PROPERTY DIGESTS FOR FINALS

Ramon was however willing to vacate the property. Javier then promised to
TOPIC: Possession and Kinds (Elements) make arrangements with Ramon to vacate the property and to pay the latter
his disturbance compensation. Hence, they proceeded to enter into a
Sps. Yu vs. Pacleb
Contract to Sell canceling the Agreement mentioned. However, Javier failed
G.R. No. 172172. February 24, 2009
to comply with his obligations.

FACTS:
Javier did not appear in the proceedings and was declared in default.
Respondent Pacleb and his late first wife are the registered owners
of a parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan, Dasmarias, Cavite, covered by a TCT
RTC Decision: Javier is directed to deliver the certificate of title of the land
aka. (The Langcaan Property).
to the Sps. Yu. Said Decision and its Certificate of Finality were annotated on
the TCT.
The Langcaan Property became the subject of three (3) documents
purporting to transfer its ownership.
Petitioner spouses Yu and Ramon and the latters wife executed
1. A Deed of Absolute Sale entered into between Spouses Pacleb and
a Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng
Del Rosario.
Pagtalikod sa Karapatan whereby Ramon waived his tenancy rights over the
2. A Deed of Absolute Sale entered into between Del Rosario and
Langcaan Property for P 500,000.
Javier.
3. A Contract to Sell entered between Javier and petitioner spouses Yu
Later, Respondent Pacleb filed a Complaint for annulment of deed of sale
 Sps. Yu agreed to pay Javier a total consideration of P900,000.
and other documents arising from it. Alleged that the deed of sale between
 P600,000 (P200,000 as previous payment and P400,000 to be
Del Rosario was spurious as their signatures thereon were forgeries.
paid upon execution of the contract) was acknowledged as
Respondent later dismissed the case without prejudice.
received by Javier and P300,000 remained as balance.
 Javier undertook to deliver possession of the Langcaan Property
Petitioner spouses Yu filed an action for forcible entry against respondent
and to sign a deed of absolute sale within thirty (30) days from Pacleb with the MTC. Alleged that they had prior physical possession of the
execution of the contract. Langcaan Property through their trustee, Ramon, until the latter was ousted
by respondent.
All the aforementioned sales were not registered.
MTC Decision: In favor of petitioner spouses Yu
Petitioner spouses Yu filed with the RTC for specific performance and RTC Decision: Affirmed
damages against Javier to compel the latter to deliver to them ownership CA Decision: SET aside lower court’s decision
and possession, as well as title to the Langcaan Property.  CA said that it was respondent Pacleb who had prior physical
possession of the property as shown by his payment of real estate
In their Complaint, they alleged that Javier represented to them that the
taxes thereon.
Langcaan Property was not tenanted. They discovered it was tenanted by
Ramon. Petitioner spouses demanded the cancellation of their agreement
Subsequently, Respondent Pacleb filed the instant case for removal of cloud
and the return of their initial payment.
from title with damages to cancel the annotated Decision (*the one involving
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Javier*) and its Certificate of Finality, from the title of the Langcaan
Property. Alleging that the deed of sale between him & late first wife with
Del Rosario could not have possibly been executed on February 27, 1992 as
he was residing in the US and his late first wife had already died 20 years
ago.
During pendency of the instant case, respondent died. He was substituted by
his surviving spouse and the children with the first wife.
RTC Decision: Dismissed respondents case and held that petitioner spouses
are purchasers in good faith. The successive sales sealed the regularity of
the purchase by petitioner spouses. Further, the *Javier Case* is already
final and can no longer be altered thus the RTC ordered cancellation of TCT
in the name of respondent and the issuance of a new title in the name of
petitioner spouses.
CA Decision: Reversed and set aside RTC. Petitioner spouses are not
purchasers in good faith and that the Decision (*Javier Case*) did not
transfer ownership of the Langcaan Property to petitioners
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/O petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for value and in
good faith.
2. W/O ownership over the Langcaan Property was properly vested in
petitioner spouses by virtue of the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93
(*Javier Case*)
1. We find petitioner spouses contentions without merit.
Petitioner Ernesto Yu testimony, stated that he inspected the Langcaan
Property and talked with the tenant, Ramon, before he purchased the
same. However, in his Complaint for specific performance and damages
which he filed against Javier, he alleged that it was only after he had entered
into an Agreement for the sale of the property and his initial payment
of P200,000 that he discovered that the property was indeed being tenanted
by Ramon who lives in the said farm
This inconsistency casts grave doubt as to whether petitioner
spouses personally inspected the property before purchasing it.
More importantly, however, several facts should have put petitioner
spouses on inquiry as to the alleged rights of their vendor, Javier, over the
Langcaan Property.
a) the property remains to be registered in the name of respondent
despite the two (2) Deeds of Absolute Sale. Both deeds were not
even annotated in the title of the Langcaan Property.
b) a perusal of the two deeds of absolute sale reveals that they were
executed only about two (2) months apart and that they contain
identical provisions.
c) it is undisputed that the Langcaan Property is in the possession of
Ramon, the son of the registered owner. This bare fact alone should
have made petitioner spouses suspicious as to the veracity of the
alleged title of their vendor. Moreover, petitioner spouses could have
easily verified the true status of the Langcaan Property from Ramons
wife, since the latter is their relative
The case law is well settled, viz.:
The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser
who buys from the registered owner himself. Corollarily, it
requires a higher degree of prudence from one who
buys from a person who is not the registered owner,
although the land object of the transaction is
registered. While one who buys from the registered owner
does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one
who buys from one who is not the registered owner
is expected to examine not only the certificate of title
but all factual circumstances necessary for him to
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 determine if there are any flaws in the title of the
transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land.
This Court has consistently applied the stricter
rule when it comes to deciding the issue of good faith of
one who buys from one who is not the registered owner, but
who exhibits a certificate of title.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
d) Finally, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1199-95 (*Javier Case*)
cannot serve to validate the sale to petitioner spouses since the
dismissal was ordered because Del Rosario and Javier could no
longer be found. Indeed, the dismissal was without prejudice.
Based on the foregoing, therefore, petitioner spouses cannot be
considered as innocent purchasers in good faith.
2. Petitioner spouses argue that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case
No. 741-93 as to the rightful owner of the Langcaan Property is
conclusive and binding upon respondent even if the latter was not a
party thereto since it involved the question of possession and
ownership of real property, and is thus not merely an action in
personam but an action quasi in rem.
Civil Case No. 741-93 is an action for specific performance and damages filed
by. The obligations of Javier under the contract to sell attach to him alone,
and do not burden the Langcaan Property.
We have held in an unbroken string of cases that an action for
specific performance is an action in personam.
Being a judgment in personam, Civil Case No. 741-93 is binding only upon
the parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard. It cannot bind respondent since he was not a party
therein. Neither can respondent be considered as privy thereto since his
signature and that of his late first wife, Angelita Chan, were forged in the
deed of sale.
All told, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals finding that, as between
respondent and petitioner spouses, respondent has a better right over the
Langcaan Property as the true owner thereof.

In Domagas v. Jensen, we distinguished between actions in personam and

actions quasi in rem .

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an

action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in
rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is
determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only.
In an action quasi in rem, an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property.

EH405 SY 2016-2017

TOPIC: Doctrine of Constructive Possession
Republic of the Philippines vs. Jacob
G.R. No. 146874, July 20,2006
FACTS:
On August 14, 1970, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
739, Establishing as Reservation for the Purpose of the Exploration,
Development, Exploitation and Utilization of Geothermal Energy, Natural Gas
and Methane Gas a Parcel of Land in the Province of Albay, Island of
Luzon, Philippines. Lot No. 4094 of the Malinao Cadastre is covered by the
said proclamation.
Private respondent, a retired public school teacher, filed an
application with the RTC of Albay for the confirmation and registration of her
alleged title over Lot No. 4094.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, opposed the
application for the following reasons:
3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the
applicant/s
4. That the parcel/s applied for is/are portions of the public
domain belonging to them
Private respondent appended to her application the tracing cloth
plan of the property under the name of Sotero Bondal. The blue print,
[3]
dated February 27, 1991, was prepared and signed by Geodetic
Engineer Bonifacio C. del Valle and approved by Ernesto L. Llave, Chief,
Regional Surveys Division of the Lands Management Service. Per Report [4] of
the Land Registration Authority dated September 27, 1994, the property was
the subject of an application for registration (Cadastral Case No. 42, GLRO
Cadastral Record No. 1324), but no decision has been rendered thereon, or if
there had been any, no copy of the same was furnished to the [Land
Registration Authority]. The report also states that the property is covered by
Free Patent No. V-13062 dated May 21, 1955.[5] Private respondent had also
applied for a free patent over the property, but withdrew her application in a
Letter[6] dated October 27, 1994 addressed to the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region V, Legaspi City.
Private respondent adduced the following evidence and factual
allegations to support her application before the RTC:
The previous owner of Lot No. 4094, Sotero Bondal, sold the
property to Macario Monjardin, a brother of private respondents mother (her
Uncle). Macario declared the property in his name under a Tax Declaration in
1930 and again in 1949 Since Macario was residing inManila and was unable
to cultivate the property, he asked his sister, respondent’s mother, to be
his encargado. By then, private respondent was already a 17-year old
substitute teacher who then accompanied her mother in supervising the
planting and harvesting of palayand the improvement of the lot.
Sometime in 1946, Macario sold the property and executed a deed
of salein favor of the respondent’s mother and father but failed to declare
the property for taxation purposes under their names. Her parents later died
intestate. Private respondent executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial
Adjudication[13] where she declared that as sole heir of the
spouses IgmedioPatricio, she was the sole owner of the property.
However, Lot No. No. 4094 was declared for taxation purposes
under the name of Socorro where she paid the realty taxes over the
property.
When cross-examined, private respondent admitted that she had no
copy of the deed of sale executed by Sotero Bondalin favor
of Macario Monjardin.
EH405 SY 2016-2017

RTC Decision: In favor of the applicant Jacob.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed the decision to the CA.
Alleging that private respondent failed to prove her claim that the
original owner of the property, Sotero Bondal, sold the property to her
uncle Macario Monjardin. It was likewise pointed out that private respondent
admitted that she had no copy of any such deed of sale.
CA Decision: Affirm RTC decision. It declared that although private
respondent failed to adduce in evidence the deed of sale executed
by Sotero Bondal in favor of Macario Monjardin, her testimony that the sale
took place was enough. Her claims were likewise buttressed by her
documentary evidence.
The Republic of the Philippines filed the instant petition
ISSUE:
W/O Jacob can register the subject land under her name under the Public
Land Act
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove
the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since
June 12, 1945.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant
from the government, whether express or implied. It is indispensable that
there be a showing of a title from the State.
In the case at bar, when private respondent filed her application
with the RTC on May 6, 1994, Lot No. 4094 was no longer alienable and
disposable property of the public domain, since as of August 14, 1970, by
virtue of Proclamation No. 739, it was segregated from the public domain
and declared part of the reservation for the development of geothermal
energy. Private respondent filed her application for confirmation 24 years
after the said proclamation was issued.
It bears stressing that one claiming private rights under the Public
Land Act, as amended, must prove by clear and convincing evidence that all
the substantive requisites for acquisition of public lands (along with the
procedural) had been complied with.
Secondly, private respondent failed to adduce clear and convincing
evidence that by August 14, 1970, she had already acquired ownership over
the property by herself or through her predecessors-in-interest through
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
property since 1945 or earlier.
Indeed, the law speaks of possession and occupation. Possession is
broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. Unless, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation seems to highlight the facts that for an
applicant to qualify, her possession of the property must not be a mere
fiction.
EH405 SY 2016-2017

Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over her own
property. A mere casual cultivation of portions of land by the claimant does
not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership. Such possession is
not exclusive and notorious as it gives rise to a presumptive grant from the
State. The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership
to substantiate the claim over the land. The good faith of the person consists
in the reasonable belief that the person from whom she received the
property was the owner thereof and could transfer ownership.
In this case, however, private respondent failed to offer in evidence
the deed of sale purportedly executed by SoteroBondal in favor
of Macario Monjardin as vendee. On cross-examination, she admitted that
the only deed of sale she had was the deed of absolute
sale Macario Monjardin executed in favor of her parents, the
spouses Igmedio Patricio. The documentary evidence adduced by private
respondent even belies her claim that Sotero Bondal sold the property to her
uncle. She even failed to identify B.C. Monjardin, much less explain whether
such person was really her uncle. She even failed to adduce in evidence any
tax declaration over the property under his name and that he paid the realty
taxes for the property from 1930 to 1946.
Private respondents also promised to submit proof based on the
records in the Register of Deeds and other government agencies showing
that Sotero Bondal sold the property to Macario Monjardin; and that if such
records had been destroyed during the Second World War, she would submit
proof of said destruction. Private respondent failed to comply with her
undertaking and rested her case without presenting said evidence.
Significantly, the spouses Igmedio Patricio applied for a free patent
over the property after the Second World War, which, according to private
respondent, was rejected by the Bureau of Lands. Private respondents
testimony is further belied by the request to withdraw her application for a
free patent over Lot No. 4094 which she made on October 27, 1994.The
records also show that the property is the subject of Cadastral Case No. 42,
G.L.R.O. No. 1324 and there is no evidence on record that this case has
been terminated. There are thus two applications for registration of the same
lot: (1) the application of private respondent in the court below; and (2)
Cadastral Case No. 42.
Furthermore, the fact that the blue print copy of the tracing cloth
plan covering the subject lot as of 1991 was still in the name
of Sotero Bondal is proof that not all the records of the Land Management
Authority relative to the property had been lost. Unless and until respondent
offered credible evidence that Monjardin had purchased the property
from Bondal, it cannot be said that the spouses Igmedio Patricio acquired
the rights and interests of Bondal over the property through Monjardin;
private respondent cannot even tack her own possession of the property to
that of her parents. In fact, she failed to adduce evidence that her uncle had
been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the property. While she
claimed that her mother was designated as encargado, private respondent
failed to even mention the portion of the property that was cultivated, or at
least where and who planted the palay. Such declaration
(that Macario designated her mother as encargado) without more does not
constitute preponderant evidence to prove adverse, continuous, open,
public, and peaceful possession in the concept of owner. Private respondents
testimony that after her parents purchased the lot, they began receiving the
share of the produce of the property does not in itself constitute proof of
such adverse possession.
The Regional Trial Court is ordered to DISMISS private respondents
application for confirmation of title over Lot No. 4094.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: Doctrine of Constructive Possession
Sarmiento vs Lesaca
G.R. No. L-15385, June 30, 1960
FACTS:
On January 18, 1949, plaintiff bought from defendant two parcels of land.
After the sale, plaintiff tried to take actual physical possession of the lands
but was prevented from doing so by one Martin Deloso who claims to be the
owner thereof;
Plaintiff instituted an action before the Tenancy Enforcement Division of the
DOJ to oust said Martin Deloso, which action she later abandoned
Plaintiff wrote defendant asking the latter either to change the lands sold
with another of the same kind and class or to return the purchase price
together with the expenses she had incurred in the execution of the sale.
Defendant did not agree to this proposition.
On December 31, 1949, plaintiff filed a complaint in the CFI of Zambales
praying for the rescission of the contract of sale executed between her and
defendant for failure of the latter to place the former in the actual physical
possession of the lands she bought.
RTC Decision: declaring the deed of sale rescinded. Case was certified to
the SC on the ground that the questions involved are purely legal.
ISSUE: W/O the execution of the deed of sale in a public document (Exhibit
A) is equivalent to delivery of possession of the lands sold to appellee thus
relieving her of the obligation to place appellee in actual possession thereof.
RULING:
Articles 1461 and 1462 of the old Civil Code provide:
ART. 1461. The vendor is bound to deliver and warrant the thing
which is the subject-matter of the sale.
ART. 1462. The thing sold shall be deemed delivered when the
vendee is placed in the control and possession thereof.
If the sale should be made by means of a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing
which is the subject-matter of the contract unless the contrary
appears or is clearly to be inferred from such instrument.
From the above it is clear that when a contract of sale is executed the
vendor is bound to deliver to the vendee the thing sold by placing the
vendee in the control and possession of the subject-matter of the contract.
However, if the sale is executed by means of a public instrument, the mere
execution of the instrument is equivalent to delivery unless the contrary
appears or is clearly to be inferred from such instrument.
It can be clearly seen therein that the vendor intended to place the vendee
in actual possession of the lands immediately as can be inferred from the
stipulation that the vendee "takes actual possession thereof ... with full rights
to dispose, enjoy and make use thereof in such manner and form as would
be most advantageous to herself." The possession referred to in the contract
evidently refers to actual possession and not merely symbolical inferable
from the mere execution of the document.
Has the vendor complied with this express commitment? She did not.
As provided in Article 1462, the thing sold shall be deemed delivered when
the vendee is placed in the control and possession thereof, which situation
does not here obtain because from the execution of the sale up to the
present the vendee was never able to take possession of the lands due to
the insistent refusal of Martin Deloso to surrender them claiming ownership
thereof. And although it is postulated in the same article that the execution
of a public document is equivalent to delivery, this legal fiction only holds
true when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of the
property from the hands of the vendor into those of the vendee. This is what
we said in a similar case:
“….It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser
theownership and right of possession. The thing sold must be placed
in his control. When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the
thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will
of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public
instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the
instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material
tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or through another
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by
the interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality — the
delivery has not been effected. (Addison vs. Felix and Tioco, 38 Phil.,
404; See also Garchitorena vs. Almeda, 48 Off. Gaz., No., 8, 3432;
3437)

The next question to resolve is: Can plaintiff rescind the contract of sale in
view of defendant's failure to deliver the possession of the lands?

YES, this action is based on Article 1124 of the same Code, which provides:

Art 1124. The right to resolve reciprocal obligations, in case one of

the obligors should fail to comply with that which is incumbent upon
him, is deemed to be implied.

The person prejudiced may choose between exacting the fulfillment of the
obligation or its resolution with indemnity for losses and payment of interest
in either case. He may also demand the resolution of the obligation even
after having elected its fulfillment, should the latter be found impossible.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Topic: POSSESSION; Concept
Malabanan vs Republic
G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009
Facts:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of
land. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for
more than thirty (30) years. Malabanan presented his witness,
AristedesVelazco, who testified that the property originally belonged to a 22
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, LinoVelazco. Lino had four
sons, two of which were Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’
grandfather.
Upon Lino’s death, his sons inherited and divided the property among
themselves, but by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their
father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including the lot which
originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco.
It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.Malabanan also presented, among other documentary evidence,
a Certificationissued by CENRO-DENR, which stated that the subject property
was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land...”
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan.
The Republic interposed an appeal, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required
by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing
the application of Malabanan, ruling that under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the
lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court
noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property
was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos’
possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the
period of possession.
Issue:
1. Whether or not it is sufficient that the classification of land as alienable
and disposable occurs at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for
registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier
2. As for purposes of Section 14(2) of the PD 1529, whether or not a parcel
of land classified as alienable and disposable may be deemed private
land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription
Ruling:
1. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those
who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length
and quality of their possession.
Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and
disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is
declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
2. In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these
are alienable or disposable.
There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or
the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

Clearly, the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that

Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property as there is
no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since
12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidence is to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for

registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that it is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible
to acquisition by prescription.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Topic: POSSESSION; How exercised Payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the
teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no
Chua-Burce v CA independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank.
G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000
Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession
Facts: over the missing funds. Hence, the element of juridical possession being
Ramon Rocamora, the Manager, requested Fructuoso Peñaflor, Assistant absent, petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa.
Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of the cash inside the vault,
which should total P4,000,000.00, more or less. During this initial cash
count, they discovered a shortage of fifteen bundles of One Hundred Pesos
denominated bills totalling P150,000.00.

The next day, to determine if there was actually a shortage, a re-verification

of the records and documents of the transactions in the bank was
conducted. There was still a shortage of P150,000.00. The bank initiated
investigations totalling four (4) in all. The person primarily responsible was
the bank's Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce, the herein accused. Unable
to satisfactorily explain the shortage of P150,000.00, the accused's service
with the bank was terminated.

To recover the missing amount, Metrobank filed a Civil Case for Sum of
Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and Garnishment against
petitioner and her husband, Antonio Burce. Also, information for Estafa was
filed against petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the elements of the crime of estafa were duly proven beyond
reasonable doubt

Ruling:
We find the first element absent. When the money, goods, or any other
personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1) in
trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires
both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing
received.

Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right

over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.
Petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-
in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a
bank teller, both being mere bank employees.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Topic: POSSESSION; Concept of Holder
Carlos v Republic
G.R. No. 164823, August 31, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Carlos, represented by her daughter, Teresita Carlos
Victoria, filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over a
parcel of land. Petitioner alleged, among others, that she is the owner of said
parcel of land which she openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and
occupied since July 12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide claim of ownership;
that there is no mortgage or encumbrance affecting said property, nor is it
part of any military or naval reservation; that the property is being used for
industrial purposes; and that there are no tenants or lessees on the property.
Petitioner further claimed that she has been in possession of the subject land
in the concept of an owner; that her possession has been peaceful, public,
uninterrupted and continuous since 1948 or earlier; and tacking her
possession with that of her predecessors-in-interest, petitioner has been in
possession of the land for more than 50 years.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, filed
an opposition to petitioner’s application.
Petitioner later presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies
of her neighbors, Sergio Cruz and Daniel Castillo, and Teresita Carlos Victoria
herself. Victoria admitted that her mother had sold the land to Ususan
Development Corporation in 1996 but failed to deliver the title. Hence, the
heirs of Maria Carlos made a commitment to the corporation to deliver the
certificate of title so that they could collect the unpaid balance of the
purchase price.Petitioner also presented in court the concerned officers of
the DENR to establish that the land in question is alienable and disposable.
The trial court granted the application. On appeal, the CA reversed and set
aside the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was in possession of the property at the time
of the application for confirmation of title.
Ruling:
No.
The applicant at the time she filed her application for registration of title was
no longer in possession and occupation of the land in question since on
October 16, 1996, the applicant's mother and predecessor-in-interest sold
the subject land to Ususan Development Corporation. Possession and
occupation of the land in question pertains not to the applicant but to
UsusanDevelopment Corporation, thus it can be said that the applicant has
no registrable title over the land in question.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a)
that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of
the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a
bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12,
1945.
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has met the first requirement
but not the second. Carlos no longer had possession of the property at the
time of application for the issuance of the certificate of title.
Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property.
Nonetheless, even if it were true that it was petitioner who had actual
possession of the land at that time, such possession was no longer in the
concept of an owner. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession
in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the
concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so.
On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in
another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his
belief be right or wrong.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Topic: POSSESSION; Possessor in Good Faith/Bad Faith
Sps. Po Lam v CA
G.R. No. 116220,December 6, 2000
Facts:
Lots No. 1557 and 1558 are prime commercial lots located in the heart of
Legaspi City's commercial district. These were sold by Lim KokChiong to the
Legaspi Avenue Hardware Company (hereafter referred to as LAHCO). Felix
Lim, Lim Kok Chiong's brother, filed a complaint with the then Court of First
Instance of Albay against his brother and LAHCO to annul the deeds of sale
covering said lots on the ground that the sale included the 3/14 pro-indiviso
portion of the lots which Felix Lim had inherited from his foster parents. Felix
Lim filed with the Register of Deeds of Albay a notice of lispendens over the
two lots.
The trial court, on motion of Felix Lim, dropped the case against Lim
KokChiong. The trial court rendered a decision declaring LAHCO to be the
absolute owner of the two above-mentioned lots. The trial court ordered the
cancellation of the notice of lispendensi nscribed on the titles of the two lots.
The notice of lispendensinscribed on TCT No. 2580 was cancelled.
However, the notice of lispendens annotated on TCT No. 2581 remained
uncancelled, allegedly because the duplicate owner's copy of said TCT was
with the Continental Bank, Lot No.1558 having been mortgaged by LAHCO to
said bank.
Felix Lim appealed to the Court of Appeals. LAHCO sold the two lots to
spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Ong Po Lam. Thereafter, said certificates of
title were themselves cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 8102 and 13711,
respectively, in the name of petitioners.
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
After the Po Lam spouses purchased the two lots from LAHCO, they leased
the commercial building erected on Lot No. 1557 to private respondent Jose
Lee for one year. Jose Lee refused to pay rentals to the Po Lam spouses,
informing them that he would deposit the same in court since Felix Lim had
promised to sell the property to him.
Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Po Lim were purchasers in good faith or transferees
pendente lite
Ruling:
We held that the Po Lam spouses could not be deemed buyers in good faith.
The annotation of lispendens on TCT No. 2581 which covers Lot 1558,
served as notice to them that the said lot is involved in a pending litigation.
The sole basis for finding petitioners to be purchasers in bad faith was the
subsistence of the notice of lispendens inscribed on TCT No. 2581, which
covered Lot No. 1558, at the time petitioners-spouses purchased the lots in
dispute. And since Lot No. 1558 was sold simultaneously with Lot No. 1557,
even if the notice of lispendens on Lot No. 1557 had already been cancelled,
petitioners were held to be purchasers in bad faith even in regard to Lot No.
1557.
However, it must be pointed out that even if a notice of lispendens on TCT
No. 2581 (Lot No. 1558) was still subsisting at the time petitioners bought
the property from LAHCO, there also was a court order ordering that the
annotation be cancelled, as in fact, it was cancelled.
In this case, while petitioners bought Lot No. 2581 from LAHCO while a
notice of lispendens was still annotated thereon, there was also existing a
court order cancelling the same. On this ground alone, petitioners can
already be considered buyers in good faith.
Since the doctrine rests on public policy, not notice, upon the cancellation of
the notice of lispendens, the Po Lam spouses cannot then be considered as
having constructive notice of any defect in the title of LAHCO as to make
them transferees pendente lite and purchasers in bad faith of Lots No. 1557
and 1558. Conversely, cancellation of the notice of pendency terminates the
effects of such notice. The effects of such notice were terminated, resulting
in the Po Lam spouses not being bound thereby.
In fine, they cannot be considered transferee’s pendente lite and purchasers
in bad faith of the property.
Petitioners-spouses are PURCHASERS IN GOOD FAITH and Transfer
Certificates of Title No. 8102 and 13711 in their name valid, without
prejudice on the part of private respondent Jose Lee to file a separate action
for reimbursement for the value of said property from the Legaspi Avenue
Hardware Company.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: POSSESSION; Concept of good faith
HEIRS OF MARCELINO CABAL VS SPOUSES LORENZO CABAL
G.R. No. 153625, July 31, 2006
FACTS:
Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a 4,234-square meter parcel of land situated
in Iba, Zambales, described as Lot G. In August 1954, Marcelo died, survived
by his wife Higinia and his children (Marcelino, Lorenzo, Daniel, Cecilio,
Natividad, Juan xxx). Sometime in 1949, five years before he died, Marcelo
allowed his son, Marcelino, to build his house on a portion on Lot G, now the
southernmost portion of Lot 1-E. Since then, Marcelino resided thereon.
Later, Marcelino's son also built his house on the disputed property.
In August 17, 1964, Marcelo's heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves
the parcel of land owned by Marcelo (Lot G). A consolidated subdivision plan
revealed that Marcelino and his son occupied and built their houses on the
southernmost portion of another lot (Lot 1-E) and not the adjacent lot
designated to him (Lot G-1). The owners of the said lot, spouses Lorenzo
and Rosita Cabal (respondents), confronted Marcelino on this matter which
resulted to an agreement to a re-survey and swapping of lots for the
purpose of reconstruction of land titles. However, the agreed resurvey and
swapping of lots did not materialize.
Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal filed a complaint for Recover of Possession with
damages against Marcelino before the MTC of Iba, Zambales. They alleged
that Marcelino introduced improvements in bad faith on their land with
knowledge that the adjacent lot is titled in his name. Marcelino contends that
respondents have no cause of action against him because he has been in
possession in good faith since 1949 with the respondents’ knowledge and
acquiescence. He further avers that acquisitive prescription has set in.
MTC rendered a decision in favor of Marcelino. The RTC reversed the
decision of the MTC saying that Marcelino's possession was in the concept of
a co-owner and therefore prescription does not run in his favor; that his
possession, which was tolerated by his co-owners, does not ripen into
ownership. Marcelino filed a petition for review with the CA but the CA
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON Marcelino is a builder in good faith.
DISCUSSION ON GOOD FAITH: It has been said that good faith is
always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the
possessor rests the burden of proof. Good faith is an intangible and abstract
quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice
and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable
advantage. An individual's personal good faith is a concept of his own mind
and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations
alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of
good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a
superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to
possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
RULING: Marcelino's possession of the disputed lot was based on a
mistaken belief that Lot G-1 is the same lot on which he has built his house
with the consent of his father. There is no evidence, other than bare
allegation, that Marcelino was aware that he intruded on respondents'
property when he continued to occupy and possess the disputed lot after
partition was effected in 1976.
Moreover, the fact that in 1977 Marcelino mortgaged Lot G-1 subject of TCT
No. 22656 is not an indication of bad faith since there is no concrete
evidence that he was aware at that time that the property covered by the
title and the one he was occupying were not the same. There is also no
evidence that he introduced improvements on Lot G-1.
In fact, the agreement on March 1, 1989 to a resurvey and swapping of lots
for the purpose of reconstructing the land titles is substantial proof of
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Marcelino's good faith, sincerity of purpose and lack of intention to hold on
to two lots.

Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least until the time he was
informed by respondents of his encroachment on their property.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: POSSESSION; Concept of good faith
NEGRETE vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MARINDUQUE
G.R. No. 31267
Facts:
Claiming that since 1945 she and her late husband had been in continuous
and peaceful possession of a parcel of land with an area of nine (9) hectares
more or less in sitio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 8431 in her name, Ignacia Negrete filed on July 28, 1956 a
forcible entry suit against the Igmedio Maderazo in the municipal court of
Mogpog alleging among others that on January 7, 1956, said defendant,
through strategy, force, intimidation, and stealth unlawfully entered the
northern portion of said parcel of land, said northern portion comprising an
area of about four hectares. To expedite the proceedings, the municipal
court directed the chief of police of Mogpog to conduct an ocular inspection
of the disputed land to determine whether the land area cultivated by the
defendant is the same land claimed by the plaintiff-appellant as the northern
portion of her land under Tax Declaration No. 8431. MTC found that the
defendant has not unlawfully entered the land in dispute on January 7, 1956
as alleged by the plaintiffs, he being in the material and physical possession
of the said land prior to the date of the incident. Instead of appealing from
the aforesaid decision of the municipal court of Mogpog, plaintiff-appellant
filed on January 18, 1967 — after the lapse of ten (10) years — an action for
recovery of ownership of property (reivindicacion) against defendant.
Defendant contends that he bought for P150.00 on August 30, 1954 the
northern portion of about 3,5700 square meters which is now covered by a
tax declaration in his name from Tito Oriendo, who declared it for taxation in
1949 and interposes as special defense that the action had been barred by
the statute of limitation for plaintiff-appellant filed this present action over
ten (10) years after he purchased the property.
Issue: WON action has prescribed.
Held:
No, the action has not prescribed. Defendant insists that he has acquired
ownership over the disputed parcel by ordinary prescription through adverse
possession of only ten (10) years. But ordinary acquisitive prescription of
immovables and other real rights thru adverse possession of ten (10) years,
requires possession "in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by
law". In the absence of a just title or good faith, ownership of immovables
can be acquired by extraordinary prescription thru an uninterrupted adverse
possession of thirty (30) years. The law defines a possessor in good faith as
one who is not aware of any flaw in his title or mode of acquisition; and
conversely, one who is aware of such a flaw is a possessor in bad faith. The
essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the
validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention
to overreach another.
A deed of sale, to constitute a just title and to generate good faith for the
ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten (10) years, should refer to the same
parcel of land, which is adversely possessed. In the case at bar, the deed of
sale in favor of the deceased Igmedio Maderazo covers a parcel of land
patently different from the disputed land owned by plaintiff-appellant as to
area, location and boundary owners. The disputed parcel contains an area of
about nine (9) hectares, and is situated in sitio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog,
Marinduque. On the other hand, the parcel of land purchased on August 30,
1954 by the defendant from Tito Oriendo for P150 is situated in barrio
Puyog, Boac, Marinduque. It was also found that the ocular inspection
commissioned by the lower court in the ejectment case appears to have
been signed by only two commissioners, namely, Constancio Marte and
Igmedio Maderazo. It was not signed by Teodoro Lagustin, the alleged
commissioner of the plaintiff. Defendant admits that he is a resident of barrio
Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque. As the buyer, he knew what lot was
sold to him. And having signed as vendee the deed of sale in his favor, he is
conclusively presumed to have read the deed of sale, which clearly states
that the parcel he acquired is located in barrio Puyog, Boac, Marinduque.
Hence, not being a possessor in good faith, defendant can acquire
ownership over the disputed parcel of land of about nine (9)
EH405 SY 2016-2017
hectares belonging to plaintiff-appellant only by extraordinary
acquisitive prescription thru an uninterrupted adverse possession
of thirty (30) years. Since he occupied the same for only about
thirteen (13) years from 1954 until 1967, when his adverse
possession was interrupted by the filing of the action for
reivindicacion on January 18, 1967.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: POSSESSION; Concept of good faith
Baltazar et al vs. Caridad et al
G.R. No. L-23509, June 23,1966
Facts: -In a cadastral proceeding, the trial court rendered decision dated
January 23, 1941 awarding Lot No. 8864 to the sps Julio Baltazar and
Constancia Valencia as their conjugal property. Said decision became final.
-Julio Baltazar, the registered owner of said Lot died. On December 6, 1961,
his surviving wife and children, as petitioners, filed a motion, in the cadastral
case praying for writ of possession against respondents Silvina Caridad and
her daughter, Eduarda Caridad, who had been in possession of the southern
portion of said Lot since 1939, while the cadastral case involving said lot was
pending before the trial court, and before the decision was rendered and the
corresponding decree issued in 1941.
-The trial court granted petitioners' motion. The order having become final,
the sheriff enforced the writ and placed petitioners in possession of the
southern portion of the lot.
-Petitioners presented a motion to compel respondents Eduarda Caridad and
her mother to remove their respective houses which they built in 1958 and
1959, respectively, in the southern portion of the disputed lot, and, in the
event of their failure to do so, to order the sheriff to demolish the same.
-Trial court granted petitioners' motion, ordering respondents to remove
their respective houses within 30 days from receipt of said order.
-Respondents-appellants question the power or jurisdiction of the trial court,
sitting as a cadastral court, to order the removal of their respective houses
which were built in the disputed lot long after the issuance of the final
decree of registration. They insist that they are builders in good faith of
the houses in question, and, as such, they are accorded rights
under Article 448 of the new Civil Code.
Issues: Whether or not Silvina and Eduarda Caridad were builders in good
faith. (Topic)
Whether or not the Court erred in compelling Silvina and Eduarda Caridad to
remove their respective houses from the disputed lot.
Held:
1. Appellants can not be regarded as builders in good faith because they are
bound by the 1941 decree of registration that obligated their parents and
predecessors-in-interest. Good faith must rest on a colorable right in the
builder, beyond a mere stubborn belief in one's title despite judicial
adjudication. The fact that in 1959 appellants demolished and replaced their
old house with new and bigger ones can not enervate the rights of the
registered owners. Otherwise, the rights of the latter to enjoy full possession
of their registered property could be indefinitely defeated by an unsuccessful
opponent through the simple subterfuge of replacing his old house with a
new one from time to time.
2. Respondents do not dispute that during the pendency of the cadastral
proceeding, rendition of the judgment and issuance of the final decree of
registration in favor of Julio Baltazar, the late Andres Caridad, his surviving
spouse, respondent Silvina Caridad, and their children, one of whom is
respondent Eduarda Caridad, were in possession of the southern portion of
the disputed lot; and that respondent Eduarda Caridad claims right and title
thereto as a mere heir and successor-in-interest of said Andres Caridad.
Neither do respondents dispute the propriety and validity of the order of the
cadastral court, granting the writ of possession in favor of petitioners as well
as its enforcement. Under these circumstances, we hold that the order of the
cadastral court, granting petitioners' motion to compel respondents to
remove their respective houses from the disputed lot, is valid and
enforceable against respondents. In the case of Marcelo vs.Mencias, etc., et
al., this Court had already upheld the jurisdiction or authority of the court of
first instance, sitting as a land registration court, to order, as a consequence
of the writ of possession issued by it, the demolition of improvements
introduced by the successor-in-interest of a defeated oppositor in the land
registration case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order should be, as it is hereby, a ffirmed.
Other Principles:
EH405 SY 2016-2017
-Rules of Court are applicable to land registration cases in a suppletory
character.

- If the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the

delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein, a writ of
demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is
but a complement of the former which without said writ of demolition would
be ineffective.

-When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial o fficer, all

auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into e ffect
may be employed by such court or officer.

-Independent of any statutory provision, every court has inherent power to

do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the
scope of its jurisdiction.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: Concept of Bad Faith
Benin v. Tuason
G.R. No. L-26127, June 28, 1974
FACTS:
Three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing
substantially the same allegations. The plaintiffs alleged that they were the
owners of the three parcels of agricultural land located in the barrio of La
Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in Caloocan. The plaintiffs in these three civil
cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, that sometime in the
year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands,
the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through
their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, using
bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started
defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of
plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements thereon.
When the plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of
defendants in 1953, they discovered for the first time that their lands, as
described in their respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or
erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as
Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No.
735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original
applicants for registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la
Paz, et al.
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the
registered owners had applied for the registration of two parcels of land
(known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate) located in
Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of Rizal, of which Parcel No. 1
(Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square meters but the
boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and
amended; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is
bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for
registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the amendments and
alterations, which were made after the publication of the original application,
were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC
No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March
7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914, known as
Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants
of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate). They
contend that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and
void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the
decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to
the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from
the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and that
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa
Estate), is also null and void from the beginning because it was issued
pursuant to a void decree of registration. The lower court rendered a
decision in favour of the plaintiffs. A motion for new trial was filed by
defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However, before the
motion for new trial was resolved by the court, said defendant, on February
11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond, and on
February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the judgment was valid?
2. Whether or not JM Tuason is a buyer in good faith?
RULING:
We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land
Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No.
7681. Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or
order, an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to
the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of
the same act the court may at any time order an application to be amended
EH405 SY 2016-2017
by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the application. The mean that there was a change of ownership from Santa Clara Monastery to
amendment may be made in the application or in the survey plan, or in both, C.W. Rosenstock & Co.
since the application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment
consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel
of land not previously included in the original application, as published, a
new publication of the amended application must be made. (so no
publication if lesser, but if added, then kailangan og publication)

In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1
and Parcel 2 that accompanied the application for registration in LRC No.
7681 was amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of
opposition, or which were the subject of another registration case.

Trial Court also ruled that the one published is bigger than the one
being approved. But the SC found out that the difference was only around 27
square meters

Even granting that the registration court had no jurisdiction over the
increased area of 27.10 square meters (as alleged by appellees), the most
that the lower court could have done was to nullify the decree and the
certificate of title insofar as that area of 27.10 square meters is concerned, if
that area can be identified. But, certainly, the lower court could not declare,
and should not have declared, null and void the whole proceedings in LRC
No. 7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred in declaring null and void ab
initio Original Certificate of Title 735 which covers not only the supposed
excess area of 27.10 square meters but also the remaining area of 8,798,617
square meters of Parcel 1 and the entire area of 15,961,246 square meters
of Parcel 2.

In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the

boundaries on the southwestern side is Santa Clara Monastery, while in the
decree of registration the words "Santa Clara Monastery" do not appear but,
instead, are replaced by the words "C. W. Rosenstock & Co." It will be
remembered that during the registration proceedings the plan of Parcel 1
was ordered amended, and the surveyor, who prepared the amended plan
must have found that what used to be the property of the Santa Clara
Monastery at the time of the original Survey was already the property of C.
W. Rosenstock & Co. when the amended plan was prepared. This can simply
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: Interruption of Good Faith
Suobiron v. CA
G.R. No. 109903, November 20, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses Andres Suobiron and Socorro Suobiron, Jose
Sullano Jr. and Ireneo Ferraris instituted an action to annul the orders of the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) and the corresponding decrees issued by
the Land Registration Commission. Petitioners alleged in their complaint that
the land registration court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing
both orders because the requirements of the law on reconstitution of court
records were not complied with thus rendering void not only the orders but
also the decrees and certificates of title issued thereunder. Private
respondents denied the allegations for the annulment of the orders and
decrees. They counterclaimed for the delivery to them of the property in
litigation. They could have received had they not been deprived of
possession thereof.
The trial court found that the two (2) parcels of land were previously
subject of LRC Case No. 673, GLRO Record No. 54404, before the CFI of
Iloilo and that aside from the Director of Lands, the other oppositors. After
due notice, publication and hearing, the CFI rendered judgment adjudicating
the parcels of land in favor of spouses Luis Adelantar and Fortunata Ponce.
All court records were destroyed or burned as a result of the battle
for liberation. The court issued an order directing the reconstitution of the
records. Luis Adelantar filed a motion for reconstitution of the records of LRC
Case No. 673 furnishing copies thereof to oppositors.
Taking advantage in the meantime of the chaotic conditions during
the war, Quintin Lorezo and Bernabe Lorezo entered the litigated property
and appropriated the produce thereof to the damage and prejudice of the
registered owners. The Adelantars filed an action in the CFI of Iloilo against
the Lorezos for recovery of possession.
The CFI rendered judgment declaring the Adelantar spouses owners
of the property and ordering the receiver earlier appointed by the court to
deliver to them the possession thereof as well as the produce received by
the receiver since his appointment. The decision having become final and
executory the trial court issued a writ of execution which was implemented
by the Provincial Sheriff. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of
the trial court except with respect to the award of attorney's fees which was
deleted as no reason was given therefor.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision in Civil Case No. 938 is conclusive upon them
RULING:
YES. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals as we find no
reversible error therein. The procedure laid down by Act 3110 for the
reconstitution of a court record in case of loss or destruction.
The requirements of the law for the reconstitution of a court record
were fulfilled. The clerk of court, soon after liberation, sent a notice to the
then presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo informing him of
the destruction of all court records in the province. Copies of the motion for
reconstitution were served by the movant (the now deceased Luis Adelantar)
on the oppositors through their respective counsel.
It appearing that Atty. Felix Evidente was not the oppositors' counsel
of record the allegation that no notice was served on him may no longer be
relevant.
The Adelantar spouses might have failed to submit in the
reconstitution proceedings an authentic copy of respondent court's
resolution.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 The decision in Civil Case No. 938 declaring the Adelantar spouses
owners of the two (2) parcels of land claimed by Basilia Lorezo, Isabel
Lorezo and Canuto Lucero is conclusive upon the parties therein as well as
their successors-in-interest, the parties herein, under the doctrine of res
judicata.

The trial court held petitioners liable to private respondents for the
net produce of the properties in question from the time the former's
possession in good faith was legally interrupted when they were served
summons in connection with private respondents' complaint for recovery of
possession with damages. It may be that petitioners acquired the disputed
properties in good faith and had since then occupied the same but such bona
fide character of possession ceased when they were served summons.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 Maneclang v. Baun
G,R. No. 27876, April 22, 1992
FACTS:
Margarita Suri Santos died intestate. She was survived by her
husband Severo Maneclang and nine (9) children. A petition for the
settlement of her estate was filed by Hector S. Maneclang, one of her
legitimate children. Pedro M. Feliciano, the administrator of the intestate
estate of Margarita, filed a petition in SP Proc. No. 3028 asking the court to
give him "the authority to dispose of so much of the estate that is necessary
to meet the debts enumerated" in the petition. While notice thereof was
given to the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, through his counsel, Atty.
Teofilo Guadiz, no such notice was sent to the heirs of Margarita.
Despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the intestate court issued
an Order "authorizing the administrator to mortgage or sell so much of the
properties of the estate for the purposes (sic) of paying off the obligations"
referred to in the petition. Pursuant to this Order, Oscar Maneclang, the new
administrator of the intestate estate, executed a deed of sale in favor of the
City of Dagupan.
The new judicial administratrix of the intestate estate, Adelaida S.
Maneclang, daughter of the late Margarita Suri Santos, filed with the Court of
First Instance an action for the annulment of the sales made by the previous
administrator pursuant to the Order, cancellation of titles, recovery of
possession and damages against the vendees Juan T. Baun and Amparo
Baun, etc.
The cause of action against the City of Dagupan centers around the
deed of sale executed in its favor by former judicial administrator Oscar S.
Maneclang.
The evidence adduced by plaintiff discloses that Oscar Maneclang
was induced by its then incumbent Mayor.
The trial court rendered a partial decision against the City of
Dagupan, Annulling (sic) the Deed of Sale executed by the Administrator
being null and void ab initio. It is essential and mandatory that the interested
parties be given notices of the application for authority to sell the estate or
any portion thereof which is pending settlement in a probate court. An order
issued by a probate court for the sale of real property belonging to the
estate of a deceased person would be void if no notice for the hearing of the
petition for such sale is given.
The City of Dagupan is not a purchaser in good faith and for value
as the former judicial administrator, Oscar Maneclang, testified that he was
induced by then incumbent Mayor.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the sale executed by the judicial
administrator to the City of Dagupan is null and void ab initio
2. Whether or not defendant City of Dagupan is not a
purchaser in good faith and for value
3. Whether or not defendant City of Dagupan to pay the
plaintiff the sum of accumulated rentals or reasonable value
of (sic) the use of the property in question, plus interest
4. Whether or not defendant City of Dagupan to pay a monthly
rental or reasonable value of (sic) its occupation of the
premises up to the date the possession of the premises is
delivered to the plaintiff by said defendant
RULING:
1. In this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo
Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. Two of the heirs, Hector
Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age, were not
represented by counsel. The remaining seven (7) children were still minors
with no guardian ad litem having been appointed to represent them.
Obviously then, the requirement of notice was not satisfied. Without them,
EH405 SY 2016-2017
the authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be null
and void ab initio.

