Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Property Digests Prefinals Yu To Edca
Property Digests Prefinals Yu To Edca
TOPIC: Possession and Kinds (Elements) MTC Decision: In favor of petitioner spouses Yu
RTC Decision: Affirmed
CA Decision: SET aside lower court’s decision. CA said that it was respondent Pacleb
SPS. ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE ONG YU, Petitioners, vs. BALTAZAR N. who had prior physical possession of the property as shown by his payment of real
PACLEB, (Substituted by ANTONIETA S PACLEB, LORNA PACLEB- estate taxes thereon.
GUERRERO, FLORENCIO C. PACLEB, and MYRLA C. PACLEB),
Respondents.G.R. No. 172172. February 24, 2009 Subsequently, Respondent Pacleb filed the instant case for removal of cloud from title
with damages to cancel the annotated Decision (*the one involving Javier*) and its
FACTS: Respondent Pacleb and his late first wife are the registered owners of a Certificate of Finality, from the title of the Langcaan Property. Alleging that the deed
parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan, Dasmarias, Cavite, covered by a TCT aka. (The of sale between him & late first wife with Del Rosario could not have possibly been
Langcaan Property). executed on February 27, 1992 as he was residing in the US and his late first wife
had already died 20 years ago.
The Langcaan Property became the subject of three (3) documents purporting to
transfer its ownership. During pendency of the instant case, respondent died. He was substituted by his
1. A Deed of Absolute Sale entered into between Spouses Pacleb and Del surviving spouse and the children with the first wife.
Rosario.
2. A Deed of Absolute Sale entered into between Del Rosario and Javier. RTC Decision: Dismissed respondents case and held that petitioner spouses are
3. A Contract to Sell entered between Javier and petitioner spouses Yu purchasers in good faith. The successive sales sealed the regularity of the purchase
Sps. Yu agreed to pay Javier a total consideration of P900,000. by petitioner spouses. Further, the *Javier Case* is already final and can no longer be
P600,000 (P200,000 as previous payment and P400,000 to be paid altered thus the RTC ordered cancellation of TCT in the name of respondent and the
upon execution of the contract) was acknowledged as received by issuance of a new title in the name of petitioner spouses.
Javier and P300,000 remained as balance.
Javier undertook to deliver possession of the Langcaan Property and to CA Decision: Reversed and set aside RTC. Petitioner spouses are not purchasers in
sign a deed of absolute sale within thirty (30) days from execution of good faith and that the Decision (*Javier Case*) did not transfer ownership of the
the contract. Langcaan Property to petitioners. Hence, this Petition.
All the aforementioned sales were not registered. ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for value and in
Petitioner spouses Yu filed with the RTC for specific performance and damages good faith.
against Javier to compel the latter to deliver to them ownership and possession, as 2. Whether or not ownership over the Langcaan Property was properly vested
well as title to the Langcaan Property. in petitioner spouses by virtue of the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93
(*Javier Case*)
In their Complaint, they alleged that Javier represented to them that the Langcaan
Property was not tenanted. They discovered it was tenanted by Ramon. Petitioner RULING:
spouses demanded the cancellation of their agreement and the return of their initial 1. We find petitioner spouses contentions without merit.
payment.
Petitioner Ernesto Yu testimony, stated that he inspected the Langcaan Property and
Ramon was however willing to vacate the property. Javier then promised to make talked with the tenant, Ramon, before he purchased the same. However, in his
arrangements with Ramon to vacate the property and to pay the latter his Complaint for specific performance and damages which he filed against Javier, he
disturbance compensation. Hence, they proceeded to enter into a Contract to Sell alleged that it was only after he had entered into an Agreement for the sale of the
canceling the Agreement mentioned. However, Javier failed to comply with his property and his initial payment of P200,000 that he discovered that the property was
obligations. indeed being tenanted by Ramon who lives in the said farm
Javier did not appear in the proceedings and was declared in default This inconsistency casts grave doubt as to whether petitioner spouses personally
RTC Decision: Javier is directed to deliver the certificate of title of the land to the inspected the property before purchasing it.
Sps. Yu. Said Decision and its Certificate of Finality were annotated on the TCT.
More importantly, however, several facts should have put petitioner spouses on
Petitioner spouses Yu and Ramon and the latter’s wife executed a Kusangloob na inquiry as to the alleged rights of their vendor, Javier, over the Langcaan Property.
Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayagng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan whereby
Ramon waived his tenancy rights over the Langcaan Property for P 500,000. a) the property remains to be registered in the name of respondent despite the
two (2) Deeds of Absolute SaleBoth deeds were not even annotated in the
Later, Respondent Pacleb filed a Complaint for annulment of deed of sale and other title of the Langcaan Property.
documents arising from it. He alleged that the deed of sale between Del Rosario was b) a perusal of the two deeds of absolute sale reveals that they were executed
spurious as their signatures thereon were forgeries. Respondent later dismissed the only about two (2) months apart and that they contain identical provisions.
case without prejudice. c) it is undisputed that the Langcaan Property is in the possession of Ramon,
the son of the registered owner. This bare fact alone should have made
Petitioner spouses Yu filed an action for forcible entry against respondent Pacleb with petitioner spouses suspicious as to the veracity of the alleged title of their
the MTC. They alleged that they had prior physical possession of the Langcaan vendor. Moreover, petitioner spouses could have easily verified the true
Property through their trustee, Ramon, until the latter was ousted by respondent.
2. Petitioner spouses argue that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 741- Private respondent appended to her application the tracing cloth plan of the property
93 as to the rightful owner of the Langcaan Property is conclusive and under the name of Sotero Bondal. The blue print,[3] dated February 27, 1991, was
binding upon respondent even if the latter was not a party thereto since it prepared and signed by Geodetic Engineer Bonifacio C. del Valle and approved by
involved the question of possession and ownership of real property, and is Ernesto L. Llave, Chief, Regional Surveys Division of the Lands Management Service.
thus not merely an action in personam but an action quasi in rem. Per Report[4] of the Land Registration Authority dated September 27, 1994, the
property was the subject of an application for registration (Cadastral Case No. 42,
In Domagas v. Jensen,[35] we distinguished between actions in personam and GLRO Cadastral Record No. 1324), but no decision has been rendered thereon, or if
actions quasi in rem . there had been any, no copy of the same was furnished to the [Land Registration
Authority]. The report also states that the property is covered by Free Patent No. V-
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action 13062 dated May 21, 1955.[5] Private respondent had also applied for a free patent
determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in over the property, but withdrew her application in a Letter [6] dated October 27,
personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its 1994 addressed to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region
nature and purpose, and by these only. V, Legaspi City.
In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject Private respondent adduced the following evidence and factual allegations to support
his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the her application before the RTC:
property.
The previous owner of Lot No. 4094, Sotero Bondal, sold the property
Civil Case No. 741-93 is an action for specific performance and damages filed by. The to Macario Monjardin, a brother of private respondents mother (her
obligations of Javier under the contract to sell attach to him alone, and do not burden Uncle). Macario declared the property in his name under a Tax Declaration in 1930
the Langcaan Property. and again in 1949 Since Macario was residing inManila and was unable to cultivate
the property, he asked his sister, respondent’s mother, to be his encargado. By then,
We have held in an unbroken string of cases that an action for specific performance private respondent was already a 17-year old substitute teacher who then
is an action in personam. accompanied her mother in supervising the planting and harvesting of palayand the
improvement of the lot.
