IEEE ICC 2013 - Ad-hoc and Sensor Networking Symposium
Distributed Resource Allocation for
Device-to-Device Communications Underlaying
Cellular Networks
Rongqing Zhang1,2 , Lingyang Song1 , Zhu Han3 , Xiang Cheng1,2 , and Bingli Jiao1
1
School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science, Peking University, Beijing, China.
2
State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks, Xidian University, Xi’an, China.
3
Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of Houston, Houston, TX, USA.
Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the resource sharing
problem to optimize the system performance in device-to-device
(D2D) communications underlaying cellular networks from a
distributed and cooperative perspective. Specifically, we formu-
late a coalitional game with transferable utility, in which each
user intends to maximize its own utility and has the incentive
to cooperate with other users to form a strengthened user
group that can increase the opportunity to win its preferred
spectrum resources. Furthermore, we propose a distributed
merge-and-split based coalition formation algorithm based on
a new defined Max-Coalition order to effectively process the
resource allocation problem. Simulation results confirm that,
with much lower computational complexity, the proposed scheme
achieves an approaching performance in terms of network sum-
rate compared with the centralized optimal resource allocation
scheme obtained via exhaustive search.
I. I NTRODUCTION
The increasing data rate demand for local area services
and gradually increased spectrum congestion have triggered
research activities for improving spectral efficiency in cellular
networks. Device-to-Device (D2D) communication [1], [2],
which behaves as an underlay to cellular networks and reuses
the cellular resources, can achieve improved spectral utiliza-
tion and cell throughput enhancement. One of the key issues in
D2D communication is the interference management problem
caused by the resource sharing between the D2D commu-
nications and traditional cellular communications, which has
great effects on the performance of network throughput and
communication reliability.
Much works have been proposed to address the interference
management problem in D2D communications underlaying
cellular networks [3], [4]. In [3], the authors analyzed optimum
resource allocation and power control, and the results show
that by proper resource management for D2D communications,
the D2D communications can effectively improve the total
throughput with the interference between D2D communica-
tions and traditional cellular communications limited. In [4],
the authors formulated the interference relationships among
different D2D communication links and cellular communica-
tion links as a novel interference-aware graph, and proposed
an interference-aware graph based resource sharing algorithm
for the investigated network.
In this paper, we investigate the resource sharing problem
in D2D communications underlaying cellular networks from a
cooperative perspective and solve it effectively in a distributed
manner with low complexity. In the investigated network, the
978-1-4673-3122-7/13/$31.00 ©2013 IEEE 1889
D2D pairs and cellular UEs have their own utilities which are
defined as the sum transmission rate they can achieve through
the resource blocks (RBs) allocated to them, and they have
the same priorities to access the RBs. Each user (either D2D
pair or cellular UE) intends to maximize its own utility, but
only the user group that achieves the maximum sum-rate on a
specific RB can obtain it from the BS for data transmission.
Thus, the users have the incentive to cooperate with other
users to form a strengthened user group if they can achieve an
improved sum-rate on their preferred RBs, which will increase
their opportunities to win the RBs.
Specifically, we formulate this distributed cooperation of
D2D pairs and cellular UEs in pursuing the spectrum resources
as a coalitional game with transferable utility [5]. Different
from the conventional coalitional game introduced in [5], here
the proposed game is further divided into several sub-games,
each addressing the allocation problem of one specific RB.
Each user can only participate in one sub-game at a time
but can change its identify (i.e., its current preferred RB
index) to leave the current sub-game and join in another one.
These sub-games can process the resource allocation problem
simultaneously and in a distributed manner. In addition, based
on a new defined Max-Coalition order, we devise a distributed
merge-and-split based coalition formation algorithm for the
proposed game. Finally, the efficiency of the proposed dis-
tributed coalition formation based resource allocation scheme
for D2D communications underlaying cellular networks is
verified by simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the D2D underlaying cellular communication scenario is
described and the corresponding resource allocation optimiza-
tion problem is formulated. In Section III, the utilities of
D2D pairs and cellular UEs are defined and the resource
allocation problem is formulated as a coalitional game with
transferable utility. In Section IV, we propose a distributed
coalition formation algorithm based on the merge and split
rules to solve the resource allocation problem. Simulation
results are provided in Section V and the conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
II. S YSTEM M ODEL AND P ROBLEM F ORMULATION
A. System Description
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider a downlink transmission
scenario in a cellular network, in which there exists two types
of communications, i.e., the traditional cellular communication
 gAk
m
, gD
k
n,t ,Dn,r
, gb,D
k
n,r
, gD
k
n,t ,Am
and gD
k
n,t ,Dn ,r
, respec-
''8(V
&HOOXODU8( 6RXUFH
tively, where m ∈ M, n ∈ N , n ∈ N , n = n , and