2. Their failure to do so for thirteen (13) years amounted to such

inaction and delay as to constitute laches. This conclusion, however, cannot
apply to the rest of the children — Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and
Teresita — who were then minors and not represented by any legal
representative. They could not have filed an action to protect their interests.

3. Even if it is to be assumed that Mayor Fernandez and Councilor

Guadiz induced Oscar Maneclang to sell the property, the fact remains that
there was already the order authorizing the sale. He was disputably
presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and that his
official duty was regularly performed. The filing of a case alleging bad faith
on the part of a vendee gives cause for cessation of good faith. Its Answer,
however, was filed on 5 November 1965. Accordingly, its possession in good
faith must be considered to have lasted up to that date. As a possessor in
good faith, it was entitled to all the fruits of the property and was under no
obligation to pay any rental to the intestate estate of Margarita for the use
thereof.

However, upon the filing of the Answer, the City of Dagupan already became
a possessor in bad faith.

4. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the

decision in all respects, except to the extent as above modified.

As modified, (a) the sale in favor of the City of Dagupan, is hereby declared
null and void; however, by reason of estoppel and laches as abovestated,
only 5/9 of the subject property representing the presumptive shares of
Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and Teresita, all surnamed Maneclang,
may be recovered; (b) subject, however, to its right to retain the property
until it shall have been refunded,

City of Dagupan is hereby ordered to reconvey to the intestate

estate of Margarita Suri Santos 5/9 of the property in question.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Topic: ACQUISITION OF POSESSION; Recourse to Courts undersirable lessees, it was improper for de Mesa and Daleon to resort to
fencing their properties to remove them. The CA affirmed the lower court’s
VILLAFUERTE v. CA decision but with modification of the amount for damages.

GR No. 134239, May 26, 2005

Issue:

Facts: Whether or not the CA erred in substantially reducing the amount of

damages awarded by the trial court.
Sps. Villafuerte operated a gasoline station on the premises of three
adjoining lots owned by several persons. One of these lots were owned by
Edilberto de Mesa while another is owned by Gonzalo and Federico Daleon.
The remaining lots were owned by Anicia Yap-Tan, the mother of the wife of Ruling:
Villafuerte. De Mesa and Daleon acquired their lots subject to the lease by
PetrophilCorporation which had built the gasoline station managed by the Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the lease
Villafuertes. When the lease to Petrophil expired, the Villafuertes obtained a contracts between the Villafuertes and de Mesa and Daleon over the latters
new lease from de Mesa for a period of one year. However, with regard to respective lots had already expired. There was also a congruence of findings
the lot owned by Daleon, the Villafuertes were not able to secure a lease that it was wrong for private respondents to fence their properties thereby
renewal, but instead received demand letters for them to vacate which the putting to a halt the operation of the gasoline station.
subsequently ignored.

Due to this, a complaint for ejectment was filed by Daleon against

Article 536 of the Civil Code explicitly provides for the proper recourse of one
the Villafuertes wherein no settlement was reached. After the expiration of
who claims to be entitled to the possession of a thing. When private
the lease contract with de Mesa, the Villafuertes continued to operate the
respondents personally took it upon themselves to evict petitioners from
gas station despite the demands to vacate.
their properties, which act was in clear contravention of the law, they
On an early morning, de Mesa and Daleon, with the aid of several became liable for all the necessary and natural consequences of [their] illegal
persons and without the knowledge of the Villafuertes, caused the closure of act. (actuallymaoraniang related sa topic. the rest was a discussion on the
the gasoline station by constructing fences around it. Due to this, the award for damages)
Villafuertes countered with a complaint for damages with preliminary
mandatory injunction against de Mesa and Daleon. The Villafuertes amended
their complaint to include the computation for damages. De Mesa and
Daleon, in their defense, stated that they did the fencing because of the
Villafuerte’s refusal to vacate. The lower court denied the application for
preliminary mandatory injunction stating that they have no more right to
stay on the premises. For the damages claimed by the Villafuertes, the
Court ruled in favor of the spouses and ordered de Mesa and Daleon to pay
damages. The Court ruled that though the spouses were deemed
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Topic: ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION; Possession by mere
tolerance
ARAMBULO v. GUNGAB
G.R. No. 156581, September 30, 2005
Facts:
Emerciana Gungab is the registered owner of the contested parcel of
land with improvements in Quezon City. In separate letters, Gungab made a
formal demand to Victoria and Miguel Arambulo to vacate the subject
property which the latter refused. Because of their falure to amicably settle
the issue in the barangay, Gungab filed a separate ejectment complaint
against Arambulo, alleging that she tolerated the occupancy of Arambulo
without rent and that they refused to vacate upon demand. Arambulo, in
defense, asserting that Arambulo is a co-owner of the property. Arambulo
alleged that after Pedro Reyes, the father of Emerciana and Victoria, died,
the property became part of the common properties of the Reyes clan.
Through the permission given by the wife of Pedro (Anastancia), the
Arambulos have been occupying the property for the last 20 years and that
the possession of the said portion was with the knowledge, consent, and
tolerance of the co-owners. The MeTC dismissed the ejectment case which
was upheld by the RTC, citing that the the Arambulos have the right to
retain possession of the property pursuant to Article 448 of the CC.
However, the CA reversed the ruling, citing that Gungab, having a
genuine TCT, has the preferred right to possess. They deemed that the claim
of co-ownership was unsubstantiated.
Issue: Whether or not Gungab can eject the Arambulos
Ruling:
The evidence showed that respondent has a Torrens Title over the
land. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that respondent, as registered
owner, is preferred to possess it. The age-old rule is that the person who has
a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. Except for
petitioners unsubstantiated claim that Victoria Arambulo is a co-owner of the
property, they have not presented other justification for their continued stay
thereon.
Persons who occupy the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them is bound by an implied
promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. Notably,
Anastacia Reyes only allowed petitioners to use and occupy certain portions
of the subject property. They admitted their use and possession of these
portions of the subject property had been with the knowledge, consent and
tolerance of all the other co-owners. Consequently, after respondent
obtained title to the subject property and withdrew her tolerance later on,
Arambulo’s refusal to vacate it rendered their possession thereof unlawful.
Since Arambulo’s occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance,
they are not entitled to retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil
Code. They are aware that their tolerated possession may be terminated any
time and they cannot be considered as builders in good faith. Moreover, as
aptly found by the Court of Appeals, the Arambulos have not presented
evidence to prove that they made improvements on the subject property and
defrayed the expenses therefor. Moreover, the Court did not sustain the
Arambulos contention that since they had possession of the subject property,
they are entitled to remain there. Again, they confuse unlawful detainer with
forcible entry. Prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary in an
unlawful detainer case. It is enough that she has a better right of
possession. Prior physical possession of a property by a party is
indispensable only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the
defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property, but his
possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of
his right to possess. Thus, the Arambulos’ prior physical possession of the
property does not automatically entitle them to continue in said possession
and does not give them a better right to the property.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Topic: ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION; Possession by mere
tolerance
BARNACHEA v. CA
GR No. 150025, July 23, 2008
Facts:
Ignacio filed a complaint for ejectment against Barnachea before the MTC.
The subject matter were lots titled to the Ignacios which are adjacent to the
propert that Barnachea owns and occupies. The properties were originally
part of the land owned by a certain Luis Santos in which it was inherited by
his daughter Purificacion Santos Imperial. The land was then subdivided and
transferred to tenant-farmers Santiago Isidro and Procopio de Guzman. The
Ignacios own the land from Usudri while the Ignacios own the land from de
Guzman. To avert the implementation of the writ of exection obtained by
Ignacio, Barnachea filed a Notice of Appeal. Pending the resolution on the
issue of ejectment, Ignacio’s sister (Leticia) filed a petition for Quieting of
Title with the RTC. Due to this, Barnachea filed an urgent motion for
suspension of proceedings which was denied by the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of an action involving the issue of ownership is
sufficient basis for the suspension of an ejectment proceeding between the
same parties and the same subject matter.
Ruling:
No.
The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are similar because they
are both summary actions where the issue is purely physical possession.
Other than these commonalities, however, they possess dissimilarities that
are clear, distinct, and well established in law.
In forcible entry, (1) the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical
possession of the property until he was deprived of possession by the
defendant; (2) the defendant secures possession of the disputed property
from the plaintiff by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
hence, his possession is unlawful from the beginning; (3) the law does not
require a previous demand by the plaintiff for the defendant to vacate the
premises; and (4) the action can be brought only within one-year from the
date the defendant actually and illegally entered the property.
In marked contrast, unlawful detainer is attended by the following features:
(1) prior possession of the property by the plaintiff is not necessary; (2)
possession of the property by the defendant at the start is legal but the
possession becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to
possession based on his or her contract or other arrangement with the
plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff is required by law to make a demand as a
jurisdictional requirement; and (4) the one-year period to bring the
complaint is counted from the date of the plaintiffs last demand on the
defendant.
In this case, a plain reading of the complaint shows Ignacio positions that
they was in prior possession of the disputed property; that Ignacio allowed
them to occupy the disputed property by tolerance; that Ignacio eventually
made a demand that the Barnachea vacate the property (on August 26,
1998, which demand them received on August 31, 1998); and that the
Barnachea refused to vacate the property in light of the defenses they
presented. Separately from the complaint, Ignacio characterized the action
they filed against Barnachea in the MTC as an unlawful detainer when they
stated in their memorandum that as alleged in the complaint, what was filed
by Ignacio was an ejectment suit for unlawful detainer.
The issue in an unlawful detainer case is limited to physical possession.
When a claim of ownership is used as a basis for de facto possession or to
assert a better possessory right, the court hearing the case may
provisionally rule on the issue of ownership. As a rule, however, a pending
civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the
suspension of the ejectment proceedings.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Topic: ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION; Possession by mere A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
LLOBRERA v. FERNANDEZ failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
GR No. 142882, May 2, 2006 against him.
Facts:
The judgment favoring the ejectment of petitioners being consistent with law
Fernandez, as one of the registered co-owners of the subject land, served and jurisprudence can only be affirmed. The alleged consignation of the
written demand letters to the Sps. Llobrera. The latter refused to vacate P20.00 monthly rental to a bank account in respondents name cannot save
which led to the filing of a formal complaint in the Barangay. With the failure the day for the petitioners simply because of the absence of any contractual
to amicably settle the dispite, Fernandez filed a complaint for ejectment and basis for their claim to rightful possession of the subject property.
damages against Llobrera before the MTCC. Llobrera alleged in their Answer Consignation based on Article 1256 of the Civil Code indispensably requires a
that they had been occupying the property in question beginning the year creditor-debtor relationship between the parties, in the absence of which,
1945 onwards, when their predecessors-in-interest, with the permission of the legal effects thereof cannot be availed of.
Gualberto de Venecia, one of the other co-owners of said land, developed
and occupied the same on condition that they will pay their monthly rental of
P20.00 each. From then on, they have continuously paid their monthly
rentals to Gualberto de Venecia or Rosita de Venecia or their representatives,
such payments being duly acknowledged by receipts. Beginning sometime
June 1996, however, the representative of Gualberto de Venecia refused to
accept their rentals, prompting them to consign the same to Banco San
Juan, which bank deposit they continued to maintain and update with their
monthly rental payments.

The MTCC ruled in favor of Fernandez and ordered Llobrera to

vacate the premises. The RTC and CA affirmed this judgement of the lower
court.

Issue: Whether or not Llobrera’s possession of the property is founded on

contract or not.

Ruling: No. This factual issue was resolved by the three (3) courts below in
favor of Fernandez, citing that there is an absence of any written
memorandum of the alleged lease arrangements. From the absence of proof
of any contractual basis for Llobrera’spossession of the subject premises, the
only legal implication is that their possession thereof is by mere tolerance. In
Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled:

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Topics: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Possessor v. Owner
Sps. Apostol v. CA and Sps. Chua
G.R No. 125375, June 17, 2004
Facts:
On September 3, 1993, the respondents, Spouses Emmanuel and Edna
Chua, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners, Spouses
Elpidio and Amelia Apostol, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Metro
Manila. The respondents alleged Luz B. Pascua was the owner of the parcel
of land located in Quezon City covered by TCT No. 198936 with an area of
315 square meters. She sold a portion of the property to the respondents on
July 8, 1976 for P45,548. On June 7, 1993, the Spouses Pascua executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the improvements thereon in
favor of the respondents. On the basis of the said deed, the respondents
were issued (TCT) No. 87610 over the property on June 8, 1993.
In the meantime, the petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents,
the Spouses Chua, the Spouses Pascua, and the Register of Deeds in the
RTC of Quezon City, for annulment of deed of sale and TCT No. 86338, and
for reconveyance with damages. The petitioners alleged that they had been
in possession of the property since 1973; their adverse claim over the
property was annotated on June 20, 1979 as Entry No. PE 8812; Luz Pascua
died on December 2, 1984 but Paulo Pascua did not inherit the property
from her because the same had already been sold to the respondents; Paulo
Pascua executed a falsified affidavit for self-adjudication over the property
on the basis of which he was able to secure, on May 20, 1993, TCT No.
86338.
Issues:
Who is entitled to the lawful possession of the subject property?
Ruling:
It is an accepted rule that a person who has a Torrens title over the
property, such as the respondents, is entitled to the possession thereof. As
discussed in the Pangilinan Case in Javelosa v. Court of Appeals, and
declared that the registered owners are entitled to the possession of the
property covered by the said title from the time such title was issued in their
favor. Moreover, the fact that the respondents were never in prior physical
possession of the subject land is of no moment, as prior physical possession
is necessary only in forcible entry cases.
Article 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same
time in two different personalities except in cases of co-
possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession,
the present possessor shall be preferred, if there are two possessors,
the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the
same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are
equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership through proper
proceedings.
In this case, defendants were able to establish the fact that they have been
in physical and material possession of the subject premises from the time
they purchased the same from Luz B. Pascua on July 8, 1976. Defendants,
therefore, are in possession of the property in the concept of an owner, and
under the law, a possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the
legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be
obliged to show or prove it (Art. 541, NCC).
Moreover, it is important to note that defendants purchased the subject
premises from Luz B. Pascua on July 8, 1976 while plaintiffs purchased the
same from Paulo Pascua only on June 4, 1993, a much later date. This is
shown by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Luz B. Pascua in favor of
defendants on July 8, 1976 which is evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale
of Unsegregated Portion of Land executed by Luz B. Pascua and Paulo
Pascua in favor of the defendants on July 14, 1977 and a Deed of
Confirmation of Deed of Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Land with Waiver dated
July 14, 1977 executed by Paulo Pascua. These documents put in doubtful
validity the subsequent sale of the same land by Paulo Pascua in favor of the
plaintiffs. Paulo Pascua had no right, therefore, to transfer ownership of the
subject land to plaintiffs because, Luz B. Pascua, the original owner, had
already sold the same land to defendants during her lifetime. And upon the
death of Luz B. Pascua, Paulo Pascua had no right to adjudicate the subject
lot to himself because he even confirmed such sale and waived any rights,
interest and participation over the subject residential house and lot in a Deed
of Confirmation of Absolute Sale with Waiver dated July 14, 1977.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Topics: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Possessor v. Owner the property after acquiring title to it through a sale between her and the
mortgagee-bank.
Ayson v. Enriquez Vda. De Carpo
The CA correctly held that Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals was applicable to
G.R No. 152438, June 17, 2004
the controversy. The continued occupation of the property by petitioner was
Facts: merely tolerated by respondent. Consequently, the former was bound by an
implied promise that she would vacate the premises upon demand. Her
Petitioner was the owner of three (3) parcels of land in Manibang, Porac, failure to do so justified respondents action for ejectment filed in the MTC.
Pampanga and has been in possession of the aforesaid properties being the
owner thereof. On August 29, 1980, petitioner mortgaged said properties to
the Philippine National Bank, Angeles City Branch (Bank). These were
subsequently foreclosed by the Bank. After failing to redeem within the
prescribed period, petitioners TCTs were canceled and new ones were issued
in the name of the Bank on May 14, 1985. On April 14, 1999, the Bank sold
the property to the respondent herein and is now covered by TCT No.
466519-R in favor of the respondent.

On October 22, 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City for the annulment of TCT No. [466519-R] and the deed
of sale between the Bank and the respondent as well as for reconveyance
and damages. With said Civil Case No. 9582 still pending, respondent, on
January 3, 2000, sent demand letters dated December 29, 1999 demanding
petitioner to vacate the premises.

Issues:

1. Who has jurisdiction over the case

2. Who has a better right over the property

Ruling

The trial brought to light the true nature of the right of possession of
respondent over the property, and the circumstances surrounding her
dispossession. The facts, as culled from the evidence presented by both
parties, unequivocally show that the instant case is one for unlawful
detainer.
Respondent was able to present evidence showing that after the
foreclosure of the property, petitioner failed to redeem it within the
redemption period. Thus, the latter was divested of her ownership and right
to retain possession thereof. Respondent acquired a better right to possess

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
Dumo v. Espinas
G.R No. 141962, January 25, 2006
Facts:
Spouses Dumo are the owners-possessors of a parcel of sandy beach resort
in Bauang, La Union. Severa J. Espinas filed a "Quieting of Title and/or
Ownership and Possession against spouses Sandy and Presnida Saldana,
subject matter of the case being the same resort. Although a decision has
been rendered against the defendants in the case against spouses Saldana,
the same was not enforced.
Disgruntled with the refusal of the sheriff to put them in possession over the
questioned real property, and in open defiance with the official action taken
by the sheriff, all defendants acting for the interest of Espinas took it upon
themselves, employing force, intimidation, and threat, to enter the property.
Despite protests made by Spouses Dumo, who were there then present and
visibly outnumbered by defendants and their agents who were armed with
sticks, bolos, hammers, and other deadly weapons, successfully drove out
plaintiffs, and took over the premises
Spouses Dumo prayed for the payment of actual, moral and exemplary
damages. The MTC rendered judgment holding that petitioners were able to
prove their right of possession over the subject property. Respondents
appealed the case to the RTC of Bauang, La Union. The RTC reversed and
set aside the Decision of the MTC. It also ruled that as regards damages, the
only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property.
Spouses Dumo filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA held that the
MTC correctly found that the petitioners were in possession of the subject
land and agreed with the ruling of the RTC that in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental
value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property concerned.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the only damage that can be
recovered is the fair rental value for use of the property
Ruling:
No. The CA is correct. There is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral
and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases,
the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment
cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be
recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere
possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the
property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have
no direct relation to his loss of material possession.
Although the MTC’s order for the reimbursement to petitioners of their
alleged lost earnings over beach resort could have been considered as
compensation for their loss of the use and occupation of the property while it
was in the possession of the respondents, records do not show any evidence
to sustain the same.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
Corporation v Treyes
G.R. No. 152438, April 27, 2007
FACTS:
CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto
R. Benedicto (petitioners) claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of
public land in Barangay Bulanon, SagayCity, Negros Occidental for 25 years.
However, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr., with his men, forcibly entered the leased
properties and barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed
wire fence along the road going to CRG Corporation‘s fishponds, and
harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings. It was alleged that the
respondents also ransacked the church.
CGR filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sagay City separate
complaints for Forcible Entry with Temporary Restraining Order with
Preliminary Injunction and Damages and reserved a separate civil action.
The MTC found Treyes and his men guilty of forcible entry.
CGR filed a separate complaint alleging therein that he suffered damages for
the actions of Treyes during and after the forcible entry. A claim for
additional damages which arose from incidents occurring after the
dispossession by Treyes of the premises was thereafter prayed for. The MTC
awarded the claims of CGR.
RTC dismissed the complaint for damages on the ground of prematurity
saying that “damages may only be maintained after a final determination on
the forcible entry cases has been made.”
Issue:
Whether or not a complainant in a forcible entry case can file an independent
action for damages arising after the act of dispossession had occurred even
during the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry.
RULING:
YES, Corporation may institute a separate and independent complaint for
damages even during pendency of separate complaints for forcible entry,
arising after the act of dispossession had occurred based on the separate
acts done after the dispossession such as the stealing of fish and ransacking
of the church.
As per Dumo v. Espinas, it was settled that the only form of damages that
may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
This is because the only issue to be resolved in a case for forcible entry is
rightful possession and the only damages one could recover from such action
for forcible entry is that which the plaintiff could have had if he was still the
possessor of the property. The only damages you can get is what you lost
when you are deprived of material possession. Everything else should be
claimed by ordinary action.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
The respondents asserts their claim by citing Progressive Development
Corporation v. CA. However, this case is different from Progressive
Development Corporation v. CA in which the claim for damages separate
from forcible entry with damages was dismissed on the ground of
litispendentia (identity between two pending actions with respect to rights
asserted, reliefs prayed for, is such that when judgment is done on one, res
judicata will result in the remaining action or simply put, two cases are so
similar that judgment of one will render affect the other decision
considerably).

In Progressive Development Corporation case, the separate action for

damages is based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased premises by
the petitioner in that case while the action for forcible entry with damages is
an action claiming for damages for the loss sustained by the plaintiff.
Basically, the damages asked for are from the same injury in the forcible
entry case (they are both for the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property).

In the present case, the damages asked for in the forcible entry case is
based on the dispossession while the action for damages is based on acts
done AFTER dispossession such as the carting away of fish and the
ransacking of the church.

Hence, order of the RTC is reversed and set aside.

EH405 SY 2016-2017

TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. v CA
G.R. No. 97637, April 10, 1992
FACTS:
Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation (or Ramon Que), Iloilo, Multi Parts Supply
Corporation (or Ramon Que), VirgilioAng, Henry Tan, Southern Sales
Corporation, and Chang Liang, Jr. were lessees of a commercial building and
bodegas standing on registered land in Iloilo City owned in common by Lucy
A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R. Locsin, Lourdes C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin and Ester
L. Jarantilla. After the expiration of the period in the lease agreement, lessor
executed an Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of Star Group Resources and
Development.
In the Deed of Sale, it was stated that vendee shall henceforth deal with the
lessees and occupants of the properties herein sold without any further
warranty or obligation on the part of the Vendors.
Being the vendee, Star Group then filed an action of unlawful detainer
against Wilmon Auto Supply.
Petitioner refused to concede invoking that the lessors violated their
leasehold rights because they were not accorded with: 1) rights of pre-
emption; 2) buyer is not required to honor leases; 3) the lessees
were denied the option to renew their leases upon the expiration
thereof.
These same propositions were also raised in the case it filed with the RTC. In
the unlawful detainer cases, it was decided by the MTC that the case should
proceed against some of the lessees but not with the others. The lessees
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. They filed a petition for
certiorari and the RTC held in the end that the pendency of the case in the
RTC did not warrant suspension of the unlawful detainer case with the MTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the unlawful detainer suits in MTC against petitioner,
lessees, for the reason that their lease had expired, should be abated by the
action filed in RTC by lessees based on the contention that they are entitled
to a right of pre-emption/prior purchase of the leased premises.
RULING: No, an ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed with
the RTC based on a tenant’s claim of his right of pre-emption being violated.
The Court gave relevant precedents such as:
 injunction suits do not abate ejectment
 accionpubliciana does not suspend an ejectment suit
 writ of possession does not bar execution of judgment
 action for quieting title does not bar an ejectment suit.
The reason for the above rulings of the precedence were that the actions in
the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and
on not a few occasions, that the case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delay
disposition of the ejectment proceeding or that the issues presented in the
former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action
and there resolved.
SC said that the cases cited by the petitioners were exceptions such as in
Vda. De Legazpi v. Avendano case, it was based on strong reasons of equity
not found in the present petition. In Vda. De Murga v. Chan, the essential
requisite of an unequivocal demand to vacate and surrender the premises
had not been fulfilled.
SC stressed that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant
raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
EH405 SY 2016-2017
MTC, MeTC and MCTC have the competence to resolve “the issue of
ownership....only to determine the issue of possession.”

Hence, Petition was dismissed

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
De Luna v CA
G.R. 94490, August 6, 1992
FACTS:
De Luna filed a case for forcible entry, alleging that he is the owner of an
unregistered parcel of land in San Juan, Zambales since 1938. However, on
December 18 and 19 1971 Daclison et al (Daclison, Crispin, Doble and
Dimaano) entered the land and began plowing it and even fenced the land
with barbed wire and began planting sugar cane.
Petitioners prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and
pay him the amount of P45.00 monthly per hectare until possession thereof
would be transferred to him, with litigation expenses and costs.
Defendants denied the allegations in the complaint. Daclison, Crispin and
Doble deny ever entering the and occupying the disputed property. Dimaano
for his part claimed that De Luna was not the owner of the property, it was
owned by Dequina who had declared the property in his name for taxation.
It was alleged that when Dequina died, his son took over and leased the
property to Dimaano. Dequina is actually the uncle of De Luna.
MTC ruled in favor of De Luna. RTC revered the decision of the MTC, CA
affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Luna is entitled to the possession of the property
RULING: Yes, De Luna is entitled to the possession.
Well-established is the rule in ejectment cases that the only issue to be
resolved therein is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of
the premises, or possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership
that either party may set forth in their pleadings. If petitioner can prove prior
possession in himself, he may recover such possession from even the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in
his favor priority time, he has the security that entitles him to stay on the
property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
either accionpubliciana or accionreindivicatoria.
Dimaano may have claimed to possess the property by virtue of a lease
agreement by the alleged owner, but the RTC is wrong to conclude that
Dequina owns the subject property.
De Luna proved through substantia evidence that he had prior possession of
the property and established by witnesses, notably by his own tenants
(possession by Dilag, his lessee, can be proven since 1953 and since
possession can be exercised in the name of another, it positively redounds to
De Luna)
Witnesses also state that De Luna has cultivated the land from 1938 to 1941
with his mother and leased the property to the witness
On the other hand, Dimaano failed to prove DequinaJr’sprior possession,
much less ownership over the land. The mere fact that Dequina Sr. declared
the property for taxation purposes does not constitute possession.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. was
the owner of the disputed property since there is no evidence whatsoever to
support such a conclusion.
However, it goes without saying that this case does not bar petitioner and
Agustin Dequiña, Jr. from resolving the issue of ownership over the disputed
property in an appropriate proceeding.
Hence, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Costs against private respondents.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
Semira v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76031, 2 March 1994
Facts:
Lot 4221of petitionerSemira, the subject parcel of the present
controversy, was once owned by private respondent Buenaventura An.
Private respondent previously acquired the subject parcel from a certain
Juana Gutierrez for P850.00 bymeans of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
executed on 4 January 1961. Aside from the estimated area of 822.5 square
meters appearing in the deed of sale, the boundaries of the lot were also
stated.
Buenaventura An sold the same to his nephew, Cipriano Ramirez, in
1972 for the lump sum of P2,500.00 also by means of a "Kasulatan ng
Bilihan ng Lupa" whichlikewise incorporated both the estimated area and the
definite boundaries of the land. Cipriano Ramirez, in turn, sold the lot to
petitionerSemira in 1979 with the very same boundaries mentioned in the
deed of sale executed in his favor by his uncle Buenaventura An.However,
the area stated in the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" was 2,200 square
meters and not 822.5 appearing in the previous document. As delimited by
its boundaries, the lot is actually much bigger than 822.5 square meters.
This was confirmed by the Taysan Cadastral Mapping Survey conducted in
1974 where it is definitely stated that the area of Lot 4221 is 2,200 square
meters; hence, the reason for the change.
On 17 March 1979, petitionerSemira entered the subject parcel and
began the construction of a new rice-mill. However, on 18 April 1979, a
complaint for forcible entry was filed against him by Buenaventura An in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo. The latter claimed that the area
of Lot 4221 was 822.5 square meters only and that the excess of 1,377
square meters forcibly occupied by petitioner formed part of the land he
owned. Private respondent insists that he only sold 822.5 square meters,
hence, his nephew could not have transferred a bigger area to petitioner.On
the other hand, petitionerSemira claims that he owns the entire 2,200 square
meters since it is the size of Lot 4221following its established boundaries.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the question of ownership is so necessarily involved
that it would be impossible to decide the question of bare possession
without first setting that of ownership.
2. Whether or not petitioner Semira’s ejectment from the disputed
area, despite the absence of clear and indubitable proof that private
respondent had prior physical possession, was proper; and
Ruling:
1. In the instant case, the issue of possession cannot be decide
independentlyof the question of ownership. The question of who has prior
possession hinges onthe question of who the real owner of the disputed
portion is. And the latter, in turn, depends on whether such portion is part of
Buenaventura An’s property or that of Lot 4221 of petitioner Semira.
We sustain petitioner Semira’s contention that he owns the entire
2,200 square meters since it is the size of Lot 4221 following its established
boundaries.We have repeatedly ruled thatwhere land is sold for a lump sum
and not so much per unit of measure or number, theboundaries of the land
stated in the contract determine the effects and scope of the sale,not the
area thereof. Hence, the vendors are obligated to deliver all the land
includedwithin the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be
greater or smallerthan that recited in the deed. This is particularly true
where the area is described as"humigitkumulang," that is, more or less.
Hence, when private respondent Buenaventura An sold Lot 4221 to
his nephew CiprianoRamirez by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
which incorporated both the area and the definite boundaries of the lot, the
EH405 SY 2016-2017
former transferred not merely the 822.5 square meters stated in their
document of sale but the entire area circumscribed within its boundaries.

2. No, the ejectment for forcible entry was not proper, absent any clear
and indubitable proof that private respondent had prior physical possession.

Considering the facts established in this case, it is not difficult to

sustain petitioner Semiraover private respondent Buenaventura Anwhen the
latter failed even to prove prior possession in his favor. Absent such element,
it cannot be said that he was forcibly deprived of the disputed portion.
Hence, his action for forcible entry must fail.

It should be emphasized, however, that the case before us is merely

an action of forcibleentry and that the issue of ownership was decided for
the sole purpose of resolving priority of possession. Hence, any
pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be
regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action
between the same parties involving title to the land

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of receipt thereof, petitioner refused and failed to relinquish possession of lots
Possession 1 and 2. Hence, on April 22, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for
forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner
alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth, took over the
physical, actual and material possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of
Reynante v. Court of Appeals
the kubos or huts bordering the Liputan River and cutting off and/or
G.R. No. 95907, 8 April 1992 disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent thereto.

Issues:

Facts: 1. Who between the petitioner and privaterespondents has prior

physical possession of lots 1 and 2; and
More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as 2. Whether or not thedisputed lots belong to private respondents as a
tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos, owner and father-in-law of herein result of accretion.
private respondents, over a fishpond.
Ruling:
During the tenancy, petitioner Jose Reynante constructed a nipa hut
where he and his family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he 1. petitioner has clearly proven that he had prior possession over lots 1
and 2
had planted on lots 1 and 2 covering. These lots are located between the
fishpond and the Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River.Petitioner harvested
and sold said nipa palms without interference and prohibition from anybody. An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual
title of the property isnever determined. A party who can prove prior
After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs (private respondents'
possession can recover such possessioneven against the owner himself.
predecessors-ininterest) entered into a written agreement denominated as
Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor
with petitioner Jose Reynantewhereby the latter for and in consideration of
priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the
the sum of P200,000.00 turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to the
property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
heirs of Don Cosme Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as
accionpublicianaor accionreivindicatoria
caretaker.
On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession, he
Pursuant to the said written agreement, petitioner surrendered the
has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the
fishpond and the two huts located therein to private respondents. Private
owner of the property.
respondents thereafter leased the said fishpond to one Carlos de la Cruz.
Petitioner continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by him on lots 1 and
2 and to take care of the nipa palms he had planted therein.
The evidence on record shows that petitioner was in possession of
On February 17, 1988, private respondents formally demanded that the questioned lots formore than 50 years. It is undisputed that he was the
the petitioner vacate said portion since according to them petitioner had caretaker of the fishpond owned by the late Don Cosme Carlos for more than
already been indemnified for the surrender of his rights as a tenant. Despite 50 years and that he constructed a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond and

EH405 SY 2016-2017
planted nipa palms therein. In addition, as culled from the records, what was
surrendered to the plaintiffs was the fishpond and not the'sasahan' or the
land on which he constructed his hut where he now lives.

2. No, the disputed lots do not automatically belong to private

respondents by accretion.

Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposit (the

lot in question), byaccretion, still their failure to register said accretion for a
period of fifty (50) years subjected said accretion to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.

It is undisputed that petitioner has been in possession of the subject

lots for more thanfifty (50) years and unless private respondent can show a
better title over the subject lots,petitioner's possession over the property
must be respected.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
Banes v. Lutheran Church of the Philippines
G.R. No. 142308, 15 November 2005
Facts:
On August 16, 1990, certain members of the Lutheran Church in the
Philippines (LCP) filedan action against its President, Thomas Batong, and six
other members of the Board of Directors, before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), for accounting and damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction and appointment of a management committee. This resulted in
the division of the LCP into two factions, namely: the Batong/Saguilayan
group which includes herein petitioners and the Ladlad/Almazan group which
includes herein respondents.
By virtue of an injunction issued by SEC, herein respondents, with
the aid ofcertain members of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), the Philippine National Police (PNP), and Sheriff Primo
Alimurong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila, tried to dispossess
petitioners, as previous clergymen and occupants of the residential houses
owned by LCP and form part of the compound where the principal office of
LCP is located.Petitioners however refused to leave the same. Thus, the main
gate of the subject property was padlocked by respondents, preventing the
petitioners and their families from going in and out of said place. Security
guards were also stationed at the premises with an instruction not to allow
petitioners entry and exit.
Almost a month thereafter, or on September 9, 1993, petitioners
Manuel G. Del Rosarioand Elmer J. Bañes wrote letters addressed to Rev.
Eduardo Ladlad, as LCP President expressing their intention to leave the
premises. Petitioners Bañes and Del Rosario eventually left the premises;
however, petitioners-spouses SanRamon did not write any letter but they
were able to leave the premises by befriending theguards posted at the gate.
On December 3, 1993, petitioners filed an action for forcible entry
with prayer for issuanceof temporary restraining order and preliminary
mandatory injunction against the respondents herein.Petitioners claim that
they had been in possession of the subject premises long before the SEC
case was filed and it was only because petitioners refused to recognize the
duly constituted boardof directors that they were made to suffer by being
taken out of the house they had long been occupying. They further claim
that the respondents, together with several armed security guards, forcibly
took possession of the residential houses, occupied by petitioners, and
evicted petitioners therefrom.
On the other hand, respondents assert that petitioners did not
possess the subject propertiesin their own right but as mere agents and/or
representatives of the respondent LCP, thus, they never had any cause of
action to file a case for forcible entry. Respondents also assert that the
dispossession of the petitioners was effected without force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, and that petitioners were willing to voluntarily
leave the subject premises and merely requested for an extension of their
stay therein, showing there was no force, intimidation or stealth.
Issue:
Whether petitioners were removed from the premises by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Ruling: Clearly in the instant case, the presence of the security guards in the
subject property restricting petitioners' mobilityconstitutes force
contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners were removed from the premises by force, intimidation,

threat, strategy or stealth.
It is true that petitioners Bañes and Del Rosario wrote LCP
expressing their willingness tovoluntarily vacate the premises upon finding
another place to live in, but this is after respondents had padlocked the
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical
premises and used armed men to prevent their coming to and from the
possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
premises. Otherwise stated, said letters do not negate the initial use of force
strategy or stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from the
by respondents which constituted forcible entry. It is undisputed that
beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de
respondents owned the property occupied by petitioners, still their use of
facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are
force in evicting petitioners therefrom was not justified.
mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff
must allege prior physical possession of the property, and second, he must
also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means
provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of theRules of Court i.e., by force, Indeed, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is also settled that in the the party in peaceablequiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong
resolution thereof, what is important is determining who is entitled to the hand, violence or terror. The owner who has title over the property cannot
physical possession of the property.Indeed, any of the parties who can prove take the law into his own hands to regainpossession of said property. He
prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner must go to court.
himselfsince such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership
and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue
deprivation thereof.

In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case,

the trespasser does nothave to institute a state of war. The act of going to
the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over the property which is all that is necessary
and sufficient to show that the action is based on the provisions of Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
4. POSSESSION AS A BASIS FOR ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
i. Balatero and Heirs of BAdelles v IAC and Juan Veloso
GR 73889 September 30, 1982
FACTS:
Property in dispute was originally owned by parents of Josefa and
AlejoIglupas. After death of parents, the lot was given to Alejo and his wife
Tomasa. After Alejo died, Tomasa sold the lot t Josefa and her husband Juan
Badelles.
June 9, 1930- Josefa mortgaged the property to Juan Veloso in order to
secure a loan. (Loan was paid in 1947)
April 30, 1954- Josefa and her children sold a portion of the lot to petitioner
Florencio Balatero.
During the court proceeding for the lots in dispute, the trial court finds
Balatero and heors of Badelles as registrable owners over the lots as they
had title over the lots.Juan Veloso appealed the decision and so IAC reversed
lower courts decision adjudicating the entire lot to respondent finding tha the
contract was a contract of sale of the land.
ISSUE:
Was the contract that of a contract of sale or an equitable mortgage?
RULING:
Juan Veloso's contract with Josefa was that of an equitable mortgage and
not of sale.SC said that the price consideration to Veloso of P68 was
unusually inadequate when the same parcel of land was bought by Josefa
herself from Tomasa for P111. If the contract was indeed of sale then why
did Josefa sell it for a price almost half of what she laid for 12 years earlier?
This fact shows that the contract was an equitable mortgage than a contract
of sale.
- As such, Veloso was merely a holder and so even if he executed an
affidavit to consolidate his right of ownership over the land 4 years after
executionof contract, it was of no use because the constructive possession
over the parcel of land did not ripen into ownership because the contract
was an equitable mortgage and not contract of sale.
Ii. Director of LandsvHeirs of Tesalona
GR 66130 September8, 1994
236 SCRA 336 – Civil Law – Land Titles and Deeds – Land Registration –
Spanish titles
FACTS:
Isabel, Consuelo, and Serapia were sisters who filed a petition to register 6
parcels of land under their name. The land has an area of 10,481 sq m. The
same was inherited by them from their parents who acquired the same from
Spanish grant. The sisters showed possessory information. The lower court
ruled in their favor but only awarded 4 parcels of land. Parcel no. 1 and 2
were not yet decided upon as there was a separate case involving one
Constanciodela Pena Tan. The heirs appealed to have lots 1 & 2 be included.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs have rights over lots 1 & 2.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court noted that they do not even have rights over the
other parcels of land (but no need to disturb ruling as it was not appealed
for by the Director of Lands). The original tracing cloth plan of the land
applied for was not submitted in evidence by the heirs. Such omission is fatal
to their application as the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a
statutory requirement of mandatory character. While a blue print of survey
Plan Psu 215382 (lot 1) was presented before the trial court, the same falls
short of the mandatory requirement of law.
The basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona is a Spanish title, a
possessory information title issued on May 20, 1896 to Maria Rosita Lorenzo
pursuant to the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 for 1.0481 hectares (but
the actual land area being applied for (lot 1) was 7000+ sq m. But the heirs
did not submit the original of the possessory information title. What was
submitted was an unclear, illegible copy of a Spanish document purporting to
be the title evidencing the land grant of 1896. Moreover, proof of loss or
unavailability of the original document as required by Section 5, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court was not established thus, rendering admissibility of the
said secondary evidence questionable and dubious. PD 982 was also in effect
which mandated Spanish titles to be registered but the heirs never registered
the same (purpose of the law was to avoid falsified titles after the war).
EH405 SY 2016-2017
5. INDICIA OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION
i. Resurrection Bartolome v IAC, heirs of Sps.
BernabeBartolome and Ursula CID
GR 76792 March 12, 1990
FACTS:
The lot in dispute is originally owned by EpitacioBitara and Maria Gonzales.
The lot is located in Laoag, IlocosNorte has 725 square meters with Lot No.
11165 under tax declaration no. 5708, bounded by the propert of Pedro
Manuel in the North, the road in the east, property of Esteban in the West
and property of DoroteoBartolome in the South.
The tax declaration of the lot was superseded by Tax declaration no 37576
on April 23, 1914 already containing an area of 772 square meters with
improvements thereon.
Epistacio and his wife Maria had 2 children: Catalina and Pedro, Pedro died a
bachelor while Catalina married a certain surnamed Bartolome bore five
children named Isabela, Tarcila, Calixto, Resurreccion and Ruperta.
In 1912, Epistacio left Laog and settled in Isabela and entrusted his lot to
DoroteoBartolome who owned the adjacent lot in the South. Maria on the
other hand remained in the lot before she followed her husband in Isabela.
In 1916, Epistacio died in Isabela. Five years later, Maria, with her
grandchildren: Calixto and Resurrection (Petitioner) returned to Laoag
and found out that their house situated in the lot they owned was destroyed
by fire, thus, they boarded someone else’s house. Calixto built a bamboo
fence around his grandfather’s lot while Resurreccion returned to Isabela in
1926 when her grandmother (Maria G.) died. In the same year Doroteo went
to Davao City and died there after 2 years.
Thereafter, Director of Land instituted a cadastral proceeding over the lot
(Cadastral No. 53). In 1933, Ursula Cid (decendent of the Respondent),
the widow of Bernabe (the son of Doroteo) files an answer in the cadastral
case claiming ownership over the lot alleging an area of 1660 square meters
through inheritance.
In 1934, Resurrection also filed an answer in the same cadastral proceeding
claiming ownership over the lot with an area of 864 square meters (take
note on the difference in the area of lot claimed by Ursula). Resurrection
alleged that the lot was inherited from her grandparents.
While no further proceedings was held thereon, Resurrection entrusted the
portion she claimed to MARIA BARTOLOME (daughter of Doroteo).
In 1939, Ursula and her children migrated to Davao City leasing the lot she
claimed to a certain Severino Ramos. She instructed Maria B. to receive the
rentals and to pay taxes to the property. Dominador (son of Ursula) took
over the task, but on 1950, Philippine United Trading Inc. rented the
property until the company was burned down in 1968. The rentals of the
property were given to Dominador. Resurrection, who was at that time living
in Isabela received 50 pesos from Maria in consideration of the lease
contract.
In 1968, CFI of Ilocos sent a notice for the continuation of the hearing. A
year later, Maria filed a motion to intervene alleging co-ownership with
Ursula since she is one of the child of DoroteoBartolome (Daghanniog
children siDoroteo, si Maria B. langangni represent). Ursula buttress the
claim of Maria alleging that she and her husband purchased the lot. She
presented 3 deed of sales: [a] dated 1917, purchasing 374 sq. m. from
Doming Augustin, [b] 1913, from IgnaciaManrique and [c] from Maria
Gonzales (take note, grandmother nisiyani Resurrection ogmaonisiyaanggi
claim ni Resurrection) in 1917 for 772 sq. m. of lot for 103.75 pesos.
RTC
In 1984, The RTC only entertained the answers filed by Resurrection and
Ursula, it rendered a decision in favor of Resurrection. RTC ruled that the
deed of sale executed by Maria Gonzales in favor of Ursula has no probative
value and is incomplete and undersigned. The possession of Ursula over the
proper was also interrupted and merely tolerated during the pendency of the
case. Thus, no ownership conferred upon Ursula.
IAC
IAC reversed the ruling of RTC. IAC ruled that the document presented by
Ursula was an ancient document covered under Section 22, Rule 132 of the
ROC. Further ruled, that ownership over it was vested with the legal
presumption that she possessed it with just title.
ISSUES:
[a] WON the provisions of Rule 132 is applicable with respect to the deed of
sale in question?
EH405 SY 2016-2017
[b] WON acquisitive prescription runs during the pendency of the cadastral
proceeding?
HELD:
[a] WON the provisions of Rule 132 is applicable with respect to the deed of
sale in question?
NO, it was not applicable.
The deed of sale presented consists of 3 pieces of paper. The first page; is
blank, apparently serves as a cover page. The second page; stated therein
the consideration of the sale in the amount of 103.75 pesos sold by Maria
Paguyo to Sps. Bernabe and Ursula. The third page; contains the warranty
against eviction and the execution date of the instrument.
Dominador (the heir/son of Ursula) testified that when he was 11 years old,
he saw the FOUTH PAGE of the document containing the signature of Maria
Gonzales. It was also entrusted to him by his mother in 1947. However, the
4th page was lost during the Japanese Occupation. Dominador presented in
the court a sworn statement executed by Ursula in 1937 declaring that the
sale was evidenced by a written document; that it was transferred in the
name of her husband, that she was paying taxes thereon and that they had
been in continuous possession of the lot for more than. 30 years.
Rule 132 provides that;
Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. – Where a private writing is
more than 30 years old, is produced from a custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authority
need be given.
In this case, it appeared that the document was executed in 1917, it was
more than 30 years when it was offered as an evidence in 1983. It was also
presented in the court by the proper custodian (Dominador, the heir of
Ursula). However, the IAC failed to consider and discuss THAT NO
ALTERATION OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUSPICION ARE PRESENT.
On its face, the document appeared without alteration, but the MISSING
PAGE, nonetheless affected the authenticity of the document. The signature
is a vital proof in the voluntary transmission of rights over the sale of the lot.
IT’S INCOMPLETENESS IS FAR MORE WORSE THAN A DOCUMENT WITH AN
ALTERED CONTENT (char sad sa SC uy.)
Moreover, the genuineness of the document is also suspicious. The sale was
executed in 1917. Ursula would have had it in her possession in 1933 when
she answered the cadastral proceeding. But it turned out, she only claimed
that purchase was the mode of acquisition of the lot after he sister in law
(MARIA BARTOLOME) sought the intervention in the proceeding allrging co-
ownership.
ALL OF THE ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES NEGATES THE CONCLUSION OF THE
APPELEATE COURT THAT THE DOCUMENT IS COVERED UNDER THE RULES
IN ANCEINT DOCUMENT.
The Supreme Court also discussed that even if rules of ancient document
would apply, it is still infirm. Under article 834 of the OLD CIVIL CODE, Maria
Gonzales, as a surviving spouse, shall be entitled to a portion IN USUFRUCT
equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate
children or descendants who has not received any betterment, until it had
been determined by means of liquidation of the deceased spouse’s estate
that a portion of the conjugal property remained after all the debts and
obligations had been paid. Hence, in the absent of proof that the estate of
Epitacio (deceased spouse of Maria G.) had been settled, Maria G. has no
right to sell not even the portion of the lot in dispute in this case.
[b] WON acquisitive prescription runs during the pendency of the cadastral
proceeding?
No, SC holds that the institution of the cadastral proceeding, or atleast the
publication of notice, has the effect of suspending the running of prescriptive
period. IAC erred in ruling acquisitive prescription in favour of Ursula.
Neither Ursula can assert that acquisitive prescription was already in effect
before the institution of the cadastral proceeding because Bernabe (husband
of Ursula) declared the lot 11165 as his own only on 1925. The cadastral
proceeding started in 1933. It fell short of the 10 years actual, adverse and
uninterrupted period of possession.
OTHERS:
Payment of taxes (as declared by Ursula during the pendency of the
cadastral case) does not prove ownership. It merely is an indicium of a claim
of ownership.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
WHEREFORE, IAC decision was reversed and set aside. The eastern portion
of Lot. 11165 with an area of 772 sq. m. was adjudicated in favor to the
heirs of Epitacio while the remaining area is hereby adjudicated in favour to
the heirs of Doroteo.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Alonso v Cebu Country Club, Inc. (G.R. No. 130876)
GR 130876 January 21, 2002 Neither has the respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc. been able to establish a
clear title over the contested estate. The reconstitution of a title is simply the
FACTS: re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and
Petitioner Francisco Alonso, who died pendente lite and substituted by his condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land
legal heirs, was the only son and sole heir of the late Tomas Alonso and covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original
Asuncion Medalle. certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate
covered thereby.
Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents and records showing
that his father acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from
the Government of the Philippine Islands in or about the year 1911 in
accordance with the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120).