Being a judgment in personam, Civil Case No. 741-93 is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. It Sometime in 1946, Macario sold the property and executed a deed of salein favor of
cannot bind respondent since he was not a party therein. Neither can respondent be the respondent’s motherand father but failed to declare the property for taxation
considered as privy thereto since his signature nor that of his late first wife, Angelita purposes under their names. Her parents later died intestate. Private respondent
Chan, were forged in the deed of sale. executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Adjudication where she declared that as sole
heir of the spouses Igmedio Patricio, she was the sole owner of the property.
All told, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals finding that, as between
respondent and petitioner spouses, respondent has a better right over the Langcaan However, Lot No. No. 4094 was declared for taxation purposes under the name of
Property as the true owner thereof. Socorro where she paid the realty taxes over the property. When cross-examined,
private respondent admitted that she had no copy of the deed of sale executed
by Sotero Bondalin favor of Macario Monjardin.
Clearly, the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession over the
acquired ownership over the subject property as there is no substantive evidence to missing funds. Hence, the element of juridical possession being absent, petitioner
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa.
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners
can date back their possession, according to their own evidence is to the year 1948.
Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
FACTS: Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a 4,234-square meter parcel of land situated In fact, the agreement on March 1, 1989 to a resurvey and swapping of lots for the
in Iba, Zambales, described as Lot G. In August 1954, Marcelo died, survived by his purpose of reconstructing the land titles is substantial proof of Marcelino's good faith,
wife Higinia and his children (Marcelino, Lorenzo, Daniel, Cecilio, Natividad, Juan sincerity of purpose and lack of intention to hold on to two lots.
xxx) . Sometime in 1949, five years before he died, Marcelo allowed his son,
Marcelino, to build his house on a portion on Lot G, now the southernmost portion of Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least until the time he was informed by
Lot 1-E. Since then, Marcelino resided thereon. Later, Marcelino's son also built his respondents of his encroachment on their property.
house on the disputed property.
In August 17, 1964, Marcelo's heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves the TOPIC: POSSESSION; Concept of good faith
parcel of land owned by Marcelo (Lot G). A consolidated subdivision plan revealed
that Marcelino and his son occupied and built their houses on the southernmost IGNACIA NEGRETE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
portion of another lot (Lot 1-E) and not the adjacent lot designated to him (Lot G-1). MARINDUQUE and IGMEDIO MADERAZO, represented by his legal
The owners of the said lot, spouses Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal (respondents), representative CATALINO MADERAZO, defendants-appellees.
confronted Marcelino on this matter which resulted to an agreement to a re-survey G.R. No. 31267 November 24, 1972
and swapping of lots for the purpose of reconstruction of land titles. However, the
agreed resurvey and swapping of lots did not materialize. Facts: Claiming that since 1945 she and her late husband had been in continuous
and peaceful possession of a parcel of land with an area of nine (9) hectares more or
Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal filed a complaint for Recover of Possession with damages less in sitio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8431 in
against Marcelino before the MTC of Iba, Zambales. They alleged that Marcelino her name, Ignacia Negrete filed on July 28, 1956 a forcible entry suit against the
introduced improvements in bad faith on their land with knowledge that the adjacent Igmedio Maderazo in the municipal court of Mogpog alleging among others that on
lot is titled in his name. Marcelino contends that respondents have no cause of action January 7, 1956, said defendant, through strategy, force, intimidation, and stealth
against him because he has been in possession in good faith since 1949 with the unlawfully entered the northern portion of said parcel of land, said northern portion
respondents’ knowledge and acquiescence. He further avers that acquisitive comprising an area of about four hectares.
prescription has set in.
MTC rendered a decision in favor of Marcelino. The RTC reversed the decision of the To expedite the proceedings, the municipal court directed the chief of police of
MTC saying that Marcelino's possession was in the concept of a co-owner and Mogpog to conduct an ocular inspection of the disputed land to determine whether
therefore prescription does not run in his favor; that his possession, which was
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405
8
the land area cultivated by the defendant is the same land claimed by the plaintiff-
appellant as the northern portion of her land under Tax Declaration No. 8431.
Topic: Concept of Good Faith
MTC found that the defendant has not unlawfully entered the land in dispute on
January 7, 1956 as alleged by the plaintiffs, he being in the material and physical
possession of the said land prior to the date of the incident. NATY BALTAZAR, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellees, vs. SILVINA CARIDAD, ET
AL., defendants and appellants.
Instead of appealing from the aforesaid decision of the municipal court of Mogpog, G.R. No. L-23509, June 23,1966
plaintiff-appellant filed on January 18, 1967 — after the lapse of ten (10) years — an
action for recovery of ownership of property (reivindicacion) against defendant. Facts: -In a cadastral proceeding, the trial court rendered decision dated January 23,
1941 awarding Lot No. 8864 to the sps Julio Baltazar and Constancia Valencia as their
Defendant contends that he bought for P150.00 on August 30, 1954 the northern conjugal property. Said decision became final.
portion of about 3,5700 square meters which is now covered by a tax declaration in
his name from Tito Oriendo, who declared it for taxation in 1949 and interposes as Julio Baltazar, the registered owner of said Lot died. On December 6, 1961, his
special defense that the action had been barred by the statute of limitation for surviving wife and children, as petitioners, filed a motion, in the cadastral case
plaintiff-appellant filed this present action over ten (10) years after he purchased the praying for writ of possession against respondents Silvina Caridad and her daughter,
property. Eduarda Caridad, who had been in possession of the southern portion of said Lot
since 1939, while the cadastral case involving said lot was pending before the trial
Issue: Whether or not action has prescribed. court, and before the decision was rendered and the corresponding decree issued in
1941.
Ruling: No, the action has not prescribed. Defendant insists that he has acquired
ownership over the disputed parcel by ordinary prescription through adverse The trial court granted petitioners' motion. The order having become final, the sheriff
possession of only ten (10) years. But ordinary acquisitive prescription of immovables enforced the writ and placed petitioners in possession of the southern portion of the
and other real rights thru adverse possession of ten (10) years, requires possession lot.
"in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law". In the absence of a just
title or good faith, ownership of immovables can be acquired by extraordinary Petitioners presented a motion to compel respondents Eduarda Caridad and her
prescription thru an uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty (30) years. The law mother to remove their respective houses which they built in 1958 and 1959,
defines a possessor in good faith as one who is not aware of any flaw in his title or respectively, in the southern portion of the disputed lot, and, in the event of their
mode of acquisition; and conversely, one who is aware of such a flaw is a possessor failure to do so, to order the sheriff to demolish the same.
in bad faith. The essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest
belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of Trial court granted petitioners' motion, ordering respondents to remove their
intention to overreach another. respective houses within 30 days from receipt of said order.
