CASES FOR POLICE POWER
with the Constitution and must not infringe upon individual rights and
I. Characteristics
a. Stone vs Mississippi
Facts: Case involved a challenge to Mississippi’s denial of a blac k
man’s right to serve as a juror in a criminal trial where the defendan t
was also black. The state law prohibited black individuals from servin g
on juries.
Issue: Whether the exclusion of black individuals from jury service
violated the defendant’s rights under the fourteenth amendment’ s
equal protection clause.
Held: the SC held the Mississippi’s exclusion of black individuals from
jury service was unconstitutional. The court rules that the exclusion
violated the defendant’s rights to equal protection under the law, that
the exclusion was based on racial discrimination and denied the
defendant his constitutional rights which is guaranteed by the 14 th
amendment.
b. Ichong vs Hernandez
Facts: Petitioner Ichong adversely affected by the provisions of RA No.
1180 or “An act to regulate the retail business with an effect of
nationalizing the retail trade business, sought to enjoin the enforcement
of the retail trade nationalization law on the ground”, among others,
that it was inconsistent with the treaty of amity between the Philippin e s
and China, the United Nations Charter and the universal declaration of
Human Rights.
Issue: Whether or not RA No. 1180 violated the treat of Amity between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China.
Held: The SC saw no conflict. Citing the rule in US v. Thompson, “But
even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law.”
The court also noted the ruling in Palston v. Pennsylvania, “and the
same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the Police power of the
state.
II. Who exercises Police Power?
a. Congress
In Isagani Cruz's book on Constitutional Law, he discusses the concept of
police power within the Philippine legal context. Police power is a
fundamental attribute of sovereignty that allows the state to enact laws and
regulations for the promotion of the general welfare, public health, safety,
and morals.
According to Cruz, while police power is inherent in the state, its exercise is
primarily delegated to the legislative branch of government, which is
Congress in the Philippines. Congress has the authority to enact laws that
promote the general welfare and address various social, economic, and
public health concerns through the exercise of police power.
Cruz emphasizes that the exercise of police power must be in accordance
liberties protected by the Bill of Rights. The laws enacted by Congress
under the police power must also be reasonable, necessary, and not
arbitrary or oppressive.
Additionally, Cruz may discuss how other branches of government, such as
the executive and judicial branches, also play a role in the implementation
and enforcement of laws enacted pursuant to police power. The executive
branch, for example, is responsible for executing and implementing laws,
while the judiciary has the authority to interpret and review the
constitutionality of laws enacted under police power.
Overall, according to Cruz, while police power is inherent in the state, its
exercise is primarily delegated to Congress, subject to constitutional
limitations and the principles of reasonableness and necessity.
b. President
While Congress has the authority to enact laws that promote the
general welfare and address various social, economic, and public health
concerns through the exercise of police power, the President, as the chief
executive, is responsible for executing and implementing these laws. This
includes overseeing the enforcement of laws related to public safety,
health, and order.
Under the principle of separation of powers, the President does not
have the authority to create laws unilaterally. However, the President may
issue executive orders, proclamations, and directives to implement and
enforce existing laws within the framework established by Congress.
Additionally, the President may declare states of emergency or martial law
in certain circumstances, which temporarily expands executive authority to
maintain public order and safety.
While the President's role in exercising police power is significant, it is
subject to constitutional limitations and the principles of checks and
balances. The judiciary also plays a role in reviewing the constitutionality of
executive actions and ensuring that they are within the bounds of the law
and the Constitution.
c. Lawmaking bodies
Police power, as Cruz explains, is a fundamental attribute of
sovereignty that enables the state to enact laws and regulations for the
promotion of the general welfare, public health, safety, and morals. While
Constitutional-law-2-aranas-police-power-case-digests-and-principles 1
 inherent in the state, its exercise is primarily delegated to the legislative
branch, which in the Philippines is Congress.
Cruz highlights that the Philippine Constitution grants Congress the
authority to enact laws that address various social, economic, and public
health concerns through the exercise of police power. This includes laws
related to public safety, health regulations, traffic management,
environmental protection, and other matters essential to the well-being of
society.
Furthermore, Cruz underscores the importance of the principle of
separation of powers, which delineates the respective roles and functions
of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. While
Congress has the authority to make laws, the executive branch, headed by
the President, is responsible for executing and implementing these laws,
and the judiciary interprets and reviews their constitutionality.
Overall, according to Cruz, police power exercised by lawmaking
bodies such as Congress is essential for maintaining order, protecting
public welfare, and promoting the common good, subject to constitutional
limitations and the principles of reasonableness and necessity.
III. Extent of Judicial Review
a. Zabal vs Pres Duterte GR 238467
Issue: Whether or not Proclamation No. 475 constitute an impairmen t
on the right to travel – No.
Issue: Whether or not Proclamation No. 475 is a valid police power
measure – YES.
Held:
Ruling on Issue No. 1: Proclamation No. 475 does not pose an actual
impairment on the right to travel.
The case does not actually involve the right to travel in its essential
sense. Any bearing that Proclamation No. 475 may have on the right to
travel is merely corollary to the closure of Boracay and the ban of
tourists and nonresidents therefrom which were necessar y
incidents of the island's rehabilitation. If at all, the impact of
Proclamation No. 475 on the right to travel is not direct but merely
consequential; and, the same is only for a reasonably short period of
time. The proclamation is therefore not a law and conversely, the
President did not usurp the law-making power of the legislature
Issue No. 2 Ruling: 2. The assailed governmental measure is within the
scope of police power. The statutes from which the said measur e
draws authority and the constitutional provisions which serve as its
framework are primarily concerned with the environment and health,
safety, and well-being of the people, the promotion and securing of
which are clearly legitimate objectives of governmental efforts and
regulations.
The pressing need to implement urgent measures to rehabilitat e
Boracay is beyond cavil from the factual circumstances that
precipitated the President's issuance of Proclamation No.475. This
necessity is even made more critical and insistent by what the Court
said in Oposa v. Hon. Factoran, Jr. in regard the rights to a balanc e d
and healthful ecology and to health, which rights are likewise integral
concerns in this case.
Oposa warned that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are given continuing importance and the State
assumes its solemn obligation to preserve and protect them, the time
will come that nothing will be left not only for this generation but for the
generations to come as well.
SC ruled that the temporary closure of Boracay is reasonably
