Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Admin Chapter 1 and 2
Admin Chapter 1 and 2
Group 1
Abaloyan, Shaira
Aguirre, Juan Paolo
Natividad, Noemi
Banania, Harold
Quilo, Ciara Mae
Penohermoso, Arwin
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. General Principles.............................................................................................................................3
A. Public Office...................................................................................................................................3
1. Concept of a Public Office.........................................................................................................3
2. What is a Public Office?............................................................................................................3
3. Purpose of Public Office............................................................................................................3
4. Elements of a Public Office.......................................................................................................3
5. Characteristics of a Public Office.............................................................................................3
6. Creation of Public Office...........................................................................................................4
B. Public Officer.................................................................................................................................4
1. Public Officers as Defined by Different Laws..........................................................................4
1987 Administrative Code.........................................................................................................4
Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code......................................................................................4
RA 3019 – Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Section 2)................................................4
RA 6713 – Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers (Section 3)............5
2. Chart - Public Officers as Defined by Different Laws............................................................5
II. Eligibility and Qualification..........................................................................................................5
A. Qualification...................................................................................................................................6
1. Qualifications as an Endowment..............................................................................................6
2. Qualifications as an Act.............................................................................................................6
3. Usual Qualifications...................................................................................................................6
4. Who may prescribe Qualifications?.........................................................................................6
5. Scope of Qualifications..............................................................................................................6
6. Duration of qualifications..........................................................................................................6
Cases:..................................................................................................................................................6
B. Disqualifications...........................................................................................................................12
1. Causes of disqualification to hold public office.....................................................................12
2. Misconduct or crime................................................................................................................12
3. Impeachment............................................................................................................................12
4. Removal or suspension from office.........................................................................................12
5. Previous tenure of office..........................................................................................................12
6. Consecutive terms....................................................................................................................13
7. Holding more than one office..................................................................................................13
8. Relationship with the appointing power................................................................................13
9. Office newly created or the emoluments of which have been increased applicable to:......14
10. Being an elective official......................................................................................................14
11. Having been a candidate for any elective position.............................................................14
12. Under the Local Government Code....................................................................................14
Cases:................................................................................................................................................16
C. Specific Disqualifications Under the Constitution.....................................................................20
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1. Article VII, Section 13.............................................................................................................20
2. Article VI, Section 13...............................................................................................................20
3. Article VIII, Section 12............................................................................................................20
4. Appointees to the Constitutional Commissions.....................................................................20
5. Article IX, B, Section 6............................................................................................................22
REFERENCES..............................................................................................................................................23
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LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
I. General Principles
A. Public Office
1. Concept of a Public Office
i. Refers to a functional unit of government
(includes a department, bureau and even regional
offices)
ii. As a position (refers to any position occupied or
held by individual persons)
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5. Characteristics of a Public Office
The characteristics of a public office are:
a. it is a public trust;
b. it is not a vested right;
c. it is not property; and
d. it cannot be inherited.
B. Public Officer
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RA 3019 – Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Section 2)
the term "public officer" includes "elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent
or temporary, whether in the classified,
unclassified or exempt service, receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the
government”.
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II. Eligibility and Qualification
A. Qualification
1. Qualifications as an Endowment
qualifications required of the public officer to insure the
proper discharge of the duties of his office.
2. Qualifications as an Act
as an act by which the public functionary formally
commences the discharge of his official duties. This is
effected by the taking of an oath or filing of a bond.
3. Usual Qualifications
a. Citizenship - Natural Born citizen
b. Suffrage
c. Literacy - Able to read and write
d. Residence
e. Academic qualifications
5. Scope of Qualifications
The qualifications are usually enumerated in an
exclusive manner.
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, it
is not competent for the legislature to add to these
qualifications.
6. Duration of qualifications
Earliest date indicated by the Constitution or the Law.
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Cases:
Issue:
o Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the
time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of
Sorsogon.