A deed of sale, to constitute a just title and to generate good faith for the ordinary Respondents-appellants question the power or jurisdiction of the trial court, sitting as
acquisitive prescription of ten (10) years, should refer to the same parcel of land, a cadastral court, to order the removal of their respective houses which were built in
which is adversely possessed. In the case at bar, the deed of sale in favor of the the disputed lot long after the issuance of the final decree of registration. They insist
deceased Igmedio Maderazo covers a parcel of land patently different from the that they are builders in good faith of the houses in question, and, as such,
disputed land owned by plaintiff-appellant as to area, location and boundary owners. they are accorded rights under Article 448 of the new Civil Code.
The disputed parcel contains an area of about nine (9) hectares, and is situated in
sitio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque. On the other hand, the parcel of land Issues: 1.Whether or not Silvina and Eduarda Caridad were builders in good faith.
purchased on August 30, 1954 by the defendant from Tito Oriendo for P150 is (Topic)
situated in barrio Puyog, Boac, Marinduque. It was also found that the ocular 2. Whether or not the Court erred in compelling Silvina and Eduarda Caridad to
inspection commissioned by the lower court in the ejectment case appears to have remove their respective houses from the disputed lot.
been signed by only two commissioners, namely, Constancio Marte and Igmedio
Maderazo. It was not signed by Teodoro Lagustin, the alleged commissioner of the Held: 1. Appellants cannot be regarded as builders in good faith because they are
plaintiff. Defendant admits that he is a resident of barrio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, bound by the 1941 decree of registration that obligated their parents and
Marinduque. As the buyer, he knew what lot was sold to him. And having signed as predecessors-in-interest. Good faith must rest on a colorable right in the builder,
vendee the deed of sale in his favor, he is conclusively presumed to have read the beyond a mere stubborn belief in one's title despite judicial adjudication. The fact
deed of sale, which clearly states that the parcel he acquired is located in barrio that in 1959 appellants demolished and replaced their old house with new and bigger
Puyog, Boac, Marinduque. ones cannot enervate the rights of the registered owners. Otherwise, the rights of the
latter to enjoy full possession of their registered property could be indefinitely
Hence, not being a possessor in good faith, defendant can acquire ownership over defeated by an unsuccessful opponent through the simple subterfuge of replacing his
the disputed parcel of land of about nine (9) hectares belonging to plaintiff-appellant old house with a new one from time to time.
only by extraordinary acquisitive prescription thru an uninterrupted adverse
possession of thirty (30) years. Since he occupied the same for only about thirteen 2. Respondents do not dispute that during the pendency of the cadastral proceeding,
(13) years from 1954 until 1967, when his adverse possession was interrupted by the rendition of the judgment and issuance of the final decree of registration in favor of
filing of the action for reivindicacion on January 18, 1967. Julio Baltazar, the late Andres Caridad, his surviving spouse, respondent Silvina
Caridad, and their children, one of whom is respondent Eduarda Caridad, were in
possession of the southern portion of the disputed lot; and that respondent Eduarda
The trial court rendered a partial decision against the City of Dagupan, Annulling (sic) Topic: ACQUISITION OF POSESSION; Recourse to Courts
the Deed of Sale executed by the Administrator being null and void ab initio. It is
essential and mandatory that the interested parties be given notices of the REYNALDO VILLAFUERTE and PERLITA T. VILLAFUERTE, petitioners, vs.]
application for authority to sell the estate or any portion thereof which is pending HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EDILBERTO DE MESA and GONZALO DALEON,
settlement in a probate court. An order issued by a probate court for the sale of real respondents.
property belonging to the estate of a deceased person would be void if no notice for GR No. 134239, May 26, 2005
the hearing of the petition for such sale is given.
Facts: Sps. Villafuerte operated a gasoline station on the premises of three adjoining
The City of Dagupan is not a purchaser in good faith and for value as the former lots owned by several persons. One of these lots were owned by Edilberto de Mesa
judicial administrator, Oscar Maneclang, testified that he was induced by then while another is owned by Gonzalo and Federico Daleon. The remaining lots were
incumbent Mayor. owned by Anicia Yap-Tan, the mother of the wife of Villafuerte. De Mesa and Daleon
acquired their lots subject to the lease by Petrophil Corporation which had built the
ISSUEs: gasoline station managed by the Villafuertes. When the lease to Petrophil expired, the
1. Whether or not the sale executed by the judicial administrator to the City of Villafuertes obtained a new lease from de Mesa for a period of one year. However,
Dagupan is null and void ab initio with regard to the lot owned by Daleon, the Villafuertes were not able to secure a
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405
13
lease renewal, but instead received demand letters for them to vacate which the been occupying the property for the last 20 years and that the possession of the said
subsequently ignored. portion was with the knowledge, consent, and tolerance of the co-owners.
Due to this, a complaint for ejectment was filed by Daleon against the Villafuertes The MeTC dismissed the ejectment case which was upheld by the RTC, citing that the
wherein no settlement was reached. After the expiration of the lease contract with theArambulos have the right to retain possession of the property pursuant to Article
de Mesa, the Villafuertes continued to operate the gas station despite the demands to 448 of the CC. However, the CA reversed the ruling, citing that Gungab, having a
vacate. genuine TCT, has the preferred right to possess. They deemed that the claim of co-
On an early morning, de Mesa and Daleon, with the aid of several persons and ownership was unsubstantiated.
without the knowledge of the Villafuertes, caused the closure of the gasoline station
by constructing fences around it. Due to this, the Villafuertes countered with a Issue: Whether or not Gungab can eject the Arambulos
complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against de Mesa and
Daleon. The Villafuertes amended their complaint to include the computation for Ruling: The evidence showed that respondent has a Torrens Title over the land.
damages. De Mesa and Daleon, in their defense, stated that they did the fencing
because of the Villafuerte’s refusal to vacate. The lower court denied the application The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that respondent, as registered owner, is
for preliminary mandatory injunction stating that they have no more right to stay on preferred to possess it. The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title
the premises. For the damages claimed by the Villafuertes, the Court ruled in favor over a land is entitled to possession thereof. Except for petitioners unsubstantiated
of the spouses and ordered de Mesa and Daleon to pay damages. The Court ruled claim that Victoria Arambulo is a co-owner of the property, they have not presented
that though the spouses were deemed undersirable lessees, it was improper for de other justification for their continued stay thereon.
Mesa and Daleon to resort to fencing their properties to remove them. The CA
affirmed the lower court’s decision but with modification of the amount for damages. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them is bound by an implied promise that they will
Issue: vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the
Whether or not the CA erred in substantially reducing the amount of damages proper remedy against them. Notably, Anastacia Reyes only allowed petitioners to
awarded by the trial court. use and occupy certain portions of the subject property. They admitted their use and
possession of these portions of the subject property had been with the knowledge,
Ruling: consent and tolerance of all the other co-owners. Consequently, after respondent
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the lease contracts obtained title to the subject property and withdrew her tolerance later on, Arambulo’s
between the Villafuertes and de Mesa and Daleon over the latters respective lots had refusal to vacate it rendered their possession thereof unlawful.
already expired. There was also a congruence of findings that it was wrong for
private respondents to fence their properties thereby putting to a halt the operation Since Arambulo’s occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance, they are
of the gasoline station. not entitled to retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code. They are
aware that their tolerated possession may be terminated any time and they cannot
Article 536 of the Civil Code explicitly provides for the proper recourse of one who be considered as builders in good faith.
claims to be entitled to the possession of a thing. When private respondents
personally took it upon themselves to evict petitioners from their properties, which Moreover, as aptly found by the Court of Appeals, the Arambuloshave not presented
act was in clear contravention of the law, they became liable for all the necessary and evidence to prove that they made improvements on the subject property and
natural consequences of [their] illegal act. (actually mao rani ang related sa topic. the defrayed the expenses therefor. Moreover, the Courtdid not sustain the Arambulos
rest was a discussion on the award for damages) contention that since they had possession of the subject property, they are entitled to
remain there. Again, they confuse unlawful detainer with forcible entry. Prior physical
possession by the plaintiff is not necessary in an unlawful detainer case. It is enough
Topic: ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION; Possession by mere tolerance that she has a better right of possession. Prior physical possession of a property by a
party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the
VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO and MIGUEL R. ARAMBULO III, Petitioners, vs. defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property, but his possession
EMERENCIANA R. GUNGAB, Respondent. eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess.
