicity and composition in
the Spirit (V.9[5].7-8; V.4[7].1; VI.9[9].2.3.5; V.1[10].6.28 ff.;
7.22; V.2[11].1; V.9[5].3.19-20; and V.4[7].2); form matter

inseparability in the spiritual dominion (V.9[5].5; 10.6 ff.); spiri-
tual paradigms and cosmic images (V.9[5].5); substrate and recep-
tacle (V.9[5].5.37; 9.8-10; V.1[10]..3.28-31); Otherness
(V.9[5].8.28-31; IV.9[8].33 ff.; VI.9[9].6.42; V.1[10].1.4; 6.53);
undefined and amorphous (V.9[5] .3.19-20, also in fine;
VI.9[9].7); receives qualities and quantities (V.9[5].10.6 ff.); col-
laborates in the spiritual or sensible actualization (V.9[5].12);
multiplies and divides (IV.9[8].5); its presence makes the One to
be desired (VI.9[9].5.9; V.2[11].1); to corroborate what was said,
the first hypostasis is simple, one, perfect, etc. (V.9[5].2.26-27;
V.4(7].1; VI.9[9].9 ff.; V.1[10].7).
11. Matter in the spiritual and sensible (Enn. II.5[25].3.8-13,31-40;
VI.4[22].4.20 ff.); substrate and undefined receptacle, amorphous
and indeterminate (1II.5[25].4.12; IV.3[27].9-10); pure disposition
(11.5[25].4.3-5); the otherness (VI.4[22].11.17; II.5[25].4.6-11; 5
in initio; 1V.3[27].4.9-12); precarious gnoseological condition
(II.5[25].5).
12. Cf. likewise Enn. V.5[32].9.
13. Cf. Enn. [1.8.11.26-45 and V.8.1 ff. See also V.5[32].12.
14. Cf. Enn. V.8(31].1-3. Enn. 1I1.9[33].17 presupposes it.
15. Synthesis in 11.9.6.33-34; cf. V.5.11-13 and the summary in II.9.1.1
and V.5, chapters 6, 7 and 8.
16. The theme is amply treated in our thesis Plotinus and the Gnosis.
17. Cf. Enn. V.1[10].7 in fine and 11.9.12.
18. Cf. Enn. 11.9.17-18. 1.8.8 is antignostic. See Irenaeus de Lyon, Adv.
Haer. 1.5.4 (Harvey, I, pp. 48-9).
19. This is emphasized in Chapter 19 and II.5[25], and 4 in fine and
5.
20. Cf. Enn. V.4[7].1; V.1[10].7; VI.9[9]; V.2[11].1; and V.9[5].2
in fine.
21. Cf. Enn. 11.6.12.
22. Cf. Enn. VI.9[9].4.10,11; II.4[12].10; III.8[(30].9; etc.
23. Cf. Enn. VI.5[23].8; IV.7[2].8; 1V.8[6].8; V.1[42].10; etc.
24. Cf. F. Garcia Bazan, "Sobre una aparente contradicción en los tex-
tos de Plotino," in Genethliakon Isidorianum (Salamanca, 1975),
pp. 177-84.
25. Cf. F. García Bazán, "El'languaje de la mistica," in Escritos de
Filosofía No. 1 (Buenos Aires, 1978).
26. Cf. O. Lacombe, L’Absolu selon le Vedanta (Paris, 1937).
27. Cf. Sarhkarabhàsya 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.4.
28. We use the Vedànta-Sütra with Commentary by Samkaracarya,
translated into English by G. Thibaut, Sacred Books of the East
Series, 34-35 (Delhi, 1962) (hereinafter referred to as SB). Also

very useful is Samkara, Prolégomenes au Vedanta, translated from
the Sanskrit by L. Renou (Paris, 1951) (hereinafter referred to as
Renou).
29. The methodology of R. Otto is different. See his Mystique d’Orient
et Mystique d’Occident (Paris, 1951). Also, see G. Vallin, La Per-
spective Métaphysique (Paris, 1959).
30. Cf. P. Martin-Dubost, Qankara et le Vedanta (Paris, 1973), p. 135.
See also SB 11.1.9 (I, p. 312) and IV.4.16 (II, pp. 414-15).
31. Cf. SB 1.1.4 (I, pp. 22-3, 36-7), and 1.4.3 (I, p. 243); S. Madhava-
nanda, Vivekacüdamani (Mayavati, 1921), p. 125 (hereinafter refer-
red to as VCM); Commentary on the Mandukyopanisad 1.9 (Sloka)
(hereinafter referred to as SB Mand. Up...
32. Cf. VCM, pp. 135, 225, 237-8, and 464-70. See likewise Martin-
Dubost, Gankara et le Vedanta, pp. 64-5.
33. Cf. SB 1.1.3 (I, p. 19). See likewise Renou, p. 16 and notes, I.1.4
(I, p. 25), 1.4.15 (I, pp. 266-7), IV.4.4 (II, pp. 407-8), and IV.4.5-6
(II, pp. 408-9); VCM, pp. 260-61, 263, 573; SB Mand. Up. 1.10
(Sloka) and III.36 (Sloka). See also P. Deussen, Das System des
Vedànta (Leipzig, 1906), pp. 139 ff., and S. Radhakrishnan, /ndian
Philosophy (London, 1923), 11:533-41.
34. Cf. SB 1.1.4 (I, p. 33), 1.1.28 (I, p. 352), and 1.2.18 (II, p. 157);
and SB Mand. Up. 1.9 ($loka), 1.12 (mantra in initio), 1.29 (Sloka),
and IV.60,61,62 (Sloka).
35. Cf. SB 1.1.4 (I, p. 28); SB Mand. Up. IV.42 ($loka in fine); later
Drgdr§yaviveka, 42 (hereinafter referred to as DDV). One may
consult P. Deussen, The Philosophy of the Vedanta and the Vedan-
tasara (Calcutta, 1957), p. 22.
36. Cf. DDV 37, 41; Deussen, Das System, pp. 292-3.
37. Cf. SB 1.4.9 (I, p. 255), 11.1.14 (I, p. 328), and IV.3.14 (II, p.
401).
38. Cf. SB 1.1.4 (I, pp. 23, 28-30, 34-36, 41 and 43), 1.4.6 (I, p. 251),
1.4.22 (I, p. 279), IV.1.19 (II, p. 363), IV.2.7 (II, p. 369), and
IV.4.1-2 (II, pp. 405-6); VCM, p. 124; SB Mand. Up. IV.75-76
(Sloka); and Renou, p. 20 and note.
39. Cf., for example, Otto, Mystique d'Orient, pp. 103 ff.
40. Cf. VCM, pp. 65, 108, 110, 120, 123, and 237-8; SB II.1.14 (I, p.
329) and II.1.37 (I, p. 326). In identical tradition is DDV 13. See
Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, 11, pp. 573-4.
41. SB 1.1.2 (I, p. 15) et passim. See also S. Dasgupta, A History of
Indian Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1932), I:437-8.
42. SB 1.4.1 (1, p. 237), 1.4.23 (1, pp. 283-6), 1.4.24 (I, p. 286), and
II.1.37 (I, p. 361). See Dasgupta, Indian Philosophy, p. 438.
43. The production of the Brahman is different from that of the pot-
ters and other artisans; cf. SB 11.1.24 (I, p. 346), II.1.25 (I, p.
348), etc. Remember Enn. I1I.8[30].2 in initio, V.8[31].7, etc.
44. Cf. SB 1.4.1 (I, p. 238), 1.4.2 (I, p. 242), 1.4.3 (I, p. 243), 1.4.9 (I,
p. 255), 11.1.14 (I, p. 329), 1V.3.8-9 (II, pp. 390-91), IV.3.14 (II,
pp. 401-2), IV.4.19 (II, p. 417), and IV.4.21-2 (II, pp. 418-19); SB
Mand. Up. 1.6 (mantra); and, briefly, Martin-Dubost, Cankara et le
Vedànta, pp. 101-2.
45. SB IV.310 (II, p. 391).
46. SB 1.1.9 (I, pp. 59-60), 11.1.9 (I, pp. 311-12), 11.1.14 (I, pp.
324-5), IV.2.15 (II, p. 376), and IV.3.11 (II, p. 392). VCM, pp.
120-21. SB Mand. Up. I.1 (mantra in fine), I.5 (mantra), 1.18
(Sloka), and III.35 (Sloka).
47. SB 1.2.6 (I, p. 113), 1.4.10 (I, p. 257), and 1.4.22 (I, p. 279).
48. Cf. SB 1.1.19 (I, p. 74), 1.1.24 (I, p. 92), 11.2.3 (I, p. 111), 1.3.13
(I, pp. 171-4), and 11.1.28 (I, p. 352); Radhakrishnan, /ndian Philo-
sophy, pp. 572-3.
49, SB passim. Cf., briefly, Dasgupta, Indian Philosophy, p. 439.
50. SB 1.4.3 (I, p. 243), 1.4.6 (I, p. 251), II.1.14 (I, p. 329), 11.1.28 (I,
p. 352), II.1.31 (I, p. 355), and IV.3.14 (II, p. 401); VCM, pp.
227, 237-8, 243, 514; SB Mand. Up. 11.19 (Sloka), III.10 ($loka),
III.15 (Sloka). See Radhakrishnan, /ndian Philosophy, pp. 565 ff.
51. SB 11.1.36 (I, p. 360) and III.2.35 (II, p. 179);SB Mand. Up. 1.16
(Sloka). Also see Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, pp. 587-90.
52. SB 11.3.50 (II, p. 68); VCM, p. 243; SB Mand. Up. III.6 (Sloka in
fine).
53. SB 11.1.4 (I, pp. 329-30) and III.2.21 (II, p. 163); VCM, pp. 260,
345; SB Mand. Up. 1.18 ($loka in fine). See Radhakrishnan, Indian
Philosophy, pp. 578-87, 590-94.
54. Cf. VCM, p. 343 and, later, DDV 13, 35. There is more. Maya has
three gunas: rajas, tamas and sattva (VCM, p. 110); and as some-
thing undifferentiated (VCM, p. 108), it is a perfectly balanced
state of the gunas. (Therefore, it is said that the avrti "initiates the
action of the projecting capacity" (VCM, p. 113), and that it is
Karana-Sarira of the Atman (VCM, p. 120).) That is to say, the
maya-avyakta or ajfiana is the equivalent of the Plotinian spiritual
matter. But in Sarhkara as in Plotinus the dialectical analysis is
possible. First the sattva has the “‘divine tendencies and turning
away from the unreal" (VCM, p. 118), and second, the rajas “has
viksepa-sakti or projecting power (VCM, p. 111), and the tamas has
the avrti or.veiling power (VCM, p. 113), that is to say, the aspira-
tion upward and the tolma of Plotinian matter. Moreover, both
powers are in nidra (SB Mand. Up. 1.13 (Sloka) and, later, DDV
38). Remember the babarménos nots of Plotinus (Enn.

111.8(30].8.34). See likewise SB Mand. Up. 1.15, 1.17, and IV.94
(Sloka).
55. SB 1.2.6 (I, p. 113), 1.2.20 (I, p. 135), and 1.4.6 (I, p. 251). SB
Mand. Up. 11.16 (Sloka), II.28 (Sloka), and II.32 (६018). See Radha-
krishnan, Indian Philosophy, pp. 557 ff.
56. SB III.2.21 (II, pp. 162-3). VCM, p. 569. SB Mand. Up. IV.44
(Sloka). See Dasgupta, Indian Philosophy, pp. 486-7.
51. SB 11.1.6 (I, pp. 307-8), 11.3.50 (II, pp. 68-9), III.2.18-21 (II, pp.
157-9), III.2.26 (II, p. 173), and 11.2.35 (II, p. 179). SB Mand.
Up. 1.6 (Sloka), 11.30 (Sloka), II.31, and IV.98 (Sloka).
58. SB 11.3.17 (II, p. 32), [1.2.41 (II, p. 183), and IV.4.15-16 (II, pp.
414-15). VCM, pp. 223, 226, 230. SB Mand. Up. III.18 (Sloka),
III.23 ($loka), and IV.90 ($loka). Also see Martin-Dubost, Cankara
et le Vedànta, p. 63.
59. SB 1.4.27 (I, p. 288) and II.1.24 (I, pp. 346-7).
60. SB 1.4.14 (I, p. 266), 1.4.21 (I, pp. 277-8), 1.4.22 (I, p. 280),
1.4.28 (I, p. 289), 11.1.1 (I, p. 290), 11.1.8 (I, p. 309), 11.1.9 (I, p.
311), 11.1.14 (I, p. 320), II.1.15 (I, p. 331), 1.1.16 (I, p. 332),
II. 1.18 (I, p. 341), 11.1.28 (I, p. 353), 11.1.30 (I, pp. 354-5), II.1.31
(I, pp. 355-6), and II.4.20 (II, pp. 97-8). Samkara, Aparok$änu-
bhüti 138 (Select Works, p. 82). SB Mand. Up. 1.13 (Sloka), III.27
(Sloka), III.48 (sloka), IV.38 (sloka), IV.42 (Sloka), IV.52 (Sloka),
IV.54,55-7, IV.93 and IV.95 ($loka). Furthermore, if the effect
does not exist, neither does the maya (ajfiana), which is its possi-
bility. See SB Mand. Up. IV.38 (Sloka). One may compare equally
the gnoseological status of maya (VCM, p. 109) with the men-
tioned status of matter in Plotinus.
Samkara and
Eriugena on
Causality
Russell Hatton
University of Delaware
Newark, Delaware
Eriugena, in the Periphyseon, and Samkara, in his commen-

tary on the Brahma Sutra of Badarayana, are occasionally
concerned to establish the truth of a proposition of the type:
(1) A is the cause of B.
In the course of defending their causal assertions, both Eriu-

gena and Sarhkara sometimes raise objections of the type:
(2) A cannot be the cause of B because A has

characteristic! x while B has characteristic non-x.
Having raised such an objection to their causal assertions,

Eriugena and Samkara sometimes go further and offer as an
objection a general assertion about the nature of the causal
relation of the type:
(3) If A is the cause of B, then A and B must share

certain important characteristics.
209
210 RUSSELL HATTON
In addition to offering the same types of objections to

causal assertions, Eriugena and Sarhkara offer replies to them
which are similar and fall into two main: categories. Some-
times the objection is tackled directly and a proof that A is
the cause of B is given, which either appeals to Scriptural
authority or does not. At other times the reply is based upon
a causal analogy. The causal relationship of A and B has been
called into question because A is x but B is not x. Thus a
causal analogy is presented, i.e., a pair C and D such that C is
acknowledged to be the cause of D but C is y while D is not
y.
The following will be a detailed consideration of several
instances in which each philosopher is concerned to defend a
causal assertion against objections of the types mentioned
above.
Corporeal Effects and Their Causes
Eriugena
The “fact” that incorporeal causes can have corporeal €

fects is mentioned twice in Book One of the Periphyseon
before the possibility of such a causal relation is ever ques-
tioned.? The question is finally discussed during a considera-
tion of the relation of ousia and its natural accidents to
bodies and their accidents (P1 163-71; PL 498B-501C). The
Teacher tells the Student that quanta and qualia, the acci-
dents of bodies, are the effects of the incorporeal quality and
quantity which subsist in ousia as its natural accidents.
The student wishes to know how this is possible, for the
causes in this case are incorporeal and invisible, immutable,
and intelligible while bodies are visible and corporeal, muta-
ble, and sensible. “ον then can quantity and quality pro-
duce matter, which is something very different from them?”
he asks, and “‘why is what is understood of the causes not
also understood of their effects? . . . ` (PJ 165; PL 499A).
SAMKARA AND ERIUGENA 211
The Teacher proceeds to demonstrate that incorporeal

causes do, in fact, have corporeal effects (P/ 165-7; PL
499B-501B). The basic presupposition of this demonstration is
that all corporeal things are a combination of form and
matter and that there is no third component in addition to
these. This is not stated explicitly by Eriugena. The Teacher
begins by eliciting the Student’s agreement that unformed
matter is contemplated by reason rather than sense. The
student then agrees that since formless matter is contemplated
by reason, it is incorporeal. The Teacher notes that this con-
clusion is confirmed by authority and cites Augustine, Plato,
and the pseudo-Dionysius. Dionysius is quoted as saying that
*matter is participation in adornment and form and species,
for without these matter is formless and cannot be under-
stood in anything" (PJ 169; PL 500D). The Student agrees
that “‘the species and form and adornments themselves, by
participation in which that formless or mutability we men-
tioned is changed into matter" (PJ 169; PL 5018) are
contemplated by reason alone. Since form too is contem-
plated by reason rather than sense, it is incorporeal. But this
is all that is needed and the demonstration is completed, as
"now you see that from incorporeal things, namely mutable
formlessness which yet is receptive forms, and form itself,
something corporeal, namely matter and body, is created” (P1
171; PL 5010 B).
As it is evident from the above, Eriugena's concern is to
demonstrate that the causes of bodies and their effects do not
share the particular characteristics of corporeality, incorpore-
ality, mutability, immutability, simplicity, and composition. He
is not concerned to explain here, or elsewhere, why these par-
ticular characteristics are not shared, and why those character-
istics (if any) which are shared are shared. Such an explana-
tion would require an explicit discussion of the nature of
causation per se, something which is not found in the Peri-
physeon.
212 RUSSELL HATTON
$ amkara
Sarnkara is not particularly concerned: with the question

Eriugena considers rather carefully, "Can incorporeal causes
produce corporeal effects?" He does however, give it a passing
glance. This occurs in his commentary on Brahma Sutra
1.1.21.°
The question at issue here is the exegetical one of whether
the “source of all beings” referred to in Mundaka Upanisad
1.1.5-6 is the pradhana (a rival philosophical school’s version
of prime matter), the soul, or Brahman.
A purvapaksin (hypothetical opponent of Samkara's posi-
tion) argues that since earth and other non-intelligent things
are given as instances of "sources" in Mundaka Upanisad 1.1.7
the source of all beings must also be non-intelligent Sarh-
kara’s arguments against this position are mainly exegetical,
but his last argument replies to the purvapaksin’s interpreta-
tion of the analogies of the passage. The contention, says
Samkara, that since the parallel instances are non-intelligent,
the source of all beings, to which they are compared, must
also be non-intelligent is baseless since “it is not necessary
that two things of which one is compared to the other should
be of absolutely the same nature" (BS 1.2.21; 1:139). Conclud-
ing the discussion, Samkara says that, “The things, moreover,
to which the source of all beings is compared, viz. the earth
and the like, are material, while nobody would assume the
source of all beings to be material" (BS 1.2.21; 1:139).
This treatment appears to be the only consideration in
Sarhkara's commentary on the Brahma Sutra of the question,
"Can incorporeal causes produce a corporeal effect?" He
apparently considered it unworthy of serious attention.
. SAMKARA AND ERIUGENA 213
God and Brahman and Their Effects
Eriugena-One
In Chapter Five of Book Three of the Periphyseon Student

and Teacher discuss at length how all things can be both eter-
nal in God's Wisdom and also made from nothing. At one
point they discuss the question whether formless matter is
also created from nothing. Certain "secular philosophers"
have insisted that it could not be, and have said that formless
matter is coeternal with God. They cannot see how that
which is formless, variable, subject to accidents, extended in
place and time, receptive of different qualities, corruptible,
and compound can come into being from that which is the
form of all things, invariable, subject to no accidents, not
extended in time or space, subject to no quality, incorrupti-
ble, and simple.
But, Teacher continues, we must not doubt that "He who
made the world from formless matter also made formless
matter from absolutely nothing...." (P2 144; PL 636D).
The Teacher then offers support for this doctrine. In the first
place this is the teaching of Scripture. Secondly, such objec-
tions are incompatible with the conception of an omnipotent
creator.?
Eriugena devotes little attention to this objection, and his
first reply appears to be misdirected. It is doubtful that ''secu-
lar philosophers" will be particularly impressed with an appeal
to Scripture. The second reply is perhaps being offered as an
alternative to an appeal to Scripture. The question then
becomes, “What is our source of knowledge of God's omnipo-
tence?” If it is Scripture, then this reply would also be misdi-
rected.
In any case, Eriugena seems to feel that this objection is
hardly worthy of note, much less two discussions directed at
two different audiences. Throughout the Periphyseon he
presents a mixture of philosophical and scriptural proofs of
his doctrines. At no point does he indicate that he is aware
214 RUSSELL HATTON
that objections raised by philosophers who do not recognize

the authority of Scripture must be handled quite differently
from objections raised by those who accept it. As the discus-
sion of Samkara which follows will show, the distinction
between philosophy and theology seems to have been made
earlier in India than in Europe.
Eriugena-T wo
In Book Two of the Periphyseon there occurs an extended

discussion of the primordial causes—that which is created and
creates. At one point the Student asks if the primordial causes
understand themselves before they flow into the things of
which they are the causes.° The Teacher replies by first
pointing out that God made the primordial causes in His
Wisdom. Since God’s Wisdom knows herself and the things
that are made in her, the primordial causes are wise and not
only know themselves but the things of which they are the
principles. The Student then asks, “If the primordial causes
have wisdom of themselves because they are created in Wis-
dom and = subsist eternally in that which admits nothing
unwise in itself, how is it that from the wise causes many
unwise things proceed?” (P2 67; PL 552B). After giving exam-
ples of wise effects of the primordial causes as well as effects
devoid of wisdom, the Student answers his own question. The
rays of the sun are not dark, he observes, but the causes of
darkness inhere in them. Thus the causes of unwise things can
subsist in the wise primordial causes. Recalling that in an
earlier presentation of this example Eriugena had said that the
causes of shadow are body and light rather than inhere in
body and light (PJ 171; PL 501C) and Eriugena’s earlier state-
ment—''[ see no reason why whatever proceeds from those
things which are in the source should not be traced back to
that very source" (P1 165; PL 499A)—it would be reasonable
to conclude that the wise primordial causes can have unwise
effects.
Now the question might be asked, “What does the fact that
the sun’s rays are not dark but they are the causes of shadows
which are dark have to do with the possibility that wise
causes can have unwise effects?” When the Student asks rhe-
torically, “If the primordial causes are wise, how is it that
from these wise causes many unwise things proceed?” he
could have had the following in mind:
(4) If A is the cause of B then A and B must share

all characteristics.
But this is obviously much too broad. It says, in effect, that

cause and effect must be identical. Admittedly, if the Student
did have this in mind then the causal relation between the
sun’s rays and shadows would be a counter-example that
would refute the principle.
A more reasonable objection would be something like:
If A is the cause of B, then A and B must share cer-

tain important characteristics or types of charac-
teristics.
For example, one might object that if A is the material cause

of B then A and B must either both be corporeal or both
incorporeal, or if A is the cause of B, B must share A’s essen-
tial characteristics. Such a more specific objection would
mean that the counter-example works only if the relation of
wisdom to the primordial causes and light to the rays of the
sun are the same. Whatever the type of objection Eriugena
had in mind, however, he gives it so little attention he can
hardly have taken it seriously. This might suggest that he had
in mind the former of the two objections mentioned above.
Samkara
Samkara wishes to prove that Brahman is the material or

substantial cause (upàdana karana) of the world in addition to
being the operational or efficient cause (nimitta karana) (BS
216 RUSSELL HATTON
1.4.23: 1:283-4). Three times in his commentary on the Brah-

ma Sütra he deals with an objection to this doctrine of the
following type:
(5) The world is seen to consist of parts, be non-

intelligent, and impure but Brahman is known to be
without parts, intelligent and pure. But material
cause and effect must share these characteristics.
Thus Brahman cannot be the material cause of the
world.’
Sarhkara’s first reply to this type of objection is that we

must conclude that Brahman is both the material and opera-
tive cause of the world because this is the only assumption
that allows us to make sense out of key scriptural passages
(BS 1.4.23; 1:284). Passages such as Chandogya Upanisad
6.1.3-4 suggest that through the cognition of Brahman every-
thing else becomes known, but this is possible only through
the cognition of the material cause. This is because the effect
is *non-different" from the material cause while it is not
"non-different" from the operative or efficient cause. Thus,
knowledge of the operative cause alone cannot result in knowl-
edge of the effect.
Notice that at this point, Sarnkara’s appeal to Scripture
does not deal with the pürvapaksin's contention that the
material cause and effect must be “ of the same nature” or
"alike in kind." This is because he is dealing at this point
with an opponent who also accepts the authority of the
Vedas.5 Sarnkara deals with opponents who do not accept the
authority of Scripture later.
It should be pointed out that Sarhkara considers an appeal
to Scripture—*proof by demonstration of the connected
meaning of all the Vedanta texts" —to be the final justification
for any assertion about Brahman. This is made explicit in his
commentary on 1.4.27. Here Samkara notes that Brahman is
the material cause of the world because it is called the
"source" (yoni) in the sacred texts, and that the word
"source" is used in ordinary language to denote the material

cause. A pürvapaksin raises the objection that ordinarily the
operative and material causes are different. Sarhkara dismisses
the objection, saying that “as the matter in hand is not one
which can be known through inferential reasoning, ordinary
experience cannot be used to settle it. For the knowledge of
that matter we rather depend on Scripture altogether, and
hence Scripture only has to be appealed to" (BS 1.4.27;
1:288).
Sarhkara’s second reply to the type of objection charac-
terized above (5) occurs in a section in which he deals with
objections to his position founded on "reasoning"? alone (BS
2.1.4-6; 1:299-308). After stating the objection, the first thing
Sarnkara does is to reject one possible defence of his view.
This is the assertion that Brahman and the world do share the
characteristic of intelligence but that the intelligence of the
world is not apparent, just as a man's intelligence is unmani-
fested in certain states such as sleep. He argues that even if
such reasoning explained the difference of characteristics
between the intelligent Brahman and the non-intelligent
world, there are other characteristics not shared as well. More
important, neither perception nor inference supply evidence
that the entire world is intelligent. Thus such an assertion
could be proven only by an appeal to scriptural evidence. But
Scripture itself actually teaches that the world is of a nature
different from its material cause—non-intelligent.
Having rejected one possible defence of his doctrine, Sarh-
kara replies that “Your assertion that this world cannot have
originated from Brahman on account of the difference of its
character is not founded on an absolutely true tenet" (BS
2.1.6; 1:305). The objection in this case had been that
"things of an altogether different character cannot stand to
each other in the relation of material cause and effect" (BS
2.1.4; 1:300).
In the first place, notes Sarhkara, "we see that from man,
who is acknowledged to be intelligent, non-intelligent things
such as hair and nails originated, and that, on the other hand,
218 RUSSELL HATTON
from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such as cow-dung, scor-

pions and similar animals are produced” (BS 2.1.6; 1:305).
Secondly, even if it is agreed that the non-intelligent human
body is the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails and
that the non-intelligent dung is the cause of only the bodies
of the scorpions, the causes and their effects in these cases
would still have different characteristics. The body of the
scorpion would be a kind of non-intelligent matter with the
characteristic “‘capable of serving as the abode of an intelli-
gent principle" while the dung would be a kind of non-intelli-
gent matter with the characteristic “incapable of serving as
the abode of an intelligent principle." This would be an ob-
vious difference in characteristics. Also, the differences in
characteristics between men’s bodies on the one hand and
their hair and nails on the other is quite considerable.
Since the question at issue here is whether the intelligent
Brahman can be the material cause of a non-intelligent effect,
the relevance of the first counter-example to the purvapaksin’s
objection is obvious. The relevance of the second and third
counterexamples, however, is problematic. The differences in
characteristics between dung and a scorpion cannot be denied.
But they also share other important characteristics—
corporeality, for example. Thus Sarhkara seems to be interpret-
ing the pürvapaksin as saying that if A is the cause of B,
then B must share all characteristics of A (4). As was men-
tioned in connection with Eriugena’s dealing with the ques-
tion ‘How can wise causes have unwise effects?", such an
interpretation of the objection is so broad that it renders it
trivially false.
Sarnkara, however, goes on to consider systematically the
notion of difference in characteristics of the cause and effect
that the objection hinges on.!° He notes that a person who
insists that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the
world because of the “Difference of attributes" must mean
either that:
1. The world has none of the characteristics that

