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Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 6, Number 3, July 1968,

pp. 257-270 (Article)

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DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.1383

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The Fabric of Metaphor in Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason
D A V I D W. T A R B E T

I
THE STYLV. OF MOST PHILOSOPHIC writing is determined by its need to be as
clear and comprehensive as possible. In the preface to the first edition of the
Critique o/Pure Reason, Kant recognizes the reader's just demand for both log-
ical and aesthetic clarity, but he immediately .emphasizes logical, or what he
calls "discursive" clarity, and limits the examples and illustrations needed for
an aesthetic presentation? The consequence of this emphasis is a movement
away from figurative language toward a highly conceptual wording, and this in
proportion to the intensity of the line of argument. In the important Trans-
cendental Deduction, particularly as stated in the second edition of the Critique,
Kant's language becomes so spare that there is scarcely a concrete noun to ex-
cite the image-making power of the mind.
It is doubtful, however, whether any sustained piece of writing could avoid
the use of metaphor, and outside of the conceptual language which occupies the
body of the Critique, Kant employs a finely woven fabric of metaphor in his
work. While our consideration of style shows that a study of Kant's metaphors
cannot be a surrogate for grappling with his arguments, an examination of their
important supporting role can lead to an understanding of Kant's habits of as-
sociation, his relation to other disciplines, and his own personality. They also
serve to indicate his desired emphases, and here a general observation may be
made noting that metaphors appear less in the middle of chapters or sections
where the hearts of arguments lie, and more in opening and concluding para-
graphs or passages where they can legitimately effect a subtle influence without
tampering with the line of reasoning. There is one notable exception to this ob-
servation in Kant's wide and fully integrated use of metaphors drawn from the
field of jurisprudence. Their involvement in all areas of the Critique will require
a careful tracing of their development and a close view of their operation later
in this paper.
Closer study might best begin with metaphors which I term illustrative. They
stand in the conventional position outside the line of argument, and serve pri-
marily as illustrations of the text. Because they appear in relative isolation, they
are allowed to unfold fully and often have a finish which distinguishes them in
the reader's mind. Of all the metaphors in the Critique these are most likely to
be remarked and remembered.
~Critique o] Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (2nd ed.: London, 1933), A, xvii-
xviii. All references to the Critique o] Pure Reason will be to the Kemp Smith translation. Page
numbers of the German editions will appear enclosed in parentheses immediately following the
quotation or other reference.

[257]
258 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

A good example of an illustrative metaphor is Kant's picture of "the light

dove," which "cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might
imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty space." He goes on to ex-
plain that:

It was thus that Plato left the world of the senses, as setting too narrow limits to the under-
standing, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty Space of pure
understanding. He did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance--meeting no re-
sistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand, to which
he could apply his powers, and so set his understanding in motion. (AS-B9)

The metaphor has two aspects which are combined in the above example, but
tend to separate into positive and negative divisions in later mentions of flying,
leaping and soaring. The negative aspect predominates and is most frequently
reiterated. In the Ideals of Pure Reason, Kant's disapproval of the dove's flight
increases, for he says that "it stretches its wings in vain in thus attempting to
soar above the world of sense by mere power of speculation" (A591-B619: italics
mine). Related metaphors censure reason's "leap out beyond the context of sensi-
bility" (A563-B591), its "soaring so far above all possible experience" (A638--
B666), or any movement which indicates its leaving "the ground of experience"
(A689-B717) as wandering into the "realm of mere possibilities" (A630-B658)
where reason cannot legitimately operate, e The negative aspect of the flight meta-
phor thus coincides with Kant's usual prescription on the use of reason, and his
limitation of its operations to the realm of the sensible.
Just as the negative features become clearer in later uses of the flight and re-
lated metaphors, the positive features become clearer in the same way. The
most easily explained and readily expected approval of the flight of reason
toward a completion in the realm of the ideas comes on A569-B597. Although
the passage is reserved in its praise, beginning "without soaring so high," it is
willing to see a use in reason's free flight and does not demand that it remain
firmly on the ground. The use is found in the power of human reason to realize
the ideas of virtue and purity which serve as conceptual material for the building
of the archetype of the ideal man. This ideal is essential to the operation of the
practical reason in the formation of moral concepts, which Kant points out
have no empirical basis but are examples of "pure concepts of reason." Thus
the "empty space of pure understanding" into which reason flies, while void of
any certain and objective knowledge, may still be shaped by the meaningful
demand for a subjective moral orientation. 8 Kant checks the flight of reason
before it ascends to the level of Plato's "creative" ideas (the negative aspect
already considered), but he does not want to disparage it completely, for he
must respect reason's power in this impo.rtant "practical" use.
2 For other examples, see A637-B665; B, xiv and A569-B597; and A630-B658.
8 This idea is similarly stated in What is Orientation in Thinking? trans. Lewis White Beck
(Chicago, 1949), VIII, 136; and in the Critique o] Practical Reason, trans. Beck (Chicago,
1949), V, 49. Also see Beck's treatment of the "empty space" metaphor in his A Commentary
on Kant's Critique o] Practical Reason (Chicago, 1960), pp. 175, 256 and 262.
 M E T A P H O R I N KANT'S C R I T I Q U E 259