G.R. No. 156581, September 30, 2005
Thus, the Arambulos’ prior physical possession of the property does not automatically
Facts: Emerciana Gungab is the registered owner of the contested parcel of land entitle them to continue in said possession and does not give them a better right to
with improvements in Quezon City. In separate letters, Gungab made a formal the property.
demand to Victoria and Miguel Arambulo to vacate the subject property which the
latter refused. Because of their falure to amicably settle the issue in the barangay,
Gungab filed a separate ejectment complaint against Arambulo, alleging that she Topic: ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION; Possession by mere tolerance
tolerated the occupancy of Arambulo without rent and that they refused to vacate
upon demand. SPS. NARCISO BARNACHEA and JULITA BARNACHEA (now heirs of
Arambulo, in defense, asserting that Arambulo is a co-owner of the deceased Julita Barnachea), Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
property.Arambulo alleged that after Pedro Reyes, the father of Emerciana and HON. OSCAR C. HERRERA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 20, Malolos,
Victoria, died, the property became part of the common properties of the Reyes clan. Bulacan, HON., HORACIO T. VIOLA, Presiding Judge, MTC Pulilan, Bulacan,
Through the permission given by the wife of Pedro (Anastancia), the Arambulos have and SPS. AVELINO and PRISCILLA IGNACIO, Respondents.
GR No. 150025, July 23, 2008
Facts: Ignacio filed a complaint for ejectment against Barnachea before the MTC.
The subject matter were lots titled to the Ignacios which are adjacent to the propert
that Barnachea owns and occupies. The properties were originally part of the land
owned by a certain Luis Santos in which it was inherited by his daughter Purificacion
Santos Imperial. The land was then subdivided and transferred to tenant-farmers
Santiago Isidro and Procopio de Guzman. The Ignacios own the land from Usudri
while the Ignacios own the land from de Guzman. To avert the implementation of the Topic: ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION; Possession by mere tolerance
writ of exection obtained by Ignacio, Barnachea filed a Notice of Appeal. Pending the
resolution on the issue of ejectment, Ignacio’s sister (Leticia) filed a petition for SPS. RICARDO AND LYDIA LLOBRERA, et.al., Petitioners, vs. JOSEFINA V.
Quieting of Title with the RTC. Due to this, Barnachea filed an urgent motion for FERNANDEZ, Respondent
suspension of proceedings which was denied by the RTC. GR No. 142882, May 2, 2006
Issue: Facts: Fernandez, as one of the registered co-owners of the subject land, served a
Whether or not the pendency of an action involving the issue of ownership is writted demand letters to the Sps. Llobrera. The latter refused to vacate which led to
sufficient basis for the suspension of an ejectment proceeding between the same the filing of a formal complaint in the Barangay. With the failure to amicably settle
parties and the same subject matter. the dispite, Fernandez filed a complaint for ejectment and damages against Llobrera
before the MTCC. Llobrera alleged in their Answer that they had been occupying the
Ruling: No. property in question beginning the year 1945 onwards, when their predecessors-in-
interest, with the permission of Gualberto de Venecia, one of the other co-owners of
The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are similar because they are both said land, developed and occupied the same on condition that they will pay their
summary actions where the issue is purely physical possession.[8] Other than these monthly rental of P20.00 each. From then on, they have continuously paid their
commonalities, however, they possess dissimilarities that are clear, distinct, and well monthly rentals to Gualberto de Venecia or Rosita de Venecia or their
established in law. representatives, such payments being duly acknowledged by receipts. Beginning
sometime June 1996, however, the representative of Gualberto de Venecia refused to
In forcible entry, (1) the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession accept their rentals, prompting them to consign the same to Banco San Juan, which
of the property until he was deprived of possession by the defendant; (2) the bank deposit they continued to maintain and update with their monthly rental
defendant secures possession of the disputed property from the plaintiff by means of payments.
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; hence, his possession is unlawful from
the beginning; (3) the law does not require a previous demand by the plaintiff for the The MTCC ruled in favor of Fernandez and ordered Llobrera to vacate the premises.
defendant to vacate the premises; and (4) the action can be brought only within one- The RTC and CA affirmed this judgement of the lower court.
year from the date the defendant actually and illegally entered the property.
Issue: Whether or not Llobrera’s possession of the property is founded on contract
In marked contrast, unlawful detainer is attended by the following features: (1) prior or not.
possession of the property by the plaintiff is not necessary; (2) possession of the
property by the defendant at the start is legal but the possession becomes illegal by Ruling: No. This factual issue was resolved by the three (3) courts below in favor of
reason of the termination of his right to possession based on his or her contract or Fernandez, citing that there is an absence of any written memorandum of the alleged
other arrangement with the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff is required by law to make a lease arrangements.From the absence of proof of any contractual basis for
demand as a jurisdictional requirement; and (4) the one-year period to bring the Llobrera’spossession of the subject premises, the only legal implication is that their
complaint is counted from the date of the plaintiffs last demand on the defendant. possession thereof is by mere tolerance.InRoxas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court
ruled:
In this case, a plain reading of the complaint shows Ignacio positions that they was in A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or
prior possession of the disputed property; that Ignacio allowed them to occupy the permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
disputed property by tolerance; that Ignacio eventually made a demand that the implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary
Barnachea vacate the property (on August 26, 1998, which demand them received on action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
August 31, 1998); and that the Barnachea refused to vacate the property in light of
the defenses they presented. Separately from the complaint, Ignacio characterized The judgment favoring the ejectment of petitioners being consistent with law and
the action they filed against Barnachea in the MTC as an unlawful detainer when they jurisprudence can only be affirmed. The alleged consignation of the P20.00 monthly
stated in their memorandum that as alleged in the complaint, what was filed by rental to a bank account in respondents name cannot save the day for the petitioners
Ignacio was an ejectment suit for unlawful detainer. simply because of the absence of any contractual basis for their claim to rightful
possession of the subject property. Consignation based on Article 1256 of the Civil
The issue in an unlawful detainer case is limited to physical possession. When a claim Code indispensably requires a creditor-debtor relationship between the parties, in the
of ownership is used as a basis for de facto possession or to assert a better absence of which, the legal effects thereof cannot be availed of.