The documents showed that the original vendee of the subject lot assigned
his sales certificate to petitioner's father, who completed the required
installment payments thereon under Act No. 1120 and was consequently
issued a patent. The Director of Lands executed a final deed of sale in favor
of petitioner's father. However, the deed was not registered with the
Register of Deeds because of lack of technical requirements as required by
law.

Upon investigation of the status of the land, petitioner found out that the
title of Lot No. 727 had been administratively reconstituted from the owner's
duplicate under a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of United Service
Country Club, Inc., predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. Upon order of the
court, the name of the registered owner in the said TCT was changed to
Cebu Country Club, Inc.

Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint for declaration of
nullity and non-existence of deed/title, cancellation of certificates of title and
recovery of property against defendant Cebu Country Club, Inc. which the
trial court decided in favor of the defendant.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:
Who has the better right over the said lot?

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that neither Tomas Alonso nor his son petitioner
Francisco Alonso, or the latter's heirs, are the lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in
dispute. The petitioner was not able to secure a Torrens title, in fact the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources declined their application.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 ii. Republic of the Philippines v CA and Heirs of Democrito
O. Palza
G.R. No. 146874, July 20, 2006
FACTS:
Subject property was first owned by Santos de la Cruz who declared this
under Tax Declaration for the year 1913; 1917; and 1921
Property was successively bought by Pedro Cristobal, Regino Gervacio, Diego
Calugdan and Gil Alhambra. To evidence their respective acquisition of the
property in question, Tax Declaration 1923; 1927, and for 1934
After Gil Alhambra died, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned the property and
declared it in their names under Tax Declaration for the year 1960
5 July 1966, theheirs executed a "Deed of Sale With Mortgage" deeding the
subject property to petitioner appellee
After the sale, Plaza took possession and paid the taxes due for the years
1966 up to 1986, and in 1985 declared it in his name under Tax Declaration.
He appointed Mauricio Plaza and Jesus Magcanlas as the administrator and
caretaker, respectively. Due to losses, the property in question was
cultivated only for a while—Five (5) years according to Mauricio Plaza, and
from 1966 up to 1978 according to Jesus Magcanlas
14 November 1986, Plaza filed a petition for the registration and
confirmation of his title over the property
24 February 1988, the Republicopposed. (1) Plaza and his predecessors-in-
interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or
prior thereto; (2) the muniment of title and tax declarations as well as tax
payments relied upon do not constitute sufficient evidence of a bona fide
acquisition of the land by petitioner-appellee and of his open, continuous
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since 12 June
1945, or prior thereto, and (3) the subject property pertains to the public
domain and is not subject to private appropriation
Others who opposed the decision:
 Heirs of Santos de la Cruz argue that: (1) their PII, Santos de la
Cruz, is the 'primitive owner'; and, (2) he, his heirs, and upon their
tolerance, some other persons have been in OCEN possession of the
land in question since time immemorial until the present
 Kadakilaan Estate contends that: (1) by reason of its Titulo de
Propiedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree with approved plans
registered under the Torrens System and petitioner-appellee or his
predecessors-in-interest have not been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question since 12 June 1945 or earlier
Contention of Republic: Land in question had been withdrawn from the
alienable portion of the public domain pursuant to Presidential Proclamation
No. 679 issued on January 7, 1991, almost 6 months prior to the issuance of
the TC’s decision.
3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the President
withdrawing the subject property from sale or settlement and reserve for
slum improvement and sites and services program
31 May 1991 Plaza filed his memorandum. Only the Republic and the Heirs
of Santos de la Cruz offered their evidence.
CA: affirmed the decision confirming Plaza's title over Rel. Plan 1059, which
is the relocation plan of Psu-97886
ISSUE:
Whether or not Plaza has a registrable title over the property sought to be
titled
HELD:
Plaza and his PII have acquired and have been in OCEN possession of the
subject property for a period of 30 years under a bona fide claim of
ownership
Proof:
1. tax declarations of his predecessors-in-interest
2. the deed of sale,
3. tax payment receipts and
4. own tax declarations.
Plaza had introduced some improvements on the subject property from the
time he purchased it. His witnesses testified that he developed the subject
property into a ricefield and planted it with rice, but only for about five years
EH405 SY 2016-2017
because the return on investment was not enough to sustain the continued
operation of the riceland. Though not in the category of permanent
structures, the preparation of the land into a ricefield and planting it with rice
are considered 'improvements'.

Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not

conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership

The issuance of the proclamation did not have any effect on the subject
property as the proclamation only withdrew it from sale or settlement and
reserved the same for slum improvement and sites and services program,
but subject to actual survey and existing private rights. The proclamation did
not prohibit the registration of title of one who claims, and proves, to be the
owner

Registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title

When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land,
by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The Torrens system was
not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land, as it
merely confirms, but does not confer ownership

Plaza has proven his claim of ownership over the subject property. As
provided in the proclamation itself, his ownership of the subject property
must be respected and he cannot be barred from having the land titled in his
name. This does not contravene or negate the intention of the proclamation.
Besides, its implementing Letters of Instruction recognize that there may be
lands declared included in the Slum Improvement Resettlement (SIR)
program that are privately owned

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 iv. Cequena v Bolante
GR 137944 April 6, 2000
FACTS:
On October 15, 1975, respondent HonorataBolante and Miguel Mendoza,
brother of petitioners, had a dispute on the ownership of the land during the
cadastral survey. Because of this dispute, herein petitioners filed a civil case
against respondent claiming ownership and possession of the parcel of land
in question.
During the pre-trial conference, parties stipulated the following facts:
1) The land subject of the case was formerly declared for taxation purposes
in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza prior to 1954 but isnow declared in the
name of Margarito Mendoza.
2) The parties agree[d] as to the identity of the land subject of instant case.
3) [Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza while the
[respondent] is the only daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza.
4) Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza [were] brothers, now
deceased.
5) During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15, 1979 there
was already a dispute between Honorata M. Bolante and Miguel Mendoza,
brother of [petitioners].
6) [Respondent was] occupying the property in question.
ISSUE:
The only issue involved [was] who [was] the lawful owner and possessor of
the land subject of the case.
RULING:
The Supreme Court found the petition not meritorious. The Court ruled that
the appellate court was correct in not giving credence to the affidavit
presented by the petitioner for the reason that it cannot be admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule under the dead man's statute. Likewise, the
affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document as the petitioner failed
to explain how the purported signature of one of the respondents could have
been affixed as she was an illiterate woman who had never had any formal
schooling.
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners'
father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the
concept of owner —public, peaceful, and uninterrupted— had already
ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise,
declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership
through prescription.
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject
land, did not acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be
acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility
toward the true owner,occupation and use, however long, will not confer title
by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim
that their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their
father and brother arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary
prescription because of their adverse possessionfor thirty-two years (1953-
1985), 29 this supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot,
but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At
most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of
the property for which taxes had been paid. In the
absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land
for tax purposes does not prove ownership. In sum, the petitioners' claim of
ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis. Accordingly, the Court
denied the petition and the assailed decision and resolution of the appellate
court were affirmed.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 v. Seriña vs. Caballero
GR 127382 August 17, 2004
FACTS:
On August 11, 1982, Dr . Jesus Seriña and his wife, EnriquetaSeriña
filed a Complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession, and damages
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
respondents Victor Caballero and his tenants, T eodoroDonela and Oliver
Donela.
Seriñasalleged in their complaint that they are the absolute owners and
have been in actual and constructive possession of the land for 35 years.
They averred that sometime in March 1982, they discovered that
respondent Caballero was claiming ownership over the said land and o ffering
it for sale or mortgage to third parties. They also discovered that the
respondents Donela were occupying the land as tenants and caretakers of
the land.
The petitioners claimed that their father, Dr . Seriña, bought the land
from Lucia Vda. de Marbella who inherited it from her father, Ramon Neri.
They presented a Deed of Sale 6 dated August 23, 1947 showing that
Dr .Seriña bought 5 hectares of ricefield, bounded on the North by
RaymundoSeriña, on the East by TeofiloSaburnido, on the South by
Obdelio Caballero, on the West by Obdullo Caballero from Lucia Vda. de
Marbella.
In his answer, respondent Caballero alleged that he was the lawful owner,
and had been in actual physical possession of the disputed land since time
immemorial. He averred that the disputed land is part of Cadastral Lot
originally owned by his grandfather, Eustaquio Caballero. They averred that
Eustaqio Caballero declared the entire parcel of land for tax purposes. This
tax declaration indicated that the 119,490 square-meter parcel of land
was located at Pontacon, Iponan, Cagayan de Oro City, bounded on
North by RusticoDablio, on the East by J. Seriña and T. Saburnido, on the
South by Victor Obsioma, and on the West by Victorino Caballero.
RTC - in favor of Caballero (the boundaries of the land stated in complaint
did not coincide with what was stated in the Deed of Sale and that it was not
clearly shown that the land bought by Dr. Serina was the same land owned
by Victor Caballero)
CA - affirmed decision of RTC
ISSUE/s:
The issues in this petition are, therefore, the following: (1) whether the
petitioners were able to establish the identity of the land being
claimed by them; and (2) whether acquisitive prescription should be
appreciated in favor of the petitioners.
RULING:
The CA was correct in concluding that the petitioners failed to establish that
the parcel of land in the possession of the respondents is the same as that
subject of their complaint. The CA noted that the land subject of the
complaint has boundaries different from the land in possession of the
respondents. In fact, the land described in the complaint appears to be
different from the land described in the Deed of Sale which the petitioners
invoke as the basis of their ownership.
The complaint 24 of the petitioners states that the property they are
claiming has an area of 2.5 hectares. On the other hand, the Deed
of Sale provides that the subject property has an area of 5 hectares. The
complaint alleged that the property is located in "Mantadiao, Opol,
Misamis Oriental," while the Deed of Sale shows that the property purchased
is located in "Puntakon, Igpit, Cagayan Or. Misamis." We agree with the CA
that there was no showing that Tax Declaration No. 2442 in the name of
Eustaquio Caballero was cancelled. Absent any specific statement
therein to that effect, it cannot be presumed that Tax Declaration No. 4029
in the name of Dr. Seriña cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2442. Moreover, the
land covered by Tax Declaration No. 2442 is di fferent from that
covered by Tax Declaration No. 4029.
The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the petitioners did
not prove the identity of the land being claimed. The petitioners did not
present evidence to prove that the land registered in the name of Eustaquio
Caballero was sold to Lucia Vda. de Marbella or her predecessor-in-interest
from whom they purchased the land subject of their complaint. The failure to
establish the identity of the land is obviously fatal to the petitioners' case. In
Beo vs. Court of Appeals,
Corollarily, the rule is likewise well-settled that in order
that an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it
is indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not
only his ownership but also the identity of the property
claimed, by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.
As the appellate court succinctly stated, he who claims to have
a better right to the property must clearly show that the
land possessed by the other party is the very land that
belongs to him.
On the second issue, the CA ruled that inasmuch as the petitioners
failed to establish that the parcel of land in possession of the respondents is
EH405 SY 2016-2017
the same as the subject of their complaint, their claim of acquisitive
prescription is clearly untenable.
We agree with the respondents. Since the property has not been clearly
identified by the petitioners, their claim of acquisitive prescription
cannot be considered. Insufficient identification of the portion of land
claimed in absolute ownership cannot ripen into ownership. Possession as
a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere
fiction. Assuming, however, that the disputed land has been clearly
identified, acquisitive prescription will still not lie in favor of the petitioners
because they were not able to prove that they have been in possession of
the property for the requisite number of years. Prescription requires public,
peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property in the
concept of an owner for ten years, in case the possession is in good faith
and with just title.
The petitioners' argument that the payment of taxes on the property since
May 31, 1948 constitutes proof of their possession of the subject land for
thirty-five years is untenable. Tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima
facie proof of ownership of the property for which taxes have been paid.
In the absence of actual, public and adverse possession, the declaration of
the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) vs. CA and
City of Dagupan (CITY)
The City of Dagupan (City) filed a complaint against NAWASA (now MWSS)
for recovery of ownership and possession of Dagupan Waterworks System.
NAWASA invoked RA 1383 which vested upon it the ownership, possession
and control of all waterworks systems throughout Philippines and as one of
its counterclaims, asked for reimbursement of its necessary and useful
expenses in making improvements.
Trial court ruled in favor of City and found NAWASA to be possessor in bad
faith and not entitled to reimbursement.
NAWASA appealed to CA and argued that City must be liable for amortization
of the balance of the loan NAWASA secured for the improvement of Dagupan
Waterworks System. CA affirmed lower court’s decision and ruled that:
“..expenses were made in utter bad faith for they were made after the
complaint was filed and after numerous SC decisions declaring
unconstitutional the taking by NAWASA of the patrimonial waterworks
systems of cities, municipalities and provinces w/o just compensation.
Under Art 456 of NCC, it is clear that a builder or possessor in bad faith is
not entitled to indemnity for any useful improvement on the premises”
MWSS, successor-in-interest of NAWASA appealed to SC raising as sole issue
of WON it has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by
NAWASA to Dagupan Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that
NAWASA was found to be possessor in bad faith. It argues that Art. 546, 547
and 549 do not definitely settle the question of whether a possessor in bad
faith has the right to remove useful improvements. It invoked cases of
Mindanao Academy v. Yap and Carbonell v. CA.
Basically, the main issue is: Does a possessor in bad faith have the right to
remove useful improvements?
SC: NO!
Article 449 of CC provides that “he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on
the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity." As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful
improvements it had made without right to indemnity
Moreover, under Art 546, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for
useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under Art
547, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if it
can be done w/o damage to the principal thing and if the person who
recovers the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the
useful expenses.
The right given a possessor in bad faith to remove improvements applies
only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing
suffers no injury thereby and lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them
by paying the value they have at the time he enters into possession.
Mindanao Academy v. Yap does not support stand of MWSS. In that case,
Court ruled that if the defendant constructed a new building, as he alleges,
he cannot recover its value because the construction was done after the
filing of the action for annulment, thus rendering him a builder in bad faith
who is denied by law any right of reimbursement. What Court allowed Yap to
remove were the equipment, books, furniture and fixtures brought in by him,
because they were outside the scope of the judgment and may be retained
by him.
In Carbonell v CA, both the trial court and CA found that respondents
Infantes were possessors in good faith. On appeal, Court reversed decision
and declared Carbonell to have superior right to the land. On issue of WON
the Infantes were possessor in good faith, 4 members ruled that they were
not, but as a matter of equity, allowed them to remove the useful
improvements. Inasmuch as only four Members concurred in ruling that
respondents Infantes were possessors in bad faith and two Members ruled
that they were possessors in good faith, said decision does not establish a
EH405 SY 2016-2017
precedent. Moreover, the equitable consideration present in said case are
not present in the case at bar.

(In that case, Justice Teehankee (now Chief Justice) concurred on the same
premise as the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma that both the
conflicting buyers of the real property in question, namely petitioner
Carbonell as the first buyer and respondents Infantes as the second buyer,
may be deemed purchasers in good faith at the respective dates of their
purchase. Justice Muñoz Palma dissented on the ground that since both
purchasers were undoubtedly in good faith, respondents Infantes' prior
registration of the sale in good faith entitled them to the ownership of the
land.)

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 11. EXPENSES RULING:

i. Ramel v Aquino YES.

G.R. No. 133208 July 31, 2006 The records show that both parties failed to prove their claims through
anyreceipt or document. Despite the lack of proof, the trial court ordered
that whateverimprovements spent on the land shall be offset from the fruits
DOCTRINES: derived therefrom. Theplaintiffs claimed that they were able to improve the
Absent any direct proof on the value of improvements and the fruits, it is land after possession was given tothem. No receipts were shown to guide
just to offset the claim of improvements to the claim of fruits derived from the court as to how much were the costs of theimprovements. Likewise the
the land and then place the parties in their previous positions before the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were able to cultivate theland and
agreement. harvest palay although their testimonies to this effect are based on
theirpresumptions and calculations not on actual harvest such that the court
FACTS: also cannot makedetermination of the real fruits derived from the land. This
Daniel Aquino is a registered owner of a land which he mortgaged to the being so, the court shall justoffset the claim of improvements to the claim of
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As the property was in danger of fruits derived from the land and then placethe parties in their previous
being foreclosed,respondents sold to petitioners a portion of the land with positions before the agreement. Whatever improvements spenton the land
the agreement that petitioners would assume the remaining mortgage shall be compensated from the fruits derived therefrom.
obligation of respondents with the DBP and the balance shall be paid to
respondents. Petitioners were allowed by respondents to take possession of
the land. Subsequently, petitioners applied for a re-structuring of the
mortgage loan win the DBP for a period of ten years. Petitioners then went
to DBP to pay for the amortization but they found out that respondents had
paid the bank and the latter told the former that they would return whatever
the petitioners paid for the land and threatened to withdraw the title from
the bank. Petitioners filed with the trial court for Specific Performance with
Preliminary Injunction and Damages and three days later, respondents
withdrew the amount which they had paid to the bank. During the pendency
of the case,petitioners were able to fully settle the loan with the DBP. The
trial court rendered a decision assailed by herein petitioners on the ground,
among others, that the offsetting the claim of improvements by petitioners
and the claim of the fruits derived from the land by respondents is erroneous
citing Articles 546 and 547 of the Civil Code. Petitioners argue that as
possessors in good faith and in the concept of an owner, they are entitled to
the fruits received before possession was legally interrupted and they must
be reimbursed for their expenses or for the increase in the value the subject
property may have acquired by reason thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is legal ground to order the offsetting of the claim
of improvements by petitioners to the claim of fruits derived from the land by
respondents

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 vi. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH
a. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) vs.
CA and City of Dagupan (CITY)
GR L-54526 August 25, 1986
FACTS:
The City of Dagupan (City) filed a complaint against NAWASA (now MWSS)
for recovery of ownership and possession of Dagupan Waterworks System.
NAWASA invoked RA 1383 which vested upon it the ownership, possession
and control of all waterworks systems throughout Philippines and as one of
its counterclaims, asked for reimbursement of its necessary and useful
expenses in making improvements.
Trial court ruled in favor of City and found NAWASA to be possessor in bad
faith and not entitled to reimbursement.
NAWASA appealed to CA and argued that City must be liable for amortization
of the balance of the loan NAWASA secured for the improvement of Dagupan
Waterworks System. CA affirmed lower court’s decision and ruled that:
“..expenses were made in utter bad faith for they were made after the
complaint was filed and after numerous SC decisions declaring
unconstitutional the taking by NAWASA of the patrimonial waterworks
systems of cities, municipalities and provinces w/o just compensation.
Under Art 456 of NCC, it is clear that a builder or possessor in bad faith is
not entitled to indemnity for any useful improvement on the premises”
MWSS, successor-in-interest of NAWASA appealed to SC raising as sole issue
of WON it has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by
NAWASA to Dagupan Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that
NAWASA was found to be possessor in bad faith. It argues that Art. 546, 547
and 549 do not definitely settle the question of whether a possessor in bad
faith has the right to remove useful improvements. It invoked cases of
Mindanao Academy v. Yap and Carbonell v. CA.
ISSUE:
Whethera possessor in bad faith have the right to remove useful
improvements?
RULING:
NO!
Article 449 of CC provides that “he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on
the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity." As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful
improvements it had made without right to indemnity
Moreover, under Art 546, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for
useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under Art
547, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if it
can be done w/o damage to the principal thing and if the person who
recovers the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the
useful expenses.
The right given a possessor in bad faith to remove improvements applies
only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing
suffers no injury thereby and lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them
by paying the value they have at the time he enters into possession.
Mindanao Academy v. Yap does not support stand of MWSS. In that case,
Court ruled that if the defendant constructed a new building, as he alleges,
he cannot recover its value because the construction was done after the
filing of the action for annulment, thus rendering him a builder in bad faith
who is denied by law any right of reimbursement. What Court allowed Yap to
remove were the equipment, books, furniture and fixtures brought in by him,
because they were outside the scope of the judgment and may be retained
by him.
In Carbonell v CA, both the trial court and CA found that respondents
Infantes were possessors in good faith. On appeal, Court reversed decision
and declared Carbonell to have superior right to the land. On issue of WON
the Infantes were possessor in good faith, 4 members ruled that they were
not, but as a matter of equity, allowed them to remove the useful
improvements. Inasmuch as only four Members concurred in ruling that
respondents Infantes were possessors in bad faith and two Members ruled
that they were possessors in good faith, said decision does not establish a
precedent. Moreover, the equitable consideration present in said case are
not present in the case at bar.
(In that case, Justice Teehankee (now Chief Justice) concurred on the same
premise as the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma that both the
conflicting buyers of the real property in question, namely petitioner
Carbonell as the first buyer and respondents Infantes as the second buyer,
may be deemed purchasers in good faith at the respective dates of their
purchase. Justice Muñoz Palma dissented on the ground that since both
purchasers were undoubtedly in good faith, respondents Infantes' prior
registration of the sale in good faith entitled them to the ownership of the
land.)
EH405 SY 2016-2017
B. SABIDO vs IAC
GR 73418 September 20, 1988

FACTS:
Spouses Dasal and Pecunio filed a case for queiting of title against herein
respondents Spouses Sabido and Rances for the subject Lots B and C.
The Lower Court ruled in favor of Spouses Dasal. The sheriff then executed
the Writ of Execution as ordered by then Presiding Judge Sunga. During the
execution of the writ, the sheriff learned that a certain Dominador Sta. Ana
was occupying a portion of lot B together with two other persons (tenants of
Sta. Ana).
Third party Sta. Ana was given an opportunity to present evidences to prove
his ownership upon Lot B which according to him he purchased in good faith.
Subsequently, it was proved that the lot he claims was different from that of
the subject Lot B.
Furthermore, it was established that Sta. Ana has a relationship with the
Spouses Dasal which should alerted him that the subject lot was under
litigation and that he was also present during the ocular inspection made in
which he fails to invoke his right upon the issuance of the decision of the
ownnership of the subject Lot B which estabilshed bad faithon his part.
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Spouses Sabido. However, part of the
decision of the Appellate Court grants Sta.Ana an option to either remove his
improvements or make an offer to the lawful owners to pay for the price of
the lot where his improvements were introduced.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in granting Sta. Ana the right to
exercise the option.

RULING:
Yes, the Appellate Court erred in granting such right to Sta. Ana.
The right to exercise the option is only given to a builder in good faith
(previous discussions). The only option for a possessor in bad faith is only
granted with regards to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure.
Provided, two conditions must be satisfied. (1) removal will not cause
damage to the principal thing (2) the lawful owner does not prefer to retain
them by paying the reasonable price.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
16. POSSESSION OVER MOVABLES of petitioners that the Commission has the right to seize and impound the
car under Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which reads:
i. Edu v Gomez
GR L-33397 June 22, 1984 Sec. 60. The lien upon motor vehicles. Any balance of fees for
registration, re-registration or delinquent registration of a motor
FACTS: vehicle, remaining unpaid and all fines imposed upon
The 1968 model Volkswagen, bantam car, allegedly owned by Lt. anyvehicleowner, shall constitute a first lien upon the motor vehicle
Walter A. Bala under whose name it was originally registered, was concerned.is untenable.
reported to the Office of the Commission on Land Transportation as stolen
on June 29,1970 from the residence of Lt. Bala. Upon receipt of It is clear from the provision of said Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 that the
such information the agents of Anti-CarnappingUnit (ANCAR) of the Commissioner's right to seize and impound subject property is only good for
Philippine Constabulary, on detail with the Land Transportation Commission the proper enforcement of lien upon motor vehicles. The Land
recognized subject car on 2 February 1971 in the possession of LUCILA Transportation Commission may issue a warrant of constructive or
ABELLO and immediately seized and impounded the car as stolen property. actual distraint against motor vehicle for collection of unpaid fees for
Romeo F. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation, seized the car registration, re-registration or delinquent registration of vehicle
pursuant to Section 60 of Republic Act4136 which empowers him to 5.
seize the motor vehicle for delinquent registration aside from his
implicit power deducible from Sec. 4(5), Sec. 5 and 31 of said Code, "to
seize motor vehicles fraudulently or otherwise not properly registered. ”Lucia
Abello filed a complaint for replevin with damages in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. CFI ruled in favor of ABELLO. CFI found that the car was
acquired by ABELLO by purchase from its registered owner
MarcelinoGuansing for P9,000 and that she has been in possession thereof
since then until when the car was seized from her by ANCAR who acted in
belief that the car was stolen from Lt. Bala

ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of the car by the officials are valid.

RULING:
NO. There is no merit in the petition considering that the acquirer or the
purchaser in good faith of a chattel of movable property is entitled to be
respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true
owner thereof until a competent court rules otherwise. In the
meantime, as the true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot
be compelled to surrender possession nor to be required to institute an
action for the recovery of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond
is issued in his favor. The filing of an information charging that
the chattel was illegally obtained through estafa from its true owner by
the transferor of the bona fide possessor does not warrant disturbing the
possession of the chattel against the will of the possessor. Finally, the claim

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 ii. EDCA Publishing&DistributingCorp. vs. Santos
GR 80298 April 26, 1990
FACTS:
A person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by
telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books, payable on delivery.
EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as
ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price.
On October 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books to private respondent
Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he
showed her, paid him. Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a
second order placed by Cruz even before clearing of his first check, made
inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had claimed to be a dean and
was informed that there was no such person in its employ. Further
verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with the
Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment check.
EDCA then went to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz.
Investigation disclosed his real name as Tomas de la Peña.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books
because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was
dishonored.
HELD:
Ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of
the purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the
rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon
the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase
price has not yet been paid. Non-payment only creates a right to demand
payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of
bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the
thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn
transfer it to another.
ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith
is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable
or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the
person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the
owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership
over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a
matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the
private respondents to the books. It bears repeating that in the case before
us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books belonged to
Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed
her assured her that the books had been paid for on delivery. By contrast,
EDCA was less than cautious — in fact, too trusting — in dealing with the
impostor. Although it had never transacted with him before, it readily
delivered the books he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted
his personal check in payment. It did not verify his identity although it was
easy enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the check of this unknown
drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, by the printed
terms thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting
ownership in the buyer. Surely, the private respondent did not have to go
beyond that invoice to satisfy herself that the books being offered for sale by
Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although the title of Cruz was presumed
under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books, these being movable
property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding
to buy them.
While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its
remedy is not against the private respondents but against Tomas de la Peña,
who has apparently caused all this trouble.
In the case, Sta. Ana being a possessor in bad faith has no option but to
vacate the lot.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 d. EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE USUFRUCT
1. MODES OF EXTINGUISHMENT
i. AvelinoBaluranvs. HON. Ricardo Y. Navarro
GR L-44428 September 30, 1977
FACTS:
 On or about February 2, 1964, Spouses Domingo Paraiso and Fidela
Q. Paraiso (“spouses Paraiso”) executed an agreement entitled
"BARTER" with spouses AVELINO and BenildaBaluran
 Party of the First Part = spouses Paraiso = owner of residential lot
(480 sqm)
 Party of the First Part = spouses AVELINO and BenildaBaluran =
owner of unirrigated Riceland (223 sqm)
 Barter conditions:
"1. That both the Party of the First Part and the Party of the
Second Part shall enjoy the material possession of their respective
properties; the Party of the First Part shall reap the fruits of the
unirrigatedriceland and the Party of the Second Part shall have a
right to build his own house in the residential lot.
"2. Nevertheless, in the event any of the children of Natividad P.
Obedencio, daughter of the First Part, shall choose to reside in this
municipality and build his own house in the residential lot, the
Party of the Second Part shall be obliged to return the lot such
children with damages to be incurred.
"3. That neither the Party of the First Part nor the Party of the
Second Part shall encumber, alienate or dispose of in any manner
their respective properties as bartered without the consent of the
other.
 On May 6, 1975 Antonio Obendencio filed complaint to recover the
above-mentioned residential lot from AvelinoBaluran claiming that
he is the rightful owner of said residential lot having acquired the
same from his mother, NatividadParaisoObedencio, and that he
needed the property for purposes of constructing his house thereon
inasmuch as he had taken residence in his native town, Sarrat.
 Answering the complaint, AvelinoBaluran alleged inter alia
(1) that the "barter agreement" transferred to him the
ownership of the residential lot in exchange for the
unirrigatedriceland conveyed to plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest,
NatividadObedencio, who in fact is still in possession thereof; and
(2) that the plaintiff's cause of action if any had
prescribed. 2
 the trial Judge Ricardo Y. Navarro rendered a decision the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"Consequently, the plaintiff is hereby declared owner of the
property in question, the defendant is hereby ordered to vacate
the same. With costs against defendant."
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or notthe barter agreement did not transfer ownership of
the lot in suit to the petitioner.
2.) Whether or notthe right to re-barter or re-exchange of respondent
Antonio Obedencio had been barred by the statute of limitation.
RULING:
The court (1) declared AvelinoBaluran and respondent Antonio Obedencio
the respective owners of the unirrigatedriceland and residential lot
mentioned in the "Barter Agreement" of February 2, 1964;
(2) Ordered AvelinoBaluran to vacate the residential lot and remove the
improvements built by him thereon, provided, however, that he shall not be
compelled to do so unless the unirrigatedriceland shall have been restored to
his possession
1.) WON the barter agreement did not transfer ownership of
the lot in suit to the petitioner.
 It is a settled rule that to determine the nature of a contract courts
are not bound by the name or title given to it by the contracting
parties. 4 This Court has held that contracts are not what the parties
may see fit to call them but what they really are as determined by
the principles of law. 5
 Thus, in the instant case, the use of the term "barter" in describing
the agreement of February 2, 1964, is not controlling.
 The stipulations in said document are clear enough to indicate that
there was no intention at all on the part of the signatories thereto to
convey the ownership of their respective properties; all that was
intended, and it was so provided in the agreement, was to transfer
the material possession thereof. (condition No. 1, see page 1 of this
Decision) In fact, under condition No. 3 of the agreement, the
parties retained the right to alienate their respective properties
which right is an element of ownership.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 With the material possession being the only one transferred,
all that the parties acquired was the right of usufruct which
in essence is the right to enjoy the property of another. 6
 Under the document in question, spouses Paraiso would harvest the
crop of the unirrigatedriceland while the other party, AvelinoBaluran,
could build a house on the residential lot, subject, however, to the
condition, that when any of the children of
NatividadParaisoObedencio, daughter of spouses Paraiso, shall
choose to reside in the municipality and build his house on the
residential lot, AvelinoBaluran shall be obliged to return the lot to
said children "with damages to be incurred." (Condition No. 2 of the
Agreement)
 Thus, the mutual agreement — each party enjoying
"material possession" of the other's property — was subject
to a resolutory condition the happening of which would
terminate the right of possession and use.
 A resolutory condition is one which extinguishes rights and
obligations already existing. 7 The right of "material possession"
granted in the agreement of February 2, 1964, ends if and when any
of the children of NatividadParaisoObedencio (daughter of spouses
Paraiso, party of the First Part) would reside in the municipality and
build his house on the property.
 The trial court therefore correctly adjudged that Antonio Obedencio
is entitled to recover the possession of the residential lot pursuant to
the agreement of February 2, 1964.
 We stated above, the agreement of the parties of February 2, 1964,
is not one of barter, exchange or even sale with right to repurchase,
but is one of or akin the other is the use or material possession or
enjoyment of each other's real property.
 The manner of terminating or extinguishing the right of usufruct is
primarily determined by the stipulations of the parties which in this
case now before Us is the happening of the event agreed upon.
 Necessarily, the plaintiff or respondent Obedencio could not demand
for the recovery of possession of the residential lot in question, not
until he acquired that right from his mother, NatividadObedencio,
and which he did acquire when his mother donated to him the
residential lot on October 4, 974.
 the respondent, in whose favor the resolutory condition was
constituted, took immediate steps to terminate the right of petitioner
herein to the use of the lot. Obedencio's present complaint was filed
in May of 1975, barely several months after the property was
donated to him.

 In view of our ruling that the "barter agreement" of February 2,

1964, did not transfer the ownership of the respective properties
mentioned therein, it follows that petitioner Baluran remains the
owner of the unirrigatedriceland and is now entitled to its
possession.
 With the happening of the resolutory condition provided for in the
agreement, the right of usufruct of the parties is extinguished and
each is entitled to a return of his property.
 We hold that the parties and/or their successors-in-interest are duty
bound to effect a simultaneous transfer of the respective properties
if substantial justice is to be effected.

2.) WON the right to re-barter or re-exchange of respondent

Antonio Obedencio had been barred by the statute of
limitation.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 ii. Moralidad vs. Sps. DiosdadoPernes, supra
FACTS:
- Back when petitioner was working in the U.S. sometime in 1986, she
received news from respondent Arlene (her niece) that Mandug at the
outskirts of Davao City was infested by NPA rebels and many women and
children were victims of crossfire between government troops and the
insurgents. Shocked and saddened about this development, she immediately
sent money to Araceli, Arlene's older sister, with instructions to look for a lot
in Davao City where Arlene and her family could transfer and settle down.
This was why she bought the land subject of the present controversy
- Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for the purpose of letting Arlene
move from Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted the property
to be also available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao
City. Petitioner made known this intention in a document she executed on
July 21, 1986 which document reads:
Xxx 1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernesmay
build their house therein and stay as long as they like;
2. That anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned
real property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live
in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another;
3. That anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and
may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not
inimical to the purpose thereof;
4. That anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes
of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his
own;
5. That any proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned
properties shall be allotted to my nearest kins who have less in life in
greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of in
standing.
- Following her retirement in 1993, petitioner came back to the Philippines to
stay with the respondents' on the house they build on the subject property.
In the course of time, their relations turned sour because members of the
Pernes family were impervious to her suggestions and attempts to change
certain practices concerning matters of health and sanitation within their
compound. Arlene's eldest son would answer petitioner back with clenched
fist and at one time hurled profanities when she corrected him. Later, Arlene
herself followed suit. Petitioner brought the matter to the local barangay
lupon where she lodged a complaint for slander, harassment, threat and
defamation against the Pernes Family. Other ugly incidents interspersed with
violent confrontation transfired. Petitioner also lodged a formal complaint
before the Regional Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, charging the
respondent spouses, who were both government employees, with conduct
unbecoming of public servants.
- August 3, 1998, petitioner filed with the MTCC of Davao City an unlawful
detainer suit against the respaondent spouses. Petitioner alleged that she is
the registered owner of the land on which the respondents built their house;
that through her counsel, she sent the respondent spouses a letter
demanding them to vacate the premises and to pay rentals therefor, which
the respondents refused to heed.
- In their defense, the respondents alleged having entered the property in
question, building their house thereon and maintaining the same as their
residence with petitioner's full knowledge and express consent. To prove
their point, they invited attention to her written declaration of July 21, 1986,
supra, wherein she expressly signified her desire for the spouses to build
their house on her property and stay thereat for as long as they like.
- The MTCC, resolving the ejectment suit in petitioner's favor, declared that
the respondent spouses, although builders in good faith vis-à-vis the house
they built on her property respondents' continued possession of the premises
turned unlawful upon their receipt of the demand to vacate, such possession
being merely at petitioner's tolerance, and sans any rental.
- petitioner filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal initially granted by
the RTC in but later withdrawn on the ground that immediate execution of
the appealed decision was not the prudent course of action to take,
considering that the house the respondents constructed on the subject
property might even be more valuable than the land site
- Eventually, the RTC reversed that of the MTCC, holding that respondents'
possession of the property in question was not, as ruled by the latter court,
by mere tolerance of the petitioner but rather by her express consent. Article
1678 of the Civil Code on reimbursement of improvements introduced is
inapplicable since said provision contemplates of a lessor-lessee
arrangement, which was not the factual milieu obtaining in the case.
Instead, the RTC ruled that what governed the parties' relationship are
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, explaining thus:
Since the defendants-appellees [respondents] are admittedly possessors
of the property by permission from plaintiff [petitioner], and builders in
good faith, they have the right to retain possession of the property
subject of this case until they have been reimbursed the cost of the
improvements they have introduced on the property.
- CA ruled that what governs the rights of the parties is the law on usufruct
but petitioner failed to establish that respondents' right to possess had
already ceased. On this premise, the CA concluded that the ejectment suit
EH405 SY 2016-2017
instituted by the petitioner was premature. The appellate court thus affirmed
the appealed RTC decision
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a usufruct created between the parties.
2. Whether or not the existing usufruct may be deemed to have been
extinguished or terminated.
3. Whether or not respondents' are entiled for reimbursement of
improvements.
HELD:
1. The Court is inclined to agree with the CA that what was constituted
between the parties herein is one of usufruct over a piece of land, with the
petitioner being the owner of the property upon whom the naked title
thereto remained and the respondents being two (2) among other unnamed
usufructuaries who were simply referred to as petitioner's kin.
Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the following
wise:
ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with
the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title
constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy
another's property. It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of
another temporarily, including both the jus utendiand the jus fruendi, with
the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same.
It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21, 1986, made
known her intention to give respondents and her other kins the right to use
and to enjoy the fruits of her property. There can also be no quibbling about
the respondents being given the right "to build their own house" on the
property and to stay thereat "as long as they like." Paragraph #5 of the
same document earmarks proceeds or income derived from the
aforementioned properties" for the petitioner's "nearest kins who have less in
life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better
of(sic) in standing." The established facts undoubtedly gave respondents not
only the right to use the property but also granted them, among the
petitioner's other kins, the right to enjoy the fruits thereof.
2. The term or period of the usufruct originally specified provides only one of
the bases for the right of a usufructuary to hold and retain possession of the
thing given in usufruct. There are other modes or instances whereby the
usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished.
ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly
appears;
(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the
fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title
creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the
usufruct;
(7) By prescription.
The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the
title creating, and sets forth the conditions of, the usufruct. In fine, the
occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of
cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship
between/among kin constitutes aresolutorycondition which, by express
wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.
There is no doubt then that what impelled petitioner to file complaints before
the local barangay lupon, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, and
this instant complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is that she
could not live peacefully and harmoniously with the Pernes family and vice
versa.
The Court rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the
Pernes family and the violence and humiliation she was made to endure,
despite her advanced age and frail condition, are enough factual bases to
consider the usufruct as having been terminated.
3. Relationship between the petitioner and respondents respecting the
property in question is one of owner and usufructuary. By xpress provision of
law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement
for the improvements they may have introduced on the property.
Art.579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct
such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may
deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he
shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however,
remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without
damage to the property.
Given the foregoing perspective, respondents will have to be ordered to
vacate the premises without any right of reimbursement. If the rule on
reimbursement or indemnity were otherwise, then the usufructuary might, as
an author pointed out, improve the owner out of his property. The
respondents may, however, remove or destroy the improvements they may
have introduced thereon without damaging the petitioner's property.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the decision of the
MTCC is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that all of respondents'
counterclaims are dismissed, including their claims for reimbursement of
useful and necessary expenses.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
3. USUFRUCT IN FAVOR OF JURIDICAL OR NON-JURIDICAL A usufruct is not only about rights and privileges; a usufructuary has the
ENTITIES duty to protect the owner’s interest.
The Court further said that “at this point, the determination of the 7-hectare
i. NHA vs CA portion cannot be made to rely on a choice between the NHA’s and MSBF’s
GR 148830 April 13, 2005 survey. There is a need for a new survey, one conducted jointly by the NHA
and MSBF, to remove all doubts on the exact location of the 7-hectare area
FACTS: and thus, avoid future controversies.”
Proclamation 481 issued by then Pres. Marcos set-aside a 120-hectare
portion of land in Quezon City owned by NHA as reserved property for the
site of the National Government Center. Subsequently, Pres. Marcos issued
Proclamation 1670, which removed a seven-hectare portion from the
coverage of the NGC. Such proclamation also gave Manila Seedling Bank
Foundation, Inc. (MSBF) usufructuary over the segregated portion.
MSBF occupied the area granted by Proclamation 1670. Over the years,
MSBF’s occupancy exceeded the 7 hectare area subject to its usufructuary
rights. By 1987, MSBF occupied approximately 16 hectares. On August 18,
1987, MSBF leased a portion of the area it occupied to Bulacan Garden
Corporation (BGC) and other stallholders.
On November 11, 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum
Order No. 127 (MO 127) which revoked the status of the 50 hectares
remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of
the NGC. MO 127 also authorized the NHA to commercialize the area and sell
it to the public.
Acting on the power granted under MO 127, the NHA gave BGC 10 days to
vacate its occupied area. Any structure left behind after the 10-day period
will be demolished by NHA. BGC then filed a complaint for injunction before
the trial court.
The trial court dismissed BGC’s complaint for injunction. NHA demolished
BGC’s facilities soon thereafter.
The appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling. The NHA filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied by the appellate court. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
WON the premises leased by BGC from MSBF is within the 7-hectare area
that Proclamation 1670 granted to MSBF by way of usufruct

