1.) Sy Sr.

vs IAC, 162 SCRA 130 (1988) 1

2.) Gallar vs Husain, GR# L-20954, May 29, 1967 3

3.) Coronel vs IAC, GR#L-70191, October 29, 1987 -

4.) Caragay-Layno vs Hon. CA, GR# 52064, December 26, 1984 4

5.) Anastacia Vdade Aviles vs CA and Camilio Aviles, GR# 95748, Nov. 21, 1996 5

6.) Aznar Brothers Realty Co. vs Aying 458 SCRA 496 6

Case 1
Sy Sr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
162 SCRA 130
June 16, 1988
Facts:
The petitioners alleged that eight (8) hectares of land along the South
Superhighway in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, valued at more than P 50 milIon
is involved in these cases. They question the decision which, through a
technicality, would nullify their titles, deprive them of their properties, and
validate titles allegedly defective on their faces alone.
Henry Munar Chan applied for the registration of a parcel of land located in
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The case was docketed as LRC Case No. Q-335 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch. On February 21,
1974, a decision was rendered approving Chan's application
After the issuance of the decree, Chan continued to make several
assignments and transfer of portions of the subject parcel of land.
Corresponding certificates of title were issued to his assignees.
On February 2, 1979, Teoville Development Corporation filed a complaint for
quieting of title and damages with preliminary injunction against Henry
Munar Chan and his assignees. It alleged among others that: (1) Teoville
Development Corporation is the owner of parcels of land in Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 268165, S-27367,
S-27368, 188445, 188447 and 188347, all of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal;
(2) said parcels of land are part of a large parcel of land acquired from its
predecessor-in-interest, the Villonco Realty Company; (3) said parcels of land
were originally registered as Original Certificate of Title No. 2553 of the
Registry of Deeds for Rizal issued in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 10766, Case No. 34 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal on May 7, 1919 in favor of El Colegio de
San Jose; and (4) that the boundaries of the registered parcels of land of
Henry Munar Chan overlap those covered by the corporation's transfer
certificates of title.
1
The corporation prayed that the decrees of registration, original certificates
of title, and transfer certificates of title issued to Chan and his assignees be
declared as null and void.
On April 30, 1981, Philippine Machinery Parts Manufacturing Company, Inc.,
one of the assignees of Henry Munar Chan filed a complaint for quieting of
title with preliminary injunction and damages against Teoville with the same
court where Civil Case No. 6966-P was pending. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 9055-P.
Phil. Machinery entered into the parcels of land covered by its transfer
certificates of title, started digging them up, and removing soils therefrom.
Teoville protested against the intrusion on the ground that the same
properties were covered by its own transfer certificates of title.
The two cases were tried jointly by the court’s Branch XXIX.
After trial on the merits, the trial judge promulgated two separate decisions
in the two cases. The dispositive portion of the decision dated November 25,
1982 in Civil Case No. 6966-P states:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered upholding the plaintiff’s better
right to the properties in question, declaring as null and void Decrees of
Registration Nos. N-150479 to N-150484, inclusive, Original Certificates of
Title Nos. 10161 to 10166, inclusive, and all transfer certificates of title
emanating therefrom, and sentencing the defendants Henry Munar Chan
and the Sy Family, Anthony D. Sy, Sr., Anthony Sy, Jr., Lory T. Ngan and
Wayne T. Sy, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00
for attorney’s fees, plus costs of suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision dated November 29, 1982 in Civil Case
No. 9055-P states:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint, with
costs against the plaintiff, and, conformably with the judgment of this Court
in Civil Case No. 6966-P, Decree of Registration No. N-150482, OCT No.
10162 and TCT Nos. 29684, 103210 and 103219, and all succeeding transfer
certificates of title covering former Lot F, are hereby declared null and void.
The plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendant corporation the sum of
P162,800.00, as actual damages, and P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees."
Copies of the decisions were sent to Nemesio Diaz, but the copies were
returned to the court on December 11, 1982 unserved with annotations
from the post office on their respective envelopes that the addressee had
moved out of the stated address.
