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ITALIAN AND ITALIAN AMERICAN STUDIES

Towards and Beyond the

Italian Republic
Adriano Olivetti’s Vision
of Politics
Davide Cadeddu
Italian and Italian American Studies

Series Editor
Stanislao G. Pugliese
Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY, USA
This series brings the latest scholarship in Italian and Italian American
history, literature, cinema, and cultural studies to a large audience of
specialists, general readers, and students. Featuring works on modern Italy
(Renaissance to the present) and Italian American culture and society by
established scholars as well as new voices, it has been a longstanding force
in shaping the evolving fields of Italian and Italian American Studies by
re-emphasizing their connection to one another.

Editorial Board
Rebecca West, University of Chicago, USA
Josephine Gattuso Hendin, New York University, USA
Fred Gardaphé, Queens College, CUNY, USA
Phillip V. Cannistraro†, Queens College and the Graduate School,
CUNY, USA
Alessandro Portelli, Università di Roma “La Sapienza”, Italy
William J. Connell, Seton Hall University, USA

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14835
 Davide Cadeddu

Towards and Beyond

the Italian Republic
Adriano Olivetti’s Vision of Politics
Davide Cadeddu
Department of Historical Studies
University of Milan
Milano, Milano, Italy

ISSN 2635-2931     ISSN 2635-294X (electronic)

Italian and Italian American Studies
ISBN 978-3-030-76138-7    ISBN 978-3-030-76139-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76139-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
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microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
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known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
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Cover illustration: © Vito Arcomano / Alamy Stock Photo

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
This book is dedicated to my parents
Mario Cadeddu and Tina Secchi
hopeful lovers of freedom
 Acknowledgements

This work is the result of many years of study, during which I met several
scholars. Among all of them, I particularly wish to thank Professor
Emeritus Ettore Rotelli (Alma Mater Studiorum—Università di Bologna),
Scientific Director of the Istituto per la scienza dell’amministrazione pub-
blica (Institute for the Science of Public Administration). He taught me
the meaning of autonomy and the principles of critical method, through
our almost daily dialogue from 2003 until 2019, when the institute was
closed because of blind political will.

The manuscript was translated into English by Federica Tampoia Vezzi.

vii
 Book Notes

This study is about the historical process that led to the establishing of the
Italian Republic (1946) and its Constitution (1948), through the experi-
ence and the political reflections of Adriano Olivetti (1901–1960), general
manager and then president of the famous typewriter factory Olivetti.
After the publication of the first articles by Olivetti during the two-year
period of 1919–1920 in the weekly L’Azione Riformista, his engineering
studies at the Politecnico di Torino did not leave him much time to dedi-
cate to journalism and, with the advent of fascism, his writing activities
were finally shelved. From his personal experience as ‘production orga-
nizer’ and head of industry, his own reflections evolved: first on the scien-
tific organization of a modern company, then on that having to do with
the surrounding territory and on the direct and indirect interests that its
activities seemed to touch. An unbroken line of reasoning linked his
maturing political reflections during the two post-war periods. Spanning a
period of about 20 years, from his joining the Lega democratica per il
rinnovamento della politica nazionale (“Democratic League for the
Renewal of National Politics”) in 1919, formed around “L’Unità” by
Gaetano Salvemini, many historical experiences and theoretical influences
followed, enriched his awareness, and yielded complex answers in face of
the same problem: the crisis of representative democracy. The historical
context of the 1950s did not prove to be very propitious but the guide-
lines dispersed throughout the Italian cultural and political world from the
movement that Olivetti founded were certainly seminal—generating a
legacy of ideas that has only in part been recognized.
x Book Notes

What makes this study distinctive is the original approach to read the
history of Italy through Olivetti’s eyes and thoughts. There is nothing
comparable in English studies about Italian history, also because Olivetti’s
political thought is particular, far from the more common Christian demo-
cratic or Communist perspective of those years. It is simply another view
of what the Italian Republic could be and was not.
 Contents

1 Introduction: A View of the Intellectual Biography  1

The Typewriter Company  1
From Ivrea to Champfèr  5
Organized Ideas for the Future 10

2 Gaetano Salvemini and the United States of America 29

Renewing National Politics 29
The Political Journalist Alef 36
Diogenes’ Political Views 42
The End of the Journalistic Experience 51
New York and Filippo Turati 54

3 Among Anti-Fascists and Secret Services 83

The Memorandum 83
Office of Strategic Services Agent 87
Thinking in Switzerland 94

4 Self-Government in Constitutional Projects127

Communities127
Actual Self-Government130
The Socialist Party135
Other Political Orientations137
Olivetti’s Plan and the Constituent Assembly140

xi
xii Contents

5 A New Political Movement?161

Christian-Social Party to Community Movement161
28 October 1947164
Ends and End of Politics170
New Times New Methods177

6 The Misunderstood Legacy195

Communities and Constitution195
The Italian Historiography197
Political Ideologies201
In Search of Polity207

Bibliography231

Index253
 About the Author

Davide Cadeddu (PhD, 2004) is Associate Professor of History of

Political Theory at the University of Milan. Executive editor of Glocalism:
Journal of Culture, Politics and Innovation, he is also scientific coordinator
of the association “Globus et Locus” (Italy), member of the editorial
board of the journal Il pensiero politico. Rivista di storia delle idee politiche
e sociali, and editor of the series “Biblioteca di cultura politica europea”
(Rubbettino, Italy) and “Filologia e politica” (Giappichelli, Italy). He
writes occasionally for some national newspapers and above all for HuffPost
(Italian edition), where he has his own blog. He is director of the
“Seminario permanente sui classici del pensiero politico” at Fondazione
Giangiacomo Feltrinelli (Italy). He mainly deals with the history of twen-
tieth-century political theory, focusing on federalism, elitism, and the rela-
tionship between culture and politics. Among his recent publications are
John Dunn and the History of Political Theory, in “History of European
Ideas”, vol. 47, 1, 2021; (ed.) A Companion to Antonio Gramsci: Essays on
History and Theories of History, Politics and Historiography (2020); Luigi
Einaudi tra libertà e autonomia (2018); Reimagining Democracy: On the
Political Project of Adriano Olivetti (2012).

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: A View of the Intellectual

Biography

The Typewriter Company

It can be enlightening to re-read Italy’s history through the particular
perspective offered by an original personality. Reflecting on unrealized
intentions and ideas can give a deeper understanding of what history has
left behind and its profound potentials that, sometimes by chance or cul-
tural impossibility, did not manifest themselves.1
In this case, we want to think about the origins of the Italian Republic
since the end of the First World War, thanks to the nonconformist and
farsighted look of Adriano Olivetti, a successful entrepreneur known all
over the world, albeit having a political vocation. On 27 February 1960,
he died on a Carnival Saturday near Aigle in Switzerland, from cerebral
thrombosis, on the train from Milan and Lausanne. A few months earlier,
the typewriter company he directed, Ing. C. Olivetti & C. of Ivrea, had
acquired control over Underwood, which in 1896 launched the typewriter
prototype and then monopolized its world production for decades. Never
before had the Italian industry managed to carry out such an initiative as
climbing to one of the highest shrines of American entrepreneurship.2
Although a problematic financial situation marked the Hartford factory
(partly ignored before the purchase), its reputation and commercial net-
work could have facilitated the penetration of Olivetti’s products in the
United States of America. Indeed, the reorganization of the commercial

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2021
D. Cadeddu, Towards and Beyond the Italian Republic, Italian and
Italian American Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76139-4_1
2 D. CADEDDU

distribution soon allowed a considerable increase in sales. However, his

premature death interrupted and adversely affected the subsequent man-
agement of the operation.3
A whole world disappeared: the spiritual testament of Adriano Olivetti
had been delivered in December 1959 to the prints as a collection of writ-
ings and speeches significantly titled Città dell’uomo.4 These included “La
Fondazione Proprietaria”, with which the author had expressed the need
to introduce new forms of property, equally far from traditional capitalism
as from state socialism, capable of strictly guaranteeing technical progress
and at the same time defending the freedom of the human person.5 In
other words, it proposed to entrust the possession and control of large
enterprises to new legal institutions: foundations characterized by an
organic partnership of all the living forces of the community, representa-
tives of local, trade union, and cultural institutions.6
Olivetti conceived the idea of a proprietary foundation, probably given
the experience of the Carl Zeiss Foundation in Jena. It appears from a hint
he gave in 1945: “These unique industrial organizations derive their moral
concern from a harmony and are an attempt to create unity in the social
life of workers and their economic life”.7 As also noted on the 50th anni-
versary of the birth of Ing. C. Olivetti & C., he had progressively found
that every problem within the factory became external. Furthermore, only
those who could coordinate internal issues with external ones could give
the correct solutions. It was evident that the factory was a common good
and not a private interest and that the way to generate harmony around
the factories existed. According to Olivetti, it was necessary to create a just
and human authority that could reconcile the various problems. It had to
be invested in major economic powers, and do in the interest of all, what
it did in the factory’s interest to be efficient.8 In short, it was a question of
redefining the instruments of local government.
It was an eminently political issue. Because it faced inefficiency or lack
of interest from the institutions in meeting the demands regarding employ-
ees’ quality of life, Adriano Olivetti considered it necessary to pursue a
political action that replaces the institutional one. In 1932, with the
Domenico Burzio Foundation’s creation, the Ivrea enterprise had already
increased the assistance addressed to its employees to guarantee them a
higher social security than that offered in Italy by the limited insurance
contribution. Once appointed general manager in 1934, Olivetti started
organizing of the factory kindergarten and social services for the 1000
employees. In 1936 they gained an additional week’s leave than the
 1 INTRODUCTION: A VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 3

national contract period and saw the company canteen service’s creation.
In 1937, the company established the office of social workers and the
automobile service to transport employees, and in the same year, accident
prevention devices improved. In 1938, Olivetti took his father Camillo’s
place as president of Ing. C. Olivetti & C., the first Italian factory of type-
writers. Camillo Olivetti had founded it in 1908, after being with his mas-
ter Galileo Ferraris in the United States of America, after giving life to a
company to produce electrical measuring instruments. In 1939, Adriano
Olivetti added the mechanical training centre (built in 1936 from a middle
school), and in 1940, built housing for employees and organized a factory
library. In 1941, he established an agricultural centre which partly solved
feeding the workers’ issue during the war years, and the next year opened
a new kindergarten for their children. The company in Ivrea, with 4673
employees, produced 37,752 office machines, 26,696 laptops, and 2561
computational and accounting machines, with a share capital increased to
30 million lire.9
In June 1945, addressing the workers of Ivrea, Olivetti confided that he
feared that the factory could lose its humanity, made by knowledge and
understanding. An understanding that, to have real value, it had to be
mutual: “You must be able to know where the factory goes and why it
goes. In sociological terms, it could be called giving awareness of purpose
to work”.10 Italy was involved in a general crisis of civilization, which, at
the same time, was a social and political crisis: “Then, friends, you will ask
me: where does the factory go in this world? What is the factory in the
world of tomorrow?”11 Olivetti could not fully answer the question but
suggested a thought that influenced his actions for a long time: “Spiritual
values will lead us. These are eternal values. By following these, material
goods will arise from themselves without us seeking them”. The Gospel of
Matthew expressed the same teaching: “Seek the Kingdom and righteous-
ness of God first, and all these things will come to you”.12
In 1933, Olivetti’s products were already present in the markets of
Egypt, Tunisia, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Syria, Greece,
Albania, Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Yugoslavia,
Norway, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and Hungary. Then, in
1946 he established the first business base in New York, where the next
year, he founded the Olivetti Corporation of America. Between 1947 and
1949, the share capital increased from 120 million to 1.2 billion lire. In
1953, the amount had doubled. In 1955 it increased to 5.4 billion, then
in 1956 to 7.8 billion and 10.8 billion lire in 1957. In September 1958,
4 D. CADEDDU

the Italian production through the factories of Ivrea, Agliè, Torino, Massa,
and Pozzuoli, and the foreign ones of Barcelona, Glasgow, Buenos Aires,
Sao Paolo, and Johannesburg, was 6.2 units per minute, and studies and
experiences in the field of electronics had already begun.13
Olivetti’s attention to social problems had not diminished. On 24
December 1955, he stated to the Ivrea workers—after mentioning the
company’s success in the world—that they had “the right to ask and know:
what is the purpose of this? Where does this go?”14 Questions that he had
raised publicly the same year while he inaugurated the Pozzuoli plant:
“Can the industry give itself purposes? Are these simply in the profit index?
Is there not, besides the apparent rhythm, something more fascinating, a
destination, a vocation even in the life of a factory?” Questions that became
famous, to which Olivetti claimed to be able to provide an answer: “There
is a purpose in our everyday activities, as in Ivrea as in Pozzuoli. Without
the awareness of this intent, it is useless to hope for the work we have
undertaken to succeed”. The goal was a new type of enterprise, beyond
socialism and capitalism: “Our society believes […] in the spiritual values
of science, art and culture; finally, it believes, that the ideals of justice can-
not be disconnected from the uneliminated disputes between capital and
labour. It believes above all in Man, in his divine flame, in his possibility of
elevation and redemption”.15
Between 1956 and 1957 in the Canavese (the region around his fac-
tory), “for the first time in Italy”, he stated in July 1958, “there were
reductions in working hours on equal wages that have allowed for a long
time a working week of five days”. It had been possible to ensure women
entering maternity leave for nine and a half months with 100% of their
salary, which among other things, had been equated with that of men, “as
it demands their dignity as workers”. In addition to national family allow-
ances, it made it possible to alleviate large families’ budgets. Additionally,
despite not being yet enshrined in a regulation, a pension allowed the
elderly worker who left the factory to cope with the years of rest with the
serenity he was entitled to have. A social relation centre also provided the
basic needs of those families who were in need. “In these years, therefore”,
Olivetti observed, “we have worked in the same direction along which my
father had gone”.16
For the entrepreneurship of Italy of the 1950s, the labour force’s gov-
ernment was the focal moment of the great enterprise’s complex articula-
tion. Personnel policy proved to be an essential factor since it was
impossible to reduce work to a mere production element. Although
 1 INTRODUCTION: A VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 5

generally it was thought to subordinate the worker to production needs

through factory police, for Olivetti, the imposition of a rigid organizational-­
technical scheme on the workforce could not solve the personnel manage-
ment’s problem.17 What distinguished Adriano Olivetti was “the
acceptance of the irreplaceable data of the industrial conflict”.18 He
thought of the company as a political system and its organizational pro-
cesses as political, which consisted of constant conflicts and consequential
partial recompositions.19 For Olivetti, the conflict was a company’s com-
plementary, irrepressible factor since it revealed to be a political space.
People interpreted the enterprise as a hostile place of creation and produc-
tion: therefore, the conflict’s settlement had to occur through a political
moment, eminently democratic. This awareness allowed him to realize an
institutionalization of the clash of powers and competences between the
personnel and the technical management. The company’s peculiarity was
not creating all those social services that other companies realized in the
1950s (though of lesser quality). It was the presence of a management
board, a link between these services and the workers, to make them
involved and responsible for the redistribution of the wealth produced.
The board of directors of Ing. C. Olivetti & C. had advisory powers on
the company’s direction and deliberative ones on social services adminis-
tration. Through a complex electoral mechanism, workers and employees
appointed representatives who supported the company management
members, which led the unions to express the conflict in business develop-
ment.20 Adriano Olivetti wanted to allow the workers to become partners
in the company’s management and aware of its purposes. This intention
had been influenced above all by socialist ideals under the supervision of
his father’s example.21

