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UWNC-NFL-vs-Norichin-PP 101
UWNC-NFL-vs-Norichin-PP 101
POSITION PAPER
(for the Complainants)
PREFATORY STATEMENT
“The Supreme Court reaffirms its concern for the lowly worker who, often at
his employer’s mercy must look up to the law for his protection. The law regards him
with tenderness and even favor and always with faith and hope in his capacity to help
shaping the nation’s future. He must not be taken for granted. He deserves abiding
respect. How society treats him determines whether the knife in his hands shall be a
caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry weapon of defiance and revenge. If
we cherish him as we should, we must resolve to lighten “the weight of centuries” of
exploitation and disdain that bends his back but does not bow his head.”( Cebu Royal
Plant San Miguel Corp vs. Minister of Labor, )1
PARTIES
1
G.R. No. L-58639, 12 August 1987
1
1. Complainants UNITED WORKERS OF NORICHIN CO. – NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR (“Complainants UWNC-NFL” for brevity) Represented by
JELLY CALMA PINEDA-UNION PRESIDENT, with ROMEO ALVIZ ICARRO JR.,
JENNILYN BERNALTE CALADIAO, BRENDICK MARTINEZ DE GUIA, DONNEL
AQUINO SALVADOR, FEDERICO GERALE DEQUITO JR., JOVET AQUINO
SALVADOR, EDGAR ACOHON ISANO, CHERRY TRAGURA LAPID, ROMNICK
INFANTE TABERNA, RICO SABILLA BAGAS, JUN-JUN RYAN GOLORAN
CABUSAO, and ERICSON CAMATCHO BOLILAN are Filipinos, of legal ages, and
for purposes of these proceedings, may be served with summons, orders,
resolutions, decisions and other legal processes of the Honorable Office at c/o Atty.
General D. Du in the address stated below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
7. Complainant Pineda does not receive any SIL, and 13th month pay since
she worked for respondent Norichin. There are also no benefits such as SSS, Pagibig
and Philhealth. Attached as ANNEX "B-series" is the copy of her payslips.
8. On 7 December 2022, complainant Pineda gave birth and was taken to the
hospital. She was not able to avail her maternity leave benefits in the SSS because of
2
non-contribution by Norichin. Attached as ANNEX "C" is the copy of patient discharge
plan.
11. On April 2020, complainant Icarro also started to receive extra (incentives)
every Saturday worth P200.00 per week, apart from his food allowance worth
P100.00 per day.
12. Complainant Icarro does not receive any SIL, and 13th month pay since he
worked for respondent Norichin, and no benefits such as SSS, Pagibig and
Philhealth. Attached as ANNEX "E-series" is the copy of his payslips.
16. Complainant Caladiao does not receive any SIL, and 13th month pay since
she worked for respondent Norichin, and no benefits such as SSS, Pagibig and
Philhealth. Attached as ANNEX "G-series" is the copy of her payslips.
19. Complainant De Guia does not receive any SIL, and 13th month pay since
he worked for respondent Norichin, and no benefits such as SSS, Pagibig and
Philhealth. Attached as ANNEX "H-series" is the copy of payslips.
23. Complainant D. Salvador does not receive any SIL, and 13th month pay
since he worked for respondent Norichin, and no benefits such as SSS, Pagibig and
Philhealth. Attached as ANNEX "J-series" is the copy of payslips.
4
27. Complainant Dequito does not receive any SIL, and 13th month pay since
he worked for respondent Norichin, and no benefits such as SSS, Pagibig and
Philhealth. Attached as ANNEX "L-series" is the copy of his payslips.
31. Complainant J. Salvador does not receive any SIL, and 13th month pay
since he worked for respondent Norichin, and no benefits such as SSS, Pagibig and
Philhealth. Attached as ANNEX "N-series" is the copy his of payslips.
35. Complainant Isano does not receive any SIL, and 13th month pay since he
worked for respondent Norichin, and no benefits such as SSS, Pagibig and
Philhealth. Attached as ANNEX "P-series" is the copy of his payslips.
5
37. On April 2020, complainant Lapid started to receive extra (incentives)
every Saturday worth P200.00 a week, apart from food allowance worth P100 per
day.
39. Complainant Lapid does not receive any SIL, and 13th month pay since
she worked for respondent Norichin, and no benefits such as SSS, Pagibig and
Philhealth.