Brahman has and the cause and effect must share at
least one characteristic; or
2. The world lacks some of the characteristics that
Brahman has; or
3. The world lacks some specific characteristic .of
Brahman such as intelligence.
Samkara then discusses these alternatives.!! In the case of

the first, the assertion is false. The world and Brahman do
indeed share a characteristic, satta (existence). According to
the second alternative Brahman cannot be the cause of the
world because the world does not have all the characteristics
Brahman has. But if the effect must have all the characteris-
tics that the cause has, this would “negate” the relation of
cause and effect, “for if the two were absolutely identical
they could not be distinguished" (BS 2.1.6; 1:306). Finally,
in reference to the third alternative, Sarhkara says that when a
person insists that the world cannot be an effect of Brahman
because it lacks the characteristic of intelligence, he is arguing
as follows:
Whatever is devoid of intelligence cannot be an

effect of Brahman.
The world is devoid of intelligence.
Therefore, the world is not an effect of Brahman.
The truth of the minor premise is obvious. Thus the basic

problem for an opponent of Sarhkara is the proof of the
major premise. Sarhkara is convinced that Scripture unequivo-
cally indicates that Brahman is the cause of all effects. Thus
scripture cannot be the source of our knowledge of the truth
of the major premise. An opponent cannot advance an induc-
tive proof of the major premise because the only source of
knowledge of Brahman is scripture. Any example which the
opponent might advance as evidence of the major premise
would be denied to be such by the Vedantin.
220 RUSSELL HATTON
In spite of the fact that Sarhkara said he would deal in this

section with objections to this position based on reasoning
alone, he finds himself unable to refute the most sophisticated
of them without an appeal to Scriptural authority. Samkara's
non-orthodox opponents (those who do not accept the
authority of the Vedas) are no more likely to be impressed by
an appeal to Scripture than the "secular philosophers" Eriu-
gena mentions as objecting to the doctrine that God created
formless matter out of nothing.
Samkara's third reply to the type of criticism of his doc-
trine of Brahman as the material cause of the world outlined
above (5) arises during his critique of the Vai$esika doctrine
of atomism (BS 2.2.10-11; 1:376-86). Sarmkara begins by
showing that the Vai$esika system is just as vulnerable to the
criticism they make of his system as his own. Thus an essen-
tial part of his reply is a summary of the Vai$esika system
(BS 2.2.11; 1:382-3) the relevant portions of which are:
1. Atoms are spherical and possess color and other

characteristics;
2. When two atoms conjoin to produce a binary
compound, the characteristics of the atoms produce
corresponding characteristics in the binary com-
pound, except that though the atoms are spherical,
the binary compound is not, it is ‘minute and
short’;
3. When two binary compounds conjoin to produce
a quaternary compound, once again most of the
characteristics of the binary compound produce cor-
responding characteristics in the quaternary com-
pound, except that though the binary compounds
are minute and short, the quaternary compounds
are ‘big and long’. |
Of course, given this summary, Sarhkara’s line of argumen-

tation is obvious. He simply points out that the “forms of
extention” of the parts do not produce corresponding quali-
ties in the compounds. Thus the intelligent Brahman can be
the cause of the non-intelligent world and the non-acceptance

of this possibility would require the abandonment of a funda-
mental principle of the Vaisesika.
Now, continues Sarhkara, the Vaisesikas might try to
answer the criticism (BS 2.2.11; 1:383-5). The forms of ex-
tension of the components, they might argue, do not produce
corresponding qualities in the compounds because the com-
pounds are “‘engrossed’’ by forms of extension contrary to
that of the components, and thus the components cannot pro-
duce similar characteristics in the compounds. This principle
of "engrossment" cannot be similarly invoked by the Vedän-
tins, the Vai$esikas might further maintain. Non-intelligence,
an obvious quality of the world, is not a quality contrary to
intelligence but simply the absence of intelligence. Thus the
world is not engrossed by some quality contrary to intelli-
gence which keeps the intelligence inherent in the cause from
producing intelligence in the effect. Thus, the Vaisesikas
would conclude, the two cases of causality being compared
are dissimilar in important ways and the intelligence of the
cause—Brahman—would be expected to be manifested in the
effect—the world.
The question is thus, "How acceptable is ‘engrossment by
contrary forms' as an explanation for the difference in charac-
teristics between cause and effect?" Not at all, insists Sarh-
Kara. In a very terse section not notable for its clarity (BS
2.2.11; 1:383-5) he rejects this explanation of the fact that
certain characteristics of the cause do not produce correspond-
ing characteristics in the effect.
Though the section is quite difficult, the most important
thing to note is Sarhkara’s conclusion after rejecting the alter-
native explanation of why cause and effect do not share cer-
tain characteristics. He concludes that the fact that sphericity,
for example, is a characteristic which need not be shared by
cause and effect can be explained only on the assumption
that this is the result of the essential nature of sphericity. But
such a contention can certainly be made by Sarhkara about
the intelligence of Brahman. Thus the Vai$esikas must agree
222 RUSSELL HATTON
with the Vedantins that some causes do not produce like

effects and thus the intelligent Brahman can produce the
non-intelligent world.
Notice that the VaiSesikas are not arguing that the cause
and effect do indeed share all characteristics but this fact is
not always apparent. They argue instead that the effect shares
the characteristics of the cause unless it is *prevented" from
doing so. Samkara is forced to reject this type of causal
theory because it would require the postulation of something
other than Brahman to "prevent" the Brahman’s intelligence
from being a characteristic of the world. The postulation of
something “other” than Brahman would severely compromise
Sarhkara’s monism to say the least. Thus Samkara must argue
that the non-sharing of characteristics by cause and effect is
due to the nature of the cause alone and to no other thing.
Concluding Remarks
The thrust of Sarhkara’s replies to the criticisms of his

assertion. that Brahman is the material cause of the world
appears to be towards the principle that cause and effect need
share no characteristics. It might be remembered that at one
point he replies to the insistence of a pürvapaksin that cause
and effect must share at least some characteristics. He points
out that Brahman and the world do indeed share one
characteristic—satta (existence). However, it should be men-
tioned that elsewhere Sarhkara apparently argues that real
effects can result from unreal causes, as when a man dies after
imagining himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake.!?
Then too, such a statement is not consonant with what might
be called the standard interpretation of Sarhkara's system.
Brahman is, among other things, sat (being), while the world,
in spite of all the talk about Brahman as its material cause, is
‘mere illusion or ;nàyà," “only an illusory imagination
which lasts till the moment when true knowledge is ac-
quired,"!^ etc. The key analogy of the relation of Brahman to
the world is that of the magician to his illusion. An illu-

sion, says Sarnkara, is neither sat—“since it does not continue
to manifest itself in all times, and has its manifestation up to
the moment that the right knowledge dawns’”’!®—but neither is
it asat, for it is not absolutely non-existent in the sense that a
hare's horn or the son of a barren woman are non-existent.
If pushed by cogent criticism of key parts of his system,
Eriugena would probably have been forced to take refuge in
the principle that the cause and effect need to share no
characteristics. It has already been pointed out that he tends
to "collapse" causality by preferring to view the first term in
a causal sequence as the real cause of all subsequent effects.
The consequence of such a tendency is exemplified by his
many references to God as the cause of all effects. Since
nothing which is predicable of God's effects is, properly
speaking, predicable of God, we have a most extreme case
here of the non-sharing of characteristics by cause and effect.
Many criticisms which Sarhkara brings forth against his
position are based on the expectation that because a cause has
a particular characteristic the effect will also have it. His basic
job in dealing with such objections is to show, or remind the
pürvapaksin that though the cause has a particular characteris-
tic, the effect need not have it and conversely. Monists like
Samkara will have to deal with this basic type of criticism at
every turn, but certain problems which even non-monists have
would seem to be amenable to an insistence that there is no
characteristic which cause and effect must share. The problem
of evil and that of the interaction of mind and body are two
that come to mind.
Perhaps if this paper does nothing else it points out the
correctness of the common characterization of Eriugena as,
for example, “‘a mind of great power, hampered by the limita-
tions of his time and by the poverty of the material at his dis-
posal.”’!” Sarhkara’s discussions of the problems dealt with in
this paper are obviously the more complete and sophisticated.
Sarnkara’s work is obviousiy the product of a much more
sophisticated and pluralistic philosophical environment. We are
224 RUSSELL HATTON
reminded that the “dark ages" was not a global phenomenon

and that good philosophy was not and still is not limited to
Europe.
NOTES
1. I am using "characteristic" as the genus, of which “essential charac-

teristics” and ‘‘accidental characteristics" are the species. For
example, Russ Hatton’s characteristics would include corporeality,
humanity, masculinity, being 5'9" tall, liking beer, having a hang-
over today, etc. “‘Characteristic’’ is as general a term as I can find
which is not also a technical term in scholastic philosophy.
2. Iohannis Scotti Eriugena, Periphyseon (De Divisione Naturae) Liber
Primus, ed. & trans. I. P. Sheldon-Williams, Scriptores Latini Hiber-
niae, VII (Dublin, 1968), p. 121 (Patrologia Latina, Vol. 122,
479A, hereinafter referred to as PL) and p. 151 (PL, 493A). Subse-
quent references for passages quoted from this work will appear in
the text with the abbreviation PI.
3. Sarnkara, Commentary on the Vedanta Sütras of Badaräyana, 2
Parts, trans. George Thibaut (1890, 1895; reprint ed., New York:
Dover, 1962), Part 1, pp. 135-9. Subsequent references for passages
quoted from this work will appear in the text with the abbreviation
BS. The references will be of the form (BS a.b.c; 1:xyz). The first
three numbers refer to the traditional division of a commentary on
the Brahma Sutra into Adhyayas (Books), Padas (Chapters), and
Sutras (the particular sentence of the Brahma Sütra being comment-
ed upon). The second number (xyz) gives the page reference to
Thibaut’s translation, Part One.
4. Johannes Scotus Eriugena, Periphyseon: On the Division of Nature,
trans. Myra L. Uhlfelder, The Library of Liberal Arts, 157 (Indiana-
polis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), pp. 144-5 (PL 636C-637D). Subsequent
references for passages quoted from this work will appear in the
text with the abbreviation P.
S. Ibid., p. 145 (PL 637B). "For the omnipotent Founder of the
universe, free from all defects and reaching to infinity, was able to
create, and actually created, not only what is like Himself but also
what is unlike."
6. Iohannis Scotti Eriugena, Periphyseon (De Divisione Naturae) Liber
Secundus, ed. & trans. I. P. Sheldon-Williams, Scriptores Latini
Hiberniae, VIII (Dublin, 1973), p. 63. Subsequent references for
passages quoted from this work will appear in the text with the
abbreviation P2.
." See Samkara, pp. 284 (BS 1.4.23), 300-1 (BS 2.1.4), and 381 (BS
2.2.10).
See Samkara, pp. xlvi (Thibaut’s Introduction) and 290 (BS 2.1.1).
oo
The objection is actually stated and replied to twice. An abbrevi-

ated version is first presented (BS p. 301, line 34 to p. 302, line 6)
and then an expanded version (BS p. 302, line 6 to p. 303, line
20). The two versions are essentially the same and are not treated
separately in the following.
10. Again the objection is raised and answered twice. The difference
between the two presentations is not that of abbreviation and
consideration at length, but of a less systematic and a more syste-
matic presentation. Again the two versions are essentially the same
and are not treated separately in the following.
11. The following discussion of the “‘assertions’’ is based on the follow-
ing passage:
The first assertion would lead to the negation of the

relation of cause and effect in general, which rela-
tion is based on the fact of there being in the effect
something over and above the cause (for if the two
were absolutely identical they could not be distin-
guished.) The second assertion is open to the charge
of running counter to what is well known; for, as
we have already remarked, the characteristic quality
of existence which belongs to Brahman is found
likewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion
the requisite proving instances are wanting; for what
instances could be brought forward against the
upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general
assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is
seen not to be an effect of Brahman?... [The
upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any
such instances] because he maintains that this entire
complex of things has Brahman for its material
cause. [BS 2.1.6; 1:306]
The third objection obviously applies to the third alternative (see

page 219). But if the objections and alternatives are read carefully
the objection to the first alternative just as obviously applies to the
second and conversely. Thus they will be treated as such. Radha-
krishnan apparently fails to notice this problem. Please see his
discussion of Sarnkara’s commentary on Brahma Sütra 2.1.6 (The
Brahma Sutra: The Philosophy of Spiritual Life, p. 337).
226 RUSSELL HATTON
12. Sarnkara, pp. 324-5 (BS 2.1.14). This passage is problematic. In

spite of the fact that at one point Thibaut translates Samkara as
saying ‘as a matter of fact we do see real effects to result from
unreal causes," the examples he gives and the subsequent discussion
of them do not make it clear whether this is what Sarnkara meant.
13. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, 5 Vols.
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1922-55), 1:435.
14. Ibid., p. 440.
15. See, for example, Sarhkara, pp. 290 (BS 2.1.1), 312 (BS 2.1.9), and
344 (BS 2.1.21).
16. Dasgupta, p. 443.
17. Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, 8 Vols. (New
York: Doubleday, 1946-66), 1:130.
Union with God in
Plotinus and
Bayazid
Mohammad Noor Nabi
Aligarh Muslim University

Aligarh, India
Porphyry tells us that four times in a state of ecstasy Ploti-

nus was made one with God. He is aiso said to have been
ashamed that he had a body.! The last words of Plotinus
were, *Now I seek to lead back the self within me to the All
self"?
In a similar way one day a man asked Bayazid, "What is
the Throne (ArsA)?"
Bayazid answered, *I am."
He further inquired, “What is the Chair (kursi)?”
The Shaikh replied, *I am."
He again questioned, "What are the Tablet (Lauh) and the
Pen (Qalam)?"
The Shaikh said, *I am."
He then investigated about Prophets: Abraham, Moses and
Muhammad.
The Shaikh responded, *I am all of them." Then the man
talked about angels such as Jibrail, Mikail, Israfil and Izrail.
Again the Shaikh uttered, "I am all of them."
The man became silent.
227
228 MOHAMMAD NOOR NABI
Then the Shaikh explained, ‘‘Whoever loses himself in

Reality (God), with Reality he becomes Real. If he becomes
self annihilated, Reality sees Itself and there is no question of
Wonder.”’? It is further said that one day the Shaikh was
talking about Reality and was sucking the water of his own
mouth and was saying, "I am the wine and even the wine
drinker and the cupbearer.””{
The statements of both, Plotinus and Bayazid, clearly indi-
cate that they uphold the doctrine of Union with God.
But the vital problem is, What do we mean by Union with
God? |
To understand this problem it would be better first to go
through the concept of salvation of Plotinus and then the
concept of annihilation (Fana) of Bayazid. Salvation, Plotinus
says, begins with self-purification and the practice of ordinary
moral life. The practice of moral life is not only to avoid sin
but it is to do good positively. This leads to the freeing of the
soul from all bodily desire and worldly goods and to fixing its
attention upon the Nous. And this is possible through dialec-
tics, which for Plotinus is a form of philosophical analysis or
the discipline of philosophic thought wherein logic is used as
a tool for the analysis of reality. Through this analysis the
soul progressively sees itself as soul, then as Nous and then,
eventually, as an element of the ultimate. Now and now only
is soul prepared for the final ecstasy of re-union with the
One.? It must be clear at this stage that this concept of salva-
tion of Plotinus is based on his ontological and metaphysical
presuppositions and it entails the various stages of “‘epistro-
phe," ie. the return of the soul, stage by stage, to that
primal One from which it came.
After Plotinus we now come to Bayazid. Union, in the case
of Bayazid, is to annihilate oneself in God. Explaining the
concept of annihilation (Fana) Bayazid says, “When a man
annihilates himself according to the command of God and
subsists without depending on his self and the creatures (of
God) in expansion (Zast) of God; then he becomes annihi-
lated (Fani) to subsist and subsistent to annihilate, dead to be
UNION WITH GOD 229
alive and alive to be dead and veiled to be revealing and

revealing to be veiled.’’®
The Shaikh further says, “When I attained the stage of
proximity (Mugam-i-Qurb) to God, God asked me to desire. I
replied, ‘I have no desire. You (God) should demand some-
thing from me’. God responded, ‘So long as there is the
existence of Bayazid (self) even to an atom's weight, this
desire is impossible’.’’’
These statements of Bayazid imply that annihilation means
complete absorption of one’s own self in the personality of
God. In other words annihilation is self-surrender to God and
self-surrender demands complete obedience to the command
of God. Without complete obedience annihilation is not possi-
ble. Bayazid used to supplicate, “Oh God, how long there
would remain ‘I-ness’ and “Thou-ness’ between ‘Tl and ‘Thou’.
Please take up my 'I-ness' from the midst so that my 'I-ness'
may be with you because I am nothing. Oh my Lord! So long
as | am with Thee, I am the most superior to all and when I
am with myself, I am the most inferior to all.”’8
And God accepted the prayer of the Shaikh. The Shaikh
attained the stage of Fana Fillah (Annihilation in God). He
himself says, ‘A voice came from me in me that oh Thou I,"
i.e., *I reached the stage of annihilation in God.’’?
After the due analysis of Union with God in Plotinus and
Bayazid we may infer that Union in Plotinus means the return
of the soul from stage to stage to the Primal One and in
Bayazid it is the annihilation of the “I’’-“‘thou” relation. But
the fundamental issue is, Can we say that the Union with God
is an identification of the soul with God?
Before answering this question it would be desirable to
examine the concept of “ecstasy” in Plotinus and Bayazid
because the Union with God is not a philosophical or rational
stage for either, Plotinus or Bayazid; on the contrary, it is
purely a state of ecstasy wherein the soul comes into direct
contact with the One itself.
Ecstasy, Plotinus says, is the consummation of reminis-
cence. It is to release the soul from everything except God
which transforms it in such a way that it then perceives what

was previously hidden from it. This state will not be perma-
nent until our union with God is irrevocable. Here, in earthly
life, ecstasy is but a flash. It is a brief respite bestowed by the
favour of the Deity.!?
The actual term used by Bayazid for ecstasy is Ghalabat
and Sukr (Intoxication). These words denote the rapture of
love for God. Ecstasy involves the cessation of human attri-
butes, like consciousness, foresight and choice; and the
annihilation of a man’s self-control in God, so that only those
faculties survive in him that do not belong to the human
genus. Ecstasy is not acquired but it is purely a divine gift. It
is a stage where the attribution of man’s act is to God and a
man of ecstasy stands through God.!! It would be better here
to present an ecstatic state of Bayazid.
The author of the Tazkiratul Auliya narrates that once in
seclusion (in the state of ecstasy and intoxication) the Shaikh
uttered, *Subhani Ma azama Shani" (Glory be to Me! How
great is My Majesty). When the Shaikh came to his conscious-
ness, the disciples of the Shaikh repeated his utterance to
him. The Shaikh replied, “God will be your enemy, if you
hear such utterance again and do not kill me." The Shaikh
gave a knife to each disciple and instructed them, “If you
again hear such utterance from me, you should kill me." The
Shaikh again uttered the same thing and as the disciples in-
tended to kill the Shaikh, they saw the entire room full of
Bayazid. The disciples were hitting with their knives at Baya-
zid but the knives seemed as if to hit water. After a little
while the huge form of Bayazid came to be little and Bayazid
appeared as a finch in an arch. The companions told him his
previous state. The shaikh replied, "Here is Bayazid that you
see and that [form] was not Bayazid.”!?
From this narration it becomes explicit that ecstasy is a
state in which the soul is transformed in such a way that his
act remains no more his act but becomes the act of God.
Further ecstasy is a temporary phase of the soul which is
possible in earthly life.
UNION WITH GOD 231
Thus after the due analysis of the concepts of salvation,

annihilation, ecstasy and intoxication we may rightly conclude
that Union with God in Plotinus and Bayazid is not the iden-
tification of soul with God; on the contrary, it is the absorp-
tion of soul in God. Porphyry’s statement that in a state of
ecstasy Plotinus was made one with God means that Plotinus
was fully absorbed in God and absorption was such that there
did not remain any separation between them. As a drop of
water mixes with an ocean, it becomes an ocean; it never
means that a drop of water is identical with an ocean. In like
manner when a sufi or a mystic in his ecstasy attains the
union with God, it never means that he becomes identical
with God; it simply means that his own self becomes annihi-
lated and he subsists in God.
The last words of Plotinus, *Now I seek to lead back the
self within me to the All self,"!? also testifies to this conten-
tion. Imam Al-Ghazali, while commenting on “‘identity”’ says,
"These gnostics on their return from their ascent into the
heaven of Reality, confess with one voice that they saw
naught existence there, save the One Real.... They became
drunken with a drunkenness wherein the sway of their own
intelligence disappeared; so that one exclaimed, ‘I am the one
"Real" (Anal Haqq) and another, ‘Glory be to Me: How great
is My Majesty'.... Then when that drunkenness abated and
they came again under the sway of intelligence 440) which is
Allah’s balance scale upon earth, they knew that that had not
been actual Identity, but only something resembling Iden-
tity."!^
NOTES
1. Benjamin A. G. Fuller, A History of Philosophy, 3rd ed. (New

Delhi: Oxford and I. B. H. Publishing Co., 1979), p. 309.
2. George R. S. Mead, ed., Select Works of Plotinus, trans. Thomas
Taylor (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1929), pp. xix, xx.
Tazkiratul Auliya, Farid al-Din Attar (Bombay: Fath al-Karim, 1305

G2
A.H.I.), p. 102.
Ibid., p. 101.
~^ Ὁ
Plotinus, Enneads, 1.2.2; VI.9.7; VI.9.9-10.

Auliya, Farid al-Din Attar, p. 107.
~¬ ~
Ibid., pp. 100-101.

Ibid., p. 102.
@
Ibid.
ON
Plotinus, Enneads, 1.2.2; VI.9.7; VI.9.9-10.

pd
Ali B. Uthman Al-Hujwiri, The Kashf Al-Mahjub, trans. R. Nichol-

“~
—
son (London: Tuzac and Co., 1936), pp. 184-5.

Auliya, Farid al-Din Attar, pp. 89-90.
BOUM
»"ὸ but
Mead, Selected Works of Plotinus, pp. xix-xx.

us
Imam Al-Ghäzäli, Mishkat al-Anwar, trans. W. H. T. Gairdner

(London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1924), pp. 19-20.
Advaita Vedanta
and Neoplatonism
R. K. Tripathi
Banaras Hindu University
Varanasi, India
In this paper we are not taking up the historical question

regarding the influence of Upanisadic thought on Neoplatonism.
That is a rather controversial question and probably it can never
be settled. Philosophically speaking, it is not a very important
question either. What is more important is the question
regarding the doctrinal relation between Advaitism and
Neoplatonism. The similarities between the two systems have
often attracted the attention of scholars. But in philosophy,
distinctions are no less important than similarities and so we
propose to draw attention to both.
To begin with, we would like to make our position clear

about absolutism, because firstly, both Advaitism and
Neoplatonism are sometimes regarded as mere monism, and
secondly, Neoplatonism is not like other absolutisms found in
the West. Mere monism is not absolutism and that for many
reasons. Monism can even be materialistic but absolutism is
233
234 R. K. TRIPATHI
never so. Monism admits of the reality of the relative but

absolutism cannot. So we will try to lay down the necessary
features of true absolutism if only to see how far they are found
in Neoplatonism and Advaitism in particular and other types of
absolutism in general.
Obviously, every absolutism must accept reality as absolute
or independent. The absolute must necessarily be infinite and
universal or else it will be limited. This characteristic of the
absolute rules out every form of dualism though the duality of
subject and object or of matter and mind seems to be too
difficult to reject. Not only duality, but also the reality of
everything relative is denied. This feature does not seem to be
there in the absolute of Hegel and Bradley, because we find that
in these thinkers what is emphasized is totality and totality
itself is taken to be absolute and independent. This totality is
no doubt not mere totality but a synthesized and harmonious
totality, but nonetheless it is totality; what is rejected is
disharmony and contradiction and not the contents of
experience or the elements of appearances. But the totality,
howsoever harmonious, cannot be regarded as absolute as it is
dependent on its parts that are relative. In this way the absolute
ceases to be absolute or independent. In other words, there
seems to be no real transcendence here. The whole no doubt
transcends the parts but that is not the meaning of real
transcendence. As we have shown elsewhere! real transcendence
means independence from appearances or the rejection of the
relative as false. If the reality of the relative is accepted in any
form, it is bound to affect the absoluteness of the absolute.
But when we say that the absolute must transcend the
relative, it may appear as if we were talking of two realms—the
absolute and the relative. This is not so. The relatives are not
only relative to each other, they are also relative to the absolute
in the sense that their reality depends on the reality of the
absolute. If the relative were not dependent on the absolute, it
could neither conceal the absolute nor would it be necessary to
reject it as false. The relative must therefore be shown to be
dependent on the absolute. The two are not simultaneously
ADVAITA VEDANTA 235
real; when we know the one as real, the other is not there. The
reality of the relative is derived reality and it is not on its own
reality that it stands. That is why when the reality of the
absolute is discovered, the very legs on which the relative stands
are withdrawn. All reality belongs to the absolute and so the
relative is shorn of all its claim to reality. The relative is nothing
apart from the absolute, it is but a parasite on the reality of the
absolute. This means that the absolute is not only transcendent
but also immanent. There need not be any opposition between
transcendence and immanence, because immanence does not
mean that the absolute has really become the relative. What it
means is that the absolute appears as relative or is the ground of
the appearance of the relative. As absolute it is transcendent
and as ground it is immanent. The relative must have the
absolute as its ground or else it will become independent and
cease to be relative. The absolute of Hegel and Bradley cannot
be said to be immanent either, as it is not the ground but the
totality of its parts; the immanent must be independent of the
parts. The immanent must also be transcendent and vice versa.
Finally, the absolute must not only be at once immanent and
transcendent, it must also be somehow knowable. It must be
possible for man to have an experiential knowledge of the
absolute or else the absolute will remain just an idea or a myth.
Here we are facing a serious problem. How can the finite mind
of man know the infinite absolute? As knower the mind will be
apart from the absolute and if it is not, it cannot know the
absolute. In any case the absolute as infinite would not be
known and if it were known it would not be all-comprehensive.
It appears to be true that the finite human mind cannot grasp
the absolute, but this is so only if knowledge is regarded as
mental. There can be such a thing as intuitive knowledge or
knowledge by being. After all, how do we know our own selves?
We are the self and we Know it intuitively. The absolute is our
very self (atma sarvasya atma, ayam atma Brahma) and so there
is the possibility of knowing the absolute. The absolute being is
non-spatial and non-temporal, its infinity is not the infinity of
expanse; it is rather a qualitative infinity (svarüpatah).? This
236 R. K. TRIPATHI
knowledge not being admitted, in Hegel and Bradley the

absolute cannot be known.
II
Thus far, we have been dealing with the absolute. Now we

will deal with absolutism. As we have said above, it is necessary
for absolutism to show the dependence of the relative on the
absolute in a manner that the absoluteness of the absolute is not
affected in the least. The relative is related to the absolute but
the absolute is independent. In other words the relative does
not really come out of the absolute; it only appears to be so;
that 1s, the dependence of the relative on the absolute is only
epistemic and not ontological. The relative only appears to be
there, though really it is not there. This is possible only because
of the ignorance of the absolute. If so, it is necessary for every
absolutism to have a view of ignorance which makes the
appearance of the absolute possible, otherwise the relative will
remain an enigma. It is also necessary therefore for every
absolutism to accept two levels of knowledge and reality, the
empirical and the ultimate (the vyavaharika and the
paramarthika). It is obvious that we do not find this distinction
in Hegel and Bradley nor do we find a satisfactory view of
ignorance.
There is yet another question worth consideration for every
absolutism. Is it possible for man, purely on the basis of reason,
to assert that there is such a thing as the absolute? Reason at its
best may, it seems to us, only speculate about the possibility of
the absolute and may accept or reject the possibility. Even if
the possibility is accepted, reason cannot positively affirm that
the absolute is really there. Even if the possibility is somehow
affirmed, is it possible for reason to show the way of knowing
the absolute experientially? Certainly not; reason is confined to
concepts only. So how are we to be positively sure that the
absolute is there, that it can be experienced and that it can be
experienced in such and such manner? It is here that we see the
ADVAITA VEDANTA 237
incompetence of unaided reason and the necessity of taking

help from scriptures or Sruti. It is only sruti whose message is
based on experience that can categorically affirm the absolute
and can not only assure us of the possibility of knowing the
absolute but can also tell us the way the absolute can be
experienced. Our readiness to depend on the scripture or Sruti is
not a mark of dogmatism but a mark of our critical awareness
of the limits of reason as also of our earnestness to seek the
absolute. An earnest seeker would not make a fuss about the
acceptance of Sruti in the name of the autonomy of philosophy.
He has receptivity and humility. Arrogance of the mind and
search for the absolute go but ill together.
HI
Let us now turn to Advaitism and Neoplatonism. As every

student of the two schools knows, there are striking similarities
not only regarding the views of Plotinus and Sarhkara but also
spiritual virtues such as freedom from worldly aspirations and a
keen desire to attain the spiritual goal. For Plotinus, as for
Sarhkara, philosophy was a way of life or the light of life rather
than mere speculation. Both gave priority to contemplation as
against action. In fact we are told that Plotinus used to have
ecstasy or samadhi as it is called in India. Both believed that
spiritual teaching is something secret and sacred and is therefore
to be imparted to the chosen few, those who had the necessary
cathartic virtues. Both rejected ritualism.
In the same manner there are many points of similarity
between the philosophy of Samkara and that of Plotinus.
Attention to these similarities has been well drawn by Mead.?
We may also notice them here. Corresponding to Brahman,
I$vara and souls of Advaitism we have in Plotinus the
conception of the One, the ultimate reality from which
proceeds the Nous which in its turn gives rise to World Soul and
souls. Like Brahman, the One is formless, infinite and universal;
it is not only free from external duality but also internal change
238 R. K. TRIPATHI
(svagat bheda); it is not a being but the being of beings (Sat)

and not a good but the good (Anand). Creation for Plotinus is a
kind of radiation or emanation, the essence of which is that it
does not affect in the least the source of emanation (Purnasya
Purna Madaya Purnamevavasisyate). The One alone being real,
the world of plurality and change is unreal, matter being a
principle of non-being or darkness. Man 1s essentially one with
One (ayamatma Brahma) but until he has realised that unity, he
has to go through different births and can be born even as an
animal. This unity with the One is of the nature of identity; in
other words, man has only to discover his real nature to find
that he is the One. This discovery is not merely intellectual, it is
a kind of awakening, it is intuitive. Not only moral virtues but
also cathartic virtues, especially freedom from desire for
enjoyment (vairagya), and the practice of dialectic are necessary
for intuitive wisdom or illumination. Nothing remains to be
achieved after that (A pta Kama, Akama).
IV
The philosophy of Plotinus has been characterized in many

ways. It is sometimes said to be a blending of Platonism and
Aristotelianism.* But to us it seems that Neoplatonism is more
Platonic than Aristotelian. Plato’s distinction between knowl-
edge and opinion; his conception of the Idea of the Good as
supreme reality; his use of the simile of the sun as radiating
light? seem to be dominant in Plotinus and to go against the
realism and pluralism of Aristotle. Aristotle’s ethical views and
his views of dialectic are also different. In the same way, the
characterization of Neoplatonism as pantheism or subjective
idealism® does not seem to be correct. If it is to be called
pantheism, it is pantheistic only in the sense in which all
absolutism has to be pantheistic, that is, in the sense that reality
is the ground of appearance and not in the sense that it has
become appearance. We must not ignore the emphasis of
Plotinus on negation. As Armstrong puts it, “The essential
ADVAITA VEDANTA 239
feature of this philosophy is the denial of the limitation of the

self, of all individual personality." But in no sense is the
philosophy of Plotinus to be called subjective idealism as the
term is understood in Western thought. It is no doubt idealism
in the sense that the supreme reality is spiritual but it is
certainly not subjective idealism. The appearance is subjective
or false but subjective not in the empirical sense. We stress this
point because sometimes Advaitism also is mistakenly called
subjective idealism. Even that school of Advaitism (drsti Srsti
vada) according to which the universe is because of our seeing it
holds that the ignorance which makes the appearance of the
appearance possible is of transcendental nature; it is not
subjective in the empirical sense but in the Kantian sense.
In our view Neoplatonism is better characterized as a kind of

absolutism or even Advaitism.® Most of the features of
absolutism as pointed out above are shared by Neoplatonism.
The One is infinite and unchangeable. As transcendent it is
beyond thought and speech but as the ground of everything it is
also immanent. And though transcendent, it is intuitively
knowable as it is one with our real self. The world of plurality
and change, though dependent on the One, is false and not real.
The whole idea is briefly put in one line by Advaitism, ““Brahma
satyam Jaganmithyà jiva Brahmaiva naarah” (Brahman is real,
the world is false, Brahman and the self are one and not
different). The philosophy of Plotinus, like the philosophy of
Sarhkara, is not mere monism as there is definite denial of
change and plurality. It is sometimes said that the world of
plurality being an emanation from the One cannot be false and
if it is false it cannot be called emanation.? There is no doubt
that there is some difficulty regarding the idea of emanation,
but to us it seems that the very significance of the idea of
emanation is two-fold. Firstly, it does not mean any change in
the One, and secondly, it does not affect the absoluteness of the
240 R. K. TRIPATHI
One. If so, the phenomenal world has got to be false.

Emanation is neither transformation of the One nor absolute
creation but a kind of radiation or overflow which least affects
the source. The One only lends reality to or allows itself to be
the ground of appearance. This is the freedom of the absolute.
Emanation therefore cannot be also understood as emanation in
Kashmir Saivism where Siva and Sakti (power to evolve) are one
and the world is a real manifestation; but there is no motion in
the One of Plotinus.
Although the system of Plotinus comes closest to Advaitism,
yet some differences are there. Plotinus no doubt regards the
world as appearance and also talks of the fall of man as
ignorance of his real self, but he does not elaborate any theory
of ignorance or avidya as is done in Advaitism. There seems to
be no doubt that Plotinus does not regard ignorance as mere
absence of knowledge!? and takes ignorance to be the source of
all evil!! and matter to be unreal.!? Ignorance is neither fully
positive (bhava) nor utterly negative but apparently positive
(bhàva rüpa) or different from both. Advaitism makes it clear
that ignorance is not positive because it is negated and it is not
wholly negative as it gives to appearance; being different from
both being and non-being (sky flower) it is really indescribable
(anirvacaniya) in terms of the real and the unreal. Advaitism
further explains that ignorance has two powers—the power of
projecting the false (Viksepa) and the power of concealing
(Avarana) the real. As pointed out above, no absolutism can
afford to ignore the importance of a theory of ignorance,
because without that there can be neither an explanation for
appearance nor any logical ground to reject appearance as false.
In this regard Neoplatonism falls short of Advaitism.
There is yet another point to be considered. Sarhkara starts
with an analysis of illusion (adhyasa) and on that basis comes to
the conclusion that what is sublated (badhita) is false and what
is not sublated (abadhita) is real. In the rope-snake example the
snake is sublated and the rope is not sublated. But in principle,
the rope too or all that appears like snake is likely to be
sublated. So the question arises: Is the world also sublated
ADVAITA VEDANTA 241
anytime and is there anything which is never sublated? Reason

alone can neither assert that the world is sublated nor that there
is something which is never sublated. Here sruti or scripture
comes to our rescue and tells us that Brahman or Atman can
never be sublated (Trikalabadhita) and that the world is
sublated when Brahman is known. So Sruti seems to be
indispensable. But does Plotinus depend on sruti? Apparently
he seems to depend only on dialectic which is the process of
going up from the sensible world to the One—though the
principles of dialectic are given to a receptive man by Nous, yet
Plotinus admits that someone is needed to show him the way.!?
We know that Plotinus had a Guru or teacher called Ammonius
Saccas and so in the case of Plotinus the Guru takes the place of
Sruti or scripture. The Upanisads very clearly tell us that he
alone knows who has a teacher (A caryavan puruso veda).
So we come to the conclusion that Neoplatonism has to be
regarded as an absolutism of the Advaitic type. The two systems
share most of the essential features of absolutism, though
Advaitism does so more. There seems to be a kind of
incompleteness in Neoplatonism. Our comparison does not
intend to suggest that Neoplatonism was actually influenced by
Upanisadic thought, though the possibility is not ruled out as
held by some scholars.
NOTES
1. R. Κα. Tripathi, “Transcendence,” Anvisiki, Vol. IV, No. 3 (July,

1971). |
2. A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 57.
3. George R. S. Mead, ed., Select Works of Plotinus, trans. Thomas
Taylor (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1929), Preface. See also Advai-
tism and Neo-Platonism by J. F. Staal (University of Madras,
1961).
4. R. Baine Harris, “A Brief Description of Neoplatonism," The Signi-
ficance of Neoplatonism (Albany, New York: State University of
New York Press, 1976), p. 3.
242 R. K. TRIPATHI
5. Plato, Republic, 509.