From Ivrea to Champfèr

Adriano Olivetti was born in Ivrea on 11 April 1901 to Luisa Revel, the
daughter of a Waldensian pastor, and Camillo, a Jewish agnostic, who by
1934 had embraced formally the Unitarian Confession (built in the six-
teenth century, which denied the dogma of the trinity, the incarnation,
and the divinity of Christ).22 Against his will, Adriano had to attend the
Technical Institute’s physical-mathematical section, while he would have
preferred to study humanistic disciplines.23 When Adriano was still 13
years old, in August 1914, his father sent him to work in the factory,
where he soon learned to know and hate serial work: “a torture for the
spirit imprisoned for hours that never ended, in the black and dark of an
6 D. CADEDDU

old workshop”.24 After that experience, for many years, he did not set foot
in the factory again. He had resolutely decided that, in his life, he would
not have dealt with the industry of his father.25 At the end of the first year
of university, he decided to move from the course in mechanical engineer-
ing to that of industrial chemistry: “Between an ill-fated paternal desire
that I became an engineer, and an indistinct vocation for science, particu-
larly for chemistry, I decided to enrol in the Industrial Chemistry section
of the Regio Politecnico di Torino”.26
Olivetti was intolerant of the intrusive glare of the industrial activity in
the family life. So, he found a very productive environment to develop his
real interests (the political and social issues of the time), in the Turin of the
post-First World War period, where he moved to achieve the Bachelor of
Engineering: “From 1919 to 1924, during the long years of the
Polytechnic”, he later recalled, “I witnessed the unfolding of the tragedy
of the failure of the socialist revolution”.27 In the Piedmontese capital,
Olivetti contacted Piero Gobetti and the group of the journal “Energie
Nove”. Through them and the involvement in the editorial of the weekly
“L’Azione Riformista”, founded in Ivrea by his father, he was among the
first to support the initiatives promoted by “L’Unità” of Gaetano Salvemini
in the post-war period.28
After completing his military service between September of 1923 and
the following June, he finished his university studies graduating in July
1924.29 As he wrote years later, “fascism had crushed my aspirations to
journalism” and, at the same time, “the rebellion to enter in the paternal
factory began to be eased”.30 So, the following month he carried on his
other experience as a worker.31 Then, in the early months of 1925, he
began to show the intention of devoting himself to his father’s enterprise,
provided that he could operate with autonomy. According to his analysis,
the Ivrea factory had reached a critical development level and suffered
from an absolute centralization of functions.32
On 2 August 1925, the 24-year-old Adriano Olivetti landed in the
“free land” of New York.33 He came to study, to understand the secret of
industrial power. However, it was still hard to convince himself that every-
thing was possible, even in his small country. He would be back to prove
to himself and others “how much the will and the method could prevail
on the men and things”.34 He intended to study the organization’s secret
and see its reflections in the administrative and political field.35 He was
preparing to live the typical experience of the formation journey, which
 1 INTRODUCTION: A VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 7

several young sons of industrialists carried out in the United States since
the post-First World War.36
The observation of numerous factories allowed him to realize the pur-
pose of his journey: “to understand what is the substantial difference
between American methods and ours”.37 Once back in Italy, in January
1926, he published in April the fruit of his research within the first issue of
the periodical L’Organizzazione Scientifica del Lavoro, promoted by the
Ente Nazionale Italiano per l’Organizzazione Scientifica del Lavoro
(Italian National Agency for the Scientific Organization of Work). He
focused on the drawbacks of centralizing the various departments and
those arising from the work’s excessive organization. It seemed appropri-
ate to avoid excessive formalism and restore elasticity to the different lead-
ing roles.38 In 1926, Olivetti launched an organization reform of the Ivrea
factory:39 “Familiar with the environment and in the wake of the new
‘call,’ we tried to replace the empiricism (though intelligent, which domi-
nated the culture of the factory at the time), with a driven rationality and
what seemed systematic to contribute to mechanical operations, machin-
ing cycles, design, construction of the tools’ product and special machines
with which manufacturing the parts”.40
The Italian experience in the scientific organization of the work, in the
years at the turn of the First World War, saw the advent of the Taylorism
phase of production as a coercive resolution of organizational problems,
causing a narrowing of the possibility of spreading the most advanced and
modern company culture and practice.41 Personalities such as Adriano
Olivetti, Ugo Gobbato, Francesco Mauro, or Vittorio Valletta laid the
Italian managerial culture’s foundations in constant relationship with the
American and German ones. However, change took place only in those
productive units less likely to reduce unit costs with a mere policy of
decreasing wages and increasing workloads.42 This general national sce-
nario, characterized by a “feudalization of innovation”,43 was changed
only in the second post-war period, thanks to exogenous and endogenous
factors.44
In the 1930s, Olivetti accomplished “the definitive transition to a mod-
ern theory of direction”.45 He developed a cultural business management
model that contemplated rationalization and operational research, which
found its full manifestation in the 1950s. The focus was “the company
meant as an inseparable whole: a system to be organized according to a
rational plan conceived by the company management”.46 As observed,
“the ideals supported by Adriano in his maturity find their origin […] in
8 D. CADEDDU

the atmosphere of the factory of the Thirties, in the experiences he made,

in the many original initiatives taken back then”.47 Olivetti identified a
necessary and “dynamic relationship between the present organization
and the attempt to organize”. It allowed to outline a conception of the
organization not forcibly limited to the narrow field of an empirical defini-
tion of labour norms but inclined to prefigure more complex and vast
forms integrated one to the other.48 To “ensure the expansion and general
efficiency of a given industry”, he wrote, “the group of chief executives’
overall activity must be superior in capacity and number to the industry’s
immediate needs. Thus, their work is not completely absorbed by the per-
formance of everyday activities, and the study, preparation and realization
of new needs is made possible”.49 This ‘progressive’50 concept of the com-
pany intimately intertwined with the managerial skills which had to char-
acterize the entrepreneur. These capacities had to be linked to the
“cooperative need inherent in business management”,51 inspired by “an
internal energy constantly striving for the realization of a deeply studied
goal determining a voluntary attitude on programs, on men, on events,
excluding the authoritarian will for its own sake”.52 This expanded the
concept of the company’s direction. It had direction, which had “to be
based on cooperation and therefore on the socialization of the knowledge
of the employees”.53 “Leadership,” Olivetti noted, “becomes a combina-
tion of especially psychological and moral qualities, through which the
manager becomes able to promote the activity and action of employees,
mainly because through his influence on them the will to carry out such
actions arises”. This ability proved to be “genuinely creative” and distin-
guished itself from the common one, “characterized by authoritarian
command and not by the transmission of will”.54 The reorganization car-
ried out by Olivetti, following these principles, allowed the company to
face the crisis after 1929, with a diversification of production and a
strengthening of the sales network that avoided layoffs and recession.55
On 4 December 1932, Adriano Olivetti was appointed general director
by the general assembly of the shareholders,56 and almost eight months
later, on 31 July 1933, he enrolled in the National Fascist Party. However,
even the Ovra (the political police instituted for the repression of anti-­
fascism) observed that “Olivetti does not seem to have an adequate under-
standing of the fascist movement nor shows much attachment to the
regime. Instead, the impression is that he has asked for registration for
evident reasons of expediency, having a company that needs to be pro-
tected and supported by the government”.57 To the Ivrea police, two years
 1 INTRODUCTION: A VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 9

before his adhesion to the Fascist Party, it appeared that “Olivetti is not
fascist. Because of his ideas, his feelings are not in perfect agreement with
fascist conceptions. However, he does not carry out contrary propaganda.
He is not considered dangerous, proving to comply with the provisions of
the national government”.58 Nobody knew that on the night between 7
and 8 December 1926, he drove “stoic and silent”, alongside Ferruccio
Parri, the car that preceded as a vanguard the vehicle of Carlo Rosselli with
Filippo Turati in a secret escape to France.59 Once in Savona, he remained
there until 12 December. That same day the socialist leader Turati boarded
a speedboat together with Sandro Pertini for Corsica.60 “I was interested”,
recalled Parri, “in that young personality, already so confident and full of
self-control even in the face of danger: we would have needed it for the
clandestine struggle that was beginning”. However, “his father also
needed him, the company needed him”; in other words, “his fate was
another. So, despite my disappointment, we said goodbye in the morning
in Savona”.61
Ever since the advent of fascism, Olivetti had been in contact with some
opposition groups, especially with the organization “Giustizia e Libertà”.62
Nevertheless, even in 1934, the Ovra could not find much about it. It was
reported: “the Olivetti home in Ivrea was a significant centre. All Olivetti
are demented”.63 On 15 December 1937, Adriano Olivetti, classified as
subversive in June 1931, had been removed from the central Political
Criminal Record list, thanks also to the formal registration to the Fascist
National Party. However, in a letter written in Milan in October of 1938
by the general inspector of public security, it was still observed: “From the
serious confidential source it is reported that the well-known industrialists
Olivetti of Ivrea continue to persist in their anti-fascist attitude”.64 Benito
Mussolini in July 1937 denied the presence of a member of the govern-
ment at the inauguration of the exhibition for the master plan of Valle
d’Aosta, whose elaboration was directed by Adriano Olivetti, and shock-
ingly did not include the factory in the itinerary of his visit to Ivrea on 19
May 1939.65 Even subtitling “Uomini macchine metodi nella costruzione
corporativa” the magazine Tecnica e Organizzazzione, which he founded
in 1937, was worth little. The proximity to fascist political ideals was only
formal, and the regime’s exponents seemed well aware of it. While keeping
good official relations with the National Fascist Party, between 1938 and
1940, the Olivetti family continued to show their actual political leanings.
They hired several well-known anti-fascists that sometimes had just come
out of jail, deprived of the opportunity to find work elsewhere.66
10 D. CADEDDU

During the winter of 1942, Adriano Olivetti devoted himself to writing

a memorandum, which he distributed to several leaders of the Italian anti-­
fascist parties.67 He was most likely put in contact through Ignazio Silone,
with an informant of the office of strategic services.68 The two met in
Switzerland one evening between the end of January and early February
of 1943.69 Olivetti presented himself with four opposition groups’ creden-
tials, “including the group d’Azione and the Communists!” thus playing
an intermediary role, thanks to its relative freedom to travel abroad. The
goal was to communicate the desire of anti-fascist organizations to con-
duct revolutionary actions coordinated with the Allies’ military actions
and plans.70
Dissatisfied with the turn of the political events after 25 July 1943 he
quickly drew up a message that he entrusted to his driver to hand it over
to an Allies’ informer.71 However, that man was also an agent of the Italian
Military Intelligence Service. So, on 30 July, the Ministry of the Armed
Forces’ supreme command arrested Olivetti on charges of “proven intel-
ligence with the enemy and purpose of subverting activity of the internal
order”.72 He was held in Regina Coeli prison until 22 September,73 when
he was finally freed by order of release signed by the illegible signature74 of
Lieutenant Colonel Manfredi Talamo.75 However, since the Carabinieri
and the Military Intelligence Service were still looking for him, he expatri-
ated to Switzerland on the morning of 8 February 1944.76

Organized Ideas for the Future

Here, he stayed mainly in Champfèr, near St. Moritz, and waited for the
revision and further elaboration of his memorandum.77 It was a constitu-
tional and federalist reform project of the Italian State, later published in
1945 with the title L’ordine politico delle Comunità (“The Political Order
of Communities”). Then, after returning to Italy at the end of the war, he
began to spread its contents among politicians and scholars. This way, he
made the political convictions of his mature age clear and in an organic
way, after reworking and, for some aspects, producing them in about three
years, for an eminently practical purpose: contribute to the debate on the
post-fascist reconstruction that would develop within and around the
Constituent Assembly.
This project of institutional re-articulation of the Italian State consti-
tuted an accomplished, albeit temporary, stage of his political-institutional
reflections. It was an organic yet perfectible project that would have
 1 INTRODUCTION: A VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 11

guaranteed the author with a conceptual clarity and a precise, non-­

dogmatic strategic orientation of political action, unravelled later during
the 1950s, through and not only the movement he founded and directed.
L’ordine politico delle Comunità “was a long and carefully examined work
of political science, born from a precise awareness of political philosophy
and proper investigation of comparative public law”. However, all this
preparatory work remained in the background: “the author was not inter-
ested in documenting his preparation, but only in presenting his conclu-
sions before the most dramatic problem of our time: the redevelopment of
democracy”.78 The latter was an improvement that could not be excluded
from a reconsideration of the state’s constitutional lines, according to
Adriano Olivetti.79
First, it was necessary to identify a new local authority smaller than the
province. It would have allowed the administrative districts to coincide
with those of economic and social interests, facilitating the administrative
authorities’ control of decisions of their direct interest, thus ensuring the
effectiveness and efficiency of public action and the optimal use of
resources. This independence reform implied a reorganization of Italy’s
local government’s territorial, functional, and institutional framework to
ensure its public policy’s capacity. Olivetti believed that this was strength-
ened by the union of homogenous government’s competencies, thanks to
identifying essential functions. Through them, each local authority, region,
and state’s political activity should have articulated. Olivetti explained: “a
functional system is where the various executive bodies’ competence pro-
ceeds from a homogeneous division of activities, precisely delimited and
all subject to a single authority”. Therefore, “functionalization is a clear
case of specialization and is theoretically distinguished from it by the sci-
entific and not merely empirical character of the analysis that gave rise to
such a division of tasks”.80 In every local government, these functions
should have matched a political representative, identified according to his
competence through different legitimation forms: the examination path,
the co-­opting action, and the election choice restricted to employees, all
always subordinate to universal suffrage. Following the principles that
inspired Olivetti’s institutional choices, these criteria of legitimacy origi-
nated from the desire to represent the general interests through that rep-
resentative form that could best interpret them.81
All political representatives of a given function of government would
have made it possible to create an actual order at a national level. Thanks
to a critical path based on theoretical preparation and practical experience,
12 D. CADEDDU

this order specialized in a given political activity—would have ensured a

vertical link between the various territorial levels of government. It would
have then been possible to form legitimately, depending on the needs, the
consultative and governing bodies of any territorial authority, from the
region to the federation of states. The proportional representation prob-
lem could have been bypassed by involving all designated political repre-
sentatives in local authorities in regional states’ parliaments. In the
meantime, they would have played the role of territorial and functional
representatives, thus contributing significantly to the upgrading of politi-
cal representation in a federal state.82
This way, Olivetti promoted political orders that, starting with the local
authorities, would inform the two higher territorial levels (i.e. region and
state), and potentially also the federation of states, articulating the govern-
ment according to political functions guaranteeing constant circulation of
elites. As he later clarified, he was trying to suggest the possibility of orga-
nizing a state without parties, or better, a state with a scaled-down func-
tion of parties. He asserted in 1949: “The task of the political parties will
end, and politics will have a purpose when the distance between ends and
means no longer exists. That is, when the structure of the State and society
will reach a balance, so it will be the community and not the parties to
create the state”.83
Before the general disinterest expressed by the Commission for the
Constitution, Massimo Severo Giannini considered Olivetti’s reconstruc-
tive project based on the communities, a very fruitful idea of develop-
ments and of a concrete and current nature.84 Between the first and second
edition of the work in 1945–1946, Adriano Olivetti had found in Giannini
the perfect collaborator. Together they could expose those “concordant
proposals” on local autonomy, already unsuccessfully requested by Olivetti
to Luigi Einaudi during the Swiss exile, in an attempt to match his ideas
with those of a person of adequate training and preparation on the sub-
ject.85 The meeting place was the “Istituto di Studi Socialisti”, chaired by
Rodolfo Morandi and built to offer members and sympathizers of the
party the opportunity and the means to apply to the systematic study of
the problems affecting socialist and political action.86 Several ideas of
Adriano Olivetti became part of the motion “Lo Stato democratico repub-
blicano”, drafted by Giannini, published in “Bollettino dell’Istituto di
Studi Socialisti”, illustrated during the Congress of Florence, which finally
approved it as “the party’s program for the Constituent Assembly”.87
However, there were different approaches towards autonomy problems
 1 INTRODUCTION: A VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 13