43. Complainant Taberna does not receive any SIL, and 13th month pay since
he worked for respondent Norichin, and no benefits such as SSS, Pagibig and
Philhealth. Attached as ANNEX "R-series" is the copy of payslips.
47. Complainant Bagas does not receive any SIL, and 13th month pay since
he worked for respondent Norichin, and no benefits such as SSS, Pagibig and
Philhealth. Attached as ANNEX "T-series" is the copy of payslips.
51. Complainant Cabusao does not receive any SIL, and 13th month pay
since he worked for respondent Norichin, and no benefits such as SSS, Pagibig and
Philhealth. Attached as ANNEX "U-series" is the copy of payslips.
55. Complainant Bolilan does not receive any SIL, and 13th month pay since
he worked for respondent Norichin, and no benefits such as SSS, Pagibig and
Philhealth.. Attached as ANNEX "W-series" is the copy of payslips.
56. Things went sour on 27 June 2023, when a request for sole and exclusive
bargaining agent online validation conference was conducted by Department Of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) Mediator-Arbiter Attorney Remedios T. Vegim-Teves
which was participated both by the respondent Norichin and complainants UNWC-
NFL represented by union president complainant Pineda, Vice president complainant
Icarro and union auditor complainant Lapid. Attorney Teves validated and confirmed
that the request for SEBA certification met the requirements, and that she will issue a
SEBA certification to UWNC-NFL. Attached as ANNEX "X" is the copy of SEBA
certification.
7
57. After the online conference, respondent Norichin called all the employees
and conducted an inquiry to find out who the members of the Union are. They forced
them to sign a “petition” addressed to the DOLE med-arbiter which states that they
were allegedly forced to join the union and that their signatures were only forged.
Attached as ANNEX "Y" is the copy of pictures of the said petition.
58. Among those who were forced to sign the petition because they were
intimidated by respondent Norichin were complainants Bagas, D. Salvador, J.
Salvador, and Bolilan, but later retracted to stand as union members.
64. Respondent Norichin called all their employees for a meeting after work
(especially all union members) to compel them to sign a purported employment
contract and waiver, and also a company code of conduct whose contents were not
even explained to them and were not allowed to have a copy. Complainants were not
allowed to go home without signing the said documents first. Due to exhaustion and
hunger from working all day, complainants UWNC-NFL were forced to sign the said
documents.
8
66. On 10 August 2023, complainant Icarro submitted an explanation letter but
it was not accepted by Norichin and requested that it be translated to Tagalog.
Attached as ANNEX "DD-series" is the copy of explanation letter.
68. On 15 August 2023, Icarro was given the receiving copy of the explanation
letter. Attached as ANNEX "EE" is the copy of Tagalog explanation letter.
75. When complainant Icarro asked about his salary, respondent Norichin
answered: "ma release lang ang kanyang back pay at kahit iyong iba pa kung siya ay
mag clearance muna.” Attached as ANNEX "II" is the copy of messenger
conversation.
ISSUES
ARGUMENTS / DISCUSSION
79. Articles 258 and 259 of the Labor Code states the concept of and
enumerates the unfair labor practices committed by employers.
ART. 258. 247 Concept of Unfair Labor Practice and Procedure for
Prosecution Thereof. — Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of
workers and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate
interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain
collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom
and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of
healthy and stable labor-management relations. (Labor Code of the
Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 442 (Amended & Renumbered), [July 21,
2015)
xxxx
ART. 259. 248 Unfair Labor Practices of Employers. — It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization;
xxxx
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms
and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization, x x x (Labor Code of the Philippines,
Presidential Decree No. 442 (Amended & Renumbered), [July 21, 2015)
80. The records reveal several instances to support the charge of unfair labor
practice, specifically union busting, such as:
10
A. After the online conference on 27 June 2023, respondent Cadiente
called her employees and conducted an inquiry to find out who the members
of the Union are. They forced them to sign a “petition” addressed to the DOLE
med-arbiter which states that they were allegedly forced to join the union and
that their signatures were only forged. The said petition states: “we want to
verify the names and signature of the employees submitted by Jelly Pineda for
the certification of the United Workers of Norichin Co. - NFL as some of our
employees testify that they were neither informed nor aware and didn’t sign for
the application of the union.”2 Respondent Cadiente pointing her finger can be
seen in the photo ordering the workers to sign the said document.
D. Not allowing the workers on 04 July 2023 to go home until they sign
the waiver and code of conduct, and not giving them ample amount of time to
carefully study the said documents.