necessary under the circumstances
IV. Limitations
a. Ichong vs Hernandez
Facts: Petitioner Ichong adversely affected by the provisions of RA No.
1180 or “An act to regulate the retail business with an effect of
nationalizing the retail trade business, sought to enjoin the enforcement
of the retail trade nationalization law on the ground”, among others,
that it was inconsistent with the treaty of amity between the Philippin e s
and China, the United Nations Charter and the universal declaration of
Human Rights.
Issue: Whether or not RA No. 1180 violated the treat of Amity between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China.
Held: The SC saw no conflict. Citing the rule in US v. Thompson, “But
even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law.”
The court also noted the ruling in Palston v. Pennsylvania, “and the
same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the Police power of the
state.
V. Requisites of Police Power
a. Lawful subject
In Isagani Cruz's book "Constitutional Law," he discusses various
principles and concepts related to Philippine constitutional law. While Cruz
may not explicitly define the term "lawful subject" in his book, we can infer its
meaning based on legal principles commonly discussed in constitutional law.
In general, legal terms, a "lawful subject" typically refers to a matter or
topic that is within the scope of the law's authority or jurisdiction. It may also
refer to a person, entity, or action that is legally permissible or not prohibited
by law.
Within the context of constitutional law, a "lawful subject" may pertain
to matters or subjects that fall within the purview of constitutional provisions,
statutes, or legal principles. For example, constitutional rights and freedoms,
such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to due process,
are considered lawful subjects within the realm of constitutional law.
Cruz's discussions in his book "Constitutional Law" may explore various
lawful subjects within Philippine constitutional law, including the scope and
Constitutional-law-2-aranas-police-power-case-digests-and-principles 2
limitations of constitutional rights, principles of separation of powers, checks
and balances, and other fundamental legal concepts.
While Cruz may not provide an explicit definition of "lawful subject" in
his book, his discussions on constitutional law would likely touch upon the
importance of adhering to lawful subjects within the framework of the
Philippine Constitution and legal system. He may emphasize the significance
of upholding the rule of law and respecting the boundaries of legal authority
in interpreting and applying constitutional provisions.
i. William Kwong Management Inc vs Diamond Homeowners and Residents
Association
Facts: The case involved a dispute between William Kwong
Management Inc. and the Diamond Homeowners and Residents
Association regarding the collection of association dues and fees for
the maintenance and management of a residential subdivision. William
Kwong Management Inc. contested the authority of the association to
impose such fees and sought to challenge their validity.
Issue: Whether the Diamond Homeowners and Residents Association
had the authority to collect association dues and fees for the
maintenance and management of the residential subdivision.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the Diamond Homeowners and
Residents Association had the authority to collect association dues and
fees for the maintenance and management of the residential
subdivision. The Court ruled that such authority was inherent in the
nature of homeowners' associations to ensure the upkeep and
improvement of common areas and facilities.
ii. Ynot vs IAC
Facts: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1983, when they were confiscated for
violation of executed Order No. 626-A.
This Executive Order prohibited the transport of carabaos or carabao
meat across provincial boundaries without government clearance, for
the purpose of preventing the indiscriminate slaughter of these animals.
The petitioner appealed to the IAC (Intermediate Appellate Court) which
upheld the trial court’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not the prohibition provided in the Executive Order is
a lawful method to exercise police power.
Held: The SC held that the executive order that defined the prohibition ,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which
was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounce d
upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him the centuries-old guarantee of elementary fair play. The
court sustained that the prohibition defined in the executive order is an
unlawful method in exercising state’s police power.
iii. Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers vs GCC Approved
Medical Centers
Facts:
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) issue d
Memorandum Circular No. 9 (Series of 2004), which amended the
guidelines for the deployment of Filipino workers.
The amended guidelines required all overseas Filipino workers (OFW s)
to undergo pre-employment medical examinations only at medical
clinics designated and accredited by the GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc. (GCCAMCA).
AMCOW, representing various medical clinics, challenged the validi t y
of the memorandum circular, arguing that it violated the OFWs' right to
choose their medical service provider.
Issue:
Whether Memorandum Circular No. 9, Series of 2004, issued by the
POEA, is valid and constitutional.
Ruling:
Memorandum Circular No. 9, Series of 2004, is valid and constitutional.
Reasoning:
Regulation of OFW Deployment: The Court recognized the
government's authority to regulate the deployment of OFWs, especially
concerning their pre-employment medical examinations.
Protecting OFWs: The requirement for OFWs to undergo medical
examinations only at accredited clinics aims to protect them from
fraudulent medical certificates and ensure that they are fit to work
abroad.
Reasonable Regulation: The Court deemed the regulation reasonable ,
given the government's duty to safeguard the welfare of OFWs, protect
the integrity of the employment process, and maintain the Philippine s'
reputation as a provider of quality labor.
iv. Basco et al vs PAGCOR
Facts:
Petitioners Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., Aurelio Periquet Jr., and Ernest o
Maceda filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 186 issued by President Corazon Aquino.
E.O. No. 186 authorized the Philippine Amusement and Gamin g
Corporation (PAGCOR) to operate, license, and regulate gambli n g
casinos.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 186 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The Executive Order No. 186 is unconstitutional.
Reasoning
Violation of the Constitution: The Court ruled that E.O. No. 186 violat e d
the Constitution because it encroached upon the legislative power of
Congress to regulate gambling.
Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power: The Executive Orde r
delegated legislative power to PAGCOR by giving it the authority to
operate and regulate gambling casinos. This was deemed
Constitutional-law-2-aranas-police-power-case-digests-and-principles 3
 unconstitutional as only Congress can legislate on matters involvi n g
gambling.
Gambling as a Public Policy Issue: The Court recognized gambling as
a subject of public policy and emphasized that its regulation should be
left to Congress, not to the Executive branch.
Disposition:
The Court declared Executive Order No. 186 unconstitutional. PAGCOR
was directed to cease and desist from exercising its functions under the
said Executive Order.
v. Peopl vs Nitifan, GR 81559-60
vi. Gaston vs Republic Planters Bank
Facts:
Petitioners, representing numerous sugar producers, planters, and
millers, filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus to compel
respondents to transfer and distribute shares of stock in Republic
Planters Bank (RPB) to sugar producers, planters, and millers.
