ee,

4
orate

A BRIEF His FORY

OF THE

MACHINE GUN BATTALION

THE JAT REGT.

1941—1946

Complied by Lt.-Col. E. JOHNSON.

 COMPILER’S NOTES

This brief history is not intended as an Official record of

actions either by the M. G. Bn. or of any other Formations and
Units mentioned.
It is intendedpurely as a personal record for officers of the
Bn., a number of whom will have returned to Civil life, and the
others split up in other Bns.
It is hoped that this little work will achieve its object, and
although the Bn., no longer exists, help in the course of time to
keep fresh in the memory of all officers the good and bad times
they all shared, and the magnificient body of men—Jats—M. Rs.
and P. Ms. who shared it with them.
I must thank particularly Major Francis and Major Davis
for the ir gre at ass ist anc e in com pil ing Par t I of thi s His tor y.
E. JOHNSON.
 CONTENTS
PAGE
Part I
Chapter The raising of the Bn. L3G
Bengal and Arakan 6-15
33 Return to Bareilly for Reorganisation 15-16
Part II
Chapter IV WANGING — TIDDIM ROAD
M.S. 109—M.S. 100—MS. 82
KANGLA-TOMBI-LANGTHA-
BAL—BISHENPORE 16-22
KACHIN—SHEENAM. PALEL
—— The advance to TAMMU
Return to WANGING and Re-
organisation Zoom

Part Ill
Chapter VI Move tothe KAWBAW VALLEY
MAUKKADAW—BUDALIN—
MONYWA oS 40
ALLAGAPA—MINYMU —Prepa-
rations for crossing the R. IRA-
WADDY—Actions on the Bridge-
head
Vii YWABO—ONHMIN - KYAUKSE
MYTHA—WUNDWIN— KUME
MANDALAY 40-49
VIII . ’ NATMAUK—KYAGAN-MAGWE 49-62
—TAUNDWINGI
ALLANMYO-—PROME—PAUN.-
GDE—TANBINGON —THAR-
RAWADDY — HMAWBI—
LETPANDON —HENZADA—
TAIKKI
IX TAIKKI—Break through operations
on the PEGU Rd. to SITTANG
River 6270
Return to TAIKKI— Move to
SAIGON 70-74
SAIGON—TUDUC—BIENHUA
TUDUMOT 74-80
XII Return to INDIA — DISBAND.
MENT 80-82
 CHAPTER—I.
The Raising of the Bn.

It was decided by G.H.Q. (I), in early 1941, that in order to

come into line with the British Army at home, Machine Gun
battalions should be raised in the Indian Army, to take the place
of the M.M.G. Support Platoon, which had hitherto been a
component part of every infantry battalion.

Accordingly orders were given for the formation of the first

three M.G.Bns., and the regiments chosen, were the 6th
Rajputana Rifles, the 9th Jats, and the 17th Dogras.

Lt.-Col. B.R. Godley, who was selected to raise the M, G. Bn,

of the 9th Jats arrived back in Bareilly where it was decided the
new Bn. should be formed, on Nov. 41 from the Middle East, and
at once set about the preliminary organisation.

The nucleus of the battalion was to consist of officers and men

from Infantry Bns. of the Jat Group, preferably machine gun
trained, and these began to arrive in the later months of 1941,

Although the official date for the raising of the Bn, was 15th
Aug. 41, proper training on the basis of organised programmes
could not begin before December, owing to the necessity of sending
officers and N.C.Os. to do M.M.G, courses at Saugor, and the
battalion was not really up to strength in personnel until January
1942. The great majority of the men, about 80%, were comprised
of newly trained recruits straight from the training battalion who
had just completed their 6 months training, and after the attestation
ceremony were marched across the road as sepoys to join the
M.G.Bn. These sepoys were mostly hand picked by Colonel
Godley himself from the drafts of men, awaiting posting on
completion of their training at the T.B., and we were very lucky to
get such an excellent lot of new recruits, who have formed the
basis of the Bn. throughout its existence.