possessory right, the court hearing the case may provisionally rule on the issue of
ownership. As a rule, however, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same
property does not justify the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. Topics: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Possessor v. Owner
WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORPORATION, ILOILO MULTI PARTS SUPPLY SC stressed that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises
CORP., VIRGILIO ANG, SOUTHERN SALES CORP. and CHANG LIANG, JR., the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and STAR GROUP RESOURCES resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the MTC, MeTC and MCTC have the
AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., respondents. competence to resolve “the issue of ownership....only to determine the issue of
G.R. No. 97637, April 10, 1992 possession.” Hence, Petition was dismissed
FACTS: Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation (or Ramon Que), Iloilo, Multi Parts Supply
Corporation (or Ramon Que), Virgilio Ang, Henry Tan, Southern Sales Corporation, TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
and Chang Liang, Jr. were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas standing on Possession
registered land in Iloilo City owned in common by Lucy A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R. Locsin,
Lourdes C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin and Ester L. Jarantilla. After the expiration of the JOSE DE LUNA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SANTIAGO G.
period in the lease agreement, lessor executed an Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of MALIWANAG, RTC EXECUTIVE JUDGE, BRANCH 71, IBA, ZAMBALES; JUAN
Star Group Resources and Development. DIMAANO, JR. and GERINO DOBLE, respondents.
G.R. 94490, August 6, 1992
In the Deed of Sale, it was stated that vendee shall henceforth deal with the lessees
and occupants of the properties herein sold without any further warranty or FACTS: De Luna filed a case for forcible entry, alleging that he is the owner of an
obligation on the part of the Vendors. unregistered parcel of land in San Juan, Zambales since 1938. However, on
December 18 and 19 1971 Daclison et al (Daclison, Crispin, Doble and Dimaano)
Being the vendee, Star Group then filed an action of unlawful detainer against entered the land and began plowing it and even fenced the land with barbed wire
Wilmon Auto Supply. and began planting sugar cane.
Petitioner refused to concede invoking that the lessors violated their leasehold rights Petitioners prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay him the
because they were not accorded with: 1) rights of pre-emption; 2) buyer is not amount of P45.00 monthly per hectare until possession thereof would be transferred
required to honor leases; 3) the lessees were denied the option to renew to him, with litigation expenses and costs.
their leases upon the expiration thereof.
Defendants denied the allegations in the complaint. Daclison, Crispin and Doble deny
These same propositions were also raised in the case it filed with the RTC. In the ever entering the and occupying the disputed property. Dimaano for his part claimed
unlawful detainer cases, it was decided by the MTC that the case should proceed that De Luna was not the owner of the property, it was owned by Dequina who had
against some of the lessees but not with the others. The lessees filed a motion for declared the property in his name for taxation. It was alleged that when Dequina
reconsideration but it was denied. They filed a petition for certiorari and the RTC held died, his son took over and leased the property to Dimaano. Dequina is actually the
in the end that the pendency of the case in the RTC did not warrant suspension of uncle of De Luna.
the unlawful detainer case with the MTC.
MTC ruled in favor of De Luna. RTC revered the decision of the MTC, CA affirmed
ISSUE: Whether or not the unlawful detainer suits in MTC against petitioner, lessees, RTC decision.
for the reason that their lease had expired, should be abated by the action filed in ISSUE: Whether or not De Luna is entitled to the possession of the property
RTC by lessees based on the contention that they are entitled to a right of pre-
emption/prior purchase of the leased premises. RULING: Yes, De Luna is entitled to the possession.
Well-established is the rule in ejectment cases that the only issue to be resolved
RULING: No, an ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed with the RTC therein is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises, or
based on a tenant’s claim of his right of pre-emption being violated. possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership that either party may set
forth in their pleadings. If petitioner can prove prior possession in himself, he may
The Court gave relevant precedents such as: recover such possession from even the owner himself. Whatever may be the
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405
18
character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority time, he has the On 17 March 1979, petitionerSemira entered the subject parcel and began the
security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a construction of a new rice-mill. However, on 18 April 1979, a complaint for forcible
person having a better right by either accionpubliciana or entry was filed against him by Buenaventura An in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
accionreindivicatoria. Taysan-Lobo. The latter claimed that the area of Lot 4221 was 822.5 square meters
only and that the excess of 1,377 square meters forcibly occupied by petitioner
Dimaano may have claimed to possess the property by virtue of a lease agreement formed part of the land he owned. Private respondent insists that he only sold 822.5
by the alleged owner, but the RTC is wrong to conclude that Dequina owns the square meters, hence, his nephew could not have transferred a bigger area to
subject property. petitioner.On the other hand, petitionerSemira claims that he owns the entire 2,200
square meters since it is the size of Lot 4221following its established boundaries.
De Luna proved through substantia evidence that he had prior possession of the
property and established by witnesses, notably by his own tenants (possession by Issues:
Dilag, his lessee, can be proven since 1953 and since possession can be exercised in 1. Whether or not the question of ownership is so necessarily involved that it
the name of another, it positively redounds to De Luna) would be impossible to decide the question of bare possession without first
setting that of ownership.
Witnesses also state that De Luna has cultivated the land from 1938 to 1941 with his 2. Whether or not petitioner Semira’s ejectment from the disputed area,
mother and leased the property to the witness despite the absence of clear and indubitable proof that private respondent
had prior physical possession, was proper; and
On the other hand, Dimaano failed to prove DequinaJr’sprior possession, much less
ownership over the land. The mere fact that Dequina Sr. declared the property for Ruling: 1. In the instant case, the issue of possession cannot be decide
taxation purposes does not constitute possession. independently of the question of ownership. The question of who has prior
possession hinges on the question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. was the And the latter, in turn, depends on whether such portion is part of Buenaventura An’s
owner of the disputed property since there is no evidence whatsoever to support property or that of Lot 4221 of petitioner Semira.
such a conclusion.
We sustain petitioner Semira’s contention that he owns the entire 2,200 square
However, it goes without saying that this case does not bar petitioner and Agustin meters since it is the size of Lot 4221 following its established boundaries. We have
Dequiña, Jr. from resolving the issue of ownership over the disputed property in an repeatedly ruled that where land is sold for a lump sum and not so much per unit of
appropriate proceeding. Hence, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and measure or number, the boundaries of the land stated in the contract determine the
SET ASIDE. Costs against private respondents. effects and scope of the sale, not the area thereof. Hence, the vendors are obligated
to deliver all the land included within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real
area should be greater or smaller than that recited in the deed. This is particularly
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of true where the area is described as" humigitkumulang," that is, more or less.
Possession
Hence, when private respondent Buenaventura An sold Lot 4221 to his nephew
Cipriano Ramirez by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" which incorporated
MIGUEL SEMIRA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BUENAVENTURA both the area and the definite boundaries of the lot, the former transferred not
AN, respondents. merely the 822.5 square meters stated in their document of sale but the entire area
G.R. No. 76031, 2 March 1994 circumscribed within its boundaries.