within the PSIUP, where Olivetti had joined its Constitutional

Commission.88 Well known is the censorship made by “Avanti!” of 21
April 1946, to Giannini’s intervention. In essence, the newspaper avoided
summarizing a significant passage and attenuated Olivetti’s term “com-
munity”, replacing it with the generic term “local communities”.89 The
political message was clear: the theories of Giannini and Olivetti did not
reflect the trends of most of the party, represented by Lelio Basso, but this
latter did not come to plan any organic proposal for the reorganization of
local authorities. From the formation of the first De Gasperi government
in December 1945, the party’s position on local self-government had
begun to weaken, gradually flattening out on that of the state centralism
of the communist party. The causes were the international situation, the
consequent national reverberations, and the socialist party’s inability to
develop an independent institutional policy that would harmonize the dif-
ferent internal positions. Therefore, the socialist proposals, which emerged
between 1943 and 1946, were almost absent from the Constituent
Assembly, following the progressive political parable of the self-governing
idea and zealous party officials instead of expert jurists and technicians.90
After the disappointment in the Socialist Party and the attempted alli-
ance with the social-Christian group of Gerardo Bruni,91 Olivetti decided
to take a pre-political action, founding and directing, starting in June
1947,92 Movimento Comunità (Community Movement). However, in
the 1950s’ particular international and national political climate, the new
movement could only increase, albeit with extraordinarily new and origi-
nal contents, the attempts of ‘third way’, blamelessly isolated and power-
less in the Italian political reality.93 The communist political forces and
trade unions accused Olivetti’s social action of paternalism. While, on the
other hand, the relations with CISL (Italian Confederation of Trade
Unions) and Confindustria (General Confederation of Italian Industry)
found a brief but significant epilogue in Giulio Pastore and Angelo Costa’s
reaction to the publication of one of Olivetti’s interviews in the American
Magazine World in June of 1953.
In the interview, Olivetti reflected that the “strongly centralized
power that the state bureaucracy, the big industry, the big parties and the
Church” had always had in Italy was still persistent. All Italian trade unions
had lost freedom and autonomy, whilst the CISL and DC (Christian
Democratic Party) were inadequate to contribute to the necessary struc-
tural reforms. The Marshall Plan had initially removed Italy from com-
munism. However, “implemented through those forces (monopolies and
14 D. CADEDDU

bureaucracy) that had created and accepted fascism”, it had also left much
of society unemployed.94 If Pastore’s reply was limited to a newspaper
article, Costa’s was followed by some discrimination, although not codi-
fied, by the Confindustria regarding the Ivrea company’s products.95
In the same year of this controversy, the political declaration of
Movimento Comunità was published.96 Its position was not “comparable
to the ideology of secular groups that have left some signs in the political
debate of the fifties”. Its horizon was already fully constituted by the pros-
pect of “socialist unification”.97 Through his movement, Olivetti wanted
to implement what he called the “technique of reforms”: suggestions for
the reorganization of institutions that, “starting from the current situa-
tion”,98 would achieve “an imperfect system. However, it would have
been capable of responding at least in part to the technical requirements
set out and such as to constitute a start towards more congenial reforms”.99
In the Canavese, Movimento Comunità won an absolute majority in 32
municipalities in the local elections of 1956, and Adriano Olivetti was
elected mayor of Ivrea. Drawing strength from this victory, he decided to
present the Movimento Comunità at the general elections of 1958, even
in those areas of Italy where it was not rooted and known. From some
politicians of his party, Olivetti received recommendations of prudence
and, in fact, despite his predictions, only he was elected deputy, thanks to
the loyalty of Canavese. However, after a short time, he resigned both as
mayor and parliamentarian, in implicit controversy against the parties’
obstructionism encountered in his reform action attempts.100 On 19 July,
during an explanation of vote favouring Fanfani’s government, Olivetti
stressed the commitment, made by the council’s president in charge, to
intervene in depressed areas with coordinated plans of a much smaller size
than the regional ones. Furthermore, to the same Amintore Fanfani, he
also expressed an observation: “Urban planning has not yet, in the struc-
ture and legislation of the Italian state, reached that relevance and rank
that in other countries urban and rural planning already has”.101 His inter-
est was focused mainly on the science he thought allowed to gradually
shape the economy’s creative force. From the direction between 1935 and
1937 of the Piano Regolatore della Valle d’Aosta,102 to the commitment to
the master plan of Ivrea in 1951, from the foundation in 1955 of the insti-
tute for urban and rural regeneration of Canavese to the vice-presidency
of the institute Unrra-Casas in 1959, without forgetting his constant
attention to industrial and civil architecture,103 Olivetti gradually revealed
how much political importance urban planning played for him. He defined
 1 INTRODUCTION: A VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 15

it as “social architecture, which is utilitarian Aesthetics at the service of

over-individual and, therefore, ethical ends”.104 After reviving the maga-
zine Urbanistica in 1949, the following year he was elected president of
the Istituto Nazionale di Urbanistica (National Institute of Urbanism)
and, in 1956, became an honorary member of the American Institute of
Planners and vice president of the International Federation for Housing
and Town Planning.105
In the second post-war period and during the 1950s, to develop a cul-
tural action concurrent first to the pre-policy, and then to the policy, from
1946 onwards, Olivetti launched both the publication of the magazine
Comunità and the activity of Edizioni di Comunità.106 While the maga-
zine hosted some of the best signatures of the Italian intelligentsia, stand-
ing out for modernity of approach, graphic elegance, and variety of
interests, the publishing house was the protagonist of a courageous and
forward-looking politics of culture. Today it is all too easy to recognize
that the selected works were great: Olivetti, in several cases, risked in the
choice, and few were his mistakes. The areas of interest of Edizioni di
Comunità ranged from politics to religion, from economics to philosophy,
to urban planning. From Gurvitch to Journet, from Bettelheim to
Kierkegaard, from Wheare to Jung, from Fauquet to Bergson, to Mounier,
Eliot, Ferrero, Sartre, Berdiaev, Maritain, Burdeau, Einaudi, Piaget, Weil,
and others; starting—we forget too often—by Olivetti, the author. Initially
in Rome, the publishing house printed the second edition of L’ordine
politico delle Comunità, formally amended and enriched with an analytical
index. Even the subtitle changed from “Le garanzie di libertà in uno stato
socialista” (“The guarantees of freedom in a socialist state”) of 1945 to
“Dello Stato secondo le leggi dello spirito” (On the state following the
laws of spirit).
During those troubled years of war, a profound spiritual crisis had man-
ifested itself in Adriano Olivetti’s soul, coinciding with his father’s death
on 4 December 1943 and especially of his mother on 14 September the
following year. He wrote as an epigraph to his work: “To serve Peace and
Christian civilization with the same will, the same intensity, the same
audacity used for oppression, destruction, terror”.107 It was also a religious
turning point: “After the death of my mother”, he confided, “ceased the
sentimental and human reason that kept me from entering the Church,
which from a theological point of view, was certainly in my conscience the
only one universal and eternal: the Catholic Church”.108 On the bedside
table of his bedroom, however, he continued to keep the Bible in the
16 D. CADEDDU

Protestant version, even after 1949, the year he received Catholic bap-
tism:109 “I enter the Catholic Church, convinced of its theological
superiority”.110
Primarily through the reading of the magazine Esprit, and some French
personalism writings,111 already from the 1930s, Olivetti had developed
his interest in several authors characterized by strong spiritual accents.
However, perhaps no less important are some esoteric texts of authors like
Rudolf Steiner,112 still present today in his library. Olivetti’s personality
was collaborative and original: he did not write down his thoughts with
regularity. So, we cannot be sure if books listed in Catalogo generale delle
Edizioni di Comunità,113 from 1946 to 1960, are sources of his thought
or solicitations and valid confirmations of ideas autonomously conceived.
In L’ordine politico delle Comunità and similar works, devoid of biblio-
graphic apparatus and with few quotes, references to Maritain, Mounier,
and de Rougemont, undeniably expanded the interpretation of the real
influence of French personalism in his theorization.114 What Olivetti wrote
in 1946, in a letter to Luciano Foà, is quite essential: “Révolution person-
naliste by Mounier—I never read it”.115 Personalism allowed him to actu-
alize, “clarify”,116 and express with new terms many of those concepts and
values in which he believed already from university.117
In his production, Olivetti seems to have been eminently direct at find-
ing functional solutions informed by religious values and concerning his-
torical facts. The history and the historical evolution of political institutions
and entrepreneurial organization forms were the constant reference of all
his political and economic reflection. Only in an alternative, he added to
this approach a speculative tension that investigated, almost intuitively, the
philosophical and even esoteric foundations of the practical and scientific
choices already made. Beyond the examples that appear in his writings, it
is appropriate to grasp through a conscious look the original re-­elaboration
by a personality that proves to be of considerable creative capacity. So, the
idea drawn from readings or experiences often acquires a new value, enter-
ing a coherent conceptual plan that coordinates other ideas and fulfils the
function of a directive ideal. Olivetti’s thought had its roots in a syncretic
heritage and was expressed in the 1940s and 1950s, politically filtered by
an in-depth knowledge of comparative public law. Olivetti did not benefit
from the slightly provocative and polemical attitude of some of his phrases
and often concise style, which tried to communicate his complex political
thought. This latter seems to be the result of the confluence, in the con-
genial nonconformist melting pot of French personalism, of both elitist
 1 INTRODUCTION: A VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 17

and Marxist critique of representative democracy, assimilated and inte-

grated through ‘federalism’ meant as a political method.
He was a European intellectual, a politician of culture, who, not sur-
prisingly, joined the promoting committee of the Société Européenne de
Culture, founded in Venice in 1950 on Umberto Campagnolo’s initiative.
A pupil of Guglielmo Ferrero and Hans Kelsen, he had been the first
director of the Ivrea factory library. He had then scientifically coordinated
between 1942 and 1945, the publishing house “Nuove Edizioni Ivrea”,
the precursor of “Edizioni di Comunità”, and he had also directed with
Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves a series of political writers called “Humana
Civilitas”. Adriano Olivetti chose the term “Humana Civilitas” from
Dante’s De Monarchia to summarize and express his political ideal in the
second post-war period. In 1955, while explaining what he meant by
“human civilisation”, he asserted: “We look at Man. We know that no
effort will be valid and last in time unless it can educate and elevate the
human soul. Everything will also be useless unless we give everyone with
abundance and loving care the treasure of culture, the light of intellect and
intelligence”.118 He inserted “Humana Civilitas” in the cartouche that
crowns the famous bell that became a symbol of Olivetti’s concept of
“concrete community” to indicate the ultimate goal of human coexis-
tence: “Man’s redemption”.119 It was the directive ideal that people should
have pursued following the spirit’s suggestions.120
In the light of these quick notes on the intellectual profile of Adriano
Olivetti, let us now try to retrace, with more considerable attention, the
highlights of his biography and his political reflection, from the end of the
First World War until the constitutional debate for the foundation of the
Italian Republic. It will be easy to grasp the deep reasons and distinct fea-
tures of Olivetti’s political nonconformism. These factors led him to
occupy a secondary role in political parties’ power dynamics during the
second post-war period, leaving behind for us a cultural heritage that has
just been partially understood and collected. Thanks to this original and
alternative perspective, perhaps another Italy will reveal itself in the eyes of
the reader. An Italy that could have been, and it was not.

Notes
1. For a general analysis of the contemporary history of Italy, see
M.L. Salvadori, Storia d’Italia. Il cammino tormentato di una nazione.
1861–2016, Torino, Einaudi, 2018.
18 D. CADEDDU

2. V. Castronovo, Grandi e piccoli borghesi. La via italiana al capitalismo,

Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1988, p. 259.
3. See ibid., pp. 260–261; La Underwood: miracolo italiano o passo falso? A
colloquio con Gianluigi Gabetti, in Un’azienda e un’utopia. Adriano
Olivetti 1945–1960, a cura di S. Semplici, Bologna, il Mulino, 2001,
pp. 97–108; Olivetti-Underwood. Un’operazione rischiosa che si è tramu-
tata in un grosso affare, in “espansione”, a. II, n. 15, luglio 1970,
pp. 52–59.
4. A. Olivetti, Città dell’uomo, prefazione di G. Pampaloni, Milano, Edizioni
di Comunità, 1960; reprinted with introduction by G. Berta, Torino,
Edizioni di Comunità, 20012 (new edition in 2015).
5. Ibid., p. 217.
6. Ibid., p. 220.
7. See A. Olivetti, L’ordine politico delle Comunità. Le garanzie di libertà in
uno stato socialista, [Ivrea,] Nuove Edizioni Ivrea, 1945, p. 23 (reprinted
L’ordine politico delle Comunità, a cura di D. Cadeddu, Roma-Ivrea,
Edizioni di Comunità, 2014). The italic is in the original.
8. A. Olivetti, Appunti per la storia di una fabbrica, in Olivetti 1908–1958,
[a cura di R. Musatti, L. Bigiaretti, G. Soavi,] Ivrea, Ing. C. Olivetti & C.,
1958, p. 13.
9. See 1908–1958. Notizie dei cinquant’anni, ibid., pp. 176–180; e Uomini
e lavoro alla Olivetti, a cura di F. Novara, R. Rozzi, R. Garruccio, post-
fazione di G. Sapelli, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 2005, pp. 616–617.
10. Un discorso di Adriano Olivetti (giugno 1945), in La riforma politica e
sociale di Adriano Olivetti (1942–1945). Tavola rotonda. Roma, 1° dicem-
bre 2005, a cura di D. Cadeddu, Roma, Fondazione Adriano Olivetti,
2006, p. 62.
11. Ibid., p. 66.
12. Ibid., p. 67. On the relationship between morality, economy, and politics
in Olivetti’s action and reflection, see S. Semplici Adriano Olivetti. Etica,
impresa e cultura, in Cristianesimo e cultura politica. L’eredità di otto
illustri testimoni, a cura di N. Valentini, Milano, Paoline, 2006,
pp. 85–106.
13. See 1908–1958. Notizie dei cinquant’anni, pp. 176–190; e Uomini e
lavoro alla Olivetti, pp. 616–619. On the development of Ing. C. Olivetti
& C. in the second post-war period, consult L. Gallino, Progresso tecno-
logico ed evoluzione organizzativa negli stabilimenti Olivetti (1946–1959).
Ricerca sui fattori interni di espansione di un’impresa, Milano, Giuffrè,
1960. See also G. de Witt, Le fabbriche ed il mondo. L’Olivetti industriale
nella competizione globale (1950–1990), Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2005. On
the case of the electronic division, see L. Soria, Informatica: un’occasione
perduta. La Divisione elettronica dell’Olivetti nei primi anni del centrosi-
 1 INTRODUCTION: A VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 19

nistra, Torino, Einaudi, 1979; M. Bolognani, Bit generation. La fine della

Olivetti e il declino dell’informatica italiana, introduzione di M. Vitale,
Roma, Editori Riuniti, 2004; G. Gemelli, F. Squazzoni, Informatica ed
elettronica negli anni Sessanta. Il ruolo di Roberto Olivetti attraverso
l’Archivio Storico della Società Olivetti, in Politiche scientifiche e strategie
d’impresa: le culture olivettiane ed i loro contesti, a cura di G. Gemelli,
Roma, Fondazione Adriano Olivetti, 2005, pp. 257–308.
14. A. Olivetti, Ai lavoratori di Ivrea (sei anni di vita della fabbrica), in Id.,
Città dell’uomo, p. 173.
15. Id., Ai lavoratori di Pozzuoli, in Id., Città dell’uomo, pp. 163–164.
16. Id., Appunti per la storia di una fabbrica, pp. 15–16.
17. G. Berta, Lavoro solidarietà conflitti. Studi sulla storia delle politiche e delle
relazioni di lavoro, Roma, Officina Edizioni, 1983, p. 145. See also
F. Berardo, “Olivetti non era Valletta”: Fiom, Pci e Adriano Olivetti tra
lotta di classe e competizione politica, in “Bollettino storico-bibliografico
subalpino”, a. XCIX, fasc. II, luglio-dicembre 2001, pp. 535–572. For a
general overview, consult G. Berta, L’Italia delle fabbriche. Genealogie ed
esperienze dell’industrialismo nel Novecento, Bologna, il Mulino, 2001.
18. Ibid.
19. See ibid., p. 146.
20. See ibid., pp. 146–148.
21. See in summary D. Cadeddu, Gli Olivetti e il socialismo, in “Le scienze
dell’Uomo—I Quaderni”, a. VI, n. 3, giugno 2006, pp. 39–54.
22. See B. Caizzi, Camillo e Adriano Olivetti, Torino, Utet, 1962,
pp. 184–185; V. Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, Milano, Mondadori, 1985,
p. 102 (new edition Adriano Olivetti. La biografia, Roma-Ivrea, Edizioni
di Comunità, 2015).
23. See the testimony of sister Silvia Olivetti, in V. Ochetto, Adriano
Olivetti, p. 35.
24. A. Olivetti, “Manoscritto autobiografico inedito” (not found in the
Archivio Storico Olivetti di Ivrea), cited in B. Caizzi, Camillo e Adriano
Olivetti, p. 132; e in V. Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, p. 36.
25. Ibid.
26. A. Olivetti, “Manoscritto autobiografico inedito”, excerpt from
Bibliografia degli scritti di Adriano Olivetti, a cura di G. Maggia, Siena,
Facoltà di Scienze Economiche e Bancarie, Università degli Studi, 1983,
tomo I, p. XVI.
27. Id., Appunti per la storia di una fabbrica, p. 9.
28. See Le adesioni alla Lega, “L’Unità”, a. VIII, n. 19, 10 maggio
1919, p. 112.
29. See V. Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, pp. 43, 45.
20 D. CADEDDU