The normal caste composition in the Jat Regt. was adopted

for the M.G.Bn., A Coy. had Musalman Rajputs, B and D Jats
and’ C Company Punjabi Musalmans. The Bn. was fortunate to
receive from the 4th Bn. Subedar Major Mahboob Khan as S.M.
This V.C.O. has had over 31 years service, served during the Great
War and since he has been with us has been awarded the O.B.1.
 bazaar garries’’, condemned buses and cars. with anxi
gripping their steering wheels and even more anxiou
ect housed in hutments adjoining the
was Ht» } s this was
seated beside them.
ea
oth Jat Regt, butas this was earmarked fay
c f
,
eastern Fe and unsuitable
side OF '" was for training, its Later this stream was joined by motorbicycles, for about
an M +e Northern edge of the Bareilly Maidan had been allotted to the Bn. Besides the future
M C D.Rs. n
location Wé
‘ovember,
vere pitched, and here it remained unti] enthusiasts of varying skill decided to ma
ster the art of riding
SR EINOVERROSS where tents ses
gen h this area had lilitttletle s shade and Prprotectiion them. All officers put in plenty of practice, and the
maidan to Say
Althdoiud g have 2,t
it mobilized. he adi vant agee of afffoorrdi
din nothing of the main road leading to the Mess became a
it g good Open veritable
from the sun,
wa s we ll se pa ra te fr om ot he r units, Brooklands. Even the Subedar Major was tempted to learn, and
t r a i n i n g a r e s.
as, an d
spac e s f o r
justified his name of ~ Bahadur Sahib” by riding
in ]
at speeds quite
t was
beg. an in
i real ea rnesst. inconsistent with the amount of practice he had re
l
Ini£
] raln g then ceived and his
et
‘cul
An task that Colo nel Godl ey had been set. In the days of age.
‘ onsidered that to train
a machine gunner, at least
Peace : oe Se a
before he could be considered efficient At long last our Service vehicles became available
See ;we haq and it
eight gun teams from new was a well remembered day, when Capt.
Learnt in at the Stevens the MEO:
arrived in Bareilly after driving from Delhi with our brand new
most 8 months, by which time the new battalion had to be drivers each with a Ford “Snub nosed” 15 ewt. truck in a convoy
eady
ready for active operations. Specialists too, such as rangetakers, of about 100 vehicles strangely enough without any casualties
signallers and scouts had to be trained, a difficult eget: for to “en route.” These trucks later proved most unsuitable
teach men how to read complicated scales, and handle dials and in the
Arakan, as their piston rings, for which
replacements were never
switchboards, when Jess than a year previously they had been available soon went faulty and the engi
nes lost all their power.
ploughing in the fields in their own villages, possibly unableto The Dodge 15 cwt. and Jeeps with
which the Bn. was later
write their own name required tremendous efforts. It was not only equipped have proved a 100% improvem
ent.
the sepoys who had to be trained, the greater part of the officers
were E.C.Os. and new to the Indian Army, with only a Slight By the end of February individual training was completed,
knowledge of Urdu and of Indian troops, and who mostly had and Platoon training was started. This period
been of the had
never seen a Vickers machine gun before. most intense and hard working nature for all
As only a few ranks. The men
vacancies for officers on the M.M.G. course were scarcely had time for a moments rest througho
received, the ut their working day,
majority including 2 coy comds had to so taken up as it was with Pet
learn what they could Drills. MG. parades, School
themselves inside the battalion. periods for education, night operations,
It was a familiar sight to see field firing and even more
M.G. training.
officers vigorously attempting gun drills on the maidan, under the
Guidance of B.H.M. Des Ram, in efforts to master So good were rations, at this tim
the essentials e that with the fresh mea
of M.G. Training. Further more as it was the intention
to make and vegetables and milk from the
local military dairy, men deve-
eG: a completely mobile very many M.T. drivers had to be loped out
of al) recognition, and those wh
o had been rather
| Sea ok icthe time no military trucks avaiable) undersized on being recruited soon br
oadened into sturdy sepoys,
Officers too will not quickly forget this ti
Practice took Place bse ‘Gis had fo me. The administration
be chired. cage _- of a battalion, which is in the process of being
raised, in an area
after day an interminab] := where the peace time system of accou
kmelo pretnd end air nting for every round of
Consisting of the mo “Neag e4
stag
;
10 Proc eed
St assorted collection imaginroun d and es ammunition and gallon of petrol co
able of derelict nsumed still exists is a large job
 4
. were parades to be supervised, Programmes 5
, b u t o u t s ! de th is S e h r an d a constant round of duties
in i t s e l f constant source of headaches to company commande
o r g a n i s e d , d a i x S e e i p e e e a c e of n e w ar eas and TEWTgs rs of whom
t o b e only one, Capt Skinner, had any pretensions to mechanical
Sundays being ao tie ill be remembered by many Bea knowledge.
ns oy,
Christmas day eet aie the luxuries of Western Civilisation
he ir first introduction ath eh iht Bareilly City wher On March12th the C.O. decided to take the entire Bn. in
tl L e h i a e j¢ w i h
w h o l e B n . w a s m é w h ich had been hired M.T. up to Delhi to practise field firing on the large range South
as tl h e f
f i l m i n a c i n e m a , o ; t h e of the city.
d i a n This was an ambitious ‘undertaking, as we possessed
shown an In
well over 120 vehicles. However this large convoy after two halts
occasion.
for the night arrived at its destination with, surprisingly enough,
I t was with the g= re a t e s t r e g r e t t h a t o n F e b . 2 0 t h t h e b a t t a l i o n
no accidents to record, even though at one time the 2 i/c leading
.
badeAap enm
far nan
ewe ll dto Col . God ley , wh o had jus t BI EN or de rs 8 tak e the convoy, who was in wireless
of thet 1st (Royal) Bn., then involved communication with Capt.
jn the
T. W. King at the tail found there was nearly 14 miles separating
Been from Burma. It was his fine example of leadership, them. The field firing was quite successful and after three days
Be
and ; t oe
AE io to obtain the highes level of efficienc: y, e from the C.O. decided he himself would lead the battalion back through
: 2
every man under his command, with his tireless determination tg the heart of New Delhi, to give the sepoys a chance of seeing it.
G. Bn . in to a fi rs t cl as s fi gh ti ng unit, which inspireq
make the M. Unfortunately the Pace he set was rather too brisk at the start and
the keeness and enthusiasm of all his subordinates, and both he although the leading 30 trucks or so were able to keep their place
and Mrs. Godley will always be remembered with respect and comfortably, this was not the case further back, and early risers in
gratitude by all who served under him. India’s capital were surprised to see the unusual spectacle of trucks
full of sepoys careering down Kingsway at speeds approaching
On the departure of Col. Godley, Major R.H. Lowe the 2 i/c 60 m.p.h., determined not to lose their places in the convoy.
took over temporary command of the battalion until the new C.O,
By April 4th training was considered completed and every
Lt.-Col. W. R. Thomson M.C. arrived. Col. Thomson, remained
officer and other rank had been allotted to his particular
C.O. for only 6 months, when he was transferred to take overa job,
whether it be commanding a section, member of a gun team,
battalion of 5th Mahratta L.I. Later we heard with deep regret scout,
rangetaker driver, signaller, or storeman. In fact the M.G.Bn.
that he died of wounds received in action in Italy.
9th Jat Regt. had been formed into a corporate unit, and
was ready
Meanwhile during Feb. and March Companies went off in turn and keen to serve wherever it would be required. During
the month
to camp areas where field firing was carried out. of April the entire Bn., with the exception of a skelet
These areas, on staff
proceeded on leave, and mobilisation orders were receiv
some of which were near to Bareilly such as Chaubari and ed soon
after its return. The time of departure was obviously close at
Faridpur and some further a field as Chuehait and Budaon,
Provided excellent opportunities to company commanders no hand.
t only
to increase the efficiency of their gun
teams, but also, as this was Orders were finally received that the battalion less its M.T.
ri first. occassion on which
they had their companies would move by train from Bareilly on June 12 to Comilla in
oie lies to get to know their to
men individually, All company Eastern Bengal. A certain disappointment was felt on hearing the
‘ Was naturally taken out, at th news, as everyone had hoped that the middle East would be our
at time each coy had 23 15
€ tonners and a water cart, and w deStination, considering the battalion was entirely mobile and
hile the machine
Suited for desert warfare. However all ranks realised that
across countr a 1a tas field firing area, drivers were practised
ries y. though accidents were subsequent to the withdrawal of Gen. Alexanders army from
few, the bogging o
' Burma, India’s eastern frontier was directly threatened, and the
sand, petrol stoppages and attendant evils, were 4
——— — — — = — — —
6
early action was in no way diminished by 80ini
‘ng
a pat tal ion ’s tra nsp ort was to Pr oc ee d
prospect of ge ll a
s a n d a s m a
not west.
B a n k s t h e M e
east, and
n d / L
2“!~ t . T .
later da te , ane r o n w i t h t h e M .
road at a up l a t e
ind, to jolp
party were left beh t h e B a t t a l i o n m a r c h e d d o w n t o
g h t o f J u n e 1 2 t h
On the nig ntrained. Many officers and men from fe < 3 g
l y s t a t i o n and é it h th e p i
Bar eil a A SeasSs
ge th er wi t : a e ba nd an d We m
‘ni
Trainingng Ba tt al io n‘swe
enre
d th
of er
f. e,
” to
Th e wa ll s of th e st at io n ec ho ed an d
4 s -
re given a grea : :
<3 Se &
ees with the cheering warcries of the men, almost drowning S se et
sh ou te d fa re we ll s of th os e wh o ha d
a strains of the band and the smell
come to wish the M.G. Bn. goodbye. As the train slowly gathereg -
en ma ny wo nd er in g wh at th e fu tu re wo ul d
speed th er e mu st ha ve be ‘
AS! a