Anyone versed in Kant's philosophy would expect this praise of the practical
reason, but there are further, less obvious, approvals of reason in the flight
metaphor. Kant's choice of the beautiful dove, a symbol of peace and love, to
represent reason's metaphysical soaring is revealing. If he was as opposed to
metaphysics as some suggest, why did he not use a less attractive bird? Why
not a jackdaw or a raven? Kant mentions Plato in three of the eleven examples
of the metaphor, and in one case declares Plato's "spiritual flight" worthy of
"respect and imitation" (A318-B375). 4 Although he also admits that it is in
moral theory that Plato's ideas exhibit their "quite peculiar merits," his tone
implies a favorable reflection on metaphysics, perhaps with a look back on his
student days when he inclined toward the dogmatic metaphysics of Leibnitz.
Kant's early writing showed Leibnitz' influence, and his remark in the Pro-
legomena that "young thinkers are so partial to metaphysics constructed in a
truly dogmatic manner" (p. 317) shows he has not forgotten his youthful at-
traction to metaphysics.5
Few give up an approved doctrine without a fight, and the placement of flight
metaphors suggests that even though his own reflections forced the change upon
him, Kant experienced a struggle in leaving metaphysics behind. On A463-B491
of the Critique, Kant begins by using the flight metaphor in a passage which
reveals his attraction to metaphysies--"philosophy, beginning with the field of
our experiences and steadily soaring to these lofty ideas, displays a dignity
and worth such that, could it but make good its pretensions, it would leave
all other human science far behind." But in the next paragraph he is forced to
admit that "in the midst of its highest expectations" reason finds itself "com-
promised by the conflict of opposing arguments" which requires the denial of dog-
matic metaphysics. An extended image of a battle carries through the balance of
this and most of the next paragraph. In the preface to the second edition (B,
xiv-xv) there is a paragraph which begins with talk of soaring and ends in a
combat, while the same progression occurs on A463-64-B491-92, and in a para-
graph on A638-B666-67. What is happening here, I suggest, is a recapitulation
in metaphoric terms of the facts of Kant's own biography. His early love for
dogmatic metaphysics was superseded by his realization of the need fo~ a
"critical" philosophy only after a struggle. The arrangement of the metaphors
suggests that even after Kant was committed to his mature philosophical ideas
he felt an emotional attachment to the older metaphysics. One may awaken from
"dogmatic slumbers" without wanting to forget the dream.
It may be argued that in joining the flight and battle metaphors K a n t simply
anticipates readers of the Critique who may feel roused to a struggle when asked
to surrender their philosophical opinions. Kant speaks of his argument in the
Analytic as possibly making a man feel "robbed of his convictions" (A638-
B666), and then goes on in the same paragraph to juxtapose the two meta-
4The other two examples are on AS-B9 and A569-B597.
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York, 1950). All
references to the Prolegomena will be to the Beck translation. Page numbers of the Academy
edition will appear enclosed in parentheses immediately following the quotation or other
reference.
260 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

phors. But nothing prevents the metaphoric movement from having both a
private and public dimension. Kant, appreciating his own reaction, expects a
similar response in his reader.
At one point in the Critique, Kant says that he does not consider himself '%
particularly combative person," yet battle metaphors are more frequent than any
other in the illustrative category. In earlier writing Kant had seen fit to "take up
the arms of philosophy," 6 and the first unmistakable metaphor in the first edi-
tion of the Critique is developed on the military motif, referring to the "battle-
field of endless controversies.., called metaphysics" (A, viii). Perhaps we may
take Kant's reference to his peaceful nature as mildly ironic. But that ques-
tion need not be followed further. A mild irony needs gentle handling. A more
interesting consideration arises in watching the way in which this metaphor de-
velops in contrast to the flight metaphor.
The flight metaphor was given as a whole which subsequently divided into
negative and positive aspects. The investigation of the metaphor was, therefore,
best pursued by an analytic consideration of first one side and then the other.
The military metaphor, by contrast, is presented in the first part of the Critique
through various conflicts which are later, in the antinomies, traced to a common
source. The development of the military metaphor is, therefore, synthetic in
that it moves from various particular manifestations toward a resolution showing
the one central conflict of pure reason with itself. It is appropriate that in the
Critique, which undertakes a "synthetic" examination of the pure reason, the
military metaphor is widely used--well over fifty times---while in the Pro-
legomena, which proceeds on the "analytic" pattern, it occurs in only three in-
stances. Images drawn from biology, which are rare in the Critique, are far more
prevalent than military metaphors in the Prolegomena. The synthetic method
must begin in division, thus prompting ideas of conflict, and the analytic with a
given whole, thus suggesting organic unity where the parts are only aspects of
the whole. Kant made an apt adjustment in the metaphoric configuration of the
two works.
I would like to trace the development of the military metaphor in detail. The
first particularized conflict is between the dogmatic philosophers themselves, for
when metaphysics was under their government it was open to "intestine war" (A,
ix). The "students of metaphysics" could manage so little agreement that
"metaphysics [had] rather to be regarded as a battle-ground" (B, xv), albeit
one where little territory was won or lost. This clash of doctrines led Kant to
undertake his work in philosophy and to attempt to discover the "causes of
this conflict" (A420-21-B448). In addition to the struggle between dogmatic
philosophers, the speculative reason, which in its dogmatic extention is "the source
of all that unbelief.., which wars against morality" (B, xxx), is set against the
practical reason. 7 There is also a suggestion of the "critical" philosophy's re-
pelling "the dogmatic assaults of a speculative opponent" (A383-84), but the
central conflict of reason with itsel] only begins to unfold in the antinomies.