Facts:
Lot 4221of petitionerSemira, the subject parcel of the present controversy, was once 2. No, the ejectment for forcible entry was not proper, absent any clear and
owned by private respondent Buenaventura An. Private respondent previously indubitable proof that private respondent had prior physical possession.
acquired the subject parcel from a certain Juana Gutierrez for P850.00 bymeans of a
"Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" executed on 4 January 1961. Aside from the Considering the facts established in this case, it is not difficult to sustain petitioner
estimated area of 822.5 square meters appearing in the deed of sale, the boundaries Semiraover private respondent Buenaventura Anwhen the latter failed even to prove
of the lot were also stated. prior possession in his favor. Absent such element, it cannot be said that he was
forcibly deprived of the disputed portion. Hence, his action for forcible entry must fail.
Buenaventura An sold the same to his nephew, Cipriano Ramirez, in 1972 for the
lump sum of P2,500.00 also by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" It should be emphasized, however, that the case before us is merely an action of
whichlikewise incorporated both the estimated area and the definite boundaries of forcibleentry and that the issue of ownership was decided for the sole purpose of
the land. Cipriano Ramirez, in turn, sold the lot to petitionerSemira in 1979 with the resolving priority of possession. Hence, any pronouncement made affecting
very same boundaries mentioned in the deed of sale executed in his favor by his ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence,
uncle Buenaventura An.However, the area stated in the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
Lupa" was 2,200 square meters and not 822.5 appearing in the previous document. land
As delimited by its boundaries, the lot is actually much bigger than 822.5 square
meters. This was confirmed by the Taysan Cadastral Mapping Survey conducted in
1974 where it is definitely stated that the area of Lot 4221 is 2,200 square meters;
hence, the reason for the change. TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
In 1934, Resurrection also filed an answer in the same cadastral proceeding claiming Rule 132 provides that:
ownership over the lot with an area of 864 square meters (take note on the Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. – Where a private writing is
difference in the area of lot claimed by Ursula). Resurrection alleged that the lot was more than 30 years old, is produced from a custody in which it would
inherited from her grandparents. naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authority
need be given.
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405
22
FACTS: Petitioner Francisco Alonso, who died pendente lite and substituted by his
In this case, it appeared that the document was executed in 1917, it was more than legal heirs, was the only son and sole heir of the late Tomas Alonso and Asuncion
30 years when it was offered as an evidence in 1983. It was also presented in the Medalle. Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents and records showing
court by the proper custodian (Dominador, the heir of Ursula). However, the IAC that his father acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the
failed to consider and discuss THAT NO ALTERATION OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF Government of the Philippine Islands in or about the year 1911 in accordance with
SUSPICION ARE PRESENT. the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120). The documents showed that the original vendee
of the subject lot assigned his sales certificate to petitioner's father, who completed
On its face, the document appeared without alteration, but the MISSING PAGE, the required installment payments thereon under Act No. 1120 and was consequently
nonetheless affected the authenticity of the document. The signature is a vital proof issued a patent. The Director of Lands executed a final deed of sale in favor of
in the voluntary transmission of rights over the sale of the lot. IT’S INCOMPLETENESS petitioner's father. However, the deed was not registered with the Register of Deeds
IS FAR MORE WORSE THAN A DOCUMENT WITH AN ALTERED CONTENT (char sad because of lack of technical requirements as required by law.
sa SC uy.)
Upon investigation of the status of the land, petitioner found out that the title of Lot
Moreover, the genuineness of the document is also suspicious. The sale was No. 727 had been administratively reconstituted from the owner's duplicate under a
executed in 1917. Ursula would have had it in her possession in 1933 when she Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of United Service Country Club, Inc.,
answered the cadastral proceeding. But it turned out, she only claimed that purchase predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. Upon order of the court, the name of the
was the mode of acquisition of the lot after he sister in law (MARIA BARTOLOME) registered owner in the said TCT was changed to Cebu Country Club, Inc.
sought the intervention in the proceeding allrging co-ownership.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint for declaration of nullity and
ALL OF THE ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES NEGATES THE CONCLUSION OF THE non-existence of deed/title, cancellation of certificates of title and recovery of
APPELEATE COURT THAT THE DOCUMENT IS COVERED UNDER THE RULES IN property against defendant Cebu Country Club, Inc. which the trial court decided in
ANCEINT DOCUMENT. favor of the defendant. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court.
The Supreme Court also discussed that even if rules of ancient document would
apply, it is still infirm. Under article 834 of the OLD CIVIL CODE, Maria Gonzales, as a ISSUE: Who has the better right over the said lot?
surviving spouse, shall be entitled to a portion IN USUFRUCT equal to that
corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that neither Tomas Alonso nor his son petitioner
who has not received any betterment, until it had been determined by means of Francisco Alonso, or the latter's heirs, are the lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in
liquidation of the deceased spouse’s estate that a portion of the conjugal property dispute. The petitioner was not able to secure a Torrens title, in fact the Secretary of
remained after all the debts and obligations had been paid. Hence, in the absent of Agriculture and Natural Resources declined their application.
proof that the estate of Epitacio (deceased spouse of Maria G.) had been settled,
Maria G. has no right to sell not even the portion of the lot in dispute in this case. Neither has the respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc. been able to establish a clear
title over the contested estate. The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance
2. No, SC holds that the institution of the cadastral proceeding, or atleast the of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not
publication of notice, has the effect of suspending the running of prescriptive period. determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
IAC erred in ruling acquisitive prescription in favour of Ursula. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest
ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.
Neither Ursula can assert that acquisitive prescription was already in effect before the
institution of the cadastral proceeding because Bernabe (husband of Ursula) declared
the lot 11165 as his own only on 1925. The cadastral proceeding started in 1933. It TOPIC: INDICIA OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION
fell short of the 10 years actual, adverse and uninterrupted period of possession.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
OTHERS: COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF DEMOCRITO O. PLAZA , respondents.
G.R. No. 146874, July 20, 2006
Payment of taxes (as declared by Ursula during the pendency of the cadastral case)
does not prove ownership. It merely is an indicium of a claim of ownership. FACTS: Subject property was first owned by Santos de la Cruz who declared this
under Tax Declaration for the year 1913; 1917; and 1921. Property was successively
WHEREFORE, IAC decision was reversed and set aside. The eastern portion of Lot. bought by Pedro Cristobal, Regino Gervacio, Diego Calugdan and Gil Alhambra. To
11165 with an area of 772 sq. m. was adjudicated in favor to the heirs of Epitacio evidence their respective acquisition of the property in question, Tax Declaration
while the remaining area is hereby adjudicated in favour to the heirs of Doroteo. 1923; 1927, and for 1934. After Gil Alhambra died, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned
the property and declared it in their names under Tax Declaration for the year 1960
TOPIC: INDICIA OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION On 5 July 1966, the heirs executed a "Deed of Sale With Mortgage" deeding the
subject property to petitioner appellee. After the sale, Plaza took possession and paid
the taxes due for the years 1966 up to 1986, and in 1985 declared it in his name
FRANCISCO M. ALONSO, substituted by his heirs, petitioners, vs. CEBU under Tax Declaration. He appointed Mauricio Plaza and Jesus Magcanlas as the
COUNTRY CLUB, INC., respondent. administrator and caretaker, respectively. Due to losses, the property in question was
GR 130876 January 21, 2002 cultivated only for a while—Five (5) years according to Mauricio Plaza, and from 1966
up to 1978 according to Jesus Magcanlas
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405
23
that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least
On 14 November 1986, Plaza filed a petition for the registration and confirmation of proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration
his title over the property. ON 24 February 1988, the Republic opposed because (1) of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and
Plaza and his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
or prior thereto; (2) the muniment of title and tax declarations as well as tax revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of
payments relied upon do not constitute sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition acquisition of ownership.