The shares in RPB were acquired using stabilization fees collect ed
from sugar producers and millers under P.D. No. 388, whic h
established a fund administered by PHILSUCOM for the purpose of
financing the sugar industry's growth and stabilization.
Issues:
Whether the stabilization fees collected under P.D. No. 388
constitute funds in trust for sugar producers or public funds.
Whether shares of stock in RPB paid for with stabilization fees belong
to PHILSUCOM or sugar producers and millers.
Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of
mandamus and dismissed the case.
Reasoning:
The Court held that the stabilization fees collected under P.D. No. 388
did not create a resulting trust in favor of sugar producers, as the
statute did not clearly show PHILSUCOM's intention to hold the
funds for their benefit.
The Court also rejected the argument that the shares of stock in RPB
belonged to sugar producers, as there was no clear indication that
the investments were made for their exclusive benefit. Instead, the
funds were intended for the benefit of the entire sugar industry, in
line with the regulatory purpose of P.D. No. 388.
vii. SUNECO vs ERC
Facts:
SURNECO, a rural electric cooperative, filed a petition before the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) for approval of a formula for automati c
cost adjustment and adoption of the National Power Corporation (NPC )
restructured rate adjustment to comply with Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7832.
The ERC, successor to the ERB, reviewed and confirmed SURNECO' s
Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) charges and ordered the refund of
over-recoveries and collection of under-recoveries from consumers.
SURNECO challenged the ERC's orders, alleging that it was authorize d
to adopt a multiplier scheme for system loss recovery and that the
orders violated due process.
Issue:
Whether the ERC's orders, including the directive to refund over-
recoveries and collect under-recoveries, were lawful exercises of its
regulatory authority.
Ruling:
The petition is denied. The Court of Appeals' decision affirming the
ERC's orders is upheld. Validity of ERC's Orders: The ERC's orders were
lawful exercises of its regulatory authority to ensure that only the actual
costs of purchased power are recovered by electric cooperatives. The
orders were based on the ERC's mandate to protect the public interest
and were supported by substantial evidence.
Authority of ERC: The ERC has the authority to regulate rates impose d
by electric cooperatives in the exercise of police power. The caps set by
R.A. No. 7832 were valid exercises of police power and prevailed over
any contractual agreements between electric cooperatives and other
entities.
Compliance with Due Process: SURNECO was not denied due process
as it was given the opportunity to explain its side, submit documentary
evidence, attend hearings, and file motions for reconsideration.
viii. Velasco vs Villegas
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 4964 was enacted for a two-fold purpose. (1) To enable
the City of Manila to collect a fee for operating massage clinic
separately from those operating barber shops and (2) To preven t
immorality which might probably arise from the construction of
separate rooms. However, petitioner argues that such ordinanc e
amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their
means of livelihood without due process of law.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance was unconstitutional.
HELD:
Considering the two-fold purpose of the ordinance, it is clear that such
law is a police power measure. This Court has been most liberal in
sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed.
ix. Dela cruz vs Paras GR No L-42571-72
Facts: Petitioners were night club operators in Bocaue Bulacan, who
filed on November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary
injunction. They contended that the enforcement of Municipal
Ordinance no. 84, an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs,
cabarets, and dance halls in that municipality or the renewal of licenses
to operate them, should be stopped as the municipal has no power to
prohibit a lawful business and that such ordinance is violative to their
right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as the license
previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial
hearing. The lower court upheld the validity of the ordinance in the
name of police power and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition
for certiorari.
Issue: WON a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by
respondents, can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation
Constitutional-law-2-aranas-police-power-case-digests-and-principles 4
 of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs
employing hostesses
Held:
Supreme Court states that reliance on the police power is insufficient
to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It is to be noted that
the municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law
and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the healt h
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitan t s
thereof, and for the protection of property therein. However, it is only
valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippi n e
Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against
public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or
in derogation of common right. A municipal corporation, therefore,
cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be
regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as
originally enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the
establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like.
While it is true that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c
purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but
likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title
of the law remained the same so that the power granted to
municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe
the amendatory act as granting municipal corporations the power to
prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way
that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover ,
the
recently-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulat e
the establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatrical
performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorar i
granted.
x. Bautista vs Junio
FACTS:
This prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary
Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista, for being allege dly
violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees 1 of
the Constitution as it was provided in LOI 869 that the use privat e
motor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends and holidays
was banned from "[12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m.
Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the
day after the holiday."
It was then alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the
issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation ,
the provision banning the use of H and EH [vehicles] is unfair,
discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and
thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. 5 Moreover ,
for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process,
more specifically, "of their right to use and enjoy their privat e
property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings,
reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays," invitin g
attention to the fact that others not included in the ban enjoyin g
"unrestricted freedom."
ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of an energy conservation measure ,
Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979 ― the
response to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 is
constitutional
HELD:
'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the
scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the
ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of
law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumpti on
of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.'
It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police power
measure may, because of its arbitrary, oppressive or unjust
character, be held offensive to the due process clause and,
therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of them.
In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power,
especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with
the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway.
That is settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due process,
therefore, cannot be validly invoked.
Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the
equal protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the
attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of
hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support
in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilitie s
imposed.
Absent therefore the alleged infringement of constitutional rights, more
precisely the due process and equal protection guarantees, this
Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. 869 as tainted by
unconstitutionality.
Petition dismissed.
xi. Ermita Malate Hotel vs City Mayor of Manila GR L24693
Facts: The Municipal Board of the City of Manila issued an ordinanc e
that imposes increasing license fees, partially restricting the freedom to
contract, and restraining the liberty of an individual. It also provides that
the premises and facilities of such hotels would be open for inspection
either by the City Mayor or their duly authorized representatives. Ermita-
Malate Hotel Operators Association filed a petition for prohibition
against the mayor of the city of Manila and a plea for the issuance of
preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above
ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court renders
the ordinance unconstitutional and therefore null and void. The mayor
of Manila appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance regulating motels is a valid exercise
of the police power.
Held: The SC upheld that the ordinance regulating motels is a vali d
exercise of the police power. It also declared that the challenge d
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful
Constitutional-law-2-aranas-police-power-case-digests-and-principles 5
 to public morals. It was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral and illegitimate use to which premises could and are being
devoted.
xii. City of Manila vs Laguio
Facts:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is
a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels,
hostels and lodging houses.
On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed an RTC Petition with the lower
court praying that the Ordinance of the City of Manila be declare d
invalid and unconstitutional.
MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and
improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishment s,
motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these
were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they
were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use
women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the
community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and
moral welfare of the community."
The Ordinance ordered the removal of motels, inns,
massage parlors, beer houses, nightclubs in the Ermita-Malate area.
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and
unconstitutional for the following reasons:
1. The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels
as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulat e
the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments
2. The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D. )
No. 49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-
Malate area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions
3. The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police
power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no
reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sough t
to be protected
4. The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the
operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior
to its enactment
5. The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is
confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's propert y
rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a
particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to
extrajudicially destroy it; and
6. The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the
law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of
motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging house s
or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business
in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area.
Petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City
Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainmen t
in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community"
as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Governmen t
Code.
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the
City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of
the community in conjunction with its police power.
Hon. Laguio decided in favor of the private respondents and
declared the Ordinance null and void.
Petitioners filed an appeal with the lower court alleging that the
following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires,
or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise
of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravene s
P.D. 49931 which allows operators of all kinds of
commercial establishments, except those specified therein;
and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
Petitioners contend that the assailed Ordinance was
enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power
of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by
local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of
the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section
458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. They allege that the Ordinance is
a valid exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D.
499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity.
ISSUE: WON the Ordinance of the City of Manila shows a valid
exercise of police power.
HELD: No. The Ordinance was nullified barring the operation of
motels and inns within the Ermita-Malate area. The exercise
of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of
the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in
derogation of a common right.
The Ordinance invades fundamental personal and propert y
rights and impairs personal privileges.
It is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not
sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the
City Council under the Code had no power to enact the
Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Police power legislation of such character deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our support for it.
But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the
Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to
stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City
Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerate d
establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their
transfer or conversion without infringing the constitution al
guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws not
even under the guise of police power.
xiii. White light Corporation vs City of Manila
Facts: The case involved a dispute between White Light Corporati on
and the City of Manila regarding the imposition of business taxes on
White Light Corporation's gross receipts from lease rentals. White Light
Corporation argued that the taxes imposed were illegal and
unconstitutional.
Constitutional-law-2-aranas-police-power-case-digests-and-principles 6