On February 1, 1983, Teoville, as plaintiff in C.C. No. P and defendant in C.C.
No. 9055-P, filed in both cases an exparte motion for a writ of execution
stating that the decisions in both cases had become final and executory. It
alleged that although there was a failure to deliver the copies of the decision,
this did not suspend the running of the period for the losing parties to either
move for a new trial or to appeal from the decisions for the reason that their
counsel, Nemesio Diaz did not file a formal notice of a change of address.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 66741 also contend that the complaint of Teoville for
quieting of title in Civil Case No. 6966-P is barred by Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496) since it seeks to nullify and void the decrees of
registration and the titles issued thereunder pursuant to a valid and final
decision of Land Registration Case No. Q-335.
Issue:
As between the parties, who has a better right over the said land.
Ruling:
Accordingly, the trial court's sending of copies of its decisions in a P50 million
controversy to an old address, knowing fully well that the addressee having
already moved would no longer receive them, does not serve to start the
running of the period to appeal. And since the records are not clear as to
when the losing parties may be considered to have received copies of the
trial court's decision, we rule for purposes of these petitions, that the period
to appeal shall commence upon our decision becoming final and executory.
In the case of Gitgano v. Borromeo (133 SCRA 437), we interpreted the law
as follows:
2
The basic rule, therefore, is after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree of
registration is no longer open to review or attack, even though the issuance
thereof may have been attended by fraud. (Section 55, Act 496; Arnamento
v. Guerrero, 96 SCRA 178; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648). After
one year from its entry, a decree of registration becomes indefeasible and
conclusive. (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207).
This does not mean, however, that the aggrieved party is without remedy at
law. If the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an
action for reconveyance is still available."
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of
the decree, is not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in
the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or if the property has passed
unto the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. Such a
doctrine goes back to the 1919 landmark decision of Cabanos v. Register of
Deeds of Laguna, 40 Phil. 620' (Quiñano v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 221).
Teoville, plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6966-P alleged that the subject parcel of
land covered by petitioners’ (defendants in Civil Case No. 6966-P) certificates
of title are also covered by certificates of titles in its name.
The private respondent was correct in filing a complaint for quieting of title
pursuant to Article 476 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title
to real property or any interest therein.
This is an ordinary Civil remedy sanctioned by Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act. The one year prescriptive clause of Section 38 is not
applicable in cases of double registration.
Digest by: SLA
Case 2
ELIAS GALLAR vs.HERMENEGILDA HUSAIN, ET AL.,BONIFACIO HUSAIN
G.R. No. L-20954
May 24, 1967
Facts:
A hectare of rice land in Cabatuan, Iloilo, is the subject of this controversy.
On January 9, 1919, Teodoro Husain, the owner, sold this land to Serapio
Chichirita for P30, reserving for himself the right to repurchase it within six
years. Teodoro Husain did not redeem the land, although shortly after the
execution of the deed of sale, that is, on January 28, 1919, the vendee
a retro, Chichirita, transferred his right to Graciana Husain, sister of the
vendor aretro, in what purports to be a resale of the land. Graciana Husain
subsequently transferred her rights to the land to appellee Elias Gallar in
exchange for one cow. The transaction is recorded in a second note added
on the reverse side of the deed of sale. Possession of the land, together with
the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of Teodoro Husain, was
delivered on the same occasion to appellee(plaintiff) who since then has
been in possession of the land.
