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Reforming Budget Ritual and Budget Practice: The Case of Performance Management Implementation in Virginia
Reforming Budget Ritual and Budget Practice: The Case of Performance Management Implementation in Virginia
To cite this article: Herb Hill & Matthew Andrews (2005) Reforming Budget ritual and
Budget practice: The Case of Performance Management Implementation in Virginia,
International Journal of Public Administration, 28:3-4, 255-272, DOI: 10.1081/
PAD-200047319
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Intl Journal of Public Administration, 28: 255–272, 2005
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Inc.
ISSN 0190-0692 print / 1532-4265 online
DOI: 10.1081/PAD-200047319
Herb Hill
Virginia Department of Planning and Budget, Richmond, Virginia, USA
Matthew Andrews
Public Sector Specialist, The World Bank, Europe and Central Asia
Region Washington, DC, USA
INTRODUCTION
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the positions or perspectives of the Virginia Department of Planning and Budget
or the World Bank.
Correspondence: Herb Hill, Virginia Department of Planning and Budget, Ninth Street
Office Building, 200 North 9th Street, Room 418, Richmond, VA, 23219; E-mail:
hhill@dpb.state.va.us
256 Hill and Andrews
Act (GPRA) enacted in 1993 could be repeated for many experiences with
performance management systems: “Despite seven years on the books, the
1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) is not used widely
among Capitol Hill decision makers.”[3]
The relatively lackluster showing of performance management efforts has
not dampened demand for such reforms, however. Governments wishing to be
perceived as operating in a “businesslike” manner have adopted the belief that
they must have the basic organizational infrastructure of a performance man-
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BACKGROUND
For most of the twentieth century Virginia’s budget process resembled that of
most other US states, focused on ensuring conformity to process, expenditure
control, and fiscal probity. In the 1980s and 1990s pressure mounted through-
out the United States to extend the focus of budgeting and financial manage-
ment systems to also include concern for performance. It not only mattered
that government entities had consistent expenditure controls and followed
standard procedures, they also needed to be accountable for the results of their
spending. It was argued that concerns about performance would enhance citizen
Reforming Budget Ritual and Budget Practice 257
while the last also involves the legislature (which ratifies the budget). Figure 1
shows the linkages between these four components. Because these processes
are designed to work together to manage the performance of state government,
this system is referred to as the Virginia’s “performance management system.”
Taken as a whole, these components provide multiple streams of informa-
tion that policy and decision-makers, the general public, and state employees
can use to manage strategy and to improve and communicate the performance
of government services. The components are interrelated in a way that is
meant to both entrench a performance orientation into the government culture
and to provide the tools necessary to operationalize such culture.
This section aims to provide some detail about outstanding factors influencing
Virginia’s effort to develop a performance management reform that would
change both budget ritual and practice. The main factors identified for discussion
are the legislative basis for reform; having a core agency to drive the reform
process; ensuring a highly integrated, results-oriented financial management
process; ensuring high levels of citizen engagement; and ensuring that the
performance management systems are tailored to be useful.
Reforming Budget Ritual and Budget Practice 261
Virginia’s reform is largely based on formal orders and legislation. The earl-
iest mandate was a Governor’s Executive Order in 1995, which set the tone
for all reforms to follow and signaled the State’s intention to be performance
oriented. Legislation was also used in consistent fashion to ensure that the
reform gained momentum and to gradually entrench both the performance
mindset in government as well as practical processes facilitating performance-
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• The Code of Virginia directs the Department of Planning and Budget (DPB)
to develop and operate a system of standardized reports of program and
financial performance for management. It also directs DPB to develop,
coordinate, and implement a performance management system involving
strategic planning, performance measurement, evaluation, and performance
budgeting within state government.
• House Bill 1065, 2000, amended § 2.1-391, established a Performance
Management Advisory Committee to “provide input regarding the direction
and results of the state’s performance management efforts.”
• House Bill 1847, 2001, amended § 2.1-391, of the Code of Virginia requires
DPB to submit annual reports of performance measurement results.
• House Bill 1003, 2002, amended § 30-133, of the Code of Virginia requires
the Auditor of Public Accounts to review certain policy, planning, and fiscal
information required of state agencies and to determine whether the agen-
cies are providing and reporting appropriate financial and performance
measures; determine the accuracy of the management system used by the
agency to generate the information and its report; and report the results of
the audits of state agencies annually to the General Assembly.
From this brief list, it is obvious that the State legislated along a
consistent reform line continuously over the first few reform years. This
created a legislative underpinning for reform that communicated the
state’s intention to successfully implement the reform. It also provided a
way for political representatives to show their support for reform and
ensured that issues arising in the reform process (such as the need for
reform audits in 2002) received formal attention. Legislation also protects
reform from periods of political change. While it does not replace the pos-
itive influence a supportive governor can have, it ensures continuity in
periods of executive change. In this light, Pennsylvania’s chief informa-
tion officer, Charles Gerhards, is correct in emphasizing the importance of
a strong and supportive executive in reform: “The governor can make
planets glide through the universe with predictability and precision.”[12]
We contend that he goes too far, however, in stating that “No gubernatorial
gravity means chaos.”
262 Hill and Andrews
Certainly a non-supportive governor can cause reform chaos, but not in the
presence of established legislation, which create a protective institutional cocoon
for reform. At the 2002 Managing Performance Conference, Jim Chrisinger of
the Iowa Department of Management shared his experience in such situations.