'HVWLQDWLRQ
k ∈ K. The channel gains contain the distance-dependent
path loss and the normalized small-scale fading. Note that in
our assumption, the small-scale fading on different RBs for
&HOOXODU8(L
a certain communication link is independent, but within one
&HOOXODU8( %6
RB it stays the same, i.e., a frequency flat fading in each
RB. Also quasi-static channel fading is assumed from one
&HOOXODU8(1 slot to another. The thermal noise at the receivers satisfies
'HVWLQDWLRQ independent Gaussian distribution with zero mean and the
6RXUFH
same variance denoted by σ 2 .
''8(V The instantaneous Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio
(SINR) at cellular UE Am , m ∈ M, when RBk is allocated
to it for data transmission, can be given as
,QWHUIHUHQFHIURP''WUDQVPLVVLRQWRFHOOXODUWUDQVPLVVLRQ pb k
g Am
SINRkAm = 
K
, (1)
,QWHUIHUHQFHIURPFHOOXODUWUDQVPLVVLRQWR''WUDQVPLVVLRQ
σ2 + pd g D
k
j,t ,Am
j∈N ,Dj ∈Ck
&RPPXQLFDWLRQOLQN

Fig. 1. System model for D2D communications underlaying cellular network and the instantaneous SINR at the receiver of the D2D pair
when sharing downlink resource. Dn , i.e., Dn,r , n ∈ N , when RBk is allocated to it for data
between the BS and a cellular UE and the direct D2D commu- transmission, can be given as
nication, where the D2D communication is treated as an un-
derlay to the traditional cellular communication. We place an pd g D
k
n,t ,Dn,r
emphasis on the intra-cell interference that is due to resource SINRkDn =  k
pb gb,D  ,
sharing of the D2D communication and the traditional cellu- σ2 + K
n,r
+ pd g D
k
j,t ,Dn,r
i∈M,Ai ∈Ck j∈N ,j=n,Dj ∈Ck
lar communication. We assume that there are M traditional (2)
cellular UEs, N D2D pairs in the investigated network, where
Am , m = 1, 2, . . . , M , denotes a traditional cellular UE, and where Ck represents the cluster of the traditional cellular
Dn,t and Dn,r , n = 1, 2, . . . , N , denote a potential D2D pair communication links and the D2D communication links that
that are close enough to satisfy the distance constraint of the share RBk for individual data transmission and Dn denotes
direct D2D communication. Dn,t represents the transmitter of the D2D pair {Dn,t , Dn,r }, Dn ∈ D.
the D2D pair, while Dn,r represents the receiver of the D2D
pair. Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
B. Resource Allocation Problem
technique is employed to support multiple access for both
the traditional cellular and D2D communications and there The key issue of the resource sharing problem is to find the
are totally K RBs, denoted by R = {RB1 , RB2 , . . . , RBK }, optimal RB assignment solution for both the traditional cel-
for the cellular data transmission. Note that each RB consists lular communication links and the D2D communication links,
of a certain number of subcarriers, e.g., in the physical based on which the communication links can properly perform
layer (PHY) standard of 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE) their individual data transmission in this underlaying network.
each RB contains 12 subcarriers. Denote the set of indices Note that resource sharing among different cellular UEs are
{1, 2, . . . , M }, the set of indices {1, 2, . . . , N }, the set of forbidden in our assumption. By applying the Shannon capac-
traditional cellular UEs, and the set of D2D communication ity formula, we define the sum-rate of the cellular network
pairs by M, N , A, and D, respectively. as the sum of the channel capacity for all the communication
Note that for simplicity and with respect to fairness for dif- links including the traditional cellular communication links
ferent communication links to acquire communication service, 
and the D2D communication  links within the network. Let
we assume that each communication link, either traditional XM ×K
S(M +N )×K = be an RB assignment solution,
cellular communication link or D2D communication link, can YN ×K
be allocated at most one RB in an OFDM symbol for its where XM ×K = [αm,k ] and YN ×K = [βn,k ] denote the RB
data transmission through every scheduling process. Suppose assignment matrix for the traditional cellular communication
that the BS and the transmitters of the D2D pairs transmit links and the D2D communication links, respectively. The
with power pb and pd , respectively, and the transmit power value of αm,k and βn,k with m ∈ M, n ∈ N , and k ∈ K,
of the BS allocated to each RB for traditional cellular data can be defined as