Issue: Whether the City of Manila had the authority to impose business
taxes on White Light Corporation's gross receipts from lease rentals.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the City of Manila had the authorit y
to impose business taxes on White Light Corporation's gross receipts
from lease rentals.
xiv. Lutz vs Araneta
Facts: Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the
Interstate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the
collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate
as taxes under Sec. 3 of Commonwealth Act 567 or the Sugar
Adjustment Act. He alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void,
being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry which is a not
a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The
action having dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the plaintif f
appealed the case.
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of a special tax on sugar produce s
for the purpose of creating a special fund to be used for the
rehabilitation of the sugar industry is a legitimate exercise of the police
power.
Held: The court sustained that the imposition of a special tax on sugar
producers for the purpose of creating a special fund to be used for the
sugar industry is a legitimate exercise of the police power. The tax
levied by the challenged statue is for a regulatory purpose, namely, to
provide ways and means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the
sugar industry. Hence, Congress was empowered to find that the
general welfare demanded that the sugar industry be stabilized. The
law is thus primarily an exercise of police power and taxation was used
to implement it.
xv. Osmena vs Orbos GR 99886
Facts: The case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a law
requiring the transfer of certain functions and responsibilities from the
Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) to the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC). The petitioners argue d
that the law violated the autonomy of the MMC and encroached upon
local government powers.
Issue: Whether the law transferring functions from the MMC to the
DOTC is constitutional, particularly with regard to the autonomy of the
MMC and local government powers.
Held:: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law
transferring functions from the MMC to the DOTC. The Court ruled that
the law did not violate the autonomy of the MMC or encroach upon
local government powers.
xvi. Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of
Agrarian Reform
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal,
including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several
measures such as PD No. 27, E.O. No. 228, P.D. No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and
RA No. 6657. One of the subjects of these petitions are a 9-hectare
Riceland worked by four (4) tenants and owned by Petitioner Manaay
and his Wife and a five (5) hectare Riceland worked by four (4) tenants
and owned by Hermano. The tenants were declared full owners of
these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.I. Nos. 228 and 229 on
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal
protection, and the constitutional limitation that no private propert y
shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Petitioners invoke the cases of EPZA v. Dulay and Manotok v. National
Food Authority. Moreover, that “the just compensation comtemplat e d
by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in form of
bonds or other things of value”.
Issue: Whether or not the payment of just compensation is payable only
in cash and not in the form of bonds.
Held: The SC emphasized that it cannot be denied from these cases
that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is
money and no other. However, it reiterated, that the said expropriat i on
is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a
specific and perhaps local purpose.
The expropriation in these cases affect all private agricultural lands
whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of
the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of
expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular
community or of a small segment of the population but of entire nation.
xvii. Manila Memorial Park inc vs Secretary of Department of Social Welfare
and Development GR 175356
Facts: The case involved a petition filed by Manila Memorial Park, Inc.
challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9208, also known
as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003. The petitioner argue d
that certain provisions of the law, particularly those regulating the
overseas deployment of workers, violated their constitutional rights.
The specific provisions in question likely included those that impose d
restrictions or requirements on the recruitment, deployment, and
treatment of workers being sent abroad. These provisions are typically
aimed at combating human trafficking and protecting the rights of
migrant workers. Some common regulations found in anti-traffickin g
laws include mandatory registration of recruitment agencies, pre-
departure orientation seminars for migrant workers, and strict
monitoring of working conditions abroad.
The petitioner likely argued that these provisions unduly restricted their
ability to conduct their business operations, particularly in relation to
the overseas deployment of workers. They may have contended that
the requirements imposed by the law were excessive, burdensome, or
incompatible with their legitimate business interests.
Issue: Whether certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9208, specifically
those related to the regulation of overseas deployment of workers, are
unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9208, including its provisions regulating the overseas deployme n t
of workers. The Court found that the law's objectives, such as
combating human trafficking and protecting the rights of migran t
workers, justified the limitations it imposed on certain rights.
Constitutional-law-2-aranas-police-power-case-digests-and-principles 7