RULING:
The SC held that MSBF abused their usufructuary rights. In the instant case,
Proclamation 1670 is the title constituting the usufruct. Although MSBF has
the discretion to determine its 7-hectare usufruct, MSBF abused its right
when it exceeded the 7-hectare portion granted to it by Proclamation 1670.
EH405 SY 2016-2017

8. USUFRUCT IN FAVOR OF SEVERAL PERSONS
i. Policarpio v Asuncion
GR L-21809 January 31, 1966
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:
In a duly probated last will and testament of one
DamasaCrisostomo, she gave the naked ownership of a fishpond owned
by her to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz while its usufruct to the children
of her cousins Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo. The
fishpond is situated at a barrio of Hagonoy, Bulacan.
The children of Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo turned
out to be fourteen, namely: Maria, Pio, Fructuosa, Graciano, Vicente,
Victoria, Teodora, and Juan, all surnamed Perez, Apolonio Lorenzo, Bonifacio
Lorenzo, Vicente Asuncion, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio Perez and Servillano
Perez. On the other hand, Teodoricadela Cruz, the naked owner, bequeathed
in her will all her rights to the fishpond to Jose V. Salamat.
The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to one Gil P. Policarpio
who used to give them proportionately the usufruct corresponding to them.
During the term of the lease, however, three of the usufructuaries died,
namely, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio M. Perez and Servillano Perez, and so,
upon their death, both the naked owner and the remaining usufructuaries
claimed the shares corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries in the
amount of (P10,714.26. Because of these conflicting claims, the lessee
withheld said amount.
Subsequently, on May 31, 1962, the surviving usufructuaries leased the
fishpond to one Batas Riego de Dios who, after executing the contract of
lease, came to know of the existing conflicting claims, and not knowing to
whom of the claimants the shares of the deceased usufructuaries should be
paid, said lessee was also constrained to withhold the corresponding part of
the usufruct of the property. So, on November 15, 1962, the two lessees
commenced the present action for interpleader against both the naked
owner and surviving usufructuaries to compel them to interplead and litigate
their conflicting claims.
Defendant Jose V. Salamat avers as special defense that he is the successor-
in-interest of Teodoricadela Cruz and as such he is entitled to the shares
corresponding to the three deceased usufructuaries in as much as the
usufruct in their favor was automatically extinguished by death and became
merged with the naked owner.
The surviving usufructuaries, on the other hand, adhere to the theory that
since the usufructuaries were instituted simultaneously by the late
DamasaCrisostomo, the death of the three usufructuaries did not extinguish
the usufruct; hence, the surviving usufructuaries are entitled to receive the
shares corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries, the usufruct to
continue until the death of the last usufructuary.
When the case was called for hearing, the parties agreed to submit the case
for decision upon the submission of their respective memoranda considering
that the issue involved was purely legal in nature, and on March 29, 1963,
the trial court rendered decision the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
"Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
defendant Jose V. Salamat entitled to the sum of
P10,714.26 representing the shares of the three deceased
usufructuaries in the lease rental due from plaintiff Gil
Policarpio, ordering the latter to deliver to said defendant
the aforesaid amount; and likewise declaring said
defendant Jose V. Salamat entitled to share with the
eleven usufructuaries in the proceeds of the lease contract
executed by them with plaintiff Batas Riego de Dios,
ordering the latter to deliver to him such amount as would
be equivalent to the shares of the three deceased
usufructuaries, with the parties bearing their own costs
and expenses of litigation."
The surviving usufructuaries took the present appeal.
The important issue to be determined is whether the eleven surviving
usufructuaries of the fishpond in question are the ones entitled to the fruits
that would have corresponded to the three deceased usufructuaries, or the
naked owner Jose V. Salamat.
Appellants argue that it is the surviving usufructuaries who are entitled to
receive the shares of the deceased by virtue of Article 611 of the Civil Code
which provides: "A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at
the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the
last survivor." On the other hand, appellee contends that the most a usufruct
can endure if constituted in favor of a natural person is the lifetime of the
usufructuary, because a usufruct is extinguished by the death of the
usufructuary unless a contrary intention clearly appears (Article 603, Civil
Code). Hence, appellee argues, when the three usufructuaries died, their
usufructuary rights were extinguished and whatever rights they had to the
fruits reverted to the naked owner.
If the theory of appellee in the sense that the death of the three
usufructuaries has the effect of consolidating their rights with that of the
EH405 SY 2016-2017
naked owner were correct, Article 611 of the Civil Code would be
superfluous, because Article 603 already provides that the death of the
usufructuary extinguishes the usufruct unless the contrary appears.
Furthermore, said theory would cause a partial extinction of the usufruct,
contrary to the provisions of Article 611 which expressly provides that the
usufruct shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor. The
theory of appellee cannot, therefore, be entertained.
It, therefore, appears that the Spanish commentators on the subject are
unanimous that there is accretion among usufructuarieswho are constituted
at the same time when one of them dies before the end of the usufruct. The
only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament and
the testator makes a contrary provision. Here there is none. On the contrary,
the testatrix constituted the usufruct in favor of the children of her three
cousins with the particular injunction that they are the only ones to enjoy the
same as long as they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of
them die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones. These
provisions of the will are clear. They do not admit of any other
interpretation.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The eleven surviving
usufructuariesare hereby declared to be entitled to the shares of the three
deceased usufructuaries and, hence, as a corollary, appellees Gil P.
Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby ordered to pay to them the
money withheld by them respectively representing the shares of the
deceased usufructuaries. No costs.

|||

EH405 SY 2016-2017

i. AS TO RECIPIENTS OF BENEFIT
a. North Negros Sugar v Hidalgo
GR 42334 October 31, 1936
FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of a sugar central (known as “mill site”) and also its
adjoining plantation Hacienda “Begona”. He constructed a road adjoining the
“mill site” and the
Provincial highway. Plaintiff allows vehicles to pass upon paying toll charge
of P0.15 for each one pedestrians are allowed free passage.
Defendant owns the adjoining “Hacienda Sangay” wherein he has a billiard
hall and a tuba saloon (as in drinking place). The road of the plaintiff is the
only means of access to get to Hacienda Sangay.
At one point, plaintiff stopped defendant from using the said road. Hence,
instead of takingthe road to get to his Hacienda Sangay, defendant passed
through Hacienda Begona in apassageway used by the carabaos.
Plaintiff applied for injunction to restrain the defendant from
entering/passing through hisproperties (road & Hacienda).
ISSUE:
Whether or not injunction should be granted.
HELD:
NO.
RATIO:
For injunction to be granted, it must be established that the right sought to
be protectedexists, but also that the acts against which the injunction to be
directed are violative of said right.
In the case at bar, plaintiff failed to establish his right and that the defendant
hascommitted/attempts to commit acts that endanger such right. The
complaint does not state
how and why the mere passage of defendant over plaintiff’s estate
conveying “tuba” to hisHacienda has caused damage to plaintiff’s property
rights. The real damage that the plaintiff seeks to avoid is the fact that tuba
is disposed of at defendant’s hacienda in which theplaintiff’s laborers have
access (apparently, the plaintiff hates that his laborers are getting drunk in
the tuba saloon of the defendant). This however, is a nothing more than an
exerciseof legitimate business on the part of the defendant. What the law
does not authorize to bedone directly, cannot be done indirectly (if plaintiff
cannot enjoin defendant from sellingtuba, neither can it obtain injunction to
prevent him from passing over its property totransport tuba).
(TOPICAL: on mode of acquiring easements): The road was constructed by
the plaintiff on hisown land and it made this road accessible to the public,
regardless of class/group of persons/entities. This is a voluntary easement
constituted in favor of the community.Indeed, the plaintiff may close the
road at its pleasure as no period has been fixed when theeasement was
constituted, but while the road is still open, he may not capriciously
excludedefendant from its use. Having the road devoted to the public in
general, the road is chargedwith public interest and while so devoted, the
plaintiff may not establish discriminatorydiscriminatory exceptions against
any private person.
The road in question being a public utility, or, to be more exact, a private
property affected with a public interest, it is not lawful to make arbitrary
exceptions with respect to its use and enjoyment. The circumstance that the
plaintiff is not the holder of a franchise or of a certificate of public
convenience, or that it is a company devoted principally to the manufacture
of sugar and not to the business of public service, or that the state has not
as yet assumed control or jurisdiction over the operation of the road in
question by the plaintiff, does not preclude the idea that the said road is a
public utility.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 ii. FOR CONTINUOUS NON-APPARENT EASEMENTS AND
DISCONTINUOUS ONES (APPARENT OR NON-APPARENT)
a. Ronquillo v Roco
GR L-10619 February 28, 1958
Easements of right of way may not be acquired by prescription because it is
not a continuous easement.
FACTS:
Petitioners’, Rpnquillo, parcel of land was connected to the Naga Market
Place and Igualdad St. by an easement of a right of way through the land of
the respondents, which they have been using for more than 20 years.
Petitioner further claims that respondents predecessor in interest have long
recognized and respected the private legal easement of road right of way of
the former. The petitioners alleged that they have been in continuous and
uninterrupted use of the road or passage way.
On May 12, 1953, the respondents, Vicente Roco and Raymundo Martinez,
and their men with malice constructed a chapel in the middle of the said
right of way which, accordingly has impeded, obstructed and disturbed the
continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of way.
On July 10, 1954 new respondents, NatividadRoco and Gregorio Miras, and
their men through force and intimidation planted wooden posts, fenced with
barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way and their right of
way against the petitioner’s protests and opposition.
This prevented petitioners from going to or coming from their homes to
Igualdad Street and the public market of the City of Naga.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement of right of way can be acquired thru
prescription.
HELD:
NO.
An easement of right of way though it may be apparent is, nevertheless,
discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, CANNOT BE ACQUIRED
THROUGH PRESCRIPTION, but only by virtue of a title. Under the New Civil
Code, easements may be continuous discontinuous (intermittent), apparent
or non apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or less long
intervals and which depend upon acts of man (Articles 615).
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or
prescription, continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones
whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles
620 and622).
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, particularly the articles thereof
aforecited, it would therefore appear that the easement of right of way may
not be acquired through prescription. Even Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code
providing for prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property,
excludes there from the exception established by Article 539, referring to
discontinuous easements, such as, easement of right of way.
(Bargayovs.Camumot, 40 Phil., 857, 867).
Further, in the case of Cuayong vs. Benedicto, (37 Phil., 781) where the
point in issue was whether or not vested rights in a right of way can be
acquired through user from time immemorial, the Court held that no
discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event.
MINORITY OPINION:
Easements of right of way may already be acquired by prescription, at least
since the introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law on prescription
through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190. Said law, particularly,
Section 41 thereof, makes no distinction as to the real rights which are
subject to prescription, and there would appear to be no valid reason, at
least to the writer of this opinion, why the continued use of a path or a road
or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more,
not by mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of
it, cannot give said party a vested right to such right of way through
prescription.
“The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to
constitute adverse possession does not require the use thereof every day for
the statutory period, but simply the exercise of the right more or less
frequently according to the nature of the use.” (17 Am. Jur. 972) "It is
submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous servitudes can be
acquired by prescription, provided it can be shown that the servitude was
actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other
right and adverse to all other claimants'."
EH405 SY 2016-2017
4. EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
iii. NATURE OF THE EASEMENT
a. National Power Corporation v. Carlos Villamor
GR 160080 June 19, 2009
FACTS:
Due to NPC’s Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, NPC’s transmission lines
and tower have to pass parcels of land in Danao and Carmen, Cebu. Two of
these lands in Carmen are owned by Carlos Villamor. On these lands stand
fruit-bearing trees and non-fruit bearing trees.
NPC filed expropriation of Lots 3 and 4 of Villamor’s lands. NPC deposited
with PNB the amount representing the assessed value on tax declaration of
lands. Trial court ordered issuance of writ of possession in favor of NPC.
Alleged siblings of Carlos Villamor intervened and claimed that NPC violated
their legal rights in negotiating only with Carlos, who is one of the 7 heirs;
that Carlos is not authorized by other legal heirs to negotiate and receive
payment for the land sought to be expropriated.
Only issue between NPC and Villamor is the reasonableness and adequacy of
just compensation of the properties.
Trial court created board of 3 commissioners who subsequently submitted
their recommended amount of P433 per square meter as FMV.
Villamor filed comment, exhibiting a similar expropriation case of a lot
adjoining his, filed by NPC. In that case, the just compensation was fixed at
P600 /sq.m. However, upon motion of NPC, was reduced to P450. He prayed
that same amount be awarded to him; also prayed that a small portion of Lot
4 with an area of 15.23 sq. m. which was separated from remaining
unaffected portion of total area and would not be used by Villamor for any
productive purposes, be included as part of total area that should be
compensated by NPC.
Trial court fixed compensation at P450 but did not grant prayer of Villamor to
include the small portion so latter filed MR which was granted by the court.
NPC appealed.
CA denied appeal saying that Commissioner’s Report did not consider the
fact that in expropriating the portion of Lot 4, a small dangling portion of
said lot consisting of 15.23 sq.m. was left out and separated. Considering
that said portion cannot anymore be used by Villamor for any productive
purpose and same will cease to have commercial value to later, said dangling
area should also be paid.
Petitioner’s Contention:
 Under Section 3A of its charter, where private property will be traversed
by transmission lines, NPC shall only acquire an easement of right of way
since owner retains ownership of property and can devote land to
farming and other agricultural purposes. In this case, since lands are
agricultural with no sign of commercial activity, the amount of P450 is
excessive and unreasonable.
Respondent’s Contention:
 Affected portions of the lands are not only traversed by petitioner’s
transmission lines but a portion is also used as site of its transmission
tower.
 Asserts that petitioner cannot hide behind the provisions of Section 3A
and claim that it may only pay owners an easement fee not exceeding
10% of market value of property.
 Points out that other owners similarly affected by the project were
compensated in the amount of P420 to 450 as shown in the deeds of
absolute sale and compromise agreements executed by petitioner in
other expropriated cases
ISSUE:
Whether the fair market value awarded by trial court may be reduced taking
into account that NPC is allegedly acquiring only an easement of right of way
and that the land affected are classified as agricultural?
RULING: NO
Petitioner’s reliance on Section 3A has been struck down by SC in a number
of cases. Easement of right of way falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain.In installing the 230 KV Talisay-
Compostela transmission lines which traverse respondent's lands, a
permanent limitation is imposed by petitioner against the use of
the lands for an indefinite period. This deprives respondent of the
normal use of the lands. In fact, not only are the affected areas of the
lands traversed by petitioner's transmission lines but a portion is used as the
site of its transmission tower. Because of the danger to life and limbs that
may be caused beneath the high-tension live wires, the landowner will not
be able to use the lands for farming or any agricultural purposes.
Further, the trial and appellate courts fixed the valuation of the lands at P450
per square meter. The courts considered not only the Commissioners' Report
and the opinion values of different agencies submitted to the trial court but
also the several deeds of absolute sale and compromise agreements entered
into by petitioner with landowners adjacent to respondent's lands.
EH405 SY 2016-2017

iii. REQUISITES OF THE EASEMENT
a. Valdez v Tabisula
GR 175510 July 28, 2008
FACTS:
Spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased from spouses Francisco
Tabisula and CaridadTabisula a parcel of land. Contained in the deed of sale
is a stipulation that the Sps. Valdez ‘shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters [sic]
wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not
included in this sale’. Sps. Tabisula then built a concrete wall on the subject
property. Feeling betrayed by said act of Sps. Tabisula based on the deed of
sale’s intended road right of way,Sps. Valdez reported the matter the brgy.
Lupon but it was in vain which constrained Sps. Valdez to file a case for
specific performance against the Tabisulas with the RTC. The Sps. Tabisula
contended that :1: Sps. Valdez and family also are the owners of two
properties adjoining the subject property, which adjoining properties have
access to two public roads ; and 2: they could not have agreed to providing
petitioners an easement “on the western side of their lot” as there exists a
two-storey concrete house on their lot where the supposed easement is to
be located, which was erected long before the subject property was sold to
the Valdez’s; thus , the easement should be taken from the western portion
of the subject property and not from theirs.
RTC dismissed the Sps. Valdez’s complain. On appeal, Sps. Valdez were
again turned down.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sps. Valdez are entitled to the right of way as provided
for in the deed of sale
RULING:
The Sps. Valdez are not entitled to the right of way.
An easement or servitude is “a real right constituted on another’s property,
corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to
abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his
property for the benefit of another thing or person.” The statutory basis of
this right is Article 613 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different
owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the
dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
There are two kinds of easements according to source – by law or by the will
of the owners. So Article 619 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the
owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
From the allegations in Sps Valdez’ complaint, it is clear that what they seek
to enforce is an alleged grant in the deed by respondents of an easement
reading: “they shall be provided a 2 ½ meters wide road right-of-way on the
western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale.”
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction involving the sale
or disposition of real property must be in writing. The stipulation harped
upon by petitioners that they “shall be provided a 2 ½ meters wide road
right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this
sale” is not a disposition of real property. The proviso that the intended grant
of right of way is “not included in this sale” could only mean that the parties
would have to enter into a separate and distinct agreement for the purpose.
The use of the word “shall,” which is imperative or mandatory in its ordinary
signification, should be construed as merely permissive where, as in the case
at bar, no public benefit or private right requires it to be given an imperative
meaning.
Besides, a document stipulating a voluntary easement must be recorded in
the Registry of Property in order not to prejudice third parties. So Articles
708 and 709 of the Civil Code call for, viz:
Art. 708. The Registry of Property has for its object the inscription or
annotation of acts and contracts relating to the ownership and other rights
over immovable property.
Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or of other rights over immovable property,
which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall
not prejudice third persons.
Sps Valdez are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of
way. For to be entitled to such kind of easement, the preconditions under
Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established, viz:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to other persons, and without adequate outlet to a public
highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring
estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
xxxx
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to
the proprietor’s own acts. (Underscoring supplied)
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule,
EH405 SY 2016-2017
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article
649, the following requisites must be complied with: (1) the
property is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3)
the isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant estate’s
own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent
with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest. The onus of proving the existence
of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate, herein Sps.
Valdez.
Since the Sps. Valdez then have more than adequate passage to two public
roads, they have no right to demand the grant by the Sps. Tabisula of an
easement on the “western side of the Tabisula’s lot.”; it appearing that the
Sps. Valdez and their family are also the owners of two properties adjoining
the subject property which have access to two public roads or highways.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 b. Quintanilla v Abangan the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement,
G.R. No. 160613 the same should not be imposed.
Worthy of note, is the undisputed fact that there is already a newly opened
FACTS: public road barely fifty (50) meters away from the property of appellants
Sometime in the 1960s, Perfecta bought Lot No. 3771-B-1-A, with an area of , which only shows that another requirement of the law, that is, there is no
2,244 square meters, located at Inayawan, Cebu City (the dominant estate) adequate outlet, has not been met to establish a compulsory right of way. As
from one DionisioAbasolo, who formerly owned all the properties therein. between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to
Thereafter, Perfecta donated the dominant estate to Apolinardito, who is provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which,
now the registered owner thereof. Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a although longer, will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of rattan-made second alternative should be preferred.
furniture. In the conduct of their business, they use vans to haul and
transport raw materials and finished products. As they wanted to expand
their business and construct a warehouse on their property (the dominant
estate), they asked for a right of way from Pedro sometime in April 1994.
However, it appears that Pedro, who was the owner of Lot No. 3771-A-1,
containing an area of 1,164 square meters (the servient estate) and a lot
near the dominant estate, sold the same to DARYL'S on March 24, 1994, and
thereafter, DARYL'S constructed a warehouse over the servient estate,
enclosing the same with a concrete fence. Petitioners, thus, sought the
imposition of an easement of right of way, six (6) meters in width, or a total
area of 244 square meters, over the servient estate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Apolinardito is entititled to a right of way.

RULING:
NO. We hold that Apolinardito as owner of the dominant estate together with
Perfecta failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence and
concurrence of all the requisites in order to validly claim a compulsory right
of way against respondents. It should be remembered that to be entitled to
a legal easement of right of way, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3)
the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate. The fourth requisite is absent. As between a right of way
that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide ingress and
egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer
will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative
should be preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 c. Jesus is Lord Foundation v City of Pasig
GR 152230 August 9, 2005
FACTS:
A fire marshall testified that he had seen the new road and averred that a
firetruck could pass through it. He estimated that houses in area ranged
from 300 to 400. He also testified that Damayan Street is the only road in
the area. Finally, BonifacioMaceda, Jr., Tax Mapper IV, testified that,
according to their records, JILCSFI became the owner of the property only
on January 13, 1994
The plaintiff offered in evidence a photocopy of the letter of Engr. Jose
Reyes addressed to Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco to prove that the plaintiff made a definite and valid offer to acquire
the property to the co-owners.
However, the RTC rejected the same letter for being a mere photocopy.
Danilo Caballero averred that he had been a resident of Sto. Tomas Bukid for
seven years. From his house, he could use three streets to go to E. R.
Santos Street, namely, Catalina Street, Damayan Street and BagongTaon
Street. On cross- examination, he admitted that no vehicle could enter Sto.
Tomas Bukid except through the newly constructed Damayan
Street.
RTC Ruling
On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the plaintiff, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and in accordance with Section 4,
Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the Court Resolves to DECLARE the plaintiff as having a lawful right to
take the property in question for purposes for which the same is
expropriated. The RTC held that, as gleaned from the declaration in
Ordinance No. 21, there was substantial compliance with the definite and
valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the
expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto.
Tomas Bukid
The Court of Appeals Decision
In a Decision dated March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC.
[28] The CA agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff substantially
complied with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, particularly the requirement that
a valid and definite offer must be made to the owner.
The CA declared that the letter of Engr. Reyes, inviting Lorenzo ChingCuanco
to a conference to discuss with him the road project and the price of the lot,
was a substantial compliance with the valid and definite offer requirement
under said Section 19.
In addition, the CA noted that there was also constructive notice to the
defendants of the expropriation proceedings since a notice of lispendens
was annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 on November
26, 1993
Finally, the CA upheld the public necessity for the subject property based on
the findings of the trial court that the portion of the property sought to be
expropriated appears to be, not only the most convenient access to the
interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid, but also an easy path for vehicles entering the
area, particularly fire trucks.
Moreover, the CA took into consideration the provision of Article 33 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementingthe Local Government Code, which
regards the construction or extension of roads, streets, sidewalks as public
use, purpose or welfare
ISSUE
(1) Whether the respondent complied with the requirement, under
Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a valid and definite
offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint;
 The petitioner stresses that the law explicitly requires that a valid
and definite offer be made to the owner of the property and that
such offer was not accepted. It argues that, in this case, there was
no evidence to show that such offer has been made either to the
previous owner or the petitioner, the present owner.
The petitioner contends that the photocopy of the letter of Engr.
Reyes, notifying Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco of the respondents intention to construct a road on its
property, cannot be considered because the trial court did not admit
it in evidence.
 And assuming that such letter is admissible in evidence, it would
not prove that the offer has been made to the previous owner
because mere notice of intent to purchase is not equivalent to an
offer to purchase.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
RULING
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or
by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is
one of the harshest proceedings known to the law. Consequently, when the
sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict
construction will be given against the agency asserting the power. Corollarily,
the respondent, which is the condemn or, has the burden of proving all the
essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation. It has the burden
of proof to establish that it has complied with all the requirements provided
by law for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Valid and Definite Offer
Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code provides:
ARTICLE 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale.
1. The offer to buy private property for public use or purpose shall be in
writing. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for
its acquisition, and the price offered.
2. If the owner or owners accept the offer in its entirety, a contract of sale
shall be executed and payment forth with made.
3. If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a price
higher than that offered to them, the local chief executive shall call them to
a conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the selling price.
The chairman of the appropriation or finance committee of the sanggunian,
or in his absence, any member of the sanggunian duly chosen as its
representative, shall participate in the conference. When an agreement is
reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall be drawn and executed.
4. The contract of sale shall be supported by the following documents:
(1) Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief executive
to enter into a contract of sale. The resolution shall specify the
terms and conditions to be embodied in the contract;
(2) Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract;
and
(3) Certification of the local treasurer as to availability of funds
together with a statement that such fund shall not be disbursed or
spent for any purpose other than to pay for the purchase of the
property involved.
The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement
of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property before
filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter.
An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the
other for the celebration of a contract. It creates a power of
acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to
transform the offerors promise into a contractual obligation
Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness
the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of
the proposed contract.[53] An offer would require, among other things, a
clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the
envisioned contract. The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite
offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and
voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid
the expense and delay of a court action.
The law is designed to give to the owner the opportunity to sell his land
without the expense and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive
litigation. This is a substantial right which should be protected in every
instance.
It encourages acquisition without litigation and spares not only the
landowner but also the condemnor, the expenses and delays of litigation. It
permits the landowner to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring
the property, immediate use and enjoyment of the property.
A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer,
to acquire the property for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or
his privy. A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice.
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its
complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property
for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by the
respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government
Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of
Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco.
It bears stressing, however, that the respondent offered the letter only to
prove its desire or intent to acquire the property for a right-of-way. The
document was not offered to prove that the respondent made a definite and
valid offer to acquire the property. Moreover, the RTC rejected the document
because the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the original copy
thereof.
The respondent, likewise, failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter
were sent to and received by all the co-owners of the property, namely,
Lorenzo ChingCuanco, Victor ChingCuanco and Ernesto Kho.
The respondent sought to prove, through the testimony of its messenger,
Rolando Togonon, that Lorenzo
EH405 SY 2016-2017
ChingCuanco received the original of the said letter. But Togonon testified
that he merely gave the letter to a lady, whom he failed to identify. He
stated that the lady went inside the store of Lorenzo ChingCuanco, and later
gave the letter back to him bearing the signature purportedly of one Luz
Bernarte. However, Togonon admitted, on cross-examination, that he did not
see Bernarte affixing her signature on the letter. Togonon also declared that
he did not know and had never met Lorenzo ChingCuanco and Bernarte.
Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners, the letter is not a
valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the property for a
price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners,
Lorenzo ChingCuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price
that may be mutually acceptable to both parties.
Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas clauses of the ordinance that
the property owners were already notified by the municipality of the intent to
purchase the same for public use as a municipal road, a substantial
compliance with the requirement of a valid and definite offer under Section
19 of R.A. No. 7160.

Ruling: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent
without prejudice to the refiling thereof

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 d. Ramos v. Gatchalian Realty
GR 75905 October 12, 1987
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Ramos was an owner of a house and lot bought from
Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision. Two road lots abut
petitioner’s property namely Gatchalian Road and Sukat Road (this
one appearing as a proposed road).
2. Petitioner Ramos filed a complaint for an easement of a right of way
with preliminary mandatory injunction against private respondents
contending:
 Gatchalian Realty Inc. built a concrete wall right in front of
Ramos’ premises, blocking his entrance/exit to Gatchalian Road,
the nearest, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the
public road or highway
3. On the other hand, Respondent Gatchalian Realty Inc. Filed its
answer and averred:
 Palanyag road is not a public road but a private street
established and constructed by the corporation intended for the
sole and exclusive use of its land buyers
 Such grant of right of way is not a legal necessity because such
lot has an existing road right of way to Sukat Road
4. Lower Court: In favor of Petitioner Ramos
Lower Court (acting on motions by two parties): Order setting aside previous
ruling. Decision rendered prematurely as the defendants had not presented
their evidence on the main evidence.
CA: Affirmed. Petitioner failed to establish the existence of the preconditions
to be legally entitled to an easement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has successfully shown that all the requisites
necessary for the grant of an easement of a right of way in his favor are
present
HELD:
No, first requisite is absent. In favor of respondents.
1. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owener (Art. 613, NCC)
2. It is established either by law (legal easement) or by the will of the
parties (voluntary easement).
 Case at bar, there was no agreement between the parties so
voluntary easement ruled out.
 What is left to examine is WON petitioner is entitles to a Legal or
Compulsory easement of a right of way.
3. Articles 649 and 650 under the Civil Code fixed the preconditions for
its grant:
1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway
2) After payment of proper indemnity
3) That the isolation must not be due to the claimant’s act
4) That the right of way claimed is ‘at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.’
4. On the first requisite, petitioner contends:
 The Gatchalian Avenue is its “nearest, most convenient and
adequate road” to and from a public highway
 He is contrained to use a “temporary” way the adjoining lots
belonging to different persons which is allegedly “bumpy and
impassable especially during rainy season”
 The road right of way to Sukat Road which respondent referred
to as petitioner’s right of way is not an existing road but has
remained a proposed road.
5. Petitioner’s position is not impressed with merit. He failed to prove
the non-existence of an adequate outlet to Sucat Road except
through the Gatchalian road.
 There is a road right of way provided by the
SobrinaRodrguezLombos Subdivision for its buyers
 The fact that said road is undeveloped and causes inconvenience
to petitioner does not bring him within the ambit of the legal
requisite.
 Petitioner should have asked first demanded from the
SobrinaSubdvision the improvement and maintenance of such
road since the petitioner acquired his lot from it, not from
Gatchalian Realty.
 Jurisprudence has consistently held that “mere convenience for
the dominant estate is not enough to serve as basis.”
 There must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for
it.”
EH405 SY 2016-2017
DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES INC. VS. GUILLERMO BALANDAN
G.R. No. L-3422. June 13, 1952.
Facts: Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. "was the owner of an ice-plant
factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed
two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine.
While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks
themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers. The
edges of the tank were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground.
Through the wide gate entrance, which was continually open, motor vehicles
hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and any one could
easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on
the gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiffs' son, Mario Balandan, a
boy barely 8 years old, while playing with and in company of other boys of
his age, entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one
of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank,
only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having died of 'asphyxia
secondary to drowning.
The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the
view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and
neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accident to persons
entering its premises.
Issue: Whether or not a body of water is an attractive nuisance.
Ruling: No. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to
bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual
condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.
The doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One who maintains on his
premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent
children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of
tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises.
The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in
question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or
alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or
use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children.
The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not
considered an attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana
Appellate Court as follows:
"Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children.
Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against
this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently
presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property
creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the
work of nature without adding any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable
because of having created an 'attractive nuisance.' Anderson vs.
Reith-Riley Const. Co., N. E., 2nd, 184, 185; 184, 185; 112 Ind.
App., 170.
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the
question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes
immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitioner - that the parents of
the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because
they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of
no responsible individual — needs no further discussion.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
XI. DONATION
a. NATURE OF DONATIONS
1. CONCEPT, NATURE AND EFFECT
HEIRS OF R. FLORENCIO VS. HEIRS OF T. DE LEON
G.R. NO. 149570. MARCH 12, 2004
Facts: Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot with an area of 828
square meters located in San Miguel, Bulacan. The said lot was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44349. 3 In the 1960s, De Leon
allowed the spouses Rosendo and Consuelo Florencio to construct a house
on the said property and stay therein without any rentals therefor.
On September 26, 1966, De Leon, with the consent of her husband Luis,
leased the aforesaid parcel of land for P5 per month to Bienvenido Santos
"for as long as the lessor (Teresa de Leon) had an outstanding loan with the
Second Quezon City Development Bank of Quezon City but not to exceed the
period of fifteen (15) years." De Leon assigned her leasehold right in favor
of the Second Quezon City Development Bank. The lease and De Leon's
leasehold right were annotated at the back of TCT No. T-44349 as Entry
Nos. 152248 and 152249, respectively. Thereafter, Bienvenido Santos
constructed a house thereon.
In November 1978, De Leon, then already a widow, died intestate. In
deference to her wishes, her heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio to continue
staying in the property. In March 1995, Florencio died intestate, but his
heirs, the respondents, remained in the property. On April 26, 1995, the
heirs of De Leon, through counsel, sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio,
demanding that they vacate the property within ninety (90) days from
receipt thereof. The latter refused and failed to vacate the property.
The heirs of De Leon, thereafter filed a complaint for ejectment against the
heirs of Florencio before the MTC of San Miguel, Bulacan.
In their answer to the complaint, the heirs of Florencio alleged that the
plaintiffs had no cause of action against them, as Teresa de Leon had
executed a Deed of Donation on October 1, 1976 over the said parcel of land
in favor of their predecessor, Rosendo Florencio. The latter accepted the
donation, as shown by his signature above his typewritten name on page
one of the deed. After De Leon's death, Florencio and his children, in
coordination with Jose de Leon, the administrator of the aforesaid property,
arranged for the registration of the land subject of the donation in the name
of Rosendo Florencio, which was, however, superseded by the untimely
demise of Jose de Leon in 1991. Thus, the property remained in the name of
Teresa Sevilla de Leon, even after Florencio's death in March of 1995.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners, as heirs of Rosendo Florencio, who
appears to be the donee under the unregistered Deed of Donation, have a
better right to the physical or material possession of the property over the
respondents, the heirs of Teresa de Leon, the registered owner of the
property.
Ruling: No. Under the New Civil Code, donation is one of the modes of
acquiring ownership. Among the attributes of ownership is the right to
possess the property.
The essential elements of donation are as follows: (a) the essential
reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of
the donee; and (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.
When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further
requires that the donation be made in a public document and that the
acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate public
instrument; in cases where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument,
it is mandated that the donor be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be
noted in both instruments.
As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee, and is
perfected from the moment the donor is made aware of the acceptance by
the donee, provided that the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law
from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally
considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply
with the charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance, to
EH405 SY 2016-2017
be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.
It must be made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the
donee's acceptance must come to the knowledge of the donor.
In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid,
it must be made in a public document. Registration of the deed in the Office
of the Register of Deeds or in the Assessor's Office is not necessary for it to
be considered valid and official. Registration does not vest title. The
necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of third
persons are affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the deed of
contracts executed by their predecessors-in-interest.
On the other hand, the fundamental principle is that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein as the
registered owner. The registered owner has the right to possess, enjoy and
dispose of the property without any limitations other than those imposed by
law.
In this case, the deed of donation, on its face, appears to bear all the
essential requisites of a valid donation inter vivos. With Teresa de Leon as
the donor and Rosendo Florencio as the donee, the deed of
donation appears to have been notarized by Notary Public TirsoManguiat. On
this premise, Florencio, and after his death, his heirs, acquired ownership
over the property although Certificate of Title No. T-44349 under the name
of Teresa de Leon had not yet been cancelled.
However, as pointed out by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, there are
cogent facts and circumstances of substance which engender veritable
doubts as to whether the petitioners have a better right of possession over
the property other than the respondents, the lawful heirs of the deceased
registered owner of the property, Teresa de Leon, based on the Deed of
Donation and these are as follows:
1. If she, indeed, donated the property, she would surely have turned over
the owner's duplicate of TCT No. T-44349 to Florencio, to facilitate the
issuance of a new title over the property in his favor. There was an
imperative need for the deed to be registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds, and the title to the property to be thereafter issued in the name of
the donee, Florencio. At the very least, Florencio should have caused the
annotation of the deed immediately after October 1, 1976 or shortly
thereafter. Such annotation would have been binding on the respondents, as
De Leon's successors-in-interest, as well as to third persons. However,
Florencio failed to do so. Even as De Leon died intestate in 1978, Florencio
failed to secure title over the property in his name before he himself died
intestate in 1995. It is incredible that he would fail to register the deed and
secure title over the property under his name for almost twenty years.
2. Florencio failed to inform the heirs of De Leon that the latter, before her
death, had executed a deed of donation on October 1, 1976 over the
property in his favor. It was only in 1996, or eighteen years after the death
of De Leon when the respondents sued the petitioners for ejectment that the
latter claimed, for the first time, that De Leon had executed a deed of
donation over the property in favor of their predecessor, Florencio.
3. The petitioners should have declared the property under their names and
paid the realty taxes therefor, if they truly believed that they were its
owners. They failed to do so. It was still the respondents who are paying for
its realty taxes. The fact of Florencio's inaction and that of the petitioners'
weakened the latter's claim that they acquired ownership over the property
under the deed of donation.
4. The petitioners never adduced in evidence the owner's duplicate of TCT
No. T-44349 under the name of De Leon, nor did they explain why they
failed to adduce in evidence the said owner's duplicate of the title. The only
conclusion is that the said owner's duplicate copy was not turned over to
Florencio contemporaneously with or after the execution of the deed of
donation; hence, their failure to secure title over the property.
5. The petitioners failed to adduce in evidence Atty. Manguiat's (witness in
the Deed of Donation) counter-affidavit to the said complaint (respondents
filed for falsification and perjury against Florencio and Atty. Manguiat), or, at
the very least, a separate affidavit explaining the facts and circumstances
surrounding the notarization of the deed of donation.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
6. A reading of the deed will show that at the bottom of page one thereof,
Florencio was to subscribe and swear to the truth of his acceptance of the
donation before Municipal Mayor Marcelo G. Aure of San Miguel, Bulacan.
However, the mayor did not affix his signature above his typewritten name,
thus:

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of October, 1976,

the DONOR having exhibited her Res. Cert. No. A-3723337 issued at
Quezon City on January 10, 1976.

MARCELO G. AURE

Municipal Mayor

It appears that a second page was added, with the name of Atty. Manguiat
typewritten therein as notary public, obviously, with the use of a different
typewriter.

In sum then, we agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the deed
of donation relied upon by the petitioners is unreliable as evidence on which
to anchor a finding that the latter have a better right over the property than
the respondents, who, admittedly, are the heirs of Teresa de Leon, the
registered owner of the property under TCT No. T-44349 of the Registry of
Deeds of Bulacan.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
2. REQUISITES (taasjudnikaylibogug facts. Pasensya.
Tibuokangkan involved)
I.
HEIRS OF C. REYES VS. CALUMPANG
G.R. NO. 138463. OCTOBER 30, 2006
Facts: The instant case involves Lot No. 3880 of the Cadastral Survey of
Tanjay, Negros Oriental which has a land area of around 25,277 square
meters, more or less. Said lot was originally owned by a certain Isidro Reyes,
who sired eight children, viz: Victoriana Reyes Manaban, Telesfora Reyes
Manaban, Leonardo Reyes, Juan Reyes, Eduarda Reyes, Miguel Reyes,
Eleuteria Reyes, and Hermogenes Reyes. The protagonists in this case are
the descendants, specifically the grandchildren, of the three eldest children
of Isidro Reyes, namely, Victoriana, Telesfora and Leonardo.
Among Isidro’s children, it was Leonardo who managed the properties of
their father. In 1924, a cadastral survey was conducted pursuant to Act No.
2259. Leonardo, through his representative, Angel Calumpang, filed an
answer in the cadastral court naming all eight children of Isidro Reyes as
claimants of the said lot.
On July 10, 1949, a certain DominadorAgir filed a claim over the disputed lot,
naming some grandchildren of Leonardo Reyes (great-grandchildren of Isidro
Reyes), namely: Victorino, Cipriano, Luis, Ricardo, and Daylinda Reyes, the
children of Higino Reyes (eldest son of Leonardo); and Beatriz, Guillermo,
and Jovito Reyes, the children of Policarpio Reyes (second son of
Leonardo). The Decision granted judicial confirmation of the imperfect title of
petitioners over said lot. OCT No. OV-227 was issued on August 5, 1954 in
the name of petitioners, namely: Victorino, Cipriano, Luis, Ricardo, Jesus,
Daylinda, Jovito, Guillermo, and Beatriz, all surnamed Reyes.
The nine registered co-owners, however, did not take actual possession of
the said lot, and it was Victorino and Cipriano Reyes who paid the land
taxes. The heirs of Telesfora Reyes Manaban and Victoriana Reyes Manaban
(daughters of Isidro Reyes) retained possession over a hectare portion of the
said lot where they built their houses and planted various crops and fruit
bearing trees. Meanwhile, sometime in 1968, Jose Calumpang, grandson of
Leonardo Reyes and cousin of petitioners, also took possession over a
hectare of the said lot, planting it with sugarcane. Thus, Jose Calumpang
and his son Geoffrey continued to plant sugarcane over almost a hectare of
the said lot while the heirs of Telesfora Reyes Manaban and Victoriana Reyes
Manaban---the respondents Agalas and Manabans---occupied the rest of the
same lot which is about one hectare.
Sometime in 1972, respondent AgapitoAgala (grandson of Victoriana Reyes
Manaban) was informed by his cousin Victorino Reyes, one of the petitioners
and registered co-owner of Lot No. 3880, that there was already a title over
the said lot. This prompted respondent AgapitoAgala and the other heirs of
Telesfora and Victoriana to seek advice from a judge who suggested that
they request the registered co-owners to sign a quitclaim over the said lot. A
conference was allegedly held on December 27, 1972, where three (3) of the
registered co-owners Victorino, Luis, and Jovito all surnamed Reyessigned a
Deed of Quitclaim, where, for a consideration of one peso (P1.00), they
agreed to release, relinquish and quitclaim all their rights over the land in
favor of the legal heirs of the late Victoriana Reyes and Telesfora Reyes.
The Deed of Quitclaim was annotated on the back of OCT No. OV-227.
Thereafter, respondent AgapitoAgala had the then Police Constabulary (PC)
summon the other registered co-owners, namely: Cipriano, Ricardo,
Daylinda, Guillermo, and Beatriz, to sign another deed of quitclaim. But the
latter allegedly ignored the call, prompting the heirs of Victoriana and
Telesfora Reyes to file on June 9, 1975 in Civil Case No. 6238, with the
Dumaguete City RTC, Branch 40, a Complaint for Reconveyance of Real
Property, Cancellation of Certificate of Title and Damages against the
registered co-owners of the disputed lot who did not sign a deed of quitclaim
and DominadorAgir, who filed the amended answer in the cadastral
proceedings in 1949. On April 28, 1987, the trial court dismissed the
complaint and ruled in favor of the registered co-owners of Lot No. 3880. On
appeal, the CA upheld the trial court and affirmed the RTC November 29,
1989 Decision. The CA Decision was not raised for review before this Court,
thereby attaining finality.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Consequently, on July 2, 1991, petitioners filed the instant civil case
for Recovery of Possession, Declaration of Non-existence of a Document,
Quieting of Title and Damages against Jose Calumpang, Geoffrey
Calumpang, AgapitoAgala, Lorenzo Manaban, Heirs of Olympia Manaban,
PelagiaManaban, Felipe Cueco and Heirs of RestitutoManaban (herein
respondents) in Dumaguete City RTC.
Petitioners, as registered owners of Lot No. 3880, alleged that by tolerance
they allowed respondents Jose and Geoffrey Calumpang to cultivate an area
of about one hectare of the said property; and also by tolerance allowed
respondents Manabans and Agalas to occupy another hectare portion of the
same lot. They further alleged that in December 1972, petitioners Victorino,
Luis, and Jovito Reyes got sick; and believing that they were bewitched by
the occupants of the said lot, they signed a Deed of Quitclaim, waiving all
their rights and interests over their respective shares in the disputed lot in
favor of the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes; and that thereafter, the
latter filed Civil Case No. 6238 in 1987, which was dismissed by the
Dumaguete City RTC.
Issues:
(1) Whether or nor a party who lost rights of ownership in a parcel of land
due to laches be allowed to regain such ownership when one who benefited
from the delay waives such benefit.
(2) Whether or not the Quitclaim (Waiver) is valid.
(3) Whether or not the Quitclaim (Waiver) Complies with the Requisites of a
Valid Contract and the Formal Requisites to Convey Real Property.
(4) Whether or not the Quitclaim was a Donation
(5) Whether or not the Calumpangs are barred by Civil Case No. 6328
Ruling:
(1)Yes. Petitioner’s title over Lot No. 3880 had become indefeasible due to
the laches of the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes. However, like any
rights over immovable property, titleholders may convey, dispose, or
encumber their right or interest. Thus, through the waiver and quitclaim, the
rights of the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes were acknowledged,
revived, and activated to the extent of the rights waived by titleholders
Victorino, Luis, and Jovito Reyes. Clearly, the quitclaim executed by
titleholders Victorino, Luis, and Jovito Reyes waived and conveyed their
rights over the said lot in favor of the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora
Reyes, whose equitable rights were barred by laches. But such revived and
activated rights over Lot No. 3880 correspond only to the extent of the rights
of Victorino, Luis, and Jovito Reyes waived in their favor.
(2) Yes. In the case of Valderama v. Macalde reiterated the three (3)
essential elements of a valid waiver, thus: (a) existence of a right; (b)
athe knowledge of the existence thereof; and, (c) an intention to relinquish
such right. [25] These elements are all present in the case at bar. The three
(3) executors, who were co-owners and titleholders of the said lot since
1954, were aware of their rights, and executed the Deed of Quitclaim in
clear and unambiguous language to waive and relinquish their rights over Lot
No. 3880 in favor of the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes. Thus, the
existence of a valid waiver has been positively demonstrated. Moreover,
in People v. Bodoso, cited in Valderama, it was held that the standard of a
valid waiver requires that it not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.
(3) Yes. The Deed of Quitclaim complies with the essential requisites of a
contract provided in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, viz: (a) consent of the
parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of the waiver and
quitclaim; and, (c) the cause of the waiver and quitclaim that is
established. First, there is no doubt as to the consent of the executing
parties and the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes. Second, the object is
the executors right over the subject land. And third, the cause is certain, that
is, the recognition by the executors of the rights of the heirs of Victoriana
and Telesfora Reyes over the disputed lot.
It likewise complies with Article 1358 (1) of the Civil Code which requires
that acts and contracts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishments of real rights over immovable
property must appear in a public document. This is complied with, as the
Deed of Quitclaim is a public document having been acknowledged before a
notary public. Moreover, the Deed of Quitclaim has been duly annotated in
the original certificate of title covering the subject lot.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
(4) No. Petitioners contended that the Deed of Quitclaim is really a donation
and thus necessitates acceptance by respondents Agalas and
Manabans. However the antecedents of the execution of the Deed of
Quitclaim shows otherwise. Victorino, Luis, and Jovito Reyes signed the Deed
of Quitclaim to relinquish their rights in recognition of respondents’ right over
the said land and thus conveyed their rights and interest in the quitclaim to
respondents Agalas and Manabans (the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora
Reyes).
It should be remembered that respondents Agalas and Manabans are the
heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes. Originally the rights and interests of
respondents over Lot No. 3880 were formally filed in 1924 in the cadastral
proceedings in the Cadastral Court. Leonardo Reyes instructed his
representative to file an answer asserting the ownership of said lot by the
eight (8) children of Isidro Reyes which includes Victoriana and
Telesfora. However on July 10, 1949, another claim was filed by
DominadorAgir only in behalf of the children of Higino and Policarpio Reyes,
and excluded Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes. Thus, when OCT No. OV-227
was issued, the respondents Agalas and Manabans, as heirs of Victoriana
and Telesfora, were excluded.
(5) Yes. Respondent Calumpangs apparently did not adduce evidence to
assert their rights over subject lot both in the prior Civil Case No. 6238 and
in the instant one. Be that as it may, the claim of respondent Calumpangs
over Lot No. 3880 had been conclusively denied in Civil Case No. 6238. Thus,
whatever rights and interests respondents Jose and Geoffrey Calumpang
have had over Lot No. 3880 are barred by the Decision in Civil Case No.
6238. Moreover, the December 19, 1997 Resolution of the CA had become
final and executory. Consequently, having no rights over Lot No. 3880, there
is no reason for respondents Jose and Geoffrey Calumpang to continue
occupying a portion of Lot No. 3880.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The January 26, 1999 Decision
and the March 25, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
54795 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondents Jose and Geoffrey Calumpang
are ORDERED to VACATE Lot No. 3880, REMOVE their houses from the said
lot, if any, and PAYpetitioners, jointly and severally, PhP 10,000.00 as
attorneys fees. The heirs of Victoriana and TelesforaReyesamong whom are
respondents Agalas and Manabansare entitled to8,425.667 square meters of
Lot No. 3880.