Held:
o No. Frivaldo, the winning candidate was disqualified by the Supreme
Court, after it was established that he was not a Filipino Citizen at the
time of his election, even if he had then, under American Law, already
forfeited his American Citizenship.
o While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he
nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue
of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the
elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not
concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United
States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did
lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not
and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his
citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At
best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his
naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
o The petitioner in this case, which was decided in 1989, actually ran
for governor also in 1992. He again handily won said election but was
eventually declared disqualified anew by the Supreme Court by
reason of his not being a Filipino citizen.
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o When he ran for the 3rd time in 1995, the COMELEC disqualified
him again essentially relying on the earlier’s rulings of the SC (he was
not a citizen of the Philippines)
2. Frivaldo v. Comelec (257 SCRA 727) G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
Facts:
o Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of
votes in three successive elections but who was twice declared by this
Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien
citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost
Philippine citizenship thru repatriation.
o He had taken his oath of allegiance a few hours before the
proclamation of his opponent in 1995, who was declared the winner
despite petitioner’s actually having won said election.
Issue:
o Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it
seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be
proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given
retroactive effect? If so, from when?
Held:
o Yes. In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local
Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the
latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term
of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725
to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been
suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and
Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted
and thus valid and effective.
o Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law
granting him a new right to resume his political status and the
legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having
been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his
means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given
retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the
pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S.
nationality.
o Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of
Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor,
and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since
his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his
registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated
as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely
consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is
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not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold
public office.
3. Labo v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1), G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
Facts:
o Petitioner Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City. Private
respondent Lardizabal, the losing candidate, filed a petition for quo
warranto questioning petitioner’s citizenship. The latter claims that
petitioner is a naturalized Australian citizen, having married an
Australian citizen. Records also showed petitioner’s oath and
affirmation of allegiance to the Queen of Australia. These were not
denied; petitioner however claimed that his naturalization in Australia
made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his
Philippine citizenship and that his naturalization in Australia was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen
was bigamous.
Issue:
o Is the petitioner a Filipino citizen?
Held:
o The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local
elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he
was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of
his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of
Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code.
o The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile
technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of
Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous
majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead
over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the
people of that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed
the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner
owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a
stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens
of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
o It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride
in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more
than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him.
Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious
advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer him material
and other attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be
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sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and
transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. But
having done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back with open
arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself
disowned by it as an undesirable alien.
o Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily
recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the
returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the
country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his
total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This
may not be accomplished by election to public office.
4. Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 130872 Mar. 25, 1999)
Facts:
o Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa
Cruz, Marinduque, while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz,
was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of
Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang
Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red
won as the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was
appointed by then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality.
However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as
member of the municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque
had cleared his appointment. When Red finally received his
appointment papers, President Aquino was already in power. But still
Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the
Sanggunian.
o Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to
receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure
appointment papers from the Aquino administration after three years
and nine months from the date he received his appointment paper
from President Marcos.
o Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several
criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie arising from the
refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB
sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations
for estafa through falsification of public documents against
petitioners, and one (1) information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e) of
RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the
Mayor alone.
o The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two accused
guilty on all counts of estafa. However, with respect to the charge of
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violation of RA No. 3019; the Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor
Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for
reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
o Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of the crime charged.
Held:
o No. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer
implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is
holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that
officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not
only for that term but until their successors have been elected and
qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become
vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected
and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry
over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be
beyond the term fixed by law.
o In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a
Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the
expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does, not
also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express
or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an
officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed
or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent of not allowing
holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the
legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the
law-making body favors the same.
o Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts
generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent
to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an executive or
administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant
or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions.
This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the
principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public
convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a
hiatus in the performance of government functions.
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B. Disqualifications
1. Causes of disqualification to hold public office
a. Law requires a public officer to be in possession of his
mental faculties.
b. Blindness may not necessarily disqualify a person from
public office if he possesses the other qualifications
imposed by law.