xviii. Department of Education vs San Diego
Facts: The case involved a dispute between the Department of
Education and the San Diego Unified School District regarding the
implementation of certain educational policies. The Department of
Education issued guidelines requiring schools to adopt specific
curriculum standards, while the San Diego Unified School District
sought to implement alternative standards.
Issue: Whether the Department of Education had the authority to
mandate specific curriculum standards for schools, and whether the
San Diego Unified School District could deviate from these standards.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the Department of Education had
the authority to establish curriculum standards and that the San Diego
Unified School District was required to comply with these standards.
xix. Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs BOT
Facts: The board of Transportation (BDT) issued Memorandum circular
phasing out the old taxis. The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc.
Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation filed a petition to declar e
the nullity of Memorandum Circular of the BDT and Memorandum
Circular of the BLT.
Issue: Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the
assailed memorandum circular violates the petitioners’ constitutional
rights to equal protection of the law.
Held: The SC, in the language of Chief Justice Fernando, sustained that
the necessities imposed by Public Welfare may justify the exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
Insofar as the non-application of the assailed circulars to
other transportation services is concerned, it need only to be recalle d
that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same
treatment be accorded to all but it is the uniform operation by legal
means so that all persons under similar circumstances would be
accorded the same treatment in the liabilities imposed.
xx. Balacuit vs CFI of Agusan del Norte GR L-38429
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 640 was passed by the Municipal Board of the City of
Butuan on April 21, 1969 which penalizes ―any person group of persons,
entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admissi on
tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or
other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve
(12) years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but
should charge only one-half of the said ticket.
The petitioners Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel
are managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater,
and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of the
said ordinance, they filed a complaint before the Court of First Instanc e
of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City on June 30, 1969 praying that the
subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, voi d
and unenforceable.
Subsequently, the respondent court rendered its decision declari n g
Ordinance No. 640 as constitutional and valid. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the respondent court but was later
on denied.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 640 is unconstitutional and an invali d
exercise of police power.
HELD:
(A)s to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of
police power, the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true
that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulati on
must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinanc e
must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressi ve
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or callin g
subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the
guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the
exercise of police power. police measure for the regulation of the
conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon
the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights.
right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or
used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within
the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a
theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix
what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and
that any person who did not approve could stay away.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the
legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable ,
oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of
petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the
interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has
been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of
the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable
and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercisin g
police power, be upheld as valid.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby
rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore,
null and void. This decision is immediately executory.
xxi. UBFHAI vs City of Mayor of Paranaque
Facts: The case involved a dispute between the United BF Homeowners
Association, Inc. (UBFHAI) and the City Mayor of Paranaque regardi n g
the imposition of a garbage fee ordinance. UBFHAI contested the
constitutionality and legality of the ordinance, arguing that it lacke d
legal basis and violated homeowners' rights.
Issue: Whether the garbage fee ordinance imposed by the City Mayor
of Paranaque is constitutional and legally valid.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the garbage fee ordinance was
constitutional and legally valid. The Court ruled that local governmen t
units have the authority to impose reasonable fees for services
provided, such as garbage collection and disposal.
xxii. MMDA vs Viron Transit Co
Constitutional-law-2-aranas-police-power-case-digests-and-principles 8
 Facts: The case involved a dispute between the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) and Viron Transit Co. regarding the
validity and enforcement of a traffic regulation issued by the MMDA.
The regulation imposed a ban on provincial buses along certain roads
in Metro Manila during certain hours to ease traffic congestion.
Issue: Whether the MMDA has the authority to issue and enforce traffic
regulations, including the ban on provincial buses, within its jurisdiction .
Held: The Supreme Court held that the MMDA has the authority to issue
and enforce traffic regulations within its jurisdiction, including the ban
on provincial buses. The Court ruled that the MMDA was acting within
its mandate to address traffic congestion and promote public safety.
b. Lawful means
In general, legal terms, "lawful means" refers to actions or
methods that are authorized, permitted, or not prohibited by
law. This means that any action taken within the bounds of
applicable laws, regulations, and legal principles would be
considered lawful.
For example, in the context of criminal law, lawful
means of obtaining evidence may include obtaining a search
warrant from a judge before conducting a search, or obtaining
information through legal interrogation techniques. Any
evidence obtained through lawful means would be admissible
in court.
Cruz's discussions on criminal law and procedure
may touch upon the importance of adhering to lawful means
in the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses. He
may emphasize the necessity of respecting constitutional
rights and due process protections while carrying out law
enforcement activities.
While Cruz may not have provided a specific
definition of "lawful means," his writings on criminal law and
legal principles would likely underscore the significance of
conducting lawful activities within the framework of Philippine
law and respecting individual rights and liberties.
i. Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers vs GCC
Approved Medical Centers
Facts: The case involved a dispute between the Association of Medical
Clinics for Overseas Workers (AMCOW) and the GCC Approved Medical
Centers regarding the accreditation process for medical clinics
servicing overseas workers. AMCOW challenged the validity of certain
regulations imposed by the GCC Approved Medical Centers, claimin g
that they were arbitrary and discriminatory.
Issue: Whether the regulations imposed by the GCC Approved Medical
Centers on medical clinics servicing overseas workers are valid and
enforceable.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the regulations imposed by the GCC
Approved Medical Centers are valid and enforceable. The Court rule d
that the regulations were issued pursuant to the authority vested in the
GCC Approved Medical Centers to ensure the quality and standard of
medical services provided to overseas workers.