6Gesammelte Schri#en, II, 33.

This opposition is presented on B, xxv.
 M E T A P H O R I N KANT'S CRITIQUE 261

In the Prolegomena, where little use is found for the military metaphor, the
mere listing of the antinomies is sufficient to draw forth a mention of "conflict"
in the next paragraph (p. 340). This, and the high concentration of military
metaphors in the second and third sections of the Antinomy of Pure Reason,
shows how closely Kant linked the antithetical features of reason to a meta-
phoric conflict. Reason can never satisfy itself while under the necessity of
harmonizing with the understanding, and thus " t h e r e . . . arises a conflict which
cannot be avoided, do what we will" (A422-B450).
In the light of this fundamental conflict all prior divisions and combats must
now be reviewed and "nothing remains for reason save to consider whether
the origin of this conflict, whereby it is divided against itself, may not have
arisen from a mere misunderstanding" (A464-B492). This consideration, insofar
as the military metaphor is concerned, reaches its climax in the Discipline of
Pure Reason. This section is thoroughly impregnated with metaphor, and is
of particular interest to anyone interested in Kant's metaphors, for many find
their final reiteration and refinement there. The section might be considered a
metaphoric coda to the whole Critique. Once the central conflict has been crys-
talized in the antinomies, a shift of attitude may be made toward the struggles
found there. Reflection on the antinomies shows that conflicts can be avoided
by a proper limitation on the use of reason. While there seemed to be a real
battle, the antithesis which caused it produces "only an apparent conflict, resting
upon misunderstanding" (A740-B768). Any fights waged on these terms "can be
laughed at, as mere child's play" (A743-B771), and they should be used only as a
form of instruction which points the way to a higher "critical" position. "In-
stead, therefore, of rushing into the fight, sword in hand, we should rather
play the part of the peaceful onlooker, from the safe seat of the critic"
(A747-B775). K ant expresses the final resolution of the military metaphor in a
"critical" calm with a most effective passage. There is no need to take seriously a
"polemic in the field of pure reason," for:

Both parties beat the air, and wrestle with their own shadows, since they go beyond the
limits of nature, where there is nothing that they can seize and hold with their dogmatic
grasp. Fight as they may, the shadows which they cleave asunder grow together again forth-
with, like the heroes in Valhalla, to disport themselves anew in the bloodless contests. (A756-
B784)

Thus the critical philosophy of K a n t "puts an end to the conflict [of reason] and
induces it to rest satisfied with a limited but undisputed patrimony" (A768-
B796) .s
Many illustrative metaphors grow from Kant's earlier studies or his own in-
terests. He had, for example, given a course on military pyrotechnics and the
art of fortification while an unsalaried lecturer at KSnigsberg. He read Rousseau
avidly, and his insistence on unrestricted freedom of thought finds expression

8The military metaphor occurs in three later, minor, instances: on A776-BS04, connected
with the "leaden weapons" of pure reason on A778--B806,and to criticize "the apagogic method
of proof" on A793-B821.
262 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

in political terms with a strong republican bias. ~ His life-long interest in sea-
faring is reflected in metaphors which turn on images of the ocean, anchors
and ships. 1~ The most popular of Kant's lecture courses originated from what
might be called his intellectual hobby. Through wide reading in books of travel
and geography he gathered information on the world and its inhabitants. This
information, collected under the title of Physical Geography, supplied both his
course and a group of metaphors in the Critique which compounded cartographic,
oceanographic and travel information. 11 They might for convenience sake be
termed geographic metaphors.
Kant considered himself, along with David Hume, "one of those geographers
of human reason" (A760-B788) anxious to chart the continent of the mind. He
was particularly interested in marking the limits of reason. The negative as-
pect of the flight metaphor acknowledged these limits, but its dynamic charac-
ter made it impossible to mark them effectively. Static geographic terms are
better suited to this use. In setting forth the distinction between the phenomenal
and noumenal realm Kant insists that:

We have now not merely explored the territory of pure understanding, and carefully surveyed
every part of it, but have also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in it its right-
ful place. This domain is an island.., the land of truth ... surrounded by a wide and stormy
o c e a n . . , where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive ap-
pearance of farther shores. (A235--36--B294--95)