2. Misconduct or crime
a. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude
are usually disqualified from holding public office.
b. The wording or the applicable constitutional or
statutory provisions determines whether the
ineligibility to hold office because of a crime results
from mere commission or arises only after prosecution
and conviction.
c. A violation of a municipal ordinance to qualify as a
“crime” must involve at least a certain degree of evil
doing, immoral conduct, corruption, malice, or want
of principles reasonably related to the requirements
of the public office.
3. Impeachment
a. Persons subject to impeachment:
President
Vice-President
Members of the Supreme Court
Members of Constitutional Commission
Ombudsman
b. Judgment in impeachment cases is limited to removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines but the
convicted person shall still be subject to prosecution,
trial and punishment according to law. (Constitution,
Article XI, Section 3(7).
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unexpired term but it does not disqualify him to take
some other office or be elected or appointed to a new
term of the same office.
6. Consecutive terms
a. Vice-President – shall not serve for more than 2
successive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office shall not be
considered an interruption of the service for the
full term for which he was elected. (Constitution,
Article VII, Sec. 4)
b. Senator – shall not serve for more than 2 consecutive
terms. (Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 4)
c. Members of the House of Representatives – shall not
serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. (Constitution,
Article VI, Section 7)
d. Elective officials (except barangay officials) – shall not
serve for more than 3 consecutive terms (Constitution,
Article X, Section 8)
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consideration. (Article VII, Section 13 of 1987
Constitution)
b. Restriction is not applicable to:
Members of family who contracted marriage with
anyone in position already
Persons employed in a confidential capacity
Teachers
Physicians
Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
9. Office newly created or the emoluments of which have
been increased applicable to:
a. “Emolument” does not refer to the fixed salary alone
but includes such fees and compensations which the
incumbent is entitled to receive by law. (Article VI,
Section 13)
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imprisonment, within 2 years after serving
sentence;
Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
Those convicted by final judgment for violating
the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
Those with dual citizenship;
Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-
political cases here or abroad;
Permanent residents in a foreign country or
those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right
after the effectivity of this Code; and
Insane or feeble-minded.
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Cases:
Issue:
o Whether or not BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection.
Held:
o The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection
is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiation, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees
65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
o In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require
that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they
assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated,
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a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be
that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local
officials.
o Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also
be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither
be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree
could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
o But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumlao), who has
retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
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2. National Amnesty Commission v. COA (G.R. No. 156982 Sept. 8, 2004)
Facts:
o Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government
agency created in 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through
Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and
review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven (7) members: a
Chairperson, three (3) regular members appointed by the President,
and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local
Government as ex officio members.
o After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three (3) ex
officio members turned over said responsibility to their
representatives who were paid honoraria.
o However, in 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit
the payment of honoraria to these representatives pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038.
o Meanwhile, in 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the
new Implementing Rules and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347),
which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada. Section 1, Rule
II thereof provides that ex officio members may designate their
representatives to the Commission. Said Representatives shall be
entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may
be authorized by law.
o Petitioner NAC invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing
before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor and the National
Government Audit Office disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex
officio members' representatives, to no avail.
Issue:
o Whether or not NAC ex officio members and official representatives are
entitled to the honoraria/allowances.
Held:
o NO. The Court ruled that COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an
internal and interpretative regulation or letter of instruction which does
not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing
rule or regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its
auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed by Section
18
13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official
family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from
holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation.
o The Court said that COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant
per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex
officio members' official representatives. The representatives in fact
assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but
by mere designation from the ex officio members who were themselves
also designated as such.
o An appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an
individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given
office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional
duties, usually by law, upon a personal ready in the public service by
virtue of an earlier appointment.
o Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant
upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached
to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle
the officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an
employee's right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued
and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere
designation.
o Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals
are prohibited from receiving.
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C. Specific Disqualifications Under the Constitution
20
3. Article VIII, Section 12
The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
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REFERENCES
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