In an affidavit dated March 6, 1928, Chichirita confirmed the "redemption" of
the land by Graciana Husain. In another affidavit of the same date, Graciana
Husain for her part confirmed having subsequently sold the land to the
appellee(Gallar).1äwphï1.ñët
In 1960, appellee(Gallar) asked the Cadastral Court for the issuance to him of
a transfer certificate of title but the court dismissed his petition for lack of
jurisdiction. (The court, however, granted appellee's request for the
amendment of the certificate of title by changing the surname of "Osaen" to
"Husain.") He, therefore, filed this suit in the Court of Instance of Iloilo on
October 10, 1960 to compel Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain, as heirs of
3
Teodoro Husain, to execute a deed of conveyance in his favor so that he
could get a transfer certificate of title. He also asked for damages. In their
answer, Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain denied the sale and contended
that the agreement between their father and Serapio Chichirita was that of a
mortgage to secure a loan of P30. They claimed that the mortgage had been
discharged on January 28, 1919 when Graciana Husain paid Teodoro Husain's
debt to Chichirita. The trial court found that after acquiring the land from
Teodoro Husain, Serapio Chichirita sold it to Graciana Husain who in turn
sold it to the appellee(Gallar). Accordingly, it ordered the
appellants(respondents) to execute a deed of conveyance of the land in favor
of the appellee on the authority of our ruling in Sapto v. Fabiana, G.R. No. L-
11285, May 16, 1958. From this judgment, Bonifacio Husain brought this
appeal to this Court. He contends that the land in question, which is
identified as Lot No. 766 of the Cadastral Survey of Cabatuan, Iloilo and
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 4521 of the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo, is not the same land which Teodoro Husain sold to Serapio Chichirita
on January 9,1919. According to appellant he raised this question at the trial
but the lower court passed it up in its decision. The records on appeal do not
disclose that appellant made such a claim.
Issue:
Who has the better right between plaintiff and defendant?
Ruling:
Otherwise, the records do not show any allegation made much less evidence
presented, by appellant of the supposed difference in the identity of the land
sold in the deed of pacto de retro sale and the land now in question. Indeed,
the only defense put up by appellant was that the pacto de retro sale was in
reality a mortgage and that, at any rate, appellee's action was barred by the
statute of limitations. In so doing, appellant joined issues with the appellee
and he will not now be permitted to bring up new matters on appeal as this
would constitute changing of theory — so utterly unfair to the adverse
party1 that the lower court deliberately, perhaps, ignored the point.
Still it is argued that no action can be brought on the basis of the deed of sale
with a right of repurchase because the land in question was redeemed a few
days after it had been sold. While it is indeed true that the first note written
on the reverse side of the deed of sale speaks of the "redemption" of the
land, there is no evidence to show that the vendee, Graciana Husain, was
acting in behalf of her brother Teodoro Husain, in the exercise the latter's
right of redemption. Now, unlike a debt which a third party may satisfy even
against the debtor's will2 the right of repurchase may be exercised only by
the vendor in whom the right is recognized by contract3 or by any person to
whom the right may have been transferred.4 Graciana Husain must,
therefore, be deemed to have acquired the land in her own right, subject
only to Teodoro Husain's right of redemption. As the new owner she had a
perfect right to dispose of the land as she in fact did when she exchanged it
for a cattle with the appellee.
Now, when Teodoro Husain failed to redeem the land within the stipulated
period, i.e., January 9, 1925, its ownership became consolidated in the
appellee(plaintiff). True the successive sales are in a private instrument, but
they are valid just the same.5 By the delivery of possession of the land on
April 2, 1919 the sale was consummated and title was transferred to the
appellee(Gallar). Indeed, this action is not for specific performance; all it
seeks is to quiet title,6to remove the cloud cast on appellee's ownership as a
result of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made by their predecessor.
And, as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is
imprescriptible.7 Appellant's argument that the action has prescribed would
be correct if they were in possession as the action to quiet title would then
be an action for recovery of real property which must be brought within the
statutory period of limitation governing such actions.
P.S. Galibog ko sa facts ambot dmd basa lang mu sa full text kay 4 pages ra.
Bantay mu sa appellant ug appellee nga word.
Digest by: WJLB
4
Case # 4
Caragay –Layno vs. Hon. CA and Salvador Estrada
GR No. 52064
December 26, 1984
Facts: It was established by a relocation survey that the disputed portion of
the lot is a bigger parcel of sugar and coconut land. The entire parcel is
covered by an OCT under the name of Mariano De Vera. His intestate was
administer by his widow and later by her nephew, the Respondent herein.