transmission is equal, i.e., the transmit power on each RB is 
1, when RBk allocated to Am ,
pb /K. The channel gains of the traditional cellular commu- αm,k = (3)
0, otherwise,
nication link from the BS to the cellular UE Am , the D2D
communication link from Dn,t to Dn,r , the interference link and
from the BS to Dn,r , the interference link from Dn,t to Am , 
and the interference link from Dn,t to Dn ,r when they share 1, when RBk allocated to Dn ,
βn,k = (4)
the RBk for individual data transmission, are represented by 0, otherwise.
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Therefore, we can obtain the optimal RB assignment solution, coalitional game, i.e., either a cellular UE or a D2D pair, has
denoted by Sopt by solving the optimization problem as two individual attributes, the identity order list L(V ) and the
 M current identity δ(V ), where V = Am or Dn , m ∈ M, n ∈ N .
K
W  
Sopt = arg max log2 1 + SINRkAm αm,k The term L(V ) is a vector of RB indices, ordered such that
S(M +N )×K K m=1 the RB index corresponding to the highest signal-to-noise ratio
k=1

N  (SNR) at the receiver of the communication link appears first
+ log2 1 + SINRkDn βn,k (5) and the RB index corresponding to the lowest SNR appears
n=1 last, and δ(V ) is the first element in L(V ) indicating the
⎧
⎪
⎪ Ck = {Ai , Dj | αi,k = 1, βj,k = 1, i ∈ M, j ∈ N } , current interested RB index of the player.
⎪
⎪
⎨ M
αm,k ≤ 1, B. Coalitional Game Definition
s.t.
⎪
⎪
m=1
  We define the distributed resource assignment process as
⎪
⎪
K K
⎩ αm,k ≤ 1, βn,k ≤ 1, a coalitional TU game (T , v), where T denotes the set of
k=1 k=1
players, i.e., T = A∪D, and v(S) is the value of a coalition S,
(6)
S ⊆ T . Note that in our assumption, only the players having
where SINRkAm and SINRkDn are given in (1) and (2), respec- the same current identity which means that they are seeking
tively. Note that the second constraint in (6) guarantees that for the same RB are permitted to form a coalition together.
the situation that two or more traditional cellular UEs occupy Then, there totally exists K types of coalitions, denoted by
the same RB for data transmission is forbidden and the third S k , k ∈ K, corresponding to the K RBs, respectively. The
constraint in (6) guarantees that each communication link can value v of a coalition S k can be given as
obtain at most one RB in an OFDM symbol through every RB ⎧
0, if S k = Φ,
assignment process.  k ⎨ k 
v S = |
|S
Note that the optimization problem formulated in (5) and ⎩ W K log2 1 + SINRkVi , otherwise,
(6) is an NP-hard combinatorial optimization problem with i=1
nonlinear constraints, especially as the number of cellular UEs (9)
and D2D pairs grows, the computational complexity increases where |S k | denotes the number of members in the coalition,
rapidly. Therefore, in the following section, we formulate this Vi = Am or Dn , m ∈ M, n ∈ N , Vi ∈ S k , Φ represents the
resource allocation problem as a coalitional game and solve it empty set, and here Ck = S k in the expressions of SINRkAm
in a distributed manner with low computational complexity. and SINRkDn given in (1) and (2).
III. R ESOURCE A LLOCATION AS A C OALITION Although there may be many disjoint coalitions for a certain
F ORMATION G AME coalition type when the distributed resource assignment pro-
In this section, we formulate the resource assignment prob- cess concludes, only one coalition with the maximum coalition
lem among both cellular UEs and D2D pairs as a coalitional value of each coalition type can be allocated the corresponding
game with transferable utility (TU) and propose a merge-and- RB for the data transmission of the players within it. Thus,
split based coalition formation algorithm to solve it with low each player has the incentive to find optimal partners with the
computational complexity. In the proposed coalitional game, same interest forming larger coalitions to increase its counter
there involves a set of players, i.e., the cellular UEs and the to obtain the RB finally for data transmission.
D2D pairs in the considered network. Each player seeks to The payoff of each player in a coalition S k , k ∈ K, is
obtain an optimal RB for its individual data transmission, defined as the individual contribution to the coalition value
while it has to share the RB with some other players within that the player offers. Therefore, the payoff of the player Vi ,
the same resource group. i = 1, 2, . . . , |S k |, in coalition S k can be given as
   