81. One by one, the union officers and organizers have been surgically
targeted by the respondents and imposing absurd charged against them. Production
staff like complainants Pineda, Icarro, Caladiao, Lapid and the Salvador Brothers
would be closely monitored by a newly-installed CCTV by respondent Norichin during
their work. Respondent Cadiente would deliberately instigate confrontations with them
and then charge them with insubordination and disrespect. If they cannot make
trumped up charges against union officers, the respondents would resurface old
violations. In short, respondent Norichin went on a fishing expedition in order to
terminate the then union organizers and prevent them from organizing a union.
85. The applicable provision of law to this case is Article 297 of the Labor
Code, as amended, which states:
86. In Maula v. Ximex Delivery Express, Inc, 6 this Court reiterated previous
pronouncements on the nature of serious misconduct as a just cause to terminate an
employee according to the Labor Code. To quote:
87. On the other hand, loss of trust and confidence, as a just cause for
termination of employment, is premised on the fact that an employee concerned
holds a position where greater trust is placed by management and from whom greater
fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of
the offense for which an employee is penalized.7 Loss of trust and confidence to be a
valid cause for dismissal must be work related such as would show the employee
concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer and it must be based on a
6
G.R. No. 207838, January 25, 2017.
7
Cocoplans, Inc. v. Villapando, G.R. No. 183129, May 30, 2016.
12
willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. Such breach is willful if
it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.
The loss of trust and confidence must spring from the voluntary or willful act of the
employee, or by reason of some blameworthy act or omission on the part of the
employee.8
88. Willful breach of trust, as just cause for the termination of employment, is
founded on the fact that the employee concerned: (1) holds a position of trust and
confidence, i.e., managerial personnel or those vested with powers and prerogatives
to lay down management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees; or (2) is routinely charged with the care
and custody of the employer's money or property, i.e., cashiers, auditors, property
custodians, or those who, in normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly
handle significant amounts of money or property. In any of these situations, it is the
employee's breach of the trust that his or her position holds which results in the
employer's loss of confidence.9
90. Thus, in order to dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence, the employee must be guilty of an actual and willful breach of duty duly
supported by substantial evidence.11 Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.12
91. In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show
that the dismissal is for a just cause.13 In the case at bar, respondent Norichin failed
to adduce substantial evidence that would clearly demonstrate that complainant
Icarro has committed serious misconduct or has performed actions that would
warrant the loss of trust and confidence reposed upon them by their employer.
Contrary to the findings to the investigation conducted by respondent Norichin, there
is no concrete and credible proof to support the allegation of wiretapping leveled by
respondent Norichin against complainant Icarro. - the said criminal act being the
underlying reason for the dismissal of the latter.
8
Venzon v. ZAMECO II Electric Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 213934, November 9, 2016.
9
Inocente v. St. Vincent Foundation for Children and Aging, Inc., G.R. No. 202621, June 22, 2016.
10
Continental Micronesia, Inc. v. Basso, G.R. Nos. 178382-83, September 23, 2015, 771 SCRA 329, 351,
citing Apo Cement Corporation v. Baptisma, 688 Phil. 468, 480-481 (2012).
11
Leo's Restaurant and Bar Cafe v. Densing, G.R. No. 208535, October 19, 2016.
12
Mamba v. Bueno, G.R. No. 191416, February 7, 2017.
13
Turks Shawarma Co. v. Pajaron, G.R. No. 207156, January 16, 2017.
13
92. The records of this case clearly indicate that no concrete and credible
proof was presented to link complainant Icarro to the wiretapping allegedly
committed. In fact, the ruling of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor14 stated that:
“We have gone over the records and evidence adduced during the
preliminary investigation and we are not convinced that the respondent herein
should be prosecuted for Violation of RA 4200. While the complainants were
able to secure the actual recording of the alleged conversation, there is no
concrete and credible proof that it was obtained properly and legally by the
said complainants. In other words, how they were able to discover about the
existence of the alleged recorded conversation through the video recording
device of the cellphone belonging to the respondent has not been sufficiently
explained and alleged in the filed complaint and we have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to how they were able to open the cellphone of herein
respondent. Under the given circumstances, it is the impression of the
undersigned that the complainants had illegally accessed and illegally opened
respondent’s cellphone without the express knowledge and consent of the
latter. If there is someone who should be criminally charged here, it should be
the complainants and not the respondent since the discovery as to the
contents of the video recording device of the cellphone was done not in the
manner and ways allowed or authorized by existing laws.”
xxxxx
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for violation of RA
4200 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and for insufficiency of
evidence.”(emphasis supplied)
93. Based on the above, the wire taping case filed by the respondent Norichin
in the Prosecutor’s office has no basis and it is not true that the complainant violated
RA 4200. Hence, there is no legal basis for his dismissal.