Once this mapping is complete, Kant can place knowledge on the "island" of the
sensible, and while it is possible to extend understanding beyond this area in a
"problematic" way, in truth, "the domain that lies out beyond the sphere of
appearances is for us empty" (A255-B310). But Kant further refines the geog-
raphy metaphor. He does not simply want to place knowledge of the noumenal
world "outside the horizon of human reason" (A760-B788) as Hume's scepti-
cal philosophy had done. This would be a mere censuring of reason's ignorance on
a particular point, not a criticism demonstrating from principles reason's ex-
clusion from the consideration of all questions of a certain kind (A761-B789).
The step that Kant takes to establish his position here is very interesting. In
order to fix and go beyond Hume's "horizon," Kant also finds it necessary to
transcend the terms of his metaphor. "Reason," he says, "is not like a plane in-
definitely far extended," i.e., a horizon, "but must rather be compared to a
sphere, the radius of which can be determined from the curvature of the arc
of the surface . . . . Outside this sphere (the field of experience) there is nothing
that can be an object for reason" (A762-B790). Thus, a slight assist from mathe-
For examples see A339-B397, A395, A738-39-B766--67, A744--B772, and A746-B774. The im-
plications of the political metaphor are revealed in Perpetual Peace, and Kant's essay "What is
Enlightenment ?"
lo For examples see A395-96, A725-B753, and A726-B754.
1~For examples from cartography see B, vii, A238-B297 and A255-B310 ; from oceanography,
A235-36--B294-95 and A395-96; from travel, A235-36-B294-95 and A644-B672. Rudolf Eucken
discusses the geography metaphor in "Uber Bilder und Gleichnisse bei Kant," Beitri~ge zur
Einfi~hrung in die Geschichte der Philosophe (Leipzig, 1906), pp. 61-62, 67, and 69.
 M E T A P H O R I N KANT'S CRITIQUE 263

matics completes the lesson in metaphysical geography. Only minor examples of

illustrative metaphors remain. 12

II
Kant thought himself "one of those geographers of human reason." He felt,
then, that he could draw an analogy between his work in philosophy and the
work of a geographer. From this one parallel little could be concluded regarding
the manner in which Kant saw his work vis-a-vis other intellectual disciplines, but
fortunately, this parallel is not unique. Kant often refers to other branches of
learning and to the arts. The metaphors which outline these patterns of associ-
ation deserve special attention, and the distinguishing name of metaphors of
analogy.
In the Prolegomena, Kant humorously disavows any connection with "high
towers and metaphysically great men resembling them, round both of which
there is commonly much wind," and chooses "the fruitful bathos of experience"
(p. 373 n.). This propensity for the concrete and empirical suggests that Kant
feels most comfortable in the company of natural scientists. As a young man,
mathematical, scientific, and cosmological studies formed his main interest.
With his philosophic reflections growing out of this scientific background, it is
not surprising that Kant draws many analogies between himself and scientists.
But we must not assume that every reference to science and mathematics ef-
fects a metaphoric analogy. When the reference illustrates a particular argu-
ment, the metaphor is illustrative. The mathematical terms which bring the
geography metaphor to a conclusion give an example of such a use. The image of
the sphere is a metaphoric representation of Kant's contention that the specula-
tive reason has determinate limits discoverable through a critical examina-
tion of reason itself. Metaphors of analogy do not serve to mirror arguments in
this way. They are more concerned with indicating the methods used to ap-
proach the problems of reason in the Critique. They suggest a model upon which
Kant is proceeding and, therefore, take a broad rather than a particular view.
There is also a difference in their actual formation. Although we used the illus-
trative metaphors to make inferences concerning Kant's character, they are,
from his point of view, autonomous--chosen for their ability to present the
matter under consideration. Metaphors of analogy do not have this autonomy,
for Kant is consciously implicating himself in the terms of the metaphor. They
are reducible to Kant's saying, "I am here working as a chemist, an astronomer,
a doctor, a musician," or any other figure he finds appropriate. They thus tend
to resolve themselves in that low-level form of metaphor called a simile, with
Kant on one side of the comparison and a certain discipline on the other.
Although Kant never used the expression "Copernican revolution" in his own
writing, it has become a major characterizing metaphor for the Critique which