6. A. H. Armstrong, ‘‘Plotinus and India," Classical Quarterly 30
(1936), p. 24.
7, Ibid., p. 22.
8. Staal, Advaitism and Neo-Platonism; see n. 80, p. 179. But on p.
203, Staal says that ‘‘the Neo-Platonic position is between the
monotheistic and Advaitic position but nearer to the latter.”
9. Ibid., p. 193.
10. Ibid., p. 195.
11. Ibid., p. 89.
12. Ibid., p. 190.
13. A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, p. 128.
The Concept of
Human Estrangement
in Plotinism and
Samkara Vedanta
Ramakant Sinari
Indian Institute of Technology

Bombay, India
The unique characteristic of different transcendence theories

in philosophy is that they have emerged out of man’s basic
feeling of being placed in a world whose affairs are unable to
contain his aspirations totally. For all purposes this feeling has
remained the pivot around which transcendentalists have woven
their thoughts. There is something indemonstrable and yet
existentially certain about this feeling: it underlies all our
preoccupations with objects and situations in the world. The
awareness that the everyday world is the world of contingents
and finites and represents only the surface of Being might not
dawn on everybody with equal intensity. People take time to
realise that our life conceals a kind of ontological separation of
ourselves from our “roots,” that this separation has made us
perpetual seekers of quietude and security, that it is behind our
most unpredictable moods of restlessness, boredom, dejection,
anguish, and insignificance. The main program of transcendence
philosophies is to ratiocinate and articulate this separation and
sometimes to develop a salvation ethics that is supposed to rise
from it. Plotinus’s Neoplatonism and Samkara's Advaita
243
244 RAMAKANT SINARI
Vedanta, two of the most comprehensive transcendental

philosophies in the world, are aimed at both these ends. Their
thrust is to speculate on the condition of the "fallen"
man—man estranged from Being, from that hidden oceanic
expanse within him that seems to be the raison d'etre of all his
experiences—and show the way for his self-recovery.
The Hellenic tradition, like the Hindu-Buddhist tradition in
the ancient Orient, accentuated the ontological as against the
empirical in man. It visualised man as an open-ended act
yearning to encompass the meaning of all existence. For
instance, Heraclitus (500 B.C.) speaks of Logos or the rational
principle running through the universe, and about man as a
being destined “‘to understand the intelligence by which all
things are steered through all things." Man's spirit, he held, is
open toward the Logos. For Parmenides, the junior
contemporary of Heraclitus, the ontological ground of
everything is Being and it is comprehensible through rational
thought. Being, he said, is the One, changeless, undifferentiated,
united, and inclusive of all that is. Pure thought points at it. It
transcends the world of our sense experiences. To Anaxagoras,
who figured circa 480 B.C., mind is the motivating force behind
the whole world-process and must be referred to as the very
device that enables us to construct our world-experience.
Anaxagoras condemns the “‘weakness of the sense-perceptions”’
which prevent us from reaching the truth.
The principal design of the thinkers of the Upanisads (the
source books of Indian thought, the oldest of which might have
been composed circa 1000 B.C.) was to capture the
transphenomenal foundation of our being in the world and to
map out the entire urge for transcendence we feel while we are
still submerged in worldliness. The polarity between the
transphenomenal and the phenomenal, the transcendental and
the immanent, or the eternal and the temporary, is the central
theme of Upanisadic thought. Man’s ordinary, empirical life
(called Jiva) to which the world is real is looked upon by the
Upanisadic sages as transitory, laden with ignorance (avidya),
illusory, and subject to suffering and evil. Our constant
CONCEPT OF HUMAN ESTRANGEMENT 245
endeavor is to reach the infinite, the eternal, the qualityless, the

timeless. Our thirst is for the beyond, the most comprehensive,
the wholesome, and until we are able to touch it our feeling of
being estranged from what we ideally are is inevitable.
In Greek philosophy, as in ancient Indian philosophies,
theories center around the transcendental-immanent horizons of
human consciousness. They embody a certain attitude—the
attitude of rejecting the empirically given with a view to
encompassing the essential or transphenomenal. Actually, if one
limits one’s interests to the world of objects and stays rigidly
adhered to the phenomenal, one is likely to forever overlook
the most natural inward-seeing act of one’s consciousness. As
Heidegger pointedly says, one’s attention must slowly move
from one’s condition in the world to one’s specific way of
transcending this condition in the realization of Being.! The
philosophies—empiricism, positivism, etc.—that today embody
the assumption that a flight from the phenomenal toward the
transphenomenal is arbitrary remain markedly unconcerned
about the basic quest of the human self. For the recognition of
this quest a reference to that which transcends the given, that is,
to that which is incomprehensible through scientific thought
and language, must be accepted as legitimate. Transcendentalists
everywhere have repudiated the ability of the phenomenal to
contain the movement of consciousness toward Being, i.e.,
toward its own basis.
Plotinus’s (205-270 A.D.) conception of the transcendence-
immanence nexus human consciousness reflects is highly
representative of the Being theories that went before him. The
single forceful idea which runs through all his six Enneads is
that although the transcendental or “‘divine’’ realm (the One)
is the true home of man, the spatio-temporal and practical
world in which man (the All-Soul) lives is not unreal but a
necessary completion of the One. The first emanation of the
One is Nous. Nous is the eternal creative principle, the Divine
Mind, the intellectual universe. It is the total and universal
mind-stuff having a potentiality of diversifying itself into
246 RAMAKANT SINARI
multiple intelligences, which we ourselves are. Man as a sensi-

ble and self-conscious being is not cut off from Nous (or, for
that matter, from Divinity), but as one possessing and having
concern for his body and living amidst material things is lower
than his transcendental source.
The One or Divinity is pure spontaneity and includes with-
in its compass of self-expression everything that is or can be.
It is manifest in man through his self-experience, i.e., through
his experience of inner space into which his whole being runs
as it were. Kierkegaard, the modern existentialist, refers to the
One as the experience of “‘passionate inwardness" or ‘pure
subjectivity.’ In fact the notable feeling we have of being
uncompromised with the world or with ourselves speaks of
our being away from the One. The One is the ontological self
that we really are. There could be no estrangement, no sense
of being fallen apart, had we not been born with a self that
extends into the region of the absolute, the transphenomenal,
the qualityless. The One is there already in us, but we have to
realize it in order fo be it.
The One, according to Plotinus, comprises three hypostases
or principles: Itself or the Good, the Nous, and the All-Soul
or Soul of the All. Two rather intricately conceived distinc-
tions occur repeatedly in Plotinus’s writings: the distinction
between the One and the Nous and that between the Nous
and the individual souls (the All-Soul). In fact there is no
justification for the distinction he so ardently draws between
the One and the Nous, for both these notions denote the
organic totality of all that is. The One, Plotinus says, is pure
will, pure unity, absolute love, and the cause and ground of
all being.? Being Divinity itself, it is self-directed, self-loving,
eternally creating itself, and returning upon itself. It is the
Good, "light above light," “the active First Cause," the Abso-
lute, the denial of all limitations, “‘the Infinite Self," the
supreme source of all substances.’ Plotinus, however, argues
that the One does not by itself come within the reach of
human knowledge. There is a certain distance between what
the human self is capable of “‘seeing”” through the transcen-

dental act and what it is as it is in the world. The One is not
accessible to us directly—it is reached by us through the Nous,
which is the transphenomenal essence of our consciousness.
The Nous (also described by Plotinus as the Intellectual
Cosmos) is a bridge between man and the One. There is no
way for man’s ascent to the One except through self-
knowledge and self-transformation. Being of the nature of the
deepest experience our consciousness is capable of, Nous is
the destination of our inward-seeing act.* Within our subjec-
tivity we are much more than what we figure in the empirical
world. As Nous we are the totality of all realizable mental
powers. Human souls, Plotinus points out, are an emanation
of Nous, which is the genesis of all that is good, beautiful,
and intelligent in them.
In many sections of the Enneads, as A. H. Armstrong tells
us, Plotinus describes the One in terms almost identical with
those applied to Nous? Both are characterized, for example,
as the ground of all beings, the origin and totality of things,
the unpredicable unity. Indeed here and there Plotinus
emphasizes the purely noetic aspect of the One and accounts
for Nous’s being the primal stage in the emergence of the
universe from God. In Nous, he remarks, the One finds its
complete “radiation.” It descends into the organic universal
whole through Nous.
In any case, the One of Plotinus is the ultimate divine
reality divisible into two—the Universal Mind and that which
holds itself beyond it. The latter is of the nature of perfect
transcendence, the One itself, or pure spirit hiding the poten-
cy of variegated mental and material creations. Generally,
Neoplatonists, following the Pythagorean-Platonic tradition,
allude to this, “the Highest of the high," as Infinite Dyad.
Plotinus’s speculations on the condition of man in the
world are not without ambiguity. Although the world and
human souls in it are inherent to the Nous, the very world-
experience (with its vicissitudes, contradictions, finitude, and
248 RAMAKANT SINARI
contingency) represents man’s estrangement from his ontologi-

cal home. Plotinus asserts that our being situated in time and
Space is not without the process of the One. The world has
no explanation except in terms of the logic of Divinity’s self-
manifestation. And yet so long as the human soul dwells in
the world it experiences a state of uprootedness. The ontolo-
gical in man, the divine spirit flowing toward itself via him so
to say, keeps him summoned perpetually. Nous’s elusive call
in him lifts him above his worldly engagements. In the face of
worldly happenings, therefore, man lives a restless life.
There is a striking similarity between Plotinus’s under-
standing of man’s relation to the Nous and Sarhkara’s® theory
of the bondage of human consciousness. Sarhkara, like Ploti-
nus, is an explorer of the ontological domain of human exis-
tence, and what he produces is an intellectual system as
firmly based on the self's experience of transcendence as
Plotinus's is.
Sarhkara’s mission was to realise the ultimate meaning of
human existence. As an interpreter and reconstructor of the
metaphysical thought of the Upanisads Samkara was indeed
committed to the ethics of salvation (moksa) which is the
very backbone of the Upanisadic compositions. However when
we examine the whole structure of his philosophy we see that
it hinges on one profound observation, viz., that amidst every-
thing that consciousness knows and does not know, or can
know and cannot know, it has the peculiar characteristic of
acting as a transphenomenal seer-unto-itself. This characteristic
which Sarnkara has described by the word ätman (pure con-
sciousness), or more appropriately säksin (witnessing con-
sciousness), constitutes the principal ontological assumption of
his system. Like Plotinus's Nous-All-Soul relation, Samkara's
Brahman-atman (Being-self) relation is resolvable into a kind
of two-faces-of-the-same-coin theory.
In Sarhkara Vedänta, as in Plotinism, Being or Brahman 1s
defined as the totality of all things, the ultimate basis of all
strata of experience, the highest fusion of truth, knowledge,
and eternity. There is nothing that does not depend on
Brahman or has not come out of it. It is the supreme intellect

governing all phenomena. Intelligence, matter, space, time,
causality, change, and all those categories through which we
discern the reality of the world have their origin in Brahman.
The Upanisads say that the nature of Brahman cannot be
exactly defined. They often use negative terms to convey
what Brahman-experience could possibly amount to. Even
contradictory attributes are ascribed to it. The Brhadaranyaka
Upanisad states that it is like “light and no light, desire and
absence of desire, anger and absence of anger, righteousness
and absence of righteousness."" In the Katha Upanisad, it is
characterized as “‘smaller than the small, greater than the great,
sitting and yet moving, lying and yet going everywhere."
Like the One or Nous in Neoplatonism, Brahman is taken
both by the Upanisads and Sarhkara as Supreme Spirit or Pure
Essence, self-expressing, self-shining, and self-validating.
Samkara's transcendentalism is ostensibly world-rejecting.
By positing the Supreme Being (Brahman) as the ultimate
cause of all existence, a life-force capable of manifesting itself
through diverse products, Sarhkara annuls the very reality of
the world. Although everything emanates from Brahman, he
argues, Brahman is not tied to its emanation. Like Plotinus's
Divinity it is wholesome and creative because its presence is
felt through all creation. Sarhkara says that the universe has
appeared as the effect of something which is absolutely real
(satyam), eternally conscious (jaànam), and infinite (anantam
Brahman). The universe is a variegated pattern and cannot
have originated from a cause which is not absolutely perfect
and self-caused. This self-caused cause, viz., Brahman, Samkara
asserts, expresses itself through an infinite number of things
(nàma-rupa) all of which are appearances. Thus the universe,
compared to the primordial reality of Brahman, is an appear-
ance.
What Plotinus states about the One or the absolute is
almost an echo of Sarhkara’s understanding of Brahman. Ploti-
nus writes:
250 RAMAKANT SINARI
...in the One itself there is complete identity of

knower and known, no distinction existing between
being and knowing, contemplation and its object
constituting a living thing....
... Being is limitless; in all the overflow from it

there is no lessening either in its emanation nor in
itself. ...
Its nature is that nothing can be affirmed of it—not

existence, not essence, not life—It transcends all
these.?
Both Plotinus and Sarhkara argue that the Real at the heart
of the universe is reflected in the depth of the human soul.
This depth is denoted by Sarhkara, following the Upanisadic
insight, by the word aiman. Insofar as their ontological aspect
is concerned, there is no distinction between Brahman and
àtman just as there is none between Nous and the individual
souls. Atman is only an individuation or a kind of reflection
of Brahman in man. Throughout Indian philosophy the identi-
ty between Brahman and atman is presumed.
However, although Brahman as the Supreme Being and
atman as the individual self are not fundamentally distinct
from each other, to every individual his own empirical exis-
tence is a unique fact. In its essence atman is of the nature of
highly intuitive knowledge, pure consciousness, total transcen-
dence, but in its worldly state it finds itself to be a stranger,
that is, to have lost its self-identity. Atman’s whole endeavor
is to realise its own being which is somehow lost.
According to Sarhkara, our phenomenal or vyavaharika
existence represents our estrangement from our original trans-
cendental or paramarthika state. The standpoint to which we
are accustomed in our ordinary life does not originate from
our transcendental being but from a misguiding and deluding
agency, called avidya or ignorance, operating in us. Avidya
inauthenticates Brahman or atman and reduces it from the
transphenomenal to the phenomenal tier. As individuals on
the phenomenal tier, that is, as souls overwhelmed by the

affairs of the world or samsara, we live a life of homelessness,
dereliction, and ennui.
Actually there is no problem of estrangement unless one is
aware that one has fallen out of a reality to which one ought
to be harmoniously related. Man would not have been envel-
oped by loneliness had he been in unison with his inner
space. As Heidegger says, all our attitudes toward things in
life are colored with a kind of *homesickness."!? We seem to
have run asunder from our native land, the ontological source
of our existence, and descended deep into the crevice of
temporality. The estranged constantly moves along a passage
between a state of forlornness and the imperative I-should-be-
my-real-self. The most striking characteristic of our worldly
self is that it feels that it lives a fractured existence and that
it is in quest of a state of being unlike anything that it can
experience on the phenomenal plane.
What is peculiar and undoubtedly paradoxical about human
consciousness is that it is phenomenal and transphenomenal at
the same time. Plotinus underlines this paradox throughout
his reflections on the Nous-All-Soul relationship. He does not
reject the vividness of the experience we have of living as
*bodied" and in a material world. the sense-world is existent,
engaging, and inescapable. But compared to the transphenom-
enal world, that is, the world of the One or Brahman, this
world is a confinement. In Indian philosophy it is described as
bondage; Plotinus suggests that it is like a prison or cave.!!
Man lives in this world like a stranger, an alien. Although we
are born in a physical, spatio-temporal universe and are
endowed with empirical consciousness, we are not completely
bound up to it. [t is because man is ontologically higher than
what he is “‘condemned”’ to be in the world that he feels for-
lorn.
For Sarhkara the self or àtman is worldly and trans-worldly,
saguna (having qualities) and nirguna (qualityless) at one and
the same time.!? The two antithetical attributes of the human
self respond to two distinct points of view. Understood as the
252 RAMAKANT SINARI
innermost subjectivity perceived from within, the atman-

experience constitutes a domain about which it is impossible
to make logical statements. The indubitable truth, Sarhkara
says, is that the pure and self-luminous 21777077 is not grasped
by our rational thought but by the suprarational insight inher-
ent in us. Our world-consciousness, on the other hand, is the
mundane aspect of our existence. In the whole Vedanta tradi-
tion, man as a being conscious of the world is described as
jiva. Jiva is thus the condemned form of àtman, i.e., atman's
inauthentication and self-estrangement shows up in jiva.
Samkara looks upon jiva (literally, soul) as pure consciousness
under the spell of a kind of self-deception or ignorance
(avidya).
Plotinus is not a total world-rejecter, at least not to the
extent of dismissing the world impressions we have as unreal.
Having mastered the paths trodden by Plato and Aristotle
before him, he makes a compromise between two apparently
unresolvable positions, viz., “transcendence alone is true" and
"the source of all that is essential or formal is to be bound in
particulars." For Plotinus human souls are born in the world
as "bodied" because of their original proneness to sin, fall, or
degradation. The world, however, is not their permanent
abode. Plotinus writes:
This is the fall of the soul, this entry into matter;

thence its weakness; not all the faculties of its being
retain free play, for matter hinders their manifesta-
tion; it encroaches upon the soul's territory and, as
it were, crushes the soul back and turns to evil what
it has stolen until that finds strength to rise again.!°
There is almost a reverberation of the theory of the Nous-

All-Soul hypostases in Samkara's idea of the transcendental-
empirical aspects of atman. According to Plotinus, the Nous is
not a unidirectional and finished reality but a sort of going-
out-of-itself and turning-within-itself act. That is why individ-
ual human souls, despite their being concerned about the
world ordinarily, find themselves as acts of will thrusting

ahead. By their very ontological make-up they exhibit a thirst
for eternity, a longing for Being, an urge for de-estrangement.
The nature of human soul, Plotinus explains,
is twofold, being of divine station but skirting the

sense-known nature; thus, while it communicates to
this realm something of its own store, it absorbs in
turn whenever it plunges in an excessive zeal to the
very midst of this sphere; though even thus it is
always able to recover itself by turning to account
the experience of what it has seen and suffered
here, learning so the greatness of existence in the
Supreme and more clearly discerning the finer
things by contrast with their opposites. The experi-
ence of evil brings the clearer perception of good.!*
Thus for Plotinus and Sarmkara man is born with a call

from the Absolute, the Nous, the Divine, or Brahman. The
ontological in us transmits this call. By functioning in the
world man does not really sink into self-oblivion. The quest
for the transphenomenal forms the core of his life's activities.
Human consciousness is a whole and does not permit of a
permanent cleavage within itself. The transcendental and the
phenomenal, the paramarthika and the vyavaharika, the atman
and the jiva are therefore facets or dimensions of the same
integral reality, the same human soul.
The progression from the empirical to the transcendental is
a process within the realm of one's own consciousness. It is a
journey from one's experience of the solidly existent world,
i.e., the world of static externals, to the world of one's own
"inside." In fact in every state or act of our mind we surpass
ourselves as outer-directed beings and “flow” inward toward
what can be described as the pre-reflective and pre-conscious
expanse. This expanse is not fully verbalizable. Because of its
immensely elusive and metalinguistic nature the Upanisads
have used negative epithets to denote it. The Buddhists
254 RAMAKANT SINARI
equated it with Emptiness (sünyatä). Buddhists very signifi-

cantly emphasize its holistic, subjective, and existential realiza-
tion by one in one’s own inner space—that. is, one intuits it as
“oneness of being and non-being.”!5 Plotinus and Sarnkara do
not overtly stretch their negative characterization of Being to
the extent of emptying it out, but still their repeated sugges-
tion that it is unpredicable and unverbalizable takes it close to
Buddhists’ Nothing. Consciousness’ transcendence is ultimately
the indication of the invitation Being exercises on it.
There is perhaps no other expression of human reality
which is as mysterious as its being in the world and being at
the same time a project beyond the world. Man is a self-
Surpassing movement, a perpetual act of being and non-being,
a highly ambiguous oscillation between the phenomenal and
the transphenomenal. Nothing posits itself as stable and fin-
ished to human consciousness. We “‘fly’’ over the realised free-
dom, beyond the fulfilled state of our being, and beyond all
that we are in this world. A continuous state of awakening to
the primordial foundation of our existence, that is, to our
ontological roots as it were, leaves us with a feeling of being
self-estranged. The story of man is the story of his endeavor
to overcome this feeling.
NOTES
1. For Heidegger, man hides the possibility of reaching his ontological

basis, viz., Being. See Arne Naess’s study of Heidegger in his Four
Modern Philosophers (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1968).
2. Grace H. Turnball, comp., The Essence of Plotinus, based on the
translation by Stephen Mackenna (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1934), pp. 196-7.
Ibid., p. 197.
e
4. Ibid., pp. 194-5. Nous, like pure consciousness or Brahman in

Indian philosophy, can be said to express itself through our
inward-seeing act. See my Structure of Indian Thought (Springfield,
IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1970), pp. 60-61.
9. A. H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in

the Philosophy of Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1940), p. 2.
Sarhkara (8th century A.D.) is perhaps the most creative thinker of
ancient India. He is known for his nondualistic system of Being
known as Advaita Vedanta. This system basically adheres to the
metaphysical position set in the Upanisads.
S. Radhakrishnan, ed., The Principal Upanisads (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1953), p. 278.
Ibid., p. 617.
Turnball, The Essence of Plotinus, pp. 115-16.
Karl Rahner, “Introduction au concept de philosophie existentiale
chez Heidegger,” in Recherches de science religieuse (1940), p. 153.
11. Plotinus’s idea that man’s being in the world is almost like his
being in a cave perhaps has its origin in Plato’s famous cave myth.
See for a penetrating reflection on this, J. N. Findlay, The Trans-
cendence of the Cave (London: Allen & Unwin, 1967), pp. 137-59.
12. For this characterization of Brahman or atman see The Sacred
Books of the East, Vol. xxxiv, Sankaracarya: Commentary on the
Vedànta-sütras, trans. George Thibaut (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass,
1962), pp. 243 ff.
13. Turnball, The Essence of Plotinus, p. 58.
14. Ibid., p. 150.
15. A very insightful comparison between Being in Indian philosophy
and Emptiness in Buddhism is made by Masao Abe. See his *Non-
Being and MU-The Metaphysical Nature of Negativity in the East
and the West," in Religious Studies, 11, pp. 181-92.
Plotinus and
Sri Aurobindo:
A Comparative Study
Pritibhushan Chattery1
Calcutta University
Calcutta, India
Ever since the dim dawn of speculation man has been

inquiring into the nature of this universe and his place there-
in. He has been raising and discussing the questions: How
came this universe into existence? Whence are we? Whither
are we? Man’s curiosity about the how, the whence and the
whither gave rise to science and philosophy. In the early stage
of human thought science and philosophy were inseparable,
but gradually science separated itself from philosophy and
kept itself confined to sense-experience. But philosophers, at
least many of them, preferred to transcend the empirical
world and raised questions about meta-empirical Reality. What
is the nature of the Ultimate Reality? Is it one or many? Is it
conscious or unconscious? How is the finite world—especially
the world of selves—related to the Ultimate Reality? These are
some of the perennial problems to the solution of which
philosophers of different ages and climes have formulated
different theories and world-views. Of course, some have
257
258 PRITIBHUSHAN CHATTERJI
adopted a negative attitude and have denied the utility and

even the validity of metaphysical questions. We are not con-
cerned with them. We are here specially concerned with two
great thinkers—Plotinus and Sri Aurobindo—who, though
separated by a gap of sixteen hundred years and long
stretches of land, offered some constructive suggestions to the
solution of the metaphysical problems of perennial interest.
The two thinkers have different philosophical traditions and
historical and cultural backgrounds. Plotinus was born in 205
A.D. in Upper Egypt and was probably a “Hellenised Egyp-
tian," whereas Sri Aurobindo was born in India in 1872,
educated in Britain according to the English pattern of school-
ing, and later on turned nationalist Indian and drank deeply
of Indian lore.
In the present paper we devote ourselves to a comparative
study of these two great thinkers.
11
The philosophy of Plotinus is an integrated one. The entire

classical Greek philosophy casts its shadow upon his philoso-
phy. He develops a full-fledged theory of the One in the
Platonic tradition. He is also influenced by Aristotle and the
Stoics. But he does not simply combine Plato, Aristotle and
the Stoics—his writings display the unity of the vision of the
entire Greek philosophy. Much in the same way Sri Auro-
bindo also formulates an integrated philosophy—a philosophy
which effects an integration of the different typesof philoso-
phy, Indian and Western, ancient and modern, and yet bears a
distinct stamp of originality.
These two master minds are concerned with the nature and
character of the Ultimate Reality and of the relation of the
world to it. Both of them believe in one Supreme spiritual
Reality as the ultimate source of everything. While Plotinus
owes his inspiration to Plato, Sri Aurobindo owes his to the
philosophy of the Upanisads as developed in the Vedanta. Sri
PLOTINUS AND SRi AUROBINDO 259
Aurobindo characterizes the Supreme Reality as Sat-Cit-

Ananda, i.e., Existence-cum-Consciousness-cum-Bliss. Plotinus,
however, does not describe the One in any such way, but it is
implicit in his system that the One is existence-cum-conscious-
ness, for it is the first principle of Being and the ultimate
source of Intellect and souls. Plotinus points out that no
adequate description of the One is possible, for human lan-
guage is quite unfit for the task. Following the Upanisadic
ideal Sri Aurobindo also holds that the Supreme Reality is
also beyond the grasp of human reason. Both Plotinus and Sri
Aurobindo agree that all things move out of the Supreme
Reality and all finally move towards it.
11
Before we take up a detailed comparative study let us have

a brief survey of the philosophy of Plotinus.
Plotinus conceives of a Trinity which is constituted by
three hypostases, viz., the One, the Nous and the Soul.
The One is the first member of the Trinity. But how to
prove it? The proof is provided by two doctrines formulated
by Plotinus: (a) the doctrine of emanation, and (b) the doc-
trine of intuitive experience.
The entire world must have come out of some source. In so
far as the world is one system, the source must be the same.
Hence it may be presumed that the world is an emanation
from some one higher principle. Moreover, the One is realized
by many seers in their mystical experience. Though this
experience is incommunicable, those that have it are con-
vinced of its validity and they welcome others who would
follow them. Indeed, the heart has “reason” which the logical
intellect knows not of.
The primal One pervades the entire world-system and in
this sense it is omnipresent. But the One is also other than
everything that we experience in this world. As it is other
than everything elsewhere, it is "nowhere," i.e., not existing
in a particular point of space or in a particular thing. The One

is unique and hence it cannot have any parallel or anything
similar to it. It is infinite—it is the greatest and the highest,
not quantitatively, but qualitatively. It is infinite, not because
it cannot be counted or measured, but because it eludes all
attempts at comprehension. It is the greatest, not because it
has the highest degree of magnitude, but because it has the
highest potentiality. It is the highest, not because it has the
greatest height, but because we cannot imagine anything
higher than this. It is also the highest Good, because it 15
above all goods. There is no earthly good to which it is subor-
dinate or which it tries to acquire by effort. It does not aspire
after anything, but all things aspire after it. Instead of the
One becoming good in association with others, those others
that participate in it become good. It is free, because nothing
can conceal its self-manifestation.
The One produces the Nous (which is rather imperfectly
translated as “Mind” or *"Intellect"), and the Nous in its turn
produces the World-soul or Soul of the Whole. This third
principle is directly responsible for the production of all
earthly existents. This sort of serial production is to be under-
stood as the preceding member of the series delegating its
potentiality to the succeeding member. As Whittaker explains,
*As mind looks back to the One, Soul looks back to the
Mind and this looking back is identical with the process of
generation.”’! It should, however, be borne in mind that this
order of first, second and third principles is to be taken
neither in the spatial nor in the temporal sense; but their
priority and posteriority is to be understood in the logical
sense.
But why should the One indulge in Creation at all? Plotinus
replies that since the One contains the potency for all, it
cannot but manifest itself, for potency without an express
manifestation becomes meaningless. If there is sun, there must
be light; similarly, if the One is, then the Nous as its manifes-
tation must be. As the sun is to the light, so is the One to the
Nous. The One has its eternal "irradiation" in the form of the
PLOTINUS AND ऽर AUROBINDO 261
Noûs.? Just as man becomes conscious of himself through

self-consciousness, so the One may be said to “‘see’’ itself
through the light of the Noüs. The One is prior to all
thought and Being, and so it requires something, viz., Nous,
that would manifest it, and through that it becomes con-
scious. But in itself it is not unconscious or subconscious—
rather it goes beyond consciousness. It must however possess
potentiality for consciousness which finds expression in Nous.
Indeed, the One is inexpressible and it is difficult to charac-
terize it.
The Nous may be described as Supramundane Intelligence.
Emanating as it does from the One, it contains the potenti-
ality for all existence. This potentiality indicates that it has the
productive capacity by which the essential forms are made
manifest in apparent separation from one another and from
the One. Thus Plotinus leans towards the Platonic doctrine of
appearance and reality. He holds after the manner of Plato
that individuals are individuated not simply in terms of space
and time, but are individuated as "appearances of Ideas which
alone are real.” So all individuals pre-exist in the Nous. And
this is true not only of man, but of all sub-human and vegeta-
tive life.
The third and final member of the Trinity is Soul. It
possesses a twofold nature—one upward and the other down-
ward. “It is," as Dean Inge explains, *an energy thrown off
by the Spirit. As an image of Spirit, it resembles its principle
closely. But while on one side it is closely attached to Spirit,
of which it is the effluence, on the other it touches the
phenomenal world. Soul is still a part of the Divine world,
though the lowest part."^ In other words, in its transcendent
aspect or upward movement it is related to the Nous (Spirit,
Mind or Intelligence) and in its downward aspect it functions
as a principle of life and growth. The Soul is in fact the
so-called connecting link" between the spiritual world and
the phenomenal world—it is the “last logos of the former and
the first element of the latter." Because of its connection
with the phenomenal world there may be two kinds of
misunderstanding, viz., that it is limited and that it is lost in

the world. Plotinus rules out both these objections. He says
that the Soul being rooted in Nous cannot be limited—rather
it is capable of unlimited expansion. Again, the Soul is not
lost or merged in the world, rather the universe participates in
it and is “embraced and moulded" by it. The Soul is the
Providence ruling over the world, and hence the material
universe becomes a living organic whole. The Soul is not the
aggregate of particular souls, rather it is the Soul of the All. It
is not just at the summit of the world and it has no fixed
position—it is, to quote Inge again, "the wanderer of the
metaphysical world.”
The Soul which is the World-Soul or Soul of the All gives
rise to individual souls. Plotinus finds it difficult to explain
how the World-Soul originates the individual souls; but he
would not accept the view that there is one Soul, a view
which is subscribed to by Heraclitus and the Stoics. The
individual souls have their places in this world. An individual
soul descends into a body. For Plotinus this descent is a kind
of fall and yet is a kind of necessity. It is both voluntary and
non-voluntary. The soul suffers from self-isolation and because
of this it is imprisoned in a body. This descent does not mean
that a soul literally moves down into body. The descent
happens when a body shares in the life of a soul. The “‘shar-
ing in" or participation of the body in the soul becomes an
evil, as the universal activity of the soul is thereby hampered
or limited. The soul as it descends "leaps out," so to speak,
from the whole to a part and is thus compelled to confine its
activity to a part."
The imprisonment of the soul in a body is not permanent.
It has the capacity for rising to the One. The return of the
soul to the One is obviously not visible, tangible or physical
in any sense. The return is psychical. It involves (a) mentally
withdrawing oneself from the world and thereby interiorizing
oneself, (b) undergoing a rigorous intellectual and moral
discipline, and (c) realizing the internal illumination and union
with the One. The re-discovery of an individual's true self is
in the first instance a return to Nous. Then as he feels himself

as "perfect in wisdom and goodness," he feels himself united
with the One. The individual then comes to the journey's end.
It is extremely difficult to describe this stage of union. But
probably Plotinus does not mean that an individual is com-
pletely lost and merged in the final stage of union. Armstrong
holds that it will be a stage of unity-in-diversity. He com-
ments: "It is true that in the union we rise above Nous to a
state in which there is no longer Seer and Seen, but only
unity. But universal Nous, of which we are then a part, exists
continually in that state of union without prejudice to its
intuitive thought and unity-in-diversity.’”®
The ethical duty of an individual is to make an attempt to
overcome the limitations arising out of its imprisonment in
the body and be united with the One, from which, metaphys-
ically speaking, the world has descended. Thus ethics requires
an individual to move in a direction opposite to that in which
the world has evolved. As Windelband explains, "Metaphysics
and ethics to Plotinus were, then, in inverted parallelism:
ethics teaches the way of salvation to be the same series of
stages of development toward an end, which is known in
metaphysics as the process of origination from a beginning.""?
IV
Let us now turn to Sri Aurobindo. Like Plotinus Sri Auro-

bindo also is a monist and he also starts from the concept of
one Supreme Being. Plotinus seems to lean, at least occasion-
ally, towards rigid monism and reminds one of the Advaita
philosophy (which is a purely absolutistic or non-dualistic
philosophy), advocated by Samkara and others. Sri Aurobindo
supports a kind of modified monism, which he calls integral-
ism. While Plotinus is content with stating that the One
contains the potency for all existence and is inexpressible, Sri
Aurobindo accepts an integral view of Reality and tells us
that Reality is neither pure one nor many, but is a unity in
204
264 PRITIBHUSHAN CHATTERJI . . /.— /»— —
diversity and at once personal and impersonal. To quote him,