y on Ei os 2
hold in store, an d wh at wo ul d a e e en d of a e Jo ur ne
chee. ee eS
jo in ed to ge th er in to on e un it , 2
which this body of: men so recently m o
z a eee
were now embarking. Roy ee:sa
kK :

i, wo bh 2 ey
a eg goles
:2 3 2e
Bengal and Arakan.

al in Ju ne 19 42 role a eee =
The Bn. on ar ri va l at Co mi ll a in Ea st er n Be ng 3 & Sop)
m o d a t i o n in 2 HA 649 um
join ed 14 In d. Di v. an d wa s al lo tt ed te mp or ar y a c c o m
ce aS
Mynamati Camp . It wa s th e ti me im me di at el y fo ll ow in g th e
and this division = Pa aa
retreat from Burma of Gen. Alexander’s Army
was the only one at the time between the Japanese Forces and Sfu h
1)
u e
Ba
By
n
;
Calcutta. Speculation was naturally rife among all ranks as to
.
ei ae tetS
what the immediate role of the Bn. would be, and all were wonder- a ae ao)
ing whether we should be immediately plunged into action. This ss ca BO
Goi On a e
Bee ee e
was not to be the case e h however and as will be seen many weary
months elapsed before any of our machine guns were called upon to e ee
aelwere Oe
fire at the en emy. ae
ray 3 &

am cet orders came for Companies to go out on detach- il

i *
‘
Fae and Ait i accordingly took place.
mo ;
A Company went 10 3
)
é z
; M under Pa bs
FAZILPUR wi1th au n a of th e 1/17 Dogras, B Com‘ pany © id a gs
e :
th e 1/ 7 Ra jp ut s, an d 2 8
© Company nae i nPu nj ab Re gt . an d cg a
3B ; en ! un de r th e 2/ 1 Pun j a b Re gt .,
gt.,
al l th es e la st
ns, form g
in 47 Bde. W
hose H.Q. was at Feni. D Company a
Bn. H.Q. were nd
kept at C OMILLA with Div. H.O.
14 Diy, commanded .
by Main iGou: Lloyd consisted at this

so
 /

time of little more than 2 Brigades, and had been

ordered to hold a
line from North of Comilla to CHITTAGONG against the
approaching Japanese who were considered likely to make the
attempt of advancing directly into India following the fall of
AKYAB. It was a small and inexperienced
force they would have
found blocking their path, and it js per
hap s fortunate to the
extreme that the attempt was never ma
de at this period.