In this factual setting, respondents could have filed an action for

reconveyance to recover their shares in Lot No. 3880. However, instead of
instituting such a suit, respondents were able to convince Victorino, Luis, and
Jovito, all surnamed Reyes, to execute a Deed of Quitclaim restoring to them
their shares. Therefore, it is clear that the quitclaim is not a donation for the
three (3) Reyeses---Victorino, Luis, and Jovito who merely acknowledged the
ownership of and the better right over the said lot by the heirs of Victoriana
and Telesfora Reyes. Having acquired title over the property in 1954 to the
exclusion of respondents Agalas and Manabans, through the Deed of
Quitclaim executed in 1972, the three (3) Reyeses merely acknowledged the
legal rights of respondents over their shares in the said lot. In fine, the Deed
of Quitclaim, not being a donation, no formal acceptance is needed from the
Agalas and Manabans.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
ii.
SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CONFERENCE CHURCH OF SOUTHERN
PHILIPPINES, INC.VS. NORTHEASTERN MINDANAO MISSION OF
SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST, INC.
G.R. NO. 150416, JULY 21, 2006
Facts: This case involves a 1,069 sq. m. lot covered by TCT No. 4468 in
Bayugan, Agusandel Sur originally owned by Felix Cosio and his wife,
FelisaCuysona.
On April 21, 1959, the spouses Cosio donated the land to the South
Philippine Union Mission of Seventh Day Adventist Church of Bayugan
Esperanza, Agusan (SPUM-SDA Bayugan). Part of the deed of donation read:
The donation was allegedly accepted by one LiberatoRayos, an elder of the
Seventh Day Adventist Church, on behalf of the donee.
21 years later, however, on February 28, 1980, the same parcel of land was
sold by the spouses Cosio to the Seventh Day Adventist Church of
Northeastern Mindanao Mission (SDA-NEMM). TCT No. 4468 was thereafter
issued in the name of SDA-NEMM.
Claiming to be the alleged donee's successors-in-interest, petitioners
asserted ownership over the property. This was opposed by respondents
who argued that at the time of the donation, SPUM-SDA Bayugan could not
legally be a donee because, not having been incorporated yet, it had no
juridical personality. Neither were petitioners members of the local church
then, hence, the donation could not have been made particularly to them.
On September 28, 1987, petitioners filed a case, docketed as Civil Case No.
63 (a suit for cancellation of title, quieting of ownership and possession,
declaratory relief and reconveyance with prayer for preliminary injunction
and damages), in the RTC of Bayugan, Agusandel Sur.
Issue: Whether or not the donation to petitioner’s successor-in-interest is
valid.
Ruling: No. The donation was void.
Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a
thing or right in favor of another person who accepts it. The donation could
not have been made in favor of an entity yet inexistent at the time it was
made. Nor could it have been accepted as there was yet no one to accept it.
The deed of donation was not in favor of any informal group of SDA
members but a supposed SPUM-SDA Bayugan (the local church) which, at
the time, had neither juridical personality nor capacity to accept such gift.
Declaring themselves a de facto corporation, petitioners allege that they
should benefit from the donation.
But there are stringent requirements before one can qualify as a de
facto corporation:
(a) the existence of a valid law under which it may be incorporated;
(b) an attempt in good faith to incorporate; and
(c) assumption of corporate powers.
While there existed the old Corporation Law (Act 1459), a law under which
SPUM-SDA Bayugan could have been organized, there is no proof that there
was an attempt to incorporate at that time.
The filing of articles of incorporation and the issuance of the certificate of
incorporation are essential for the existence of a de facto corporation. We
have held that an organization not registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) cannot be considered a corporation in any
concept, not even as a corporation de facto. Petitioners themselves admitted
that at the time of the donation, they were not registered with the SEC, nor
did they even attempt to organize to comply with legal requirements.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Corporate existence begins only from the moment a certificate of
incorporation is issued. No such certificate was ever issued to petitioners or
their supposed predecessor-in-interest at the time of the donation.
Petitioners obviously could not have claimed succession to an entity that
never came to exist. Neither could the principle of separate juridical
personality apply since there was never any corporation to speak of. And, as
already stated, some of the representatives of petitioner Seventh Day
Adventist Conference Church of Southern Philippines, Inc. were not even
members of the local church then, thus, they could not even claim that the
donation was particularly for them.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
iii.
JUTIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-44628. AUGUST 27, 1987
Facts: During his lifetime, Arsenio Seville owned — (1) a parcel of
agricultural land described as Lot No. 170 situated at Anquibit, Asuncion
(Saug), Davao del Norte containing an area of 11.9499 hectares, more or
less; (2) a parcel of agricultural land described as Lot No. 172 likewise
situated at Anquibit, Asuncion (Saug), Davao del Norte with an area of
9.6862 hectares; (3) a residential house erected on Lot 172; (4) rice and
corn mills and their respective paraphernalia valued at P5,000.00; and (5)
five (5) carabaos in the possession of the then defendants (pp. 6-9,
Petitioners' brief).
On March 4, 1963, Arsenio Seville executed an affidavit in favor of
Melquiades Seville which states:
“xxx…That it is my desire that in case I will die I will assign all
my rights, interest share and participation over the above-
mentioned property and that he shall succeed to me in case
of my death, however, as long as I am alive I will be the one
to possess, enjoy and benefit from the produce of my said
land and that whatever benefits it will give me in the future I
shall be the one to enjoy it…xxx”
On May 24, 1968, Arsenio Seville mortgaged said properties to the Philippine
National Bank in consideration of a loan. This was done with the knowledge
and acquiescence of Melquiades Seville.
On May 15, 1970, Arsenio Seville died intestate, single, without issue, and
without any debt. He was survived by his brothers, Buenaventura Seville and
Zoilo Seville who are included as respondents; brotherMelquiades Seville;
and sisters Encarnacion Seville and Petra Seville. Thereafter, Melquiades died
and is survived by his children Consuelo, Celestino, Tiburcio, Ravelo, Sonita,
Lucy, Epifania, Naracy and Emmanuel, all surnamed Seville. Sisters
Encarnacion and Petra died later. Encarnacion is survived by her children
Trinidad, Teresita, Ulysses and Alejandrino, all surnamed Sullan, and her
husband Vicente Sullan while Petra Seville is survived by her children
Orlando Manican and PacificoManican.
The children of Melquiades Seville are now claiming exclusive ownership of
the properties and improvements thereon on the basis of the instrument
executed by Arsenio Seville in favor of Melquiades Seville and on their
alleged actual possession, occupation, and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and
172 since 1954 continuously and peacefully in the concept of owner up to
the time of Arsenio Seville's death.
Vicente Sullan and the other respondents (heirs of the brothers of Arsenio)
filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance at Tagum, Davao del
Norte against the petitioners (heirs of Melquiades) for partition and
accounting of the properties of Arsenio Seville, alleging they are heirs of the
decedent.
Issue:Whether or not the affidavit executed by Arsenio Seville in favor of his
brother- Melquiades, was a deed of donation.
Ruling:No. The affidavit was not a donation inter vivos or mortis causa but
a mere declaration of an intention and a desire. Certainly, it is not a concrete
and formal act of giving or donating.
It is quite apparent that Arsenio Seville was thinking of succession (". . . in
case I will die, I will assign all my rights, share and participation over the
above-mentioned properties and that he shall succeed to me in case of my
death. . . . "). Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the
donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and shall be
governed by the rules established in the title on succession (Art. 728, Civil
Code).
EH405 SY 2016-2017
The petitioners likewise contend that the document was a valid donation as The actions of the respondents are in consonance with their claim of co-
only donations are accepted by the donees. However, the petitioners could ownership.
not have accepted something, which by the terms of the supposed
"donation" was not given to them at the time. The affidavit could not
transmit ownership except in clear and express terms.

Furthermore, the homestead application was later prosecuted in the name of

Arsenio Seville and the land, much later, was mortgaged by him to the
Philippine National Bank in consideration of a loan. Arsenio dealt with the
land and entered into transactions as its owner. All these happened with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the supposed donee, Melquiades Seville.
Contrary to the petitioners' allegations in their brief, there was no immediate
transfer of title upon the execution of the affidavit.

Contrary to what the petitioners aver, private respondents as legal heirs of

Arsenio Seville have actual and substantial interests in the subject of
litigation thus qualifying them as real parties-in-interest.

Common ownership is shown by the records. Therefore, any claim of

ownership of the petitioners is not based on the affidavit but on the fact that
they are heirs of Arsenio Seville together with the private respondents.

It is likewise significant to note the respondents' assertion that the signed

affidavit is a forgery because Arsenio Seville was illiterate during his lifetime.
He could not write his name. He executed documents by affixing his
thumbmark as shown in the Real Estate Mortgage, which he executed on
May 24,196 in favor of the Philippine National Bank. The real estate
mortgage came much later or more than five years after the supposed
donation toMelquiades Seville where Arsenio Seville allegedly affixed his
signature. This fact was not disputed by the petitioners.

Moreover, the petitioners' actions do not support their claim of ownership.

During the lifetime of Arsenio Seville, he paid the PNB amortization out of his
personal funds and out of the income on his property. The payments were
not continued by the petitioners when Arsenio Seville died so much so that
the property was extrajudicially foreclosed and had to be repurchased by
Zoilo Seville, one of the respondents, through installment arrangements.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
3. Kinds
i. As to Consideration (Art.725, 726, 733)
Di SiockJian v. SyLiocSuy
G.R. No. L-17783. June 22, 1922
Facts: The land in litigation was registered under the provisions of the
Mortgage Law in the name deceasedSyLiocSuy in the year 1899, and that
said land, with the improvements was registered under the provisions of Act
No. 496, in the year 1914 and stood in his name in the registry under said
Act No. 496.
SyLiocSuy, one of the defendants, executed on April 23, 1918, a deed of
donation (Exhibit A) in favor of his minor children represented by their
mother, the herein plaintiff Di SiockJian, which was accepted on the same
date in a document (Exhibit B). On that date of acceptance, Di SiockJian was
not the judicial appointed guardian of the property of the plaintiff minors.
Later, on December 9, 1919, she was appointed by the CFI of Manila as
guardian of the persons and properties of said minors.
After the execution of Exhibits A and B, Di SiockJian took possession of, and
managed, the property described in said exhibits, and collected the rents on
said property and paid tax up to the end of July, 1919, on behalf of the said
minors. All defendants had knowledge of the existence of the documents
Exhibits A and B of the facts mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Exhibits
A and B, however, were not registered.
On July 5, 1919, the same SyLiocSuy executed the document (Exhibit D),
revoking said donation, and on July 12, of the same year, he executed
another document of purchase and sale of the same property (Exhibit C) in
favor of the other defendants in the amount of P45,000. This deed of
purchase and sale was presented to the registrar of deeds, and certificate of
title issued under Act No. 496 in favor of SyLiocSuy's codefendants as
purchasers.
Plaintiff Di SiockJian, in her capacity as guardian of the minors SyKiongChuan
and FlorenciaSyLiocSuy, asks that the contract of purchase and sale (Exhibit
C) to be declared void as it was made to defraud said minors; that the title
of the said minors to the property donated to them and described in Exhibits
A and B recognized.
The defendants, in turn, ask that judgment be entered to the effect that the
deed of donation (Exhibit A) is null and void, claiming that they are the only
legal owners of the property, and that the plaintiff render an account of all
the moneys received by her as rent of said property with interest and costs.
The court declared the defendants See KiongPha, See Kiong Land, See
KiongChian, and See KiongThi, the sole owners of the estate in question and
sentenced the plaintiff to render an account of all the rents, profits, and
income obtained or received by her from the said property since February 9,
1920, the date of the filing of the first answer of the defendants.
The first question raised by the appellant deals with the nature of the
donation under consideration. The fifth clause of the deed of donation
contains an obligation on the part of the person on behalf of the donees, to
provide the donee with lodging, food, clothing, and laundry, medical
attendance and medicine, and all other things necessary for his subsistence
during his lifetime, this obligation to cease upon the destruction of the
property by accident or fortuitous event.The appellant contends that such
donation is pure, and not, as was held by the court quo, conditional or
onerous.
Issues:
(1) Whether the donation is a pure donation or a conditional donation?
(2) Whether or not the donation was duly accepted?
Ruling:
(1)The donation involves a condition or burden which must be complied with
by the donees. The donation in question is conditional, for the reason that it
was made with the condition that the person accepting it on behalf of the
minor donees, should defray his lodging, food, clothing, and laundry and
fulfill the other obligations stated in the said clause of the donation.
(2) No. Article 636 of the Civil Code provides that person who cannot enter
into a contract cannot accept conditional or onerous donations without the
intervention of their legal representatives, and according to the stipulation of
facts, the mother of the minors had not been appointed by the court as
guardian to her children when she accepted said donation. Not being then
the legal representative of her children, she could not validly accept said
donation, for while she is considered as the natural guardian of her minor
children and by virtue thereof she has the right to have them in her custody
and educate them, yet this right does not extend to the properties of said
minors unless declared so by the court. (Sec. 553, Code of Civil Proc.) If the
EH405 SY 2016-2017
donation was not dully accepted in accordance with article 629 of the Civil
Code, it was not perfected as provided in article 623, there was not any For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed is hereby affirmed with
contract binding upon the donor, and nothing could, therefore, prevent him costs against the appellant.
from withdrawing the offer, as he did, in the document Exhibit D.

In a pure donation no obligation is imposed upon the donee, and

consequently, after the donation is perfected, no right is acquired by the
donor which need be perfected. In such a case, the acceptance may be said
to be a mere formality required by the law for the perfection of the
contract.But in conditional or onerous donation in favor of minors, as
is the case under consideration, there is stronger reason for
requiring the intervention of their legal representative because it
goes to the validity of the acceptance in such a way that the lack of
this legal requisite renders the act void and of not effect; and this so,
in the first place, because no one can contract in the name of another
without being authorized by him or without having his legal representation
(art. 1259, Civ. Code), and in the second place, because obligations arising
from contract have the force of law between the contracting parties and
must be performed in accordance with their stipulations (art. 1091, Civ.
Code) and it is precisely because, as in the case at bar, certain obligations
are imposed upon the donees, that the consent to assume them is required
to be given by their legal representatives to protect the right of the donor. If
the mother who accepted the conditional donation was the legal
representative of her children, the acceptance is valid; if she did not have
their legal representation, it is void, as made in violation of the law.
The appellant questions the title of the defendants and contends that the
purchase made them of the property in question is fraudulent. This
contention is untenable. There is not in the record any evidence of fraud,
with the exception of the knowledge which the defendants had of the
documents, Exhibits A and B. But such knowledge is no proof of bad faith, if
it is taken into account that they knew, on the other hand, that the offer to
donate had been withdrawn by the donor in the document, Exhibit D; that
said documents, Exhibit A and B, were not recorded in the registry of
property; and that the vendor was the only person appearing in the registry
as owner of the property.

The due execution of the document Exhibit C being admitted in the

stipulation of facts, and it appearing that the registered title of the vendor
contained nothing restrictive of his right to dispose of the property in
question, and the title of the purchasers having been registered in the
registry of property, it is clearthat said purchasers acquired an irrevocable
right over the said property.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
City of Manila v. Rizal Park Co.
G.R. No. 31063. September 13, 1929
Facts:On October 24, 1912, C.W. Rosenstock& Co. executed a deed of
donation (Exhibit A) in favor of the City of Manila, gratuitously and
irrevocably, the absolute ownership of said block 44, whereon the city may
build or erect a school or schools, or buildings for educational purposes, with
playgrounds, within the period of three years from the date of the execution
of said instrument.
C. W. Rosenstock& Co., assigned and transferred to the City of Manila the
absolute ownership of a strip of land 21,972.32 square meters in area, for
the laying out, opening, and construction of a main street in said Rizal Park
subdivision with a width of eighteen (18) meters, providing it with the
necessary cement gutters, fresh water pipes, together with at least two
public fountains, and the necessary electric light service. It also bind itself to
assign, transfer and convey gratuitously, in favor of the City of Manila, other
portions of land for the laying out and opening of the streets marked and
indicated on the plan attached to the instrument, as soon as the city decided
to open any of said streets, with the understanding that said obligation
should be in force for three years from the date of said instrument.
The City of Manila accepted the assignment made and promised by C. W.
Rosenstock& Co., and constructed the main street named Washington, and
constructed and opened the streets indicated in the deed, and established
adequate gutters and drains in the streets of the blocks in which five or more
houses had been built.
However, defendant Rizal Park Co., successor to the rights and obligations of
C. W. Rosenstock& Co., refused to comply with the obligation to execute the
deed of conveyance of the block in question, whereon the City of Manila may
construct a school or schools, or any building for educational purposes, and
necessary playgrounds for the recreation of the school children.
As a result, the City of Manila filed an action to compel defendant, Rizal Park
Co., to execute the transfer and conveyance of the parcel of land known as
block 44 of the Rizal Park subdivision in the City of Manila to the plaintiff, the
City of Manila.
The lower court decided the case ordering the defendant to execute within
ten days from the date when its decision became final, the deed assigning
and conveying to the City of Manila the full ownership of block No. 44.
The first question raised by the appellant involves the interpretation of
paragraph I of deed Exhibit A. Said paragraph I is as follows:
I. The said partnership, C. W. Rosenstock& Co., does hereby bind
and obligate itself to assign, transfer, and convey to the City of
Manila, gratuitously and free from all payment or indemnity or
irrevocably, the absolute and unconditioned ownership of the land
herein after described, whereon the city may build a schoolhouse or
schoolhouses, or buildings for educational purposes, with
playgrounds for the recreation and enjoyment of the school children,
within three years from the date hereof. . .
The appellant deduces three conclusions from the terms of this paragraph,
to wit: (1) That the City of Manila should first have built upon the block in
question, a school or schools, or buildings for educational purposes, and the
necessary playground for the recreation and enjoyment of the school
children, before having the right to obtain the assignment promised by the
defendant; (2) that the construction of the said buildings should have been
made by the City within three years from the date of the deed, or from
October 24, 1912; and (3) that having failed to construct said buildings
within said periods of three years, it has lost the right to the assignment.
Issue:Whether or not the construction of the buildings for the school in the
block in question is a condition precedent to the assignment of said block to
the City of Manila, and the three year period from the date of the deed fixed
therein was given for the building of the schoolhouses by the City of Manila?
Ruling: No. This is a contract of assignment, or more specifically, a contract
of onerous donation by virtue of which the defendant bind itself to convey
gratuitously in favor of the plaintiff the land in question, in consideration of
the improvements that the City of Manila agrees to make certain
improvements in said subdivision, in consideration of the assignment of a
portion thereof which the defendant binds itself to make in favor of the
plaintiff.
There is nothing in the paragraph I of the deed in question requiring the City
of Manila to construct buildings on the block in question before the
EH405 SY 2016-2017
defendant would be obliged to execute the promised assignment. If there
were the intention of the parties, they would have clearly stated in the
contract. And of course it would have been impossible for the City of Manila
to accept such condition, not knowing, as it should have known, that it
cannot erect any building on land that is not its absolute and exclusive
property.

Such a designation has not the character of a condition precedent to the

execution of the deed of assignment. The cause of consideration by virtue of
which the partnership C. W. Rosenstock& Co., made this gratuitous
assignment to the City of Manila, or the condition under which the defendant
promised this gratuitous assignment to the plaintiff is the improvements
which the latter bound itself to make isthe building of the main street, the
establishment of cement gutters, fresh water pipes, public fountains, electric
lights, and the construction of other streets, ditches, gutters, and drains in
places where five or more houses have been built in the block. The City of
Manila has complied with these obligations, and the appellants makes no
assignment of error on this point.

The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the sole modification
that the City of Manila must erect said buildings in the block in question
within a reasonable time, taking into account chiefly the educational needs of
the inhabitants of the Rizal Park subdivision.

EH405 SY 2016-2017

Lagazo v. CA&Cabanlit
G.R. No. 112796. March 5, 1998
Facts:Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of plaintiff-
appellee, was awarded in 1975 a 60.10-square meter lot which is a portion
of the Monserrat Estatelocated in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The Monserrat
Estate is a public land owned by the City of Manila and distributed for sale
to bona fide tenants under its land-for-the-landless program. Catalina Jacob
constructed a house on the lot.
In 1977, or shortly before she left for Canada where she is now a permanent
resident, Catalina Jacob executed a special power of attorney in favor of her
son-in-law Eduardo B. Espaol authorizing him to execute all documents
necessary for the final adjudication of her claim as awardee of the lot.
Catalina Jacob, however, revoked said authority in an instrument executed in
Canada on April 16, 1984 due to the failure of Eduardo B. Espaol to
accomplish the purpose of the power of attorney granted to him.
Simultaneous with the revocation, Catalina Jacob executed another power of
attorney of the same tenor in favor plaintiff-appellee.
In 1985, Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over a Lot
8W in favor of plaintiff-appellee. Following the donation, plaintiff-appellee
checked with the Register of Deeds and found out that the property was in
the delinquent list, so that he paid the installments in arrears and the
remaining balance on the lot and declared the said property in the name of
Catalina Jacob.
In 1986, plaintiff-appellee sent a demand letter to defendant-appellant
asking him to vacate the premises. A similar letter was sent by plaintiff-
appellees counsel to defendant on September 11, 1986. However,
defendant-appellant refused to vacate the premises claiming ownership
thereof. Hence, plaintiff-appellee instituted the complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against defendant-appellant.
Opposing plaintiff-appellees version, defendant-appellant claimed that the
house and lot in controversy were his by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Catalina Jacob dated October 7, 1977 in favor of Eduardo B.
Espaol covering the residential house located at the premises and a two
Deeds of Assignment, one executed onSeptember 30, 1980 and the other
on October 2, 1982.
After trial, the lower court decided in favor of plaintiff-appellee and against
defendant-appellant. The defendants theory is that he is the owner thereof
because he bought the house and lot from Eduardo Espaol. He admitted that
he signed the Deed of Assignment in favor of Eduardo Espaol on September
30, 1980, but did not see awardee Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes signed it. In
fact, the acknowledgement shows that the assignor/awardee did not appear
before the notary public. Defendant, claiming to be the owner of the lot,
unbelievably did not take any action to have the said house and lot be
registered or had them declared in his own name.Such attitude and laxity is
very unnatural for a buyer/owner of a property, in stark contrast of the
interest shown by the plaintiff who saw to it that the lot was removed from
the delinquent list for non-payment of installments and taxes due thereto.
The CA, however, reversed the decision of the trial court ruling upon the
absence of any showing that petitioner accepted his grandmothers donation
of the subject land. Citing jurisprudence that the donees failure to accept a
donation whether in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument
renders the donation null and void, Respondent Court denied petitioners
claim of ownership over the disputed land. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a
donation need not be stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus, although
the deed did not categorically impose any charge, burden or condition to be
satisfied by him, the donation was onerous since he in fact and in reality paid
for the installments in arrears and for the remaining balance of the lot in
question. Being an onerous donation, his acceptance thereof may be express
or implied, as provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil Code, and need not
comply with the formalities required by Art. 749 of the same code.
Issue: Whether the donation was simple or onerous?
Ruling:The donation was simple, not onerous. Even
conceding that petitioner’s full payment of the purchase price of the lot
might have been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed
by the donor as a condition for the donation. Rather, the deed explicitly
stated:
That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the
DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and
generosity and considering further that the DONEE is a grandson
of the DONOR, the DONOR hereby voluntarily and freely gives,
transfer[s] and conveys, by way of donation unto said DONEE, his
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, all the right, title and
interest which the said DONOR has in the above described real
property, together with all the buildings and improvements found
therein, free from all lines [sic] and encumbrances and charges
whatsoever;

It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge
petitioner as the donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure
donation. The payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary
acts. The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of
attorneyexecuted by Catalina Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson,
authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her
obligations. Nothing in the records shows that such acts were meant to be a
burden in the donation.

Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its

absence makes the donation null and void. In this case, the deed of donation
does not show any indication that petitioner donee accepted the gift. During
the trial, he did not present any instrument evidencing such acceptance
despite the fact that private respondent already raised this allegation in his
supplemental pleading to which petitioner raised no objection. It was only
after the Court of Appeals had rendered its decision, when petitioner came
before this Court, that he submitted an affidavitdated August 28, 1990,
manifesting that he wholeheartedly accepted the lot given to him by his
grandmother, Catalina Reyes. This is too late, because arguments, evidence,
causes of action and matters not raised in the trial court may no longer be
raised on appeal.

Since petitioner, who was the plaintiff below, failed to prove with clear and
convincing evidence his ownership claim over the subject property, the
parties thus resume their status quo ante. The trial court should have
dismissed his complaint for his failure to prove a right superior to that of
private respondent, but without prejudice to any action that Catalina Reyes
or Eduardo Espaol or both may have against said private respondent. Stating
this point otherwise, we are not ruling in this case on the rights and
obligations between, on the one hand, Catalina Reyes, her assigns and/or
representatives; and, on the other, Private Respondent Cabanlit.

Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
ii. As to taking effect (Art.728-731)
b. Designation given – not conclusive
Sps. Gestopa v. CA &Danlag-Pilapil
G.R. No. 111904. October 5, 2000
Facts: Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of 6 parcels of
unregistered lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis
causa, two of which are dated March 4, 1965 and another dated October 13,
1966, in favor of private respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil.The first deed
pertained to parcels 1 & 2.The second deed pertained to parcel 3. The last
deed pertained to parcel 4. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights
of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their
lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated
during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary.
On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, Catalina
Danlag, executed a deed of donation inter vivos covering the aforementioned
parcels of land plus two other parcels in favor of private respondent
Mercedes. This contained two conditions, that (1) the Danlag spouses shall
continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime, and that (2) the
donee cannot sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the said
spouses, without their prior consent and approval. Mercedes caused the
transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on
them.
In 1979, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4 to petitioners, Mr.
and Mrs. AgripinoGestopa. As a result, the Danlags executed a deed of
revocationrecovering the six parcels of land subject of the aforecited deed of
donation inter vivos.
In 1983, respondent Mercedes Pilapilfiled with the RTC a petition against the
Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of titleover the above parcels of
land. She alleged that she was an illegitimate daughter of Diego Danlag.
That she lived and rendered incalculable beneficial services to Diego and his
mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter was still alive.
In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that the deed of
donation dated January 16, 1973 was null and void because it was obtained
by Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it
was validly executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon
the death of the donor. Further, the donation was void for it left the donor,
Diego Danlag, without any property at all.
In 1991, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiff declaring the Donations Mortis Causa and Inter Vivos as
revoked, and, therefore, has no legal effect and force of law.
In 1993, the CA reversed the trial court declaring the deed of donation inter
vivos dated January 16, 1973 as not having been revoked and consequently
the same remains in full force and effect.Hence, this instant petition for
review filed by the Gestopa spouses.
Petitioners allege that the appellate court overlooked the fact that the donor
did not only reserve the right to enjoy the fruits of the properties, but also
prohibited the donee from selling or disposing the land without the consent
and approval of the Danlag spouses. This implied that the donor still had
control and ownership over the donated properties. Hence, the donation
was post mortem.
Issue:
(1) Whether or the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa?
(2) Was the revocation valid?
Ruling:
(1) Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated the
properties out of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a
donation inter vivos.Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates
that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the
properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need
for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of the
properties? Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his
maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the
donor intended to part with the six parcels of land.Lastly, the donee
accepted the donation. An acceptance clause is a mark that the donation
is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter
vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to
be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime.
In addition, the Danlag spouses already executed three donations mortis
causa prior to the execution of donation inter vivos. The Danlag spouses
were aware of the difference between the two donations. If they did not
intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the four lots
EH405 SY 2016-2017
already donated mortis causa. Petitioners' counter argument that this
proposition was erroneous because six years after, the spouses changed
their intention with the deed of revocation, is not only disingenious but also
fallacious.

Petitioners assert that since private respondent purchased two of the six
parcels of land from the donor, she herself did not believe the donation
was inter vivos. As aptly noted by CA, however, it was private respondent's
husband who purchased the two parcels of land.On the alleged purchase by
her husband of two parcels, it is reasonable to infer that the purchase was
without private respondent's consent. Purchase by her husband would make
the properties conjugal to her own disadvantage. That the purchase is
against her self-interest, weighs strongly in her favor and gives credence to
her claim that her husband was manipulated and unduly influenced to make
the purchase, in the first place.

(2) No. A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on

account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges
imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The donor-spouses did not invoke
any of these reasons in the deed of revocation.Finally, the records do not
show that the donor-spouses instituted any action to revoke the donation in
accordance with Article 769 of the Civil Code.Consequently, the supposed
revocation on September 29, 1979, had no legal effect.

Petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 Cuevas v.Cuevas
G.R. No L-8327, Dec. 14 1955
Facts: On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized
conveyance entitled "Donacion Mortis Causa," ceding to her nephew Crispulo
Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of unregistered land in Nueva Ecija. In
the same instrument appears the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas.
Subsequently the donor revocated the donation and brought action in RTC to
recover the land conveyed, on the ground (1) that the donation being mortis
causa, it had been lawfully revoked by the donor; and (2) even if it were a
donation inter vivos, the same was invalidated because (a) it was not
properly accepted; (b) because the donor did not reserve sufficient property
for her own maintenance, and (c) because the donee was guilty of
ingratitude, for having refused to support the donor.
RTC denied the recovery sought.
CA forwarded to SC because the case raise questions of law
Issue: Whether the true nature of the deed embodies a donation inter
vivos, or a disposition of property mortis causa revocable freely by the
transferor at any time before death.
When the donor stated that she would continue to retain the "possession,
cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and attributes of ownership," she
meant only the dominium utile, not the full ownership. The words "rights and
attributes of ownership" should be construed ejusdem generis with the
preceding rights of "possession, cultivation and harvesting" expressly
enumerated in the deed. Had the donor meant to retain full or absolute
ownership she had no need to specify possession, cultivation and harvesting,
since all these rights are embodied in full or absolute ownership; nor would
she then have excluded the right of free disposition from the "rights and
attributes of ownership" that she reserved for herself.
It is highly desirable that all those who are called to prepare or notarize
deeds of donation should call the attention of the donors to the necessity of
clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation, they wish to retain
the right to control and dispose at will of the property before their death,
without need of the consent or intervention of the beneficiary, since the
express reservation of such right would be conclusive indication that the
liberality is to exist only at the donor's death, and therefore, the formalities
of testaments should be observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of
the right of free disposition would place the inter vivos character of the
donation beyond dispute.

Ruling: The deed was a valid donation inter vivos with reservation of
beneficial title during the lifetime of the donor.

Neither the designation mortis causa, nor the provision that a

donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor", is a
controlling criterion in defining the true nature of donations.

The crux of the controversy revolves around the provisions of the deed of
donation. There is an apparent conflict in the expression that the donor
reserves to herself "the right of possession, cultivation, harvesting and other
rights and attributes of ownership while I am not deprived of life by the
Almighty"; but right after the same donor states that she "will not take
away" (the property) "because I reserve it for him (the donee) when I die."

In the first, the donation is operative inter vivos; in the second, we would be
confronted with a disposition mortis causa, void from the beginning because
the formalities of testaments were not observed.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: Donations to be delivered after Donor’s Death
Alejandro v. Geraldez
G.R. No L-33849, Aug. 18, 1977
Facts: Spouses Diaz and Severa Mendoza, their daughter-in-law Regina
Fernando, and their three children, Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz and Andrea
Diaz, executed a deed of donation covering eight lots of the Lolomboy Friar
Lands Estate, owned by the Diaz spouses.
Gabino Diaz died in 1962. In 1964 Severa Mendoza and her two children,
Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz, executed a deed of donation denominated as
"KasulatanngPagbibigaynaMagkakabisaPagkamatay (Donation Mortis Causa)"
over one-half of Lot No. 2377-A, which is a portion of the LLot 2377 of the
Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate.
Note: (For Lot 2377, in the deed of donation 1/3 was donated to Angel Diaz,
and 1/3 to Andrea Diaz with 1/3 left to the spouses.)
In that deed of donation, Severa Mendoza donated to Andrea Diaz her one-
half share in Lot 2377-A, which one-half share is identified as Lot 2377-A-1,
on condition that Andrea Diaz would bear the funeral expenses to be
incurred after the donor's death. She died in 1964.
The other one half share was already adjudicated to Angel Diaz because he
defrayed the funeral expenses on the occasion of the death of Gabino Diaz.
So Andrea Diaz sued-her brother, Angel Diaz for the partition of Lots Nos.
2377-A and 2502. Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia Diaz
(the third daughter), and their children intervened in the said case. They
claimed one-third of Lot No. 2502. Angel Diaz alleged in his answer that he
had been occupying his share of Lot No. 2502 "for more than twenty years".
The intervenors claimed that the 1949 donation was a void mortis causa
disposition.
Note: (Lot 2502 in the deed was divided and ½ in the west side was
donated to Angel Diaz and the other half was given to Andrea.)
RTC: Deed was a valid donation mortis causa and the division for lot 2502
between angel and andrea was already a valid extrajudicial partition and
Teodorico/intervenors were not given any share.
Appeal: Andrea claims that the deed is inter vivos
Teodoricoalejandrointervenors claim that the deed is mortis causa and the
deed was not a valid extrajudicial partition and they should be given 1/3 of
lot 2502.
Issue: Whether or not the deed is inter vivos.
Whether or not Intervenors should be given 1/3 share of the lot
Ruling:
The donation in the instant case is inter vivos because it took effect during
the lifetime of the donors. It was already effective during the donors'
lifetime, or immediately after the execution of the deed, as shown by the
granting, habendum and warranty clause of the deed.
The habendum and warranty clause is the donors' declaration that they
donate (ipinagkakaloob ) Lot No. 2502, the property in litigation, in equal
shares to their children Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz, the western part to
Angel and the eastern part to Andrea. The acceptance clause is another
indication that the donation is inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in
the form of a will, are never accepted by the donees during the donors'
lifetime. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.
The Code prescribes different formalities for the two kinds of donations. An
inter vivos donation of real property must be evidenced by a public
document and should be accepted by the donee in the same deed of
donation or in a separate instrument. In the latter case, the donor should be
notified of the acceptance in an authentic form and that step should be
noted in both instruments.
A transfer mortis causa should be embodied in a last will and
testament (Art. 728). It should not be called donation mortis causa.
It is in reality a legacy. If not embodied in a valid will, the donation
is void.
Articles 728 to 732, shows that it is the time of effectivity (aside from the
form) which distinguishes a donation inter vivos from a donation mortis
causa. And the effectivity is determined by the time when the full or naked
ownership (dominium plenum or dominium directum) of the donated
properties is transmitted to the donees. The execution of a public instrument
is a mode of delivery or tradition.
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that
the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee
EH405 SY 2016-2017
only because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the donation
takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a
last will and testament. But if the donation takes effect during the donor's
lifetime or independently of the donor's death, meaning that the full or
naked ownership (nudaproprietas) of the donated properties passes to the
donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of
the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
Justice J. B. L. Reyes following the French doctrine explained that no one
may both donate and retain.
What are the distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa?
Justice Reyes says that in a disposition post mortem (1) the transfer conveys
no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, of
the transferor (meaning testator) retains the ownership, full or naked
(domino absoluto or nudaproprietas); (2) the transfer is revocable before the
transferor's death and revocability may be provided for indirectly by means
of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed, and
(3) the transfer would be void if the transferor survived the transferee.
After the donor's death both deeds were recorded in the registry of deeds. In
the donor's will dated March 26, 1951, which was duly probated, the
donation of a parcel of land in the second deed of donation was confirmed.
Under these facts, it was held that the 1948 deed of donation mortis causa
was inter vivos in character in spite of repeated expressions therein that it
was a mortis causa donation and that it would take effect only upon the
donor's death. Those expressions were not regarded as controlling because
they were contradicted by the provisions that the done would defray the
donor's expenses even if not connected with her illness and that the donee's
husband would assume her obligations under the deed, should the done
predecease the donor. Moreover, the donor did not reserve in the deed the
absolute right to revoke the donation.

In a donation mortis causa it is the donor's death that determines that

acquisition of, or the right to, the property donated, and the donation is
revocable at the donor's will. Where the donation took effect immediately
upon the donee's acceptance thereof and it was subject to the resolutory
condition that the donation would be revoked if the donee did not give the
donor a certain quantity of rice or a sum of money, the donation is inter-
vivos.

The fact that the donation is given in consideration of love and affection or
past or future services is not a characteristic of donations inter vivos because
transfers mortis causa may be made also for those reasons.

However, where the donor declared in the deed that the conveyance was
mortis causa and forbade the registration of the deed before her death, the
clear inference is that the conveyance was not intended to produce any
definitive effect nor to pass any interest to the grantee except after her
death. In such a case, the grantor's reservation of the right to dispose of the
property during her lifetime means that the transfer is not binding on her
until she dies. It does not mean that the title passed to the grantee during
her lifetime.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Vita v. Montanano
G.R. No. 50553 Feb. 19, 1991
Facts:Nazario Vita, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of
deceased Edilberto Vita filed a case seeking to recover from defendants-
appellants Soledad Montanano, EstanislaoJovellano and EstebanaJovellano
the possession of three (3) parcels of land and their annual yield since
January, 1962 in the amount of P1,100.00 a year. Nazario claims that
Edilberto Vita owned and possessed these three (3) parcels of land covered
by: Tax Declarations and was enjoying the fruits therefrom. Upon his death,
defendants-appellants, through stealth and strategy, took possession of the
land and gathered the fruits therefrom. Notwithstanding demands from
plaintiff-appellant, defendants appellants refused to surrender the possession
of these parcels of land.
Defendants-appellants deny that the parcels belong to Edilberto Vita. They
claim that the two parcels of land belong to Soledad Montanano as these
were conveyed to her by IsidraMontanano (her aunt and wife of Edilberto
Vita) and Edilberto Vita in a document signed and executed by them and
ratified by one Mr. Matienzo, a Notary Public. However, all copies of said
document were lost during the last war. The other parcel of land is owned in
common by Soledad Montanano, her brother Jose and sisters Elena and
Alodia. It originally belonged to Francisca Asilo, deceased sister of their
grandmother, Micaela Asilo. Its ownership was transferred to them under the
arrangement sanctioned by Edilberto Vita himself wherein all the proceeds
from the yearly harvests therefrom shall be spent for the yearly masses to be
held for the souls of Francisca Asilo and IsidraMontanano.
Nazario claims that there was no such document executed the three (3)
parcels of land remained in the possession of IsidraMontanano and Edilberto
Vita; that upon the death of IsidraMontanano, who left neither descendants
nor ascendants, her surviving spouse Edilberto Vita succeeded her and took
immediate possession of her estate.
They alleged therein that they acquired ownership of the three (3) parcels of
land by virtue of a donation mortis causa executed by IsidraMontanano on
November 22, 1938 and by a donation executed by her on December 20,
1940 which was confirmed by Edilberto Vita.
Plaintiff-appellant insists that Edilberto Vita has a right to the conjugal half in
the first two parcels as surviving spouse had ceased to be inchoate upon the
death of Isidra in 1957, and that such right had been vested upon him by
operation of law. With respect to the conjugal half pertaining to Isidra in said
two parcels, and the entirety of the third parcel as her paraphernal property,
they were likewise vested upon him by operation of law, subject only to the
right of her nephew and nieces. (descendants because of dying without
issue)
Issue:
Whether or not the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint are
included in the estate of Edilberto Vita as he is the husband of Isidra.
Whether or not acceptance is necessary in a donation mortis causa
Whether the donation dated December 20, 1940 is mortis causa or inter
vivos.
Ruling:
All the lands in question were paraphernal properties of
IsidraMontanano. As she acquired all these parcels of land, either
by inheritance or donation, from her father Domingo Montanano,
her aunt Francisca Asilo and her uncle Juan Asilo. For Vito’s share
the conjugal partnership of IsidraMontanano and Edilberto Vita
should be liquidated in the testate proceedings of Isidra. As both
spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in
the testate or intestate proceedings of either.
Defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants allege the following: 1)
that a donation mortis causa, being in the nature of a legacy, need not be
accepted; their acceptance of that donation is superfluous; and 2) that the
December 20, 1940 donation is a donation inter vivos because: a) there is no
stipulation or provision therein that the donation is essentially revocable; b)
there was an acceptance of the donation; c) the donation was not simply
made in consideration of the death of the donor but of her affection for the
donees.
2.) It is explicit in Article 725 of the Civil Code that acceptance
is necessary in a donation. This applies to all kinds of
donation because the law does not make any distinction.
The rationale behind the requirement of acceptance is that
nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his will.
The said deed of donation mortis causa of November 22, 1938 seems to
have been legally and validly executed, but it cannot be given force and
effect as the acceptance thereof by the donees is void and illegal in
EH405 SY 2016-2017
as much as they were made at the time of the execution of the document,
not after the death of the donor IsidraMontanano. A donation mortis
causa takes effect only after the death of the donor, consequently it
is only after the latter's death that its acceptance may be made.