“The absolute reality of the Absolute must be, not a rigid
indeterminable oneness, not an infinity vacant of all that is
not a pure existence. .. . 210 As pointed out at the outset, Sri
Aurobindo characterizes the Supreme Reality as Sat-Cit-
Ananda, i.e., Existence-Consciousness-Bliss. It is a triune
Being. The triple nature does not again mean the existence of
three separate attributes. That which is Existence is Con-
sciousness, and that which is Consciousness is Bliss. The
Reality is basically consciousness and it contains within itself
Spiritual Energy, which, when manifested, becomes active and
dynamic force, i.e., Creative Energy. Hence Sri Aurobindo
prefers to speak of Consciousness-Force in a hyphenated form
with reference to the Supreme Reality. This stress on con-
sciousness and dynamic energy seems to be lacking in
Plotinus.
Neither Plotinus nor Sri Aurobindo keeps the Supreme
Reality confined to itself. Both of them explain the world as
a product of the One Supreme Reality. The key concept with
Plotinus is “emanation,” while with Sri Aurobindo it is
"evolution." Plotinus thinks that the Nous emanates out of
the One and the Soul out of the Nous. But the term ‘‘emana-
tion" does not carry with it a sense of activism on the part of
the One—it seems to imply that the world-system automati-
cally comes out of the One, its nature being what it is. But
here Sri Aurobindo falls back on the concept of evolution,
which is a dynamic concept. He also puts his own interpreta-
tion upon it. The supporters of the traditional mechanical
theory of evolution hold that matter gives rise to life and life
to mind. But they cannot explain how and why matter should
lead to life and life to mind. They cannot satisfactorily ex-
plain the nisus of evolution; feels Sri Aurobindo. To explain
the onward movement of evolution Sri Aurobindo formulates
a somewhat novel concept of involution. He tells us that
evolution has been possible because there has been a prior
involution. Saccidananda, the Supreme Reality, veiled itself
voluntarily and came down to a level which is called the level
PLOTINUS AND SRI AUROBINDO 265
of matter. Thus what passes for matter is not really dead,

inert matter, but supreme consciousness in a veiled form.
Evolution is therefore not a mere change, a result of chance
variations, an operation of matter-particles, but it is guided all
through by Consciousness-Force. Consciousness which is veiled
in matter struggles for expression. In animal life this con-
sciousness manifests itself in a rudimentary form in instinct
which is subconscious or just conscious. Consciousness moves
further, though slowly and gradually, through more and more
organized forms of life; and it reaches a highly complex form
in Man. While the emanation of Plotinus is a three-stage
process, the evolution of Sri Aurobindo’s conception is a Six-
stage process. According to Sri Aurobindo, the progressive
movement of evolution passes through the following stages:
(1) matter (ada); (i) life (prana); (ui) psyche (caitanya-
purusa), (iv) mind (manas); (v) super-mind (vijiana or Rta-
cit); and (vi) Existence (sat). This evolution takes place be-
cause it was preceded by involution. Involution passed
through the above stages in the reverse order. This means that
Supreme Being or Existence first came down to the level cf
Supermind, then to the level of mind and so on gradually,
stopping at the level of matter. Thus what Plotinus calls
emanation has some resemblance with Sri Aurobindo's con-
cept of involution. But emanation is directly involved in crea-
tion, while involution is a pre-condition of evolution which is
involved in creation.
Both Plotinus and Sri Aurobindo agree in holding that
matter cannot have any separate existence over against the
Spiritual Reality, and both are opposed to any gross dualism
between Spirit and matter. But their attitude to matter is
different. For Plotinus matter is indeterminate and is in its
nature ugly and evil. It is at the opposite extreme of things
intelligible. Just as light gradually fades away in darkness, so
the divine essence gradually degenerates and loses itself at the
farthest end into matter. Thus matter is a non-being, a princi-
ple of negation. But for Sri Aurobindo matter is nothing but
Supreme Reality in a completely veiled form and not some-

thing in which Reality degenerates and loses itself completely.
Indeed, for Sri Aurobindo matter is concealed consciousness
and hence emergence or creation is possible from the side of
matter (which, of course, is really spirit). For Sri Aurobindo,
matter, being Supreme Reality in a veiled form, contains all
the potentiality for creation, while for Plotinus the potenti-
ality of the One terminates or disappears in matter. Unlike
Plotinus, Sri Aurobindo would not call matter an evil, though
of course he characterizes it as a “seat of ignorance” in so far
as the light of consciousness remains concealed in it. In short,
the attitude of Plotinus to matter is more negative than posi-
tive, while that of Sri Aurobindo is more positive than
negative.
Both Plotinus and Sri Aurobindo look upon the universe as
a harmonious whole, as an unbroken series of descending and
ascending values and existences. For Plotinus all grades of
existence are, says Dean Inge, “integral parts of the eternal
systole and diastole in which the life of the universe consists,
a life in which there is nothing arbitrary or irregular."!! And
the remark applies equally to Sri Aurobindo. In fact, in both
Plotinus and Sri Aurobindo the concepts of Descent and
Ascent figure prominently.
Though both Plotinus and Sri Aurobindo speak of descent
and ascent, their interpretation varies. With Plotinus the
descent starts with emanation from the One; and the One
cannot but emanate because of its inherent potency. He does
not tell us why the One should emanate. But Sri Aurobindo
seems to be more explicit on this point. He holds that the
Supreme Reality descends or conceals himself voluntarily in
order that there may be ascent, evolution or creation. The
two processes of Descent and Ascent, Involution and Evolu-
tion, are always going on—they constitute the cycle of cosmic
existence and thus they bring to the forefront the problem of
the how and the why of Existence. The Supreme Reality
indulges in involution or descent in a sportive spirit (or /ila, as
it is technically called) for the delight of becoming. Thus with
Sri Aurobindo descent and ascent are twin processes that go

hand in hand and one is a correlate to the other. But in
Plotinus, as we have seen, the notion of descent in the sense
of voluntary concealment on the part of the One and for the
sake of cosmic emergence or creation is lacking. When Ploti-
nus comes to the third member of his Trinity, viz., Soul, he
speaks of descent more or less in the sense of fall or degenera-
tion. The Individual Soul falls into a body, and in order to
overcome the bad company of the body, the soul should
strive to make an ascent. The soul of an individual, even
though imprisoned in a body, maintains a separateness from
the body, which as material is an *'evil." But when Sri Auro-
bindo advises spiritual ascent of an individual, he does not
advise anyone to leave aside the body. Sri Aurobindo aims at
total perfection through total transformation, a divinization of
the entire earthly life. Hence he cannot ignore the body
which constitutes “‘the base” of our life on earth. If we can
rise to the Spiritual height, the base should also join the
heights. Says Sri Aurobindo, “If our seeking is for a total
perfection of the being, the physical part of it cannot be left
aside; for the body is the material basis, the body is the
instrument which we have to use."!? The spiritual transforma-
tion on which Sri Aurobindo lays so much emphasis “15 not a
change into something purely subtle and spiritual to which
Matter is in its nature repugnant and by which it is felt as an
obstacle . . . ; it takes up Matter as a form of the Spirit. . . .”!3
In divine transfiguration the physical body of a man will
shine, assures Sri Aurobindo, in the glories of “a pure and
spiritualized physical existence.” From this it is evident that
Sri Aurobindo is averse to any total condemnation of earthly
life in bodily form. In fact, the leitmotiv of Sri Aurobindo
finds expression in the two fundamental questions which he
discusses: (a) How can divine life be established on earth”;
and (b) How can Spirit be reconciled to Matter? Hence there
cannot be any attempt on the part of Sri Aurobindo to run
away from earthly life.
It should also be noted that when Sri Aurobindo speaks of

the ascent of an individual, he also points out that individual
evolution is in tune with cosmic evolution. Ascent and
Descent constitute the very feature of the cosmos itself. Of
Plotinus it has been said that he is "caught between a COS-
mos-centered and man-centered perspective." But Sri Auro-
bindo tries to effect a reconciliation between these two
perspectives.
Both Plotinus and Sri Aurobindo agree that the ascent of
an individual to the supreme level is a long and arduous
process and that when an individual rises to the spiritual
summit he experiences a supra-terrestrial illumination. Accord-
ing to Plotinus, an individual soul first rises to the Nous and
therefrom to the level of the One and finally becomes united
with the One. At this supreme level an individual has a kind
of Vision that baffles all description. Plotinus says, ‘To see
and to have seen that Vision is reason no longer. It is more
than reason, before reason, and after reason. . . . 771 Similarly,
according to Sri Aurobindo, to have supramental transforma-
tion an individual has to undergo a psychic and spiritual trans-
formation. He also describes that there are four stages of
ascent from the level of human intelligence to that of the
Supermind, viz., (i) Higher Mind, (ii) Illumined Mind, (iii)
Intuitive Mind, and (iv) Overmind." When an individual
reaches the goal of Supermind, his body and mind undergo a
radical transformation and he becomes a gnostic being. A
gnostic being has a vision of Truth and he develops an integral
knowledge which transcends the ordinary level of argumenta-
tion or ratiocination. He also transcends all so-called values of
our daily life. The whole of the gnostic life is governed by
one principle of self-expression of the Spirit, the Will of the
Divine Being. This principle leaves enough room for freedom
and no rigid standardization is insisted upon. The Gnostic 13
not thus merged in the Supreme Reality. He experiences an
ineffable joy and delight and his mind is always illumined. Sri
Aurobindo visualizes the emergence of a community of gnos-

tic beings or supermen and with its emergence the Kingdom
of Heaven on earth will be established.
Unlike Plotinus, Sri Aurobindo is not so much interested in
the saving of an individual soul as he is in the upliftment of
concrete man. For Sri Aurobindo the emergence of man is
not just an event among events—rather it is a central episode
of the evolutionary world pregnant with immense significance.
Man appears to be an ambiguous phenomenon—he is half-
animal and half-god. He has a pre-human past and super-
human future. He is in between the forces of Nature and
Spirit. But this ambiguity is not, in the words of Sri Auro-
bindo, *a thing to be deplored, but rather a privilege and a
promise, for it opens out to us an immense vista of self-
development and self-exceeding."!5 Man thus occupies a
special position of honour in so far as he is destined to a
higher life by unfolding the potentiality that lies dormant in
him because of the involution of the Supreme Reality. Man is
not the last word or the full stop in the evolutionary process.
He is limited and yet he aspires to be infinite; he is relative
and yet he feels an irresistible urge towards the Supreme. So
man should transcend the level of humanity and develop the
Superman in him. This is no determinisitic conception of
development, for man must make genuine spiritual efforts to
unfold his innate potentiality for a divine life. This ideal of
supermanhood is to be carefully distinguished from the in-
flated ego of the physically strong man or the Ubermensch of
Nietzsche's dream. Such a superman is an apotheosis of mere
power or physical strength who does not care at all for values
and norms. But the Superman of Sri Aurobindo's vision rises
above the level of humanity not by physical power but by
spiritual progress. He cares more for inner conquest than for
outward show of power. He converts his whole being into ‘a
channel of divine puissance." Needless to say, this conception
of the Superman is lacking in Plotinus's conception of the
ascent of the soul. Moreover, this conception puts a meaning
in evolution by emphasizing the supreme end which is being
progressively realized through it. And this teleological meaning

cannot be discovered in Plotinus’s theory of emanation.
While formulating the ideal of Supermanhood Sri Auro-
bindo tells us that individual effort by itself is not adequate
for the development of Supermanhood and so the individual
effort is to be combined with Divine Grace. Man can ascend,
only if the Divine descends to lift up man. Thus a new mean-
ing is added to the concept of Descent. The meaning is that
unless the Divine Being condescends to descend and stretches
out His helping hand, an individual man cannot ascend or rise
to the supramental level all by himself.!?
We now come to the end of our brief comparative study.

The purpose of this paper is surely not to extol or decry one
of the two philosophers (whom we have compared) at the
cost of the other. Such a study repays in so far as it shows
how the two philosophers differing in their ages and philo-
sophical training offered certain similar solutions when faced
with more or less identical problems.
Each of the two thinkers we have studied here is an origi-
nal thinker in his own right. And each is difficult to interpret.
Every interpretation that may be offered is likely to be chal-
lenged by a counter-interpretation. But on the whole it seems
that the philosophy of Plotinus is more abstract than con-
crete, while that of Sri Aurobindo is more concrete than
abstract. But they can meet in so far as they both trace the
universe to One Reality and neither of them explains away
the world of things and beings as an illusion. Moreover,
neither of them is a purely abstract thinker, spinning cobwebs
of theories; on the other hand, both are practical and in-
tensely eager to offer relief to ailing mankind. Both philoso-
phers feel that the destiny of an individual is not to be
confined to the here and now. Both are of the opinion that
an individual should make a genuine effort at spiritual regen-

eration. Both seem to diagnose that we suffer so much because
we have moved far away from our original spiritual home, and
that the sooner we return to our spiritual home, the better.
The last words said to have been uttered by Plotinus, “Try to
bring back the god in you to the divine in the All,’’?° sum up
as much the philosophy of Plotinus himself as of Sri Auro-
bindo.
Civilization today is passing through a crisis and mankind is
overburdened with maladies of existence. We simply develop a
feeling of anguish, a kind of nausea, a sense of alienation in
this world. We raise the problem of evil and suffering, but
cannot throw any light thereon. We have freedom and yet we
cannot fruitfully utilize that freedom, because we do not
know what our duties are. We do not realize that our primal
duty is to awaken the Spirit that lies dormant in us. If we
follow the lead of thinkers like Plotinus and Sri Aurobindo,
we Shall realize that human existence can never be cut off
from its basic spiritual structure. It is time that we realize
this, and if we are able to do so, we shall be able to solve the
maladies of present-day human existence.
NOTES
l. Thomas Whittaker, The Neo-Platonists (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1901), p. 55.
2. Plotinus, Enneads, V.1.6.
3. Cf. Plato’s conception of the Good in The Republic (VI.507): “It
was the Sun, then, that I meant when I spoke of that offspring
which the Good has created in the visible world, to stand there in
the same relation to vision and visible things as that which the
Good itself bears in the intelligible world to intelligence and to
intelligible objects."
4. W.R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, 2 Vols., third ed. (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1948), 1:204.
5. A. H. Armstrong thinks that this downward or lower aspect of
Universal Soul is a “fourth distinct hypostasis and has its special
name, Nature (though Plotinus is reluctant to admit it)." See his

Plotinus (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953), p. 37.
Inge, Philosophy of Plotinus, 1:203.
Plotinus, Enneads, VI.4.16.
Ὁ 9
Armstrong, Plotinus, p. 41.

Wilhelm Windelband, History of Ancient Philosophy, trans. Herbert
Ernest Cushman (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1899), p. 369.
10. Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine (New York: Greystone Press,
1949), p. 759.
11. Inge, Philosophy of Plotinus, 1:254.
12. Sri Aurobindo, The Supramental Manifestation on Earth (Pondi-
cherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1952), p. 6.
13. Ibid., p. 7.
14. Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine, p. 991.
15. Joseph Katz, Plotinus’ Search for the Good (New York: King’s
Crown Press, 1950), pp. 35-6.
16. Plotinus, Enneads, VI.9.10.
17. For details see Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine, chapters 25 and 26.
18. Sri Aurobindo, The Human Cycle (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo
Ashram, 1949), p. 315.
19. Sri Aurobindo comments in his Essays on the Gita, First Series
(Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1937), p. 217: “If there were
not this rising of man into the Godhead to be helped by the
descent of God into humanity[,] Avatarahood (Incarnation) for the
sake of Dharma (righteousness) would be an otiose phenomenon."
20. See A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus (Enneads), Vol. I, Loeb Classical
Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), l:xxv.
The Influence of
Indian Philosophy
on Neoplatonism
C. L. Tripathi
University of Allahabad
Allahabad, India
In the annals of comparative philosophy there has been a

controversy among Orientalists regarding the influence of
Indian philosophy on Neoplatonism. Both advocates of Indian
influence on Neoplatonism and their opponents have adduced
strong arguments to establish their theses. In order to resolve
the controversy which, like Hydra, raises its head again and
again, we have to answer three questions: (1) whether some
doctrines are common to both Indian philosophy and Neopla-
tonism; (2) whether they are of Indian origin and involve
abandonment of the Greek tradition of rational critical
thought;! and (3) whether chronologically they first appeared
in India or in Greece?
As regards the first question a brief sketch of the funda-

mental doctrines of Neoplatonism with reference to their
Indian parallels will be sufficient for our purpose.
273
274 C. L. TRIPATHI
The One. In the philosophy of Plotinus, the One is another

name for God. It is the Absolute Spirit. It is pure being and
the absolute causality. It is also the “Good.” Everything finite
finds its aim in it and flows back into it.? It has no attributes
at all; it is a being without magnitude, without life, without
thought. It excludes all knowledge; Plotinus says, “‘imagine a
well (pégi) without origin; it gives itself to all rivers; but it is
not diminished by that; it remains quietly in itself."? It
reminds us of the Absolute described in the peace chant of
the Hindu purnam, where plenitude proceeds from plenitude
yet it remains plenitude undiminished and undisturbed.*
Emanation (Creation). The question arises: if there is no
good beyond the Absolute why should the One create any-
thing beyond itself? Plotinus answers that since all things,
even those without life, impart of themselves what they can,
the most perfect cannot remain in itself but must pass over.
Hence, the creation is not something different from the
Absolute. It is the overflow of the Absolute. He compares the
Absolute with an overflowing spirit which by its excess gives
rise to that which comes after it, or a central source of light
which illumines all things. It may be compared with the
Hindu concept of Lila. The production of the lower is not the
aim or the motive of the activity of the higher. Creationis
not a physical process but emanation. The distinction is
similar to that between vivarta (appearance) and modification
(parinama). Both Plotinus and the Upanisads hold that God
does not disperse Himself in individual or natural things.
There is a continual process from first to last, but the cause
remains itself as it was.’
Nous. The first emanation of the original essence is Nous.
It is a complete image of the original essence and archetype
of all existing things. Mind knows its objects not like percep-
tion of external things, but as one with itself.? As this unity
involves the duality of thinking and being thought, it is not
the highest but the second in order of supermundane causes.
It is being and thought at the same time. As image the Nous
is equal to the original essence, as derived it is completely
__ INFLUENCE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY | 275
4/>
different from it. It is for Plotinus the highest sphere the

human spirit can reach and at the same time pure thought
itself. This doctrine of Nous may be compared with the per-
sonal (Saguna) Brahman of the Upanisads.
Soul. The soul is an immaterial substance like Nous, its
image and product. It is related to the Nous, as Nous is re-
lated to the primal One. It stands between the Nous and the
world of phenomena. It is the principle of life and motion in
things. It is of two kinds: the World Soul and the individual
soul. The first can be compared with the doctrine of Hiranya-
garbha of the Upanisads and the second with the jivatman.
Like the Upanisads, Plotinus maintains that the soul can
return to itself through the practice of virtue and ascetic
purification.
After release from the body the soul dwells in God which
is reality and true being. It is a world which cannot be seen
with our physical eyes.? Here we are no longer men, we are
kings.
Hule. Plotinus has described ὕλῃ, or “matter,” in many
ways. It is the same as evil, “privation,” “a lie," a *phan-
tom."!? [t is a mere abstraction, a name for the bare recepta-
cle of forms. [t is indeterminate nothing and yet not nothing.
It can be compared with the doctrine of maya which is
appearance yet not a mere blank. It is something positive. In
the words of Puech, it is magical and illusory. Being the
product of matter this sensible world is also a mere illusion.!!
Rebirth. Like the Upanisads Plotinus believes in the doc-
trine of rebirth. For him even animals have souls. So long as
we do not attain the highest wisdom we are bound to succes-
sive rebirths, which are like one dream after another or sleep
in different beds.!?
Law of Karma. Plotinus believes in the Law of Karma. He
says it is a universal principle that each soul after death goes
where it longs to be.!? Those who have exercised their human
faculties are born as men; those who have lived a sensuous life
are born as lower animals.!^ He also refers to the absorption
276 C. L. TRIPATHI
of disembodied souls in the Universal soul, and this can be

reached through an ascetic and contemplative life.!°
Like the Upanisads, Plotinus believes that through the
analytic process of the dialectic,!® the mind reaches its
cherished goal and after reaching it becomes quiescent and
unified. Here even thought disappears. It is the stage of
supreme unity which is beyond even self-knowledge. Here the
soul loses its identity and becomes "One." In the words of
Plotinus:
But in the vision that which sees is not reason but

something greater than and prior to reason, some-
thing presupposed by reason as is the object of
vision. He who then sees himself when he sees will
see himself as a simple being, will be united to
himself as such, will feel himself, become such. We
ought not even to say that he will see, but he will
be that which he sees, if indeed it is possible any
longer to distinguish between seer and seen, and not
boldly to affirm that the two are One.!?
In this theory of vision we have the direct influence of orien-

tal philosophy of the Indian type.'®
Like the Upanisadic philosophy Neoplatonism believes in
the technique of entering into spiritual consciousness.
Through meditation we can free the soul from its subjection
to the body and attain union with the Divine. In order to
attain this union we must strip everything of the body until
the vision is attained. We must abstract from the body, from
the soul, from sense perceptions, appetites and emotions, and
from even the intellect with its duality. Then the soul touches
and gazes on the supreme light.!? In this account we may see
a replica of the Indian theory of contemplation.??
Like the Upanisads, Neoplatonism has faith in a higher
revelation to man in mystical experiences. Porphyry tells that
during the period of five years when he lived with Plotinus,
Plotinus was four times in union with God. Likewise he laid
more emphasis on Jnana (wisdom and contemplation) than on
INFLUENCE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 277
karma or ritual ceremonies and looked upon karma as an

enfeebled product of contemplation; and in the true spirit of
mystic systems he rose above the political barriers of nations
and states.?!
Porphyry and other Neoplatonic philosophers also followed
the path carved by their great teacher— Plotinus.
Porphyry? holds the salvation of the soul as the aim of
philosophy. According to him the source of evil is not so
much in the body as in the desires of the soul.?? He advo-
cates strict asceticism and abstinence from animal food.?*
Iamblichus?> accepted Plotinus’s teachings with little varia-
tion. He suggests that man can obtain unification with the
central source (God) not by his own efforts but by theurgic
practices which must be performed correctly.
In the works of Proclus the living experience of Plotinus
becomes a fixed tradition.^? The metaphysics of being is
approved by a doctrine of categories. He teaches that beyond
all bodies is the soul’s essence; beyond the souls is the intel-
lective principle; and beyond all intellectual substances is the
One. The soul is incorporeal and independent of the body and
therefore imperishable. To know the self truly is to know it
as actually One, as potentially all things and as divine. He
accepted the Neoplatonic trinity and explained the existence
of the universe along Plotinian lines. He says that everything
complete tends to reproduce itself. Every productive cause
produces the next and all subsequent principles while itself
remaining steadfast. Between the pure unity of the One and
the minimal unity of matter, indeterminate sources are recog-
nized.
Like mystics he advocates world citizenship. His saying,
“the philosopher ought not to observe the religious customs
of one city or country but ought to be the common hiero-
phant of the whole world," reminds us of the Vasudhaiva
Kutumbakam of Indian philosophy. Ascetic and contemplative
virtue is rated higher than the practical. He gives devotional
orientation to the Neoplatonism of Plotinus. Prayer for Ploti-
nus was the turning of the mind to God; to Proclus it was
278 C. L. TRIPATHI
humble supplication for divine mind. He had superstitious

respect for theurgy. He agrees with Iamblichus that individual
things are united to the “One” by the mysterious operation
of the occult symbols which reside in certain stones, herbs,
and animals.??
Apart from these doctrines there are some other ones
which have striking resemblances with the doctrines of Indian
philosophy. For instance, the three hypostases of Plotinus
resemble the three bodies of Buddha;® the Neoplatonic
comparison of divine activity to the effortless and unpremedi-
tated radiation of light by the sun reminds us of the descrip-
tion of Brahman in the Upanisads and of Buddha in the
Buddhist texts;?? and the doctrine of Kenodoxia (empti-
ness)?? is a counterpart of the Upanisadic doctrine of Avidya,
or “Ignorance.” The Hypocratical treatise “On Winds” resem-
bles the more ancient doctrine of Prana which forms a well-
known topic of the Taittiriya Upanisad.?! The Maitri Upani-
sad stresses that we have to destroy our abhimana and get rid
of the sheaths hiding the self.?? A medical theory in Plato’s
Timaeus resembles Indian medical theories.?? The duration of
the Heracleitian “Great Year" (10-8) is a decimal fraction
which is based on Indian calculations.?^ The doctrine of the
infinity of Brahman and the world, and the doctrine of identi-
ty between God and soul and between knowledge and Brah-
man are well-known topics of the Upanisads.
We can trace some elements of Vedic origin in Philostra-
tus’s Life of Apollonius of Tyana.?? There are references to
Avamedha,?$ to Vedic rites, and to Yogic powers.?" There
are certain striking resemblances in the matter of passage to
Heaven. In the Rg-Veda, heaven is the home of the soul to
which, after death, it returns purified;?® before reaching
Heaven it has to cross a stream?? and pass by Yama's watch-
ful dogs, *the spotted dogs of Sarama."^? Further, the cradle
of Neoplatonism was not the quiet university town of Athens,
but the great manufacturing city of Alexandria which was at
that time not only a great intellectual centre but also the
place where East and West rubbed their shoulders, where the
wisdom of Asia was in high repute and where men of wisdom

like Philostratus expressed the highest veneration for the
learning of the Indians and even went to India to consult the
Brähamanas.*!
The scholars*? who try to find the hypostases of Plotinus
in the “Trinity” of Plato and the simile of One and the sun in
the Republic and other Platonic dialogues; the doctrine of
Kenodoxia in Parmenides; the doctrine of infinity of Brahman
and world in Melissus's “Being,” in Anaxagoras’ “Nous,’’*?
and in Heracleitus’s “Soul”; and then emphatically assert that
Neoplatonism is a legitimate development of Greek thought
and Plato’s own speculations** —forget the fact that these
philosophers were also influenced by Indian thought through
Orphicism and Pythagoreanism.*°
In fact, the philosophy of Plato and even that of his
independent disciple Aristotle was a kind of splendid digres-
sion from the main current of Greek speculation.^? Plato’s
growing sympathy with Orphic and Pythagorean teachings; the
devoutness and solemnity of his later attitude towards reli-
gion; the ethical rigorism of his old age, with its strongly
marked ascetic tendency; his interest in Oracles and demons
and the momentary appearance of an ‘evil soul” in the
Timaeus, all point the way the wind was blowing.^" Iambli-
chus, the biographer of Pythagoras and one of the greatest
philosophers of Neoplatonism, clearly admitted that Plato,
Aristotle, and he himself were all Pythagoreans.*®
From the discussion above we may draw the conclusion
that some of the fundamental doctrines of Neoplatonism
which have striking similarities with the doctrines of Indian
philosophy were well-established in the Upanisads at least in
the 6th century B.C.—long before the rise of Neoplatonism.
II
As regards the second question, as to whether certain views

of Plotinus are of Indian origin and involve abandonment of
280 C. L. TRIPATHI
the Greek tradition of rational critical thought, a brief

summary is necessary of those systems which represented an
Opposite stream of thought and through which Indian philoso-
phy had penetrated the minds of Greek thinkers.
Among these systems the Orphic was the most outstanding.
In it we find a mystical theology, a code of conduct for
moral life, a system of purificatory and expiatory rites,*?
which believes in the universal brotherhood of all beings, in
the existence of God (Dionysius), in the immortality?? and
divinity of Soul, and in the state of ecstasy where soul sees
the vision of God. If a man leads a moral life and subdues his
passions and appetites through ascetic practices such as a life
of chastity, abstinence from beans and fish, the wearing of
ordained clothes, and avoidance of bloody sacrifices, he can
reach divinity within this very lifetime.
Like Orphic religion Eleusinianism?! also believes in the
immortality and the divinity of soul. It says that dark shrouds
are wrapped round the soul; man can unwrap them through
initiation and can become divine. At the end of the initiation
the initiate hears the last words from his teacher, “Go in
peace,” which remind us of the Upanisadic “Om Säntih,
Säntih, Sàntih."5?
The Pythagorean school? was also influenced by Orphic
culture. Likewise it believed in the immortality of soul, in the
doctrine of rebirth,?^ and in the purification of soul through
ascetic practices like self-control. Pythagoras, like the Upani-
sadic philosophers, believed that all souls are identical by
nature. The apparent distinctions between human beings and
other beings are not ultimate. A man, through theoria, “the
contemplation of the divine," can realize his true nature and
be free from the wheel of transmigration. It is said that
Pythagoras had travelled widely studying the teachings of
Egyptians, Assyrians and Brähmanas, and was greatly influ-
enced by India in his religious, philosophical and mathemat-
ical teachings. Even in the formulation of his famous theo-
rem of the quadrature of the hypotenuse he was influenced
by India where it was already known in the older Vedic
times, long before Pythagoras.°> Like the Jains and the

Buddhists he refrained from violence and eating meat and
regarded certain vegetables as taboos.??
Like Pythagoras, Empedocles also believed in the divinity
and immortality of soul; in the doctrine of rebirth and its
final release from the world of sense; and in the attainment of
divine status through asceticism.??
Socrates also believed in the same doctrines of meditation,
immortality of soul, renunciation of the world and brother-
hood of all mankind which are Orphic in nature and are quite
different from the ritualistic religion of the Greeks. He
believed in an inner voice (Daemon) and rational self-
discipline.
In Plato the mystic tradition reached its zenith. He believed
in the immortality, divinity and transmigration of soul, and
the super-sensible (beatific) vision of the philosopher. The
simile of the cave reminds us of the doctrine of maya. Like
Indian philosophers he held that body is a fetter?? for the
soul which can be broken through the pursuit of wisdom.
Like Hindus he believed that God is perfect righteousness and
those of us who are most righteous are most like him. His
doctrine?! of “Logistikon, Thumos, and Epithumia" reminds
us of the Samkhya doctrine of the gunas (sattva, rajas and
tamas, respectively). The division of souls into three classes
based on the preponderance of these psychical elements
answers to the divisions of the Indian caste system.°* The
concept of the Age of Kronos in Plato, which is similar to the
Golden Age of Hesiod, seems to be a new version of the four
yugas of the Hindus.°?
In the end of the Republic Plato advocated the doctrine of
karma. The disembodied souls are represented as choosing
their next incarnation at the hands of Lachesis, daughter of
necessity, who is the Law of Karma personified; and like
Indian philosophers he held that the endeavour of philosophy
is to ascend to the first principle of the universe which trans-
cends all definite existence.4
282 C. L. TRIPATHI
We have in Plato as in the Upanisads the highest God—the

idea of the Good in the Republic, the Demiurgus and the soul
of the world in the Timaeus. |
In the mystic cults and the teachings of Pythagoras, Plato,
Socrates and the Neoplatonists, we find a decisive break with
the Greek tradition of rationalism and humanism. The mystic
cults are definitely un-Greek and anti-Hellenic in their charac-
ter.°° They are different from the anthropomorphic worship
of the Greeks. Their adherents are organized in communities
based on voluntary admission and initiation. Their cosmogony
and eschatology are foreign to the Greek spirit. Homer is not
troubled by the problem of the origin of things. He knows of
no world egg which plays a prominent part in many cosmog-
onies and in Orphism. Those who are familiar with the Vedic
hymn of creation will note that the conceptions of night and
chaos and the birth of love, as well as the cosmic egg, are
accepted by the Orphics.०९
To seek to become like the gods is to the orthodox Greek
the height of insolence, though it is of the essence of the
Orphic religion. We have the typical Greek reaction to the
Orphic doctrine “God am I, mortal no longer" in the follow-
ing lines of Pindar:
Seek not to become a god; seek not to become