To those who know Eastern Bengal, the difficulties confro

nting
troops digging defensive positions will easily be realised. The
whole country consists of miles of rice fields enclosed by small
“bunds” or low earth walls, the only cover being inside the
villages, which are built up on a higher level and enclosed
in trees and vegetation. It was impossible to dig one foot
without drawing water, and consequently all positions had to
be built up inside a village area with earth and Sand bags, a
very tedious and lengthy proceeding. From June to November
all Companies occupied the same positions, and throughout the
Monsoon rains awaited the arrival an enemy, who never came.
The level of the water rose to such an ex
tent that many occupied
buildings were submerged and vari
ous outlying section positions
Were so marooned that it was only poss
ible to send them their sup-
plies and rations by boat. Abundant mosquitoes, leeches, prickl
y
heat and other skin diseases all co
ntributed to make this a particu-
larly trying time. With the ground entirely water-l
ogged it was
well nigh impossible to exercise th
e men, and even training of any
description was difficult to carry
out. It required the highest
ingenuity on the part of all officers
to keep up their mens interest,
so little was there of an active nature
that could be done.

It was at this time that the sad news

came of the death by
drowning of Lieutenat LG. Manni
ng, while on a Local Jungle
Warfare course. Although this officer had only been
with the
Battalion a few months, he had
become very popular with all
officers and respected by the men. His loss was very deeply
regretted by all ranks by whom he will a
lways be remembered.

With the ending of the rainy Season, life took on a more

hopeful aspect. To start with nearly all men had mana
ged to get
three weeks leave, by which morale
increased perceptibly, and
 8
mou rs seemed to suggest the prospec of 9
all current T ly dire ctio n, and the Possiblity OF
secondly 4 South easter MAUNGDAW
early moves in and BUTHIDAUNG had been captured
without opposition and it appeared
ome action hopeful that we might soon
advance to the end of the MAYU
; B. Company had moved to CHITTAGONG and peninsula and obtain a “ jumping
In November off”’ place for an eventual
‘ Cox’s Bazaar further down the Coast, ang assault on AKYAB. 47Bde. advancing
a f t e r w e n t to - down the narrow peninsula
shortly encountered stiff opposition
about 10
i n d e r o f t he Bn. now under 53 Bde. was concen trateg miles to the Northin the DO
soon t h e r e m a NBAIK area, however and we
D Companies were doing Coastal
in ee ONG. Here C&
cee TANGA peninsula and A Company Protec
there halted. The country consisted of a_ belt of fairly op
r e
teq en
defence alon country between the Sea and th
e sharply rising hills running
the important KARNAPULI budge ie ae se bathing, down the centre of the peninsula, the
gap between this belt and the
; d training exercises all helped to make this tim, range being filled by thick w
oods covering the foothills, A series
dry peste os joyable, and proved a pleasant contrast to the of parallel nalas and dry river beds ran
down the peninsula at right
sin uee aaa From " Sitreps”” too News came of angles to the line of the hills, and it w
ce ae surprisingly as inside one of these nullahs
unimpeded advance of me forward that the Japanese had built themselve
s an intricate and strongly
into the Arakan, and it seemed likely that fortified system of inter connected bunker Posi
elements of 14 Div. tions. Having been
of ours would shortly be called upon to Move unable to capture this position in an init
others Companies ial daylight assault in
which B Coy. played its part our troops dug themselv
forward with them. During one of the few Jap air raids on es in along
the line of the next nullah, and only 30
CHITTAGONG at this time, a flight of -Zeros”’ came low over 0 yards from the enemy,
the peninsula in a sweep. At least 18 M.M.Gs. oma & D
For the next 24 months this intervening
Companies opened up manned by officers, strip was to become
and men alike, and a no man’s land reminiscent of the last war and was to be the
sprayed the air with bursts. Later news came that one of the scene of much bloodshed in the many un
successful attacks that we
Zeros had been shot down in the Sea some way further down the put in on the enemy positions. B Coy. had 2 Pls. along the for-
Coast and as it was pierced with .303 only, it was credited by the ward line of our defensive area and
one slightly to the rear on the
R.A.F. to the Bn. much to every one’s satisfaction. .Much dispute coast, which could also fire on th
e enemy position, and stayed in
took place between C & D Coys as to whom had_ been successful, the same posts for over five weeks unti
l relieved by C Coy,
and O.C., D Coy. considerably weakened his case by hanging up an
aeroplane wheelin his Mess, claiming that it belonged. to the A Coy.
had meanwhile taken up positions on
the famed
crashed plane, discovered near his lines, which on closer inspection “Twin Knobs” at the Eastern end of the
enemy position, an
was found to have British markings ! ! unenviable spot, which was mortared
by the Japs day and night.
All ammunition, water and other supplies
had to be man handled
In early January of 1943, C Company moved into. and troops there were maintained only with
Cox’s great difficulty.
Bazaar, from where B Company had previously left, and who
were
now advancing with the forward troops of The strain of living so close to the enemy for such long periods
47 Bde. pushing dow!
the MAYU peninsula South of newly captured was considerable: particularly as one rarely if ever caught a glimpse
MAUNGDAW and of Jap movement, so excellent was his use
BUTHIDAUNG. Shortly after this, of cover and conceal-
A Company was ordered ment. In fact there can be no doubt that at this stage of the war
down to join B Company on the Western side of the
and from now onwa M A Y U ra né ® the Japanese forces in Arakan were considerable better trained an
;
rds jt Is d
necessary to record events in in
t two
more seasoned than our own troops, of whom none had seen
Narratives,
Firstly, the history of B
was relieved
a n d A Companies (the ate previous action, and consisted largely of battalions, like
by C Coy.) ich ourselves
Operated near to each Otherand secondly of A & D Coys. whit with no former experience of warfare: One could stare at the Jap
 10
arcely Ss a
see a twig Move 1]
d with binoculars and scarcely |
o r h o u ESPODRE RS
line f joined B Company commanded by Capt. Francis who had already
d i s p l a c e d . e i
or a l e a f . . o n a t h been in position for a month.
in by 14, Div,
were put
‘or attacks
| It is difficult when events are considered in retrospect to
ition ala n
io d
ns M a
st r
roc h
ng t
w h e
o l
h a
a sdt b
¢ w
e ien g
DONB Y iAIKo < pos! g
durin oF 2Yf Jfi
a pve
; F
Bae b
tt record consecutively happenings during this period of essentially
p Br ig ad e
b y t
t h e h e BBr
r iit
t i s
is h
ma d e Non e of :these attacks succeedeg static warfare, and all that stands out clearly is the constant
our troop s:
down to. re i anxiety of waiting, the discomforts of living for weeks on end in
o e
in ve ry he av y los s of lif e. All followed the
and resulted y b a r r a g e | of 25 pounders ang holes in the ground, and, the growing feeling of frustration at our
i n i t l al h e a v
ttern, the
a f a n t r y , e a r l y r e p o r t s 4 inability to make progres.
a s s a u l t o f t h e i n
. f o l l o w e d byj the
. h
NMe i M . a °