A. Utility Function Definition φki = v S k − v S k /{Vi } , (10)
Here we define the utilities of the cellular UEs and the D2D where S k /{Vi } denotes the coalition transformed from S k by
pairs as the transmission rate it can achieve through the RB deleting Vi in it. Note that v (Φ) = 0 in our definition of the
allocated to them. Therefore, the utility of cellular UE Am , coalition value, thus φki = v S k if there is only one player Vi
m ∈ M, can be obtained as in coalition S k , i.e., S k = {Vi }. We can guarantee that finally

K  at most one cellular UE will stay in a coalition by the payoff
αm,k W
U Am = log2 1 + SINRkAm , (7) allocation policy that only the cellular UE has the highest
K payoff (note that this payoff of a cellular UE is calculated by
k=1

and the utility of D2D pair Dn , n ∈ N , can be obtained as (10) when supposing all the other cellular UEs are removed
from the current coalition) can obtain the payoff while the

K
βn,k W  payoffs of the other cellular UEs in the same coalition are set
U Dn = log2 1 + SINRkDn , (8)
K equal to a high negative value. Then, those cellular UEs with
k=1
negative payoffs will deviate from the coalition on their own
where SINRkAm , SINRkDn , αm,k , and βn,k are given in (1), initiative.
(2), (3), and (4), respectively. Considering there exists different types of coalitions and
Note that due to different performance on different RBs only the coalitions of the same type can be merged togeth-
for a certain communication link, each player in the defined er, we divide the defined coalitional game (T , v) into K
1891
coalitional sub-games, denoted by (T k , v k ), k ∈ K, where
T k = {Vi | δ(Vi ) = k, Vi ∈ T }, T = T 1 ∪ T 2 ∪ · · · ∪ T K ,
T k1 ∩ T k2 = Φ, k1 , k2 ∈ K, k1 = k2 , and v k is defined the
same as v in (9). However, the K coalitional sub-games cannot
proceed independently during the resource assignment process
since each player in the investigated network can change its
current identity due to the payoff it will obtain in the current
coalitional sub-game group and join in another coalitional sub-
game group to seek for the corresponding RB which may bring
it higher potential payoff. Thus, the K coalitional sub-games
need dynamically update its own group information once one
of the players makes a decision to change its current identity
during the resource assignment process.
IV. M ERGE - AND -S PLIT BASED C OALITION F ORMATION
A LGORITHM
In this section, we devise a distributed merge-and-split based
coalition formation algorithm to solve the resource assignment
problem in the investigated D2D communications underlaying
cellular network.
A. Coalition Formation Concepts
To construct a coalition formation process suitable to the
proposed coalitional game, we require several definitions as
follows.
Definition 1: A collection of coalitions, denoted by P, is
defined as a set P = {S1 , S2 , . . . , Sp } of mutually disjoint
coalitions Si ⊂ T . In other words, a collection is any arbitrary
group of disjoint coalitions Si of T not necessarily spanning
all the players
p of T . If a collection P spans all the players of
T , i.e., i=1 Si = T , then the collection is recognized as a
partition of T .
Definition
 2: Consider  two collections P = {S1 , . . . , Sp }
and Q = S1∗ , . . . , Sq∗ which are partitions of the same subset
T ∗ ⊆ T (i.e., same players in P and Q). Then, a comparison
relation  is defined as that PQ implies the way P partitions
T ∗ is preferred to the way Q partitions T ∗ .
Note that the motivation of the proposed coalition formation
game is to assign the RBs to the cellular UEs and the D2D
pairs for their individual data transmission effectively in a
distributed manner, which can achieve an optimized system
sum-rate with low computational complexity. Through the
coalition formation game, only one coalition with the max-