94. It should be stressed that the reason why Icarro was targeted is because
of the preventive mediation that UWNC-NFL requested with the NCMB on July 03,
2023. Norichin used the said case as a retaliatory measure designed to coerce
UWNC-NFL into withdrawing their complaint for nonpayment of labor standards and
benefits. Such an act is proscribed by Article 118 of the Labor Code which states:
14
ANNEX "KK-series"
14
96. From the above discussion, it is crystal clear that the complainant was
illegally dismissed from employment. And as the Union Vice President, he possessed
a vital position to the union organizing. Hence, respondent Norichin is guilty of Union
Busting.
97. It has been established from the discussion above that complainant Icarro
was illegally dismissed. Hence, he is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and salaries.
103. However, Auto Bus Transport System, Inc. v. Bautista 15 clarified the
correct reckoning of the prescriptive period for service incentive leave pay:
105. The clear policy of the Labor Code is to grant service incentive leave pay
to workers in all establishments, subject to a few exceptions. Section 2, Rule V, Book
III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides that "[e]very employee who
has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive
leave of five days with pay." Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every
employee who has served "within 12 months, whether continuous or broken reckoned
from the date the employee started working, including authorized absences and paid
regular holidays unless the working days in the establishment as a matter of practice
or policy, or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in
which case said period shall be considered as one year." It is also "commutable to its
money equivalent if not used or exhausted at the end of the year." In other words, an
employee who has served for one year is entitled to it. He may use it as leave days or
he may collect its monetary value. To limit the award to three years, as the solicitor
general recommends, is to unduly restrict such right.
107. Applying Article 291 of the Labor Code in light of this peculiarity of the
service incentive leave, we can conclude that the three (3)-year prescriptive period
commences, not at the end of the year when the employee becomes entitled to the
commutation of his service incentive leave, but from the time when the employer
refuses to pay its monetary equivalent after demand of commutation or upon
termination of the employee's services, as the case may be.
108. The above construal of Art. 291, vis-a-vis the rules on service incentive
leave, is in keeping with the rudimentary principle that in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations,
the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. The
policy is to extend the applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees
who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed
policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. 16 (Emphasis
supplied).
109. Hence, the complainants are also entitled to the amount of proportionate
13th month pay and service incentive leave pay as mandated by law.
110. It is evident that the illegal dismissal of the complainant Icarro was
attended by bad faith on the part of the respondents. He was unceremoniously
dismissed because of his union activities, and without any just or valid causes.
111. The complainant suffered sleepless nights and anxiety, having lost his job
which is his ONLY source of livelihood. As such, this humble counsel prays that the
Honorable Labor Arbiter penalize the respondents with Moral Damages as he may
deem fit.
112. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good. The law allows the grant of exemplary damages in cases such as this to
serve as a warning to the public and as a deterrent against the repetition of this kind
of deleterious actions. Hence, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Labor
Arbiter award Exemplary Damages as he may deem fit, to prevent this kind of
treatment be repeated to other employees.
16
Id. at 876-878, citing Fernandez v. NLRC, 349 Phil. 65, 94-95 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
17
113. Because of the injustices that the respondents committed against the
complainants, which resulted in the loss of employment of Icarro, the complainants
were constrained to retain the services of a legal counsel to protect their rights and
seek relief. Hence, an award of attorney’s fees is also proper in the case at bar.
114. Article 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, governs the grant of
attorney's fees in labor cases:
Art. 111. Attorney's fees. (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the
culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of
the amount of wages recovered.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or
administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages, attorney's fees which
exceed ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
115. Section 8, Rule VIII, Book III of its Implementing Rules also provides,
viz.:
116. The Supreme Court has already explained in PCL Shipping Philippines,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission17 that there are two commonly accepted
concepts of attorney's fees the ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an
attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the
legal services the former renders; compensation is paid for the cost and/or results of
legal services per agreement or as may be assessed. In its extraordinary concept,
attorney's fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by
the losing party to the winning party. The instances when these may be awarded are
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically in its paragraph 7 on actions
for recovery of wages, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless the
client and his lawyer have agreed that the award shall accrue to the lawyer as
additional or part of compensation.