Zeus;...mortal things befit mortals best. Mortal
winds must seek what is fitting at the hands of the
gods, recognizing what is at our feet, and to what
lot we are born. Strive not my soul, for an immor-
tal life, but do the thing which it is within thy
power to do. 9
Hailer says:
Genuine Greek religion knows no mystical striving

after a blessed union with God in ecstasy after an
abolition of the limits of individuality in a realm
beyond the conscious life. Prophetic austerity and
mystic indifference are alike foreign to it.9?
On the other hand, Orphic religion was a religion of an en-

tirely different kind from the civic worship to which the
ordinary Greek professed his allegiance.°’It did not enjoin the
practice of the civic virtues, nor is discipline or transformation
of character required by it; the sum total of its morality is to
bend one’s course towards the deity and turn away not from
the moral lapses and aberrations of earthly life, but from
earthly existence itself.7°
In Plato’s philosophy, as we have discussed earlier, there is
not even a single concept which is in tune with the Greek
theology. The essential unity of the human and the divine
spirit, the immortality of the human soul, the escape from the
restless wheel of the troublesome journey, the phenomenality
of the world, the contempt for the body, the distinction
between knowledge and opinion, contradict every single idea
of Greek popular religion.?!
In him we find the most eminent representative of the
heretics’? whose minds were heavily charged with an Orphic
mysticism mainly derived from Asiatic sources. India, always
the home of mystical devotion, probably contributed the
major share."? In the words of Dr. Inge, ‘“‘the Platonic or the
mystical outlook on life for which religion is at once a philos-
ophy and a discipline” was first felt in Asia, especially in the
Upanisads and Buddhism,"^ and it influenced the entire
Greek culture. In fact, Greek culture rose against an oriental
background from which it was never isolated, save in the
minds of classical scholars."? Tarn is also of the same view.
According to him, “Egyptian, Persian and Indian cultural
influences were absorbed into the Greek world from very
early times.”7° In the words of Prof. Mayer, we may con-
clude that though alien in origin, alien to the spirit of Helle-
nism, predominantly Indian in character and content, walking
in the shadow without support from the state, the Orphic, the
Eleusinian, and the Pythagorean brotherhoods and the Plato-
nic schools prepared the way for later Platonism and for
certain elements in Catholic theology.??
284 C. L. TRIPATHI
Some scholars may not agree with our conclusions. They

might think it derogatory to the Greeks to assume them to
have taken some of the sources of their knowledge and beliefs
from older times. But there may be no denying of the fact
that these ideas are similar and that they were firmly estab-
lished in India before the sixth century B.C. and arose in
Greece after that period. History does not repeat itself except
with variations and there is no dearth of historical evidence
which proves the relation between India and Greece from
time immemorial. Nor was there any spirit of bigotry in the
Greeks not to learn anything which was alien in origin.18
HI
As regards the third question, whether chronologically some

of the views of Plotinus first appeared in India or in Greece,
the picture is clear. Since the Vedic Age—the second millen-
nium B.C.—we find close agreements between the language
and the mythology, religious traditions and social institutions
of Indians and Iranians, on the one hand, and those of the
Greeks, Romans, Celts, Germans, and Slavs, on the other. The
gods of Father Heaven (dyauspiter, Jupiter), Mother Earth
(Aurora, Usas), and the Sun (Surya) are common to Greeks
and Indians. The Olympian religion of the Greeks and Vedic
beliefs had a common background. There is also a striking
similarity between the social life described in the Homeric
poems and that of the Veda. Both are patriarchal and tribal.
These facts indicate that these two cultures had a common
origin at some early date. Thus in the Rg-Veda, the European
will find memorials of his own racial inheritance.’? In so far
as we are Aryan in speech, that is, in thought, so far the
Rg-Veda is our own oldest book, says Max Müller.°°
Twice?! the Vedic god Mitra,?? who is known as Mithra in
the language of Avesta, conquered a great part of the Western
world, and became a favourite deity of the emperors. Aurelian
won victory in his name in 270 A.D.. Galerius and Licenius
dedicated a temple to his name in 307 A.D. at Carantum on

the Danube.
Commerce between the mouth of the Indus and the Persian
gulf was unbroken down to Buddhist times. We have evidence
of trade by sea between the Phoenicians of the Levant and
Western India as early as 975 B.C., when Hiram, king of Tyre,
imported ivory, apes and peacocks for decorating the palaces
and the temple of Solomon.??
Trade between the Indus Valley and the Euphrates also
seems to be very ancient. For we find in the cuneiform in-
scriptions of the Mittite Kings of Mittani in Cappadocia,
belonging to the sixteenth or fifteenth century B.C., the
names of the Vedic gods—Indra, Mitra, Varuna, and the
A$vins.9^
In the sixth century B.C. India and the West became closer
when, after the fall of Babylon in 538 B.C., Cyrus founded
the Persian Empire and Darius his successor made the Indus
Valley and Greece part of his empire (510 B.C.).
The presence of a large body of troops in Darius's expedi-
tion against Greece in 480 B.C.; the discovery of the modelled
heads of Indians at Memphis about the fifth century B.C.; and
the first book about India by Scylax?? in 510 B.C. show that
there was a close connection between India and Greece in
political, cultural and economic fields. The rise of philosoph-
ical reflection in Greece and the revolt against the tradi-
tional Homeric religion belong to this period. There we find
Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno and Anaxagoras, who laid
down the foundations of Greek metaphysics, which has a
great resemblance with the Upanisadic doctrine of “Reali-
ty."96 The mystical schools of Greek philosophy—Orphism,
Eleusinianism, and Pythagorean cults—also belong to this
period which exerted great influence on the formulation of
the fundamental doctrines of Greek philosophy. These schools
influenced Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and the Bac-
chies of Euripedes.?" The tragic poets Aeschylus, Sophocles,
and Euripedes were also interested in their moral philosophy.
286 C. L. TRIPATHI
We have a reference to Greek inscript in the Astadhyayi of

Pànini.55 Eudoxus,®? the astronomer and friend of Plato, was
greatly interested in Indian thought. We have also a tradition
in Aristoxenus?? which mentions the visit of Indian thinkers
to Athens and their conversation with Socrates. All these
factors provide contemporary evidence for the prevalence of
Indian thought in Greece in the 4th century B.C.
The invasion of India by Alexander the Great in 327 B.C.
was a turning point in the history of Indo-Greek relations. It
was not only the march of an army but also the march of
thought. Alexander had marched along with Pyrrho and
Onesicritus?! who acquired a great deal of knowledge of
Indian thought, and returned with many Indian thinkers includ-
ing Kalanos, an Indian philosopher. This event changed the
entire course of the history of the Academy. The philosophy
of Plato was replaced by the philosophy of Pyrrho, and the
Greek ideal of 'happiness" gave place to imperturbability of
soul.
With the advent of Chandra Gupta Maurya on the political
horizon of India, the Indo-Greek relationship started on the
ambassadorial level. The principal successor of Alexander the
Great, Seleucus Nikator (third century B.C.), sent Megasthenes
as ambassador to Chandra Gupta Maurya. He has given a very
good account of the India of the 3rd century B.C. He says
that in many points their teaching agrees with that of the
Greeks.?? After Megasthenes, Diamachus of Plataea was sent
to Bindusara as ambassador by Antiochus I and Dionysius was
sent by Ptolemy Philadelphus of Egypt. He lived in India
from 285 to 247 B.C.??
During the reign of ASoka, who ascended the throne of
Magadha in 272 B.C., the military expedition started by
Alexander the Great was turned into an expedition for peace.
He held a Council?* at Pätaliputra where it was decided to
send missions to various countries to spread Buddhism. Ac-
cordingly, delegates were sent to five sovereigns of the West,
namely, Antiochus Theos of Syria, Ptolemy Philadelphus of
Egypt, Antigonos Gontos of Macedonia, Magas of Cyrene, and
Alexander of Epirus.?? These missions were received favour-

ably.
Again, during 190-180 B.C., the Bactrian empire was ex-
tended into India by Demetrius, and Dindha and Kathiawar
became its provinces.
During these centuries thousands of Greeks who settled in
India became Indianized and accepted Indian religion and
philosophy as their own. The erection of the column of
Vasudeva by Heliodorus?? in 140 B.C., and the conversions
of Menander?" and Kaniska to Buddhism amply demonstrate
this fact. We also know from history that Alexander Polyhis-
tor of Asia Minor had a good deal of knowledge of Buddhism;
a senior priest of Yona country attended the foundation
ceremony of the great tope on the initiation of King Dutt-
hagamini which was held in 157 B.C., accompanied by thirty
thousand priests;?® the Indian king Poras sent an ambassador
to Augustus in 20 B.C., along with an Indian thinker;?? and
Apollonius of Tyana went to India to consult the Brähmanas.
In the work of Hippolytus which was written in 320 A.D.,
at least 25 years before Plotinus left Alexandria for Rome, we
come across many passages which give a very detailed account
of the philosophy of the Maitri Upanisad. This knowledge
cannot have resulted from the records of the historians of
Alexander the Great, for there is a clear reference to the river
Tàgabena (Tungabena) of South India.1® Plotinus,'® the
founder of Neoplatonism, was himself anxious to acquire a
first-hand knowledge of Indian philosophy and with this in
mind accompanied King Gordian in his expedition against the
Sapor of Persia in 242 A.D.. Due to the sudden death of the
King at Mesopotamia his dream could not be realized. Porphy-
ry, the illustrious disciple of Plotinus, had a good knowledge
of Indian philosophy. In his De Abstinentia he has given a
good account of some Indian views on the authority of Barde-
sanes which the latter had acquired from an Indian ambassa-
dor to the Imperial Court early in the third century. !°?
In the presence of these historical data we may conclude
that Indian thought might have played a great part in the
288 C. L. TRIPATHI
development of the doctrines of Neoplatonism, and that

Neoplatonism might be the result of the religious syncretism
which arose from the conquests of Alexander the Great and
the undertakings of the Roman Empire. 1% Modern ontologists
also support the above conclusion and hold that all the resem-
blances between the similes used by Greek and Indian writers
cannot be explained simply by reflection on earlier Greek
ideas.!?^ But in order to give the final verdict on this subject
we must await future researchers who will unveil the myster-
ies with their knowledge of Indian and Greek traditions. !95
NOTES
R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London: Duckworth, 1972), p. 14.

.
|
2. “Yato và imäni bhütàni jáyante yena jàtàni jivanti
Taittiriya Upanisad 3.1.1.

Enn. X.5-1.
Bw
"Oum Pünamadah Pürnamidam Pürnât Pürman Udacyate. Pürnasya

Pürnamädäya Pürnam eva ava$isyate." Brhadäranyaka Upanisad
5.1.1.
5. Enn. V.2.1.
6. “Tasya Bhäsä sarvam idam vibhati.” Kathopanisad 2.2.15.
7 Enn. V.2.2.
8. Enn. V.5.].
9. Enn. III.4.24,.
10. Enn. II.5.5.
11. J. F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism (Madras, 1961), p. 192.
12. Enn. III.6.6.
13. Enn. IV.3.13-15.
14. Porphyry and Iamblichus do not agree with Plotinus. According to
them, human souls are never born as beasts and birds.
15. Enn. IV.8.4.
16. Adhyaropapavada.
17. Trans. W. R. Inge, quoted in his Philosophy of Plotinus, Vol. II
(1918), p. 141.
18. W. R. Inge, Christian Mysticism (London: Methuen & Co., 1899),
p. 98.
19. Enn. V.3.13.
20. E. Bréhier, La Philosophie de Plotin (Paris, 1938), pp. 107-37,

quoted in Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism, p. 236.
21. S. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 214.
22. 230-300 A.D.
23. Stutfield, Mysticism and Catholicism (1925), p. 34.
24. De Abstinentia is a work of Porphyry’s where abstinence from
eating animal food is prescribed.
25. D. circa 330 A.D.
26. 410-485 A.D. The most original and systematic Neoplatonic
thinker after Plotinus.
27. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions, p. 218.
28. J. Przyluski, ‘‘Les Trois Hypostases dans l'Inde et à Alexandrie,"
Melanges Cumont II (Brussels, 1936), pp. 925-33, quoted in Staal,
Advaita and Neoplatonism, p. 239.
29. For instance, the use of this and other similes to illustrate the
unpremeditated nature of the Buddha’s activity by the Tibetan
writer Gampopa (Jewel Ornament of Liberation, trans. Guenther,
chap. 21, pp. 271-4), following the Indian Buddhist philosopher
Asahga (Uttaratantra IV.58-60). The Sun simile recurs in the
modern Hindu mystic Raman Maharshi (Collected Works, p. 46);
quoted in Wallis, Neoplatonism, p. 15, n. 2.
30. J. Filliozat, ‘‘La doctrine des Brahmanes d’après saint Hippolyte,"
Journal Asiatique 234 (1943-45), quoted in Staal, Advaita and
Neoplatonism, p. 243.
31. Taittiriya Upanisad 2.3.1.
32. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism, p. 245.
33. Filiozat, ‘‘La doctrine des Bráàhmanes...," quoted in Staal,
Advaita and Neoplatonism, p. 243.
34. Ibid.
35. Bréhier, La Philosophie de Plotin, pp. 107-33.
36. र. Goossens, ‘‘Un texte grec relatif à l'aévamedha," Journal Asia-
tique (1930), p. 280, quoted in Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism,
p. 243.
37, P. Meile, “‘Apollonius de Tyane et les Rites Vediques," Journal
Asiatique 234 (1943-45), p. 451, quoted in Staal, Advaita and
Neoplatonism, p. 243.
38. Rg-Veda X.4.8.
39. Rg-Veda X.14.8.
40. Rg-Veda X.14.3.
41. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol IX, ed. James Hastings,
s.v. ‘“‘Neoplatonism,”” by W. R. Inge, p. 308.
42. J. F. Staal, Cambridge Platonists, Pistorious, and Cudworth hold
this view. See Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism.
290 C. L. TRIPATHI
43. A. H. Armstrong, “71011105 and India," Classical Quarterly (1936),

pp. 22-8.
44, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. IX, ed. Hastings, s.v.
*"Neoplatonism," by Inge, p. 308.
45. P. T. Rajie, The Universal in the Western and the Indian Philoso-
phy," in Radhakrishnan, a collection presented in honor of his
sixtieth birthday (London: George Allen, 1951), p. 404. Burnet,
Early Greek Philosophy (1930), p. 98.
46. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. IX, ed. Hastings, s.v.
"Neoplatonism," by Inge, p. 308.
47. Ibid.
48. Paul Edwards, The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. V, pp.
473-4.
49. Plato, Phaedrus 69C.
50. Herodotus 2.81.
51. Eleusis of Attica was the founder of this culture.
52. Iíavasyopanisad, Mantra 18, peace chant.
53. It was founded by Pythagoras who was born at Cronton in the
second half of the sixth century B.C. It was a religious fraternity
where admission was gained by initiation.
54. Plato, Phaedo 62d.
55. H. G. Rawlinson, Legacy of India (1937), p. 5.
56. Ibid.
57. “Whoever exerteth himself, with toil him can we release. The soul
at length returns to its divine status and the wise men who prac-
tice such holy living eventually become Gods while yet on earth.”
Empedocles, Fragment 146.
58. Plato, Apology 29C.
59. Plato, Phaedo 65-7; Apology 29C.
60. Plato, Thaetetus 176.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Plato, Republic, Book 6.
65. Nietzsche, Will to Power, Vol. I, ed. Oscar Levi (1909), p. 346.
66. Leggi, Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity, Vol. 1 (1925), p.
123. See also Aristophanes, The Birds (693).
67. W. K. C. Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek Religion (1935), pp. 236-7.
68. Hailer, E.T., Prayer (1932), p. 76.
69. Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek Religion, p. 206.
70. Erwin Rodhe, Psyche, II, p. 125.
72. Sir Richard Livingston, Greek Genius and its Meaning to Us, I,
pp. 197-8.
73. Stutfield, Mysticism and Catholicism, p. 74.
74. W. R. Inge, The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought
(1926), pp. 7, 9.
75. E. R. Dodds, Humanism and Technique in Greek Studies (1936),
p. 11.
76. W. W. Tarn, The Greeks in Bactria and India (1938), p. 67.
77, Mayer, Political Thought (1939), p. 7.
79, Ibid., p. 119.
80. Kaegi, The Rg-Veda (1898), p. 25.
81. First its march was stopped at Salamis; centuries later under the
dynasty of Arsacids he penetrated the Roman world.
82. Mitra and Mithra are identical.
83. Book of Kings X.22, quoted in Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions,
p. 121.
84. They called these gods by the Vedic title ‘“‘Näsatyä” and bore
Aryan names.
85. Scylax was a Greek sea captain whom Darius commissioned to
explore the course of the Indus about 510 B.C. Herodotus
IV.441.
86. Szabo, *Indische Elemente in Plotinischen Neuplatonismus," Scho-
lastic 13 (1938), pp. 57-96.
87, Leggie, Forerunners and Rivals, p. 123.
88. "Yàvanàni lipih." Panini, Astadhyayi 4.1.59. Panini is the greatest
authority on Sanskrit grammar.
89, Pliny, Natural History XXX.3.
90. Eusebius, Praepario Evangelica XI.3. Aristoxenus (c. 330 B.C.) was
a disciple of Aristotle. Eusebius (315 A.D.) records a statement of
Aristoxenus according to which Indian thinkers visited Athens and
met Socrates. One of them asked Socrates about the scope of his
philosophy. An inquiry into human phenomena, was the reply.
The Indian laughingly answered, “How can we inquire into human
phenomena when we are ignorant of divine Self?" Quoted in
Werner Jaeger, Greeks and Jews," Journal of Religion (April,
1938), p. 128.
91. Onesicritus was a disciple of Diogenes. He was sent by Alexander
to Taxila to persuade Indian thinkers to accompany him. Conse-
quently, Kolonos agreed to accompany him. Radhakrishnan,
Eastern Religions, p. 153.
92, Cambridge History of India, Vol. 1 (1922), pp. 419-20.
93. Pliny, Natural History VI.21.
292 C. L. TRIPATHI
94. The third Council of Buddhism was held at Pätaliputra under the
Jeadership of Tissa Moggaliputta.
95. Thirteenth Rock Edict. Quoted in Radhakrishnan, Eastern Reli-
gions, p. 156.
96. Heliodorus was a native of Taxila. He was sent by King Antialci-
das to King Kä$iputra Bhägabhadra as ambassador of Greece. He
has written his account in Brahmi scrit. Radhakrishnan, Eastern
Religions, p. 156.
97. Menander embraced Buddhism under the influence of Nägasena.
The Milinda Pañha gives a very good account of the dialogue
between King Menander and Nágasena.
98. The number is exaggerated.
99, Strabo has given this account on the authority of Nicolaus of
Damascus.
100. Hippolytus, a Christian saint, has written a book under the title
Refutation of All Heresies. He says that Brähmanas drink the
water of the river Tagabena. This river is nothing but the Tung-
bend of the Mahabharata. Sarnkara had established Srngerimatha
(which still exists) on the banks of this river.
101. Some historians hold the view that Ammonius Saccas was the
founder of Neoplatonism. Plotinus was his disciple.
102. Stutfield, Mysticism and Catholicism, p. 418, quoted in Radha-
krishnan, Eastern Religions, p. 215.
104. Wallis, Neoplatonism, p. 15.
105. Ibid.
A Survey of Modern
Scholarly Opinion
on Plotinus and
Indian Thought
Albert M. Wolters
Institute for Christian Studies

Toronto, Ontario
I take it as my task in this paper to give a brief orientation,

in broadest outline, in the twentieth century literature sur-
rounding the general theme, “‘Plotinus and Indian Thought."
Please note the restriction to Plotinus; I will touch only
incidentally on Neoplatonism in general. Similarly, observe
that I shall be concerned chiefly with Plotinus and /ndian
thought in particular, treating only incidentally the much
broader question of “oriental influences" upon Plotinus in
general.
I should add, furthermore, that I speak as a student of the
general history of Western philosophy, who has done some
specialized work in Plotinus. This means, for one thing, that
my angle of vision is definitely that of the Western histori-
ographer of philosophy; Indian philosophy appears in my
horizon chiefly as a possible source of influence upon my
own field of study, and I claim no expertise whatever in the
other area.
Secondly, my position as a student of Western philosophy
in general determines my interests in questions of historio-
graphic methodology and it is from this point of view that I
293
294 ALBERT M. WOLTERS
wish to survey the literature in question. It is my intention,

therefore, to take a glance at twentieth century scholarship on
the question of Plotinus and Indian thought with the follow-
ing methodological focus: can “Indian thought” be properly
considered an ‘influence’, ‘source’, or ‘determinative factor’ on
Plotinus, and what kinds of criteria are legitimate in deciding
such a question?
I adopt this focus not only because it squares with my own
interests as historian, but also as justification for giving this
paper at all. The fact is that there are already in existence at
least two excellent essays on my subject, and I want to do
more than merely repeat or supplement them. The two essays
in question are the following: the appendix entitled "The
problem of Indian influence on Neoplatonism"' in J. F. Staal,
Advaita and Neoplatonism, A Critical Study in Comparative
Philosophy, published in Madras in 1961,' and the article by
H. ΒΕ. Schlette entitled “‘Indisches bei Plotin" first published
in the Festschrift Einsicht und Glaube in 1962,“ and reprint-
ed, with slight revisions, in his Aporie und Glaube in 1970.?
Both of these essays (neither of which refers to the other,
having been written at about the same time) appear to have
remained relatively unknown: Staal's probably because it was
published in Asia, and Schlette's because it is tucked away in
two collections of largely theological essays. Although I-am
indebted to both Staal and Schlette, my scope is broader than
theirs, and I differ from them both in their conclusions and in
the methodological focus which I will adopt.
The nineteenth century saw the development of the prob-
lem of ‘oriental influences" on Plotinus. Can Plotinus be
understood exclusively as an original development of the
Greek tradition, or must we have recourse to extraneous
influences from “the East" to account for the distinctive
features of his philosophy? It is basically the former position
which is taken by such historians of philosophy as Hegel,"
Kirchner? and Zeller, whereas the presence of ‘“‘Orientalis-
mus" in Plotinus is defended by such scholars as H. Ritter,
Victor Cousin,? and E. Vacherot.? Especially H. Ritter is of
SURVEY OF MODERN SCHOLARLY OPINION 295
interest for our purposes, since he for the first time (to my
knowledge) looks upon Plotinus and Neoplatonism as heirs to
the Upanisads. However, Ritter is an exception, in this regard,
and his extravagant overstatement of the case of /ndian influ-
ence had the effect of bringing the whole thesis into disre-
pute. After Ritter, the case for “oriental influences" had
reference virtually exclusively to Iranian and Egyptian factors.
It is important to note a curious complicating factor at this
point. The debate for and against Eastern sources of Plotinus’s
thought was equated with a debate for and against the
"purity" of his philosophy. It was generally assumed that the
Greek tradition stood for clarity of thought, rationalism,
objectivity and philosophical respectability. Anything coming
from ‘‘the East" was somehow a contaminating impurity, and
had overtones of superstition, mysticism, irrationalism and
Schwdrmeréi. To admit “oriental influences" on anyone was
tantamount to besmirching his good name. A good example
of this pervasive prejudice (which underlies a good deal of the
twentieth century discussion as well) is the notorious article
on Plotinus by the Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano
entitled, “Was für ein Philosoph manchmal Epoche macht"
(1876),'° a virulent diatribe against Plotinus as betrayer of the
Greek tradition.
It is against this background that we must see the influen-
tial article “Orientalisches bei Plotin?" published by H. F
Müller in 1914.!! Müller (died approximately 1918) was a
Plotinus devotee who had spent a lifetime studying, eluci-
dating, editing and translating the Enneads in a time when
Neoplatonism in general was considered a manifestation of the
decadence of Greek philosophy, and his article passionately
defends Plotinus against any suspicion of contamination by
"oriental influences." His first two sentences sum up the
burden of the argument: “The question whether the thought
of Plotinus was subject to oriental influences must be answer-
ed with an unqualified ‘no’ (muss rundweg verneint werden).
This philosophy is a genuinely Hellenic growth (ein echt helle-
nisches Gewüchs)." The body of the article is devoted to
refuting one by one all arguments to the contrary. Plotinus is

against the exorcism of demons, he has no truck with theurgy
and the mystery cults, he has no use for astrology, he 1s
unjustly accused of Schwürmeréi and theosophy (p. 78). He
was a mystic, to be sure, but then so was Plato (p. 79). When
we read the Enneads “it is pure Platonic air which surrounds
us, not oriental mist and fog."!^ The article concludes there-
fore: “‘What Plotinus thought, taught and lived he owes to the
Greeks, especially the divine Plato."?
Müller's article is important for a number of reasons. One is
that it does not occur to him to refute the suggestion that
Plotinus was influenced specifically by /ndian thought.
Apparently, this was not considered a serious option at the
beginning of our century. Another is the obvious prejudice
against any movement, theme or image associated with the
East; Müller is clearly concerned to indicate the Hellenic
*purity' of Plotinus. And finally, Müller's article is important
because it was enormously influential. It has been widely
quoted since in Plotinian scholarship, and to my knowledge
always with approval. His phrase "ein echt hellenisches
Gewáchs" has become something of a winged word, which
might stand as a motto over by far the greatest part of what
has been written on this subject since.!^
It is in fact the case that, within the world of Plotinian
scholarship since its renaissance after the First World War,
there has been an almost overwhelming consensus that Ploti-
nus must be understood strictly in terms of the Greek tradi-
tion, and that all influences from ‘‘the East" whether they be
Iranian, Jewish, Egyptian or Indian, are to be considered at
best improbable, marginal, or irrelevant. In the words of A.
W. Benn, "there is nothing Oriental about Neoplatonism. All
its component elements may be traced back to purely Greek
thought."!5 With the one significant exception of Émile
Bréhier, about whom we will speak in a moment, every lead-
ing Plotinus scholar of the twentieth century downplays any
but Greek factors in accounting for the development of
Plotinus's thought.
It would be wearisome to list all the testimonies which can

be adduced to back up this assertion. Let me do no more
than give a brief sampling of statements to this effect by a
number of the most eminent students of Plotinus:
1. A. ΗΠ. Armstrong: *[Plotinus] never in fact established

any sort of contact with Eastern thinkers; and there is no
good evidence, internal or external, to show that he ever
acquired any knowledge of Indian philosophy."'!é
2. H. KR. Schwyzer: ‘ A derivation [of the identity of the
self and the One in Plotinus] from India is impossible, if only
for external reasons. . . . Plotinus's thought can be understood
as an organic elaboration of the Platonic philosophy."!?
3. Vincenzo Cilento: “That is why Plotinus’s mysticism has
a character all its own, the character of a genuine Hellenic, in
fact Platonic, growth, and is not contaminated by oriental
influences.”18
4. Paul Henry: “Thus Plotinus is not only historically but
also logically the culmination of Greek philosophy."'!?
5. Jean Trouillard: ““Thus we can simultaneously posit both
that Plotinus’s philosophy is an authentic unfolding of Plato-
nism, and that, on the basis of that starting point, it is a
genuine creation.”’?°
More telling perhaps than these quotes is the argument

from silence which we can derive from those explicit discus-
sions of the ‘sources’ of Plotinus which fail altogether to
mention Indian thought. Most notable among these is of
course the volume Sources de Plotin, the publication of
papers and conversations held at Vandoeuvres in 1957.7!
None of the papers there presented deals with possible orien-
tal sources, let alone specifically Indian influences. The same
can be said of the section “Zur Frage der Quellen Plotins" in
the recent introduction and bibliographic guide to Plotinian
thought and scholarship by Schubert Venanz.??
Yet the consensus is not complete on this point. The
notable exception among leading Plotinus scholars in this
regard 1s Emile Bréhier, the well-known French translator of
the Enneads. In a course on the philosophy of Plotinus which

he gave at the Sorbonne in Paris, in the winter of 1921-22, he
put forward the thesis that Plotinus must have been influ-
enced by Indian thought. These lectures were published in
1928 as the book La philosophie de Plotin.?* Chapter 7 deals
with *L'orientalisme de Plotin," in which he makes his case
for Indian influence.
In brief, his argument is as follows. Plotinus’s conception of
the Intellect (νοῦς) is ambivalent; on the one hand it is
‘rationalistic’, opposing a clearly defined object to a rational
subject, but on the other hand it is ‘mystical’, whereby the
subject becomes identified with all objects indiscriminately. It
is this second feature, *the identity of the self with universal
being," which is unprecedented in Greek philosophy, and
must derive from elsewhere. It can not derive from the mysti-
cism of the oriental cults, because these all presuppose cultic
ritual and a salvation mediator, both of which Plotinus rejects.
"Therefore," Bréhier concludes, *I am led to look for the
source of Plotinus's philosophy beyond the Orient close to
Greece, and to go as far as the religious speculation of India,
which in Plotinus's day had already been fixed for centuries
in the Upanisads and had kept all its vitality.””?*
Müller's arguments do not count against this hypothesis,
since he does not deal with the possibility of specifically
Indian influences on Plotinus. The fact is that “in Plotinus we
thus grasp the first link of a religious tradition which is ulti-
mately no less powerful in the West than the Christian tradi-
tion....In my view this tradition goes back to India."?*
This is not as strange as it may seem, since the Greeks had
long been fascinated by the East, including India, and had had
dealings with it. We know too that Plotinus was interested in
Indian philosophy. Moreover, the similarities between Plotinus
and Indian thought had already been pointed out earlier by
the German philosophical historians Ritter, Deussen and
Oldenberg.
As we have already indicated, Bréhier's thesis was not
received with favour by his colleagues in Plotinian studies,
who almost to a man rejected his arguments. Representative

of the general negative response to Bréhier was the article
"Plotinus and India" by A. H. Armstrong, which appeared in
the Classical Quarterly in 1936.?9 In it Armstrong did not
deny that there might have been Indian influence, but argued
that there was no definite evidence in favour of it. Nor did he
deny that the parallels adduced by Bréhier between Plotinus
and the Upanisads were striking; his point instead was that it
is “unnecessary to go outside the tradition of Greek thought
in order to explain Plotinus."??
To make his case Armstrong brings forward the following
considerations:
1. “There was never a people which in its thinking was less

open to any real influence from abroad [than the Greeks] .”
2. Plotinus's allusions to oriental culture and his early
interest in Eastern philosophy prove nothing with regard to
any influence on him.
3. The “subjective idealism” of Plotinus can be accounted
for by reference to Greek antecedents. There was a streak of
irrationalism in Greek thought which goes back to Heraclitus
and Euripides, and is prominent in the Hermetica, roughly
contemporary with Plotinus. But even Greek rationalism
contained the seeds of Plotinian “pantheistic idealism,” since
the notion of infinity in the intelligible world is prefigured in
Anaximander’s ἄπειρον and the Stoic doctrine of the (6 (८०९
TOLOV, whereas the non-distinctness of the ego has roots in
pre-Socratic philosophy and Aristotle's νοῦς χωριστός.
4. An overwhelming sense of man's alienation from a Fate-
ruled world was prevalent in Plotinus's day, and could well
give rise to doctrines such as the ultimate identity of one's
innermost self with a transcendent principle.
Since the time of Armstrong's article, research into the

Greek antecedents of Plotinus's thought has made great prog-
ress, and the arsenal of arguments for explaining Plotinus in
exclusively Greek terms has become significantly greater. We
need only mention the later work of Armstrong himself,28
and of Willy Theiler,?? Philip Merlan,?? Cornelia de Vogel,*!