3.) The second deed of donation executed on December 20,

1940 is a donation inter vivos. It was supposed to be another
deed of donation mortis causabut in a provision in the second
deed of donation it was obviously the intention of
IsidraMontanano to grant a donation inter vivos. Although the
rest of the paragraph states otherwise, the donor only reserved for
herself, during her lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or
produce, a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership
of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is
the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations.
Furthermore, mention must be made of the fact that the
consideration of the second deed of donation is love and services
rendered by defendants-appellants and intervenors appellants to
IsidraMontanano.

Complaint of plaintiff is dismissed, the claim of defendants to the donated

properties in the donation executed on November was set-aside but plaintiff-
appellant was ordered: a) to deliver the possession of the properties donated
by virtue of the deed of donation dated December 20, 1940 (because it
was donated already as it was inter vivos), and b) to render an accounting of
the products harvested therefrom from January 23, 1962 up to the present.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 Sicad v. Court of Appeals Valderramas) the right to dispose of the donated property during the donor’s
G.R. No. 125888 Aug. 13, 1998
lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa “the right of
FACTS: In 1979, Aurora Montinola executed a deed entitled “Deed of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive. The
Donation Inter Vivos” in favor of her three grandchildren CatalinoValderrama, donation is therefore void because the formalities of a will, which is
Judy Valderrama, and Jesus Valderrama. The deed however provided that essentially a donation mortis causa, were not complied with.
that the donation shall be effective only 10 years after Montinola’s death. In
1980, the original title of the parcel of land subject of the donation was
cancelled and a new title was given to the Valderramas. Montinola however
retained the original title and she continued to perform acts of ownership
over the parcel of land.

In 1987, Montinola revoked the donation because of acts of ingratitude

committed against her by the Valderramas; that the Valderramas defamed
her; that she overheard the Valderramas plotting against her life. In 1990,
she petitioned to have her title be reinstated and her grandchildren’s title be
cancelled. She said that the donation is actually a donation mortis causa and
that the same is void because the formalities of a will were not complied
with. In the same year, she sold her property to spouses Ernesto and Evelyn
Sicad.

The Valderramas opposed the petition. In 1993, while the case was still
pending, Montinola died. The petition was continued by the spouses Sicad.

ISSUE: Whether or not the “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” is actually a

donation mortis causa.

HELD: Yes, the deed is a donation mortis causa. Montinola not only reserved
for herself all the fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even
more important, specially provided that without the knowledge and consent
of the Montinola, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any
way, thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute of
ownership, the power to dispose of the properties. A donation which
purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the done (in this case the
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: Instances of Donations Inter Vivos
Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106755 Feb. 1, 2002
FACTS: BasilisaComerciant, mother of five children, executed a Deed of
Donation to her five children covered by Transfer Certificate 3268, with an
area of 150 square meters. The said document reads as follows:
“xxx Kusangloobnaibinibigayko at ipinagkakaloobngganap at
hindinamababawisanaulitngapatnaanakko at sakanilangmgatagamagmana
(sic),xxx”
Thereafter, the parties executed another notarized document that stated”
“xxx Na angtitulonumero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036) ngLungsodngKabite,
bahaysalotengtirahanngBagongPooknanababanggitsanasabingkasulatan, ay
mananatilisapoder o possession ng Ina, nasiBasilisaComerciantehabangsiya
ay nabubuhay at Gayon din angnasabingTitulo ay hindimapapasangla o
maipagbibilianglupahabangmaybuhayangnasabingBasilisaComerciante. Xxx “
On Feb 1979, Basilia executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Apolinaria Austria
Magat for P5000. Basilia’s children contested the act, saying that the
donation was intervivos and thereby irrevocable. The trial court disagreed,
stating it was mortis causa and therefore revocable. The case went to the CA
and the case was reversed. CA found the document to be intervivos because
of the phrase “ganap at hindinamababawisanaulit”
Basilia, to their mind, definitely had no plans of revoking the donation. The
document executed thereafter upheld such irrevocability.
The parties proceeded to the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation was inter vivos.
HELD: YES.
The court found that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa
depends on whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the
properties upon the execution of the deed.
In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, the court recalls the characteristics of a
donation mortis causa,:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2)That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of
a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
For the case at bar, the phrase “hindinamababawi” definitely exudes the
character of an intervivos agreement. The other provisions therein which
seemingly make the donation mortis causa do not go against the irrevocable
character of the subject donation. According to the petitioner, the provisions
which state that the same will only take effect upon the death of the donor
and that there is a prohibition to alienate, encumber is mortis causa. The
court disagrees. The said provisions should be harmonized with its express
irrevocability. In Bonsato where the donation per the deed of donation would
also take effect upon the death of the donor with reservation for the donor
to enjoy the fruits of the land, the Court held that the said statements only
mean that “after the donor’s death, the donation will take effect so as to
make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all
liens and encumbrances.
In Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the prohibition to
alienate does not necessarily defeat the inter vivos character of the donation.
It even highlights the fact that what remains with the donor is the right of
usufruct and not anymore the naked title of ownership over the property
donated. In the case at bar, the provision in the deed of donation that the
donated property will remain in the possession of the donor just goes to
show that the donor has given up his naked title of ownership thereto and
has maintained only the right to use (jus utendi) and possess (jus
possidendi) the subject donated property.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Furthermore, the act of selling the property to petitioner herein cannot be
construed as a valid act of revocation of donation. A formal case ought to be
filed pursuant to Art 764 which speaks of an action bearing a prescriptive
period of 4 years from non compliance with the deed of donation. In this
case, the 4 year prescriptive period does not even apply because none of the
terms (if any) were even violated.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Del Rosario vs Ferrer GR No. 187056 1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death
of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
September 21, 2010; Instances of Donation Inter Vivos, Case 4 transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the

FACTS : On August 27, 1968, the Spouses Gonzales executed a donation
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
Mortis Causa in favor of their two children Asunscion and Emiliano and their
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
granddaughter Jarabini. Said donation covered the 126 square meter
the properties conveyed; and
property of the Spouses Gonzales. The donation mortis causa however did
not contain an attestation clause. It was also stipulated to be irrevocable by 3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive
the donors. The donees also accepted the donation and signed the the transferee.
acceptance clause.
The clear intent to make the donation irrevocable makes the
Meanwhile on December 19, 1968, before his death, Leopoldo (the donor donation a donation inter vivos since a donation mortis causa is by
husband) executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests over the nature revocable as shown in the second requisite.
126 square meter property to Asunscion only.
The SC also holds that the legal effect of a stipulation whereby a
In 1998, Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of the donation Mortis Causa donee reserves the right of administration, ownership and
execute don August 27, 1968. Asunscion opposed this petition and presented possession while still living and only have the donation take effect
upon their death is that the donors retain beneficial ownership of the
the deed of assignment executed in her favor on December 19, 1968.
property while still living.
The RTC held that the donation mortis causa was actually one which was
Furthermore, the fact that the donees accepted the donation through signing
inter vivos since the donors executed such donation during their lifetime.
the acceptance clause supports the conclusion that the donation was inter
Using the latter as basis, the RTC declared the deed of assignment in favor
vivos since acceptance clauses are only needed in donations inter vivos.
of Asucncion to be void. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision and
Donations mortis causa need not be accepted by the donees since they are
declared the donation to be one of mortis causa. Since it was not
in the form of a will.
accompanied by a notarial will, the donation mortis causa was declared void
by the CA. Furthermore, the CA held that the petition for the probate of the Since the donation was inter vivos, it was already operative and final. It was
donation dated August 27, 1968 was a collateral attack against Asucnsion’s already deemed perfected the donor learned of the donees acceptance of
deed of assignment, therefore, contrary to law. the donation. This gives rise to the conclusion that the subsequent deed of
assignment in favor of Asuncsion was void since by then, Leopoldo did not
ISSUE : Whether or not the donation was a donation mortis causa or a
have any right to assign.
donation inter vivos.
Lastly, the SC holds that the rules on probate are flexible and that since
HELD : The donation was a donation inter vivos. The SC emphasized
Asuncsion had placed the validity of the deed of assignment squarely in
that irrevocability is an idea which is absolutely incompatible with
issue, she is now estopped from invoking the defense of a collateral attack
donations mortis causa since they are by nature revocable. The
against such deed.
three requisites for a donation mortis causa are as follows :
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: Instances of Donations Mortis Causa
Maglasang v Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan GR No. 131953
June 5, 2002; Instances of Donations Mortis Causa, Case 1
FACTS : In 1992, ConchitaCabatingan executed in favor of petitioners Estela,
Nicolas and Merly all surnamed Cabatingan a deed of conditional donation
inter vivos. Through the said donation, Conchita bestowed her properties in
Cebu and Masbate stipulating that the donation would be rescinded on the
event that the donee dies before the donor and that it would only take effect
upon the death of donor.
Sometime in 1995, after the death of ConchitaCabatingan, the respondent
heirs filed an action before the RTC for the annulment of the deeds of
donation in favor of petitioners. The RTC ruled that the donation was mortis
causa and not inter vivos. Said donation was declared void for not having
complied with the forms and solemnities under Article 806 of the New Civil
Code. Petitioners appealed this decision to the SC.
ISSUE : Whether the donations were mortis causa or inter vivos.
HELD : The donations were mortis causa, the SC upheld the RTC decision.
The three requisites of a donation mortis causaare :
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of
a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee
Since the donations in question were stipulated to take effect upon the death
of the donor, Conchita, it was a donation mortis causa. The SC reasoned out
that if it were a donation inter vivos, the donor would have made stipulations
evidencing intentions of having the donation take effect during her
(Conchita’s) lifetime. Moreover, one decisive characteristic of a donation
mortis causa is that the transfer is considered void should the donee
predecease the donor. Since the donations in question in the case at bar
contained a stipulation to that effect, the SC held that it was a donation
mortis causa.
Since the donation was mortis causa, it needed to comply with the
requirement under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall
be interpreted to them.
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain
a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Even though the questioned donations were executed before a notary public,
the fact that they weren’t able to comply with the above cited conditions
made them void.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Carino v Abaya GR No. 46706

June 26, 1940; Instances of Donations Mortis Causa, Case 2

FACTS :Petrona and Dorotea, both surnamed Gray were in their 70s when
they executed a donation bestowing their properties to several people mainly
because they did not have any ascendants or descendants. Among the
people listed in the said donation, Miguel Carino was designated as
administrator. He was tasked to manage the properties and use the profits
he would have gained therefrom for the payment of necessary expenses and
the upkeep of the property.

Miguel Carino however predeceased the Gray sisters. About 8 years after the
death of the Gray sisters, Jose Carino, son of Miguel Carino, filed an action in
court to have the properties included in the donation declared as trust
properties. He was trying to have himself as administrator of the property.
Abaya, on the other hand, opposed the action filed by Jose. Abaya contends
that the donation was in fact a will.

The RTC ruled in favor of Jose Carino and declared some of the properties
included in the donation as trust properties. On appeal, the CA reversed the
RTC decision and held that the donation were neither inter vivos or a will,
they were in fact donations mortis causa. Since they failed to comply with
the requirement under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civile Code, they
were declared void.

ISSUE : Whether the donation was inter vivos as insisted by the petitioner or
a will as insisted by respondent.

HELD : The SC upheld the decision of the CA and declared the donation to
be mortis causa. There was a paragraph in the donation which stated that
“the donation was to take effect 30 days after the death of the last one to
die between the Gray Sisters”. This stipulation clearly indicates the intention
of the Gray sisters to have the donation operative only after their death.
Since the donation was mortis causa, it needed to comply with the
requirements under the provision of testamentary succession, since said
donation did not comply with these requirements, it was declared

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Topic: Effect of Resolutory Conditions on Donations Inter Vivos
Central Phil. University vs. CA GR No. 112127
July 17, 1995; Effect of Resolutory Conditions on Donations Inter
Vivos, Case 1
years to comply with its obligation under the deed of donation but still did
not do the same.
In sum, the deed of donation was cancelled. CPU was directed to reconvey
the property back to the heirs of Don Lopez, Sr. for failure to comply with
the resolutory conditions under the deed of donation. Also, the case was not
remanded back to the RTC as the CA originally ordered since there was no
need for the courts to fix a period in this particular case.

FACTS : Sometime in 1939, the late Don Lopez, Sr. executed in favor of CPU
(Central Phil. University) a tract of land. On the donation, Don Lopez, Sr.
stipulated that CPU was among others, obligated to exclusively use the land
as a medical university, to erect a monument in memory of Don Lopez, Sr.
and to refrain from selling, encumbering and conveying the donated land in
any way.

In 1989, the heirs of Don Lopez, Sr. filed an action for reconveyance and
annulment of the deed of donation alleging that CPU failed to comply with its
obligations. The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Lopez and rendered the
donation void. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision holding that
since the obligation was not provided with a period within which CPU was to
comply with its obligations, the case was to be remanded back to the RTC
for the fixing of a period.

ISSUE : Whether or not the deed of donation was onerous and with a
resolutory condition.

HELD : The SC reinstated the RTC decision and accordingly modified the CA
decision. The SC cited Article 1181 and held that the condition imposed by
the donor was in fact a resolutory condition. It was an onerous donation
since CPU had the obligation of complying with the stipulations under the
deed of donation, specifically, to keep the donation operative, they were to
build school buildings on the donated tracts of land.

Furthermore, the case need not be remanded back to the lower courts for
the fixing of a period. As a general rule, if an obligation does not carry with it
a period but the facts and circumstances of the case hint out that the parties
originally intended for a period, the courts may fix the periods for them. In
the case at bar, a reasonable period of time hold already lapsed. CPU had 50

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Quijada vs. CA GR No. 126444
December 4, 1998; Effect of Resolutory Conditions on Donation
Inter Vivos, Case 2
FACTS : In 1956, Trinidad Quijada together with her sisters executed a deed
donating a two hectare parcel of land to the Municipality of Talacogon on the
condition that the Municipality was to build a school on the subject land.
is because there is a possibility of reversion if ever the resolutory condition
never occurs.
In the case at bar, what Trinidad sold to Mondejar was really her inchoate
right over the donated property. Logically, when the land were reverted back
to the original donors, Mondejar, having assumed Trinidad’s inchoate rights
over the property, became the owner thereof.

In 1962, despite having donated the land to the Muncipality, Trinidad sold
the entire lot to Monedejar. Mondejar in turn parcels of the land to four
different buyers.

In 1980, the heirs of Trinidad Quijada filed a case for Forcible Entry against
Mondejar but such case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. In 1987, the
Municipality of Talacogon issued a resolution conveying the subject lands
back to the donors for having failed to comply with their obligations of
building a school on the donated land.

The heirs of TrindadQuijada then filed an action against respondents

Mondejar et al. alleging that deeds of sale in their favor were void since
having donated it to the Municipality to Talacogon, Trinidad no longer had
the right to sell them. The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Trinidad and
annulled the deeds of sale in favor of the respondents. On appeal, the CA
reversed the RTC decision reasoning out that when Trinidad donated the
subject land, she still possessed an inchoate right over the land. So when the
Municipality returned the land through the resolution dated 1987, the land
was automatically transferred to respondents.

ISSUE : Whether or not Trinidad validly sold the land to Mondejar.

HELD : The SC affirmed the CA decision. As a general rule, a donation is

perfected at the moment the donor is made aware of the acceptance of the
donee. In this case, the donation was already perfected. The SC also
emphasized that when a donor transfers property via donation subject to a
resolutory condition, the donor retains an inchoate right over the land. This

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Topic: Perfection of Donation Issue: Whether or not the donation was valid and perfected.

DolarvsLublub

Facts Ruling: Yes. The donation is presumed to be valid. The petitioner is not the
proper party to file the case due to the grounds that he had invoked. The
Petitioner and SerafinJaranilla are co-owners of a parcel of land in Brgy. proper party should have been Sanggunian of Barangay P.D. Monfort North.
Lublub, Dumangas, Iloilo. They donated the land to the said barangay with The respondent and the Sanggunian never opposed to the act of the
the following conditions: barangay captain. In fact, the barangay has been enjoying the donation.
Hence, the donation was deemed perfected.
A.) That the area donated shall be for the purpose of constructing building
and/or establishing public plaza, sports complex, public market, health
centers and the like for the use of the Barangay of Lublub which area shall
be hereinafter be known as DON VENANCIO DOLAR PLAZA and shall be so
designated in a proper landmark;

B.) That the construction and development of the area above-described shall
be initiated and completed within five (5) years from the execution of this
Deed of Donation and should the same be not made or completed then this
Deed of Donation shall have no force and effect whatsoever and the
ownership of the above-described property will revert back to the DONORS
including all or any unfinished improvement the DONEE might have placed or
constructed.

C.) That . . . should the use of the area be converted to uses other than
herein stipulated, then this DEED OF DONATION shall be deemed revoked
and the ownership shall revert back to the DONORS .

The barangay captain accepted it. The property became a site for
government office buildings and recreational facilities. The petitioner
executed another deed of donation with the same conditions. The barangay’s
peaceful possession of the area was undisturbed until the mother lots were
included for list of tax delinquent properties for disposition. The highest
bidder during the succeeding auction was the petitioner. The petitioner then
filed for an action to quiet the title due to the failure of the barangay to
comply to the conditions.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: Donation by Guardian or Trustee

Aranetavs Perez

Facts: Petitioner was appointed as a trustee due to the will of the late
Angela Tuason (the will is in Spanish). The beneficiaries are Benigno, Angela
and Antonio Perez y Tuason (Angela and Antonio are the respondents). The
petitioner executed a deed of donation in favor of the City of Manila,
covering the lots pertaining to the trusteeship. The donation was opposed by
the respondent.

Issue: Whether or not a deed of donation of a trustee is valid.

Ruling: Yes. Unfortunately, the law applicable is the old civil code. The
trustee was established before the old civil code took effect. Under the old
civil code, the donation is based on the liberality of the owner. The new civil
code protects the beneficiaries from the trustees, but the old civil code does
not. The principle of non-retroactivity also takes place in this case. Hence,
the donation of the trustee, IN THIS CASE, is valid.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Topic: Capacity of the Donee

Special Disqualification

a. CIVIL CODE

SSS vsDavac

Facts: The late PetroniloDavac, a former employee of Lianga Bay Logging

Co., Inc. became a member of the SSS. He designated the respondent
Candelaria as a beneficiary as his “wife.” Petronilo died, and each
respondents filed their claim for the death benefit. It was found out that
Petronilo had two marriages with respondents Lourdes (first) and Candelaria
(second). The processing was held in abeyance due to the conflicting claims.
The SSS then asked the respondents to litigate between themselves their
conflicting claims. The SSS then made a resolution that the death benefit
would be in favor of Candelaria.

Issue: Whether or not the death benefits awarded to Candelaria is valid.

Ruling: Yes. It is valid because Candelaria was not guilty of concubinage.

She was not even aware of the bigamous relationship. It does not matter
that the benefits are that of a donation or that similar to a life insurance
policy. Furthermore, the benefits do not form part of the conjugal property.
It is because the sources of the fund are from the employee’s contribution,
employer’s contribution and the Government contribution. This is a special
privilege under the law. The benefits are non-transferrable, and are not
subject to tax legal processes. If there is a named beneficiary and the
designation is not invalid (as it is not so in this case), it is not the heirs of the
employee who are entitled to receive the benefits. Therefore, it is valid.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: Donations of Movables is no accretion among donees unless expressly so provided. There being
neither valid donation nor sale, the cancellation of the original certificates of
Genatovs de Lorenzo stock as well as the issuance of new certificates in the name of Florentino
and Francisco was illegal and improper for lack of valid authority.

Facts: The Genato Commercial Corporation (petitioner) is a family

corporation, founded by the spouses Vicente Genato and Simona B. de
Genato. They had 6 children with Florentino and Francisco as petitioners,
and Felisa as respondent.

The majority of the members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of the

petitioner company had a meeting, and designated Florentino as Assistant
Secretary-Treasurer. Respondent was absent in the meeting. A deed of
donation of a bonus of one stock share of the Treasury stock (Php100 value)
was then executed in favor of Villamiel. The decision was unanimous.

Four or five days after, Florentino as Assistant Secretary-Treasurer cancelled

the share certificates in lieu thereof issued another share certificate to
respondents. The new share certificates were not presented as evidence, but
was merely mentioned. Simona died after liberation. An estate proceeding
was filed. The inventory did not include the shares of stock. Years later,
PhilTrust, the judicial administrator of the intestate estate filed a complaint
to recover the stocks that were not inventoried.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid donation.

Ruling: No. The act of Simona giving the certificate of shares to the
petitioners did not constitute a valid manual donation in law for lack of
proper acceptance. The delivery and acceptance must be simultaneous.
Since by appellants' own version, the donation intended was a joint one to
both donees, one could not accept independently of his co-donee, for there
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: Donation of Immovables
Gonzales v. CA
G.R. No. 110335. June 18, 2001
Facts: The subject properties in litigation are two parcels of agricultural
Land in Cabanatuan City containing of 46.97 hectares and 37.5735 hectares
respectively. The said parcels of land were originally owned by
spouses Marina and Ignacio Gonzales (now deceased). The
petitioners in the case at bar are the successors-in-interest or the children
and grandchildren of said Gonzales spouses while the private respondents
are the farmers and tenants of said spouses who have been cultivating the
parcels of land even before World War II either personally or through their
predecessors-in-interest.
On May 7, 1969, Marina Gonzales died intestate and appointed as
administratrix of her estate was petitioner Lilia Gonzales. Sunsequently, 3
years after, on July 12, 1972, Ignacio Gonzales executed a Deed of Donation
conveying his share of the property, specifically the 47 hectare lot, in favor
of his 14 grandchildren before the partition of the estate. It is important to
note however that the said donation was not registered.
By virtue of P.D. No. 27 which took effect on October 21, 1972 the said
landholdings of the spouses Gonzales were placed under Operation
Land Transfer and private respondents were accordingly issued the
corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer and Emancipation
Patents.
On March 5, 1974 the appointed administratrix, Lilia Gonzales filed an
application for retention with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform. This
said application was granted by the DAR secretary.
The said decision by the DAR secretary was however reversed and
set aside upon filing by the private respondents of a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals on March 15, 1993 upholding the certificates
of land transfer and emancipation patents.
Issue: Whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was not
registered when P.D. No. 27 took effect, should be excluded from the
Operation Land Transfer
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in order that
the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
public document, specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy."
Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the
titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which
are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of property shall
not prejudice third persons." From the foregoing provisions, it may
be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an
immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be
contained in a public document.
Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and
effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation
must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of
Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non-registration of a deed of
donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration
comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected, as in
the case at bar.
It is the main contention of the Petitioners that the deed of donation
executed by Ignacio Gonzales validly transferred the ownership and
possession of Lot 551-C which comprises an area of 46.97 hectares to his 14
grandchildren. They further assert that inasmuch as Lot 551-C had already
been donated, the same can no longer fall within the purview of P.D. No. 27,
since each donee shall have a share of about three hectares only which is
within the exemption limit of seven hectares for each landowner provided
under P.D. No. 27.
The unregistered deed of donation cannot operate to exclude the
subject land from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer of
P.D. No. 27, which took effect on October 21, 1972. To rule otherwise
would render ineffectual the rights and interests that the tenants-farmers
immediately acquired upon the promulgation of P.D. No. 27, especially so
because in the case at bar, they have been cultivating the land even before
World War II. Accordingly, the Certificates of Land Transfer and the
Emancipation Patents respectively issued to private respondents over the
land in question cannot be cancelled.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Petitioners contend that the deed of donation was not registered because of
the pendency of the intestate proceedings. The Supreme Court rules the
pendency of the intestate proceedings and the real estate mortgaged to the
PNB, do not preclude the registration annotation of the donation at the back
of the certificate of title covering the land.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
J.L.T. AGRO, INC. v. BALANSAG
G.R. No. 141882, March 11, 2005
FACTS:
Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena and had
two kids namely Josefa and Emilio. After her death, he married Milagros
Teves and they had four children namely: Maria Teves, Jose Teves, Milagros
Teves and Pedro Teves. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a
Compromise Agreement.
not valid, added that it contained a prohibited preterition of Don
Julian’s heirs from the second marriage.
ISSUE:
(A.) Was there preterition in the case?
(B) Whether or not the future legitimecan be determined, adjudicated and
reserved prior to the death of Don Julian
RULING:

When Antonia died an action for partition was instituted where the parties (A) None.
entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will. In the
the properties of Don Julian. On the basis of the compromise agreement, the
case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was
CFI declared a tract of land known as Hacienda MedallaMilagrosa as property
a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved
owned in common by Don Julian and his two children of the first marriage.
Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of
The property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian.
preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving
Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other properties at Bais, including the
a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the
electric plant, the “movie property,” the commercial areas, and the house
heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death.
where Don Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was retained
by Don Julian.

On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of
Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro,
Inc. (petitioner). Later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an
instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with
the Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental Deed) dated 31 July 1973.
This instrument transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other
properties, in favor of petitioner. The appellate court ruled that the
supplemental deed, conveying ownership to JLT agro is not valid
because the Compromise Agreement reserved the properties to Don
Julian’s two sets of heirs their future legitimes. The two sets of heirs
acquired full ownership and possession of the properties respectively
adjudicated to them and Don Julian himself could no longer dispose of the
same. The appellate court in holding that the Supplemental Deed is
(B) As a general rule, No.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not
outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The
exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritance, and the exception to the exception is partition inter vivos
referred to in Article 1080.
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid
pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally
operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the
second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise
agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to
the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the
EH405 SY 2016-2017
interest by its nature was inchoate. Evidently, at the time of the execution of
the supplemental deed in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner
of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his
heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death.

EH405 SY 2016-2017

Ortiz v. CA
G.R. No. L-7307 May 19, 1955
Facts: The subject property in this case originally belongs to Spouses
Bonifacio and Vicenta, subsequently, the said property was donated by
the spoused to herein petitioners, Ortiz their grandchildren. Note
that the said donation was made in a public document acknowledge before a
notary public. The said donors were likewise duly notified of donee’s
acceptance.
Alejandro Ortiz died without issue in Capas, Tarlac, as a prisoner of war,
during the last occupation by the Japanese.However, it appears that on
August 14, 1941, the donor spouses executed another notarial deed
of donation of the same property, in favor of Andres Basada, herein
respondent, nephew of the donor Vicenta de Guerra, subject to the condition
that the donee would serve and take care of the donors until their death.
This donation was also duly accepted by the donee in the same instrument
In 1947, the first donee (Ortiz) filed revindicatory action against the
second donee (Basada) alleging that in 1946, the latter entered and usurped
the land donated to and owned by them, and refused to vacate the same.
Basada claimed ownership of the land on the ground that the donation in
favor of the Ortizes had been revoked.
CFI Ruling
The Court of First Instance of Samar upheld Basada's claim
and dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the donees Ortiz had
abandoned the donors "to public mercy", with" most base ingratitude and
highly condemnable heartlessness"
CA Ruling
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter correctly
held that the donation in favor of appellants Ortiz had been duly
perfected in accordance with law, and it should "stand until after its
revocation should have been asked and granted in the proper proceedings,"
citing a decision by the Supreme Court in Ventura vs. Felix. It added that the
subsequent donation of the property to Basada" is not, certainly, the way a
prior donation should be revoked."
Issue: Whether or not both ownership and possession were vested to the
petitioners upon execution of the deed of donation in a public instrument
Ruling:From the time the public instrument of donation was
executed and acknowledged by donors and donees in 1940, the
latter acquired not only the ownership but also the possession of
the donated property, since the execution of a public instrument of the
conveyance is one of the recognized ways in which delivery (tradition) of
lands may be made (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1463; new Civil Code, Art.
1498), unless from the terms of the deed, the contrary is expressed or
inferable.
In the present case, the donation is on its face absolute and
unconditional, and nothing in its text authorizes us to conclude that
it was limited to the naked ownership of the land donated.
Considering that under the law, a donation of land by Public instrument is
required to express the charges that the donee must assume (old Civil Code,
Art. 633; new Civil Code, Art. 749), the absence in the deed of any express
reservation of usufruct in favor of the donors in proof that no such
reservation was ever intended.
The mere fact that the donors remain in the property after donating it is
susceptible of varied explanations and does not necessarily imply that
possession or usufruct was excluded from the donation. And the donees
Ortiz having been vested with ownership and attendant possession since
1940, it is clear that the subsequent donation of the property in favor of
respondent Basadaconfered on the latter no right whatever over the property
as against the former donees.
Wherefore, and without prejudice to any action of revocation that may
lawfully apertain to the donors, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and of
the Court of First Instance of Samar dismissing the complaint are hereby
reversed, and the respondent Andres Basada is sentenced to restore
possession to petitioners Cresencia and Pacita Ortiz. The records of the case
EH405 SY 2016-2017
are ordered remanded to the Court of origin for assessment of the damages
suffered by the petitioners. Cost against respondent Andres Basada.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Sumipat v.Banga
G.R. No. 155810. August 13, 2004
Facts: The subject property in the case at bar are three parcels of
land owned by Spouses Placida Tabo-Tabo and LauroSumipat who
are childless. LauroSumipat, however sired five illegitimate children out of an
extra-marital affair with PedraDacola namely, Lydia, Laurito, Alicia, Alejandro
and Lirafe all surnamed Sumipat.
Subsequently, on January 5, 1983, LauroSumipat executed a document
denominated "DEED OF ABSOLUTE TRANSFER AND/OR QUIT-
CLAIM OVER REALPROPERTIES" (the assailed document) in favor of
defendants-appellees covering the three parcels of land.
It appears however that on the purported date of execution of the said
document (Jan. 5, 1983), LauroSumipat was already very sick and
bedridden. That Lydia, one of Lauro’s children, upon her request, their
neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of LauroSumipat whereupon Lydia
guided LauroSumipat’s hand in affixing his signature on the assailed
document which she had brought.
Subsequently, Lydia was also able to obtain Placida’s signature, the same
was signed by Placida in haste, without knowing what it was all about.
After LauroSumipat’s death, his wife Placida and defendants-appellees jointly
administered the properties 50% of the produce of which went to plaintiff-
appellant. But as Placida’s share in the produce of the properties dwindled
until she no longer received any and learning that the titles to the properties
in question were already transferred/made in favor of the
defendants-appellees, she filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles,
contracts, partition, recovery of ownership now the subject of the present
appeal.
Trial Court’s Ruling:
The trial court found that the subject properties are conjugal. However,
because Placida failed to question the genuineness and due execution of the
deed and even admitted having affixed her signature thereon, the trial
court declared that the entirety of the subject properties, and not
just LauroSumipat’s conjugal share, were validly transferred to the
defendants, the petitioners herein.
CA’s Ruling:
The CA however reversed and set aside the ruling by the trial court .
The CA annulled the deed insofar as it covers Placida’s conjugal share in the
subject properties because the latter’s consent thereto was vitiated by
mistake when she affixed her signature on the document. The CA found
that:
 The appellate court held that since Placida was unlettered, the
appellees, the petitioners herein, as the parties interested in
enforcing the deed, have the burden of proving that the terms
thereof were fully explained to her. This they failed to do.
 The appellate court found that Placida did not understand the full
import of the deed because the terms thereof were not explained to
her either by the petitioners or by the notary public before whom the
deed was acknowledged. According to the appellate court, Judge
Pacifico Garcia (Judge Garcia), before whom the deed was
acknowledged, did not identify Placida as having appeared before
him on January 5, 1983 to acknowledge the deed.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the questioned deed by its terms or under the
surrounding circumstances has validly transferred title to the disputed
properties to the petitioners.
(2) Whether or not the questioned deed is subject to prescription.
Ruling:
(1) The deed covers three (3) parcels of land.[19] Being a donation of
immovable property, the requirements for validity set forth in Article 749 of
the Civil Code should have been followed, viz:
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it (2) Passage of time cannot cure the fatal flaw in an inexistent and
must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property void contract. The defect of inexistence of a contract is permanent
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. and incurable; hence, it cannot be cured either by ratification or by
prescription.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done Turning now to the effects of the absolute nullity of the deed, it is well-
during the lifetime of the donor. settled that when there is a showing of illegality, the property registered is
deemed to be simply held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be name it is registered, and the former then has the right to sue for the
notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both reconveyance of the property. The action for the purpose is also
instruments. imprescriptible. As long as the land wrongfully registered under the
Torrens system is still in the name of the person who caused such
Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the registration, an action in personam will lie to compel him to
donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been reconvey the property to the real owner.
accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof.
The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of
donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must
be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a
separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the
deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and
void.

In this case, the donees acceptance of the donation is not

manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate document.
Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void.

We also note the absence of any proof of filing of the necessary return,
payment of donors taxes on the transfer, or exemption from payment
thereof. Under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, the tax code in
force at the time of the execution of the deed, an individual who makes any
transfer by gift shall make a return and file the same within 30 days after the
date the gift is made with the Revenue District Officer, Collection Agent or
duly authorized Treasurer of the municipality in which the donor was
domiciled at the time of the transfer.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
Arangote vs. Sps. Maglunob
G.R. 178906. February 18, 2009
FACTS: Elvira Arangote acquired the subject parcel of land from Esperanza
Maglunob, who is grand aunt of respondents Martin Maglunob and Romeo
Salido. In June 1986, Esperenza executed an affidavit in which she
renounced her rights, share and participation in the land in favor of Elvira
and her husband. It appears that the lot was not exclusive property of
Esperanza but also of the other heirs of Martin I whom she represented in
the partition agreement. Elvira and her husband, Ray constructed a house on
the land in 1989 and in 1993, OCT was issued in her name by the DAR.
However, respondents with the help of hired persons entered the property
and built a wall behind and in front of Elvira’s house. Elvira and Ray sued
respondents for quieting of title and declaration of ownership. Respondents
averred that they were co-owners of the land with Esperanza who allegedly
inherited the land from Martin 1 together with Tomas and Inocencia (Martin
2’s and Romeo’s predecessor in interest). They argued that Esperanza could
not have validly waived her rights in favor of Elvira and Ray. MCTC ruled for
Elvira. RTC reversed MCTC and declared respondents lawful owners of the
land together with the other heirs of Martin I. Elvira went to the CA but the
CA affirmed the RTC decision. Before SC, Elvira argued that both RTC and CA
erred in declaring the affidavit of Esperanza void because it is a valid and
binding proof of transfer of ownership of the subject property as it was
coupled with actual delivery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to Elvira and her husband is valid.
RULING:Supreme Court affirmed the decision of CA. SC ruled that
the affidavit executed by Esperanza wherein she renounced,
relinquished and waived all her rights, share, interest and
participation in the subject property in favor of Elvira and Ray is in
fact a donation.
It is clear from the records that the subject property was not Esperanza’s
exclusive share, but also that of the other heirs of her father, Martin I.
Esperanza expressly affixed her thumbmark to the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of July 1981 not only for herself, but also on behalf of the other
heirs of Martin I. Though in the Partition Agreement dated 29 April 1985
Esperanza affixed her thumbmark without stating that she was doing so not
only for herself, but also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, this does
not mean that Esperanza was already the exclusive owner thereof. The
evidence shows that the subject property is the share of the heirs of Martin
I. This is clear from the sketch attached to the Partition Agreement dated 29
April 1985, which reveals the proportionate areas given to the heirs of the
two siblings, Pantaleon and Placida, who were the original owners of the
whole parcel of land from which the subject property was taken.
Further, it bears emphasis that the Partition Agreement was executed by and
among the son, grandsons, granddaughters and cousins of Victorino.
Esperanza was neither the granddaughter nor the cousin of Victorino, as she
was only Victorino’s grandniece. The cousin of Victorino is Martin I,
Esperanza’s father. In effect, therefore, the subject property allotted to
Esperanza in the Partition Agreement was not her exclusive share, as she
holds the same for and on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, who was
already deceased at the time the Partition Agreement was made.
To further bolster the truth that the subject property was not exclusively
owned by Esperanza, the Affidavit she executed in favor of petitioner and
her husband on 6 June 1985 was worded as follows:
That I hereby renounce, relinquish, waive and quitclaim all my rights, share,
interest and participation whatsoever in the [subject property] unto the said
Sps. Ray Mars Arangote and Elvira T. Arangote, their heirs, successors, and
assigns including the improvement found thereon;
Logically, if Esperanza fully owned the subject property, she would have
simply waived her rights to and interest in the subject property, without
mentioning her "share" and "participation" in the same. By including such
words in her Affidavit, Esperanza was aware of and was limiting her waiver,
renunciation, and quitclaim to her one-third share and participation in the
subject property.
Going to the issues raised by the petitioner in this Petition, this Court will
resolve the same concurrently as they are interrelated.
EH405 SY 2016-2017

In this case, the petitioner derived her title to the subject property from the
notarized Affidavit executed by Esperanza, wherein the latter relinquished
her rights, share, interest and participation over the same in favor of the
petitioner and her husband.
A careful perusal of the said Affidavit reveals that it is not what it purports to
be. Esperanza’s Affidavit is, in fact, a Donation. Esperanza’s real intent in
executing the said Affidavit was to donate her share in the subject property
to petitioner and her husband.
As no onerous undertaking is required of petitioner and her husband under
the said Affidavit, the donation is regarded as a pure donation of an interest
in a real property covered by Article 749 of the Civil Code. Article 749 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must
be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and
the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate
public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the
lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be
notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments.
From the aforesaid provision, there are three requisites for the validity of a
simple donation of a real property, to wit: (1) it must be made in a public
instrument; (2) it must be accepted, which acceptance may be made either
in the same Deed of Donation or in a separate public instrument; and (3) if
the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor must be notified
in an authentic form, and the same must be noted in both instruments.
This Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the Affidavit
executed by Esperanza relinquishing her rights, share, interest and
participation over the subject property in favor of the petitioner and her
husband suffered from legal infirmities, as it failed to comply with the
aforesaid requisites of the law.
In Sumipat v. Banga, this Court declared that title to immovable property
does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a Deed of Donation
until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor
duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same
instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same
document, it must be made in another. Where the Deed of Donation fails to
show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in
a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in
the Deed of Donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null
and void.
In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is tantamount to a Deed of
Donation, met the first requisite, as it was notarized; thus, it became a public
instrument. Nevertheless, it failed to meet the aforesaid second and third
requisites. The acceptance of the said donation was not made by the
petitioner and her husband either in the same Affidavit or in a separate
public instrument. As there was no acceptance made of the said donation,
there was also no notice of the said acceptance given to the donor,
Esperanza. Therefore, the Affidavit executed by Esperanza in favor of
petitioner and her husband is null and void.
The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance dated 23 September 2000, as
well as the notice of such acceptance, executed by the petitioner did not
cure the defect. Moreover, it was only made by the petitioner several years
after the Complaint was filed in court, or when the RTC had already rendered
its Decision dated 12 September 2000, although it was still during
Esperanza’s lifetime. Evidently, its execution was a mere afterthought, a
belated attempt to cure what was a defective donation.
It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during
the lifetime of the donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance may
still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for proof that a
formal notice of such acceptance was received by the donor and noted in
EH405 SY 2016-2017
both the Deed of Donation and the separate instrument embodying the
acceptance. At the very least, this last legal requisite of annotation in both
instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by the petitioner.
Neither the Affidavit nor the Deed of Acceptance bears the fact that
Esperanza received notice of the acceptance of the donation by petitioner.
For this reason, even Esperanza’s one-third share in the subject property
cannot be adjudicated to the petitioner.

With the foregoing, this Court holds that the RTC and the Court of
Appeals did not err in declaring null and void Esperanza’s Affidavit.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: Periof to Fulfill COndition donor. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If
there was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition, such as what
obtains in the instant case, the donation may now be revoked and all rights
which the done may have acquired under it shall be deemed lost and
Central Philippine University vs CA
extinguished.
FACTS:

A deed of donation involving a parcel of land was executed by Don Ramon

It has been fifty years, unfortunately, CPU still failed to comply with its
Sr., member of the board, in favor of CPU conditioned that:
obligation. It is but just and equitable now to revoke CPU as done and
1) The land shall be for the exclusive use of CPU and a medical college should return the donated property to the heirs of the donor.
shall be established
2) Land shall be called “RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS” and they shall erect
cornerstones bearing that name;
3) The net income from the land shall be put in the RAMON LOPEZ OTHER PRINCIPLES:
CAMPUS FUND.
A donation is considered onerous when executed for a valuable
consideration which is considered the equivalent of the donation.
After fifty years, no medical college building was established.
In the case at bar, the donation of the land was subject to a condition to
ISSUE: establish a medical college therein, thus, the donation must be for an
onerous consideration.
Whether or not the donation is revocable because of the alleged resolutory
breach. In case of gratuitous donation, doubts should be resolved in favor
of the least transmission of rights.
RULING:

YES.

A donation may be revoked for non-fulfillment or non-compliance

of the conditions set forth.