30. See A. Olivetti, “Manoscritto autobiografico inedito”, in V. Ochetto,

Adriano Olivetti, p. 45.
31. See Olivetti 1908–1958, p. 173; and the testimony reported in V. Ochetto,
Adriano Olivetti, p. 45.
32. Olivetti’s letter to his father, Ivrea, 30 March 1925 (not found in the
Olivetti historical archive of Ivrea), quoted in V. Ochetto, Adriano
Olivetti, pp. 50–51.
33. Olivetti’s letter to his mother, New York, 2 August 1925, in A. Olivetti,
Lettere dall’America (agosto 1925–gennaio 1926), in “Annali di storia
dell’impresa”, XII (2001), p. 181 (new edition A. Olivetti, Dall’America:
lettere ai familiari, Roma-Ivrea, Edizioni di Comunità, 2016).
34. A. Olivetti, “Manoscritto autobiografico inedito”, in B. Caizzi, op.
p. 137; and in V. Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, p. 51.
35. Id., Appunti per la storia di una fabbrica, p. 10.
36. See G. Gemelli, Costruire la modernità: Adriano Olivetti e l’America,
“Annali di Storia dell’Impresa”, XII (2001), p. 295.
37. Olivetti’s letter to his family, New York, 20 September 1925, in A. Olivetti,
Lettere dall’America, p. 203.
38. Ing. A.O., Note bibliografiche, “L’Organizzazione Scientifica del Lavoro”,
a. I, n. 1, aprile 1926, p. 50.
39. See Olivetti 1908–1958, p. 173.
40. G. Martinoli, Gli anni della formazione, in Fabbrica, Comunità,
Democrazia. Testimonianze su Adriano Olivetti e il Movimento Comunità,
a cura di F. Giuntella, A. Zucconi, Roma, 1984.
41. G. Sapelli, Economia, tecnologia e direzione d’impresa in Italia, Torino,
Einaudi, 1994, p. 147.
42. See ibid., p. 148.
43. Id., Appunti per una storia dell’organizzazione scientifica del lavoro in
Italia, “Quaderni di sociologia”, vol. XXV, n. 2–3, aprile-settembre
1976, pp. 154–171.
44. See Id., Economia, tecnologia e direzione d’impresa, p. 148. See also
D. Bigazzi, Modelli e pratiche organizzative nell’industrializzazione itali-
ana, in Storia d’Italia. Annali, vol. XV, L’industria, a cura di F. Amatori,
D. Bigazzi, R. Giannetti, L. Segreto, Torino, Einaudi, 1999, pp. 895–994;
F. Butera, Crisi endogena del taylorismo, in Id., La divisione del lavoro in
fabbrica, Venezia, Marsilio, 1977.
45. G. Sapelli, Gli “organizzatori della produzione” tra struttura d’impresa e
modelli culturali, in Storia d’Italia. Annali, vol. IV, Intellettuali e potere,
a cura di C. Vivanti, Torino, Einaudi, 1981, p. 665.
46. Id., Organizzazione lavoro e innovazione industriale nell’Italia tra le due
guerre, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1978, p. 86.
47. G. Martinoli, Gli anni della formazione, p. 26.
 1 INTRODUCTION: A VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 21

48. G. Sapelli, Gli “organizzatori della produzione”, p. 666.

49. A. Olivetti, Il quadro generale dell’organizzazione, “L’Organizzazione
Scientifica del Lavoro”, a. III, n. 5, maggio 1928, p. 312. The italic is in
the original.
50. See L. Gallino, Indagini di sociologia economica e industriale, Milano,
Edizioni di Comunità, 1972, pp. 62 ss.
51. G. Sapelli, Organizzazione lavoro e innovazione industriale, p. 185.
52. A. Olivetti, Dirigenti e ideali direttivi, “L’Organizzazione Scientifica del
Lavoro”, a. VI, n. 5, maggio 1931, p. 226.
53. G. Sapelli, Organizzazione lavoro e innovazione industriale, p. 185.
54. A. Olivetti, Dirigenti e ideali direttivi, p. 226.
55. See B. Caizzi, op. pp. 175–176.
56. See V. Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, p. 69.
57. “Promemoria. Ing. Adriano Olivetti”, c. 1, in Archivio centrale dello
Stato, Roma, fondo Ministero degli Interni, Direzione generale di pub-
blica sicurezza, Divisone polizia politica, Fascicoli personali, b. 916, fasc.
“Olivetti Adriano”.
58. Letter to the Regia Questura di Aosta, Ivrea, 24 July 1931, in Archivio
della Fondazione Adriano Olivetti, Rome, Adriano Olivetti, fasc. “Olivetti
Adriano di Camillo—Questura di Aosta—Classifica ‘Sovversivo’”.
59. F. Parri, All’alba, la Corsica: era la libertà, “L’Umanità”, a. II, n. 239, 9
ottobre 1948, p. 3.
60. See S. Pertini, La fuga di Filippo Turati, in Trent’anni di storia italiana.
Dall’antifascismo alla Resistenza (1915–1945), lezioni con testimonianze
presentate da F. Antonicelli, Torino, Einaudi, 1961, p. 96.
61. See, F. Parri, All’alba, la Corsica: era la libertà, p. 3; Id., L’utopista posi-
tivo, “Il Mondo”, a. XII, n. 11, 15 marzo 1960, p. 5. See also
E. Tagliacozzo, L’evasione di Filippo Turati, in No al fascismo, a cura di
E. Rossi, Torino, Einaudi, 1957, p. 54; and A. Garosci, Vita di Carlo
Rosselli, Firenze, Vallecchi, 1973, p. 85.
62. See “Memorandum”, c. 1, written by an Oss informant on 14 June 1943,
in National Archives and Records Administration, College Park
(Maryland), Rg 226, Entry 210, Box 367, file 660..
63. Letter from Turin of 9 April, in Archivio centrale dello Stato, Roma,
Ministero dell’Interno, Direzione generale della pubblica sicurezza,
Divisione polizia politica, Fascicoli personali, b. 916, fasc. “Olivetti
Adriano”. For a general overview, see also M. Franzinelli, I tentacoli
dell’Ovra. Agenti, collaboratori e vittime della polizia politica fascista,
Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2020; Id., Delatori. Spie e confidenti anonimi:
l’arma segreta del regime fascista, Milano, Mondadori, 2001; Id., Guerra
di spie. I servizi segreti fascisti, nazisti e alleati. 1939–1943, Milano,
Mondadori, 2004.
22 D. CADEDDU

64. See Letter No. n. 13557, dated Milan, 31 October 1938, sent to the
Public Security Department, in Archivio centrale dello Stato, Roma,
Ministero dell’Interno, Direzione generale della pubblica sicurezza,
Divisione polizia politica, Fascicoli personali, b. 916, fasc. “Olivetti
Adriano”.
65. See V. Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, p. 91.
66. See La Olivetti nella Resistenza, “Quaderni del Centro di documentazi-
one sull’antifascismo e la Resistenza nel Canavese”, n. 1, aprile
1973, p. 173.
67. See both the Einvernahmeprotokoll of Adriano Olivetti, and that of Wanda
Soavi, both written by the “Polizeiabtellung” of Bellinzona on 9 February
1944, in Archivio di stato di Bellinzona, fondo Internati (1943–1945),
sc. 60.8, fasc. “Olivetti Adriano fu Camillo—1901”, e ivi, sc. 79.1, fasc.
“Soavi Wanda di Guido—1909”.
68. On the Oss activity, see R. Harris Smith, Oss: The Secret History of
America’s First Central Intelligence, Berkley, University of California
Press, 1972; Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors. Oss and the Origins
of the Cia, London, Andre Deutsch, 1983; The Secret War. The Office of
Strategic Services in World War II, edited by George C. Chalou,
Washington, National Archives and Records Administration, 1992.
69. See the text marked “Confidential”, in National Archives and Records
Administration, College Park (Maryland), Rg 226, Entry 210, Box 367,
file 660.
70. At the same time, Olivetti was also in contact with the British “Special
Operations Executive”. See M. Berettini, La Gran Bretagna e
l’antifascismo italiano. Diplomazia clandestina, Intelligence, Operazioni
speciali (1940–1943), prefazione di M. de Leonardis, Firenze, Le Lettere,
2010, pp. 122–129.
71. See G. Fuà, Uomini e leader. Considerazioni e ricordi, raccolti da
R. Petrini, Jesi, Centro Studi P. Calamandrei, 2000, p. 49; e la testimoni-
anza riassunta in V. Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, p. 119.
72. See the report of the General Police Directorate to the commissioners of
Aosta, Milan, Piacenza, and CC Rome, dated “Valdagno, 1 June 1944”;
and the attached letter of the Police Headquarters in Rome of 28
February 1944, in Archivio della Fondazione Adriano Olivetti, Roma,
fondo Adriano Olivetti, fasc. “Olivetti Adriano di Camillo—Questura di
Aosta—Classifica ‘Sovversivo’”. For a summary on the Sim activity, see
also G. De Lutiis, I servizi segreti in Italia. Dal fascismo alla seconda
Repubblica, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1998, pp. 25–40. On the role of Ovra
and Sim, see also R. Canosa, I servizi segreti del duce. I persecutori e le vit-
time, Milano, Mondadori, 2000.
 1 INTRODUCTION: A VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 23

73. See l’Einvernahmeprotokoll, di Adriano Olivetti. For a general overview,

see L. Klinkhammer, L’occupazione tedesca in Italia 1943–1945, Torino,
Bollati Boringhieri, 1993; R. De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il
fascismo, Torino, Einaudi, 19884.
74. Letter from the Police Headquarters in Rome of 28 February 1944.
75. See the testimony reported in B. Caizzi, op. p. 195. On the German occu-
pation of Rome, see C. De Simone, Roma città prigioniera. I 271 giorni
dell’occupazione nazista (8 settembre ‘43–4 giugno ‘44), Milano, Mursia,
1994; R. Katz, Roma città aperta. Settembre 1943–Giugno 1944, Milano,
il Saggiatore, 2003; G. Sale, Roma 1943: occupazione nazista e deportazi-
one degli ebrei romani, “La Civiltà Cattolica”, a. 154, vol. IV, quaderno
3683, 6 dicembre 2003, pp. 417–429.
76. See D. Cadeddu, Tra antifascisti e alleati: Adriano Olivetti (gennaio
1943–febbraio 1944), “L’Acropoli”, a. V, n. 6, novembre 2004,
pp. 694–711.
77. See A. Olivetti, Stato Federale delle Comunità. La riforma politica e sociale
negli scritti inediti (1942–1945), a cura di D. Cadeddu, Milano,
FrancoAngeli, 2004. On the stay in Switzerland, D. Cadeddu, Adriano
Olivetti e la Svizzera (gennaio 1943–settembre 1945), in Spiriti liberi in
Svizzera. La presenza di fuorusciti italiani nella Confederazione negli
anni del fascismo e del nazismo (1922–1945). Atti del convegno internazio-
nale di studi. Ascona, Centro Monte Verità. Milano, Università degli Studi
8–9 novembre 2004, a cura di R. Castagnola, F. Panzera, M. Spiga,
Firenze, Franco Cesati, 2006, pp. 219–238.
78. Testimony of Giuseppe Maranini published in Ricordo di Adriano
Olivetti, a cura della rivista “Comunità”, Milano, Edizioni di Comunità,
1960, p. 82.
79. For a quick overview, F. Ferrarotti, Comunità e democrazia nel pensiero
politico di Adriano Olivetti, in Id., Un imprenditore di idee. Una testimo-
nianza su Adriano Olivetti, a cura di G. Gemelli, Torino, Edizioni di
Comunità, 2001, pp. 111–128; D. Cadeddu, Teoria e prassi. Aspetti del
pensiero di Adriano Olivetti, “L’Acropoli”, a. IV, n. 5, ottobre 2003,
pp. 588–592.
80. A. Olivetti, L’ordine politico delle Comunità, p. 53.
81. See ibid., passim.
82. See ibid.
83. Id., Fini e fine della politica, a cura del Comitato Centrale delle Comunità,
Ivrea, Movimento Comunità, 1949, p. 25.
84. Review to L’ordine politico delle Comunità, “Bollettino d’informazione e
documentazione del Ministero per la Costituente”, a. II, n. 12, 30 aprile
1946, p. 14.
24 D. CADEDDU

85. See the letter by Olivetti to Einaudi, 18 November 1944, in D. Cadeddu,

Luigi Einaudi tra libertà e autonomia, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2018, ch. 2.
86. R. Morandi, Programma dell’Istituto, “Bollettino dell’Istituto di Studi
Socialisti”, a. I, n. 1, dicembre 1945, p. 1; rpt. in Id., Democrazia diretta
e riforme di struttura, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, pp. 24–26.
87. See Il XXIV Congresso del Partito Socialista Italiano, “Bollettino di
informazione e documentazione del Ministero per la Costituente”, a. II,
n. 12, 30 aprile 1946, p. 10; Per lo Stato di domani, “Avanti!”, a. 50, n.
97, 21 aprile 1946, p. 1; F. Taddei, Il socialismo italiano del dopoguerra:
correnti ideologiche e scelte politiche (1943–1947), Milano, Franco Angeli,
1984, pp. 273–274.
88. See La giornata di ieri, “Avanti!” a. 50, n. 94, 18 aprile 1946, p. 1.
89. See E. Rotelli, L’avvento della Regione in Italia. Dalla caduta del regime
fascista alla Costituzione repubblicana (1943–1947), Milano, Giuffrè,
1967, pp. 260–261.
90. See ibid., passim; Taddei, Il socialismo italiano del dopoguerra;
S. Magagnoli, Autonomie locali e regioni nei lavori per l’elaborazione della
Costituzione, in La formazione della Repubblica. Autonomie locali, regioni,
governo, politica economica. Ricerca della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, a
cura di S. Magagnoli, E. Mana, L. Conte, Bologna, il Mulino, 1998,
pp. 11–188.
91. See V. Ochetto, Il difficile rapporto con Adriano Olivetti, in Gerardo
Bruni e i cristiano-sociali, a cura di A. Parisella, Roma, Edizioni Lavoro,
1984, pp. 275–288.
92. See V. Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, p. 141. See also what the author
observes ibid., p. 160.
93. A synthetic analysis of the “impossible way of the third forces”, inserted
in the panorama of ideological and custom models dominant in
Republican Italy, is offered by E. Galli della Loggia, Ideologie, classi e cos-
tume, in L’Italia contemporanea 1945–1975, a cura di V. Castronovo,
Torino, Einaudi, 1976, pp. 379–434.
94. See A. Olivetti, Corrispondenza per gli Stati Uniti, “Comunità”, a. VII,
n. 19, giugno 1953, pp. 1–4 (rpt. in G. Berta, Le idee al potere. Adriano
Olivetti tra la fabbrica e la Comunità, Milano, Edizioni di Comunità,
1980, pp. 215–221); then published with cuts as How U.S. Aid
Boomeranged in Italy, in “World”, vol. I, n. 1, November 1953,
pp. 60–62.
95. See V. Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, pp. 222–223. More generally, see
D. Saresella, Catholics and Communists in Twentieth Century Italy.
Between Conflict and Dialogue, London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2020.
96. Tempi nuovi metodi nuovi, a cura della Direzione Politica Esecutiva,
Milano, Edizioni di Comunità, 1953 (pubblicata anche con il titolo
 1 INTRODUCTION: A VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 25