imum coalition value of each coalition type can be allocated
the corresponding RB for the data transmission of the players
within it, which meanwhile means that if a player cannot
join the coalition with the maximum coalition value of a
certain type, it will obtain nothing, its payoff is zero, since it
cannot get the RB for its data transmission when the coalition
formation process concludes. Thus, two disjoint coalitions
of the same coalition type are preferred to combine with
each other if they can form a stronger one with a higher
coalition value instead, as the players of them will have more
chance to win the corresponding RB for their individual data
transmission. Then, we define a new comparison relation with
respect to the investigated resource assignment problem as
follows.
Definition
 3: Consider  two collections P = {S1 , . . . , Sp }
and Q = S1∗ , . . . , Sq∗ with the same players in them. Then,
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the Max-Coalition order is defined as
 
P Q ⇔ max{v(S1 ), . . . , v(Sp )} > max{v(S1∗ ), . . . , v(Sq∗ )} ,
(11)
where max{· · · } means the maximum value of a vector.
B. Merge-and-Split Based Coalition Formation Algorithm
Using the coalition formation concepts defined in the previ-
ous subsection, we construct a distributed coalition formation
algorithm based on two simple rules denoted as “merge” and
“split” which permit to modify a partition of T [6].
 Merge Rule: Merge any set of coalitions {S1 , . . . , Sl }
whenever
 the merged form is preferred, i.e., where
l
Sj {S1 , . . . , Sl }, then, {S1 , . . . , Sl } −→
j=1 
l
j=1 Sj .
 
l
 Split Rule: Split any coalition j=1 Sj whenever a split
 
l
form is preferred, i.e., where {S1 , . . . , Sl } S
j=1 j ,
 
l
then, j=1 Sj −→ {S1 , . . . , Sl }.
According to the above rules, multiple coalitions can merge
into a larger coalition if merging yields a preferred parti-
tion based on the Max-Coalition order. This implies that a
group of players can agree to form a larger coalition, if the
merged coalition has a higher value than any of the disjoint
coalitions, which can improve the counter of the players for
winning the corresponding RB finally for their individual data
transmission. Note that the merge operation can only occur
among disjoint coalitions of the same coalition type due to
our assumption that only the players of the same identity,
i.e., seeking for the same RB currently, can form a coalition.
Similarly, an existing coalition can make a decision to split
into smaller disjoint coalitions if splitting yields a preferred
partition based on the Max-Coalition order.
Based on the defined merge and split rules, we construct a
distributed coalition formation algorithm as follows:
 Phase 1 - State Initialization:
• Each cellular UE and D2D pair acts as a player partici-
pating in the proposed coalitional game in order to acquire its
interested RB for individual data transmission. Each player,
denoted by Vi , initializes its attributes based on the CSI of its
own communication link.
Vi calculates its identity order list L(Vi ) according to
the SNR on different RBs. The identity order list disposes the
RB index with a higher SNR in the front and the RB index
with a lower SNR followed in order.
Vi initializes its current identity δ(Vi ) as the first
element in L(Vi ).
• The proposed coalitional game is divided into K coali-
tional sub-games. Each player in the proposed coalitional game
chooses to join in a corresponding coalitional sub-game based
on its current identity δ(Vi ), and is regarded as a disjoint
independent coalition.
 Phase 2 - Iterative Coalition Formation:
Repeat
Each sub-game deals with the merge-and-split based
coalition formation concurrently and independently until
reaching a temporal stable partition.
− Iteration index t = 0.
 − Repeat
6
x 10
4.2