ii. Lorenzo vs Director of Health
Facts: The case of Lorenzo v. Director of Health took place in the
Philippines in 1927. The petitioner, Angel Lorenzo, filed a petition for
habeas corpus. Lorenzo claimed that his confinement in the San
Lazaro Hospital in Manila violated his constitutional rights. Lorenzo
admitted that he was a leper but argued that leprosy was not an
infectious disease. The respondent, the Director of Health, stated in the
return of the writ that Lorenzo was confined in accordance with Section
1058 of the Administrative Code. Section 1058 empowered the Director
of Health to apprehend and detain leprous persons in the Philippines.
Issue:
Is the law authorizing the segregation of lepers in the Philippin e s
constitutional, specifically in relation to the petitioner's confinement in
the San Lazaro Hospital?
Ruling:
The court upheld the constitutionality of the law allowing the
segregation of lepers in the Philippines. The court denied the petitioner' s
challenge to his confinement in the hospital.
iii. City of Quezon City vs Ericta
Facts: The petitioner sought to justify its ordinance requiring at least six
percent of the total areas of memorial park cemeteries to be “set aside
for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities” as a valid exercise of its
police power.
There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal,
both the City Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the
rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The CFI (court of first
instance) registered rendered the decision declaring Sec. 9 of
Ordinance 6118, null and void. A motion for reconsideration havin g
been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the petition of
review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all privat e
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is
tantamount to taking of private property without just compensation.
Held: there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at
least (6) percent of the total area of private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinanc e
is actually taking without just compensation to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation.
Constitutional-law-2-aranas-police-power-case-digests-and-principles 9
 iv. Office of Solicitor General vs Ayala Land Inc
Facts: The case involved a dispute between the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and Ayala Land Inc. regarding the ownership and
development of a parcel of land in a prime commercial area. The OSG
claimed that the land was owned by the government and that Ayala
Land Inc. had unlawfully acquired it.
Issue: Whether Ayala Land Inc. unlawfully acquired the parcel of land,
which the OSG claimed was owned by the government.
Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of Ayala Land Inc., ruling that it
lawfully acquired the land and dismissing the claim of the OSG.
v. Fernando vs St Scholastica’s College
Facts: The case involved a dispute between Fernando and St.
Scholastica's College regarding alleged discrimination in admissi on
policies. Fernando claimed that the college's admission policie s
discriminated against male applicants.
Issue: Whether St. Scholastica's College's admission policie s
discriminated against male applicants in violation of anti-
discrimination laws.
Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of St. Scholastica's College ,
ruling that its admission policies did not constitute unlawful
discrimination.
VI. Standards for Judicial Review
a. Strict Scrutiny
Isagani Cruz, a prominent Philippine legal scholar, has not
specifically delved into the concept of "strict scrutiny" in the same
manner as it is commonly discussed in American constitutional law.
However, he has written extensively on principles of constitutional law,
including those related to judicial review and the protection of
fundamental rights.
In the context of Philippine jurisprudence, principles akin to
strict scrutiny are often applied when assessing laws or government
actions that implicate fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech,
religion, and equal protection. While Cruz may not explicitly use the
term "strict scrutiny," his discussions on these topics typically revolve
around the necessity of the government demonstrating a compelling
state interest and the law being narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.
Cruz may emphasize that when fundamental rights are at
stake, the courts engage in a rigorous examination of the
government's justification for the law or action in question. He may
stress the importance of ensuring that laws that infringe upon
fundamental rights are necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and that they are narrowly tailored to minimize any
encroachment on those rights.
Furthermore, Cruz might discuss how Philippine courts have
applied heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate against certain
groups or burden fundamental rights. He may highlight landmark
cases where the courts have struck down laws that failed to meet this
heightened standard of review, particularly those that unjustifiably
restricted freedom of expression, curtailed religious liberties, or
infringed upon the rights of marginalized groups.
In summary, while Isagani Cruz may not explicitly discuss
"strict scrutiny" as a distinct legal concept in the same manner as
American legal scholars, his writings on constitutional law in the
Philippine context often touch upon similar principles related to
heightened judicial review of laws that implicate fundamental rights.
b. Rational Basis standard
In the Philippine context, Cruz would likely discuss the
Rational Basis standard within the framework of judicial review of
legislation. He may explain that, similar to its application in the United
States, the Rational Basis standard in the Philippines involves a
deferential approach by the courts to legislative enactments. Under
this standard, courts generally uphold laws as constitutional if they are
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
Cruz might emphasize that the Rational Basis standard
requires courts to give great deference to the legislature's judgment
in matters of economic and social policy. He may discuss how courts
typically refrain from second-guessing the wisdom or efficacy of
legislative choices and instead focus on whether there exists any
conceivable rational basis for the law in question.
Additionally, Cruz might highlight the significance of the
Rational Basis standard in the context of the Philippine Constitution's
provisions on due process and equal protection. He may explain that
while these provisions impose limitations on the government's
exercise of its regulatory powers, they also afford the government a
wide degree of discretion in pursuing legitimate state interests.
Overall, while Isagani Cruz's discussions on the Rational
Basis standard may not be as explicitly articulated as those found in
American legal scholarship, his writings would likely underscore the
deferential approach of Philippine courts to legislative enactments
and the importance of rationality and legitimacy in upholding laws
under judicial review.
c. Overbreadth doctrine
The overbreadth doctrine, according to constitutional
law expert Isagani Cruz, refers to a principle in constitutional
law that allows the invalidation of a statute on the basis that it
is overly broad and infringes on protected speech or conduct
that is constitutionally permissible. In his writings, Cruz
explains that the overbreadth doctrine recognizes that a law
may be unconstitutional not only because of its specific
Constitutional-law-2-aranas-police-power-case-digests-and-principles 10
 application to a particular case but also because it reaches too
far and potentially suppresses protected expression or
conduct.
Cruz argues that the overbreadth doctrine serves as
a safeguard to prevent the chilling effect on free speech and
expression caused by overly broad laws. By striking down
statutes that unnecessarily infringe on protected rights, the
doctrine aims to protect individuals from the fear of
prosecution or punishment for engaging in constitutionally
protected activities.
Facts: The case involved a constitutional challenge to the Cybercrime Prevention
Act of 2012, particularly its provisions on online libel. Petitioners, including Atty. Jose
Jesus M. Disini, Jr., argued that certain provisions of the law violated constitution al
rights to freedom of expression and due process.
Issue: Whether the provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, particularly
those on online libel, are constitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012 on online libel are constitutional, subject to certain limitations and
safeguards.