and H. J. Kramer?? to realize how much ammunition has
been gathered to undermine the necessity of Bréhier’s thesis
of an Indian influence on Plotinus.
An attack on Bréhier’s thesis from a different quarter was
launched by J. M. Rist in the chapter on "Mysticism" in his
book Plotinus: The Road to Reality (1967). 33 Basing himself
on the distinctions made by R. C. Zaehner between different
types of mysticism, Rist contends that one of Bréhier’s main
premises, which had been admitted by Armstrong, is invalid,
namely that the mysticism of Plotinus and that of the Upani-
sads is of the same type. Rist argues that Plotinus holds to a
‘theistic’ mysticism, i.e., one in which the experiencing subject
does not lose its individuality in the mystical experience. The
mysticism of the Upanisads, on the other hand, is of the
‘monistic’ kind, where this does not appear to be the case. If
the doctrines are thus significantly unlike, concludes Rist,
“derivation or significant influence can be forgotten."34
One might suppose therefore, that Bréhier’s proposal found
little or no support after it was first launched. Bréhier himself
seems to have thought so. In 1948, four years before his
death, Bréhier was asked whether he still held to his theory
respecting an Indian influence on Plotinus, and he replied:
] raised the question. I was not able to resolve it. I

thought at that time that the matter might interest
those who concern themselves with India. I found a
number of very definite relationships between the
Neoplatonists and India. But I found no one who
was interested, and the question remains to be
studied.23
Yet this was not the case. For while it was true that
Bréhier’s thesis found almost no support within the world of
Plotinus scholarship, a number of other scholars, chiefly
Indologists, have picked it up and developed it. Moreover, at
least one scholar seems to have reached similar conclusions

independently.
First of all there are the three ill-fated articles by J. Przy-
luski which appeared in the 19308.2० Taking Bréhier’s lead,
these attempted to show a doctrinal similarity between
Buddhist thought and certain trinitarian themes in Gnosticism,
Plotinus, and Christianity, and furthermore, to identify Mani
as a possible intermediary between India and the West. Przy-
luski’s work has been subjected to a devastating critique by A.
B. Keith,?? H. Puech,?? and J. F. Staal.?? One of the most
damaging criticisms was that chronological considerations
made the alleged influences impossible. Indian influence is
also postulated by P. Marucchi in his article, “Influssi indiani
nella filosofia di Plotino?" (1953),?? and striking similarities
are pointed out by Olivier Lacombe in his “‘Note sur Plotin et
la pensée indienne" (1950).?! This last article, written by an
eminent Indologist, is especially significant, because it bears
out Bréhier's point about the structural parallels between
Plotinus and the Upanisads, yet refuses to deduce a historical
influence from this fact.
Bréhier's thesis was thus not wholly without support, even
though his followers, like himself, had to contend with some
very powerful opposition. Moreover, a connection between
Plotinus and Indian thought was postulated in another article
in 1938, on other grounds than, and apparently without prior
knowledge of, Bréhier's work. Arpad Szabó in an article
entitled, "Indische Elemente im plotinischen Neuplatonis-
mus"^? sees an influence of Sarhkhya philosophy, on Ploti-
nus's doctrine of the fall of the soul. According to him, the
view that the union of soul and body is an illusion is one of
the conflicting sides of Plotinus's tension-ridden anthropology,
and cannot be explained in terms of the Greek tradition, since
the latter knows only a culpable fall of the soul into the body
(the other side of Plotinus's thinking). Accordingly, writes
Szabó, “^€ are forced to look for the analogies and sources
of this train of thought in Indian philosophy," and more
specifically in Sankhya philosophy, since a similar view of the

soul's embodiment as illusion is found there.^?
Szabó's thesis, however, has fared even worse than Bré-
hier's. J. F. Staal,^^ for example, has pointed out that Ploti-
nus does not conceive of embodiment as an illusion, even
though the embodied soul is sometimes called εἴδωλον. More-
over, the Sànkhya texts to which Szabó appeals to make his
case are to be dated centuries after Plotinus. It is therefore
not surprising that Szabó's article appears to have had little
influence in subsequent discussions.
To conclude my overview, I would like to draw your atten-
tion to the two essays which I mentioned at the beginning of
my paper: those by Staal and Schlette. These are both sub-
stantial studies which have taken into account most of the
literature before 1960, and come to conclusions which are
methodologically similar. It seems to me that they probably
reflect the general state of the question prior to the present
conference.
The basic situation to which both Staal and Schlette react
is made up of the following basic components:
1. It is historically possible that Plotinus was in contact

with and influenced by Indian thought. We know from
Porphyrv's Life that he had some interest in Indian philoso-
phy, we know that there was some knowledge of Indian
thought in the West at that time,* and Alexandria was a
crossroads for cultural contacts between East and West.
However, we have no definite evidence that Plotinus ever did
in fact become acquainted with Indian thought, and the
Enneads reflect only a very intense preoccupation with the
Greek philosophical tradition. The possibility of actual con-
tact with India remains an unsubstantiated possibility.
2. There do appear to be similarities of doctrine, especially

with regard to Plotinian mysticism (although there is very
little agreement as to how striking these similarities are). The
important methodological question therefore is: do possible
contact and doctrinal similarity add up to probable influence?
Staal and Schlette both answer “no,” although their emphasis

is different.
Schlette concludes his survey of the literature as follows:
Influences of Indian thought on Plotinus are possi-

ble, but have so far not been demonstrated, perhaps
they are not demonstrable at all, or only to a very
slight degree; the comparative method can not in
principle answer the historical question.46
However, this does not mean, for Schlette, that it is therefore

illegitimate to speak of “Indian elements in Plotinus" (/n-
disches bei Plotin), if there are doctrinal parallels to be ob-
served. He writes,
If it could be shown that such a material (sachliche)

affinity must in fact be assumed, then it would be
perfectly legitimate to speak of Indian elements in
Plotinus, even if such a connection would not (now
or ever) be demonstrable in historical and literary
terms.77
He then proceeds to identify five themes of "Indian thought"

in general which have, in his opinion, an “inner affinity" with
Plotinus's philosophy. These are the following:
1. the identity of atman with brahman ;

2. the striving toward union with the divine being;
3. the knowledge of the ineffability (Unnennbarkeit) and
heterogeneity (Andersartigkeit) of the divine mystery;
4. the law of karma and of reincarnation;
5. the interpretation of this-worldly reality as deceptive,
illusory maya.*®
I am not aware of any critical reaction to Schlette’s article,

and take this opportunity to voice the following comments of
my own about his argument. It seems to me extremely mis-
leading to speak of “Indian elements in Plotinus" in this
sense. By his definition it would be equally valid to speak of

"Plotinian elements in Indian thought" which implies some-
thing quite different. Moreover, I wonder whether the five
themes mentioned are indeed characteristic of all Indian
thought. Finally, there is an “inner affinity" of some of these
themes not only with Plotinus, but also with other Greek
thinkers (cf. the fifth point and the whole Platonic tradition).
Finally, a word about the attitude of J. F. Staal, as exemp-
lified in his work on Advaita and Neoplatonism. Staal too
denies the probability of historical influence of Indian thought
on Plotinus, but unlike Schlette he does not advocate speak-
ing of Indian elements in him all the same. The question of
whether or not one considers Indian influence probable is ulti-
mately decided, argues Staal, by one’s philosophical convic-
tions. It all depends on one’s view of historical causality. In
this there are two extremes: the doctrine of the 'preexistence
of the effect in the cause’ and the doctrine of creatio ex
nihilo. Staal elucidates this as follows:
Whoever is inclined, perhaps unconsciously, to the

last view, will tend to stress points which are
common to a certain field and its preceding back-
ground, and interpret these as effect and cause
respectively; whoever is inclined to the other view
will stress the differences and try to show that there
are elements of the later phenomenon counterparts
of which cannot be found in the earlier phenome-
non.^?
Applied to Plotinus, in other words, the first approach

would tend to dissolve him into his sources, going as far afield
as India to account for features which Greek sources can not
explain. The second approach would stress Plotinus's originali-
ty as a creative thinker, and feel no need to adduce literally
far-fetched parallels. Staal makes no secret of his own stance
in the matter: “It will be seen how far our comparative study
depends upon the view which stresses creatio ex nihilo; for in
comparisons we will often stress differences.”°° The constant

emphasis of Staal’s comparative study, accordingly, is to rela-
tivize the similarities in favour of the dissimilarities, and to
consider “influence” as a category in intellectual historiogra-
phy which must be viewed with caution, if not downright
suspicion.
In my opinion, Staal has put his finger on an important
point in all discussions of "influences" and *''sources" in the
history of philosophy. Our judgments in these matters tend to
be biased by fundamental attitudes to the nature of history,
and I for one would like to plead for a greater recognition of
originality and creativity in the history of philosophy. For
that reason, I am predisposed to side with those who reject
the probability of Indian influence on Plotinus. However, does
this mean that I therefore favour the approach which seeks to
"explain" Plotinus in strictly Greek terms, as the majority of
interpreters of Plotinus have tended to do? I think this is not
necessarily the case. I think there is perhaps good reason to
be cautious of the notions of "influence" and *'source" also
when applied to the Greek antecedents of Plotinus. There is
overwhelming evidence that Plotinus lived and moved in the
horizon of the Greek philosophical tradition, but there is no
evidence that he was a prisoner of it. The greatness of Ploti-
nus as a philosopher is partly measured by the fact that he
brought much that was historically new, something that can-
not be reduced to antecedent factors. It is this which all
Plotinian Quellenforschung forgets at its peril.
NOTES
1. Madras University Philosophical Series, No. 10.

2. J. Ratzinger and H. Fries, eds., Finsicht und Glaube (Freiburg,
1962), pp. 171-92.
3. H.R. Schlette, Aporie und Glaube (Munich, 1970), pp. 125-51.
4. G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen tiber die Geschichte der Philosophie,
in his Werke (1st ed., Berlin, 1836), XV:37-69.
C. H. Kirchner, Die Philosophie des Plotin (Halle, 1954).

E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, III/2 (4th ed., Leipzig,
1903), pp. 485-9.
H. Ritter, Geschichte der Philosophie (Hamburg,1834),
IV.542-627.
V. Cousin, Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie, 1 (Paris, 1841).
E. Vacherot, Histoire critique de l'école d'Alexandrie (Paris,
1846-51), 1.103 ff.
In Franz Brentano, Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augen-
blicklicher Stand, nebst Abhandlungen über Plotinus, Thomas von
Aquin, Schopenhauer und Auguste Comte (Hamburg, 1968).
Hermes XLIX (1914), 70-89.
"Klare platonische Luft ist es, die uns umfängt, nicht orientalischer
Dunst und Nebel." Ibid., p. 81.
13. "Was Plotin gedacht, gelehrt und gelebt hat, verdankt er den Grie-
chen, vornehmlich dem góttlichen Platon." Ibid., p. 89.
14. The phrase is quoted in Schlette, op. cit., p. 126, and is a favourite
of Italian Plotinus scholar Vincenzo Cilento, who speaks of “un
schietto germoglio ellenico" in a number of different places; see his
Antologia plotiniana (4th ed., Bari, 1970), pp. 17, 20; ‘La radice
metafisica della libertà nell'antignosi plotiniana," La Parola del Pas-
sato XVIII (1963), 116; Paideia antignostica (Florence, 1971), p.
25.
15. A. W. Benn, History of Ancient Philosophy (London, n.d.), p. 139.
16. A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus (New York, 1962), p. 13.
17. "Eine Herleitung aus Indien ist aber schon aus äusseren Gründen
unmóglich...Plotins Denken kann als organische Weiterentwick-
lung der platonischen Philosophie begriffen werden." H. R.
Schwyzer, *Plotin," RE XXI (1951), cols. 580-1.
18. "Ecco perché il misticismo plotiniano ha una natura tutta sua, di
schietto germoglio ellenico, anzi platonico, e non contaminato da
influssi 0161191. . . . ' V. Cilento, Antologia plotiniana (Bari,
1970), p. 17.
19. P. Henry, "Introduction (1962): The Place of Plotinus in the His-
tory of Thought," in Plotinus: The Enneads, trans. S. MacKenna
and B. S. Page (4th ed., London, 1969), p. 14111.
20. "Aussi peut-on soutenir à la fois que le plotinisme est l'épanouisse-
ment authentique du platonisme et qu'il est, à partir de celui-ci,
une véritable création." J. Trouillard, “1.6 neoplatonisme" in Ency-
clopédie de la Pléiade, Histoire de la philosophie 1 (Paris, 1969), p.
89].
21. Entretiens Hardt 5 (Geneva, 1960).
22. S. Venanz, Plotin. Einführung in sein Philosophieren (Freiburg/

Munich, 1973), p. 87. See also the discussions of Plotinus's
"sources" in P. Merlan, "Plotinus," The Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, VI:352-3, and J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality
(Cambridge, 1967), pp. 169-87.
23. See ibid., p. v. The book went through four editions, the second of
which was translated by Joseph Thomas as The Philosophy of Ploti-
nus (Chicago, 1958).
24. "Je suis ainsi conduit à rechercher la source de la philosophie de
Plotin plus loin que l'Orient proche de la Gréce, jusque dans la
spéculation religieuse de l'Inde, qui, à l'époque de Plotin, était déjà
fixée depuis des siécles dans les Upanisads, et avait gardé toute sa
vitalité." Ibid., p. 118.
25. “Avec Plotin, nous saissisons donc le premier chainon d'une tradi-
tion religieuse, qui n'est pas moins puissante en fond en Occident
que la tradition chrétienne. . .. C'est à l'Inde que j'ai supposé que
remontait cette tradition." Ibid., p. 120.
26. Classical Quarterly XXX (1936), 22-8.
27. Ibid., p. 22.
28. A. H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in
the Philosophy of Plotinus (Cambridge, 1940).
29. Willy Theiler, Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus (Berlin, 1940).
30. Philip Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism (The Hague, 1953);
idem, "Greek philosophy from Plato to Plotinus," in A. H. Arm-
strong, ed., The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early
Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 14-132.
31. Cornelia de Vogel, ‘On the Neoplatonic character of Platonism and
the Platonic character of Neoplatonism," Mind LXII (1953), 43-64.
32. H. J. Krümer, Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik (Amsterdam,
1964).
33. J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Toronto, 1967), pp.
213-30.
34. Ibid., p. 229.
35. Études bergsoniennes II (1949), 222.
36. J. Przyluski, "Indian influence on Western thought before and
during the third century A. D.," Journal of the Greater India
Society I; idem, ‘Mani et Plotin," Bulletin de la classe des lettres
de l'Académie royale de Belgique XIX (1933), 322-6; idem, "Les
trois hypostases dans l'Inde et à Alexandrie," Mélanges Cumont
(Brussels, 1936), II:925-38.
37. A. B. Keith, "Plotinus and Indian Thought," Indian Culture II
(1935/36), 125-30.
38. H. C. Puech, Le manichéisme (Paris, 1949), p. 134, n. 191.
39. 1. F. Staal, op. cit., p. 239.

40. Atti del XIX Congresso Internazionale degli Orientalisti, Roma
1935 (Rome, 1938), pp. 390-4. I have not seen this article, but cf.
B. Marién, Bibliographia critica degli studi plotiniani (Bari, 1949),
p. 602, and H. R. Schlette, op. cit. p. 131. I am here leaving out of
account the improbable thesis of Ernst Benz (Indische Einflüsse auf
die frühchristliche Theologie (Wiesbaden, 1951), pp. 197-202) that
Ammonius Sakkas, Plotinus’s teacher, was himself an Indian. See
the refutations by H. Dorrie (Hermes LX XXIII (1955), 440 ff.) and
Schlette, op. cit., p. 135.
41. Annuaire de l'École pratique des hautes Études, section des sciences
religieuses (Paris, 1950), pp. 3-17. Also printed as "A note on
Plotinus and Indian Thought," in Silver Jubilee Commemoration
Volume of the Indian Philosophical Congress (Calcutta, 1950),
I1:45-54; and as ‘“‘Plotino y el pensiamento hindu,” Notas y Estu-
dios de Filosofia IV (1953), 109-211. See discussions of this article
in M. de Gandillac, La Sagesse de Plotin (2nd ed., Paris, 1966), pp.
26-7 (de Gandillac accepts Lacombe's conclusions) and in Staal, op.
cit., pp. 245-6. Lacombe is also cited with approval by Rose-Marie
Mossé-Bastide, La pensée philosophique de Plotin (Paris, 1972), pp.
13-14.
42. Scholastik XIII (1938), 87-96.
43. *So sind wir gezwungen, die Analogien und Quellen dieses Gedan-
kenganges in der indischen Philosophie [zu] suchen. .. . " Ibid., pp.
89-90.
44. Op. cit., pp. 241-2.
45. J. Filliozat, *La doctrine des brahmanes d'aprés saint Hippolyte,"
Revue de l'histoire des religions CXXX (1945), 59-91. |
46. ‘‘Einflüsse indischen Denkens auf Plotin sind móglich, jedoch
bislang nicht nachgewiesen; vielleicht sind sie überhaupt nicht oder
nur in ganz geringem Masse nachweisbar; die vergleichende Methode
kann die historische Frage grundsätzlich nicht lósen." Schlette, op.
cit., p. 136.
47. *Wenn sich zeigen liesse, dass eine solche sachliche Affinität tatsä-
chlich anzunehmen ist, so wáre man in diesem Sinn durchaus be-
rechtigt, von Indischem bei Plotin zu sprechen, auch wenn eine
solche Verknüpfung historisch und literarisch nicht nachweisbar
wáre und bleiben sollte." Ibid., p. 136.
48. Ibid., p. 137.
49, Staal, op. cit., p. 23.
50. Ibid., p. 23.
Neoplatonism,
Indian Thought,
and General
Systems Theory
John R. A. Mayer
Brock University
St. Catharines, Ontario
William James speculated that for the infant who has not
yet grown into language the experienced world is probably a
booming, buzzing confusion. As language is appropriated the
perceived manifold gains some order, some structure. The
strangeness and perhaps the wonder transmute into the famil-
jar, the homey, the expected.
If this account of original human experience is more or less
plausible, and it seems so to me, then one can conclude that
the first and untutored experience of man is one of multiplic-
ity, of a manifold of many dimensions. Not only are there
different shapes and colours, but there are sounds and sights
and textures; there are things, there are feelings, there are
events, there are dreams. Desires, images, moods rise and
vanish; situations, surprises irrupt and alter the horizons of
awareness, shifting one’s focus of attention from this to that.
309
310 JOHN R. A. MAYER
And for many people it seems that while the content of

experience continues to increase, and the structuring vocabu-
lary gains progressive sophistication, the fundamental develop-
ment of consciousness halts here, and the rest of one’s life
interests are centered on the accumulation of experience,
information and its analysis.
It could be shown, however, that even as the manifold
manifests itself in its manyness, there is already in the back-
ground an inexplicitly and consciously inaccessible require-
ment of a contrast—the structure which makes the manifold
coherent and orderly, patterned, cyclical, recognizable in the
sense of re-cognizable.
In all likelihood this background is the source of language,
making generic terms apparently appropriate to the concrete
particulars, thus initiating the structuring of the many toward
the whole.
For some people, under diverse circumstances this hidden
background suddenly or gradually becomes foreground; and
with this change one’s world is changed. A new meaning
emerges from the givenness of the manifold. What heretofore
signified the mere adjacency of diverse particulars now is seen
as the partial manifestation of a single whole, which con-
stantly reveals and conceals itself in the many appearances.
II
In the Western tradition perhaps the first intellectual re-

sponse to this experience, of which we have some record,
might be that of Thales. Perhaps he expressed himself feebly,
and in an unconvincing way when he claimed that all things
were made of water. There-are several shortcomings of this
formulation, if the claim that it is an attempted response to
that unitive perception which has in its full-blown forms
become formulated as monism is correct. Firstly, the naming
of the ultimate as water, while it is intelligible, is a mistake,
because to the unreflective listener it somehow suggests the
GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY 311
primacy of the familiar form of water. Only on reflection

does one realize that if everything is water, the familiar trans-
parent liquid has no priority over the appearance of water as
rock or plant, or human body. Each of these, alike, is but a
form and only one form of water. Thus the negative formula-
tion of Anaximander, namely that the underlying unitive
source is the boundless, the unspecific, the ἄπειρον, is a
considerable improvement over Thales.
The second shortcoming of Thales’ formulation lies with
the implication that the unitive ground is explicitly in the
domain of the material, the objective—for after all is said and
done, water, in whatever shape or texture it presents itself to
us will seem, once again to the unreflective disciple, as an
extended entity. And thus the underlying unity of the mani-
fold will be conceptually appropriated as “‘matter.”’
Yet, those who have paid closer attention to the experience
of the coherency of the manifold recognize that this coher-
ency embraces not only things, objects, entities, and bodies,
but integrates with these one’s own consciousness with all its
modes, and intentionalities as well as its subject-pole.
Here are Plotinus’s words:
When the contemplative looks upon himself in the

act of contemplation he will see himself to be like
its object. He feels himself to be united to himself
in the way that the object is united to itself; that is
to say, he will experience himself as simple, just as
it is simple.
Actually we should not say “He will see." What he

sees, in case it is still possible to distinguish here the
seer and the seen...is not seen, not distinguished,
not represented as a thing apart. The man who
obtains the vision becomes, as it were, another
being. He ceases to be himself, retains nothing of
himself. Absorbed in the beyond, he is one with
it. ...
Therefore is it so very difficult to describe this

vision, for how can we represent as different from
us what seemed while we were contemplating it not
other than ourselves, but perfect at-oneness with
us?!
IH
The individual who has gained this new and less frequent
way of being in the world, in which the world and one's own
being in it dislimn their separateness, finds it his task to
formulate, to speak the meaning of his experience. He has
available to him only the language gained in the earlier plural-
istic mode of experiencing.
Obviously his speaking is to be oriented mainly toward
those whose experience is still pluralistic. The aim of speaking
is not merely to assert; it is to create, to bring about in the
listener that transformation of consciousness which will
permit the emergence of the new, holistic mode of apprehen-
sion. What is at stake is not merely assertion or description—
rather it is the modification of that basic reality principle in
the listening perceiver which will permit him to renounce that
innocence which takes the presented multiplicity of the world
and himself as ultimately real in its manifoldness.
Once the new speaking is formulated, it focuses attention
on those unobtrusive but present clues in the manifold whose
paradoxical and special character can be made paradigmatic
and universalized to provide persuasion for the learner to seek
the new perspective. For example, in the Chandogya Upani-
sad, Svetaketu is invited by his father to consider dissolved
salt as the now invisible yet all-pervasive presence in brine,
giving it its characteristic properties; just so the invisible all-
pervasive is what the seed conceals to account for its capacity
to become the mighty tree—and so—almost as a poetic refrain
the father teaches that ‘that art thou, also, Svetaketu’—TAZ
TWAM ASI. And so the self-other chasm is bridged— nature
and person, God, world and man are seen to have the same
identity.
In the Neoplatonic tradition as well, the unitive experience
invites the experiencer to express in speculative metaphysical
or theological language, or in poetic metaphor the significance
and the persuasive, illuminative character of the new con-
sciousness. Clearly the demand is to use the available concep-
tual framework, and yet so to modify it as to intimate the
drastic novelty of what was formerly the manifold, and is
now only a visible token of the One whose unity both con-
tains all distinctions, and is beyond any distinction.
In the Indian tradition this paradox gives rise to the need
for a doctrine of two truths (samvrtti and paramarthas). The
aspect which sees that all distinctions are but distinctions of
the One is a correct aspect, and yields a set of true claims—
whose truth, however, is logical, perspectival, practical
(samvrtti). The other sense, which recognizes the One to be
beyond all distinctions is not itself a perspective, but is
beyond perspective, including them and transcending them. A
different family of knowledge can be gathered here, more
akin to wisdom, which sees the One as the unknowable source
of all knowledge, to which the only sound relationship is one
of reverence rather than intellectual appropriation, but which
nonetheless manifests a converse relation to the reverencer—
namely, love. ?
Instances of useful imagery from the world of natural
objects recognized as paradigmatic are the sun and the over-
flowing wellspring.
The effulgence of the sun, as it beams its own substance
into the void not only makes the visible world visible; it
makes the visible world, in the sense that the sun coaxes the
seed into the plant, hatches the fly and the mosquito; creates
living rills which flow refreshingly from the frozen mountain
tops. Thus the sun is the source, but remains what it is. And
yet there is the dread contrast—the sun delights the eye that
beholds the visible—yet blinds the eye which would behold
the sun. In both Western and Indian thought these aspects of
the experienced world were not only recognized but utilized

as archetypal for metaphysics and theology.
Similarly consideration of the overflowing wellspring, which
feeds its environs with water, yet remains filled to the brim,
was to invite the attention of the listener to a way of concep-
tualizing the relationship between the One and the many.
In this way doctrines of creation, which are conceptually
pluralistic, radically separating the maker from the made were
replaced in the unitive traditions by doctrines of emanation,
playful self-revelation-cum-self-concealment in the temporal
flux of the mutable, which sometimes gained expression as
pantheism, but more often, in the more articulate formula-
tions as panentheism.?
IV
But for the critical inquirer a problem remains. The unitive

vision is no doubt an experience, and perhaps, even a self-
certifying one. However, while one remains in a critical stance
the question arises as to whether the unitive vision is a posi-
tive transformation of consciousness, an advance, a growth, a
veridical insight, or whether it is a pathology, a decay of the
original reality principle, an ailment in whose grips differentia-
tions so useful to and so necessary in what is known as practi-
cal life, cease.
A positivist approach to the resolution of this dilemma is in
principle impossible. The very criterion in terms of which one
would favour the unitive or pluralistic alternative is already
based on one or the other of these presupposed-thus being
incapable of serving as the basis for decision.
It seems, therefore, preferable to recognize that the unitive
experience is, like the more primitive (in a sense of earlier
rather than a pejorative sense) pluralistic perception, a poten-
tially useful and important one, which, however, could invite
unsound, unbalanced responses from which counterfunctional
practical inferences could be drawn.
In order to approach our problem of whether the unitive

vision is veridical or deceptive I shall sketch briefly a theory
of experience, which I cannot here defend—it will be merely
outlined.
All experience has a two-fold nature as experience. There is
that aspect to which the experiencer is fundamentally passive,
and that aspect, which is the constituting interpretive one, to
which language and idea make their positive contribution, and
in which the experiencer is actively and responsibly involved.
Of course each of these aspects, the passive and the active, are
but analytic fictions. Neither has its own independent reality.
It is nonetheless interesting to separate the unity of experi-
ence into these two aspects.
I would like to propose that that aspect of experience to
which man is fundamentally passive, the raw, pre-constituted
datum (as stated above, this is an analytic fiction and has no
independent existence) is beyond being true or otherwise. It
simply makes no sense to give to this component of experi-
ence two truth-values—it simply is what it is.
On the other hand, the responsive, interpretive component,
which secures the meaning of the raw “‘datum”’ is what can be
true or false. If this be granted it follows that the given aspect
of the unitive vision is beyond the question of truth or fal-
sity, while the interpretive-responsive aspect has potentially or
actually flawed constituents.
Our method, then, will be the exploration of the varieties
of responses to the unitive perception, along with the rejective
arguments of the critics, and the use of our own intuition,
which must be reflectively consulted in order to arrive at
some tentative resolution of the dilemma of whether the
unitive vision is a progression or pathology of consciousness.
Monistic metaphysical speculations have often yielded a
kind of indifference to the manifold, and, its critics maintain,
a consequent dissociation from involvement with issues of
significance to human well-being. The critics contend that the
unitive vision is dysfunctional because it promotes callousness
and lack of concern. If the world of injustice and suffering is
dismissed as mere illusion and deception by the monist then

the critics are sound in their objection, since the experience
of moral indignation and duty are based on a categorical, that
is, unconditional, imperative.
But while on occasion monism has in fact led to indiffer-
ence and callousness, it need not do so. There is a subtle but
significant contrast between equanimity and indifference. The
more persuasive monists have made it clear that although the
manifold is not ontologically many, as it is supposed by the
pluralist, it needs to be taken seriously, that is, with compas-
sion, concern, joy and zest.
In such a brief account as the present one it is impossible
to resolve the question about all monistic philosophies and
theologies once and for all. There are too many variations of
monism for each to be equally adequate and true. But there is
value in the monistic vision, exactly because it provides a
thoroughly sustaining basis of meaning, a strong and invulner-
able sense of identity which can weather the vicissitudes of
fortune and circumstances. And even though occasionally
there are instances of extreme withdrawal from the issues of
the manifold by the contemplative, there have also been
thoroughgoing examples of heroic and invincible creative
involvement with them, in which “holy indifference" in the
service of the Divine (St. Ignatius) or “bhakti” was the funda-
mental descriptive of the meaning of the involvement, whose
nature coincided in its fullest sense with the most dedicated
benefaction.
Thus, devotion to and reverence for the One, even when
that One is beyond good and evil* has yielded that intense
longing for identification with and realization of the good,
which overcomes the above objections, leaving the unitive
vision coincident with this important touchstone for truth.
The fact that the intellectual problem of how and why
separation from the good, or the One (even if it is merely an
apparent separation), is possible, and in terms of what princi-
ple can the increasing or decreasing distance of separation be
measured or felt, is another criticism of the metaphysics of
monism. This has to our knowledge and satisfaction never

been resolved adequately by purely intellectual processes; and
consequently has been dealt with by those with the monistic
perspective as a demonstration of the limits of intelligibility.
In the Aristotelian tradition, as well as the Hegelian one,
rational intelligibility has been a condition of being; but that
this must be so has not been adequately demonstrated. To the
contrary, the monistic tradition claims that intelligibility is a
condition of being limited and hence evidence not of being,
but of lying in the shadow of distance from being;—even if
how that is so cannot be understood. This is why for Plotinus
nous is not identical with the One but already derived from
it, involving some sort of necessary duality in intellection in
spite of the immediate contemplative grasp of the unity of
being.
Thus, while we can’t make the reason and process of multi-
plicity and separation intelligible in the classical or the Indian
monistic traditions, a second-order intelligibility is achieved by
exposing the dualism, and hence limitation, of intelligibility,
denying its being the essence of being. Consequently the prob-
lematic character of the multiple or manifold remains.
It is the contention of the present paper that it is possible

to respond to the unitive vision not only in terms of meta-
physics and theology, but also in terms of a critique of
modern science which in turn retains its scientific and meta-
scientific character. While in fact the phrases "'systems-
research" and “‘systems-science”” are far too broadly used to
be indicators of the presence of this transformed perspective
of the manifold, it is our contention that at the root of the
systems approach to the sciences lies the unitive vision, even
if, on occasion, it is less explicitly expounded.
We have to examine two fundamentally related yet distinc-

tive notions—namely, the systems approach to the sciences,
and general systems theory.
The systems approach to the sciences is the consequence of
the discovery that the discrete disciplines, with their respec-
tive special analyses of what seem to be causal structures have
left out significant aspects in their tendency to reduce expla-
nations to causal chains. Rather, it has been seen that in
addition to the primary interactions, often interpreted as
causal chains, there are weaker, less perceptible, but nonethe-
less significant interactions among other aspects of the whole,
which for human purposes play determinative, or at least
important roles.
Ecosystems, feedbacks, information exchange, cybernetics,
and in general, the recognition of the complexity of wholes in
their interdependence and interactions with parts has been the
consequence.
Thus arose the need for a new science, a new study, which
has both mathematical aspects and empirical ones, called
general systems theory. This is the science of the study of
wholes, or wholeness. It is an attempt to provide abstract
models of what it means to be a part, what is differentiation,
what is identity, what is the significance and the possibility of
independence, of a closed system, and, in contrast, an open
system.
Of course such studies can be undertaken and are being
undertaken from the pluralistic perspective. Many authors in
the field talk about “‘wholes” in the plural, or are prepared to
consider isolated, situational complexes as “a closed system."
But it seems to me that some of the serious studies of
wholes can and will go beyond pluralism, and provide a scien-
tific language for responding to and describing the unitive
vision. Most importantly, it is recognized and accepted that
every system, every whole which can be considered intellec-
tually, is embedded in a matrix with which it is interdepen-
dent. Thus the boundary, the differentiation between the
whole and its matrix is not an absolute isolating “‘skin,” but,
indeed, much more like the organic skin, a locus of inter-

action, which nonetheless can serve as a demarcation line
because the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the inter-
actions among elements and complexes within the demarca-
tion are distinctive from those which take place across the
demarcation. This type of insight enables us to get a better
conceptual grasp of how it is possible to have differentiation,
distinction, contrast, without being absolutely different, or
having an autonomous separateness. Furthermore, if, by defi-
nition, we recognize that every system which is deemed
"closed" is nonetheless embedded in an environment which
does have some influence on the system, then we recognize
that the notion of a "closed" system is an idealized structure,
which may be considered for practical purposes, but can never
be.
So far our description of systems science and systems
theory is pretty inert, thoroughly comprehensible in merely
material and objective terms. This is misleading. The claims
made transcend the notion that whatever is, is embedded in a
larger chunk of the material and natural universe. Rather,
what is involved is the seeing that the natural universe as such
is embedded in a system of language, and of judgment, a
system of perception, and of evaluation, whose one aspect is
measurement. These in turn have cultural contexts, with all
the values and history that that entails. Now, these in turn
may be deemed to be embedded, bounded by aspects of the
natural world. And so we come to the seemingly paradoxical
notion of mutual embeddedment. At this stage complemen-
tarity and the psychological flip-flop of foreground-
background reversions of perception can come to our aid.
But then, these mutually inter-embedded quasi-wholes, the
natural world, and the conceptual-mental-linguistic-cultural
world, for which the German language has an adequate
term—''Geistich"—are themselves embedded—but in what?
Here we come back to the theme of our conference—and a
joint insight from general systems theory and Neoplatonism.
The ultimately embedding matrix is beyond the knowable.
And yet the knowable interacts with it, and ultimately

depends on it.
One must be warned that interaction need not be concep-
tualized as causation. That is just a tendency of individuals
socialized in one particular intellectual tradition. Creation,
emanation, inspiration, information are other conceptualiza-
tions of interaction. But one needs also to remind oneself that
caring, loving, longing, and abandonment are forms of inter-
action as well. Nor do all of these collectively exhaust either
the species or the types of interaction possible. Furthermore,
every interaction has a converse; and the converse of an inter-
action is like its original only if the interaction is symmetrical.
Hartshorne has convincingly demonstrated the primacy of
asymmetry.? Hence it can be shown that the dependency of
the intelligible realm upon its embedding One is not mutual.
The embedding One clearly can and needs must have relation-
ships not only with the system “the intelligible domain," but
with each of its subsystems, and each of the elements thereof.
This is the most abstract, yet most persuasive conclusion from
general systems theoretic considerations.
VI
It thus remains for us to conclude the paper, and review its

claims.
In the first section we argued that the originary way of
being-in-the-world for all men has a fundamentally pluralistic
dimension in the foreground, while, inadvertently, even then
an integrative, unifying background introduces language, the
initial organizing principle. We have also suggested that in
some cases, for reasons not well understood, there seems to
come a reversal of focus, centering on the integrated and
holistic character of every apparent contrast—especially the
self-other, world-man, God-nature ones. This transformation
of consciousness through the emergence of a new meaning
perceived in the manifold calls for a phenomenology; it is an

invitation to say the meaning of being.
In the second section we considered Thales’ notion that all
is water, as a first and not quite adequate attempt to respond
to the experience of the unitive vision, showing some of the
requirements of a more adequate response.
In the third section we discussed the role of archetypal
analogies from the realm of ordinary experience, asserting that
the function of speaking is not merely to make truth claims,
but to mold, transform the consciousness of the listener.
Thus, there is a proselytizing character even to the apparently
most descriptive of monistic metaphysics or theology. We
then raised the critical question as to whether or not the
unitive vision is an advancement or a deterioration over the
pluralistic way of being in the world, and while we were
sympathetic to certain kinds of criticism with respect to some
of the interpretations of the significance of the unitive vision,
we indicated that such interpretation is not an essential or
necessary consequence thereto.
While the problem of apparent separation and a principle of
distance from the One has been left plainly unresolved, it has
been shown that this conundrum does not invalidate the
powerful formative effect of the transformation produced by
the unitive vision.
And finally we have shown that response to such an experi-
ence can, in contemporary times, take on a new form of
expression, emerging as a critique of conventional science. It
has also been suggested that the careful study of wholes and
boundaries in terms of a systems-approach will reveal a struc-
ture of being very close in character to Plotinus’s metaphysic,
in which the ultimately embedding One is not itself intelli-
gible, but upon it depends each and every aspect and constit-
uent of every embedded whole, or system; whether under-
stood as “‘closed”’ or “open.”
NOTES
Enneads VI.9[9].10.
^~
Cf. Bhagavadgita 18.69b.