of the land by petitioner-appellee and of his open, continuous possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owner since 12 June 1945, or prior thereto, and The issuance of the proclamation did not have any effect on the subject property as
(3) the subject property pertains to the public domain and is not subject to private the proclamation only withdrew it from sale or settlement and reserved the same for
appropriation. slum improvement and sites and services program, but subject to actual survey and
existing private rights. The proclamation did not prohibit the registration of title of
Others who opposed the decision: one who claims, and proves, to be the owner
Heirs of Santos de la Cruz argue that: (1) their PII, Santos de la Cruz, is the
'primitive owner'; and, (2) he, his heirs, and upon their tolerance, some Registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title.
other persons have been in OCEN possession of the land in question since
time immemorial until the present When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
Kadakilaan Estate contends that: (1) by reason of its Titulo de Propiedad de necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The Torrens system was not established
Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree with approved plans registered under the as a means for the acquisition of title to private land, as it merely confirms, but does
Torrens System and petitioner-appellee or his predecessors-in-interest have not confer ownership.
not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or earlier Plaza has proven his claim of ownership over the subject property. As provided in the
proclamation itself, his ownership of the subject property must be respected and he
Republic contended that the land in question had been withdrawn from the alienable cannot be barred from having the land titled in his name. This does not contravene or
portion of the public domain pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 679 issued on negate the intention of the proclamation. Besides, its implementing Letters of
January 7, 1991, almost 6 months prior to the issuance of the TC’s decision. Instruction recognize that there may be lands declared included in the Slum
Improvement Resettlement (SIR) program that are privately owned.
On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the President withdrawing
the subject property from sale or settlement and reserve for slum improvement and TOPIC: INDICIA OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION
sites and services program
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUEÑA and RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO,
On 31 May 1991 Plaza filed his memorandum. Only the Republic and the Heirs of petitioners, vs. HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent.
Santos de la Cruz offered their evidence. GR 137944 April 6, 2000
CA Decision: affirmed the decision confirming Plaza's title over Rel. Plan 1059, FACTS: On October 15, 1975, respondent HonorataBolante and Miguel Mendoza,
which is the relocation plan of Psu-97886 brother of petitioners, had a dispute on the ownership of the land during the
cadastral survey. Because of this dispute, herein petitioners filed a civil case against
ISSUE: Whether or not Plaza has a registrable title over the property sought to be respondent claiming ownership and possession of the parcel of land in question.
titled
During the pre-trial conference, parties stipulated the following facts:
HELD: Plaza and his PII have acquired and have been in OCEN possession of the
subject property for a period of 30 years under a bona fide claim of ownership 1. The land subject of the case was formerly declared for taxation purposes in
Proof: the name of Sinforoso Mendoza prior to 1954 but isnow declared in the
1. tax declarations of his predecessors-in-interest name of Margarito Mendoza.
2. the deed of sale, 2. The parties agree[d] as to the identity of the land subject of instant case.
3. tax payment receipts and 3. [Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza while the [respondent]
4. own tax declarations. is the only daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza.
4. Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza [were] brothers, now deceased.
Plaza had introduced some improvements on the subject property from the time he 5. During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15, 1979 there was
purchased it. His witnesses testified that he developed the subject property into a already a dispute between Honorata M. Bolante and Miguel Mendoza,
ricefield and planted it with rice, but only for about five years because the return on brother of [petitioners].
investment was not enough to sustain the continued operation of the riceland. 6. [Respondent was] occupying the property in question.
Though not in the category of permanent structures, the preparation of the land into
a ricefield and planting it with rice are considered 'improvements'. ISSUE: The only issue involved [was] who [was] the lawful owner and possessor of
the land subject of the case.
Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the RULING: The Supreme Court found the petition not meritorious. The Court ruled
concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that the appellate court was correct in not giving credence to the affidavit presented
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405
24
by the petitioner for the reason that it cannot be admitted as an exception to the In his answer, respondent Caballero alleged that he was the lawful owner, and had
hearsay rule under the dead man's statute. Likewise, the affidavit cannot be been in actual physical possession of the disputed land since time immemorial. He
considered an ancient document as the petitioner failed to explain how the purported averred that the disputed land is part of Cadastral Lot originally owned by his
signature of one of the respondents could have been affixed as she was an illiterate grandfather, Eustaquio Caballero. They averred that Eustaqio Caballero declared the
woman who had never had any formal schooling. entire parcel of land for tax purposes. This tax declaration indicated that the
119,490 square-meter parcel of land was located at Pontacon, Iponan, Cagayan
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father de Oro City, bounded on North by RusticoDablio, on the East by J. Seriña and T.
claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner — Saburnido, on the South by Victor Obsioma, and on the West by Victorino Caballero.
public, peaceful, and uninterrupted— had already ripened into ownership. RTC - in favor of Caballero (the boundaries of the land stated in complaint did not
Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for coincide with what was stated in the Deed of Sale and that it was not clearly shown
the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when that the land bought by Dr. Serina was the same land owned by Victor Caballero)
coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim CA - affirmed decision of RTC
for ownership through prescription.
ISSUE/s: The issues in this petition are, therefore, the following: (1) whether the
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did petitioners were able to establish the identity of the land being claimed by
not acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere them; and (2) whether acquisitive prescription should be appreciated in favor of
occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true owner, the petitioners.
occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse
possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was public, RULING: The CA was correct in concluding that the petitioners failed to establish
peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably acquired that the parcel of land in the possession of the respondents is the same as that
ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for subject of their complaint. The CA noted that the land subject of the complaint has
thirty-two years (1953-1985), this supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire boundaries different from the land in possession of the respondents. In fact, the
disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed. land described in the complaint appears to be different from the land described in the
Deed of Sale which the petitioners invoke as the basis of their ownership.
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for The complaint 24 of the petitioners states that the property they are claiming
which taxes had been paid. In the has an area of 2.5 hectares. On the other hand, the Deed of Sale provides
absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax that the subject property has an area of 5 hectares. The complaint alleged that the
purposes does not prove ownership. In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of property is located in "Mantadiao, Opol, Misamis Oriental," while the Deed of Sale
the whole parcel has no legal basis. Accordingly, the Court denied the petition and shows that the property purchased is located in "Puntakon, Igpit, Cagayan Or.
the assailed decision and resolution of the appellate court were affirmed. Misamis." We agree with the CA that there was no showing that Tax Declaration No.
2442 in the name of Eustaquio Caballero was cancelled. Absent any specific
TOPIC: INDICIA OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION statement therein to that effect, it cannot be presumed that Tax Declaration No.