Overall, Cruz emphasizes the importance of the

overbreadth doctrine in ensuring that laws are narrowly
tailored to achieve their legitimate government objectives
without unduly restricting fundamental rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution.

d. Void for vagueness doctrine

The "void for vagueness" doctrine, as explained by Isagani

Cruz in constitutional law, refers to a principle used to invalidate
statutes that are so imprecise or unclear that individuals cannot
reasonably understand what conduct is prohibited or required by the
law. Cruz argues that the Constitution requires laws to provide fair
notice of prohibited conduct and to establish clear standards to guide
enforcement.

According to Cruz, the void for vagueness doctrine serves

to protect individuals from arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of
laws by ensuring that statutes are sufficiently clear and precise. He
suggests that vague laws can lead to confusion among citizens and
law enforcement officials, potentially resulting in inconsistent or
unjust application.

Cruz emphasizes that the void for vagueness doctrine is

rooted in the due process clause of the Constitution, which requires
that laws be sufficiently definite to prevent individuals from being
deprived of life, liberty, or property without fair notice and an
opportunity to be heard. He argues that vague laws violate this
fundamental principle by failing to provide adequate notice of
prohibited conduct and by leaving too much discretion to law
enforcement authorities.

Overall, Cruz highlights the importance of the void for

vagueness doctrine in safeguarding individual rights and promoting
the rule of law by ensuring that statutes are clear, precise, and
enforceable.

i. Disini vs Executive Secretary

Constitutional-law-2-aranas-police-power-case-digests-and-principles 11