1~For the most noteworthy examples see those from biology, B24, A387, A777-78-B805-06,
and A835-B863; from merchant life, A599-B627 and A602-B630; from government, A667-B695,
A741-B769, and A789-BS17.
264 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

correctly identifies Kant's fundamental impulse} S The critical philosophy went

to school to the sciences, and Kant did see Copernicus' astronomical ideas as typ-
ical of his reversal of an epistemological point of view. 14 But Kant's scientific
impulse continues beyond this revolution in point of view. The Copernican revolu-
tion is only an hypothesis, as is the idea that objects of knowledge have to con-
form to a priori concepts. The hypothesis must be confirmed by a method "mod-
eled on that of the student of n a t u r e . . , looking for the elements of pure reason in
what admits o] confirmation or re]utation by experiment" (B, xviii n.). Kant is
working like a scientist, and in so doing, "promises to metaphysics, in its first
parb---the part that is occupied with those concepts a pr/or/ to which the cor-
responding objects, commensurate with them, can be given in experience--the
secure path of a science" (B, xviii-xix).
Evidence of the scientific impulse appears throughout the Critique in exam-
ples drawn from physics, mathematics, astronomy and optics. 15 But Kant is par-
ticularly attracted by the work of the chemist. Only a few pages from the end
of the work, Kant adds an important reminder that "what the chemist does in the
analysis of substances.., is in still greater degree incumbent upon the philoso-
pher, that he may be able to determine with certainty the part which belongs to
each special kind of knowledge in the diversified employment of the understand-
ing and its special value and influence" (A842-B870). le The chemist's appeal
seems to lie in his "experiment of reduction" ~vhereby he distinguishes the ele-
ments of a substance and sees how they may be properly recombined. Kant paral-
lels his work in philosophy to this chemical operation in a footnote on B, xxi, and
later speaks, in the manner of a chemist, of "separating and distinguishing"
rules for the sensibility and the understanding in the Aesthetic and Logic (A52-
B76). This parallel reproduces in a metaphor of analogy the impulse discovered
in the geography metaphor--a desire for clear divisions with special designa-
tions creating a comprehensive image of the mind. The chemist's procedure
describes the method, while the geographer's map charts the results of the chem-
ist's experiments.
Although metaphors of analogy mainly concern science and mathematics, Kant
does find ties with other disciplines and even with the arts. His "observing... in
the manner of anthropology" (A550-B578) links him with what we would now
call social science. He poses as a doctor to remedy the ills of dogmatic speculation
and to administer "a true cathartic [which] will effectively guard us against
. . . groundless beliefs and the supposed polymathy to which they lead" (A486-
B514). 17 When considering self-consciousness, Kant refers to a musician strik-
ing the keys of an instrument (B414 n.); and if any metaphoric force remains
in the word "harmony," he sees himself as a musician when he settles the con-
For a ful! account of the use of this expression, see Norwood Russell Hanson, "Copernicus'
Role in Kant s Revolution," Journal o] the History o] Ideas, X X : 2 (April 1959), pp. 274-81.
~4Kant gives his account of the parallel with Copernicus on B, xvi-xvii.
For examples from astronomy see A179-B221, A211-B257, A213-B260, B277, and A662-63--
B690-91; from mathematics, A234--B287 and A295-B351; from physics, A295--B351 and A662-
63-B690-91. An effective example from optics concerning the "locus imaginarius," is found on
A644-B672.
~6The same reminder is given in the last paragraph of the Critique o] Practical Reason.
17For another mention of the physician see A824-B852. Logic is called "a cathartic of the
common understanding" on A53-B78.
 M E T A P H O R I N KANT'S CRITIQUE 265