Petitioner and the respondent were first cousins, “both orphans, who lived
together under one roof in the care of a common aunt.”
As Administratrix, DE VERA's widow filed in Special Proceedingsan
Inventoryof all properties of the deceased. Because of the discrepancy in
area mentioned in the Inventory as 5,147 square meters (as filed by the
widow), and that in the title as 8,752 square meters, ESTRADA repaired to
the Disputed Property and found that the northwestern portion,
subsequently surveyed to be 3,732 square meters, was occupied by
petitioner. Respondent demanded that they vacate the Disputed Portion
since it was titled in the name of the deceased DE VERA, but petitioners
refused claiming that the land belonged to them and, before them, to
JULIANA's father Juan Caragay. Respondent then instituted suit against
petitioner for the recovery of the disputed portion, which she resisted,
mainly on the ground that the disputed portion had been fraudulently or
mistakenly included in the OCT so that a constructive or implied trust existed
in her favor. She then counterclaimed for reconveyance in the sense that
title be issued in her favor.
RTC: In favor of Respondent. It ordered petitioner to vacate. CA affirmed.
Issue: WON the CA erred in declaring the respondent as the rightful owner of
the disputed portion of lot.
Held: The evidence discloses that the disputed potion was originally
possessed openly, continuously and uninterruptedly in the concept of an
owner by Juan Caragay, P’s deceased father. It was also proved that Realty
taxes were also religiously paid from 1938 to 1972.
Tacking the previous possession of her father to her own, they had been in
actual open, continuous and uninterrupted possession in the concept of
owner for about forty five (45) years, until said possession was disturbed in
1966 when respondent informed JULIANA that the Disputed Portion was
registered in Mariano De Vera's name.
To substantiate her claim of fraud in the inclusion of the Disputed Portion in
OCT No. 63, petitioner, an unlettered woman, declared that during his
lifetime, respondent, her first cousin, and whom she regarded as a father as
he was much older, borrowed from her the Tax Declaration of her land
purportedly to be used as collateral for his loan and sugar quota application;
that relying on her cousin's assurances, she acceded to his request and was
made to sign some documents the contents of which she did not even know
because of her ignorance; that she discovered the fraudulent inclusion of the
Disputed Portion in OCT No. 63 only in 1966 when respondent so informed
her and sought to eject them.
Of significance is the fact, as disclosed by the evidence, that for twenty (20)
years from the date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when this suit
for recovery of possession was instituted, neither the deceased DE VERA up
to the time of his death in 1951, nor his successors-in-interest, had taken
steps to possess or lay adverse claim to the Disputed Portion. They may,
therefore be said to be guilty of laches as would effectively derail their cause
of action. Respondent took interest in recovering the said portion only when
he noticed the discrepancy in areas in the Inventory of Property and in the
title.
Inasmuch as respondent had failed to assert any rights over the Disputed
Portion during his lifetime, nor did he nor his successors-in-interest possess it
for a single moment: but that, petitioner had been in actual, continuous and
open possession thereof to the exclusion of all and sundry, the inescapable
inference is, fraud having been unsubstantiated, that it had been erroneously
included in OCT No. 63. The mistake is confirmed by the fact that deducting
3,732 sq. ms., the area of the Disputed Portion from 8,752 sq. ms., the area
of Lot 1 in OCT No. 63, the difference is 5,020 sq. ms., which closely
approximates the area of 5,147 sq. ms., indicated in the Inventory of
Property of DE VERA. In fact, the widow by limiting the area in said Inventory
to only 5,147 sq. ms., in effect, recognized and admitted that the Disputed
Portion of 3,132 sq. ms., did not form part of the decedent's estate.
The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily wreak havoc on the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title. For, mere possession of a certificate of title
5
under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder's true ownership
of all the property described therein for he does not by virtue of said
certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included.
A Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to persons who
have never asserted any right of ownership over it. The Land Registration Act
as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith
and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission
of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the expense of another.