RUD
Cf. Hartshorne & Reese, eds., Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago).

Cf. William Blake.
Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method
(^
(Illinois: Open Court, 1970), chap. X, pp. 205-26.

Some
Critical
Conclusions
I. C. Sharma
Cleveland State University

Cleveland, Ohio
This concluding article aims at clarifying the implied

conclusions of the contributors. In order to do justice to the
analysis of the ideas presented by all the scholars, it seems
necessary to give a very brief nonpartisan view of Indian
thought, based on the study of original sources which have
not so far been translated into any Western language. Almost
all the aspects covered by the participants in the Seminar and
published in this volume, refer to those aspects of Indian
philosophy which have direct or indirect connection with
Vedic thought. I would therefore begin with the exposition of
Indian thought, with reference to the Vedas and Upanisads,
which are the perennial sources of the Indian tradition.
In order to throw sufficient light on the epistemological

method of the Vedas, it is important to state that two types
of knowledge have been accepted by the Vedic seers, viz.: (1)
Vijnana (scientific knowledge), and (2) 77474 (comprehensive
knowledge). The word Vijnana is the combination of Vi +
Jnana. Vi means “plurality, individuality, and changeability.”’
323
324 I. C. SHARMA
Jnana literally means "knowledge, awareness and understand-

ing," but in this context, it has to be understood as “inner-
most knowledge." Hence, the entire metaphysics of the
Vedas, which later on is elaborated by the Upanisads, the
Bhagavadgità and the classical systems, has two aspects. The
Vijnana aspect is concerned with the pluralistic nature of
particularities and the changeable nature of the universe. The
Jnana aspect is connected with the innermost unity behind
the diversity. The two trends in the Vedas are called Mantra
Vidya (science of unity), and Yajna Vidya (science of plurali-
ty). The Mantra Vidya is also called Mula Vidya (science of
the root), and Yajna Vidya is called Tula Vidya (science of
explanation). Further, Mantra Vidyà is designated as Brahman
Vidya (the science of ultimate Being), and Yajna Vidya is
called Brahmana Vidya (science of cosmic processes or
forces).
The Vedic metaphysics, therefore, is both monistic and
pluralistic, unitive and divisive. The unity concerns the inner-
most ground and the diversity is associated with the extended
pluralistic cosmic reality. The unitive philosophy is a matter
of recognition and realization, termed as Darshana (seeing).
The pluralistic reality is a matter of actual behavior, practice
and grappling with the environment, termed as Varttana. This
thought has been summed up in the statement ““Samadarshna
and Vishamavarttana," i.e., ““unitive philosophy and differen-
tiative behavior." By differentiation is meant the acceptance
of the differences between the subject and object, self and
environment. Wherever the word Drsti (seeing) has been used
in Indian thought, it refers to Drashta (seer, the self). Wher-
ever the word Varttana is used, it refers to a concrete
situation of reciprocity between the unitive self and pluralistic
environment. This ethico-metaphysical characteristic of Vedic
thought pervades the history of Indian philosophy from the
ancient to the modern times. That is why all the classical
systems are unanimous in basing their views on the Vedic
authority.
SOME CRITICAL CONCLUSIONS 325
The other concepts which need clarification are those of

Brahman and Atman. The word Brahman cannot be translated
exactly. It has been suggested that Brahman is that which
expands, because the term Brh means "to expand." This
would be a wrong translation, because the Vedas, the Upani-
sads and the Bhagavadgità refuse to accept Brahman as an
activity itself, though all activity is due to Brahman. All three
sources of Indian thought referred to here are unanimous in
accepting the fourfold nature of Brahman: (1) Avyaya Brah-
man (the eternal infinite ground of all, not even One); (2)
Aksara Brahman (the indestructible One, absolute cause); (3)
Atmaksara Brahman (the supreme self, endowed with the
potentiality of creation, preservation and destruction, and
hence a creator, not yet differentiated in subject and object);
and (4) Visvasrit Brahman (cosmic form, the pluralistic world
of galaxies, super galaxies and individualities as an irradiation
of just one spark of the supreme self). It is noteworthy that
Avyaya Brahman is not even One or a unity. In this sense, the
One of Plotinus may be closer to Avyaya, though not exactly
identical with it. The Avyaya is also called Paratpara (beyond
the beyond). Aksara is the absolute indestructible cause. It is
the One unmanifested, potential cause, which at the next
stage becomes Paramapurusa, À tmaksara (the supreme self, or
literally, the supreme person). It would be erroneous to enter-
tain any anthropomorphic idea of a person here. The literal
meaning of À tmaksara is "self-limitation of indestructible
reality." Comparison can be misleading. It cannot be identi-
fied with the world soul, nor completely with Nous. It is
more Nous than world soul. It is an irradiation from A ksara
Brahman, which is both One and the Nous as a potentiality.
This explanation would give the reader an idea why many
Upanisadic passages appear to be contradictory, though they
are not so.
The Vedic and the Upanisadic Brahman are identical on
account of this fourfold nature: the ground, the cause, the
supreme self, and the cosmic form.
326 I. C. SHARMA
Atman (the self) or Purusa (man) is exactly a miniature

Brahman. The fourfold nature of man has been stated to be
the sum of Atman (pure being), the Buddhi (the causal self),
the Manah (the creative psyche—mind), and Sarira (the physi-
cal body with sense organs and organs of action). The grada-
tion in the case of Brahman from Avyaya to Visvasrit is from
subtle and most fundamental to less subtle and dependent. In
the case of man, called Adhyatma, the gradation is from the
most subtle to the most gross. Based on this fourfold cosmic
metaphysics and human nature, are the fourfold social, ethical
and philosophic systems in the Vedas, the Upanisads and the
Bhagavadgita. Unlike Plato, the social system in the Vedic
tradition is not threefold, but fourfold, because of the spiri-
tual, the intellectual, the mental, and the physical aspects.
The fourfold values parallell to Platonic virtues are Artha
(economic value), depending on temperance; Kama (love),
depending on courage and temperance; Dharma (ethical duty),
depending on justice and courage; and Moksa (spiritual perfec-
tion), depending on wisdom. The Upanisads also state the
fourfold nature of knowledge, based on the four levels of
Jàgrat (waking consciousness); Svapana (dream conscious-
ness); Susupti (deep sleep consciousness or unconsciousness);
and Turiya (supra-consciousness, associated with the spiritual
self, the causal self, the mental self and the physical self,
respectively). The word Cit (consciousness) applies both to
waking and dream consciousness and the word Acit (uncon-
sciousness) as the ground of Cit (consciousness), is not to be
understood as devoid of consciousness. The word Turiya is
beyond the concept of Cit and Acit. Incidently, Plotinus's
gradation of the stages from the physical to the level of the
One, so far as soul's journey back to the One is concerned,
seems to be parallel to this hierarchy.
The detailed discussion of the fourfold nature of Purusa in
the Bhagavadgità is given in the article "The Plotinian One
and The Concept of Paramapurusa in the Bhagavadgita." How-
ever, it seems important to mention that the philosophy of
the Bhagavadgità propounds four, not three paths, as it is
commonly believed. These four paths or the methods, the

Yogas, of attaining enlightenment are: the Buddhi Yoga, cor-
responding to the spiritual aspect of man (the Buddhi here
may mean Nous, which is closer to the One); Jnana Yoga,
corresponding to the intellectual or rational aspect (Jhàna and
Vijnana as explained earlier, are combined in this path);
Bhakti Yoga, corresponding to the mental aspect; and Karma
Yoga, corresponding to the physical nature of man. It is perti-
nent to point out that the first six discourses of the
Bhagavadgità are devoted to the Buddhi Yoga, the seventh
and eighth discourses explicate the Jnana Yoga, the ninth to
twelfth discourses explain the Bhakti Yoga, and the last six
discourses expound the Karma Yoga.
On account of want of space and the propriety of not
crossing the limits of the universe of discourse, it would be
desireable to confine an introduction to Indian thought to the
presentation given above. However, any comments and ques-
tions would be welcomed for further clarification.
The thought of the Bhagavadgità is closest to that of
Plotinus so far as metaphysics, ethics and epistemology are
concerned. Both the Bhagavadgità and Plotinus accept
contemplation (Yoga) as the method of salvation or the union
of the individual soul with the One. The Bhagavadgita, as has
been stated already, regards the way of intellect (Buddhi
Yoga) as the highest technique. Plotinus likewise advocates
contemplation. Whether Plotinus's meditation precedes his
metaphysical system, or the formulation of the metaphysics
precedes meditation, is not of academic significance. The
truth is that he asserts that meditation does lead to the union
of the One. The Bhagavadgità clearly emphasizes that this
Yoga or union of the individual soul with the indestructible
One, ultimate Brahman, requires contemplative knowledge of
the Truth, including the realization of It in the pluralistic
universe as well as constant contemplation of the One. It is
also advocated that once perfection or God-realization has
been attained, there is no rebirth of the soul. The soul attains
its highest abode. It is beyond all limitations of time, space
328 I. C. SHARMA
and causality. In the eighth discourse of the Bhagavadgita, it

is stated that all the individual beings become manifest or
actualized, because their matrix is unmanifested. The entire
host of beings is cyclically manifested and merged back into
their source. But higher than the unmanifested source (Ploti-
nus’s second hypostasis) is another essence, which is subtler
than the subtlest and which is not destroyed even when all
manifested beings are destroyed. This unmanifest, indestruc-
tible essence is called the ultimate abode.! Attainment of that
abode means salvation.
The first paper, “Indian Wisdom and Porphyry’s Search for
a Universal Way," by Dr. O’Meara, is concerned with salvation
in the sense of ultimate abode. It highlights many philosophi-
cal parallels and historical data with reference to the closeness
of the Greek and the Indian culture. The author quotes Saint
Augustine to emphasize that Porphyry was aware of Indian
thought and culture. It may be recalled here that the quotes
from the Greek and Roman sources, including Megasthenes,
constantly refer to Gymnosophists. The word Gymnosophists
is a variation of the Sanskrit words Jaina Muni, i.e., “Jaina
monk.” It is true that Jainism was popular in India at that
time. However, Megasthenes used the term Gymnosophist
both for the Vedic philosophers, the Brahmanas, and the
Jaina and the Buddhist ascetics, Sramanas.
The quote from Megasthenes referring to the similarities
between Greek thought and the “first principles operating in
the universe” held by the Indians at that time, is most perti-
nent. It clearly refers to the philosophy of the Upanisads and
that of the Bhagavadgita. Reference to God (Brahman) as
light, which is discerned by the enlightened sages, again shows
the acquaintance of Megasthenes with the Upanisads and the
Bhagavadgita at least indirectly. The Mundaka Upanisad says:
There the stainless and invisible Brahman shines in

the highest golden sheath. It is pure; it is the light
of lights; it is that which they know who know the
self.?
In the Bhagavadgita as well, Brahman is designated as “ ‘the

light of lights’, which illumines everything that exists."? These
facts, combined with the direct or indirect evidence of the
mutual exchange between the cultures of Greece and India,
are corroborated historically from both sides. Since the philos-
ophies and theories of the then India have been alluded to in
Greek sources, it is possible that more evidence in this regard
could be collected by the scholars. Professor O’Meara’s effort
to throw light on the parallels, both philosophical and histori-
cal, opens new fields for further investigation.
The next two papers, "Plotinus and the Upanisads" by Dr.
Hatab and "Proclus and the T'ejobindu Upanisad" by Dr.
Rosan, are necessary for the proper understanding of Neopla-
tonism and Indian thought. Dr. Hatab has drawn inspiration
from a wider range of Upanisads with a view to removing
some misunderstandings about Plotinus and Hinduism. He has
made an attempt to point out that it would be erroneous to
hold that the world is an illusion, either according to the
Upanisads or Plotinus. In this connection, our previous obser-
vation about the concept of Brahman in its four aspects, as
depicted in the Vedas, further supports Dr. Hatab's viewpoint.
Dr. Rosan’s approach is phenomenological. It should, how-
ever, be remembered that Tejobindu Upanisad is just one of
the Upanisads, which are all unanimous in the acceptance of
immanence as well as transcendence of Brahman. Three Maha-
vàkayas (universal statements, not litanies) are accepted as
fundamental truths in all the Upanisads. These Mahavakayas
are: ‘‘Sarvam Khalvedam Brahman,” i.e., “everything indeed is
Brahman" ; *Brahman Satyam Jaganmithya," i.e., ““Brahman is
the (final) truth and the world (in comparison with pure
Brahman) is false"; and, *Aham Brahmasmi," i.e., "I am Brah-
man." Keeping in view the immanence of the Brahman, those
statements in Tejobindu Upanisad are true, which refer to the
identification of the utterer with the spatio-temporal aspect or
Visvasrit aspect of the Brahman. Wherever the self is identi-
fied with the transcendental (Avyaya) aspect, Paratpara
330 I. C. SHARMA
(beyond the beyond), then by contrast, it is justified to re-

gard everything other than the infinite Brahman as false. The
Mahavakayas are philosophically arrived at and experientially
realized utterances or universal statements. Tejobindu Upani-
sad is not an exception. It differs from phenomenology,
because the reality expressed therein is not within the paren-
theses like the subjective experience of the phenomenologist.
Sat, Cit and Ananda stand for "infinite existence," "infinite
consciousness," and “‘infinite bliss.”
The word Tejobindu literally means “the point" or "drop
of light," and even “beyond light." The oscillation between
affirmation and denial of the relative reality, the extension
(Tula) of Brahman is not a contradiction, nor a subjective
report. It is a philosophical observation of shifting attention
from the immanent to the transcendental aspects of Brahman
and vice versa. The first three aspects of Brahman—the
ground, the cause, and the supreme self—have also been desig-
nated as Anantam (infinite), Jnanam (pure knowledge) and
Satyam (pure truth), respectively. These aspects are transcen-
dental in the sense that they are Swarupa Laksanas or “the
essential characteristics." The immanent aspect, being within
the spatio-temporal and causal cosmos, is the irradiation of
the first three. In the cosmic immanence those very three
transcendental characteristics are self-limited and become Sat,
Cit and Ananda in limited form. The utterance of “I am Brah-
man" is philosophically justified when the utterer identifies
himself with Sat, Cit and Ananda at one time and with the
transcendental characteristics at the other. The Tejobindu,
"the point" or “the drop of light," when merged into the
ocean of light (Brahman), does not lose its identity. It does
not literally merge into the ocean, but becomes the ocean
itself. Phenomenology is limited to the state of becoming, the
manifest, whereas Upanisadic thought explains the relativity
of the manifested reality in the context of the unbounded
infinitude on both ends, unlike the bracketed phenomeno-
logical experience at the empirical level. The Upanisad of the
Bhagavadgità declares:
Unmanifest are the beings in the beginning, unmani-

fest are they at the end, they are manifest only in
the middle; hence the death should not be lament-
ed.^
The words "I am" in the context of Tejobindu Upanisad

refer not to the ego, but to the unitive aspect of the self
(Atman). “I am" in an empirical sense has to be transcended
and made one with the One. This unity again has to be
termed not a monistic state, but a state of nondualism. The
concept of nondualism is philosophic, and as such points to
the consistency and logical validity of the self, which is both
finite and infinite, immanent as well as transcendent, and
cosmic as well as acosmic. These facts show that Tejobindu
Upanisad cannot be reduced to phenomenology.
The next paper on ‘‘Buddhi in the Bhagavadgità and Psyché
in Plotinus," by Professor Armstrong and Dr. Ravindra, is
fascinating. It has a very close affinity with my own contribu-
tion, entitled “The Plotinian One and the Concept of Parama-
purusa in the Bhagavadgita.” Though these two articles are
written independently, yet they may appear to be comple-
mentary when read together. Dr. Ravindra's explanation of
the word Buddhi needs a little elaboration. The term Buddhi
in the Buddhi Yoga of the Bhagavadgità does not stand for
discursive intelligence; it is exactly noetic in nature. That is
why Buddhi is distinguished from Manas (mind). When
Buddhi is mentioned as a product of Apara Prakrti (lower
nature), classed with mind, sense organs and fivefold material
elements, it pertains to the diffusion of Visvasrit Brahman
(psyche) in the spatio-temporal cosmos and the individuated
souls (psychai). There is no confusion when Purusa is identi-
fied sometimes with Aksara (the indestructible) and some-
times with Ksara (the destructible) aspects of Brahman. After
all, Visvasrit Brahman diffused in the cosmic form is the self-
limitation of the supreme self.
332 I. C. SHARMA
The destructible aspect of the cosmic form, like that of the

lower psyche, has been called Ksara Purusa. The indestruc-
tible, the inner aspect, the immanent nature of Brahman
(higher psyche) has been designated as Aksara Kütastha. The
third aspect, which is beyond Ksara and Aksara, has been
called Paramapurusa or Purusottama in the Bhagavadgita. The
triad of the destructible, the indestructible and the transcen-
dental aspects within the cosmic form is the replica of the
transcendental triad of the ground, the absolute cause and the
supreme self outside the spatio-temporal world.
The Aksara, as transcendental, is exactly the Nous as the
repository of all creation and the source of emanation of the
psyche. In man, it is represented by the Buddhi, which is next
to the Atman (the pure self). The fourfold nature of man
from this point of view has been summed up in the third
discourse of the Bhagavadgita:
The senses are subtle, subtler than senses is the

mind, subtler than the mind is the intelligence and
subtler than the intelligence is He (the pure self).?
In the Buddhi Yoga, intelligence is designated as Prajna,

(the irradiation of the Nous in man). It is noetic psyche. The
concept of Sthitaprajna is exactly the same as that of the
"noetic contemplation” and the “ideal state of man...in
which his individual psyche behaves as like cosmic psyche as
possible,” in the words of Professor Armstrong.
The word Yoga, therefore, may be translated as “‘noetic
state of the psyche.” If this is permitted, the parallel between
the Buddhi and psyche, as depicted in this paper, is therefore
most accurate.
The soul, which is in a unitive state of Yoga, which is pure
self, which has conquered the lower self and the senses, and
which has become (realized) immanent in all beings, is not
bound by any kind of actions performed in life.? In the words
of Plotinus, a man who is in a noetic state of contemplation
would not be bound by the limitation of the physical world,
in spite of remaining active in practical life. The Sanskrit

equivalents for a person who is in a state of noetic contempla-
tion are: Yuktah (united with the One); Sthitaprajnah (stabi-
lized in intellect); Yogin (practitioner of Yoga); Tatparah (one
absorbed in the Ultimate); etc.
The next paper is “Phraseology and Imagery in Plotinus
and Indian Thought, Especially Mahayana Buddhism,” by Dr.
Richard T. Wallis. He agrees that “the resemblances between
the accounts given by the mystics the world over" do exist,
and yet he holds that a cultural contact is inapplicable to
mysticism. The question is whether cultural contact, leading
to the exchange of results of experiments in the area of
science has any significance. I think it has a great significance,
because comparative study of scientific theories and exchange
of the results of experiments on the part of the scientists of
different countries and cultures, has led to the development
of science and technology for the benefit of humankind. Even
if we rule out mutual influence of the Greek and Indian cul-
tures, and in spite of the factual and historical evidence, the
parallels between the results of mystic experience have no
doubt a great philosophical and scientific signification. This
significance is heightened by a comparative study of the
Bhagavadgità and Plotinian thought, especially in an historical
context.
Here we may raise the question why religion, in spite of its
universal appeal to love and humanitarianism, has, unlike
science, lagged behind in commanding recognition. How is it
that science and technology are more highly respected all over
the world than religion, irrespective of caste, creed, nationali-
ty and race? Why do scientists the world over agree in the
objectivity of scientific truth, thereby giving a base of unity
to mankind, whereas religion seems to have caused dissensions
and disagreements, leading even to bloodshed and wars in the
name of God? Scientists are unanimous about the nature of
the atom, but religionists have not come to any agreement
with regard to the ground of religious experience—God. The
334 I. C. SHARMA
reasons may be a lack of cooperation, an absence of compara-

tive study of religious experience, and a tenacious refusal to
accept factual evidence of the mystics of the world as a possi-
ble hypothesis of an objective unanimity with regard to the
nature of God.
Let us accept that Plotinus was absolutely ignorant of
Indian thought. The question arises, what could be the cause
of the parallelism between the meditative methods of Plotinus
and those of the Upanisads and the Bhagavadgita? How is it
that similar methods have led to the same conceptual formula-
tion in Plotinus of the theory of the One, the Nous, the
Psyche and the World, as that of Indian thought? The most
modest answer would be that, just as the scientists’ experi-
ments on the nature of the atom performed in different labo-
ratories have led to the same conclusions, the Greek and
Indian thinkers might have reached identical conclusions in
the domain of religion independently of one another.
Comparative study of Neoplatonism and Indian thought
seems to imply such an hypothesis. In order that this hypo-
thesis is properly formulated, confirmed and verified, research-
ers in the East and the West shall have to be open-minded.
They shall have to be prepared to sacrifice their narrow ten-
dency of glorifying the individuality and integrity of the
authors of philosophical systems in order to arrive at the
objective truth. In the absence of such an attitude, explana-
tions of the parallels, with a tendency to overrate one's own
culture, are bound to be incomplete and self-contradictory.
This seems to have happened when Dr. Wallis suggests
hesitantly that perhaps Plotinian thought influenced Budd-
histic thought, and even the thought of the Bhagavadgita.
There is ample evidence to prove the continuity of Indian
thought from the Vedic through the Upanisadic period and
the period of the Bhagavadgita to that of the classical period.
In this connection, it may be pointed out that the word Dhar-
makaya (cosmical body), identified with ultimate reality, is a
combination of Dharma and Kaya, meaning “the law" and
"body," respectively. The word Dharma has its origin in the
Vedas, where it means “the cosmic law and ground of all exis-
tence." Similarly, the observation about the statement of
Maharishi Raman is not only anticipated by the Bhagavadgita,
but anti-postulated and explained in detail much earlier by
the Mantras, the Brahmanas and the Upanisads.
The paper “Meditative States in the Abhidharma and in
Pseudo-Dionysius" by Dr. Rodier is very interesting. It has
been well supported by relevant quotations and is thought-
provoking. His analysis of the state of meditation from a
comparative point of view further strengthens the hypothesis
of a common ground of the experiences of meditative states.
This analysis also points out that both the technique of
meditation and the experienced states of it are verifiable and
even demonstrable. Another important observation in this
paper is that the purpose of the technique of meditation is
self-purification. This observation has great importance, be-
cause a comparative study of Neoplatonism and Indian
thought does incline us to this conclusion. This is true not
only with reference to Buddhistic thought, but also with
reference to the Vedic tradition down to Patanjala Yoga and
Jainism, which is chronologically prior to Buddhism.
Followed by this analysis is the scholarly paper of Dr. John
Borelli, entitled “‘Matter and Exemplar: Difference-in-Identity
in Vijnanabhiksu and Bonaventure." In fact, the approach of
Vijnanabhiksu would not appear to be different, as long as
evolution of Vedantic thought as the continuity of Vedic
thought is not lost sight of. ‘Unity and plurality’ in God dates
back to Rg Vedic times, as it has already been stated in
connection with the terms Jnana and Vijnana. It may be help-
ful to explain the meaning of the Vedic word AUM in this
context. The letter A stands for origination, or creation. It is
therefore indicative of the pluralistically creative power of
God and is symbolized by Brahma in Hinduism and ‘The
Father in Heaven’ in Christianity. The letter U signifies evolu-
tion or preservation, symbolized by Visnu in Hinduism and
‘The Son’ in Christianity. The letter M is associated with
destruction of matter back into spirit, the function attributed
336 I. C. SHARMA
to and symbolized by Shiva in Hinduism and ‘The Holy