success in reaching the Jap nullah, a break of ae "EWSy ithey It is most encouraging to remember the great fortituds with
Stories of the infantry S04 up in small which the men faced this difficult period of hardship and
gradual and increasing
gradu ally forced to halt by the withe ring fire of Jap discomfort, their first experience of active service, and during the
Series being
L.M.Gs. on fixed lines inside the position and eventual withdrawa] most trying periods the morale of all ranks was of a very high
of the survivours. standard.

In all these attack s our M. M. Gs . we re cal led up on to pla y One particular “shoot” we carried out is worth recalling. The
their part in giving supporting fire, but it is doubtful in view of the Japanese were known to be using cetain tracks through the hills
very solid defences that the enemy had constructed that any very after nightfall for bringing up their supplies, and it was decided
satisfactory fire effect was obtained other than keeping the enemy’s to harass these particular areas by concentrated machine gun fire.
“heads down’ unitil the last possible minute before the infantry For this task 4 sections of B. Coy. and 4 Sections of C. Coy. were
attack went in. detailed and as darkness fell the 16 gun teams slowly came into
previously reconnoitred positions along the line of the coast, and
Although by our inability to observe Japanese movement, it was on a given signal all 16 M.M.Gs. blazed into action, and for 15
often difficult to believe that the enemy was so close, he kept us in minutes kept up an unending volley of fire over the whole area.
no doubt as to his presence by the use of his mortars and 75 M.M. Results could not be checked as -our forces never reached as
gun fire. With the 4 in mortar the Jap was particularly accurate far as the target area during that campaign, but judging by the
and our M.M.G. positions came in for much attention, necessitating very strong enemy artillery and mortar counter fire with which the
frequent adoption of alternative positions. Even so, quite a number Jap reacted, it is hoped that he was caused at the least, great

Se eee
ap casualties were caused to our men by enemy Mortar fire. Air embarrassment.