He agrees that “Political transitions can pose particular administrative chal-
lenges” but also discusses how political change in Iowa did not derail perfor-
mance measurement reforms because these were highly institutionalized:
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results focus has also been developed in the activities of accounting and audit-
ing agencies and in legislative oversight bodies:
• The Auditor of Public Accounts (APA) audits the accounts of every state
entity. APA’s staff conduct both financial and performance audits. The lat-
ter involve examining whether entities acquire, protect, and use resources
economically; causes of inefficiencies; whether entities comply with appro-
priate laws and regulations; and the degree to which entities achieve
intended results. The APA also regularly reviews performance measures
included in the state’s performance management system.
• Virginia’s legislative oversight agency, the Joint Legislative Audit and
Review Commission (JLARC), provides the General Assembly with infor-
mation for use in legislative decision-making, to monitor and report
whether state agencies and programs are in compliance with legislative
intent concerning appropriations and objectives, determine whether state
agencies and programs are operating efficiently and effectively, and com-
municate findings and recommendations in this regard.
and how they are provided. In these contexts, performance management systems
need to be focused on specific, operational aspects of services to be useful.
Policy-makers are selected for employment through a political process
and usually are closely associated with a political party or leader. They may or
may not have expertise in the area of oversight, but have a clear ideological
orientation and understand how this orientation relates to policy priorities. To
support their advocacy efforts, their information needs are typically more stra-
tegic and political than operational in nature. The primary reason that these
individuals use performance management systems, it can be argued, is to
strengthen their position in the policy-making process and/or their opportuni-
ties for political advancement. Political landscapes can be highly competitive
with continuously shifting issues, and the economic and political conse-
quences of changes in policy-making influence can be significant. Savvy policy-
makers in these contexts naturally seek to minimize opportunities that provide
their opponents with useful information. Different strategies can be used in
this context to limit the distribution of performance information. For example,
policy-makers may officially classify more “sensitive” performance informa-
tion, thereby restricting its distribution and ability to be obtained through
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. The design of performance
information systems needs to take such strategic behavior into account.
The Virginia reform experience has placed great emphasis on early
determination of whether service delivery staff or policy-makers are the pri-
mary users of the system. The results of such identification process have been
complex, however, as the primary users of performance information are
numerous: the public, executive branch officials, legislative branch officials,
budget staff, and line agencies—all requiring specific types of information
for specific purposes.
Reforming Budget Ritual and Budget Practice 267
vice, the efficiency of the processes, service quality, and the outputs and out-
comes of services. The intention is that the analysis of this information will
make the operation and results of the program as “transparent” as possible to
service-delivery staff. General planning statements and a few performance
measures pertaining to one or two aspects of services are insufficient for these
purposes.
To meet the needs of policy-makers, a performance management system
has been developed that allows politicians to assess performance in relation to
a specific policy or program in the mix of important economic, educational,
social, and environmental problems being debated. Policy-makers can use
information to identify and assess the performance of programs as they affect
key outcomes, aiding them in developing advocacy positions in relation to
budget items. This type of information rarely results in operational “transpar-
ency,” but should help inform perceptions about a set of policy priorities and
strengthen the political position of the policy-makers advocating them.
The process of user identification has been crucial to ensuring reform
implementation progress and reform usefulness in Virginia. As the system
has been developed and refined, more specific subgroups of users within
these two general categories have been identified and their information
needs, in turn, have influenced the specific structure and processes used by
the system. Apart from affecting decisions about the type of information to
provide, the concern over who is receiving information has influenced infor-
mation system design in relation to the timing of information collection and
reporting:
This article asserts that GPRA, as well as other systems like it, could be
more successfully implemented if decision-makers explicitly clarified the pur-
pose of the performance management system as supporting service delivery or
policy-making and fashion it accordingly. This is a difficult challenge, given
that policy-makers are the senior decision makers in government, and can
exploit for political purposes the symbolic value of performance management
systems regardless of the system’s operational success or failure. The incen-
tives for clearly and explicitly defining the primary purpose of a performance
management system and structuring it accordingly are, therefore, relatively
weak. When such incentives are in place, however, the next step is to ensure
through the implementation process that different users find performance
information valuable.
To provide an ongoing assessment of the perceived value of perfor-
mance information, Virginia developed the Performance Management
Index (PMI). The Performance Management Index (PMI) was developed
to answer the following basic questions: To what degree are all state
270 Hill and Andrews
systematically.
The PMI intended to provide a “quick look” at how state agencies are
doing with several basic processes an organization must implement to
manage performance systematically. In this sense, the PMI provides stake-
holders in the Commonwealth of Virginia with a general indication of the
level of statewide commitment and action concerning performance man-
agement. Providing this “snapshot” is intended to assist in developing an
understanding of reform implementation progress and success. It has been
vital in providing reformers with an assessment of reform implementation
and ideas on where reform should be re-focused and reform elements
strengthened.
No. Question
CONCLUSION
institutional acceptance.
The main factors that are suggested to have led to implementation success
are the strong legislative basis for reform; the creation of a core agency to
drive the reform process; the emphasis on ensuring reforms facilitate the
development of a highly integrated, results-oriented financial management
process; ensuring high levels of citizen engagement; and ensuring the perfor-
mance management systems are tailored to be useful. These factors all com-
bine to facilitate a setting in which participants in the budget and financial
management process have incentives to use the reforms and are pressured by
one another to do so. As such, performance management becomes both valu-
able as ceremony (accepted socially) and practice (accepted substantially).
REFERENCES