Spirit’ in Christianity. Moreover, AUM, a syllable with the
potentiality of the threefold function of God, is also the
super-sound, called Shabda Brahman. It is equivalent to the
word Logos, translated as “‘word”’ in the Gospel of John. It is
stated that God was word and word became flesh, the Son.
According to Hindu terminology, it could be said that the
primal nature of God was word, as sound, Aum. It is from
the sound that U, the Son, the Visnu, the light of lights,
emanates. It is the Visnu aspect or the Son aspect that incar-
nates Itself in the human body, as an Avatara. A Hindu would
not only not object to universal Christ as the way to God,
but would even emphasize that it is the only way.
The meaning of the universal Upanisadic statement “Aham
Brahma Asmi" (“I am Brahman’’) needs little explanation in
this context. This is only an hypothesis, a suggestion and an
interpretation from a comparative point of view. — Sri Krsna
says, “I am the light of lights and the Aum of the Vedas and
whosoever surrender to Me, comes to the ultimate abode.”
Jesus Christ says, “I am the way, the truth and the light.” Is
Christ referring to the "I" as his personal empirical ego, when
he particularly jumps to the words “truth” and “‘light’’? Can
we not associate Jesus Christ with Moses, who saw the light
(burning fire not consuming the bush) and who reported that
the God he saw exhorted him to announce that His name is
"I am that I am"? Is it not the same universal “1 Am"
(Aham), conveyed by Moses, which Jesus Christ repeats in his
declaration of being the way, the truth and the light? The
comparison again leads us toward the hypothesis of the same-
ness of the ground of experience of the Upanisadic sages,
Moses, and Jesus Christ.
Dr. Paul Hacker’s paper “Cit and Noüs" may at first sight
appear to be a note of dissent to our thesis. Emphases on
conceptual differences between Indian thought, particularly
what he calls Vedantism, and Neoplatonism seem to have
upset the author so much that he “was often tempted to
renounce writing a paper to be read at the congress." In the
first half of his article he seems to be somewhat dogmatic in

his assertion, “East is East and West and West." He also seems
to exhibit an ambivalent attitude of praise and condemnation
toward the so-called Vedàntism. His polemic in the earlier
part of the essay is at times emotive, skeptical and even logi-
cally fallacious. He resorts to the fallacies of 7gnoratio Elen-
chii, argumentum et verecundeum, as well as argumentum et
hominem. He first praises Paul Deussen as “‘the deepest special-
ist of Vedàntism in the West," and quotes his words as an
authority to show that Sarnkara is guilty of postulating ‘a
subject without an object," though as already pointed out this
is not the case. Later on, he says that Deussen, “the most
specialized specialist[,] misunderstood the most central of the
subject[s] of his studies." In this connection, it may be point-
ed out that Sarhkara’s system of Vedànta is Advaitavada
(Nondualism) and not Aikyavada. It is so because subject as
well as object, the dual aspect of the same Brahman, have
been recognized. Dr. Hacker repeatedly admits that his po-
lemic is directed only toward Sarnkara’s Vedäntism and not
toward Indian thought in general. Even after using such a
saving clause in his statement against Sarnkara, he also says:
Vedantism, far from being a pedestrian matter-of-

fact philosophy, has developed such a pure and
sublime concept of Spirit as no other philosophy,
be it in India or in the West, has ever succeeded in
discovering. I think it was an enormous achievement
to abstract Spirit, not only from contents, but also
from those elements that seem inseparably linked
up with it to form that Ego or the subject of knowl-
edge.
These words of Dr. Hacker, placed side by side with his alle-
gation of “the monstrosity of an absolute perception" against
Sarnkara, show that the author is blowing hot and cold in the
same breath.
This, however, does not minimize the importance of this
most scholarly paper by Dr. Hacker from the comparative
338 I. C. SHARMA
point of view. Within the paradigm with which he starts, he

has tried to demonstrate the logicality of his conclusions. His
scholarship and the knowledge of the sources relevant to his
paradigm are superb. I wish he could have included the other
schools of Nondualism in his purview. Sri Vallabhacharya,
the founder of Pure Nondualism of the Vedanta, declares
that, to say ^“ ‘this world is an illusion’ is itself the greatest
illusion." Keeping in view the continuity of Indian thought of
which Sarnkara’s Vedanta is an integral part, the recognition
of ‘unity in diversity’ cannot be lost sight of.
That Indian thought is not unaware of the unity and inter-
penetration of the three aspects of Sat, Cit and Ananda in
connection with the fourth aspect of Brahman, the cosmic
form, does not need any elaboration. Dr. Hacker's contribu-
tion is no doubt unique. In spite of pointing out some differ-
ences of the interpretations of some metaphysical concepts of
Neoplatonism and Vedantism, he has strongly advocated that
the comparative study of Neoplatonism has great value. Talk-
ing about the Indian triad of Sat-Cit-Ananda, he observes:
I venture to submit that similarity between this

triad, the Christian triad, Trinity, on the one hand
as well as Proclus’s ‘Being-Life-Spirit’ triad on the
other hand, is no mere chance, but is grounded in
reality.
This is a most positive statement, which strongly supports our

thesis with regard to the significance of comparative study of
mystical experience with reference to the nature of its
Ground—Brahman, The One.
The next paper, entitled “Matter in Plotinus and Sarnkara,”
by Dr. Francisco Garcia Bazan, is being placed after “Cit and
Nous” so as to maintain the sequence of thought. This is a
genuine scholarly attempt to bring out the parallel between
Plotinus and Sarmkara, so far as the nature of matter is con-
cerned. The exposition of Plotinus's view seems to be more
precise than that of Sarñkara, because the author of the paper
admits that his approach is limited mainly to Sarhkara’s

commentary on the Brahma Sutra.
It would be pertinent to point out that for the facility of
the reader, the word "conscience," used as the translation of
Cit, should have been substituted by “‘consciousness,” and the
word ‘“‘happiness,”’ as the translation of Ananda, by the word
“bliss.” Since Sarhkara’s writings are massive, it would not be
fully justified to assert that he considered the world or matter
as a mere “illusion” in the ordinary sense. He has stated a
number of times that the world is not as unreal as "the son
of a barren woman" or an imaginary “flower of the sky." The
thrust of Sarnkara’s idea of transcendence is positivistic. In
other words, when he speaks of Brahman as true and the
world as false, he does not mean that the transcendence of
Brahman negates the world. The world as relative reality is
apprehended as such in comparison with the highest reality of
the Brahman.
Samkara has stated that the reality of the dream world is
neither absolutely true nor absolutely false. As long as one is
in the dream state, there is no doubt about the reality and
concreteness of the experiences. It is only when one wakes up
that in comparison with the waking experiences, one realizes
that the dream was not concrete, but mental imagery. Similar-
ly, the empirical plurality is real, though not absolutely real.
When it is compared with the higher experience (Brahmanu-
bhava), the world is apprehended to be an illusion. Hence, it
is neither abolutely real nor absolutely unreal, but relatively
real. It has been designated as Sadasad Vilaksna (characterized
by being and nonbeing). This nature of the world or matter is
transcended only at the highest intuitive or contemplative
level, according to both Plotinus and Sarhkara.
Dr. Bazán's conclusive observation in this connection is
most relevant:
In regards to the central and supreme intuition of

both thinkers, a mystic nature stands out. [n rela-
tion to their form of predominant discursive and
340 I. C. SHARMA
symbolic exposition and in relation to their mutual

logical demands, their psychic, speculative and intel-
lectual temperaments take on emphasis.
It is therefore implied in this paper that explanation of the

parallels lies in the similarity of the mystic experience, the
comparative study of which can throw light on the nature of
its Ground.
Professor Hatton's paper is a comparative study of Sarhkara
and Eriugena on the question whether cause and effect must
share any characteristics. The question is seen as a more gene-
ral statement of the problem whether any term can be univo-
cally applied to both Creator and creature or to both infinite
being and finite being. Professor Hatton concludes that both
Sarnkara and Ériugena agree that in general, cause and effect
need share no characteristics and thus in particular, that no
term can be predicted univocally.
The next paper included in this volume is “Union with God
in Plotinus and Bayazid" by Dr. Mohammed Noor Nabi,
because it concentrates on the theme of mystic experience.
Dr. Nabi has pointed out that ethical discipline as well is a
means to the highest goal of union with the One and that in
the case of Plotinus, this discipline means intellectual analysis,
which is conducive, like ethics, to contemplation on the One.
The comparative study of Muslim mysticism with Plotinian
mysticism further indicates the universality and objectivity of
the ultimate reality.
The next two papers concern the intellectual and philo-
sophical similarities and differences between Neoplatonism and
Samkara's Vedanta. These papers are "Advaita Vedanta and
Neoplatonism" by Dr. २. K. Tripathi and “The Concept of
Human Estrangement in Plotinism and Sarnkara Vedänta” by
Dr. Ramakant Sinari. Dr. Tripathi has followed a typical
approach of a closed Samkarite and concluded that *"Neopla-
tonism has to be regarded as an absolutism of [an] Advaitic
type." In spite of the fact that this approach overlooks the
SOME CRITICAL CONCLUSIONS 34]
general and unbiased interpretation of the Upanisadic philoso-

phy, it pretends to represent Indian thought as an absolutism.
The tendency of overlooking the differences between the
Nondualism of Sarhkara and Neoplatonism limits the scope of
the paper. However, it does point out the parallels which are
indicative of the commonness of mystic experiences of Plotinus
and Sarhkara.
Dr. Sinari has adopted a modern comparative approach. He
has compared the two philosophies from an existential point
of view as well. On account of the existential paradigm, Dr.
Sinari observes that the design of the thinkers of the Upani-
sads
was to capture the transphenomenal foundation of

our being in the world and to map out the entire
urge for transcendence we feel while we are still
submerged in worldliness.
This may be partially true, even though, in light of what has

been stated earlier, this view is not truly representative of
Indian thought. To say that *Samkara's transcendentalism is
ostensibly 'world-rejecting' " and that *Samkara annuls the
very reality of the world" is not correct. However, the com-
parison in this paper is thought-provoking.
The next paper, by Dr. Priti Bhusan Chatterji, entitled
*Plotinus and $ri Aurobindo: A Comparative Stuay,” is very
interesting and academically important. It deals with the
Neovedantic philosophy of Sri Aurobindo as a counterpart of
Plotinian philosophy. Dr. Chatterji contends that just as Greek
philosophy is summed up as a confluence in Plotinus, simi-
larly Sri Aurobindo’s philosophy integrates East and West and
yet remains original. The comparisons in the paper are striking
and significant. The conclusion that the One, the Unique and
the Transcendental are known intuitively, is quite in keeping
with the general trend of all the viewpoints presented in this
volume. In the next paper, "The Influence of Indian Philos-
ophy on Neoplatonism," C. L. Tripathi notes some striking
342 I.C. SHARMA
similarities between certain Neoplatonic views and certain

doctrines found much earlier in the Upanisads, considers the
question of whether some of Plotinus's views are of Indian
origin, and finally discusses whether they first appeared in
India or Greece. The next paper, “Α Survey of Modern Schol-
arly Opinion on Plotinus and Indian Thought," by Dr. Wol-
ters, is self-explanatory. In light of previous remarks presented
in this volume, it needs no further comments.
The concluding paper, by Dr. J. R. A. Mayer, entitled
‘‘Neoplatonism, Indian Thought and General Systems
Theory," is a beautiful contribution to this volume. That this
article seems to sum up the findings of all the scholars who
have contributed the foregoing papers is evident from the very
title chosen by Dr. Mayer. A careful reading of this essay
would incline the reader to conclude that the comparative
topic of Neoplatonism and Indian thought is not only infor-
mative, but also most valuable for the future of philosophy
and science. Dr. Mayer has raised questions about knowledge,
metaphysics and mystic experience and has answered them
without any ideological bias or philosophical preoccupation of
mind. His analysis is logical, and his language chaste and
appealing.
Dr. Mayer points out that neither pluralism nor monism
can totally be rejected and that the empirical value of the
former and the enlightening character of the latter contribute
to the wholeness of truth, which science, philosophy and
religion, analysis, intellect and intuition seek to investigate.
Though the paper is general—encompassing epistemological,
metaphysical, phenomenological, mystical and logical implica-
tions of the main theme of this volume—yet it does point out
that the intuitive experience of the underlying reality at the
base of plurality has “‘the powerful formative effect" and that
"responses to such an experience can in contemporary times
take on a new expression, emerging as a critique of conven-
tional science." Professor Mayer's view that monistic metaphys-
ics, in which the ultimate One, though itself unintelligible, is
L——————80ME
CRITICAL CONCLUSIONS 545
343
the ground of every embedded whole or system, is com-

mendable.
A word to sum up the unitive theme and diversified ap-
proach of all the contributors to the study of Neoplatonism
and Indian thought seems to be a part of my duty. As the
reader will notice, the areas chosen by the contributors range
from historical to metaphysical, logical, ethical, mystical, epis-
temological, phenomenological, pragmatic and even compre-
hensively evaluational aspects of the problem.
A thread of unity, suggested by the hypothesis that the
parallelism of expression and the technique of attaining the
unitive experience of the One in Plotinus, Brahman in Indian
thought, and God in the case of all the mystics the world
over, seems to run through all the articles. Every author has
made a unique contribution. The volume itself presents a
"unity in diversity" and "harmony in discord." Its philosophi-
cal importance does not need to be elaborated. Professor R.
B. Harris must be congratulated as the initiator of the
contemporary revival of interest in Neoplatonism, which
seems to be the only philosophy that can bridge the artificial
gap between the Eastern and the Western traditions of phil-
losophy. I hope that the comparative study of Neoplatonism
with other areas of philosophy, science, religion and psychol-
ogy will perhaps lead to a better understanding of various
disciplines. This is a most laudable philosophical venture.
NOTES
1. Bhagavadgita, VIII.18-21.
2. Swami Nikhilananda, trans., The Mundaka Upanisad (New York,
1964), p. 115.
3. Bhagavadgità XIII.17.
4. Ibid., II.28.
5. Ibid., III.42.
6. Ibid., V.7.
Index
The use of the italics typeface in the index has been reserved for the
titles of texts and publications.
abädhita, 240 Aelian, 11

abheda, 138 Aeneaus of Gaza, 22
Abhidhammatthasangaho, 128 ahamkára, 69
Abhidharma, 121, 122, 125, 127 ahamkartr, 178
Abhidharmakosa, 109 Aikyaváda, 337
abhim4na, 278 aisthesis, 134
Absolute, The, 233, 234, 235, ajnána, 197, 199, 201
236, 253 akasa, 113
absolutism, 236, 239 äkasanancäyatana, 125, 129
Acit, 326 äkincannäyatana, 125
adhyäsa, 193, 195, 240 Aksara, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 97,
Adhyätma, 326 98, 325, 331, 332
Adhyätma Upanisad, 52 Aksara Brahman, 325
Advaita and Neoplatonism, A Aksara Kutastha, 332
Critical Study in Compara- Alexander the Great, 10, 12,
tive Philosophy, x, 294 286, 288
Advaitaväda, 337 Al-Ghazali, 231
Advaita Vedänta (or Advaitism), Ambrose, Saint, 19
192, 233, 234, 237, 239, Ammianus Marcellinus, 18
240, 263 Ammonius Saccas, 241
345
346 INDEX
Anal Haqq, 231 Avamedha, 278

Anand, 238 Avarana, 240
Ananda, 330, 338, 339 Avatära, 336
Anantam, 330 avidyä, 33, 34, 39, 40, 176, 198,
anantam Brahman, 249 240, 244, 250, 252, 278
Anaxagoras, 279 avrti-Sakti, 194
anejja, 125 avyakta, 195
Anguttaranikaya, 125 avyamátma Brahma, 238
Anirvacaniya, 96, 198, 240 Ayyangár, T. R. Srinavasa, 53
Anuruddhacariya, 128 Avyaya Brahman, 92, 325
Anyaya Brahman, 90
Apara Prakrti, 331 Bädaräyana, 138, 147, 191, 209
Apollonius of Tyana, 12, 13, 19, bädhita, 240
20, 21 Bardesanes, 13, 14, 287
Aql, 231 Bayazid, 227, 228, 229, 230
arhat, 9 Bazan, Francisco Garcia, 181,
Aristotle, 73, 279 338
Arjuna, 64, 66, 69, 71, 72, 89, Beauty, 185
95 Beierwaltes, W., 171, 174
Armstrong, A. H., 238, 263, Benn, A. W., 296
297, 299, 332 Berkeley, George, 48
Artha, 326 Bhagavadgita, (or Gita), 9, 63,
arüpadhyänäni, 121 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 72,
arüpa jhäna, 126, 128, 129 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 88, 89,
arüpaloka, 123 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97,
Aryadeva, 113 98, 99, 104, 114, 115, 324,
Asanga, 105, 109 326, 327, 328, 329, 330,
asat-kdrya, 146 332, 333, 334, 335
A$oka, 286 bhakti, 68, 72, 316
Astadyayi, 286 bhakti yoga, 71, 82, 327
Athens, 10 Bhäskara, 148
Atmabodha Upanisad, 52 bhava, 240
Atmaksara Brahman, 90, 325 bhävana, 68
Atman, 38, 53, 55, 56, 57, 70, bhava rüpa, 240
72, 173, 192, 194, 241, bhedäbheda, 138
248, 250, 251, 252, 253, Bidez, Joseph, 21
303, 325, 326, 331, 332 Biography of Proclus, 48
Augustine, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, Bonaventure, 137, 139, 149,
20, 21, 211, 328 150, 151, 152, 153, 154
Aurelian, 284 Borelli, John, 137, 335
Aurobindo, Sri, 257, 258, 263, Bradley, 234, 235, 236
264, 265, 266, 267, 268, Brahdäranyakopanisad, 179
269, 270, 271, 341 Brahma, 35
INDEX 347
Brahman, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, Cicero, 109

38, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 67, Cilento, Vincenzo, 297
69, 70, 71, 72, 81, 90, 92, Cit, 161, 163, 164, 168, 171,
93, 94, 95, 97, 106, 110, 178, 326, 330, 338, 339
145, 146, 147, 154, 176, citta, 123
192, 194, 195, 196, 199, City of God, 5, 8, 17, 19, 20, 21
200, 201, 212, 216, 217, Clement of Alexandria, 11
218, 219, 220, 222, 237, Commentary to the Brahma-
239, 241, 248, 249, 250, Sutra, 191, 193, 194
251, 253, 278, 279, 303, consciousness, 54, 55, 59
325, 327, 328, 330, 337, Conze, Dr., 102, 109
338, 339, 343 Cousin, Victor, 294
Brahman-atman, 248 Cumont, Franz, 21
Brahmana Vidyä, 324
Brahmans, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20 Dandamis, 14
Brahma Suütras, 138, 146, 150, Darius, 285
191, 209, 212, 216, 339 darshana, 191, 324
Brahmänubhava, 339 De Abstinentia, 287
Brahman Vijnana, 93 De Divinatione, 109
Brahmasutrabhasya, 162, 178 Demetrius, 287
Brahmaviharas, 134 Derrett, 10
Bréhier, Emile, x, 296, 297, 298, Deussen, Paul, 162, 174, 337
300, 301 de Vogel, Cornelia, 300
Brhad-aranyaka Upanisad, 32, dharma, 63, 64, 68, 71, 83, 326,
165, 249 334
Brock University, x, 1, 4 Dharmakäya, 104, 334
Buddha, 104, 106, 107, 109, dhyana yoga, 82
112, 278 dianoia, 79
Buddhaghosäcariya, 127, 134 Dihle, 11
Buddhi, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, Diodorus, 11
70, 71, 72, 80, 81, 90, 178, Dion Chrysostom, 11
326, 331, 332 Diotima, 88
Buddhism, 8, 9 Divine Names, 135
buddhi yoga, 71, 72, 82, 83, 89, Dodds, E. R., 163
92, 99, 327, 331, 332 Drashta, 324
Drsti, 324
caitanyapurusa, 265 duhkha,68
Canada Council, 4 Duryodhana, 64
cetasika, 123
Chaldean Philosophy, 50 Earp, Alan, x
Chandogya Upanisad, 39, 52, ecstasy, 229, 230, 231
216, 312 Edessa, 13
Chatterji, Pritibhusan, 257, 341 eikasia, 134
348 INDEX
ekaggatä, 124 Hiranya-garbha, 35

Elagabalus, 13 human estrangement, 243ff
Elements of Theology, 49 Huxley, Aldous, 3
emanation, 239, 240, 274
Empedocles, 281 Iamblichus, 50, 279
Enneads, 5, 64, 65, 78, 79, 80, India, 3
81, 82, 88, 104, 295 Inge, Dean W. R., 261, 262, 266,
Eriugena, 209, 210, 211, 213, 283
214, 223, 340 International Society for Neopla-
Eudoxus, 286 tonic Studies, x, 1, 4
Eusebius of Caesarea, 19 Ifa Upanisad, 39
Isherwood, Christopher, 3
Fana, 228 Jévara, 35, 36, 37, 140, 177,
Fana Fillah, 229 196, 198, 237
Festugiere, 11 Itinerarium, 153
Filliozat, 9, 11
jada, 265
Galerius, 284 Jägrat, 326
Gampopa, 105 Jainism, 9
Ghalabat, 230 James, William, 309
Gita Vijnana Bhasya, 93 Jewel Ornament of Liberation,
Gnosticism, 186 105
God, 97, 110, 154, 178, 179, jhanas, 123, 125, 131, 132, 134
213, 223, 227, 228, 229, jiva, 244, 252, 253
230, 231, 259, 280, 313, jivatman, 275
333 jñäna, 68, 71, 80, 81, 93, 94,
Goleman, Daniel, 131 276, 323, 324, 335
guna, 69 jnànam, 249, 330
Gymnosophists, 14, 17, 328 jhana yoga, 71, 82, 327
Julian, Emperor, 18, 83
Hacker, Paul, 161, 336, 337 Jung, C. G., 74
Hailer, E. T., 282
Harris, R. Baine, ix, 343 kaivalya, 39
Hatab, Lawrence J. 27, 329 Kaivalya Upanisad, 38, 39
Hatton, Russell, 209, 340 Kali Yuga, 63
Hegel, 234, 235, 236, 294 Kalkt, 9
Heidegger, 251 kámaloka, 123
Henry, Paul, 297 Kaniska, 287
Heraclitus, 244, 279 kapidhvaja, 68
Hieratic Art, 50 karma, 31, 70, 275, 277, 281,
Hierocles, 19 303
Hinayàna, 9 karma yoga, 71, 82, 327
Hippolytus of Rome, 11, 287 kasina, 128
INDEX 349
Katha Upanisad, 72, 162, 249 Mamertus, Claudianus, 22

Kauravas, 63 Manah, 326
Keith, A. B., 300 manas, 66, 67, 69, 80, 265, 331
Kena Upanisad, 33, 34 Mandükya Upanisad, 35, 36
Kenodoxia, 278, 279 Mantras, 335
Kierkegaard, 246 Mantra Vidyä, 324
Kirchner, 294 Marcellinus, 19
Koelman, Gaspar, 141 Marinus, 48
Kramer, H. J., 300 Marucchi, P., 301
Krsna, 9, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, matter, 181ff
70, 71, 72, 79, 81, 82, 89, maya, 35, 39, 40, 58, 70, 92,
91, 92, 96 176, 177, 178, 194, 196,
Ksara Purusa, 97, 332 197, 198, 201, 222, 275,
kSetra, 69 281, 303
kSetrajna, 69 Mayer, John २. A., x, 1, 309,
kukkucca, 124 342
Kurukéetra, 63, 72 Meander, 287
Megasthenes, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20,
Lacombe, Oliver, 301 328
Larson, Gerald, 137 Melissius, 279
Les Mages Hellénisés, 21 Merlan, Philip, 300
Letter to Anebo, 6 Mimàmsaà, 8, 146
Licenius, 284 Mita (or Mithra), 284
Life of Apollonius of Tyana, 278 moksa, 38, 57, 64, 65, 248, 326
Lila, 90, 274 Moore, Woodrow W., 181
Logos, 111, 183, 184 Mula Vidya, 324
Lombard, Peter, 151 Miller, H. F., 295, 298
Longinus, 10 Mundaka Upanisad, 33, 39, 162,
212, 328
McCrindle, J. W., 10 Mystical Theology; 122, 132,
133, 135
madbhäva, 70
Mädhyamika, 102 Nabi, Mohammad Noor, 227, 340
Maharshi, Ramana, 103, 104, nama, 195
114 nämarüpa, 194, 197, 201, 249
Maha Upanisad, 52 Narada, 129
Mahäväkayas, 329 Nearchus, 10
Mahavakya Upanisad, 52 Needham, Dr. Joseph, 101
Mahäyäna, 9 Neoplatonism, 1, 22, 46, 48, 61,
Mahäyäna Buddhism, 102 101, 105, 107, 162, 163,
Maitreyanätha, 105 164, 168, 169, 171, 172,
Maitri Upanisad, 32, 52, 162, 174, 178, 179, 233, 234,
278, 287 273, 282, 309, 319, 341
350 INDEX
Neoplatonists, 2, 3, 18, 65, 82, Paramätmä, 97, 98

111, 112, 114, 115, 164, Parame$vara, 53
174, 247 Para$uräma, 9
nevasaññanañsaññayatana, 125 Paratpara, 325
Nikáyas, 125 Paravahera Vajiränana, 129
Nimbarka, 138 parinäma, 138, 274
nimitta kärana, 215 Parmenides, 244, 279
nirguna, 199, 251 Patanjala Yoga, 335
Nirmänakäya, 104 Patibhäga Nimitta, 128
nirvana, 9, 111, 112, 123 Patna, 10
Nous, 7, 29, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, Periphyseon, 209, 210, 211, 213,
38, 65, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 214
92, 95, 109, 132, 161, 163, Philo, 87
164, 170, 178, 228, 237, Philosophoumena, 11
241, 245, 246, 247, 248, Philostratus, 12, 13, 19, 20, 278,
253, 260, 261, 263, 274, 279
275, 279, 325, 327 piti, 124
Nyaya, 146, 191 Plato, 6, 73, 87, 97, 134, 211,
261, 279, 281, 282, 283,
O’Brien, Elmer, 87, 88 296
Ojha, Sri Madhusudan, 93 Platonic Theology, 49
Old Dominion University, 4, 27 Pliny, 11
O’Meara, John J., 5, 328 Plotinus, 2, 6, 17, 27, 28, 29,
One, The, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 38, 63, 65, 73, 74, 76, 81,
33, 34, 36, 38, 40, 47, 49, 83, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 95,
50, 87, 91, 92, 95, 96, 132, 98, 102, 107, 108, 109,
133, 170, 185, 187, 188, 110, 111, 115, 131, 161,
190, 237, 238, 239, 240, 163, 164, 167, 170, 173,
241, 245, 246, 247, 259, 181, 182, 184, 185, 186,
260, 267, 274, 276, 277, 187, 189, 191, 192, 202,
278, 279, 325, 327, 338 227, 228, 229, 231, 237,
238, 239, 241, 243, 245,
paligenesis, 8 246, 247, 249, 250, 251,
Palladius, 19 253, 254, 257, 258, 260,
Pancikaranam, 192 261, 262, 263, 264, 265,
Pandavas, 63 266, 267, 268, 269, 270,
Panini, 286 271, 274, 275, 276, 277,
paramapurusa, 87, 88, 89, 90, 279, 287, 293, 294, 299,
91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 304, 311, 326, 332
325, 332 Plotinus: The Road to Reality,
paramärthas, 313 300
parämarthika, 193, 236, 250, Porphyry, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12,
253 13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 77,
INDEX 351
87, 88, 112, 227, 231, 277, rüpaloka, 123

287, 328
potentia, 178 Saccidänanda, 264
pradhäna, 212 Sadasad Vilaksna, 339
prajfia, 37, 332 saguna, 251, 275
prakrti, 69, 70, 71, 72, 80, 81, Sakti, 178
83, 94, 137 säksin, 248
pralaya, 195 Sallustius, 108
prana, 265, 278 samadhi, 237
Proclus, 2, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, Samanaeans, 13, 14, 15, 16
50, 51, 52, 113, 163, 164, Samanya Vedanta Upanisad, 53
166, 169, 171, 338 Sarhbhogakäya, 104
Przyluski, J., 104, 300 sarhkalpa, 67
Pseudo-Callisthenes, 11 Samkara, 35, 162, 163, 171,
Pseudo-Dionysius, 121, 122, 211 174, 175, 177, 179, 181,
psyché, 63, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 191, 192, 198, 199, 201,
78, 79, 80, 81 202, 209, 210, 212, 214,
Puech, H., 301 215, 216, 217, 218, 219,
pumam, 274 220, 221, 222, 223, 237,
purusa, 69, 88, 94, 97, 326, 331 240, 243, 248, 249, 250,
Purusottama, 93, 97, 332 251, 252, 253, 254, 263,
pürvapaksin, 212, 216, 217, 218, 339, 340, 341
222, 223 Sarnkaräcärya, 92
Pythagoras, 12, 281, 282 samsära, 251
samvrtti, 313
Questions of Milinda, 10, 13 Sankhya, 8, 139, 140, 141, 144,
154, 174, 191, 302
Radhakrishnan, 92 Sankhya Karika, 140, 141
rajas, 69 Sankhya Pravacana Bhasya, 141
rajoguna, 67 Sankhya Sara, 141
Räma, 9 Sankhya Sutras, 141, 142, 147
Raman, Maharishi, 335 Sankhya-Yoga, 137
Rämänuja, 35, 138, 148 Saramati (Sthiramati), 105
Ratnagotravibhaga, 102, 105 Sarira, 69, 326
Rg-Veda, 278, 284 Sarvastivadin School, 109
Rist, J. M., 300 sat, 222, 223, 238, 265, 330, 338
Ritter, H., 294 Satapatha Brahmana, 93
Rodier, David F. T., 121, 335 sat-cit-dnanda, 171, 173, 259,
Rosán, Laurence J., 45, 329 264
Rtacit, 265 sat-kärya, 137, 138, 139, 140
rüpa, 56, 123, 132, 195 sátta, 222
rüpadhyänäni, 121 sattva, 69
rüpajhäna, 123, 124 satyam, 249, 330
352 INDEX
Schlette, H. R., 294, 302, 303, S ve ta$vatara Upanisad, 31, 32,

304 35, 38, 39, 162
Schwyzer, H. R., 297 Swarüpa Laksanas, 330
Scylax, 285 Syrianus, 50
Sentences, 151 Szabó, Arpad, 301
Shabda Brahman, 336
Sharma, I. C., 4, 87, 323 taijasa, 36
Shastri, Sri Motilal, 93 Taittiriya Upanisad, 35, 278
Siculus, 11 tamas, 69
Simplicius, 113 Tarn, W. W., 283
Sinari, Ramakant K., 243, 340, Tatparäh, 333
341 Tazkiratul Auliya, 230
Sophist, 184 Tejobindu Upanisad, 45, 46, 52,
spirit, 163, 164, 165, 166, 178, 53, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 329,
179, 183, 184, 185, 267 330, 331
éradhä, 68 Thales, 310
$ruti, 63, 237, 241 Theiler, Willy, 300
Staal, J. F., x, 294, 301, 302, Theodoret, 21
303, 304, 305 Thera, The Venerable Narada,
St. Catharines, Ontario, ix, 1 128
Sthitaprajña, 332, 333 The System of the Vedanta, 162
Stoichetosis theologike, 163, Timaeus, 107, 278
169, 173 Tripathi, C. L., 273, 341
Strabo, 11, 19 Tripathi, R. K., 233, 340
St. Thomas, 164 Trouillard, Jean, 297
Subala Upanisad, 32, 38, 52 Tula Vidyà, 324
Subrahmanya, Padit S., 53 turiya, 37, 326
sukha, 124
Sukr, 230 uddhacca, 104
Summa contra gentiles, 164 Union with God, 227ff
sunyata, 254 Universities’ Grants Commission
Susupti, 326 of India, 4
svabhäva, 69, 70, 83 upadäna Kärana, 137, 215
svadharma, 83 Upadesasáhasri, 171, 174, 177
svagat bheda, 238 upádhi, 196
Svapana, 326 Upanisadbrahmayogin, Sri, 53
$varga, 38 Upanisads, 11, 12, 27, 31, 34,
svärtha, 171 38, 40, 41, 53, 72, 90, 96,
svarüpatah, 235, 236 161, 162, 163, 165, 169,
svatantra, 171 191, 244, 248, 249, 253,
svatassiddha, 169 258, 274, 275, 276, 278,
svayamprakasata, 169 279, 282-3, 295, 300, 323,
Svetaketu, 312 324, 326, 328, 329, 330,
INDEX 353
334, 335, 341 Virät Purusa, 90

upekkha, 125 Visnu, 9, 336
Uttama Purusa, 97, 98 Visuddhimaggo, 127, 131, 134
Uttaratantra, 102, 103, 104, visva, 36
105, 107, 108, 110, 111, Visvasrit Brahman, 90, 92, 325,
112 331
vitakka, 124
Vacherot, E., 294 vivarta, 274
vairägya, 238 vyakta, 195
Vaisesika, 8, 146, 191, 220, 221, vyäpäda, 124
222 Vyasa, 141, 142
Vallabhächärya, Sri, 338 vyävahärika, 193, 250, 253
Varttana, 324
Vasubandhu, 109 Wallis, Richard T., 101, 131, 333
Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, 277 Weil, Simone, 1
Vedanta, 138, 139, 154, 179, Whittaker, Thornas, 110, 260
191, 219, 222, 248, 338 Windelband, Wilhelm, 263
Vedäntism, 161, 162, 167, 171, Wolters, Albert M., 293, 342
174, 175, 176, 177 World-Soul, 35, 36, 47, 92, 94,
Vedas, 55, 58, 60, 91, 93, 94, 97, 109, 3237, 260, 325
97, 216, 220, 323, 324,
326, 335 yajna, 67, 93, 94
Vernanz, Schubert, 297 Yajña Vidya, 324
Vibhanga, 126 yoga, 71, 89, 90, 91, 92, 99,
vicära, 124 332
vidya, 33, 34, 39, 68, 200 Yogäcära, 102, 105, 110
Vijfiana, 93, 94, 265, 323, 335 Yogamäyä, 90
Vijnanabhiksu, 138, 139, 141, Yoga Sara Sangraha, 141
142, 144, 146, 147, 154, Yogashästra, 93
335 Yoga Varttika, 144
Viksepa, 240 ogin, 333
viksepa-Sakti, 194 Yuktah, 333
viññanancäyatana, 125, 129
Virapattanam, 10 Zaehner, R. C., 300
virdt, 196 Zeller, 294

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NEOPLATONISM

©1982 International Society for Neoplatonic Studies

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced

For information, address State University of New York

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Indian Wisdom and Porphyry's Search

Plotinus and the Upanisads

Proclus and the Tejobindu Upanisad

The Plotinian One and the Concept of

Phraseology and Imagery in

Meditative States in the Abhidharma

Matter and Exemplar: Difference-in-Identity

Cit and Nous

Matter in Plotinus and Samkara

Sarhkara and Eriugena on Causality

Union with God in Plotinus and Bayazid

Advaita Vedanta and Neoplatonism

The Concept of Human Estrangement in

Plotinus and Sri Aurobindo:

The Influence of Indian Philosophy

A Survey of Modern Scholarly Opinion on

Neoplatonism, Indian Thought, and

Some Critical Conclusions

Old Dominion University

All of the papers in this volume were presented or prepared

few books and articles comparing the two intellectual tradi-

achievement that must await considerable further investigation

The editor wishes to indicate his special appreciation for

John KR. A. Mayer

While the present volume is an edited record of the pro-

disjointed aspects of experience as grounded in a common ma-

It seems that Europe requires genuine contacts

This book, then, also proposes to be a partial response to

Neoplatonists today can be divided into two groups, with a

bring to a world dominated by materialistic, pluralistic, rela-

individual with his original source, by means of devotion,

University College Dublin

Porphyry, the disciple of Plotinus to whom we are indebted

When Porphyry says... that no single sect had been

tion of the soul, deriving from some true philoso-

Augustine further asserts that Porphyry held firmly that Provi-

an Egyptian priest, a passage from which is quoted earlier in

You [Porphyry], being a philosopher, we must

One must emphasize that Porphyry’s discussion of all man-

are reported to have concerned themselves with salvation of

de l'Inde fermée, de l'Inde ayant créé une civilisation en vase

speakers from the series of compilations of relevant texts in

exposé, les précisions relatives à la nature du Θεός des Brahm-

life overlaps with Porphyry’s. Philostratus lived in Tyre (which

But since we have already made mention of one of

sages, whom the Greeks are wont to call the

at large, and when any one is to be enrolled in their

offers to prevent them; on the contrary, all deem

This passage was quoted almost verbatim by Stobaeus, and

themselves if they have observed this less than they consider

from Porphyry or aliunde. In either case—since Augustine

sending their foremost men with presents as far as from the

... yet on many points their [i.e. of the Indi] opin-