Dichiarazione politica; rpt. in U. Serafini, Adriano Olivetti e il Movimento

Comunità. Una anticipazione scomoda, un discorso aperto, Roma, Officina
Edizioni, 1982, pp. 362–397). Members of the Executive Political
Directorate and signatories of the document turn out to be Rosario
Assunto, Ludovico Barbiano di Belgiojoso, Rigo Innocenti, Alberto
Mortara, Riccardo Musatti, Adriano Olivetti, Geno Pampaloni, Ludovico
Quaroni, Umberto Serafini, Giorgio Trossarelli, Renzo Zorzi.
97. Berta, Le idee al potere, p. 21.
98. A. Olivetti, Proposta per un Senato organico e funzionale, in Id., Città
dell’uomo, p. 254.
99. Ibid., p. 251.
100. For a reconstruction of the political and social commitment of Movimento
Comunità and its attempt to create and crystallize a new political ‘subcul-
ture’, consult G. Sapelli, R. Chiarini, Fini e fine della politica. La sfida di
Adriano Olivetti, introduzione di L. Gallino, Milano, Edizioni di
Comunità, 1990. For a reflection on his historical experience, see also
A. Mortara, Adriano Olivetti (1901–1960), in I protagonisti dell’intervento
pubblico in Italia, a cura di A. Mortara, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 1984; and
R. Chiarini, Una critica democratica al centralismo e alla partitocrazia: il
comunitarismo di Adriano Olivetti, in La costruzione dello stato in Italia e
Germania, introduzione di R. Chiarini, Manduria-Bari-Roma, Lacaita,
1993, pp. 197–219. See also G. Iglieri, Storia del Movimento Comunità,
Roma-Ivrea, Edizioni di Comunità, 2019.
101. See A. Olivetti, [Intervento del 19 luglio 1958,] in Atti parlamentari,
Camera dei Deputati, III Legislatura, Assemblea plenaria, Discussioni,
Seduta 12, vol. I, Roma, Tip. della Camera dei Deputati, s.d. [1958],
pp. 545–546; rpt. come Per il nostro paese riforme di struttura, in Berta,
Le idee al potere, pp. 243–245.
102. Studi e proposte preliminari per il Piano Regolatore della Valle d’Aosta,
direzione generale del Dott. Ing. Adriano Olivetti, edizione a cura di
R. Zveteremich, [Ivrea,] Nuove Edizioni Ivrea, 1943 (rpt. come Studi e
proposte preliminari per il piano regolatore della Valle d’Aosta, presentazi-
one di R. Louvin, introduzione di G. Ciucci, Torino, Edizioni di
Comunità, 20012).
103. See R. Astarita, Gli architetti di Olivetti. Una storia di committenza
industriale, prefazione di Cesare de Seta, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2000.
104. See A. Olivetti, Libertà di associazione e partiti politici, in Id., Città
dell’uomo, pp. 212–213; e anche Id., L’ordine politico delle Comunità,
p. 179. On this subject, see R. Musatti, Il concetto di urbanistica secondo
Adriano Olivetti, in Id., La via del Sud e altri scritti, Milano, Edizioni di
Comunità, 1972, pp. 149–156; and M. Labò, L’aspetto estetico dell’opera
sociale di Adriano Olivetti, Milano, Görlich, 1957.
26 D. CADEDDU

105. In general, see C. Olmo, Urbanistica e società civile. Esperienza e cono-

scenza, 1945–1960, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1992; and Costruire la
città dell’uomo. Adriano Olivetti e l’urbanistica, a cura di C. Olmo, pre-
sentazione di L. Olivetti, Torino, Edizioni di Comunità, 2001.
106. See B. de’ Liguori Carino, Adriano Olivetti e le Edizioni di Comunità
(1946–1960), Roma, Fondazione Adriano Olivetti, 2008. For a specific
aspect, see the recent C. Toschi, Olivetti e l’editoria d’arte, in Il libro
d’arte in Italia (1935–1965), a cura di M. Ferretti, Pisa, Edizioni della
Normale, 2020, pp. 159–175.
107. A. Olivetti, L’ordine politico delle Comunità, p. 5.
108. Letter from Olivetti to Mario Melloni, 12 July 1949, quoted in
V. Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, p. 249.
109. See V. Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, pp. 183–184.
110. Letter from Olivetti to Grazia Galletti, 19 December 1948, quoted in
V. Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, p. 249.
111. To reconstruct the lively ‘personalism’ atmosphere of the 1930s in France,
consult J.-L. Loubet del Bayle, Les non-conformistes des années 30. Une
tentative de renouvellement de la pensée politique française, Paris, Éditions
du Seuil, 1969.
112. On the interesting theory, still to be proved, of Steiner’s influence on
Adriano Olivetti’s political thought, consult G. Alvi, Le seduzioni eco-
nomiche di Faust, Milano, Adelphi, 1989, passim; and L. Fantacci,
Adriano Olivetti e Rudolf Steiner, “Surplus”, 2–1999, pp. 91–99. See
D. Cadeddu, Olivetti steineriano? Nella sua teoria sociale, secondo me,
c’era anche il marxismo, “HuffPost” (Italy), 17 February 2015.
113. See il Catalogo generale delle Edizioni di Comunità. 1946–1982, [prefazi-
one di R. Zorzi,] Milano, Edizioni di Comunità, 1982.
114. In this direction was also expressed the Introduction found in A. Olivetti,
Società Stato Comunità. Per una economia e politica comunitaria, Milano,
Edizioni di Comunità, 1952, pp. IX-XXXVIII.
115. Olivetti’s letter to Luciano Foà, Rome, 31 January 1946, in Archivio
della Fondazione Arnoldo e Alberto Mondadori, Milano, Fondo Erich
Linder, Corrispondenza, b. 3 (1946), fasc. 68.
116. See J. Lacroix, Il personalismo come anti-ideologia, Milano, Vita e pen-
siero, 1974, p. 41.
117. See La dichiarazione dei principi, “L’Unità”, a. VIII, n. 17, 26 aprile
1919, pp. 1–2; S. Ristuccia, Il progetto politico di Adriano Olivetti
nell’Italia del dopoguerra, in La comunità concreta: progetto ed immagine.
Il pensiero e le iniziative di Adriano Olivetti nella formazione della cultura
urbanistica ed architettonica italiana, a cura di M. Fabbri, A. Greco,
Roma, Fondazione Adriano Olivetti, 1988, p. 29; and C. Malandrino, Il
federalismo comunitario di Adriano Olivetti, in Id., Socialismo e libertà.
 1 INTRODUCTION: A VIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 27

Autonomie, federalismo, Europa da Rosselli a Silone, Milano, Franco

Angeli, 1990, pp. 204, 208.
118. A. Olivetti, Il cammino della Comunità, in Id., Città dell’uomo,
pp. 84–85.ved
119. Ibid., p. 85.
120. On Olivetti’s ability to innovate methods and institutions, see G. Gemelli,
Il regno di Proteo. Ingegneria e scienze umane nel percorso di Adriano
Olivetti, Bologna, Bononia University Press, 2014.
 CHAPTER 2

Gaetano Salvemini and the United States

of America

Renewing National Politics

The treaties of the first post-war period transformed geopolitics.
Nevertheless, the First World War was already something profoundly dif-
ferent from the previous war experiences, able to either affect or change
the political ideas and value orientation of those living in the most remote
corners of Europe.1 In Piedmont, northwestern Italy, on 16 April 1918,
five days after turning 17, the young Adriano Olivetti thought he could
“make an important decision”, and immediately enlisted as a war volun-
teer.2 In April, the Rome Pact consolidated the anti-Habsburg nationality
policy, which affirmed the right of the populations under the Austro-­
Hungarian Empire to constitute or complete their national identity
through political-economic independence. The propaganda following the
diplomatic action became one of the causes of the Habsburg army’s col-
lapse and the Italian victory.3 Furthermore, many young people did not
remain indifferent to the passion manifested by different political person-
alities in their public interventions. In April 1918, the solemn Rome Pact
finally gave the impression to understand the fundamental importance of
oppressed nationalities’ politics.4
Olivetti was aware of the surprise that his decision would have aroused
in his father since he did not believe that he had ever shown within himself
“something resembling hero material”. However, he observed that it was

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 29

Switzerland AG 2021
D. Cadeddu, Towards and Beyond the Italian Republic, Italian and
Italian American Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76139-4_2
30 D. CADEDDU

not a matter of considering it a heroic gesture, but merely understanding

“the choice I made as a duty given by my particular condition: to have
finished secondary school and not be necessary to my family”. If it was not
a young man who was in these conditions “to set an example of good-
will”, he remarked, “who could give it?”5 As Olivetti recalled about a year
later, Thomas Woodrow Wilson “had those idealities embodied”, for
which the adversaries of the war in itself had enthusiastically accepted the
sacrifice.6
Addressing his father with an unusual “you” for the time, the young
man asked for “no advice, since in some cases the advice is perfectly use-
less, and then it can become almost harmful”.7 However, “fully aware of
the gravity of the decision and also of the seriousness” of his “future
duty”,8 he asked him “permission to come one day next week to Ivrea”,
where he will immediately go to enlist in the 4th Alpine Regiment.9 It was
a declaration of freedom, meaning that he had no intention to bow to his
father’s will. Olivetti just needed a written authorization to be admitted to
the military visit and then to the regiment:10 “No objection, I believe, can
distract me from my purpose”.11 His father did not oppose it since he had
moved to support the democratic interventionism of Leonida Bissolati
from an initial position close to Filippo Turati’s.12
Although an all-youthful emphasis in some passages tinged the letter, it
showed a deep moral sense and resoluteness in pursuing the decisions that
matured.13 Adriano Olivetti’s personality was forming through an educa-
tion free from religious dogmas and the institutional school discipline, but
still in the shadow of a mother of Waldensian religion and an authoritarian
and magnate father. He was the one who, among other things, had forced
Olivetti to attend the physical-mathematical section of the Technical
Institute, while he would have preferred to undertake humanities stud-
ies.14 In August 1914, when he was still 13 years old, he was sent by his
father to work at the factory, where he had soon learned to know and hate
the work in series: a torture for the spirit, imprisoned for hours that never
ended in the black and dark of an old workshop.15
After this experience, “for many years”, he did not set foot in the fac-
tory again, well determined that he would have never dealt with his father’s
industry.16 Furthermore, a significant act of rebellion was manifested at
the end of the first year of university when the young man decided to
move from the degree course in mechanical engineering to that of indus-
trial chemistry: “Between an ill-fated paternal desire”, supported by affir-
mations of freedom in the vocation “that I became an engineer, and an
 2 GAETANO SALVEMINI AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 31

indistinct vocation for sciences, particularly for chemistry, I enrolled in the

Industrial Chemistry section of the Regio Politecnico di Torino.”17
Intolerant to the intrusive glare of the industrial activity in the family life,
he found in the Turin of the First World War’s post-war period a very
productive environment to develop his real interests, which were the polit-
ical and social issues of the time: “From 1919 to 1924, during the long
years of the Polytechnic”, he later recalled, “I witnessed the unfolding of
the tragedy of the failure of the socialist revolution”.18
He moved to Turin to achieve a bachelor in Engineering, where he met
Piero Gobetti and the group “Energie Nove”. Together, the three were
among the first to support the initiatives promoted by the newspaper
founded and run by Gaetano Salvemini.19 Moment of impulse to the cre-
ation of a “group of friends” of “L’Unità” was the conference that took
place in Florence between 17 and 19 April 1919.20 Here, after numerous
passionate and cordial discussions, nourished by the same mental and
moral habit of sincerity, disinterest, and study, many of the controversies
that had initially appeared irreconcilable had ended in the agreement.21
The conference took note of the existence, in many readers of “L’Unità”,
of a need for effective political action, originating from an accurate and
preliminary study of the problems. It was a need that could not be satisfied
through any of the old parties, including the democratic ones. It had to
find a political organization common to all “living and free forces” to
spread the need to resolve Italian life’s urgent problems.22
On 26 April, “L’Unità” featured on the front page La dichiarazione dei
principi (The declaration of principles). It was a summary of the debate
and programme of those who had or would have joined “Lega Democratica
per il Rinnovamento della Politica Nazionale” (Democratic League for the
Renovation of National Politics), as well as its founding act.23 Synthesis of
the programme, and mental and moral habit of the adherents, was the
conviction that “in political life, and a regime of freedom and honesty,
only those who have previously, without fear, judged and criticized him-
self, can judge and criticize others”.24 Immediately, among the first friends
of the new movement,25 on 10 May, the name of Adriano Olivetti appeared
on “L’Unità”,26 in the column “Le adesioni alla Lega”. The accession was
a real signing of La dichiarazione dei principi, which can be considered a
first general affirmation of Adriano Olivetti’s political principles.
With this programme, the work of “L’Unità” was associated with that
of the League. However, the latter should have led an independent life
from the newspaper both in action and in propaganda. “L’Unità” was
32 D. CADEDDU

satisfied with creating in many young people who had emerged from the
war just fought, the need to gather together in a work of study and action,
powered by the yearning for justice and freedom. He would continue to
study with these young people point by point, the problems indicated in
La dichiarazione dei principi. Furthermore, it would provide information
on the League’s initiatives until it had given itself a body of its own.
“L’Unità” was available to the League, but not the other way around.27
According to a federalist method, the “groups of friends of l’Unità”
composed the movement. They had a shared political conception and
“repugnance of the old parties”.28 The various groups considered it neces-
sary coming together and associate to give body to their ideas and direc-
tion to their will for political action renewal. La dichiarazione dei principi
was going to be a flag around which young people eager to earn a more
worthy national life could gather. This programme was a “profession of
faith”,29 but not “an absolute creed, which engages all the adherents’ con-
science, like in the parties”.30 It was, at the same time, also a warning
against the old oligarchies unable to think about progress.31
The manifesto was divided into 15 points and a long introduction.
Here were expressed radical democratic ideals, the contempt for the old
political parties, and the conviction that the state had to fulfil a specific
function of coordinating the groups’ economic and moral activities that
composed it and serve as an instrument of collaboration and universal
dialogue. Once “Lega Democratica per il Rinnovo della Politica
Nazionale”32 had its foundations approved, the programme clearly
expressed that its members proclaimed themselves as democratic. They
supported universal suffrage, political representation, and an indispensable
material, moral and intellectual elevation of the proletariat. Once made
aware of their rights and responsible for their actions, they were then able
to actively participate in the life of the nation,33 considered “a necessary
and legitimate element of progress and internal and international solidar-
ity”.34 It followed a brief examination of the social consequences gener-
ated by the war,35 and a warning of the possibility that revolutionary
attempts could provoke a brutal reaction. The atrocious revolution and
the political class serving the capitalist or working-class clientele were both
condemned.36
The so-called dictatorship of the proletariat would indeed have demol-
ished the domination of the business, bureaucratic, and parliamentary oli-
garchy. However, it would have created the political one of a new
oligarchy.37 The idea of a proletariat’s dictatorship was rejected as well,
 2 GAETANO SALVEMINI AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 33

since, in Italy, it would have led to the power of the working minority
alone with the exclusion of the disorganized agricultural proletariat. The
working class of the major industries had revealed the tendency to gain
better working conditions and wages, transferring to the state treasury the
economic weight of these achievements without understanding whether
national production capacity improved or regressed. This mentality would
have intensified bureaucratization and contrasts between the workers and
agricultural classes in a revolutionary regime.38
If the aim was to make real the representation of all interests and all
social classes,39 the oligarchies against which the League’s democratic
spirit wanted to fight were mainly the business, the bureaucratic and the
parliamentary ones. The opposition was resolute against the financial oli-
garchy. A national oligarchy formed using banking and industrial trusts
that have the sole purpose of “looting the state”, also thanks to the com-
plicity with the bureaucracy and Giolitti oligarchy’s power, composed of
representatives of all political parties and supported on clientelism.40
The two most essential reforms indicated in La dichiarazione dei prin-
cipi were public administration and public education. In both cases, the
need was to increase the remuneration of state employees and make them
effectively responsible for their work. “A systemic propaganda against
popular prejudice, which tends to entrust more and more functions to the
state, and a fierce struggle against the bureaucratic spirit that forms all the
legislation, and against the central administrations that increasingly submit
to their control the whole life of the country” was described as necessary.
They had suppressed all initiatives in local authorities and the same gov-
ernment officials of the provincial offices, imposing “to dry up all the
sources of production, determining with their ignorance, enormous
wealth squandering, exasperating in all classes the feeling of the impossi-
bility of continuing with this system”. All had been done “for the sole
purpose of making necessary an increasing number of employees in the
ministries, and, therefore, continuous staff’s reforms and promotions to
the higher ranks”. Simultaneously, middle and lower ranks officials, too
numerous to be paid enough, remained “abandoned in misery”.41 It was
necessary to “transfer all those functions from the State’s administration
to the private initiatives or local elective ones, where central power inter-
vention is not strictly necessary”.42 Moreover, also “to ensure the local
elective administrations the maximum autonomy compatible with the
need for national unity, and the necessary incomes for the performance of
their duties”.43 Public administration reform was also necessary to
34 D. CADEDDU