Petitioner, whose property had been wrongfully registered in the name of
another but which had not yet been passed into the hands of third parties,
can properly seek its reconveyance. Prescription cannot be invoked against
petitioner for the reason that as lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed
Portion, her cause of action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet
title to the property, falls within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet
title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible. Her undisturbed
possession over a period of fifty two (52) years gave her a continuing right to
seek the aid of a Court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and the effect on her own title. Besides, under the
circumstances, petitioner's right to quiet title, to seek reconveyance, and to
annul OCT. No. 63 accrued only in 1966 when she was made aware of a claim
adverse to her own. It was only then that the statutory period of prescription
may be said to have commenced to run against her.The judgment under
review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The disputed portion should be
issued a new certificate of title in favor of petitioner.
Digest by:MDLP
Case 5
Anastacia Vda. De Aviles vs CA and Camilio Aviles
GR# 95748
November 21, 1996
Facts:
A complaint for quieting of title was filed by Camilio Aviles against
petitioners.

There was an agreement of partition of land between Camilio, Anastacio, and
Eduardo. Camilio’s share was 14, 470 sqm .
The respective area(s) alloted to them was agreed and measured before the
execution of the agreement but Camilio was not present when the
measurement was made. Camilio agreed to have a smaller area because his
brother Eduardo asked him that he wanted a bigger share because he has
several children to support.
The portion in litigation however is part of the share given to him in the
agreement of partition. At present, Camilio is only occupying an area of
12,686 square meters which is smaller than his actual share.
PLAINTIFFS aver that they are the actual possessors of a parcel of land
situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan. This property is the share of their
father, Eduardo Aviles (brother of the Camilio), in the estate of their
deceased parents, Ireneo Aviles and Anastacia Salazar.
Camilo Aviles (boundary owner) asserted a color of title over the northern
portion of the property with an area of approximately 1,200 square meters
by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes,
thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs
over said portion.
The Trial Court ordered the parties to employ the services of a Land Surveyor
of the Bureau of Lands, Region I, San Fernando, La Union, to relocate and
determine the extent and the boundary limit of the land of the defendant on
its southern side in order that the fourteen thousand four hundred seventy
(14,470) square meters which is the actual area given to the defendant be
determined;
Court of Appeals affirmed in part the decision of the trial court, reasoning
that a special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for
settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an
ejectment suit instead.
Issue:
6
Whether or not the action for quieting of title is the proper remedy for
settling a boundary dispute
Held:
The facts presented unmistakably constitute a clear case of boundary
dispute, which is not cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title.
In fine, to avail the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that
there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which
constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owners title
to or interest in real property.
The construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the disputed property and
the moving of earthen dikes are not the clouds or doubts which can be
removed in an action for quieting of title.
Digest by: KRH
CASE 6
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY VS AYING
458 SCRA 496
MAY 16, 2005
FACTS:
The disputed property is Lot No. 4399 with an area of 34,325 square
meters located at Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu City. CrisantaMaloloy-on petitioned for
the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over said parcel of land. After
her death in 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the
issuance of a decree in the name of CrisantaMaloloy-ons eight children,
namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and
Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The certificate of title was, however, lost during
the war.
Subsequently, all the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-
Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3,
1964, conveying the subject parcel of land to herein petitioner Aznar
Brothers Realty Company. Said deed was registered with the Register of
Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on March 6, 1964 under Act No. 3344 (the law
governing registration for unregistered land), and since then, petitioner had
been religiously paying real property taxes on said property.
In 1988, herein petitioner filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the
Original Title as the original title over the subject property had been lost
during the war. On April 12, 1988, the court granted said petition, thereby
directing the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to issue a reconstituted title
in the name of the abovementioned Aying siblings. Thus, Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. RO-2856 was issued.
In 1991, petitioner, claiming to be the rightful owner of the subject
property, sent out notices to vacate, addressed to persons occupying the
property. Unheeded, petitioner then filed a complaint for ejectment against
the occupants before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Lapu-Lapu City.
the MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the property. Meanwhile,
herein respondents, along with other persons claiming to be descendants of
the eight Aying siblings, all in all numbering around 220 persons, had filed a
complaint for cancellation of the Extra-Judicial Partition with Absolute Sale,
recovery of ownership, injunction and damages with the RTC of Lapu-
LapuCity.