When a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter
would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed was not a
condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one. It is not
correct to say that the schoolhouse had to be constructed before the
donation became effective, that is, before the donee could become the
owner of the land, otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: REMEDY OF DONOR
Dolar vs Brgy. Lublub et al.
FACTS:
Petitioner and Serafin Jaranilla were co-owners of a parcel of land with an
area of 4.6 hectares, identified as Lot No. 1, Pcs-06-000744 (Lot No. 1, for
brevity), situated in Brgy. Lublub, Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo. Said
property forms part of Lots No. 4181 and 4183 of the Dumangas Cadastre,
On September 16, 1981, petitioner and Jaranilla donated Lot No. 1 to
respondent Barangay Lublub, subject to the following conditions:
(A) That the area donated shall be for the purpose of con[s]tructing
building and/or establishing public plaza, sports complex, public
market, health centers and the like for the use of the Barangay of
Lublub . . . which area shall be hereinafter be known as DON
VENANCIO DOLAR PLAZA and shall be so designated in a proper
landmark;
(B) That the construction and development of the area above-described
shall be initiated and completed within five (5) years from the
execution of this Deed of Donation and should the same be not
made or completed then this Deed of Donation shall have no force
and effect whatsoever and the ownership of the above-described
property will revert back to the DONORS including all or any
unfinished improvement the DONEE might have placed or
constructed.
(C) That . . . should the use of the area be converted to uses other
thanherein stipulated, then this DEED OF DONATION shall be
deemed revoked and the ownership shall revert back to the DONORS
. . . (Underscoring added).
Then barangay captain Jose Militar accepted the donation in behalf of Brgy.
Lublub. Respondent barangay however failed to have the donation registered
under its name while petitioner acquired TCT covering the donated area.
Sometime in June 1989, petitioner executed another deed donating to
Brgy.Lublub, represented by its incumbent barangay captain, the very same
area he and Serafin Jaranilla had earlier donated to the same donee. The
second deed of donation contained exactly the same conditions expressly set
forth in the first. On May 6, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Iloilo
City, petitioner filed against Brgy. Lublub a complaint for Quieting of Title
and Recovery of Possession With Damages involving the 4.6-hectare area he
had earlier donated. Basically, petitioner claimed that the donation in
question had ceased to be effective, the donee barangay having failed to
comply with the conditions of the donation.
Trial court, on the finding that petitioner's action was already barred by
extinctive prescription under Article 764, 11 in relation to Articles 733 12 and
1144 (1) 13 of the Civil Code, granted the Barangay's motion to dismiss in
Civil Case No. 98-033 and denied petitioner's similar motion in Civil Case No.
00-140. The action to revoke donation was to have been filed within ten (10)
years from the time the action accrued, i.e., from the time of the non-
compliance of the conditions.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the acceptance of the donation is defective making it
invalid.
2) Whether or not the deed of donation in question is no longer
effective by reason of the automatic reversion clause therein.
3) Whether or not the action to quiet title has prescribed.
4) Whether or not the donation was invalid because it was not
registered in the Registry of Property
RULING:
(1) The Supreme Court held that the donation being valid and effective,
virtually forecloses any claim which petitioner may have over the
donated property against the donee and other occupants thereof, and
his action to quiet title has no merit. Militar was clothed with authority to
accept the donation for respondent barangay. On this point, petitioner
cites Section 88 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 [16] - the law then in force
- and Sections 91 and 389 the Local Government Code of 1991. In gist,
these provisions empower the punongbarangay to enter into contracts
for the barangay upon authorization of the Sangguniang Barangay, or, in
the alternative, theSanggunian may authorize the barangay head to
enter into contracts for the barangay. Moreover, from the allegations of
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 all the parties, it would appear that, through the years, the Sanggunian (3) Lest it be overlooked, the rule on the imprescriptibility of actions to quiet
of Lublub as well as all the succeeding Sangunians of P.D. Monfort North title admits of exceptions. The trial court correctly mentioned one,
neither repudiated the acceptance of the donation by Militar nor acted in referring to a situation where the plaintiff in an action to quiet title is not
a manner reflective of their opposition to the donation. On the contrary, in actual possession of the land. In the case at bench, petitioner is not in
the respondent barangay has been enjoying the material and public- possession of the property.
service benefits arising from the infrastructures projects put up on the
It may be recalled, respondent barangay had, under the terms of the
subject property. In a very real sense, therefore, the Sangguniang
deed of donation, five (5) years from the execution of the conveying
Barangay and the good people of P.D. Monfort North, by availing
deed in September 1981, or up September 1986, within which to
themselves of such benefits for more than two decades now, effectively
introduce and complete the contemplated development of the donated
ratified Militar's acceptance of the donation.
area. Following Article 764 of the Civil Code, petitioner had four (4) years
(2) If the corresponding contract of donation expressly provides for
from September 1986, or up to September 1990, within which to seek
automatic rescission and/or reversion in case of breach of the condition
the revocation of the subject donation on the ground of breach of
therein, and the donee violates or fails to comply with the condition, the
contract. The Court can grant that the prescription of actions for the
donated property reverts back automatically to the donor. Such
revocation of onerous donations, as here, are governed by the general
provision, De Luna teaches, is in the nature of an agreement granting a
rules on prescription, which, in context, is Article 1144 of the Civil Code
party the right to rescind a contract in case of breach, without need of
providing that actions upon a written contract shall be brought within ten
going to court and that upon the happening of the resolutory condition
(10) years from accrual of the right of action. Ten years from September
or non- compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is
1986 — the date when petitioner's right to revoke accrued — would be
automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that
September 1996. Here, however, what partakes as petitioner's suit to
effect. Where, however, the donee denies, as here, the rescission or
revoke was filed only in May 1998. In all, petitioner's right of action to
challenges the propriety thereof, then only the final award of the court
revoke or cancel the donation had indeed prescribed, regardless of
can, to borrow from University ofthe Philippines vs.de los Angeles,
whether the applicable legal provision is Article 764 or the favorable
"conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper or not."
Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
When a deed of donation expressly provides for automatic revocation
and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the
general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the
Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a
contract to establish such stipulations, . . . not contrary to law, . . .
public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least,
that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the
deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid
subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought.
Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be
merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory
act. In the case at bench, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent
barangay denied or challenged the purported revocation of the donation.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 It should be stated in this regard, however, that respondent barangay
had disputed the existence of the grounds upon which petitioner
anchored his right to revoke, claiming it had already complied with the
construction and development conditions of the donation. From the
records, it would appear that respondent barangay's boast of compliance
is not an empty one. As we see it, the establishment on the donated
area of telephone service, a water service, a police mobile force, and a
courtroom, all for the benefits of the barangay residents, substantially
satisfies the terms and conditions of the subject donation. The concrete
paving of roads and the construction of government offices, sports
complex for public enjoyment and like infrastructures which, per
respondent barangay's estimate, cost not less than P25 Million, add
persuasive dimension to the conclusion just made. Petitioner's long
silence vis-Ã -vis the kind of development structures that Barangay
Lublub had decided to put up or allowed to be established on the subject
area cannot but be taken as an indicia of his satisfaction with respondent
barangay's choice of public service projects. The prolonged silence was
broken only after the provincial and municipal governments advertised,
then sold the property in a public auction to satisfy questionable tax
liabilities.
(4) As between the parties to the donation and their assigns, the registration
of the deed of donation with the Registry of Deeds is not needed for its
validity and efficacy. In Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court the
Court emphatically dismissed the notion that registration was necessary
to make the donation a binding commitment insofar as the donor and
the donee were concerned.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: REVOCATION BY REASON OF INGRATITUDE OF THE DONEE
Noceda vs CA
FACTS:
Aurora Directo (donor) donated a parcel of land to Rodolfo Noceda
(donee), who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister.
Sometime in 1981, donee constructed a house on the land donated to him.
Donor fenced the portion pertaining to her, excluding the donated lot.
However, in 1985, donee removed the fence earlier constructed by the donor
and fenced the entire lot without the donor’s consent. Donor demanded from
donee to vacate her land, but the latter refused.
Hence, donor filed a complaint for recovery of possession and rescission of
donation, on the ground of ingratitude.
ISSUE:
1) Whether the donation may be revoked.
2) Whether the action has prescribed.
RULING:
(1) Yes. Donee’s act of occupying the portion pertaining to the donor
without the latter’s knowledge is an act of usurpation which is an offense
against the property of the donor, and considered as an act of
ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require
conviction of the donee, it is enough that the offense be proved in action
for revocation.
(2) No. The action to revoke a donation by reason of ingratitude prescribes
within one year from: (1) the time the donor had knowledge of the fact
and, (2) it was possible for him to bring the action. The concurrence of
these two requisites must be shown by the donee in order to bar the
present action. Donee failed to do so. He reckoned the 1 year
prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation of the property
and not from the time the donor had knowledge of the usurpation.
Moreover, donee failed to prove that at the time the donor acquired
knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for the donor to institute an
action for revocation. Basic is the rule that he who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: PRESCRIPTION- ACQUISITIVE
ESGUERRA vs MANANTAN
FACTS:
- This case stemmed from the complaint for ejectment filed by petitioner
Franco Esguerra against respondents before the RTC.
- On April 14, 1992, Franco filed his application for free patent of the
subject property. On May 20, 1992, Free Patent No. 034914-92-1117
was issued in his name.
- The Register of Deeds of the Province of Nueva Ecija issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-15176 in Franco’s name.
- Thereafter, Franco demanded that respondents vacate the premises, but
they refused to do so. He then filed a complaint for ejectment against
them before the RTC
- Pending the ejectment case, respondents filed a case for annulment of
OCT No. P-15176
The RTC dismissed the complaint for ejectment and declared null and void
OCT No. P-15176.
Franco appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied the
appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.
- The respondents had acquired title over the same for having been in
actual adverse possession of the subject property for 30 years.
- On the issue of redemption, the appellate court held that under
Article 16067 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Pio’s right to
redeem the property had already prescribed.
[FRANCO ESGUERRA]Petitioner’s Contentions:
 he is the registered owner of a parcel of land surveyed as Lot No.
661 situated inBarangaySan Cristobal, Licab, Nueva Ecija
 That he inherited it from his father, Pio Esguerra, who had inherited
it from his father, Lorenzo Esguerra.Pio allowed Gaudencio Miguel 4
to occupy his property and later mortgaged the land to Gaudencio as
evidenced by a document entitled "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" dated June 6, 1960.
 In 1979, Gaudencio executed an instrument denominated as
Kasunduan to cancel said deed of sale with the right to repurchase.
 Before the repurchase of the property, respondents Alfonso
Manantan, Danilo Manantan, Ariang Antonio, Aquilino Concepcion
and Fortunato Miguel constructed their houses on the lot without the
knowledge and consent of Pio.
 That respondents occupied the subject property by mere tolerance
of Gaudencio even without the permission of Pio.
 He also avers that since respondents’ possession has not been open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious for 30 years, they have not
acquired the property through prescription. According to him, the
subject property was already redeemed on December 24, 1978 as
evidenced by theKasunduan executed by Gaudencio in 1979.
 He contends that respondents’ action to annul the title on the
ground of fraud has prescribed since they filed it two years after the
issuance of title.
 He avers that the action should have been filed within one year after
the date of the issuance of the decree of registration.
 He further claims that the respondents have no personality to
question his title because only the State has the right to do so.
[ALFONSO & DANILO MANANTAN] Respondent’s Contentions:
 Maintains that they had established their open and continuous
possession of the subject property for 30 years and that they had
been paying the real estate taxes of the property.
 That Franco neither possessed nor improved the subject property
and even admitted that respondents possessed the property.
 They maintain that their action for annulment of title has not
prescribed since what they actually filed was an action for
reconveyance which prescribes after ten years from registration of
title.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
ISSUE:
Who has a better right over the contested property?
RULING:
It was established that the subject land is private property since time
immemorial. Records reveal that the property was cultivated as riceland and
was first declared for tax purposes under the name of Graciano Agustin. On
June 6, 1960, Pio exercised acts of ownership over the land by entering into
a notarized contract of sale with the right to repurchase with Gaudencio. He
declared in the contract that he had inherited the land from his father and
had been in possession of the property for 27 years.
In the Kasunduan executed on April 25, 1979, Gaudencio acknowledged that
Pio owned the land. Pio further disposed of the property in his last will and
testament in favor of his heirs which include petitioner. Although the will is
void for not complying with the formal requisites of a notarial will, it may be
used to show the exclusive and adverse character of petitioner’s possession
as a co-heir and co-owner.16 It also appears that respondents occupied the
property on permission of Gaudencio. While petitioner did not actually reside
and cultivate the land, Gaudencio had agreed to pay buwis or rentals for the
houses built thereon by Fortunato Miguel and Alfonso Manantan. 17Aquilino
Concepcion also agreed to pay the rent. 18 Clearly, the evidence on record
shows that the property belonged to Pio and upon his death, passed on to
his heirs.
Gaudencio still recognized Pio as the owner of the property and stated in a
notarized document that the property was mortgaged to him (" naisanla sa
akin") and that he received Pio’s payment of the debt, the same amount
under the purported contract of sale. 22Notably, both documents are
considered public documents and enjoy the presumption of validity as to its
authenticity and due execution. This legal presumption was not overcome by
respondents.23 Other than the objection that the property subject of the
documents is public land, no other proof was presented. Thus, the
presumption of validity of these documents prevails.
The appellate court erred in ruling that respondents had acquired the
property through prescription. As borne by the testimonies of Alfonso
Manantan,24 Fortunato Miguel,25 and Danilo Manantan,26 they occupied the
property, not as owners but upon permission of Gaudencio. As already
established, Gaudencio did not have open, continuous and adverse
possession of the property. Moreover, on November 13, 1979, petitioner and
Gaudencio agreed that the latter shall pay rent on the land where the houses
of Fortunato and Alfonso were built. Thereafter, Aquilino Concepcion and a
certain Pedro Antonio also agreed to pay rent. These circumstances belie
respondents’ claim of acquisitive prescription.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor
through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership,
possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted. Thus, mere possession with a juridical title, such as by a
usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee, an agent or a pledgee, not being in the
concept of an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription,
unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation
has been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory character
executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner would likewise be
inadequate. Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right,
must be en concepto de dueño, or, to use the common law equivalent of the
term, that possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no
matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription. 27
Clearly, respondents, when they agreed to pay rent, became mere lessees
and their possession cannot ripen into ownership. They also did not present
proof of ownership. The tax receipts offered in evidence merely showed that
they paid the taxes due only after petitioner filed a complaint against them.
Such payment without adverse possession does not prove ownership.
However, while this Court declares that Lot No. 661 is a private property and
not part of the public domain, the petitioner’s title as co-owner of the said lot
is imperfect and still subject to the rules on confirmation of title under
Section 48 (b)28 of the Public Land Act. 29 As an applicant for confirmation of
title, petitioner has the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
the law.30
Petitioner Franco Esguerra is declared a co-owner and holder of imperfect
title over Lot No. 661.Free Patent No. 034914-92-1117 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-15176, both in the name of Franco Esguerra are
declared null and void.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: ESSENCE  Testified that he was working in Lot No. 1243 since 1942 or
1943 first as a tenant of Socorro Reyes and thereafter of
BAUTISA vs POBLETE petitioner Celia Poblete.

FACTS:

RESPONDENTS, successors-in-interest of Socorro Reyes vda. de Poblete

(Socorro) [Daughter of Marcelo Sr. from his second Marriage], filed for a
petition to have LOT NO. 1243 under their name since they already sold it to
Winthrop Corporation for P20 million, of which P3 million has been paid, and
the balance to be paid upon registration of the land.

This was opposed by PETITIONERS, Children of Marcelo Sr. from a third

Marriage.

Respondents Contentions:

 That Lot 1243 was donated by Marcelo Reyes Sr. (Marcelo Sr.) to
Socorro, his daughter by a second marriage;
 That the cadastral survey of Lot 1243 had been undertaken primarily for
and in the name of Socorro;
 That they purchased the same land from their parents Socorro and Juan
Poblete; and
 That they and their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, peaceful and notorious possession of the subject lot in the
concept of owner for more than 50 years.
 Presented 3 WITNESSES:
o SOCORRO REYES VDA. DE POBLETE:
 That Lot No. 1243 was given to her by her father, Marcelo
Reyes, Sr. in 1932, by way of a deed of donation which was
destroyed when her house was burned.
 She had Lot No. 1243 planted to sugar cane and palay, and
had the same surveyed by the Bureau of Lands in her name.
 She also had it tax declared in her name and had been
paying the taxes thereon until she sold it to her children, the
petitioners herein.
 She did not have the land registered at once because she
thought that it first had to be tax declared.
o PANTALEON GARCIA ANCERO:

EH405 SY 2016-2017

o CELIA POBLETE:
 She and her sisters bought Lot No. 1243 for P39,000.00
from her mother, who acquired it more than fifty years
before from her father Marcelo Reyes, Sr.
 She brought the deed of sale to the Provincial Capitol
and had the tax declaration transferred to her and her
and her sister’s names, and they have been paying the
real estate tax since then.
 Their mother and they have been in possession of the
property for 60 years already.
 The oppositors are half brothers and sisters of her
mother, and they had good relations before.
 The oppositors knew about the exclusive possession of
Lot No. 1243 by their mother, because they lived only
some 150 meters away and saw their mother
harvesting the fruits of the land. They sometimes even
asked her for some of the harvest of the land but they
never made a claim on it.
Petitioners Contentions:
 That Lot 1243 had been acquired by the deceased Marcelo Reyes,
Sr. by purchase from a certain Juan Aranda. Hence, said lot should
be awarded to them as their fathers lawful heirs.
 Petitioners insist that Socorro expressly and impliedly recognized
their rights as her co-heirs when she was entrusted with the
management of the land in 1934;
o that the harvest had always been divided among the heirs,
with petitioner Dominador Sino representing the others in
getting their respective shares;
o that there was a demand for partition but it did not push
through because the land was tenanted.
RTC:
No Deed of Donation = Dismissed
CA:
 Considered private respondent’s contention that even if the donation
may have been invalid, the same could still serve as basis for
acquisitive prescription.
 Ordered the issuance of a decree of registration over Lot 1243 in
favor of private respondents.
RULING:
The appellate court, upon meticulous review of the records, found that
private respondents possession of Lot 1243 since 1934 was adverse,
continuous, open, public, peaceful and uninterrupted, and in the concept of
an owner. This case was filed only in 1991. All this time, Socorro was
exercising acts of dominion over the land such as enjoying its fruits to the
exclusion of all others, having the land cadastrally surveyed in her name and
faithfully paying realty taxes on Lot 1243 in her name. Assuming but not
conceding that there existed an implied trust between the parties, Socorros
aforementioned acts of dominion clearly repudiated such trust.
It is the essence of the statute of limitations that, whether the party had the
right to the possession or not, if he entered under the claim of such right
and remained in possession for the period required for acquisitive
prescription, the right of action of a party claiming title is barred by that
adverse possession. The right given by the statute of limitations does not
depend on and has no necessary connection to the validity of the claim
under which the possession is held.
It is a settled rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding
upon this Court if borne out by the evidence on record. Socorro obtained
possession of the land even before Marcelo Sr. died. After his death, Socorro
continued to enjoy exclusive possession of the land with no objection from
petitioners. The land was cadastrally surveyed and tax-declared in her name,
again with no protestation from petitioners. It was only when Lot 1243 was
sold for P20.7 million that petitioners suddenly fantasized about being co-
owners thereof and wanted to share in the bonanza.
Petitioners failed to present proof of their claim. There was no evidence
showing that Socorro managed Lot 1243 on behalf of Marcelo Sr.s heirs,
including petitioners. The fact that petitioner Dominador Sino allegedly got a
share of the harvest twice did not disprove at all that the entire harvest
belonged to Socorro. At most, these two occasions only proved Socorros
generosity to him, considering that he was an illegitimate child and received
almost nothing by way of inheritance.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
We find no reversible error in the appellate court’s decision. Thus, we
declare that no co-ownership existed between petitioners and respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: RATIONALE
MULTI-REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vsTHE MAKATI
TUSCANYCONDOMINIUM CORPORATION
FACTS:
Multi-Realty is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business,
and the construction and development of condominiums. It developed,
among others, the Ritz Towers Condominium, and the former Galeria de
Magallanes, both built in the Municipality (now city) of Makati. ON the other
hand, Pursuant to Republic Act No. 4726, otherwise known as the
Condominium Act, the Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation
(MATUSCO) was organized and established to manage the condominium
units. It appears that a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions
pertaining to the building was executed.
The dispute arose when the parties came into a conflict in relation to the
designated and unassigned parking lots inside the building.
Multi-Realty alleged therein that it had retained ownership of the 98
unassigned parking slots. Considering, however, that Makati Tuscany was
one of its first condominium projects in the Philippines, this was not specified
in Section 7(d) of the Master Deed since the documentation and the terms
and conditions therein were all of first impression. It was further alleged that
the mistake was discovered for the first time when MATUSCO rejected its
request to allow its (Multi-Realtys) executives to park their cars in two of the
unassigned parking lots.
In its Answer with counterclaim, MATUSCO alleged that Multi-Realty had no
cause of action against it for reformation of their contract. By its own
admission, Multi-Realty sold various parking slots to third parties despite its
knowledge that the parking areas, other than those mentioned in Sec. 5 of
the Master Deed, belonged to MATUSCO.
The RTC dismissed the petition considering that Multi-Realty failed to prove
any ground for the reformation of its agreement with MATUSCO relative to
the ownership of the common areas. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal on the ground of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioners appeal on the ground of
prescription?
RULING:
Given the factual backdrop of the case, it was inappropriate for the CA, motu
proprio,to delve into and resolve the issue of whether petitioners action had
already prescribed. The appellate court should have proceeded to resolve
petitioners appeal on its merits instead of dismissing the same on a ground
not raised by the parties in the RTC and even in their pleadings in the CA.
Even if the court would sustain the ruling of the CA that it acted in
accordance with the Rules of Court in considering prescription in denying
petitioners appeal, the Court found and so rule that it erred in holding that
petitioners action had already prescribed when it was filed in the RTC on
April 26, 1990.
Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose object is to
suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of
time and surprising the parties or their representatives when the facts have
become obscure from the lapse of time or the defective memory or death or
removal of witnesses. The essence of the statute of limitations is to prevent
fraudulent claims arising from unwarranted length of time and not to defeat
actions asserted on the honest belief that they were sufficiently submitted
for judicial determination. Our laws do not favor property rights hanging in
the air, uncertain, over a long span of time.
Article 1144 of the New Civil Code provides that an action upon a written
contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of
action accrues:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
In relation thereto, Article 1150 of the New Civil Code provides that the time
for prescription of all actions, when there is no special provision which
ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. It is
the legal possibility of bringing the action that determines the starting point
for the computation of the period of prescription.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 JOSE C. CRISTOBAL vs ALEJANDRO MELCHOR and FEDERICO
ARCALA
FACTS:
The present case stemmed from a complaint for declaratory relief and
reinstatement filed by appellant. It appears that he, along with others, were
part of the number of workers terminated from the Office of The President.
Aggrieved, some of the employees filed a civil case, others were reinstated,
and those remaining were given the assurance that they will be given
placements in certain offices. The herein plaintiff was one of those who had
not been fortunate enough to be reappointed to any positions as befits his
qualifications. While the civil case was still pending, appellant was given an
assurance by the Secretary Mutuc of the Office of the President that he will
be given a position and reinstated. The former then relied on the promise
and did not do any subsequent action. Unfortunately, when the appellant
wrote a letter requesting for reinstatement on the strength of the decision
pertaining to the civil case, it was dismissed for his alleged failure to act
within one year.
The defendants represented by the Office of the Solicitor General alleged
that plaintiff Jose Cristobal had no cause of action as he is deemed to have
abandoned his office for failure to institute the proper proceedings to assert
his right within one year from the date of separation pursuant to Sec. 16,
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, he having come to court only after the lapse
of more than nine years, thereby in effect acquiescing to his separation, and
therefore he is not entitled to any salary from termination of his emploment.
The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE:
Is the principle of laches or non-compliance with the "Statute of Limitations"
applicable against appellant?
RULING:
The doctrine of laches is an equitable principle applied to promote but never
to defeat justice. Thus, where laches is invoked against a plaintiff by reason
of the latter's failure to come to court within the statutory period provided in
the law, the doctrine of laches will not be taken against him where the
defendant is shown to have promised from time to time to grant the relief
sought for. Where a defendant or those claiming under him recognized or
directly or impliedly acknowledged existence of the right asserted by a
plaintiff, such recognition may be invoked as a valid excuse for a plaintiff's
delay in seeking to enforce such right. In brief, it is indeed the better rule
that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly
by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest
wrong and injustice would result.
The evidence of Cristobal establish the following: After the Ingles suit was
filed in court, the dismissed employees, Cristobal included, continued to seek
reconsideration of their dismissal. It was then that Executive Secretary Mutuc
assured the employees that without prejudice to the continuation of the civil
action, he would work for their reinstatement
In the meantime, however, Secretary Mutuc was replaced by other Executive
Secretaries to whom Cristobal over and over again presented his request for
reinstatement and who gave the same assurance that Cristobal would be
recalled and re-employed at "the opportune time.
Surely, it would now be the height of inequity and cutting a deep wound in
Our sense of justice, if after Cristobal relied and reposed his faith and trust
on the word and promises of the former Executive Secretaries who dealt with
him and who preceded the herein respondent Executive Secretary Melchor,
We are to hold that he lost his right to seek relief because of lapse of time.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 VIOLETA ALDOVINO, et. Al vs SECRETARY RAFAEL ALUNAN III
FACTS:
The petitioners herein were affected by reorganizing of Ministry of Tourism
as provided in Section 29 of Executive Order No. 120 which took effect on
January 30,1987. These EO provides that incumbents whose positions are
not included in the new position structure and staffing pattern or who are
not reappointed are deemed separated from the service. Pursuant to this,
the Department of Tourism (DOT, formerly the Ministry of Tourism) issued
various office orders and memoranda declaring all positions thereat vacant.
To that effect, it lead to the separation of many of its employees including
the petitioners. It can be noted that The court had previously decided similar
cases of Mandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo. The petitioners and intervenors
claimed that they should not be deprived of the relief granted to their former
co-employees when they prayed for reinstatement without the loss of
seniority rights. Furthermore, they claimed for back salaries will be computed
under the new staffing pattern from dates of their invalid termination at
rates not lower than their former salaries.
For the respondents’ part, they argued that the petitioners filed this petition
and the interventions only in October 1991, and February, March, May and
July 1992, or more than four (4) years later, hence, they are barred by
prescription for allegedly sleeping on their rights.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners’ action should be dismissed because of prescription?
RULING:
What public respondents brought up was the doctrine of laches, not
prescription; and laches is different from prescription. The defense of laches
applies independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with
the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is
a matter of time; laches is a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be
enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the
property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not.
Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is
based on fixed time, laches is not. Further, prescription may not be
considered at this late stage, not only because it was never raised and
therefore now foreclosed, but more importantly, because it must yield to the
higher interest of justice. To institute a rigid application of the doctrine of
prescription would be highly injurious to the greater interest of substantial
justice.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF LACHES of owner and therefore perfected title over the same through acquisitive
prescription.
HEIRS OF DICMAN vs JOSE CARIÑO and COURT OF APPEALS
The RTC then rendered a decision in favor of private respondent affirming
the possession done by private respondent.
FACTS: Similarly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto.
The present dispute stems from an action for recovery of possession of a
parcel of land that is claimed by both parties. Its history can be traced back
from a purchase made by respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, Sioco Carino.
In order to provide maintenance to the land, he employed petitioner’s
predecessor-in interest, Ting-el Dicman, as a cattle herder. Sioco Carino then
opted to register the disputed land in question and upon the advice of his
lawyer, and because of so many other lands under his name, the title was
placed in the name of Ting-el Dicman. Shortly thereafter, a Deed of
Conveyance was issued by Dicman in favor of Sioco Carino over half of the
total property in Dicman’s name. After the execution of the foregoing deed,
Sioco Cariño, who had been in possession of the land in controversy since
1916, continued to stay thereon.

On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cariño executed, as seller, a public instrument

entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale" covering the subject land and its
improvements with his son, Guzman Cariño, as buyer. Guzman immediately
took possession of the land publicly, peacefully, and in the concept of an
owner. In order to clearly establish the proper boundaries of the two lots, he
undertook a resurvey which yielded the indication of the boundaries and
areas of his land. On the strength of the survey findings, he filed an
application for free-patent over the land which he later withdrew when the
petitioners suddenly filed a petition claiming ownership of the entirety of the
land including the respondent’s. The trial court rendered a partial judgment
and confirmed that the title over Lot 76-A belonged to the heirs of Ting-el
Dicman, there having been no adverse claim. But as to Lot 76-B, the trial
court found it necessary to hold further hearing in order to decide on the
adverse claims of the parties.

The case was eventually dismissed when the Supreme Court made a ruling
pursuant to the case of Republic v. Marcos that Courts of First Instance of
Baguio have no jurisdiction to reopen judicial proceedings on the basis of
Republic Act No. 931. After this dismissal, Guzman Carino was left
undisturbed in his possession of the subject property until his death.

For the part of the respondent, he contended that he has been in possession
of the subject property for 55 years peacefully, in good faith, and in concept

EH405 SY 2016-2017
ISSUE: manner. When petitioners, heirs of Ting-el Dicman, tried to revive the case
on April 20, 1983, they had, far before that time, lost all rights to recover
WON the private respondents acquired the land in dispute through possession or ownership.
prescription?

RULING:

The records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in
the possession of Guzman Cariño, predecessor-in-interest of private
respondent, continuously, publicly, peacefully, in concept of owner, and in
good faith with just title, to the exclusion of the petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest, well beyond the period required under law to
acquire title by acquisitive prescription which, in this case, is 10 years. 38 The
findings of fact of the lower courts, and which this Court has no reason to
disturb, inescapably point to this conclusion: immediately after the "Deed of
Absolute Sale," a public instrument dated January 10, 1938, had been
executed by Sioco Cariño in favor of his son, Guzman Cariño (the father of
private respondent), the latter immediately occupied the property; the 1940
directory of Baguio Telephones lists his residence at Camp 7, Baguio City
along with his telephone number; his permitting the use of portions of the
property to various third parties; his introduction of improvements over the
land in controversy; the testimonial accounts of his neighbors; and that it
was Guzman Cariño alone who declared for tax purposes both the land and
the improvements thereon in his name, while the tax declarations of the
other claimants made no reference to the subject property. 39 Although
arguably Sioco Cariño may not have been the owner of the subject property
when he executed the "Deed of Absolute Sale" in 1938 in favor of his son,
the requirement of just title is nonetheless satisfied, which means that the
mode of transferring ownership should ordinarily have been valid and true,
had the grantor been the owner.40 By the time the successors-in-interest of
Ting-el Dicman sought to establish ownership over the land in controversy by
filing their "Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to Reopen Civil Reservation Case
No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211" on April 24, 1959 with the trial court, and which
Guzman timely opposed, more than 20 years had already elapsed. Thus, the
10-year period for acquisitive prescription is deemed satisfied well before
Guzman’s possession can be said to be civilly interrupted by the filing of the
foregoing petition to reopen.41 After the dismissal of that case on July 28,
1978, Guzman Cariño was left undisturbed in his possession of the subject
property until his death on August 19, 1982. His remains are buried on the
land in question. Thereafter, Guzman’s widow and son, herein private
respondent, continued possession of the subject property in the same