During early April the Japanese began to land troops on the

bombing EPO ate vidence than our ome 5;
eastern side of the MAYU peninsula, further north, and therefore
RGSS ae : he out ground straffs. dates only
behind our positions, threatening our whole L. of C. and it became
Bis cheba Goya ee vepchnaughgenémmyyaiclacs aaa apparent that
a general withdrawal from the DONBAIK position
bombs fell within 15 ie ae oe day 3 medium oe:
when would have to take place. A small force under Colonel Hopkins
Suns with earth and i DOsiuaa covering the men an 2 i/c of 6 Bde with B. Coy. was first sent back 10 miles to protect
Causing no other damage. KYAUKPANDU and INDIN, as these were considered the most
c Company com m likely Jap objectives for cutting the road. Then the difficult
company commanded ape yy Capt. Stevens relieved 4 withdrawal of the main body of 6 Bde including C. Coy. began,
by Capt. Mohd. Khan in earl
y Feb. and
 12 13
: ctricating
a number of rearguard actions, —.
who after fighting back into action but this time on the other side of the MAYU
y a r r i v e d b a c k at I N D I N .
great difficult
themselves with range, where it joined 55 Bde at the time of its withdrawal
in C . C o y . d e s e r v e s p e c i a l from RATHEDAUNG. The coy. went into action
Sub. Mohd Afsar and his Pl. immediately at
mention here. This Pl. was occupying the most forward position TIZWE. The Japatese were forcing us back as quickly as they
ov er si gh t w e r e not informed by could and it was only 2 days later that the Bde was forced back to
in the line, and by an unf o r t u n a t e
under whose command they were, TAUNGMAN where it was immediately relieved by 71 Bde of 26
the infantry Coy. Comander
The consequence being that Div. A coy. went with them back to BUTHIDAUNG being
as to the time of the withdrawal.
a r a n d hi s m e n f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s relieved by D Coy. under command of Capt. DAVIES.
g S u b e d a r M o h d A f s BS
one mornin : :
fr on t of th e Ja p li ne s. W i t h
an d u n s u p p o r t e d in
entirely alone D Coy. had meanwhile been kept
b r o u g h t hi s pl at oo n ou t, an d on coastal defence in
sreat reso ur ce s h o w e v e r th e S u b e d a r
n t , t h r o u g h ri ve rs ac ro ss Chittagong. In early Jan Capt. Skinner was posted away from
se ve ra l |so ur s of di ff ic ul t m o v e m e
after the Bn., much to the regret of all ranks and especially the Jats.
b l o w n a n d en ti re ly w i t h o u t i n f o r m a t i o n ,
wh i c h th e br id ge s h a d b e e n
of th e Co mp an y. Capt. B. M. Davies had assumed command of this coy. When
the Platoon eventually rejoined th e re ma in de r
Bn. H.Q. moved in the middle of Jan to MANGDAW D Coy.
6 Bd e. , wh o ha d re ac he d I N D I N
Before the main body of became a rear H.Q. of the Bn. In Chittagong, life, owing to the
fo rc e
Col. Hopkinsat K Y A U K P A N D U th e
could join u p with rapid advances of 14 Div., became very quiet and apart from
in be tw ee n th es e tw o v1 ll ag es an d fo ll ow ed th is
Japanese cut the road sporadic Jap-air raids took on quite a peace time air.
up by over running INDIN in a night raid, and destrcying 6 Bde.
H. Q. in wh ic h th e Br ig ad ie r hi ms el f lo st hi s lif e. The subsequent On the lst of March however urgent orders were received for
tt al io ns of 6 Bd e. br ok e ou t an d jo in ed up at -the coy. to proceed to Buthidaung and from there to join 71 Ind.
battle by which the ba
U is as to ry in it se lf , an d th e sc en es on th e be ac he s Inf. Bde. at TAUNGMAW.
KYAUKPAND
in fa nt ry we re mo vi ng , mu st ha ve re se mb le d
over which swarms of
B & C Co mp a- After two days of feverish activity the coy. with its transport
aminor DUNK I R K . Th ro ug ho ut th is ti me bo th
moved by train to DOHAZARI, from where it moved by road to
nies were co ns ta nt ly en ga ge d an d fo r th e fi rs t ti me it be ca me
Buthid
; aung. After a wait of two da ys the coy. proceeded b d
possible to fir e at ta rg et s wh ic h co ul d be ob se rv ed an d at Ja pa ne se
to TAUNGMAW.
so ld ie rs in th e op en . En em y gu ns wh ic h ha d be en br ou gh t ac ro ss bs
the hill tracks fired persistently, and this phase of the campaign The Japanese attack in this sector had now exhausted itself,
was one of the most hard fought, and expensive in both men and aad the next 3 weeks were, in spite of rumour and official expecta-
material. tion, une Veneta, apart from a small amount of Japanese shell fire
The withdrawal northwards continued until positions were and occasional “jitter” parties.
finally taken up in DILPARA and LAMBAGUNA south of
On the 23rd April withdrawal orders were received and were
MAUNGDAW where B & C Companies respectively dug in. No
carried out at night, one Platoon of D Coy. remaining to the last
further action by these two companies took place however and
and eventually withdrawing with guns mounted in trucks.
mcy were relieved by equivalent units of the M.G.Bn. 12 F. F.
Regt. in May, for a well earned rest. B. & C. coys. were then oe arrival KINDAUNG the coy. made new defensive
sent back to CHITTAGNG.
positions and stayed until lst May. The Japanese only put in one
And now as to the fortunes of A and appearance in the form of a Recce
D Companies :— Patrol. Here D Coy. drew its
A Coy. had been relieved in early Feb. by C Coy. and went first blood by killing 3 of the enemy and wounding several others
back to Cox’s: Bazaar. On the 1st May withdrawal orders were received in order
At the end of Feb. however it to reas
was called
 14
o n t h e w e s t s i d e o f t h e
o f d e f e n c e w i t h t h e B d e ,
the same g r i d l i n e
h d r e w t o B U T H I D A U N G .
hills. T h e B d e . w i t f
B d e . m o v e d a f e w m i l e s s o u t h a
A c o y st il l w i t h 5 5
At this time
J a p a t t a c k . o n B U T H I D A U N G
of Buthidaung a s a s t o p to a n y :
It w a s in t h e s e d e f e n s i v e p o s i -
which was to b e h e l d at al l co st s. :
d i r e c t s h o o t s k i l l i n g v e r y m a n y o f t h e
tion s t h a t A C o y h a d s e v e r a l z
a d a s s u m e d c o m m a n d o f t h i s C o y a n d it
en e m y . C a p t . T y b j e r g h §
re le ss e f f o r t s that such good results were
was m a i n l y d u e to hi s ti
obtained.

The gen era l sit uat ion no w was tha t bot h sid es of the MA YU
Range were now sec ure ly gua rde d and the onl y pos sib le lin e of
Japanese advanc e was the lin e of the hil ls the mse lve s. The se
im bype ne tr
us ab le
as— Th
’? e Jap ane se
however were regarded
On Ma y the 10t h the fat efu l new s was rec eiv ed tha t the
did not!
main road MA UN GD AW —B UT HI DA UN G had bee n cut , and
the Jap s wer e ad va nc in g in an Eas ter ly Dir ect ion on Bu th id au ng .
Though the original orders had been to defend Buthiadaung to the
last man and the last round it'soon became apparent a withdrwal
would be ordered. JOHNSON.
E,

55 Bde. withdrew from in front of Buthidaung to a position in BOle

the hills 7 miles North. Two Battalions of 71 Bde. also withdrew

leaving I LINCOLNS and D Coy to defend Buthidaung itself.