“eliminate one of the most active causes, which oppose the proper func-
tioning of the representative institutions”.44 So, it was appropriate to reor-
ganize public administrations with: abolition of useless offices, elimination
of non-mobility of officials with political offices, protection of employees
against the arbitrariness of superiors and political pressure, whilst provid-
ing decent salary. Concurrently, it was mandatory to reduce employees
and make them effectively responsible in citizens’ eyes, “unjustly damaged
by their ill will or lack of intelligence”.45
However, the most significant internal problem was “public educa-
tion”.46 The “educational differentiation of public institutions” and com-
petition between public and private schools, was declared appropriate.
However, it claimed “the strictest monopoly” of examinations to govern-
ment schools, for the granting of legally valid diplomas (also introducing,
state examinations for medium, professional, and university diplomas).
The school should have become “a sincere instrument of intellectual selec-
tion and social classification”, facilitating the way of higher education for
pupils of disadvantaged families, but “promising ingenuity” and “closing
it to others”. The reform of public education aimed to universally increase
individual initiative, technical value, and civic education. So, it was neces-
sary to extend the period of compulsory teaching and ensure that all
schools were genuinely efficient by organizing examinations of all grades
so that teachers could not be the final judges of their pupils.47
Italy, a secular state guarantor of worship’s freedom,48 should have
worked both for peace and the respect of nationality’s principle. Although
still inadequate, the main instrument was the League of Nations, which
would have been necessary to consolidate and refine through international
workers organizations’ contribution. Therefore, it was necessary to con-
tribute in making it an expression also of the weaker States by promoting
actions aimed at the abolition of customs barriers, the implementation of
international labour legislation, the progressive limitation of armaments,
the promotion of arbitration in international disputes, the prohibition of
secret treaties, respect for and equal treatment for all colonies. Italy had to
give up its and oppose other imperialistic policy and organize practical
economic, cultural, and national assistance to Italian emigrants.49
In economic policy, customs protection was sought just for politically
indispensable initiatives, which, otherwise, could not survive.50 The focus
had to be addressed on a better use of work and the creation of experi-
mental laboratories and technical education to counterbalance the short-
age of raw materials. State’s intervention in the economy should have
Another random document with
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ezeknek ártson, ne lenne arra kötelezve, hogy ne tanusítson
ellenséges magatartást polgártársai többségének véleményével
szemben; sőt még jobban igyekszik kezében tartani őket azáltal,
hogy sokszorosítja azon alkalmakat és eszközöket, melyek által őket
államosíthatja és szocializálhatja.
Végül arra törekszik, hogy megszüntesse a nagy társulatokat és
azok munkásságának eredményét felszívja. Megvásárolja valamely
nagy társaság vasutait, mindenekelőtt azért, hogy kihasználja azokat
s abban a reményben, hogy az állam ebből nyereségre fog szert
tenni. Mindenekfelett pedig azért, hogy ezen társaság összes
alkalmazottainak és hivatalnokainak személyzetét eltávolítsa, akik
nem törekedtek az állam, a kormány, a polgárok többsége
tetszésének megnyerésére és akiknek nem volt egyéb gondjuk és
egyéb kötelességük, mint hogy jó alkalmazottak legyenek és végül
arra törekszik, hogy helyettesítse azokat, – bár az egyének
ugyanazok maradnak, – az állami alkalmazottak olyan személyzete
által, akiket mindenekelőtt alkalmazkodóknak és jóérzelműeknek
tart.
Ezen uralomnak legszélsőbb és tökéletes állapotában, vagyis a
szocialista kormányrendszerben, csak hivatalnokok lennének.
– Következésképen – mondják az eméleti szocialisták – a jelzett
összes állítólagos hátrányokat ki fogjuk kerülni. Az állam, a
demokrácia, az uralkodó-párt, bármiként nevezzük is azt, tényleg
nem fog abba a helyzetbe jutni, hogy hivatalnokait – mikén az előbb
mondottak feltüntetik – alkalmazkodásuk és hozzá nem értésük
alapján válassza meg, minthogy az összes polgárok hivatalnokok
lennének. Eltünnék tehát ilymódon azon társadalmi dualizmus,
amely abban áll, hogy a népesség egy része az államból él, egy
másik része pedig önmagát tartja fenn és azzal kérkedik, hogy
magasabbrendű amannál jellemben, értelmiségben és
hivatottságban az előadott indokoknál fogva. Ebben rejlik a
megoldás.
– Kételkedem, hogy az legyen a megoldás, minthogy a
szocialista uralomban fennmarad a választási rendszer,
következésképen fennmaradnak a pártok. A polgárok megválasztják
a törvényhozókat, a törvényhozók a kormányt, a kormány pedig
megválasztja a munkakörök főnökeit és a javak szétosztóit. A pártok,
vagyis az érdekcsoportok fennállanak, minden csoport magának
akarja megszerezni a törvényhozókat és a kormányt, hogy a maga
számára nyerje meg ezektől ezen uralom arisztokratáit, t. i. a
munkakörök főnökeit és a javak szétosztóit, hogy a nevezettek ezen
csoport tagjai részére a munkát sokkal enyhébbé s a jövedelmet
sokkal dúsabbá tegyék.
Kivéve azt, hogy a gazdagság és ami még a szabadságból
megmaradt eltöröltetett: semmi sem változott meg s mindazon
hátrányok, melyeket fenntebb felsoroltam továbbra is fennmaradnak.
A megoldás nem következett be.
Hogy meg legyen a megoldás, szükséges volna, hogy a
szocialista kormányzatnak ne választás legyen az alapja; szükséges
volna, hogy isteni jogon alapuljon, mint a jezsuiták uralma
Paraguayban;22 szükséges volna, hogy zsarnoki legyen nem csupán
cselekedeteiben, hanem eredetére nézve is; szükséges volna, hogy
királyság legyen. Az okos királynak nincs semmi érdeke abban, hogy
hivatalnokait a hivatás nélkül valók közül válassza, sőt inkább az az
érdeke, hogy határozottan éppen az ellenkezőt cselekedje. Erre azt
felelhetik nekem, hogy rendkívül ritka eset és rendellenes dolog az,
hogy a király intelligens legyen; nem óhajtom, hogy ezt elismerjék. A
királynak – kevés kivétel mellett és amit a történet csudálkozva
jegyez föl – határozottan ugyanazon indokokból vannak kegyencei,
miként a népnek, akik őt nem homályosítják el és nem szállnak
szembe vele, következésképen akik nem értékesebbek, mint a többi
polgár, sem értelmiség, sem jellem tekintetében. A választáson
alapuló szocialista uralom és a diktátori szocialista uralom tehát
ugyanazon hátrányokat tünteti föl, mint aminőket a demokráciánál
ismerünk.
Egyébiránt alapjában véve a demokráciának a szocializmus felé
való csúszás-mászása – ha szabad magunkat ekként kifejeznünk –
nem egyéb, mint visszatérés a zsarnoksághoz. Ha a szocialista
uralom megalakulna, elsősorban is választási uralom lenne;
minthogy pedig minden választáson alapuló uralom feltételezi,
megengedi és szükségeli a pártokat, az uralkodó párt lenne az,
amely megválasztaná a törvényhozókat s amely ennek
következtében megalakítaná a kormányt és amely ezen kormánytól
nyerné el az összes kegyeket, miután azokat a maga számára
kierőszakolná. Az elv tehát az volna, hogy az országot a többség
kizsákmányolja, amint az meg is van minden olyan országban, ahol
a kormányzat választáson nyugszik.
De a szocialista kormányzat mindenekfelett a munkakörök
főnökeinek és a javak kiosztóinak olygarchiája és még hozzá nagyon
merev olygarchiája lévén, uralma alatt csakis védelem nélkül való
lények állanak, akik egyenlők a szegénységben és egyenlőkké
téttettek a nyomorúságban; ezen olygarchia egyébaránt nagyon
nehezen pótolható, ameddig a rendkívüli módon bonyolult
közigazgatás – amelyet kezeiben tart – azt követeli, hogy minden
hirtelen változás nélkül, minden a maga helyén maradjon, mint
elmozdíthatatlan olygarchia tehát csakhamar egy vezér körül
összpontosulna és elnyomná, vagy a második helyre és a második
rangsorozatba szorítaná a nemzeti képviseletet választóival együtt.
Ez hasonló volna némileg ahhoz, ami Franciaországban az első
császárság alatt történt. Az első császárság alatt a harcosok
osztálya van túlsúlyban és az uralkodik, háttérbe szoríthat és
eltiporhat mindent, miután reá állandóan szükség van s amely ha
elenyészett: újra születik és amely egy vezér körül csoportosul, aki
neki egységet ad és biztosítja számára az egység erejét.
A szocialista uralom mellett – igaz, hogy sokkal lassabban egy
emberöltő után a munkavezetők és a javak kiosztói, ezen békés
janicsárok – egy nagyon zárt, összetartó s szűkkörű kasztot
alkotnának, amelyet nem lehetne nélkülözni, ellenben a
törvényhozók nélkülözhetők, minthogy helyettük elegendő az
államtanács;23 majd egy vezér körül csoportosulnának, aki nekik az
egységet s az egység erejét adná meg.
Midőn még a szocializmust nem ismerték, állandóan azt
mondták, hogy a demokrácia természeténél fogva a zsarnokság felé
hajlik. Ez mintha megváltozott volna és úgy tetszett, hogy a
demokrácia a szocializmus felé hajlik. Ámde semmi sem változott
meg, mert midőn a demokrácia a szocializmus felé hajlik, a
zsarnokság felé törekszik. Ezt azonban öntudatlanul cselekszi, mert
tudatosan az egyenlőség felé törekszik; az egyenlőség állapotából
pedig mindig zsarnokság fejlődik ki.
Ez a jövőt illetőleg egy kissé eltérő elmélkedés volt. Térjünk
vissza tárgyunkhoz.
 IV.

A HIVATÁSOS TÖRVÉNYHOZÓ.