(a) Ptk = Merge(Ttk ): coalitions in Ttk decide to Optimal Resource Assignment Scheme
merge into a temporal sub-partition Ptk based on the merge 4 Proposed Coalition Formation Scheme
Greedy Orthogonal Resource Assignment Scheme
rules.
3.8
(b) Qkt = Split(Ptk ): coalitions in Ptk decide to split
into a temporal sub-partition Qkt based on the split rules.

Network Sum−rate
3.6
(c) Update t = t + 1 and Ttk = Qkt .
− Until merge and split operations terminate. 3.4

Each player checks whether it is in the coalition with

3.2
the highest value in the current sub-game.
− If Vi with the current identity δ(Vi ) = k ∗ , k ∗ ∈ K, 3
is in the coalition with the highest value of type k ∗ , then Vi
stays the current state. 2.8

− Else, Vi removes k ∗ from the vector of its identity

order list and changes its identity by updating δ(Vi ). 2.6
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Total Number of Cellular UEs and D2D pairs
Each sub-game updates its own player group and gets Fig. 2. Comparison in terms of network sum-rate between different schemes.
ready to start another round merge-and-split based coalition
formation process to reach a new temporal stable partition if VI. C ONCLUSIONS
the player group of it is changed. In this paper, we have investigated the resource allocation
Until all the players either stay in the coalition with the issues for D2D communications underlaying cellular networks
highest value of a certain type or have an empty vector of the in a distributed manner. From a cooperative perspective, we
identity order list left. formulated this distributed resource allocation problem as a
 Phase 3 - Resource Assignment: coalition formation game and proposed a distributed merge-
• Each coalition reports its current identity and coalition and-split based coalition formation algorithm to process the
value to the BS, based on which the BS allocates each RB resource allocation problem effectively. Simulation results
to the coalition with the highest value of the corresponding show efficiency of the proposed scheme in terms of network
identity for the data transmission of its players. performances.

V. S IMULATION R ESULTS AND A NALYSIS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This work was jointly supported by the Academic Schol-
To evaluate the efficiency of the proposed merge-and-split
arship for Doctoral Candidates of Ministry of Education
based coalition formation algorithm for the D2D communica-
of China, the National Natural Science Foundation of Chi-
tions underlaying cellular network, we conduct the following
na (Grant no. 61101079), the Science Foundation for the
simulations. Consider an isolated cellular cell, where tradition-
Youth Scholar of Ministry of Education of China (Grant
al cellular communications and D2D communications co-exist
no. 20110001120129), the State Key Laboratory of In-
and can share the RB for their individual data transmission.
tegrated Services Networks, Xidian University (Grant no.
The cellular UEs and D2D pairs are distributed randomly
ISN13-05), the National Nature Science Foundation of China
within the network, where each D2D pair has a fixed distance
61061130561 and 61222104, the National 973 project under
between the transmitter and the receiver. The main simulation
grant 2013CB336700, and the Ph.D. Programs Foundation of
parameters are set as follows: The cell radius is 500 m; the
Ministry of Education of China 20110001120129.
D2D pair distance is 10 m; the channel bandwidth is 20 MHz
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