4029 in the name of Dr. Seriña cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2442. Moreover, the
DR. JESUS SERIÑA and ENRIQUETA SERIÑA (deceased), represented by land covered by Tax Declaration No. 2442 is di fferent from that covered by
DR. JESUS SERIÑA, JR., ANTONIO SERIÑA, VIOLETA SERIÑA TAN, Tax Declaration No. 4029.
REYNALDO SERIÑA and EMMANUEL SERIÑA, petitioners, vs. VICTOR
CABALLERO, TEODORO DONELA, OLIVER DONELA, COURT OF APPEALS, The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the petitioners did not
and THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, MISAMIS prove the identity of the land being claimed. The petitioners did not present
ORIENTAL, respondents. evidence to prove that the land registered in the name of Eustaquio Caballero was
GR 127382 August 17, 2004 sold to Lucia Vda. de Marbella or her predecessor-in-interest from whom they
purchased the land subject of their complaint. The failure to establish the identity of
FACTS: On August 11, 1982, Dr . Jesus Seriña and his wife, Enriqueta Seriña the land is obviously fatal to the petitioners' case. In Beo vs. Court of Appeals,
filed a Complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession, and damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents Victor Corollarily, the rule is likewise well-settled that in order that an
Caballero and his tenants, Teodoro Donela and Oliver Donela. Seriñas alleged in their action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is
complaint that they are the absolute owners and have been in actual and constructive indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not only
possession of the land for 35 years. They averred that sometime in March 1982, they his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed,
discovered that respondent Caballero was claiming ownership over the said land and by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. As the
offering it for sale or mortgage to third parties. They also discovered that the appellate court succinctly stated, he who claims to have a better
respondents Donela were occupying the land as tenants and caretakers of the land. right to the property must clearly show that the land
possessed by the other party is the very land that belongs to him.
The petitioners claimed that their father, Dr . Seriña, bought the land from Lucia Vda.
de Marbella who inherited it from her father, Ramon Neri. They presented a Deed of On the second issue, the CA ruled that inasmuch as the petitioners failed to
Sale 6 dated August 23, 1947 showing that Dr .Seriña bought 5 hectares of ricefield, establish that the parcel of land in possession of the respondents is the same as the
bounded on the North by RaymundoSeriña, on the East by TeofiloSaburnido, subject of their complaint, their claim of acquisitive prescription is clearly untenable.
on the South by Obdelio Caballero, on the West by Obdullo Caballero from Lucia We agree with the respondents. Since the property has not been clearly identified by
Vda. de Marbella. the petitioners, their claim of acquisitive prescription cannot be considered.
Insufficient identification of the portion of land claimed in absolute ownership
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405
25
cannot ripen into ownership. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it RULING: YES. The records show that both parties failed to prove their claims
may be constructive, is not a mere fiction. Assuming, however, that the disputed land through any receipt or document. Despite the lack of proof, the trial court ordered
has been clearly identified, acquisitive prescription will still not lie in favor of the that whatever improvements spent on the land shall be offset from the fruits derived
petitioners because they were not able to prove that they have been in possession of therefrom.
the property for the requisite number of years. Prescription requires public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner for The plaintiffs claimed that they were able to improve the land after possession was
ten years, in case the possession is in good faith and with just title. given to them. No receipts were shown to guide the court as to how much were the
costs of the improvements. Likewise the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were
The petitioners' argument that the payment of taxes on the property since May 31, able to cultivate the land and harvest palay although their testimonies to this effect
1948 constitutes proof of their possession of the subject land for thirty-five years is are based on their presumptions and calculations not on actual harvest such that the
untenable. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At court also cannot make determination of the real fruits derived from the land.
most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership of the property for
which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual, public and adverse possession, This being so, the court shall just offset the claim of improvements to the
the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. claim of fruits derived from the land and then place the parties in their
previous positions before the agreement. Whatever improvements spent
on the land shall be compensated from the fruits derived therefrom.
FACTS: Spouses Dasal and Pecunio filed a case for queiting of title against herein CFI found that the car was acquired by ABELLO by purchase from its registered
respondents Spouses Sabido and Rances for the subject Lots B and C. owner Marcelino Guansing for P9,000 and that she has been in possession thereof
since then until when the car was seized from her by ANCAR who acted in belief that
The Lower Court ruled in favor of Spouses Dasal. The sheriff then executed the Writ the car was stolen from Lt. Bala
of Execution as ordered by then Presiding Judge Sunga. During the execution of the
writ, the sheriff learned that a certain Dominador Sta. Ana was occupying a portion of ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of the car by the officials are valid.
lot B together with two other persons (tenants of Sta. Ana).
RULING: NO. There is no merit in the petition considering that the acquirer or the
Third party Sta. Ana was given an opportunity to present evidences to prove his purchaser in good faith of a chattel of movable property is entitled to be
ownership upon Lot B which according to him he purchased in good faith. respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner
Subsequently, it was proved that the lot he claims was different from that of the thereof until a competent court rules otherwise. In the meantime, as the
subject Lot B. true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot be compelled to surrender
possession nor to be required to institute an action for the recovery of the chattel,
Furthermore, it was established that Sta. Ana has a relationship with the Spouses whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor. The filing of
Dasal which should alerted him that the subject lot was under litigation and that he information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained through estafa
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405
27
from its true owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor does not warrant If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been
disturbing the possession of the chattel against the will of the possessor. Finally, the unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner
claim of petitioners that the Commission has the right to seize and impound the car cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
under Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which reads Sec.60. The lien upon motor
vehicles. Any balance of fees for registration, re-registration Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the
or delinquent registration of a motor vehicle, remaining unpaid and all books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that
fines imposed upon any vehicle owner, shall constitute a first lien upon the motor he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did
vehicle concerned is untenable. not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books. It bears
repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that
It is clear from the provision of said Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 that the the books belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice
Commissioner's right to seize and impound subject property is only good for the Cruz showed her assured her that the books had been paid for on delivery. By
proper enforcement of lien upon motor vehicles. The Land Transportation contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in fact, too trusting — in dealing with the
Commission may issue a warrant of constructive or actual distraint impostor. Although it had never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the
against motor vehicle for collection of unpaid fees for registration, re-registration books he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted his personal check in
or delinquent registration of vehicle. payment. It did not verify his identity although it was easy enough to do this. It did
not wait to clear the check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales
invoice issued to him, by the printed terms thereon, that the books had been paid for
on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in the buyer.
Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy
Topic: Possession Over Movables herself that the books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did.
Although the title of Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of
EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner, vs. THE SPOUSES the books, these being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded
LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name and style more proof before deciding to buy them.
of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
GR 80298 April 26, 1990 While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its remedy is not
against the private respondents but against Tomas de la Peña, who has apparently
FACTS: A person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by caused all this trouble.
telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books, payable on delivery. EDCA
prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which In the case, Sta. Ana being a possessor in bad faith has no option but to vacate the
Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price. On October 7, 1981, Cruz lot.
sold 120 of the books to private respondent Leonor Santos who, after verifying the
seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him.
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even
before clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he
had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no such person in its
employ. Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with
the Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment check. EDCA
then went to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz. Investigation disclosed
his real name as Tomas de la Peña.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books
because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.
RULING: Ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment
of the purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is
that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been
paid. Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the
contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the
stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership
to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.