A demokrácia – amint az mai napság fennáll, – megtámadja a

végrehajtó hatalmat, meghódítja és magába olvasztja azt; támadást
intéz a közigazgatási hatalom ellen, meghódítja és magába olvasztja
azt és mindezt a törvényhozóknak – az ő képviselőinek
közvetítésével teszi, akiket a maga képére választ meg, vagyis
akiket azért választ meg, mert hivatástalanok és szenvedélyesek,
minthogy «a nép sohasem cselekszik más indokból, mint
szenvedélyből» miként Montesquieu – magának kissé ellentmondva
állítja.
De hát milyenek legyenek a törvényhozók? Úgy tetszik nekem,
hogy éppen ellenkezőnek kellene lenniök, mint amilyenek a
demokrácia által választott törvényhozók. Az eszményi
törvényhozónak nagyon tájékozottnak és a szenvedélyektől minden
tekintetben mentesnek kell lennie.
Nagyon tájékozottnak kell lennie, nem annyira a könyvekben
foglalt dolgokban, – ámbár eléggé kiterjedt jogi ismeretekkel kell
bírnia, nehogy ami minden pillanatban megtörténik, határozottan az
ellenkezőjét tegye annak, amit tenni akarna – mint inkább tisztában
kell lennie azon népnek, melynek számára törvényeket hoz
vérmérsékletével és közszellemével is.
Mert nem szabad a népnek más rendeleteket és szabályokat
adni, mint amilyeneket elviselni képes; és csodálatosan beválik itt
Solon24 ezen mondása: «azon legjobb törvényeket adtam nekik,
melyeket képesek voltak elviselni». Nemkülönben tiszteletreméltó a
zsidók istenének ezen mondása: «olyan parancsolatokat adtam
nektek, amelyek nem jók», vagyis csak annyiban jók, amennyit a ti
gonoszságtok megengedhet; «ez törli el mindazon nehézségeket,
amelyeket a mózesi törvények ellen lehet emelni» – mondja
Montesquieu.
A törvényhozónak tehát ismernie kell azon népnek, melynek
számára törvényeket hoz, véralkatát és szellemét; járatosnak kell
lennie – miként a németek mondják – a népek psychológiájában és
jegyezzük meg, hogy ismernie kell népének véralkatát, jellemét és
közszellemét, anélkül, hogy maga is bírna ezen véralkattal,
jellemmel és szellemmel; mert a szenvedélyek, hajlamok és
törekvések körében az átérzés még nem megismerés, sőt
ellenkezőleg átérezni annyi, mint nem ismerni a dolog lényegét: a
megismerés feltétele éppen ezen érzelmek hiánya.
Az eszményi, vagy legalább is a megfelelő törvényhozónak
ismernie kell népének általános hajlamait és szükséges, hogy ezen
hajlamok fölé emelkedjék és uralkodjék azok felett, minthogy az a
hivatása: részben eleget tenni azoknak, részben pedig leküzdeni
azokat.
Részben tehát eleget kell tenni azoknak, vagy legalább is
kímélnie kell azokat, minthogy az olyan törvény, amely teljes
mértékben ellentétben állana a nép vérmérsékletével, olyan lenne
mint a Roland kancalova,25 amely a világon minden jó
tulajdonsággal bírna egyetlen hiba mellett, hogy halott, sőt halva
született. Adjatok a rómaiaknak a népek jogából eredő olyan
törvényt, amely kíméletet rendel el a legyőzött népekkel szemben,
ezt a törvényt sohasem fogják végrehajtani, sőt bizonyos mételyezés
folytán hozzá fognak szokni ahhoz, hogy más törvényeket se
hajtsanak végre. Adjatok a franciáknak olyan szabadelvű törvényt,
amely az ember és polgár egyéni jogainak tiszteletben tartását
rendeli el, minthogy a szabadság a franciáknál abban áll, – miként
Joannes báró mondja, – hogy: «joga legyen mindenkinek azt tenni,
amit akar s megakadályozni másokat abban, hogy azt tegyék, amit
akarnak», ily módon ez a törvény mindig csak közepesen és kínosan
lesz végrehajtva és szokássá teszi, hogy a többi törvények se
hajtassanak végre.
A törvényhozónak tehát ismernie kell népének hajlamait, hogy
megszabhassa magának azon határokat, amelyek között meg kell
állapodnia vele szemben.
Tehát részben legyőzni azokat; mert a törvénynek azon népnél,
mely azt csak rendészeti szabálynak tekinti, olyannak kell lennie,
amilyen az egyén erkölcsi törvénye, az üdvös eredmények
szempontjából bírjon az állandósított kényszer jellegével s kell, hogy
a romboló szenvedélyek, az ártalmas hangulatok s a veszedelmes
szeszélyek féke legyen; le kell küzdenie az ént, vagy jobban mondva
olyan észszerű énnek kell lennie, ami leküzdi a szenvedélyes ént. Ez
az, amit Montesquieu meg akar értetni akkor, midőn mondja, hogy
«a szokásoknak le kell küzdeniök a körülményeket, a törvényeknek
pedig a szokásokat».
A törvénynek tehát bizonyos mértékben le kell küzdenie a nép
általános hajlamait. Szükséges, hogy a törvény a nemzet
vezérfonala legyen, melyet egy kevéssé szeressenek, mivel jónak
találják, kissé féljenek attól, mivel szigorúnak találják, kissé gyűlöljék,
mivel viszonylag ellenségesnek találják, végül tiszteljék, mivel
szükségesnek tartják.
Ilyen törvényt kell hoznia a törvényhozónak; következésképen
rendkívüli finomsággal kell ismernie azon népnek, amelynek
számára törvényeket hoz, egész lelkületét, valamint ismernie kell a
népléleknek azon árnyalatait is, amelyek ellenszegülnének éppen
úgy, mint annak azon árnyalatait, amelyek azt elfogadni hajlandók,
nemkülönben ismernie kell azokat is, akikkel minden ellenállás
nélkül képes elfogadtatni a törvényt s azokat is, akikkel szemben
nem teheti ki magát azon veszélynek, hogy erőtlennek láttassék.
Ime ez a legjobb s leglényegesebb hivatottság, amivel a
törvényhozónak bírnia kell.
Másrészről szenvedély nélkül valónak kell lennie. «A mérséklet»
azon erénye, amelyet Cicero26 annyira dicsőít és amely tényleg
nagy ritkaság, ha ezt a szónak valódi értelmében vesszük s ha ez
alatt a léleknek és elmének egyensúlyát értjük – legyen azon alap,
amelyre a törvényhozónak helyezkednie kell. «Azt mondom és úgy
tetszik nekem, hogy ezen művet27 nem egyébért írtam, mint annak
bebizonyítására, hogy a törvényhozónak a mérséklet szellemével
kell bírnia s úgy a politikai értékek, valamint az erkölcsi értékek
mindig két határvonal között mozognak» – mondja Montesquieu.
Semmi sem nehezebb az embernek, mint magát a szenvedélyek
ellen megvédelmezni, következésképen a törvényhozónak is az a
legnehezebb azon nép szenvedélyei ellen védekezni, amelyből
maga is származik, nem számítva a saját magáéit: «Aristoteles ki
akarta elégíteni részint Platon28 elleni féltékenységét, részint Nagy
Sándor iránt való szenvedélyét; Platon az athéni nép zsarnoksága
miatt méltatlankodott; Machiavelli29 el volt telve bálványával,
Valentinois30 hercegével. Moore Tamás,31 ki inkább arról beszélt,
amit olvasott, mint ami felett gondolkozott, minden államot egy görög
város egyszerű mintája szerint akart kormányozni. Harrington32 nem
látott mást, mint az angol köztársaságot, míg az írók tömege
mindenütt rendetlenséget talált, ahol nem látott koronát. «A
törvények mindig összeütköznek a törvényhozó szenvedélyeivel és
előítéleteivel (részint saját szenvedélyeivel, részint azokkal, amelyek
vele és népével közösek). Néha görbe utakon haladnak és ettől
nyerik színezetüket, néha ott rekednek és beolvadnak» – mondja
Montesquieu.
Erre pedig egyáltalában nem volna szükség. A törvényhozónak
ugyanazt a helyet kell betöltenie a nép életében, mint az öntudatnak
az ember lelkében, t. i. ismernie kell a nép minden szenvedélyét,
azoknak egész terjedelmét, horderejét, nem hagyván magát
megcsalatni azok tekintélye, álszenteskedése és titkolódzása által;
majd szembeszállván azokkal, majd legyőzvén egyiket a másik által,
majd kedvezve némileg egyiknek, egy sokkal félelmesebb másik
szenvedély kárára, majd elhagyva a küzdteret, majd visszafoglalva
azt; legyen mindig ügyes, mindig alkalmas, mindig mérsékelt; de ne
hagyja magát sem megközelíteni, sem megfélemlíteni, sem
gyönyörködtetni, sem körülhálózni, sem vezetni természetes
ellenségei által.
Sőt sokkal öntudatosabb legyen – hogy így mondjuk – mint maga
az öntudat, mert nem szabad elfelejtenie, hogy az általa mások
számára hozott törvényt egyszersmind a maga számára is hozta és
amit ma elhatározott, annak holnap is tartozik engedelmeskedni –
semel jussit semper paruit – tehát határozottan és a szó betűszerinti
értelmében – érdek nélkül valónak kell lennie, ami neki sokkal
nehezebb, mint az öntudatnak, amelynek semmi fáradságába sem
kerül, hogy közömbös legyen.
Nemcsak szenvedélyek nélkül valónak kell lennie, hanem még
saját szenvedélyeitől is mentesítenie kell magát: ami sokkal
nehezebb. Olyan szenvedélyre van szükség – képzeljük el – (hogy
hypothezis által tegyük szemlélhetővé), ami öntudattá változhatik;
miként ezt Jean Jaques Rousseau következőleg mondja:
«Hogy feltárhassuk a társadalom lehető legjobb szabályait,
melyek a nemzetek szükségleteinek megfelelnek, magasabbrendű
intelligenciára volna szükségünk, amely látná ugyan az emberek
minden szenvedélyét, de azok közül egyet sem érezne; semmi
összeköttetése sem volna természetünkkel, de ismerné azt
alapjában, boldogulása független volna tőlünk s mégis törődnék
velünk s amely végül időjártával kiérdemelvén egy messzefekvő
dicsőséget, dolgozhatnék az egyik században és gyönyörködhetnék
egy másikban.»
Ez azért van így – miként a találékony Græcia feltételezte – hogy
némely törvényhozó miután elfogadtatta népével törvényeit s
megeskette polgártársait, hogy addig, míg vissza nem tér, meg
fogják tartani azokat: száműzte magát és elvonult messzire
ismeretlen tartózkodási helyre. Ezt talán azért tették, hogy lekössék
polgártársaikat az ilymódon kivett eskü által; de vajjon nem azért
tették-e, hogy ne kelljen engedelmeskedniök a maguk által hozott
törvényeknek s ezen törvények meghozatalánál vajjon nem jártak-e
el túlszigorúan abban bizakodva, hogy elmenekülésükkel szükség
esetén ki fogják alóla vonni magukat? Proudhon33 mondá: «Olyan
szabadelvű köztársaságról álmodom, amelyben engem mint
reakcionáriust kivégeztek volna.» Lycurgus34 talán úgy tett, mint
Proudhon, de aki oly szigorú törvényekkel bíró köztársaságot
alapított, aminőt csak tudott és aki azon erős elhatározásban élt,
hogy elhagyja a köztársaságot azon a napon, amelyen megalkotta.
Solon és Sulla35 bent maradtak azon államban, melynek törvényeket
adtak. Őket tehát Lycurgus fölébe kell helyeznünk, aki elhagyta
övéit. Lycurgusnak egyébiránt az a mentsége, hogy minden
valószínűség szerint nem is létezett.
A fennmaradt legenda bizonyítja, hogy a törvényhozónak épen
úgy kell uralkodnia saját, mint népének szenvedélyein, mint
törvényhozónak pedig olyan törvényeket kell hoznia, amelyek előtt
mint embernek egy vagy más módon magának is remegnie kell.
A szónak általunk adott értelmében vett mérséklet egyébiránt
némelykor azon gondolatot kelti fel a törvényhozóban – miként már
jeleztük – hogy inkább rábeszéléssel, mint erőszakkal fogadtassa el
a törvényt, ami ugyan nem mindig lehetséges, de gyakran
megtörténik. Szent Lajos36 királyról a következőket mondja el
Montesquieu: «Látván a király korának a jogtudománnyal való
visszaéléseit, arra törekedett, hogy a nép megundorodjék attól, ez
okból tehát több rendszabályt készített birodalma és hűbéresei
(bárói), törvényszékei számára és oly nagy eredményt ért el, hogy
kevéssel halála után az ő bíráskodási módszere szerint járt el a
hűbérúri udvarok legnagyobb része. Ekként oldotta meg ezen
fejedelem feladatát, habár rendszabályai nem azért készültek, hogy
a királyság általános érvényű törvényeivé legyenek, de azért, hogy
példaképül szolgáljanak s mindenki saját érdekében követhesse
azokat. Azzal távolította el a rosszat, hogy rámutatott a jobbra.
Midőn a király törvényszékeinél és némely hűbérúri bíróságnál az
illetékes körök látták a sokkal természetesebb, sokkal észszerűbb,
az erkölccsel, a vallással s közbékével, a személy és javak
biztonságával és a közbátorsággal sokkal inkább megegyező
törvénykezési módot, elfogadták ezt és elhagyták a régit, amely csak
árnyéka volt a helyes eljárásnak. A törvényhozó legnagyobb
ügyessége: a rábeszélés, midőn nem szabad ellenállnia és az
irányítás, midőn nem szabad parancsolnia.»
Ehhez Montesquieu bizonyára némi optimizmussal, de ez végre
is kecsegtető – a következőket fűzi: «az észnek megvan a
természetes hatásköre, az ember ellenáll neki, azonban ezen
ellenállás felett az ész mindig győzedelmeskedik, mivel kevés idő
multán kényszerítve leszünk hozzá újból visszatérni».
A példa igen messzefekvő és alig alkalmazható napjainkban
bármire is. Vegyük ezért elő a vasárnapi munkaszünetre vonatkozó
megújított egyházjogi törvényt; ennek a törvénykönyvbe való
felvétele hiba volt, mert ellenkezett a francia szokások igen nagy
részével, sőt bizonyos tekintetben magával a nemzet
komplexumával; a törvényhozók tehát annak tették ki magukat, ami
bekövetkezett, t. i. a törvény alig és csak végtelen nehézségek
mellett volt végrehajtható. El lehetett volna ezt érni a törvénykönyvbe
való beiktatás nélkül is; adja meg u. i. az állam a vasárnapi
munkaszünetet minden alkalmazottja, minden hivatalnoka, minden
munkása számára az igazságügyi miniszter egyszerű
körrendeletébe foglalt azon rendelkezés által, hogy a munkásoknak
a munkabérszerződés ellen elkövetett azon szerződésszegései,
miszerint vasárnap nem állanak munkába, büntetés alá nem esnek:
ilymódon a heti munkaszünet törvénye kihirdetés nélkül is fennáll,
létezik befolyásolás és meggyőzés folytán és hatályát veszti ott, ahol
a vasárnapi munka teljesítésének szüksége annyira nyilvánvaló úgy
a munkások, valamint a munkaadók előtt, hogy mindkét fél aláveti
magát a körülmények kényszerítő erejének, sőt ezenfelül elég ereje
lesz a nemzet évszázados szabályai módosítására, anélkül, hogy
lerontsa azokat.
Lássunk még egy olyan esetet is, midőn magára a
törvénykönyvbe beiktatott törvényre nézve a törvényhozó
befolyásolás vagy ajánlás által jár el. A XIX. század kezdetével a
törvényhozó úgy gondolkozott, hogy a tisztesség követeli a férjtől, ha
tettenéri feleségét a házasságtörésen, hogy megölje bűntársával
együtt. Ezen nézet felett lehet vitatkozni, de ez mégis csak a
törvényhozó nézete volt. Dehát tett-e erre vonatkozó törvényes
intézkedést? Nem tett. A törvényhozó ez irányban a befolyásolás,
bizalmas ajánlás és szenvelgő felbátorítás mellett járt el, ezen
szavakat foglalván törvénybe: «tettenérés esetén a gyilkos férj
felmentendő».37 Nem ezen szöveget helyeslem, hanem azon
eljárást tartom lehetségesnek, mely szerint rámutatunk a törvényre
anélkül, hogy azt kötelező erővel ruháznánk fel; azon módot, mely
szerint véleményt mondunk a helyes gyakorlatról, anélkül, hogy
rendelkeznénk, mert vannak ilyen esetek és viszont vannak más
ettől eltérő esetek, ahol ez fényesen beválnék.
Végül a törvényhozó legfontosabb képességeinek egyike a
fennálló törvények megváltoztatásának tudománya; ez azon nagy
bölcseség, amely legtöbbet követel tőle, azt t. i., hogy mentes legyen
a szenvedélyektől és uralkodjék saját szenvedélyei felett. A
törvénynek csak akkor van igazi tekintélye, midőn régóta fennáll;
vagyis inkább itt két eset lehetséges: vagy nem egyéb a törvény,
mint törvénybe foglalt szokás, tehát igen nagy tekintélye lesz már
keletkezésénél fogva, minthogy értékét emeli a szokásnak –
amelyből eredt – régisége; vagy pedig a törvény nem a törvénybe
átment szokás, sőt épen ellenkezőleg ellentétben áll azzal, ez
esetben tehát, hogy hatályt nyerjen, arra lesz szükség, hogy a
hosszantartó időmúlás folytán maga is szokássá váljék.
Miként mindkét esetben látjuk, valóban a törvény régisége
biztosítja az emberek felett tekintélyének erejét. Olyan a törvény,
mint a növény, kezdetben csak gyönge fácska, majd kifejlődik, kérge
megkeményedik és gyökerei mélyen behatolnak a földbe és
belekapaszkodnak a sziklákba.
Rendkívüli körültekintés szükséges tehát ahhoz, hogy a régi
fatörzs fiatal fácskával helyettesítessék. «A törvényhozók
legnagyobb része – mondja Usbek à Rhédi38 – korlátolt emberekből
állott, akiket a véletlen helyezett a többiek fölé, akik csakis saját
előítéleteiktől és képzeletöktől kértek tanácsot… Gyakran minden
szükség nélkül eltörölték a már megalkotott törvényeket, vagyis
beletaszították a népeket a változtatásoktól elválaszthatatlan
rendetlenségbe. Igaz ugyan, hogy néha meg kell változtatni
bizonyos törvényeket azon különös oknál fogva, amely inkább a
természetből, mint az ember lelkületéből ered; de ezen eset felette
ritka és ha előfordul, csak nagy óvatossággal szabad a törvényt
megbolygatni s annyi ünnepélyességet kell alkalmazni, hogy a nép
ebből természetszerűleg azt következtesse, miszerint a törvények
valóban szentek, mert azok megszüntetéséhez oly sok alakszerűség
szükséges.» – Montesquieu ebben az esetben – miként gyakran –
egészen Aristoteles felfogását követi. Aristoteles u. i. ezt írta:
«Nyilvánvaló, hogy némely törvényt, bizonyos időközökben, meg kell
változtatni, de ez sok körültekintést követel, mert ha a
megváltoztatás alig jár előnnyel – s mert veszedelmes a törvények
könnyű megváltoztatásához hozzá szoktatni a polgárokat – inkább el
kell türni a törvényhozás és a bíróságok egynémely tévedését.
Kevesebb előny származik a törvények megváltoztatásából, mint
amily nagy azon kár, amelyet azon szokás keletkezése okoz, hogy
nem kell engedelmeskedni a bíróságnak.» (Tekintettel kell lennünk
arra is, hogy a bíróságok által alkalmazott törvény gyorsan eltünő,
mulandó jellegű és mindig közel van a megváltoztatáshoz.)
A szerepvivő népek törvényeinek ismerete, mélyreható ismerete
azon nép vérmérsékletének, jellemének, érzelmeinek,
szenvedélyeinek, hajlamainak, nézeteinek, előítéleteinek és
szokásainak, amelyhez a törvényhozó tartozik, a lélek és szív
mérséklése, szenvedélymentesség, érdeknélküliség, hidegvér, sőt a
teljes önuralom: ezek az eszményi törvényhozó tulajdonságai, sőt –
hogy többet mondjunk – ezek azon minősítések, amelyek a jó
törvény hozatalához szükségesek; valóban körülbelül ezek a
törvényhozó elemi tulajdonságai.
Jól megfigyelhettük, hogy mindez majdnem éppen az ellenkezője
azon tulajdonságoknak, amilyeneket a demokrácia törvényhozóiban
kedvel, sőt – hogy így mondjuk, – követel tőlök. A demokrácia
majdnem mindig hivatásnélkül való és tudatlan embereket választ
meg, – kifejtettem, miért és kétszeresen hivatás nélkül valókat,
vagyis olyan embereket, akiknél a szenvedély ellensúlyozza a
hivatottságot, ha ugyan birnak hivatottsággal.
De még egy különös tényt kell itt megfigyelnünk. A demokrácia
annyira szenvedélyük okából és nem szenvedélyük dacára és
annyira szenvedélyességük okából és nem azért, mert bár
szenvedélyesek választja meg megbizottait s annyira azon okokból,
amelyek miatt mellőznie kellene azokat, hogy azon ember, aki
mérsékletre és józan gondolkozásra, a lehetséges és való dolgok
tiszta megfigyelésére képes, realitással és gyakorlati szellemmel bír,
hogy magát megválasztassa s elérje összes erényeinek
gyakorolhatását: kezdi gondosan eltitkolni erényeit s lármásan
hirdetni az erényeivel ellenkező összes hibákat. A polgári háború
jelszavait használja, hogy megválasztathassa magát azon állásra,
amelyen arra számít, hogy jól megvédelmezheti és biztosíthatja a
békét s hogy békeszerzővé válhassék, azzal kell kezdenie, hogy a
lázító alakját öltse magára.
A nép minden kedvence keresztülmegy e kettős folyamaton és
ezen két álláspontot tünteti fel; szükségképen el kell foglalnia az
elsőt, hogy belekezdhessen a másodikba. «Vajjon nem volna jobb
inkább a konzervativsággal kezdeni, mint azzal végezni?» –
Egyáltalában nem volna jobb, mert az ember csak akkor lehet
valóban erősen konzervativ és csak akkor gyakorolhatja a
konzervativ hatalmat, ha mint anarchista kezdte meg pályafutását.
A nép annyira hozzá van szokva ezen átalakulásokhoz, hogy
nem tehet egyebet, mint mosolyog azokon. Azon hátrány azonban
mindig fennforog, hogy azon konzervativ ember, akinek forradalmi
multja van, mindig csupán zavaros és kétségbevont tekintéllyel fog
bírni s életének egy részét azzal fogja eltölteni, hogy
megmagyarázza azon óriási kerülő utat, amelyet megfutott s amely
számára nyüg és akadály.
Mindig az történik, hogy a nép vagy igazán szenvedélyes – vagy
álszenvedélyes embereket választ meg, akik vagy mindig
megmaradnak szenvedélyeseknek – és ezek képezik a
törvényhozók legnagyobb részét – vagy pedig mérsékeltekké válnak,
helytelen irányba terelvén őket új szerepük. És ezek a
szenvedélyesek – hogy a nagy, a túlnagy többségről szóljunk, –
gyalázó szavakban törnek ki a törvényhozásban, ahelyett, hogy ott
tudománnyal, hidegvérrel és bölcseséggel dolgoznának. Az imént
megjelölt szabályok tehát nagyon határozottan megdőltek. A
törvények nem a nép szenvedélyeit nyomják el vagy fékezik meg,
hanem éppen a nép szenvedélyeinek tulajdonképeni kifejezői. A
törvények indítványozása a hadüzenetet – a megszavazott
törvények pedig a győzelmet jelentik; ime meg annyi definició a
törvényhozók elítélésére és a rendszer megvádolására.
 V.