117. The Supreme Court also held in PCL Shipping that Article 111 of the
Labor Code, as amended, contemplates the extraordinary concept of attorney's fees
and that Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict construction in the
award of attorney's fees. Although an express finding of facts and law is still
necessary to prove the merit of the award, there need not be any showing that the
employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the wages.
118. This was in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in RTG
Construction, Inc. v. Facto and in Ortiz v. San Miguel Corporation18, where it stated:
17
G.R. No. 153031, December 14, 2006
18
“Settled is the rule that in actions for recovery of wages, or where an employee
was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and
interests, a monetary award by way of attorney's fees is justifiable under
Article Ill of the Labor Code; Section 8, Rule VIII, Book III of its Implementing
Rules; and paragraph 7, Article 208 of the Civil Code. The award of attorney's
fees is proper, and there need not be any showing that the employer acted
maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the wages. There need only be a
showing that the lawful wages were not paid accordingly.”
PRAYER
Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for under the
circumstances.
18
G.R. No. 85278 August 29, 1989
19
GENERAL D. DU
atty_general@rocketmail.com
batasmanggagawa@gmail.com
34 Matiyaga Street, Brgy. Pinyahan, Diliman, Quezon City
MCLE Compliance No. VII-0028036
PTR No. 4056185/ 01-11-2023/ Quezon City
IBP No. 279263/ 01-09-2023/ Quezon City
Roll No. 61181
COPY FURNISHED
20
Republic of the Philippines )
Pampanga ) S.S.
We, JELLY CALMA PINEDA of legal age, Filipino and resides at Porac,
Pampanga, ROMEO ALVIZ ICARRO JR. of legal age, Filipino and resides at Santa
Rita, Pampanga, JENNILYN BERNALTE CALADIAO of legal age, Filipino and
resides at Guagua, Pampanga, BRENDICK MARTINEZ DE GUIA of legal age,
Filipino and resides at Santa Rita, Pampanga, DONNEL AQUINO SALVADOR of
legal age, Filipino and resides at Santa Rita, Pampanga, FEDERICO GERALE
DEQUITO JR. of legal age, Filipino and resides at Santa Rita, Pampanga, JOVET
AQUINO SALVADOR of legal age, Filipino and resides at Santa Rita, Pampanga,
EDGAR ACOHON ISANO of legal age, Filipino and resides at Santa Rita,
Pampanga, CHERRY TRAGURA LAPID of legal age, Filipino and resides at Santa
Rita, Pampanga, ROMNICK INFANTE TABERNA of legal age, Filipino and resides at
Porac, Pampanga, RICO SABILLA BAGAS of legal age, Filipino and resides at Santa
Rita, Pampanga, JUN-JUN RYAN GOLORAN CABUSAO of legal age, Filipino and
resides at Santa Rita, Pampanga, and ERICSON CAMATCHO BOLILAN of legal
age, Filipino and resides at Santa Rita, Pampanga, after being sworn in accordance
with law, hereby depose and say:
We have caused the preparation and filing of the foregoing case and we have
read and understood the contents thereof and the allegations therein are true and
correct based on available records and of our own personal knowledge.
We have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency,
and to the best of our knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency.
If we should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed
or is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or
agency, we undertake to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
Honorable Office
21
JELLY C. PINEDA ROMEO A. ICARRO JR.
Valid ID _______ Valid ID _______
Affiant Affiant
ERICSON C. BOLILAN
Valid ID _______
Affiant
Doc No.
Page No. NOTARY PUBLIC
Book No.
Series of 2023.
22
ANNEX “A”
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ANNEX “C”
24
ANNEX “D”
25
ANNEX “F”
26
ANNEX “I”
27
ANNEX “K”
28
ANNEX “M”
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ANNEX “O”
30
ANNEX “Q”
31
ANNEX “S”
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ANNEX “V”
33
ANNEX “X”
34
ANNEX “Y”
35
ANNEX “Z-1”
36
ANNEX “Z-2”
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ANNEX “AA-1”
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ANNEX “AA-2”
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ANNEX “BB”
40
ANNEX “CC-1”
41
ANNEX “CC-2”
42
ANNEX “DD-1”
43
ANNEX “DD-2”
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ANNEX “EE”
45
ANNEX “FF”
46
ANNEX “GG-1”
47
ANNEX “GG-2”
48
ANNEX “HH”
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ANNEX “II”
50
51
ANNEX “JJ”
52
ANNEX “LL”
53