On May 10th orders were received for the force to carry out a
withdrawal action and to march over the NAUKIDAWK Pass
which was no more that a small irregular path on the Hills. This
meant that D Coy would have to manhandle its guns and a certain
amount of ammunition. The ensuring march of approx 20 miles
without food or water through nullas and over the heights of the
Mayu Range with the ever present menace of the pursuing Japa- s
nese will always remain in the memory of this Coy. After a day s
and a arent the column, almost exhausted, arrived near Mangdaw oe
me a who had marched on a parallell and equally
|
5

After on] ya few | . : ia

y a lew hou rs rest D Coy went into defensive positions
to
aotrhe west of M angdaw j under com
mand of the M.G. Bn. F. F.

sate | _-LsaAe ——
 A Coy and Bn. H.Q. now relieved, proceeded back
Chittagong.

After 4 daysin MAUNGDAW a further withdra :

leaving MAUNGDAW abandoned. The withdrawal of D Coy
was by river as faras BAWLI BAZAAR. Thence by truck to
Chittagong to rejoin the Bn.

On May 23rd the Bn. moved to Ranchi from where, on June

25 the Bn. returned to Bareilly for refitting and reorganization.

CHAPTER Ill
The Bn. arrived in Bareilly on June 24th and were put into
very good guarters adjoining the fort. It was at this period that
the Bn. lost the services of Lt. HATORN and Lt. TURNER
on their transfer to the Nevy.

It was impossible to send the whole Bn. on leave in one party

owing to accommodation difficulties and leave parties went off
piecemeal thereby adding to the training difficulties.

Orders arrived changing the organisation of the Bn. from 48

M.M.G. to 24 M.M.G. and 24 4'2” mortars. The latter was at
the time a new weapon to India, and appeared to have great
possibilities.

Although we had to wait some time before receiving the new

Mortars training started initially on the 3” Mortar the drill
for which was similiar to the 42” and with the help of the
Training Centre, mortar cadres were soon in full swing.

A small cadre of officers V.C.Os, and N.C.Os. were despatch

ed to SAUGOR to learn the new weapon. and on return passed
on their knowledge to the rest of the Bn. At the begining of
Sept. the new Commanding Officer Lt.-Col. H.E. Syer arrived vice
Lt.-Col. R. H. Lowe.

There followed a period of much hard training and experi

menting lightened for the men by sports and for the officers by the
social life of Bareilly.

With the men’s health improving daily and the initial change
over haying taken place the newly constituted Bn, began to take
shape.
 $:2"" Mortars
and about the Same
2 R ly
ae eeps and 50 Dodges AlTived,
Stream. During our stay in the area this stream
ace and by the end of Nov. fielq firin source of delight to officers, and men
waa & constant
a . E as it afforded good bathing
had almost been completed,
On arrival, we became Corps troo
ps under command of [.O.
Russell and Capt. Squires joined the Bn, + Corps. and spent most of Janua
ry, and Vebruary Settling
training hard in excel in and
was now that of 3 larger Cope lent field firing areas
--ation of the Bn. in the hills to the We
at
sa ti on O o ! comparatively near the camp,
The organi | At this time the
+ . Imphal area was
f t h e o r i g i n a l completely quiet and very much
instead o like a normal cantonement, the
a v i e s Y C o n »
X-Coy. be i n g C o m m a n d e d by Capt. B. M. D nearest enemy forces being on the East bank of the Chindwin to
b y C a p t . M . T y b j e r g . the South, and in the hills around Tiddim,
. P. P. W. W. Francis Z-Coy.
ptt.
Caap Fort White etc. some
145 miles away to the EAST,
The Bn. 2 i/c Major CAULFIELD-KERNEleYft the By,
: oceed x ITJALY as 2 i/c of the MAHR On the 3rd of March 1944, Major EF. Johnson
: ATTA M.G. Bn,
:
joined the Bn as
2nd i/c an appointment which had been
Tieee were very sorry to see him go, vacant for some months.
after having done of Three days later Lt.
e benefit of the Bn.
much for th Col. Syer, the 2nd i/c, and fou; Coy Comds,
proceeded by jeep to TAMMU for a recce of the surrounding
At the end of Dec. the sad news arrived that the Bn. would country, and to obtain an idea of the
type of terrain in Which it wag
not take 42” Mortars into action owing to the lack of ammunition likely we would fight During two days a large area was covered,
in the Eastern zone and the Bn. had to return to 3” mortars. A including excellent views of the Chin
dwin and the Kawbaw Valley
great disappointment after all the training that had been put in, from suitable vantage points. This was our first experience of th
and the high standard of efficiency reached. e
devastatingly steep features which
abound, and which we were
destined to know so well in the months
It was not long after this however that orders to proceed to to come.
Imphal were received and on Jan. 22nd 1944 the Regimental On our return to WANGING
we found the place seething
Centre Band for the 2nd time played the Bn. out of Bareil with rumours of surprise Japane
ly se advances, and even of poss
Station, back again attacks on the Imphal area itse ible
for another spell of active service which was lf, The newly coined phase Tacti
to last until the Bn. finally returned to Bareilly cal and administrative BO Su
over two years s first used during the aborti
ve Jap
later for disbandment. thrust in the Arakan was at that time the catchward of the day,
and on the 9th March at a short
notice, an advanced party of
the
CHAPTER IV Bn. 2nd i/c, and four officers,
with half the Bn. moved to a
large
hill feature about 4 miles from
The Imphal Campaign Imphal to prepare a new camp
1944, site
on the slops of the hill, as part of
the 4 Corps Box" with a role of
By 9th February the complete Bn. was concentrated at Corps mobile reserve,
WANGING about 25 miles from Imphal just
Tammu Rd.
o f f tn e m a in Imphal: The advanced party were faced wi
th no easy task, for this was
our first introduction to the idea
This proved a of tactically laid out camps
most Pleasant ca situated on the slops of extremely
modation for mp site, and although acon steep hills. Special sites for
th © men was restricte each tent had to be dug, and camouflag
d mainly to tents or tarpaulines ed from both ground level
a few additio
na] ashas were build for them and air, Every tent and all stores ha
lived in Bas
has on
i n C o y a r e a s . Officer? d to be man-handled from the
#n open space behind the Mess, i bottom of the hill, in itself no mean feat
Basha built tself a Jaret on slopes so steep that at
¢] OSE to, and over-loo times both hands, and feet were requ
king 4 ‘pléagant and tae ired to make progress,
movine
 18