The complaint was dismissed twice without prejudice. In their amended
complaint, herein respondents alleged that: they are co-owners of subject
property, being descendants of the registered owners thereof under OCT
they had been in actual, peaceful, physical, open, adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession in concept of owner of subject parcel of land since
time immemorial; their possession was disturbed only in the last quarter of
1991 when some of them received notices to vacate from petitioner and
several weeks thereafter, earthmoving equipment entered the disputed land,
bulldozing the same and destroying plants, trees and concrete monuments
(mohon); respondents discovered that such activities were being undertaken
by petitioner together with Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.;
petitioner claimed to be the owner of subject property by virtue of an
extra-judicial partition of real estate with deed of absolute sale executed in
petitioners favor by the alleged heirs of CrisantaMaloloy-on; the
aforementioned extra-judicial partition of real estate with deed of absolute
7
sale is a fraud and is null and void ab initio because not all the co-owners of
subject property affixed their signature on said document and some of the
co-owners who supposedly signed said document had been dead at the time
of the execution thereof; petitioner entered subject land in bad faith.
Petitioner alleged that it had been in actual possession of subject land
as owner thereof by virtue of the extra-judicial partition of real property and
deed of absolute sale executed in its favor; that in fact, it had been paying
taxes thereon religiously;
Petitioner then raised the affirmative defenses of failure to state cause
of action and prescription, as it took respondents 27 years, 10 months and
27 days to file the action to recover subject property, when an action to
recover property based on an implied trust should be instituted within 4
years from discovery of the fraud.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision ruling that respondent’s
evidence failed to prove that the extra-judicial partition with deed of
absolute sale was a totally simulated or fictitious contract and concluded that
said document is valid, thus, effectively conveying to petitioner the property
in question. It further held that respondents action had prescribed in that the
action is considered as one for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust, it prescribed in 10 years from the registration of the deed
on March 6, 1964; and if the action is considered as one for annulment of
contract on the ground of fraud, it should have been filed within 4 years from
discovery of the fraud.
Herein respondents appealed the foregoing decision to the CA and CA
contested Decision.The heirs of Emiliano Aying, Simeon Aying and Roberta
Aying are hereby declared as the lawful owners of the contested property
but equivalent only to 3/8.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA
decision on the following grounds:
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not respondents cause of action is imprescriptible;
(2) if their right to bring action is indeed imprescriptible, may the
principle of laches apply.
 RULING:
In the case at bar, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove the date
from which the prescriptive period began to run. Evidence as to the date
when the ten-year prescriptive period began exists only as to the heirs of
Roberta Aying, as WenceslaoSumalinog admitted that they learned of the
existence of the document of sale in the year 1967. As to the heirs of
Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, there is no clear evidence of the date
when they discovered the document conveying the subject land to
petitioner. Petitioner miserably failed to adduce proof of when the heirs of
Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying were notified of the subject document.
Hence, with regard to said heirs, the Court may consider the admission in the
amended complaint that they learned of the conveyance of the disputed
land only in 1991 when petitioner sent notices to vacate to the occupants of
the subject land, as the date from which the ten-year prescriptive period
should be reckoned.
Respondents filed their Amended Complaint on December 6,
1993. Thus, with regard to respondent heirs of Roberta Aying who had
knowledge of the conveyance as far back as 1967, their cause of action is
already barred by prescription when said amended complaint was filed as
they only had until 1977 within which to bring action. As to the respondent
heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying, they were able to initiate their action for
reconveyance of property based on implied or constructive trust well within
the ten-year prescriptive period reckoned from 1991 when they were sent by
petitioner a notice to vacate the subject property.
Evidently, laches cannot be applied against respondent heirs of Emiliano
and Simeon Aying, as they took action to protect their interest well within
the period accorded them by law.
DIGEST BY: JOY MONTERO