EH405 SY 2016-2017

Heirs of T. Dolleton v. Fil-Estate
FACTS:
PetitionersDolleton,etal.filedseparateComplaintsforquietingoftitleand/
orRecoveryofOwnershipandpossessionwithPreliminaryInjunction/
RestrainingOrderandDamagesagainstrespondentsFil-
EstateManagementInc.TheyallegedthattheyareinOCENpossessionofthesubject
parcelsofland.Therespondents,ontheotherhand,movedforthedismissaloftheeig
htComplaintsonthegroundsof
(1) prescription;
(2) laches;
(3) lack of cause of action; and
(4) res judicata..
Respondentsallegedthatthesubjectparcelsoflandwerealreadyregisteredunderth
eTorrenssystemintheirnames.Respondentsalsocontendedthatpetitionerswereg
uiltyoflaches.Despitetheirallegedpossessionofthesubjectpropertiesfor90years,
petitionersfailedtotakeanystepstoopposethelandregistrationcasesinvolvingthes
amepropertiesortoseekthenullificationofthedecreesofregistrationandcertificate
softitlewhichwereenteredandissuedasearlyas1966and1967.
RTCdismissedthecomplaintasthecourtdeterminedthatthesubjectpropertieswer
ealreadyregisteredinthenamesofrespondents,andthatpetitionerswereunableto
provebyclearandconvincingevidencetheirtitletothesaidproperties.
CAaffirmedRTCsruling.Theappellatecourtfoundthatrespondentstitlestothesubj
ectpropertieswereindefeasiblebecausetheywereregisteredundertheTorrenssys
tem.Thus,petitionerscouldnotsaythatanyclaimonthesubjectpropertiescastsaclo
udontheirtitlewhentheyfailedtodemonstratealegaloranequitabletitletothesame.
TheCourtofAppealsalsoruledthatpetitionersactionshadalreadyprescribed
ISSUE:
WONtheComplaintsfiledbypetitionersarebarredbyprescriptionandlaches?
RULING:
No.Complaintsfiledbypetitionersarenotbarredbyprescriptionandlaches.
Theaffirmativedefenseofprescriptiondoesnotautomaticallywarrantthedismissal
ofacomplaintunderRule16oftheRulesofCivilProcedure.Anallegationofprescriptio
ncaneffectivelybeusedinamotiontodismissonlywhentheComplaintonitsfacesho
wsthatindeedtheactionhasalreadyprescribed.Iftheissueofprescriptionisoneinvo
lvingevidentiarymattersrequiringafull-
blowntrialonthemerits,itcannotbedeterminedinamotiontodismiss.Inthecaseatb
ar,respondentsmustfirstbeabletoestablishbyevidencethatthesubjectproperties
areindeedcoveredbytheircertificatesoftitlebeforetheycanarguethatanyremedya
ssailingtheregistrationofsaidpropertiesortheissuanceofthecertificatesoftitleove
rthesameinthenamesofrespondentsortheirpredecessors-in-
interesthasprescribed.
NeitherdidtheCourtsustainrespondent’sassertionthatpetitionersComplaintswer
ebarredbylaches.
Lacheshasbeendefinedasthefailureoforneglect,foranunreasonableandunexplai
nedlengthoftime,todothatwhichbyexercisingduediligence,couldorshouldhaveb
eendoneearlier;ortoassertarightwithinreasonabletime,warrantingapresumptio
nthatthepartyentitledtheretohaseitherabandoneditordeclinedtoassertit.Thus,t
hedoctrineoflachespresumesthatthepartyguiltyofnegligencehadtheopportunity
todowhatshouldhavebeendone,butfailedtodoso.Conversely,ifthesaidpartydidn
othavetheoccasiontoasserttheright,then,hecannotbeadjudgedguiltyoflaches.L
achesisnotconcernedwiththemerelapseoftime;rather,thepartymusthavebeenaf
fordedanopportunitytopursuehisclaiminorderthatthedelaymaysufficientlyconsti
tutelaches.
Goingbacktopetitioner’schiefclaimthatthesubjectpropertiesaredistinctfromthel
andcoveredbyrespondent’scertificatesoftitle,then,petitionerswouldhavenostan
dingtoopposetheregistrationofthelatterpropertyinthenamesofrespondentsorth
eirpredecessors-in-
interest,ortoseekthenullificationofthecertificatesoftitleissuedoverthesame.
ItalsoappearsfromtherecordsthattheRTCdidnotconductahearingtoreceiveevide
nceprovingthatpetitionerswereguiltyoflaches.Well-
settledistherulethattheelementsoflachesmustbeprovenpositively.Lachesisevide
ntiaryinnature,afactthatcannotbeestablishedbymereallegationsinthepleadings
andcannotberesolvedinamotiontodismiss.Atthisstage,therefore,thedismissalof
petitionersComplaintsonthegroundoflachesispremature.Thoseissuesmustbere
solvedatthetrialofthecaseonthemerits,whereinbothpartieswillbegivenampleopp
ortunitytoprovetheirrespectiveclaimsanddefenses.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 CONSTANTE AMOR DE CASTRO and CORAZON AMOR DE CASTRO,
vs.CA and FRANCISCO ARTIGO
FACTS:
OnMay29,1989,privaterespondentFranciscoArtigo(Artigoforbrevity)suedpetitio
nersConstanteA.DeCastro(Constanteforbrevity)andCorazonA.DeCastro(Corazo
nforbrevity)tocollecttheunpaidbalanceofhisbrokerscommissionfromtheDeCastr
os.
Appellantswereco-
ownersoffour(4)lotslocatedatEDSAcornerNewYorkandDenverStreetsinCubao,
QuezonCity.InaletterdatedJanuary24,1984,appelleewasauthorizedbyappellant
stoactasrealestatebrokerinthesaleofthesepropertiesandfivepercent(5%)ofwhic
hwillbegiventotheagentascommission.ItwasappelleewhofirstfoundTimesTransi
tCorporation,representedbyitspresidentMr.Rondaris,asprospectivebuyerwhich
desiredtobuytwo(2)lotsonly,specificallylots14and15.Eventually,sometimeinMa
yof1985,thesaleoflots14and15wasconsummated.Appelleereceivedfromappella
ntsP48,893.76ascommission.
Itwasthenthattheriftbetweenthecontendingpartiessoonemerged.Appelleeappa
rentlyfeltshortchangedbecauseaccordingtohim,histotalcommissionshouldbeP3
52,500.00whichisfivepercent(5%)oftheagreedpriceofP7,050,000.00paidbyTim
esTransitCorporationtoappellantsforthetwo(2)lots,andthatitwashewhointroduc
edthebuyertoappellantsandunceasinglyfacilitatedthenegotiationwhichultimatel
yledtotheconsummationofthesale.Hence,hesuedbelowtocollectthebalanceofP3
03,606.24afterhavingreceivedP48,893.76inadvance.
Ontheotherhand,appellantscompletelytraverseappelleesclaimsandessentiallya
rguethatappelleeisselfishlyaskingformorethanwhathetrulydeservedascommissi
ontotheprejudiceofotheragentswhoweremoreinstrumentalintheconsummation
ofthesale.Furthermore,thepurchasepriceforthetwolotswasonlyP3.6millionasap
pearinginthedeedofsaleandnotP7.05millionasallegedbyappellee.Thus,evenass
umingthatappelleeisentitledtotheentirecommission,hewouldonlybegetting5%o
ftheP3.6million,orP180,000.00.TheDeCastrosfurtherarguethatlachesshouldap
plybecauseArtigodidnotfilehiscomplaintincourtuntilMay29,1989,oralmostfoury
earslater.Hence,Artigo’sclaimforthebalanceofhiscommissionisbarredbylaches.
ThetrialcourtfoundthatthepurchasepricewasP7.05millionandnotP3.6million.
TheCourtofAppealsaffirmedintotothedecisionofthetrialcourt
ISSUES:
WONrespondentisbarredbylaches?
RULING:
NO.Artigoisnotbarredbylaches.DeCastrosdefenseoflachesfindsnosupportinlaw,
equityorjurisprudence.
Lachesmeansthefailureorneglect,foranunreasonableandunexplainedlengthofti
me,todothatwhichbyexercisingduediligencecouldorshouldhavebeendoneearlie
r.Itisnegligenceoromissiontoassertarightwithinareasonabletime,warrantingapr
esumptionthatthepartyentitledtoassertiteitherhasabandoneditordeclinedtoass
ertit.
Artigodisputestheclaimthatheneglectedtoasserthisrights.Hewasappointedasag
entonJanuary24,1984.ThetwolotswerefinallysoldinJune1985.Asfoundbythetria
lcourt,ArtigodemandedinAprilandJulyof1985thepaymentofhiscommissionbyCo
nstanteonthebasisofthesellingpriceofP7.05millionbuttherewasnoresponsefrom
Constante.Afteritbecameclearthathisdemandsforpaymenthavefallenondeafear
s,ArtigodecidedtosueonMay29,1989.
Actionsuponawrittencontract,suchasacontractofagency,mustbebroughtwithint
enyearsfromthetimetherightofactionaccrues.Therightofactionaccruesfromthe
momentthebreachofrightordutyoccurs.Fromthismoment,thecreditorcaninstitut
etheactionevenastheten-yearprescriptiveperiodbeginstorun.
TheDeCastrosadmitthatArtigosclaimwasfiledwithintheten-
yearprescriptiveperiod.TheDeCastros,however,stillmaintainthatArtigoscauseof
actionisbarredbylaches.Lachesdoesnotapplybecauseonlyfouryearshadlapsedfr
omthetimeofthesaleinJune1985.ArtigomadeademandinJuly1985andfiledtheact
ionincourtonMay29,1989,wellwithintheten-
yearprescriptiveperiod.Thisdoesnotconstituteanunreasonabledelayinasserting
onesright.TheCourthasruled,adelaywithintheprescriptiveperiodissanctionedbyl
awandisnotconsideredtobeadelaythatwouldbarrelief.
[21]
Inexplainingthatlachesappliesonlyintheabsenceofastatutoryprescriptiveperi
od,theCourthasstated-
Lachesisrecourseinequity.Equity,however,isappliedonlyintheabsence,neverinc
ontravention,ofstatutorylaw.Thus,laches,cannot,asarule,beusedtoabateacollec
tionsuitfiledwithintheprescriptiveperiodmandatedbytheCivilCode.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: AGAINST WHOM PRESCRIPTION RUNS
NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTOvs CA and ANTONIO J.
ALBERTO, JR
FACTS:
AntonioAlbertoJr.,assistedbyhismother,AndreaJongcofiledacomplaintforackno
wledgmentandpartition.Healleged,insubstance,thatin1941hisallegedfather,Ant
onioC.Alberto,andhismother,AndreaJongco,livedtogetherashusbandandwifean
dasaresultofwhich,hewasbornonSeptember10,1942;thatduringthetimethathis
allegedfatherandmotherlivedtogetherashusbandandwifeanduptothetimeofhisb
irth,bothweresingleandhadnolegalimpedimenttomarryeachother;thatafterhisbi
rth,hisfatherandmothercontinuedlivingtogetherashusbandandwife,hisfathersu
pportingthemandintroducinghimtothepublicashisnaturalchild;thateventhefamil
yofhisfatherrecognizedhimassuch.
Abouttheyear1944,hisfatherandmotherseparated,andsubsequently,hisfatherm
arriedhereinpetitionerNatividaddelRosario,asaresultofthemarriage,two(2)child
renwerebornhereinpetitionersLourdesAlbertoandAntonioAlberto,Jr.Thatalthou
ghhisfatherwasseparatedfromhismother,hecontinuedtosupporthimandrecogni
zedhimashisownchild;
OnJuly3,1949,hisfatherdied,andwithoutnoticetohim,petitionerNatividaddelRos
arioVda.deAlberto,onJuly17,1949,institutedbeforethethenCourtofFirstInstance
ofManilaanintestateproceedingsfortheestateofhisdeceasedfatherinthesaidintes
tateproceedings,petitionersdeliberatelyomittedhimasoneoftheheirsandforthisr
easontheysucceededinhavingthepropertiesofhisdeceasedfatheradjudicatedan
dpartitionedamongthemselves.Further,heallegedthathehadabsolutelynoprevio
usknowledgeoftheintestateproceedingsandcametoknowaboutitonlyrecentlyan
dthereuponmadeademandfromthepetitionerswhorefusedtogivehimhisshare.Ac
cordingly,hepraysthatthepetitionersbeorderedtoacknowledgehimasthenatural
childofAntonioC.Alberto;thathisone-fourthsharebeturnedovertohim.
PetitionersfiledaMotiontoDismissonthegroundsthat(1)thecauseofactionisbarre
dbypriorjudgment;and(2)thatthecauseofactionisalsobarredbythestatuteoflimit
ation.Tothismotion,privaterespondentsfiledanopposition.
RTCdismissedthecomplaint.
Privaterespondent,notsatisfiedwiththedecision,appealedtorespondentCourt,an
drespondentCourtreversedthedecisionofthetrialcourt.
ISSUE:
WONrespondentisbarredbyprescription?
RULING:
YES.Therespondentisbarredbyprescription.
TheCivilCodeofthePhilippinesclearlyprovides:
Art.1100.Theactionforrescissiononaccountoflesionshallprescribeafterfouryears
fromthetimethepartitionwasmade.
IntestateproceedingswereterminatedasallegedinthecomplaintitselfonNovembe
r9,1953sothatsaidfouryearsprescriptiveperiodexpiredonNovember9,1957.Hen
ce,thepresentactionfiledonSeptember8,1960andwhichhasforoneofitsobjectsth
erescissionoftheagreementofpartitionamongthepetitioners,asapprovedbythein
testatecourt,isalreadybarredbyprescription.
Thatanactionforrescissionisalsotheproperactionincaseofanallegedpreteritionof
acompulsoryheirbyreasonofallegedbadfaithorfraudoftheotherpersonsintereste
d,whichiswhatthecomplaintinthiscaseallegesinsubstance,isindicatedinArticle11
04oftheCivilCodeasfollows:
Art.1104.Apartitionmadewithpreteritionofanyofthecompulsoryheirsshallnotber
escinded,unlessitbeprovedthattherewasbadfaithorfraudonthepartoftheotherpe
rsonsinterested;...
IthasalsobeenruledbythisCourtthatthefouryearsperiodprovidedinArticle1100oft
heCivilCode(formerlyArt.1076oftheoldCivilCode)shouldcommencetorunfromth
eapprovaloftheagreementofpartitionbytheCourt(Samsonvs.Araneta,60Phil.27,
36).Thus,inthecaseatbar,itisevidentthattheactiontorescindtheAgreementofPart
itionwhichwasapprovedbytheCourtonNovember9,1953,hadalreadyprescribed
whenrespondentfiledthecomplaintinthecaseatbaronSeptember8,1960.
Whileasageneralruletheactionforpartitionamongco-
ownersdoesnotprescribesolongastheco-
ownershipisexpresslyorimpliedlyrecognized(Art.494,CivilCode),petitionershere
inhadneverrecognizedrespondentasaco-ownerorco-
heireitherexpresslyorimpliedly.Consequently,theruleonnon-
prescriptionofactionforpartitionofpropertyownedincommon(Art.494)doesnota
pplytothecaseatbar.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Moreover,privaterespondentcannotclaimexemptionfromtheeffectsofprescriptio
nonthepleaofminorityundertheNewCivilCodewhichprovides:
Art.1108.Prescription,bothacquisitiveandextinctive,runsagainst:
(1)Minorsandotherincapacitatedpersonswhohaveparents,guardiansorotherleg
alrepresentatives:
RespondentAlberto,Jr.whohasalivingparent,hismother,AndreaJongco,whoinfa
ctfiledthecomplaintinthecaseatbarforhim,fallssquarelyundertheabove-
citedprovision.
GrantingarguendothatrespondentisanaturalchildofthedeceasedAntonioAlberto,
Sr.,theactionforrecognitionofnaturalchildmaybebroughtonlyduringthelifetimeo
fthepresumedparent.Andifthepresumedfatherormotherdiedduringtheminority
ofthechild,thelattermayfiletheactionwithinfour(4)yearsfromtheattainmentofma
jority(Art.285[1]).However,iftheminorhasaguardianasinthiscase,prescriptionru
nsagainsthimevenduringminority.Insuchcase,theactionforrecognitionmustbein
stitutedwithinfour(4)yearsafterthedeathofthenaturalfather.AntonioC.Alberto,S
r.,theallegedfather,diedonJuly3,1949.Thecomplaintforacknowledgmentandpar
titionwasfiledeleven(11)yearslater,onSeptember8,1960.Hence,prescriptionhad
setin.
Neithercanitbeclaimedthatthepresentactionisinsubstanceoneforrecoveryofpro
pertyinordertoavoidtheconsequencesofprescription,forascorrectlystatedbythe
petitioners,tobeentitledtotherecoveryofthepropertyfromtheestate,Alberto,Jr.m
ustfirstrescindthepartitionanddistributionapprovedbytheintestateproceedings,
otherwise,therecoveryofanypropertyfromthepetitionersisnotpossible.Bethatasi
tmay,suchpartitioncannolongerberescindedhavingbeenalreadybarredbytheSta
tuteofLimitations.
Furthermore,evengrantingthatArticle1104oftheCivilCodedoesnotapplyandther
eisaninjurytotherightsofplaintiff,stillactionwouldstillnotprosperunderArticles11
46and1149ofthesameCodewhichprovidethattheactionmustbebroughtwithinfou
randfiveyears,respectively,fromthetimetherightofactionaccrues.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: PRESCRIPTION & OWNERSHIP OF REAL RIGHTS 2) That plaintiffs’ claim was already barred by prescription and laches
CHARACTERISTICS OF POSSESSION because of Bomedco’s open and continuous possession of the
property for more than 50 years.
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO. INC. V CA
RTCdecision:rejectedBodemco’sclaimofownershipbasedonapriorsalebutupheld
ownershipovertheparceloflandbasedonacquisitiveprescription.
FACTS:
CAdecision:reversedtheRTC.ItheldthatBomedcoonlyacquiredaneasementofrig
AppealbycertiorariunderRule45.MagdalenoValdez,Sr.,fatherofrespondentsSer
htofwaybyunopposedandcontinuoususeoftheland,butnotownership,underArtic
gioValdez,AngelinaValdez-Novabos,TeresitaArgawanon-
le620oftheCivilCode.
MangubatandDaylindaArgawanon-
Melendres(theheirs),purchasedfromFelicianaSantillan,onDecember9,1935,apa
rcelofunregisteredlandcoveredbyTaxDeclarationlocatedinBarrioDayhagon,Med
ISSUE:
ellin,Cebu.Hetookpossessionofthepropertyanddeclareditfortaxpurposesinhisna
me.Priortothesale,however,theentirelengthofthelandfromnorthtosouthwasalre WONBodemcohasacquiredownershipofthelandbyvirtueofacquisitiveprescriptio
adytraversedinthemiddlebyrailroadtracksownedbypetitionerBogo- n.
MedellinMillingCo.,Inc.
(hereafterBomedco).Thetrackswereusedforhaulingsugarcanefromthefieldstop
etitioner’ssugarmill.WhenMagdalenoValdez,Sr.passedawayin1948,hereinprivat RULING:
erespondentsinheritedtheland.However,unknowntothem,Bomedcowasabletoh
NO.Bodemcohasnotacquiredownershipofthelandbyvirtueofacquisitiveprescripti
avethedisputedmiddlelotwhichwasoccupiedbytherailroadtracksplacedinitsnam
on
e.Theentiresubjectlandwasdividedintothree,namely,CadastralLotNos.953,954a
nd955.LotNos.953and955remainedinthenameofprivaterespondents.However, UnderArt.1137oftheCivilCode
LotNo.954,thenarrowlotwheretherailroadtrackslay,wasclaimedbyBomedcoasit
Petitioner’sclaimofownershipthroughextraordinaryacquisitiveprescriptionunder
sownandwasdeclaredfortaxpurposesinitsname.Upondiscoveryrespondentswro
Article1137oftheCivilCodecannotbesustained.Thereisnodisputethatthecontrov
tealettertoBomedcodemandingforpaymentofcompensationfortheuseoftheland
ersialstripoflandhasbeeninthecontinuouspossessionofpetitionersince1929.
butthesamewasnotheeded.
Butpossession,toconstitutethefoundationofaprescriptiveright,mustbepossessio
OnJune8,1989,theheirsfileda“ComplaintforPaymentofCompensationand/
nunderaclaimoftitle,thatis,itmustbeadverse.Unlesscoupledwiththeelementofho
orRecoveryofPossessionofRealPropertyandDamageswithApplicationforRestrai
stilitytowardsthetrueowner,possession,howeverlong,willnotconfertitlebyprescr
ningOrder/PreliminaryInjunction.”Theheirs’allegations:
iption.
1) That, before she sold the land to Valdez, Sr. in 1935, Santillan
Whileitistruethat,togetherwithaperson’sactualandadversepossessionoftheland,
granted Bomedco, in 1929, a railroad right of way for a period of 30
taxdeclarationsconstitutestrongevidenceofownershipofthelandoccupiedbyhim,
years.
thislegalpreceptdoesnotapplyincaseswherethepropertyisdeclaredtobeamereea
2) When Valdez, Sr. acquired the land, he respected the grant.
sementofrightofway.Aneasementorservitudeisarealright,constitutedonthecorp
3) The right of way expired sometime in 1959 but respondent heirs
orealimmovablepropertyofanother,byvirtueofwhichtheownerhastorefrainfrom
allowed Bomedco to continue using the land because one of them
doing,ormustallowsomeonetodo,somethingonhisproperty,forthebenefitofanot
was then an employee of the company.
herthingorperson.
Bomedco’sdefense/s:
Itexistsonlywhentheservientanddominantestatesbelongtotwodifferentowners.
1) That it was the owner and possessor of Cadastral Lot No. 954,
Itgivestheholderoftheeasementanincorporealinterestonthelandbutgrantsnotitl
having bought the same from Feliciana Santillan in 1929, prior to the
ethereto.
sale of the property by the latter to Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. in 1935.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Therefore,anacknowledgmentoftheeasementisanadmissionthatthepropertybel
ongstoanother.Havingheldthepropertybyvirtueofaneasement,petitionercannot
nowassertthatitsoccupancysince1929wasintheconceptofanowner.Neithercanit
declarethatthe30-
yearperiodofextraordinaryacquisitiveprescriptionstartedfromthatyear.
Petitioner,however,maintainsthatevenifaservitudewasmerelyimposedonthepro
pertyinitsfavor,itspossessionimmediatelybecameadversetotheownerinthelate1
950’swhenthegrantwasallegedbyrespondentheirstohaveexpired.Wedonotthink
so.Themereexpirationoftheperiodofeasementin1959didnotconvertpetitioner’sp
ossessionintoanadverseone.Merematerialpossessionoflandisnotadverseposses
sionasagainsttheownerandisinsufficienttovesttitle,unlesssuchpossessionisacco
mpaniedbytheintenttopossessasanowner.Thereshouldbeahostileuseofsuchana
tureandexercisedundersuchcircumstancesastomanifestandgivenoticethatthep
ossessionisunderaclaimofright.
Intheabsenceofanexpressgrantbytheowner,orconductbypetitionersugarmillfro
mwhichanadverseclaimcanbeimplied,itspossessionofthelotcanonlybepresume
dtohavecontinuedinthesamecharacteraswhenitwasacquired(thatis,itpossessed
thelandonlybyvirtueoftheoriginalgrantoftheeasementofrightofway),orwasbym
erelicenseortoleranceoftheowners(respondentheirs).
Itisafundamentalprincipleoflawinthisjurisdictionthatactsofpossessorycharacter
executedbyvirtueoflicenseortoleranceoftheowner,nomatterhowlong,donotstar
ttherunningoftheperiodofprescription.
Afterthegrantofeasementexpiredin1959,petitionerneverperformedanyactinco
mpatiblewiththeownershipofrespondentheirsoverCadastralLotNo.954.
Onthecontrary,until1963,petitionercontinuedtodeclarethe“sugarcentralrailroad
rightofway”initsrealtytaxreceipts,therebydoubtlesslyconcedingtheownershipof
respondentheirs.Respondentsthemselveswereemphaticthattheysimplytolerate
dpetitioner’scontinueduseofCadastralLotNo.954soasnottojeopardizetheemploy
mentofoneoftheirco-heirsinthesugarmillofpetitioner.
Theonlytimepetitionerassumedalegalpositionadversetorespondents’waswhenit
filedaclaimoverthepropertyin1965duringthecadastralsurveyofMedellin.Sinceth
en(1965)anduntilthefilingofthecomplaintfortherecoveryofthesubjectlandbefor
etheRTCofCebuin1989,only24yearshadlapsed.Sincetherequired30-
yearextraordinaryprescriptiveperiodhadnotyetbeencompliedwithin1989,petitio
nerneveracquiredownershipofthesubjectland.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 Lubos vs. Galupo
FACTS:
 The subject of the said case is a parcel of land.
 The plaintiffs claim that in a private instrument, Victoriana Dulay and
her son Restituto D. Merino sold the said property to Juan Galupo.
On the death of Juan Galupo, the same was inherited by his son
Mansueto Galupo, Sr.
 Mansueto Galupo, Sr. died in 1981. The plaintiffs are his children out
of two marriages.
 The plaintiffs complain that they discovered the land to be occupied
by the tenant farmers of defendant Lina Abalon Lubos who sold a
portion of the said land to Alicio Poldo, married to Teresita Poldo.
The plaintiffs sought the annulment of the said sale, and a
declaration that they are the lawful owners of the land.
 On the other hand, defendant Lina Abalon Lubos contends that the
subject land was originally owned by Victoriana Dulay alone, who is
her great grandmother. Victoriana Dulay sold the property to her
father Juan F. Abalon. Her father possessed the property for over
thirty (30) years when he sold the same to her. Subsequently, she
sold a portion of the property to the spouses Poldo, who claim to be
purchasers in good faith.
ISSUE:
 Who as between the parties have a better right or title to the subject
lot?
RULING:
Article 1141, Civil Code, governs prescription of real action over
immovables. It provides:
- Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
- This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the
acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.
 For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other
real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit
any right. On the other hand, good faith consists in the reasonable
belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing
was its owner but could not transmit the ownership thereof.
 Petitioner’s lack of good faith was also apparent.
 Petitioner Lubos has not offered any documentary proof of the
transaction between her father and Victoriana Dulay, the original
owner. What she presented were the testimonies of the tenants who
worked on the land. From these testimonies, it would appear that
Juan Abalon was in possession as early as 1963.
 The nature of Juan Abalons possession cannot be categorically
determined from the testimonies given. Tenant Jose Morillo admitted
that he did not exactly know who the owner is, while tenant Arturo
Tuballas admitted that he did not know how Juan Abalon came to
possess the land.
 The property was still declared in the name of Victoriana Dulay at
the time that Juan Abalon sold the land to petitioner Lubos.
 Assuming that Lina Abalon and her father possessed the property in
the concept of owner, still, acquisition of ownership by prescription
has not run in their favor.
 When the respondents filed the instant case, petitioner Lubos was in
possession of the property for only twenty-eight (28) years as
testified to by petitioner’s witnesses. This is short of the required
thirty years of uninterrupted adverse possession without just title
and good faith.
 The respondent Galupos, on the other hand, presented the escritura
de compra y venta which showed that the land was sold by
Victoriana Dulay to Juan Galupo. Upon Juan Galupos death, the
property was inherited by his heir, Mansueto Galupo, Sr. Likewise,
respondents inherited the land from their father upon the latters
death.
 Petitioner has failed to establish the chain of title through which the
land passed to her. As heretofore stated, no proof was presented to
show that, indeed, the land was transferred from its original owner,
Victoriana Dulay, to petitioner’s father, Juan Abalon.
 In contrast, the respondents have shown that the land came to their
possession as heirs of Mansueto Galupo, Sr. who was the heir of
EH405 SY 2016-2017
Juan Galupo, the person to whom Victoriana Dulay transferred the
land.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
TOPIC: PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS
Macababbad, Jr. vs. Masirag
FACTS:
 On April 28, 1999, Masirag filed with the RTC a complaint against
Macababbad, Chua and wife Say, for quieting of title, nullity of titles,
reconveyance, and damages, who cabal themselves in a mala fides
of badges of fraud, dishonesty, deceit, misrepresentations, bad faith,
under the guise of purported instrument, nomenclature “extra-
judicial settlement with simultaneous sale of portion of registered
land (Lot 4144)” dated December 3, 1967, a falsification defined and
penalized under Art. 172 in relation to Art.171, Revised Penal Code,
by “causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.”
 The investigation disclosed that the Macababbads falsified a
document entitled “Extra-judicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale
of Portion of Registered Land (Lot No 4144)” so that the Masirags
were deprived of their shares in Lot No. 4144. The document
purportedly bore the Masirags signatures making them appear to
have participated in the execution of the document when they did
not, they did not even know the Macababbads.
 The document ostensibly conveyed the subject property to
Macababbad for P1, 800.00. Macababbad registered portions of Lot
No 4144 in his name and sold other portions to third parties, one of
them is Chua and wife Say.
 Based on these allegations, the Masirags asked: 1) that the
extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale be declared null and void
ab initio and without force and effect, and that Chua be ordered and
directed to execute the necessary deed of conveyance of the land; if
they refuse, that the clerk of court be required to do so ; 2) issuance
of a new TCT in Masirag’s name and the cancellation of Macababbad
and Chua’s certificate of title; 3) that Macababbads be ordered to
pay damages and attorney’s fees.
 The Macababbads moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
the errors the Masirags raised involved pure questions of law that
should be brought before the Supreme Court via a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. While the
Masirags insisted that their appeal involved mixed questions of fact
and law and thus fell within the purview of the CA’s appellate
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the action of the respondents has already prescribed.
RULING:
 The respondents argue that their action is one for the annulment of
the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale bearing their forged
signatures. They contend that their action had not yet prescribed
because an action to declare an instrument null and void is
imprescriptible. They modified their position and argued that the sale
to the petitioners pursuant to the extrajudicial settlement of estate
and sale was void because it was carried out through fraud; thus,
the appropriate prescription period is four (4) years from the
discovery of fraud. Under this argument, respondents posit that their
cause of action had not yet prescribed because they only learned of
the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale in March 1999; they
filed their complaint the following month.
 The petitioners, on the other hand, argue that the relevant
prescriptive period here is ten (10) years from the date of the
registration of title, this being an action for reconveyance based on
an implied or constructive trust.
 SC believed and held that the respondents’ amended complaint
sufficiently pleaded a cause to declare the nullity of the extrajudicial
settlement of estate and sale, as they claimed in their amended
complaint. Without prejudging the issue of the merits of the
respondents claim and on the assumption that the petitioners
already hypothetically admitted the allegations of the complaint
when they filed a motion to dismiss based on prescription, the
transfer may be null and void if indeed it is established that
respondents had not given their consent and that the deed is a
forgery or is absolutely fictitious. As the nullity of the extrajudicial
settlement of estate and sale has been raised and is the primary
issue, the action to secure this result will not prescribe pursuant to
Article 1410 of the Civil Code. The respondents’ action is therefore
imprescriptible and the CA committed no reversible error in so ruling.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 Banco Filipino vs. CA
FACTS:
 Elsa Arcilla and her husband, Calvin Arcilla, the Appellees secured,
on three (3) occasions, loans from the Banco Filipino Savings and
ISSUES:
Mortgage Bank, the Appellant.
 To secure the payment of said loans, the Appellees executed "Real
Estate Mortgages" in favor of the Appellants over their parcels of
land.
 In the meantime, the Skyline Builders, Inc., through its President,
Appellee Calvin Arcilla, secured loans from the Bank of the Philippine
RULING:
Islands. To insure payment of the loan, the FGU Insurance
Corporation, issued PG Bondin favor of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands. Skyline Buildings, Inc., and the Appellees executed an
"Agreement of Counter-Guaranty with Mortgage" in favor of the FGU
Insurance Corporation covering the parcels of land to assure
payment of any amount that the insurance company may pay on
account of said loans.
 The Appellant prepared and issued a "Statement of Account" to the
Appellees on their loan account to the effect that the balance of their
loan account, inclusive of interests, computed at 17% per annum. It
turned out that the Appellant unilaterally increased the rate of
interest on the loan account of the Appellees from 12% per annum,
as covenanted in the "Real Estate Mortgage" and "Deed of
Consolidated and Amended Real Estate Mortgage" to 17% per
annum on the authority of the Central Bank Circular.
 The Appellees failed to pay their monthly amortizations to Appellant.
The latter forthwith filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of
Appellees "Real Esate Mortgage" in favor of the Appellant and
Appellant was the purchaser of the property at public auction.
 In the meantime, the FGU Insurance Corporation, Inc. redeemed the
aforesaid properties from the Appellant by paying to the latter.
 The Appellees filed a complaint in the Court a quo for the
"Annulment of the Loan Contracts, Foreclose Sale with Prohibition
and Injunction, Etc."
 The Appellees averred, in their complaint, inter alia, that the loan
contracts and mortgages between the Appellees and the Appellant
were null and void because: (a) the interests, charges, etc., were
deducted in advance from the face value of the "Promissory Notes"
executed by the Appellees; and (b) the rate of interests charged by
the Appellant were usurious.
 In its Answer to the Complaint, the Appellant averred that the
interests charged by it on Appellees loan accounts and that the said
loan contracts and mortgages were lawful. The Appellant further
averred that the Appellees action had already prescribed.
1. Whether or not the action of the private respondents has prescribed.
2. Whether or not the respondents are entitled to the refund of the
alleged interest overpayments.
1. Under Article 1150 of the Civil Code, the time for prescription of all
kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains
otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.
Thus, the period of prescription of any cause of action is reckoned
only from the date the cause of action accrued. And a cause of
action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or
that which should not have been done is done. The period should
not be made to retroact to the date of the execution of the contract
on January 15, 1975 as claimed by the petitioner for at that time,
there would be no way for the respondents to know of the violation
of their rights. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly found that
respondents cause of action accrued on October 30, 1978, the date
they received the statement of account showing the increased rate
of interest, for it was only from that moment that they discovered
the petitioner’s unilateral increase thereof.
2. As to whether the respondents are entitled to recover the alleged
overpayments of interest, we find that they are despite the absence
of any prayer therefore. This Court has ruled that it is the material
allegations of fact in the complaint, not the legal conclusion made
therein or the prayer that determines the relief to which the plaintiff
is entitled. It is the allegations of the pleading which determine the
nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the
allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for. Thus,
even if the complaint seeks the declaration of nullity of the contract,
the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the factual allegations
contained therein ultimately seek the return of the excess interests
paid.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 Solid Homes Inc. vs. Tan
FACTS:
 Petitioner Solid Homes, Inc., sold to the spouses Joe Uy and Myrna
Uy a subdivision lot which thereafter, the lot was registered in the
name of the Uys.
 The spouses Uy sold the same lot to herein respondents, the
spouses Ancheta K. Tan and Corazon de Jesus-Tan, by reason of
which the former title covering the lot was cancelled and replaced in
respondents’ name.
 From then on, respondents visited their property a number of times,
only to find out the sad state of development thereat. There was no
infrastructure and utility systems for water, sewerage, electricity and
telephone, as announced in the approved plans and advertisements
of the subdivision. Worse, squatters occupy their lot and its
surrounding areas. In short, there has been no development at all.
 Respondents demanded on petitioner to provide the needed utility
systems and clear the area of squatters and other obstructions to
enable them to start the construction of their house thereon and to
allow other lot owners in the area a full access to and peaceful
possession of their respective lots, conformably with P.D. No. 957
which requires an owner or developer of a subdivision project to
develop the same within one year from the issuance of its license.
 Having received no reply from petitioner, respondents filed with the
Field Office of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
a complaint for specific performance and damages therein
praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to provide the needed
facilities in the premises and rid the same of squatters; or, in the
alternative, for petitioner to replace respondents property with
another lot in the same subdivision where there are facilities
and sans squatters.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondents’ right to bring the instant case against
petitioner has already prescribed.
2. In the event respondents opt to rescind the contract, should
petitioner pay them merely the price they paid for the lot plus
interest or the current market value thereof?
RULING:
 There can be no debate at all on the legal postulate that the
prescriptive period for bringing action for specific performance, as
here, prescribes in ten (10) years. This is so provided in Article 1144
of the Civil Code. What we cannot agree on with the petitioner, and
about which petitioner is in serious error, is its submission that the
10-year prescriptive period should commence either on April 7, 1980,
when petitioner originally sold the lot to spouses Uy; or in February,
1985, when the respondents thereafter bought the same lot from
the Uy couple. Obviously, petitioner misread Article 1144 which
specifically provides that the 10-year period therein referred to
commences to run only from the time the right of action accrues.
 If not on a written contract, petitioner’s obligation to introduce
improvements on the area in question arises from law, more
specifically P.D. 957, as amended by P.D. 1216, Section 31.
 Thus, the period of prescription of any action is reckoned only from
the date the cause of action accrued. And a cause of action
arises when that which should have been done is not done,
or that which should not have been done is done. The period
should not be made to retroact to the date of execution of the
contract on January 15, 1975 as claimed by the petitioner for at that
time, there would be no way for the respondents to know of the
violation of their rights. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly
found that respondents cause of action accrued on October 30,
1978, the date they received the statement of account showing the
increased rate of interest, for it was only from that moment that
they discovered the petitioner’s unilateral increase thereof.
 With the reality that in this case, respondents made their written
demand upon petitioner to perform what is incumbent upon it only
on December 18, 1995, it was only from that date when the 10-year
prescriptive period under Article 1144 commenced to run. And since
respondents’ complaint for specific performance was filed with the
Field Office of the HLURB only on April 1, 1996, or less than four (4)
months after the date of their demand, petitioner’s reliance on
prescription of action is simply without any leg to stand on.
EH405 SY 2016-2017

BAUSAHEIRSOFJ.DINO
FACTS:
OnJune5,1978,petitionersfiledacomplaintforrecoveryofpossessionofaparcelofla
ndcoveredbyTransferCertificateofTitleNo.182registeredinthenameofpetitioner
MaryManionBausa.TheRTCdecidedthatinfavorofthepetitioners,declaringthemo
wnersofthesubjectproperty.JuanDino,respondents’predecessor-in-
interest,appealedbutitwasdismissedbytheCourtofAppealsinaResolutionwhichb
ecamefinalandexecutory.AWritofExecutionwasissuedhowever;itwasnotserved
withthedefendant.Afterwards,aDeliveryofPossessionwasexecutedbytheSheriff
whichwasreceivedbyPrivaterespondentsbutdidnotsignit.Sothen,petitionersfiled
aPetitionforDemolition.Itwasgrantedhoweveritwasnotimplementedduetothere
sistanceofrespondents.Sincethedecisionwasnotexecuted,aComplaintforExecuti
onofDecisionwasfiledwithRTCwhichconsidereditastimelyfiled,therebygrantings
uchaction.Onappeal,however,CAreversedthedecisionofRTCstatingthattheactio
nhasnotbeentimelyfiled.SothepetitionersappealedtotheSupremeCourt.
ISSUE:
1) Whetherornotpetitionerscanbedeniedoftheirrighttoenforcethedecisioni
ssuedintheirfavorfortherecoveryoftheregisteredproperty?
2) WhetherornotitwascorrectforCAdecideontheissueofownershipandtheri
ghttorecoveryofpossession,giventhattherewasalreadyaformerjudgme
ntbyRTCwhichreachedfinality?
HELD:
(1) No.Thepetitionerscannotbedeniedoftheirrighttoexecutethedecisionissuedi
ntheirfavorfortherecoveryoftheregisteredproperty.
AccordingtoArticle1144(3)oftheCivilCodeandSection6,Rule39oftheRulesof
Court,onceajudgmentbecomesfinalandexecutory,theprevailingpartycanha
veitexecutedasamatterofrightbymeremotionwithinfiveyearsfromdateofent
ryofthejudgment.Iftheprevailingpartyfailstohavethedecisionenforcedbyam
otionafterthelapseoffiveyearsfromthedateofitsentry,thesaidjudgmentisred
ucedtoarightofactionwhichmustbeenforcedbytheinstitutionofacomplaintin
aregularcourtwithin10yearsfromthetimethejudgmentbecamefinal.
Intheinstantcase,petitionersareseekingtorevivethejudgmentrenderedonOc
tober2,1985ofRTC,declaringthemasrightfulownersoftheproperty,andorderi
ngrespondentstovacatethepremises,andtopayrentsandotherdamages.The
judgmentbecamefinalandexecutoryonJanuary28,1987asshownintheEntry
ofJudgment.Thus,petitionershavefiveyearstherefromtoexecutesaidjudgme
ntbymeremotionand,shouldtheyfailtodoso,havetenyearsfromsaiddatetore
vivethejudgmentbyanindependentaction,whichtheyfiledonJanuary30,1998
.Evenifthepurposeofthelawistoprovidelimitationsontheenforcementofsuch
decision,stillitwasveryevidentthatppetitioners’pursuedeveryavailablereme
dytorecoverthesubjectpropertybutfailedduetothemachinationsofresponde
nts.TheMotionforExecutionwasnotservedtothedefendantandtheDeliveryof
Possessionwasnotalsoexecutedduetotherefusaloftherespondentstosignitin
thefirstplace.Thewritofdemolitionwasalsonotgrantedbecauseoftheresistan
ceoftherespondents.Despitediligenteffortsandthefinalandexecutorynature
oftheDecision,petitionershaveyettoregainpossessionofwhatislegallytheiro
wn.Thesecircumstancesclearlydemonstratethatthefailuretoexecutethejud
gmentwasduetorespondents’refusaltofollowtheseveralwritsorderingthemt
ovacatethepremises.ItwouldbeunfairfortheCourttoallowrespondentstoprof
itfromtheirdefianceofvalidcourtorders.Itwouldbemoreinkeepingwithjustice
andequitytoallowtherevivalofthejudgmentrenderedbyBranch52oftheRegio
nalTrialCourtofSorsogoninCivilCaseNo.639.Toruleotherwisewouldresultina
nabsurdsituationwheretherightfulownerofapropertywouldbeoustedbyausu
rperonmeretechnicalities.
(2) No,itwasnotcorrectforCAtodecideontheclaimofownershipandrighttorecove
ryofpossession.
TheCourtalsonotesthatpetitionersclaimofownershipandrighttorecoveryofposse
ssionwasbyvirtueofatitleregisteredintheirnames.Therulingofthetrialcourtregard
ingtheidentityofthelandinquestionanditsinclusioninthesaidtitlewasdulyprovenin
theproceedingsbeforeitandsaiddecisionhasattainedfinality.Itshouldbestressedt
hattheissueofwhohasbetterrightsofpossessionandownershipovertheproperties
haslongbeenadjudicatedbythecourtsandhasattainedfinality.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
TEXONMANUFACTURINGANDBETTYCHUA,petitioners,vs.GRACEMIL ustbefiledwiththeLaborArbiterwithinfour(4)years.Respondents’complaintwasfil
LENAANDMARILYNMILLENA,respondents. edonSeptember11,1995oronlythree(3)daysafterpetitionersterminatedherservi
cesonSeptember8,1995.Clearly,hersuitwasfiledontime.

Therefore,SCaffirmedthedecisionofNLRCandCA.
FACTS:

Respondents were hired by

TexonManufacturing,petitionerCompany.However,Texonterminatedtheemplo
ymentofrespondentGraceMillenawhichshereportedtotheLaborArbiterandfileda
complaintformoneyclaims.Onthesamenotempetitionercompanyalsoterminated
theserviceofrespondentMarilynMillena.Whenlatterwenttotheoffice,shewaspaid
asumofmoneyforcapitalandwasaskedtosignablankpieceofpaperthinkingthatitw
asthereceiptforthesaidamount.However,itturnedoutthatitwasaresignationlette
randquitclaimofherbacksalaries.ShethenfiledwiththeLaborArbiterbecauseofille
galdismissal.PetitionersfiledaMotiontoDismisswhichwasnotgranted,NLRCagree
ingtothedecisionoftheLaborArbiter.OnappealtoCA,theCourtdecidedaffirmedthe
NLRCOrder.ItstatedthatthethreeyearprescriptiveperiodunderArticle291oftheLa
borCode,issupposedlycountedfromthetimethecauseofactionaccrued.CAsaidtha
tArticle291oftheLaborCodeisapplicableinthecaseatbarinsofarasrespondentMari
lynMillenaisconcernedbecauseshefiledtheactionon1995,or2daysafterhertermin
ation,whichisstillwithinthefour(4)yearprescriptiveperiodprovidedforinArticle11
46oftheNewCivilCode.However,Article291oftheLaborCodeisapplicableinsofaras
privaterespondentGraceMillenaisconcernedbecauseshefiledtheactionwellwithi
nthethree(3)yearprescriptiveperiodprovidedforinArticle291oftheLaborCode.Pe
titionersraisedtheissueintheSC.

ISSUE:

Whetherornotprescriptionhassetin?

HELD:

No.Bothrespondents’actionshavenotyetprescribed.

OnGraceMillena’sactionfiled,theapplicablelawisArt.291oftheLaborCode.Record
sshowthatitwasonlyafterpetitionercompanyterminatedherservices,sometimein
thesummerof1995,thatshedecidedtofilewiththeLaborArbiterhercomplaintform
oneyclaim.Thethree(3)yearprescriptiveperiodshouldthenbecounted,notfrom19
91or1992,butfrom1995.

OnMarilynMillena’sactionfiled,hercomplaintforillegaldismissalwithprayerforthe
grantofmoneyclaimsandbenefitsisonecoveredbyArticle1146oftheCivilCode.Itm

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 INTESTATEESTATEOFFRANCISCOUBAT,deceased.JOSEL.SORIANO
vsATANASIAUBATDEMONTES,ETAL.,
FACTS:
On October 7, 1936, Eduardo Ubat obtained a loan of P400.00, evidenced by
a promissory note, from the Philippine National Bank and, as security for
payment, mortgaged his land. He died after having paid three installments,
and his only son, Francisco Ubat, inherited the mortgaged property. The son
now borrowed from Philippine National Bank, executing a chattel mortgage
on the standing crops of his land. He also died leaving an unpaid debt for his
heirs. The children instituted a proceeding for the summary settlement of his
estate wherein the bank filed its claim. The Court dismissed the claim of the
bank and later on, a creditor of Francisco Ubat also filed an intestate
proceeding. The bank filed two claims for unpaid debt of Francisco Ubat and
Eduardo Ubat. The first claim of the bank was approved but the second
though also granted but not completely. So the bank appealed to the
decision regarding the second claim. The appellee said that the obligation of
Eduardo Ubat was divisible based on equal yearly installments as stated in
the promissory note. This means that when the fourth installement had
become due and demandable the prescriptive period of ten years already
started so only the tenth installment can be recovered by the bank which
filed the action on September 1955 from October 1945 when said installment
became due and payable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the whole amount can be recovered or not because of
prescription?
HELD:
No. The whole amount due cannot be recovered.
It is to be observed that the note provided that payment of the principal and
the corresponding interest shall be made in ten equal annual installments.
Thereby making it an absolute duty on the part of the debtor to pay such
installments yearly. In other words, each installment, if not paid, gave rise to
a separate cause of action, which might be the subject matter of suit by the
bank. The statute of limitations consequently began to run, as to each
unpaid installment, from the date the bank could sue the debtor. Article 1150
of the Civil Code states that "the time for the prescription for all kinds of
actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be
counted from the day they may be brought." Therefore, the prescriptive
period starts from the time when the creditor may file an action and not from
the time he wishes to do so.
In this case, the right of the bank to sue the debtor for the whole mortgage
debt had accrued when the fourth installment was not paid. This is because
of the stipulation that failure to pay one installment would mean all the
remaining amortizations would also become due and demandable. The bank
had waived its right to sue for the entire obligation under the acceleration
clause or for any unpaid installment.
However, SC clarified that only the fourth and fifth installments according to
the schedule of amortizations are no longer collectible. So the claim
beginning from sixth installment up to the tenth can be recovered by the
bank since they fall within the ten-year prescriptive period.
EH405 SY 2016-2017
 VICENTET.TAN,VICTAN&COMPANY,INC.,TRANSWORLDINVESTMEN
TCORPORATION,FIRSTINTERNATIONALINVESTMENTCOMPANY,INC
.,FAREASTPETROLEUM&MINERALSCORPORATION,andPHILCONTRU
STINTERNATIONALCORPORATION vs CA
FACTS:
A Reconveyance of Shares of Stocks was filed wherein respondent Tan
sough to recover shares of stocks owned by him and his associates in
Continental Bank which he had assigned to three corporations. He was
formerly arrested by the military authoritieson the basis of criminal charges
filed against himfor alleged irregular transactions at Continental Bank.
Because of a possible bank run as a result of the arrests, the officers of
Continental Bank requested an emergency loan to meet pending withdrawals
of depositors.However; Commercial and Savings Bank reported that
Continental Bank's assets cannot meet its liabilities, since the latter exceeded
the former by P 67.260 million. The latter was also insolvent and that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors and
creditors, which are the two grounds mandated under Section 29 of Republic
Act No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, justifying the closure
and placing under receivership of a bank.This led to the closure of
Continental Bank.
Respondent Tan executed certain agreements transferring and assigning
shares of stocks of Continental Bank as well as other properties belonging to
him and his affiliate firms to three corps. Which are the assignees to assume
liabilities and obligations of Tan and his companies? The assignees reopened
the bank under a different name which was Interbank. After 12 years, an
action had been filed for reconveyance of the said shares of stocks.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners' action against respondent is barred by
prescription?
HELD:
Yes, it has prescribed. However, SC does not accept that under Republic Act
No. 265, the action has prescribed, and that in any event, assuming that
Republic Act No. 265 is inapplicable, Article 1146 of the Civil Code is
nonetheless a bar.
With respect to Republic Act No. 265, the Court notes that the statute talks
of enjoining the Monetary Board from taking charge of a bank's assets.
However, the petitioners are not asking for an injunction against the
Monetary Board and the Board has since in fact ceased from performing any
act in connection with Continental Bank or its successor bank. Art. 1146 also
does not apply because the action filed was for reconveyance of the shares
of stock subject of that takeover, and not on account of any injury to the
petitioners' rights.Article 1146 speaks of "injury to the rights of the plaintiff
“and "quasi-delict". As the petitioners in fact very vehemently maintain in the
present petition, the cause of action is predicated on "reconveyance of
petitioners' shareholdings in the former Continental Bank under the doctrine
of constructive trust.
SC said that for movables (like shares of stocks), existence prescription are
summarized as:
1) Four years, if the possessor is in good faith;
2) Eight years in all other cases, except where the loss was due to a
crime in which case, the offender cannot acquire the movable by
prescription, and an action to recover it from him is imprescriptible.
It is evident, for purposes of the complaint in question, that the petitioners
had at most eight years within which to pursue a reconveyance, reckoned
from the loss of the shares in 1977, when the petitioner Vicente Tan
executed the various agreements in which he conveyed the same in favor of
the Executive Consultants, Inc., Orobel Property Management, Inc., and
Antolum Trading Corporation.
Since the complaint was filed on January 13, 1987, ten years more or less
after the petitioners transferred the shares in question, it is clear that the
petitioners have come to court too late.
It cannot be acceptedby SC the petitioners’ contentions that the period
during which authoritarian rule was in force had interrupted prescription and
that the same began to run only on February 25, 1986, when the Aquino
government took power.It cannot be said as a universal rule that the period
EH405 SY 2016-2017
from September 21, 1972 through February 25, 1986 involves
aforcemajeure.

Therefore, petition has been denied.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 Provident Savings Bank vs Court of Appeals
FACTS:
The spouses Guarins obtained a loan from Provident Savings Bank secured
by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land, payable on or before June
20, 1967.
The bank was placed under a receivership by the Central Bank of the
Philippines.
The Guarins were informed that the mortgaged property would be sold at
public auction on December 27, 1984 but the latter requested for a
recomputation of their acccount and postponement of the foreclosure
assuring the bank that they had the intention to pay their obligation.
The Guarins received a Statement of Account showing 2 outstanding
accounts. One was account of Lorenzo Guarin, and the other was the
account of L.K. Guarin Manufacturing Co.
The Guarins stated in their letter that they were willing to pay Lorenzo
Guarin’s obligation so the mortgaged title would be released.
The bank, however, replied that the mortgaged title would not be released
until the account of L.K. Guarin Manufacturing Co. was paid because the
mortgaged property also served as security for the indebtedness, which was
undertaken by Lorenzo Guarin in his personal capacity and as president of
the corporation.
Chua wrote the bank saying that the mortgaged property had been offered
to him as payment of the judgment he obtained against the Guarins in a civil
case. He requested the bank to the assignment and expressed his
willingness to pay for the obligation of the Guarins so that the mortgaged
title could be released.
The bank replied informing Chua that his request could be granted if he
would also settle the obligation of L.K. Guarin Manufacturing Co.
Chua filed a complaint against the bank to release the real estate mortgage
in his favor arguing that the bank had already lost whatever right or action
it had against the Guarins because of prescription. He claimed that since the
maortgage matured on June 20, 1967, the last day within which the bank
could have foreclosed the mortgage was on June 20, 1977.
The bank countered that it was not able to foreclose the mortgage because
it was place under a receivership from September 1972 to July 27, 1981.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of the bank to foreclose the mortgaged property
had already prescribed.
HELD:
No, the action of the bank to foreclose the mortgaged property had not yet
prescribed.
As a general rule, the appointment of a receiver does not dissolve the
corporation nor does it interfere with the exercise of its corporate rights.
This principle is applicable to a situation where there is no restraint imposed
on the corporation, unlike in the case at bar where the bank was specifically
forbidden and immobilized from doing business in the Philippines from 1972
t0 1981.
Since the foreclosure is part of the bank's business activity, which could not
have been pursued by the receiver, then the prescriptive period was legally
interrupted by fuerza mayor in 1972 on account on the prohibition imposed
by the Monetary Board against the bank from transacting business, until the
directive of the board was nullified in 1981.
The period during which the obligee was prevented by a caso fortuito from
enforcing his right is not reckoned against him (Article 1154, New Civil
Code). When prescription is interrupted, all the benefits acquired so far from
the possession cease and when prescription starts anew, it will be entirely a
new one.
This concept should not be equated with suspension where the past period is
included in the computation being added to the period after prescription is
resumed.
Consequently, when the closure of was set aside in 1981, the period of ten
years within which to foreclose under Article 1142 of the New Civil Code
began to run again.
Therefore, the action filed in 1986 to compel the bank to release the
mortgage on the ground that the action of the bank to foreclose the
mortgaged property had already prescribed was not correct.
In addtiion, the letter of Chua requesting the bank that he be allowed to pay
the loan secured by the mortgage was synonymous to an express
acknowledgment of the obligation and that the bank still had the right to
EH405 SY 2016-2017
foreclose the mortgaged property, which estopped Chua from claiming ISSUE:
otherwise.
Whether or not the prescription of the right of Caldo to seek the execution of
Philippine National Railways vs NLRC the April 16, 1973 decision was stopped by the resolution of PNR
acknowledging its debt and obligation to Caldo.

FACTS:
HELD:
On April 16, 1973, the Court of Industrial Relations promulgated judgment in
an unfair labor practice case in favor of Caldo against the Philippine National No. The theory that the resolution of the PNR Board of Directors of
Raliways (PNR) and its Personnel Manager. The Court ordered PNR to December 26, 1974, considered as a "written acknowledgment of the debt
reinstate Caldo and the other complainants to their former work with full by the debtor" within the meaning of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, did rot
backwages from the time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement. The merely interrupt and renew the prescription of the right to execute the
judgment became final and was ordered executed by Order dated September judgment but caused it to stop completely, placing it, as it were, in an
4, 1974. indefinite state of suspended animation, is fallacious. The effect of the
interruption spoken of in Article 1155 is to renew the obligation, to make
On December 26, 1974, the PNR Board of Directors, through a resolution,
prescription run again from the date of the interruption and not, to repeat, to
acknowledged the company's obligation under judgment.
cause it to stop running altogether
Caldo was paid his back salaries in full up to April 30, 1974 but he was not
In addition, the destruction by fire of the records of CIR Case No. 5414-ULP,
reinstated.
which allegedly occurred in December, 1983, cannot be regarded as having
On March 31, 1986, Caldo filed with the Labor Arbiters’ Office a motion for interrupted said period, for it obviously did not prevent Caldo from
reconstitution and for an alias writ of execution. He stated that the records attempting to reconstitute the records and instituting the action before the
of his case were among those destroyed during the fire that razed the office expiry of the period of ten years from finality of the judgment rendered
of the NLRC including its Records Office. He claimed that he should be therein. Hence, Article 1154, declaring that the "period during which the
entitled to additional back wages from May 1, 1974 up to March 13, 1986 on obligee was prevented by a fortuitous event from enforcing his right is not
which latter date he allegedly made known his non-interest to be reinstated. reckoned against him," is inapplicable.
He also claimed that he should be granted separation pay for 1 month of
every year of service from March 16, 1960 up to April 30, 1974 since his
reinstatement seemed impossible.
PNR filed a motion to quash the alias writ of execution on the ground that
the judgment was more than 10 years old and therefore, could not and
should not be enforced by a simple motion.
Caldo argued that there was a delay in the execution of judgment because in
December 1983, the records of the case were among those burned in the
fire that razed the NLRC Offices.
The Labor Arbiter held that when PNR and the board of directors of PNR
acknowledged through the resolution of its debt and obligation to Caldo, the
prescription of the right of Caldo to seek the execution of the April 16, 1973
decision was stopped.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 Ledesma vs Court of Appeals
FACTS:
On August 21, 1980, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation filed a civil case
against Ledesma to enforce the terms of Trust Receipt Agreement executed
by them on April 1, 1974 but which Ledesma had failed to comply with.
As summons could not be served on the latter, said case was dismissed
without prejudice on March 3, 1981.
On December 2, 1988, the bank instituted another civil case against
Ledesma on the same cause of action and subject matter.
Ledesma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription but was
dismissed. His petition for review on certiorari of the said judgment was also
denied.
In this present motion for reconsideration, Ledesma contended that since the
Trust Receipt Agreement was executed in 1974, the second civil action filed
by the bank in 1988, which is beyond the 10-year prescriptive period, had
already prescribed. He insisted that the prescriptive period continued to run
again after the first civil action filed by the bank.
HELD:
No, the second action filed by the bank had not yet prescribed.
Article 1155 of the Civil. Code provides that the 10-year prescriptive period
for filing an action on a written contract under Article 1144(1) of the Code, is
interrupted by
(a) the filing of an action,
(b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and
(c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
Article 1155 means that upon the cessation of the suspension of the
prescriptive period, the full period of prescription commences to run anew.
In this case, the filing of the first civil action by the bank in 1980 on the
Trust Receipt Agreement executed in 1974 interrupted the counting of the
prescriptive period. So after the filing of the first civil action by the bank, the
10-year prescriptive period starts to run anew.
Hence, the second civil action filed by the bank in 1988 had not yet
prescribed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second action filed by the bank had already prescribed.

EH405 SY 2016-2017
 The Overseas Bank of Manila vs. Geraldez

FACTS:
On February 16, 1966, Valenton and Juan obtained from the bank a credit
accommodation, which was secured by a chattel mortgage.
Written extrajudicial demands dated February 9, March 1 and 27, 1968,
November 13 and December 8, 1975 and February 7 and August 27, 1976
were made upon them but they refused to pay on the ground that their
obligation was assumed by a third party.
The bank alleged that the supposed assumption of obligation was made
without its consent. On October 15, 1976, the bank filed a complaint against
Teodosio Valenton and Andres A. Juan for the recovery of the sum of
money.
The trial court dismissed the complaint reasoning that the bank's cause of
action accrued on February 16, 1966 (the date of the manager's check for
P150,000 issued by the bank to the Republic Bank) and as the complaint was
filed on October 22, 1976 or more than ten years from the accrual of the
cause of action, the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations.

ISSUE:
Whether the bank’s cause of action had already expired.

HELD:
No, the bank’s cause of action had not yet expired.
The lower court erred in holding that each of the demand letters suspended
the prescriptive period for one day only. The interruption of the prescriptive
period by written extrajudicial demand means that the said period would
commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is the correct
meaning of interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of
the prescriptive period.
The last extrajudicial demand was made on August 27, 1976 so the 10-year
prescriptive period will start anew. Hence, the complaint filed by the bank
on October 15, 1976 was still within the 10-year prescriptive period even if
the credit accommodation was obtained on February 16, 1966.

EH405 SY 2016-2017