fliers described in terms of the military metaphor on A422-25-B450-53. The

analogy with the musician is weak, and it must be admitted that as Kant moves
away from the sciences, metaphors of analogy become less frequent and less
remarkable. The comparison of his work in philosophy to that of a fine etcher
(Prolegomena, p. 259) is the only distinct parallel to fine art employed in the
course of his examination of pure reason.
Despite his acknowledged debt to other disciplines, and especially to science,
Kant was aware that their contributions were finally of limited aid to the philoso-
pher. Science leaves important questions unanswered:
Whether I am free in my actions or, like other beings, am led by the hand of nature and of
fate; whether finally there is a supreme cause of the world, or whether the things of nature
and their order must as the ultimate object terminate thought.., these are questions for the
solution of which the mathematician would gladly exchange the whole of his science. (A463-
B491)
These are the questions which concern philosophy, and are the questions which
Kant finally must face. His concerns cannot be solely objective; he must con-
tend with the subjective demand for the answers to the above metaphysical
questions. Kant may be indebted to Copernicus' methodological revolution, but
he notes: "The observations and calculations of astronomers have taught us
much that is wonderful; but the most important lesson that they have taught
us has been by revealing the abyss of our ignorance, which otherwise we could
never have conceived to be so great" (A575-B603 n.). Copernicus pointed the
way to the solution of some of philosophy's problems--what Kant termed
"metaphysics, in the first part" (B, xviii)--but revealed even greater difficulties
concerning freedom, the existence of God and immortality. Kant thus adds that
"reflection upon the ignorance thus disclosed must produce a great change in our
estimate of the purposes for which our reason should be employed." An analysis
of the main structural metaphor of the Critique will reveal the character of this
"great change."
III
Although K a n t saw his work in a strong relationship with science, the scientific
images, illustrations and analogies stand outside the flow of his argument. To find
the metaphoric mold which shapes the Critique it is necessary to look past the
metaphors of analogy. The metaphor around which the entire work is constructed
draws its associations from the field of jurisprudence, and might for convenience
be called the legal metaphor. Kant readily casts problems as legal questions, and
seems to be most at ease when he does so. TM Words and phrases--such as
tribunal, case, validity, legal title, claim, cross-examining, appeal to testimony,
pass judgment, rule, law, evidence, justify, illicit, right, legislation, canon, law-
giver--are distributed throughout the text, carefully patterning our view of the
critical philosophy. The legal metaphor, therefore, deserves attention and close
examination of both its method of development and the emphasis which it lends
to the work as a whole.
This is also noted by Friedrieh Paulsen, in Immanuel Kant his I~]e and Doctrine (London,
1902), p. 65.
266 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Early in the preface to the first edition of the Critique, Kant calls upon rea-
son "to institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and
dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in accordance
with its own eternal and unalterable laws," and then goes on to state that "this
tribunal is no other than the critique o] pure reason" (A, xi-xii). Thus the prin-
cipal setting for the work is established in a courtroom where reason presides as a
judge. As cases are initiated and tried, the Critique becomes a record of the
proceedings of this court. At times Kant takes a part in the courtroom drama,
acting as a lawyer whose task is "solely to adduce the grounds, not to speak as
to the effect which they should have upon whose who are sitting in judgment"
(A, xv). This second "judgment" is not that which reason must ultimately pass
on itself but that which the reader carries out in considering Kant's work. The
final adjustment required to make the scene complete, therefore, is the reader's
showing "the patience and impartiality of a judge" (A, xxi) in his considera-
tion of the work before him. This simple outline presents the core of the legal
metaphor, and all of the Critique's "action" occurs in this frame.
In the preface to the second edition the scene is the same, but a particular
case is being tried and the procedure of the court is more fully drawn. Reason,
as judge, is not to hear cases passively. The scientific methodology investigated
in the metaphors of analogy, leads reason to formulate questions which it "com-
pels the witnesses to answer." For reason "has insight only into that which it
produces after a plan of its own" (B, xiii). Although the testimony of the wit-
nesses (intuitions which in this instance are denominated by the term "nature")
is important, the real guide of reason is its own principles, which "it has it-
self put into nature" (B, xiv). A judgment founded on the principles of reason
and witnessed by intuitions promises a true decision. There is, however, a ques-
tion raised over the court's ability to reach decisions in cases which go be-
yond experience, since the judgment cannot "appeal to the testimony of ex-
perience in its support" (B 11). The question of "the capacity or incapacity of
reason to pass any judgment" (B 22) upon such questions will remain a prob-
lem for which reason will have to call itself to account.
In the preface to the second edition, reason acts in a special capacity
usually referred to as the "understanding." The court is to consider a question of
legal right, and reason, specialized as the understanding, presides in the case,
while "nature," considered in a narrow sense as a body of sensible intuitions, is
brought forward as a witness. The understanding "judges" the sensible intuitions
by means of concepts (A68-B93). As long as the concepts used by the under-
standing are empirical their reference to objects of experience is obvious since
"experience is always available for the proof of their objective reality" (A84-
Bl16). But when the concepts are a priori principles of reason, their relation to
experience is not clear. If there are transcendental concepts, such as causality,
which are not derived from experience but which nevertheless are applied to the
ordering of experience, their right to be so applied may, and should, be ques-
tioned. This right is considered in the Transcendental Deduction.
The word "deduction" is used by Kant not in a logical but in a legal sense.
This is made clear in the first sentences of the section. "Jurists," says Kant,
 M E T A P H O R I N KANT'S CRITIQUB 267

"distinguish in a legal action the questions of right (quid juris) from the ques-
tion of fact (quid ]acti); and they demand that both be proved. Proof of the
former, which has to state the right or the legal claim, they entitle the deduc-
S/on" (A84-Bl16). The demand quid juris requires an examination of the a
priori concepts of the understanding to " j u s t i f y . . . how these concepts can re-
late to objects which they yet do not obtain from any experience" (A85-BllT).
Kant states that this deduction is an "unavoidable necessity" without which
one would have to "surrender all claims to make judgments of pure reason" both
in application to experience and in the area where it "transcends the limits of all
possible experience" in metaphysics (A88-89-B121). TM At this critical moment,
Kant clearly chooses to present his problem in legal terms.
The outlining of the Transcendental Deduction as a question of legal right is
common to both editions. In the second, however, the legal metaphor disappears
in the new material after w But in the first edition, Kant continues the meta-
phor as he argues that the a priori concepts are not empirical "rules of associa-
tion." They have a legal claim to being considered "laws of nature" (Al12-13).
Kant asserts that while sensibility does indeed provide intuitions, these intuitions
do not come to consciousness as knowledge until they have been subjected to a
complete synthesis in the understanding, which, in providing the patterns whereby
intuitions are formed into objects, also provides the laws under which objects
form a coherent system known as "nature." (This is a broader and more common
sense of the term than the one used earlier.)
The legal metaphor which brings the deduction to a close emphasizes the
formative role of the understanding by transposing the legal situation up one
level from its application in the courtroom to its origination in a legislative body.
Kant indicates that "the understanding is something more than a power of formu-
lating rules through comparison of appearances." It not only validly applies to
experience but simultaneously transcends experience as "the lawgiver of na-
ture" (A126). The legal metaphor renders meaningful not only the "Deduction"
part of the title but also the "Transcendental" element which, in its legislative
feature, places the understanding above the courtroom of nature where its laws
are applied.
It should be observed that the Transcendental Deduction expresses in legal
terms the scientific methodology in the metaphors of analogy. If the "under-
standing is itself the source of the laws of nature," then "all empirical laws are
only special determinations of the pure laws of understanding under which, and
according to the norm of which, they first become possible" (A127-28). Nature
and objects are determined by the way in which they must be known, and the
Copernican revolution, as it applies to philosophy, is made complete. The sig-
nificant advantage of the transposition of the metaphor into a legal frame is that
it need not be so strictly limited to this revolution in methodology; it has as-
pects which continue to be investigated, and effect a continuity when the reason
considers metaphysical questions.
While the understanding has a legislative power, its laws apply only in the
area of appearances. The Transcendental Analytic of the Principles which follows
19This point is repeated, again in terms of the legal metaphor, on A233-B286.
268 }IISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