TÖRVÉNYEK A DEMOKRÁCIÁBAN.

A demokráciában hozott összes törvények ismertető jele, hogy

azok alkalmi törvények, amilyeneknek soha sem szabad volna
lenniök. A demokrácia nagyon is távol áll attól, hogy – miként ezt
Montesquieu akarta – mindenesetben félne megbolygatni a régi
törvényeket, hogy megváltoztassa azokat; lebontja a házat, hogy
sátort üssön helyette, az új törvények napról-napra
megsokszorozódnak, amint a szél fú a politika mindennapi
eseményei szerint. Hasonló ez Demosthenes39 barbár harcosához,
aki ott védekezik, ahol épen kapta a csapást, vállon ütve – paizsát
vállára emeli, majdha lábaszárát éri az ütés, gyorsan odakapja azt
az uralkodó párt is csupán azért hozza a törvényeket, hogy
védekezzék valódi – vagy vélt ellensége ellen, vagy pedig nem hoz
rögtönzött, siettetett reformokat csupán valamely botrány vagy
valamely kitörni készülő állítólagos botrány hatása alatt.
Egy «zsarnokságra törekvő egyént» – miként Athénben mondták
– nagyon sok kerületben képviselőnek választottak; gyorsan törvényt
a többszörös jelöltség megtiltására. Ugyanazon okokból s
ugyanazon ember iránti félelemből gyorsan törvényt, mely a
lajstromos szavazást?40 az arrondissement szerint való szavazással
helyettesítse.
Egy vádlottnőt – mondjuk – nagyon meggyötörtek a büntető
vizsgálat alatt, túlgyorsan alávetették az elnöki kihallgatásnak a
törvényszéki tárgyaláson s ügyetlenül vádolta a közvádló is, gyorsan
elő az egész bünvádi peres eljárásra vonatkozó gyökeres reformmal.
 Így járnak el mindenben. A törvények kohója nem egyéb, mint
újdonságok raktára, vagy még inkább olyan, mint a hirlap, amelyben
naponkint egyszer «interpellálnak», ez a vezércikk, majd a
miniszterekhez napjában többször «kérdést» intéznek azon kis
események felől, melyeket imitt-amott jeleztek, ez a regénytárca
vagy az elbeszélés; majd törvényt szerkesztenek arra, ami egy
nappal előbb történt: ez a tudományos értekezés; végül
ökölcsapásokat osztogatnak egymásnak: ez a vegyes rovat.
Nincs az országnak ennél tökéletesebb képviselete, hűséges
képe ez annak; mindaz, amivel reggel foglalkozik, tárgyalás alá kerül
itt este, éppen úgy, mint a Castel-tartarin kereskedelmi kávéházban;
a fecsegő ország nagyító-tükre ez. Tehát a törvényhozókamara ne
legyen az ország képe, hanem legyen az ország lelke – az ország
agyveleje; úgyde tekintetbe véve mindazon indokokat, amelyeket
már elmondottunk, a nemzeti képviselet csupán az ország
szenvedélyeit képviselvén, nem lehet egyéb, mint az ami; vagyis
más szavakkal a modern demokráciát nem törvények, hanem
dekretumok által kormányozzák, minthogy az alkalmi törvények nem
igazi törvények, hanem csupán dekretumok. A törvény a hosszú időn
át tartó gyakorlat által szentesített régi szabály, amelynek a polgárok
engedelmeskednek anélkül, hogy tudnák, vajjon törvény vagy
szokás-e az s amely a mélyen átgondolt, összetartozó, logikus és
egymással összhangban levő szabályok egy része. – A körülmények
által sugalt törvény nem egyéb, mint dekretum. Ez egyike azon
dolgoknak, amelyet Aristoteles igen jól látott és százszorosan
világította meg ezen lényeges és alapvető különbséget, melyet ha
félreismerünk, vagy nem ismerünk fel jól, – igen hátrányos lehet.
Idézem azon tételét, amely e tekintetben a leghatározottabb és
legerőteljesebb: «Végül van a demokráciának egy ötödik fajtája, ahol
a souverainitás a törvényről a sokaságra van átruházva. Ez akkor
következik be, midőn a dekretumok csökkentik a törvény abszolut
tekintélyét. Ez a demagógokba vetett bizalom eredménye. Azon
demokratikus kormányzatban, ahol a törvény uralkodik, nincsenek
demagógok; a legérdemesebb polgárok bírnak elsőbbséggel; de
mihelyt a törvény elvesztette fenségét, felemelkedik a demagógok
tömege. Ettől fogva a nép olyan, mint a százfejű monarcha;
souverain nem egyénileg, hanem testületileg… Az ilyen nép igazi
monarcha, – úgy akar uralkodni, mint a monarcha; felmenti magát a
törvény járma alól és zsarnokká válik; ez okozza, hogy a hizelgők itt
becsületben állnak. Ezen demokrácia az a maga nemében, ami a
zsarnokság a monarchiában. Itt is, ott is elnyomják a vagyonos
embereket: a monarchiában az önkényes rendeletek, a
demokráciában pedig az önkényes dekretumok. A demagógok és
hizelgők egy úton haladnak, van köztük valami hasonlóság, ami őket
összezavarja s egyenlő befolyással bírnak a hizelgő a zsarnokokra,
a demagóg a népre, amely a zsarnokság állapotára sülyedt. A
demagógok okai annak, hogy a souverainitás tekintélye a
dekretumokban van és nem a törvényben, azáltal, hogy mindent a
népre vezetnek vissza; ebből következik, hogy hatalmasokká válnak,
minthogy a nép úr mindenekben, ők maguk pedig urai a népnek…
Tehát joggal mondhatjuk, hogy az ilyen uralom demokrácia és nem
köztársaság; mert ott, ahol a törvények nem uralkodnak, nincs
köztársaság. Valóban, a törvény tekintélyének minden dologra ki kell
terjednie… Következőleg, – ha a demokráciát a kormányformák
közzé lehet számítani – világos, hogy az olyan uralom, amelyben
minden dekretumok által szabályoztatik – még nem is demokrácia,
mert a dekretum sohasem birhat általános jelleggel, mint a törvény.»
A régi és modern szociológusok közti összes különbség –
helyesen felfogva – abban áll, ami az évszázados törvény, vagyis a
tulajdonképeni törvény és az alkalmi törvény, vagyis a dekretum közt
van; továbbá abban, ami egy coordinált törvényhozás részét képező
törvény, vagyis az igazi törvény és azon alkalmi törvény közt van,
amely nem egyéb, mint dekretum, végül abban, ami a mindenkorra
hozott – vagyis az igazi törvény és azon alkalmi törvény közt van,
amely analog a zsarnok velleitásaival és mindenben hasonlatos
ahhoz. Midőn a régi és modern szociológusok törvényről beszélnek,
nem beszélnek egy és ugyanazon dologról, s ez okoz annyi
ellenkező felfogást. Midőn a modern szociológus törvényről beszél
ez alatt a közakaratnak ilyen és ilyen kelet alatti, pl. 1910. évi
kifejezését érti. A régi szociológus előtt a közakaratnak ilyen kelettel
való kifejezése például: II. évi 73-ik Olympiád41 nem törvény, hanem
dekretum. A törvény náluk: Solon, Lycurgus vagy Charondas42
törvényének egyik szakasza. Valahányszor egy görög vagy római
politikus ezen szavakat mondja: törvények által kormányozott állam,
ne fordítsuk le ezt másképen, ne magyarázzuk másképen: ez alatt
egy nagyon régi törvényhozás által kormányozott államot akar érteni,
amely nem változtatja meg ezen törvényhozó hatalmat. Ez adja meg
valódi értelmét a törvények híres személyesítésének a
Phedonban,43 amely együgyűség volna, ha a görögök a
«törvények» alatt azt értették volna, amit mi értünk ezen szó alatt.
Kifejezése a törvény a nép közakaratának? Ha igen, miért tisztelné
azt Socrates, aki utálja a népet, ő aki egész életén át – még büntető
pörében is gúnyolja a népet. Ez képtelenség volna. Ámde a
törvények nem dekretumok, amelyeket a nép Socrates életében hoz,
hanem törvények, melyek az államot oltalmazzák mióta létezik,
olyan törvények ezek, amelyek ősrégi bálványai az államnak.
Ezen törvények tévedhetnek, bizonyság erre az, hogy ezek
alapján Socratest halálra ítélhették; de mégis tekintélyben állottak,
tiszteletben tartották és sérthetetlenek voltak, minthogy oltalmazói
voltak az államnak évszázadok óta és védelmezői voltak magának
Socratesnek is addig a pillanatig, amíg azokkal visszaélve, ellene
nem fordultak.
A köztársaság – tehát ha elfogadjuk Aristoteles kifejezését – az a
nép, amely engedelmeskedik a törvényeknek és midőn
engedelmeskedik azoknak, ez azt jelenti, hogy engedelmeskedik
ősei írott törvényeinek. Tehát ez nem egyéb, mint arisztokrácia; mert
az, hogy nem csupán azoknak engedelmeskedik, akik az ősök
hagyományait képviselik, t. i. a nemességnek, hanem maguknak az
ősöknek is, azok gondolatainak, amelyek egy öt évszázados
törvényhozásban vannak lefektetve, ez inkább arisztokratikusabb
magatartás, mint ha az arisztokratáknak engedelmeskednék. Az
arisztokraták mindig félig a hagyományokhoz, félig saját korukhoz
ragaszkodnak; a négyszáz esztendő óta fennálló törvény négyszáz
esztendős és ez semmi egyebet nem jelent. A törvénynek
engedelmeskedni úgy, amint azt a régi szociológusok is tették, nem
azt jelenti, hogy Scipiónak44 engedelmeskedem, akivel a via
sacran45 találkozom, hanem azt, hogy az ő nagyatyja ősének
engedelmeskedem. Ez ultraarisztokratikus! tökéletesen az! A
törvény arisztokratikus, demokratikus csupán a dekretum, az alkalmi
törvény. Ezért beszél Montesquieu mindig féken tartott, elnyomott s
végeredményben törvények által fenntartott monarchiáról. Vajjon mit
akar ez jelenteni az ő idejében, amidőn a «közakarat» nem nyer
«kifejezést», amidőn ennek következtében a monarchia sem lehet
korlátolva törvények, a közakarat megnyilvánulása által, – olyan
korban, amelyben a királyságot illeti a törvényhozó hatalom, mely
törvényeket hoz, következésképen azon törvényekkel, melyeket ő
maga hoz, leronthat s újraalkothat, – nem lehet őt korlátozni?! De
hát vajjon mit akar ez jelenteni? Ez azt jelenti, hogy «törvény» alatt
Montesquieu – épen úgy mint a régi szociológusok – akiket sikerrel
tanulmányozott – az ő idejében fennálló uralom előtti régi
törvényeket érti, az ősmonarchia régi törvényeit, – (melyeket
«alaptörvényeknek» nevez) s amelyek hozzá kapcsolják s kell is
hogy hozzá kapcsolják a jelenlegi monarchiát, amelyek nélkül
hasonlóvá lenne a zsarnoksághoz, vagy a demokráciához. A törvény
lényegében arisztokratikus. A kormányzottakat a kormányzók által
kormányoztatja, a kormányzókat pedig az elhúnytak által. Az
arisztokráciának épen az a kormányforma a lényege, amely az
élőkre származik át az elhúnytakról, akik már életükben tekintettel
voltak a jövő nemzedékre. Az arisztokrácia a szó helyes értelmében
a húsból való arisztokrácia, a törvény pedig szellem-arisztokrácia; a
szó tulajdonképeni értelmében vett arisztokrácia az elhúnytakat a
hagyomány, az örökösödés, a nyert tanítások, az átszármaztatott
nevelés, nemkülönben a véralkat és jellem fiziológiai átöröklése által
képviseli; a törvény nem képviseli az elhúnytakat, a törvény: maguk
az ősök; a törvény az ő gondolataiknak lefektetése a
törvényszövegbe, amely nem változik, vagy csak észrevétlenül
változik.
Az a nemzet, amely ősi arisztokratikus előkelőségeit megőrzi és
amely diszkrétül, kiméletesen és fokozatosan új embereknek óvatos
befogadása által újítja meg azokat, arisztokratikus rendszer szerint
és arisztokratikus szellemben jár el. Ugyanezen eljárás által
határozottan arisztokratikus, sőt arisztokratikusabb azon nemzet,
amely régi törvényhozását a legnagyobb kegyelettel őrzi meg s