the Deduction is to demonstrate the proper application of the laws of reason,

and is therefore termed "a canon solely for judgment, instructing it how to apply
to appearances the concepts of understanding" (A132-B171). "Judgment,"
says Kant, "is a peculiar talent which can be practiced only, and cannot be
taught" (A133-B172). It is possible that "a physician, a judge, or a ruler may
have at command many excellent pathological, legal, or political r u l e s . . , and
yet, none the less, may easily stumble in their application . . . . He may com-
prehend the universal in abstracto, and yet not be able to distinguish whether a
case in concreto comes under it" (A134-B173).20 Judgment is here extended be-
yond the legal context, but the judge serves as an example and the courtroom
situation requires the application of laws to specific cases. There is, however, a
distinct advantage accruing to a judge who must apply the transcendental
philosophy, for "besides the rule (or rather the universal condition of rules),
which is given in the pure concept of understanding, it can also specify a priori
the instance to which the rule is to be applied" (A135-B174-75). A transcen-
dental doctrine of judgment may, therefore, guard against errors in the applica-
tion of the pure concepts of understanding. Kant promises to outline "the sensible
condition under which alone pure concepts of the understanding can be em-
ployed," and the "synthetic judgments which under these conditions follow a
pr/ori from pure concepts of the understanding" (A136-B175). The balance of the
Analytic is, as a fulfillment of this promise, a lesson in judging.
Like all other parts of the Critique, the Transcendental Dialectic includes
and is in turn comprehended by the legal metaphor; but an adjustment in its
terms is needed. Reason falls into dialectical illusion when it tries to extend
the pure concepts of understanding beyond the range of any possible intui-
tions. When intuitions are no longer able to give witness, the court cannot oper-
ate in the way described above. Any attempt to do so leads to the conflicting
decisions of the antinomies. Reason can continue to act as a judge only by serv-
ing as its own witness. At this stage in the metaphor's development, reason
must examine the evidence of its own internal efforts toward completion and
self-consistency. Although reason cannot prevent its own impulse toward dialectic,
it can investigate its own pretensions to knowledge and distinguish its areas of
competence.
The dogmatic philosophers refuse to conduct a trial in which reason is brought
to witness before itself. They simply adopt a position and refuse "to grant a fair
hearing to the arguments for the counter-position" (A407-B434). Yet some-
thing can be learned from observing their fruitless combats, for reason, in a more
critical stance, may examine the conflict between the opposing parties in the
hope of discovering "the point of misunderstanding in the case of disputes which
are sincerely and competently conducted by both sides." Moreover, this considera-
tion may enable reason to avoid internal division since "just as from the embar-
rassment of judges in cases of litigation wise legislators contrive to obtain in-
struction regarding the defects and ambiguities of their laws," reason may from
the difficulties of others, learn to make adjustments in the legislation which it
In a footnote to this page Kant puts it more bluntly : "Deficiencyin judgment is just what
is ordinarily called stupidity."
 METAPHOR IN KANT'S CRITIQUE 269

propounds for itself. This legislation cannot, like that of the understanding,
determine objective knowledge, but it can provide regulative rulings which guide
reason clear of conflict with itself. Thus Kant concludes that "the antinomy
which discloses itself in the application of laws is for our limited wisdom the
best criterion of the legislation that has given rise to them" (A424-B452).
In conducting the case outlined above, it can be seen that reason strives to
break down conflicts and to gain the greatest possible unity with itself. In doing
so it develops ideas which have their own value, "for they arise from the very
nature of our reason; and it is impossible that this highest tribunal of all the
rights and claims of speculation should itself be the source of deceptions and il-
lusions" (A669-B697). The ideas that reason legislates for itself are proper in so
far as they are taken not as "constitutive" principles for the extension of
knowledge in the sense of the categories but as "regulative" principles which
guide the reason in the area beyond the sensible (A671-B699). These regulative
principles "never in any way [proceed] counter to the laws of [the understand-
ing's] empirical employment" (A680-BT08), but carry reason to a greater unity.
While it is not possible, therefore, to have knowledge of an immortal soul or of
God, more coherence is possible in thinking as if there were a God. The Critique
cannot establish a religious position in any complete sense, but it can reserve a
place for it; and reason, by its own continual self-judgment, "prevents the
devastations of which a lawless speculative reason would otherwise inevitably be
guilty in the field of morals as well as in that of religion" (A849-B877).
Even in his choice of terms Kant has been influenced by jurisprudence. The
words constitutiver and regulativer, which are properly translated by Kemp
Smith as "constitutive" and "regulative," are not German words. They are
drawn from Latin roots with definite legal connotations. Constitutiver is from
the Latin constitutio, which in ordinary usage might have meant "condition"
or "disposition," but which in ancient law refcrred to an "imperial ordinance,
decree or constitution as distinguished from Lex, Senatus-Consultum and other
kinds of law and having its effects from the sole will of the emperor." 21 Regula-
tiver, from the Latin regula, or "rule," appeared in ancient legal usage in the
phrase regula generis which denoted a set of "general rules which the courts
promulgate from time to time for the regulation of their practice." ~z Once the
significance of these terms in Roman law is understood, their appropriateness for
Kant's purposes becomes evident. The regulative principles are formulated
only to provide a guide for the reason, just as the regula generis guided court
practice. This separates them from constitutive principles which in the cate-
gories, and applied when sensible intuitions are available, "imperially" decree
the form which knowledge must take.
Reason in its pure operation also formulates another set of laws that is binding
on itself, for "the legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects,
nature and freedom, and therefore contains not only the law of nature, but also
the moral law" (A840-B868). The reason generates not only ideas but ideals
which, like the regulative feature of ideas, have no creative power. They do, how-
Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dic~ioTmry(St. Paul, Minn., 1951), p. 384.
Ibid., p. 1450.
270 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

ever, have a practical implication in forming the moral concepts and the arche-
type of that "divine man within us, with which we compare and judge ourselves"
(A569-B597).
A synopsis of the legal metaphor reveals its influence in all parts of the Cr/-
tique. The courtroom setting established in the prefaces continues to adapt to and
provide a stage for all the later arguments of the work. Reason first calls nature
to the stand, learns and applies the laws in this case, and finally offers testi-
mony in its own behalf. In the process, the whole legislative system of the mind
is outlined and most of the significant questions of the Critique are set forth as
legal cases. There is justice in calling the legal metaphor the main structural
metaphor of the Critique, and in affirming with Kant that "the critique of pure
reason can be regarded as the true tribunal of all disputes of pure reason.., in
which our disputes have to be conducted solely by the recognized methods of
legal action" (A751-B779).
IV
While metaphors may provide useful illustration, draw analogies with other
disciplines and structure the materials of an extended work, their presence in
the Critique prompts a further and final reflection. Nathan Edelman, in an ar-
ticle entitled "The Mixed Metaphor in Descartes," claims that "metaphoric
language lays open . . . an intimate region of the philosopher's mind." ~ To dem-
onstrate his belief he examines the house and path metaphors spread through
Descartes' writing. A similar set of metaphors appears in the Critique. In the
preface to the first edition Kant announces that he has "entered upon [the] path"
of a criticism of the faculty of reason in general, and flatters himself that "in
following it [he has] found a way of guarding against all those errors which have
hitherto set r e a s o n . . , at variance with itself" (A, xii). His goal is "a secure
home" for which he develops a "plan" and frequently lays "the foundation"
(A707-B735) u4 But the end of the Critique still finds him travelling the "crit-
ical path" (A856--B884). This set of metaphors has little to do with the Cri-
tique's arguments, and it is not easy to make assertions about a mind which, in
these terms, seems so divided against itself. Yet, the factual demand need not be
the only one recognized. Just as Edelman does with the same metaphors in
Descartes, we may take the house and path metaphors in Kant's Critique as
an indication of an inner tension between assurance and uncertainty which all
men, not only philosophers, share. This metaphoric polarity opens the way to
sympathizing in its root sense of "suffering" or "feeling" with another. The op-
portunity of reaching beyond arguments is given, and for one willing to par-
ticipate in the experience, metaphors present a view of the philosopher as well
as of the philosophy.
University of Rochester
Romanic Review, X L I : 3 (October 1950), p. li~7.
b Jose,, Ferrater9 1Viora in his" article," "Pierces' Conception of Architectonic and Related
Views, Ph:losophy and Phenomenological Research, X V (1954-55), 351--,359, suggests a further
relation of the architecture metaphors in the Critique to Kabt's conception of architectonic.