At the end of two

Ww days
“a a lot had been achieved, paths Cut, )
4 19
h i l e t l1 e B n . M . T . w a s i:
t
tents s € e r e c t e d . M e a n w b usy ferrying Stor the 2 i/c decided to halt
site. to enable the convoy to close up.
to the new This
etc. fro m Waging soon proved to be an extremely long Process, and as orders were
w a s p a l l s d t o a c o n f e r e n c e received that it was
the 12Rtih es
On n n a r c h , C o l . S y e
M he was told, the situatr essential for the Bn, to reach its destination
ion on the Tiddim as quickly as possible, it was decided to send one company
C o s s re se rv e w o u l d =R o a q ahead as soon as it could be formed. on
Ck h e e an d th at th e Bn . as
u n e T i d d i m R o a d , a n d c o m e u a l At about 1630
a d e n to M. S. 12 7 on hours one Coy. under
a i Command of Capt.
r n a s ta sk t S be th e pr ot ec ti on Russell moved
comman d of 17 In d. Di v. ou off while the remainder concentrated along the
This marked the beginning road, as and when the vehicles arrived.
vital Bridge over the Manipur River. By about 2015 hrs, only
h
of a nightmaris pe ri od fo r th e w h o l e B n . O r d e r s to ce as e al l wo r, a few vehicles had not come in, and it was decided to move on.
e t e a d v a n c e d p a r t y to c . . . From the latest informati
on the new camp, and for the compl on received it was abvious that a Jap
re ce iv ed f r o m an L . O . at 9- 15 B e , force was approaching the road abou
Wanging at once, were t M.S. 106, and doubt existed
whether the convoy would
same day. It was indeed a bombshell to the advanced party afte get through before the arri
val of
advanced enemy elements on the
road. The next few hours were
all thee toilme and e labour they. had evex pdended yin the camsp”. However extremely trying for every body
, but particularly so for the driv
by th ti th Bn. M.T arri sleep “ jawan had been ers,
as the road climbed, and dropp
ed unceasingly in terrific gradien
ts,
the surface was bad, and in p
troout ed
embus.ou t' of be d, "a nd wi th w
All tents and remainingh a t e v e r they could carry were ready laces very narrow, A ceaseless flow
stores had to be left “ In situ”, of traffic containing, admin
units, stores, and guns etc w
as met,
Meanwhile at Bn. H.Q. in Wanging, moving back to M.S. 82, a
arrangements were being nd for vehicles to Pass on
what was
made for an immediate move. virtually a one way road,
The C. O. with his recce party required a steady nerve, a
of driving, and this continuin nd caref1)
Coy. Comds. etc. moved off at 02 g over a period of eight hou
00 hrs. leaving the Bn. with r s o f pitch
M.T., and men embussed in G. P it s darkness imposed a great me
. Tpt. to move off under the ntal strain on drivers, mos
2n d t of whom
i/c at 0400 hrs, Despite the sh had been at the wheel for
ort notice and dispersion of over 24 hours. However no incidents
Bn. everything was ready by th e occurred either from enem
y action, or vehicles ac ci
the appointed time, and le dents, and the
behind a small rear pa aving convoy eventually reached
M.S. 109 at about 3-30 a.m.
rty to clear up the m
at 0415 hrs, on the e s s , the Bn. moved off
13th March, Within half an hour of our
arrival firing opened up on
above the t h e road
It is of interes the camp, where the Japs had ‘ambushed
t to record that at dawn an out going
the new camp site
the following morning convoy and the road was cut behind us.
area just Prior to again moving
vacated was heavily bombed, and forward from 109
s:traaftfed, durio
ng ewhich
the C.O. was contacted at M.
S. 127 by tele-
the 2nd i/ec’’s phone, who Ordered
Its an jl] wind tent received a di the Bn. to remain at M.S. 109, and a
etc”, rect hi| t arrival with the recce group. wait his

The battle for the Tiddim Rd. h

ad begun.
This is a record only of a general
ee naturea,
nd it is not proposed
d Was to deal with the happenings at
full of traffic M.S, 109 in any detail. Let it
aS » “0 that d
moving in both
suffice to say that for those in
lessly ™ixe e s pite al] efi it, it was a period not easily fo
rgoton.
d up wit or
4 From 0400 hrs. on the 14th Marc
e
ehie
cle
es, ihe P _ h until about 0700 hrs. 17th
Bk the Bn. area was subjected to
= numerous Jap attacks most
ly at
Convoy hag Teached = On the 13th the leading element é night, all of which were beaten
oftb off by our men. During one of
a large administrative area
at M.S. 87,#
 20 ZI
2)
d h a d t o a
W O u n d e d , a n
s s e r i o u s l y a n , f o r t u n e s o f Z C o y .
Kuuss s e l | w a r e i n c o n s t
i g r e s s t o f o l l o w t h e
k s C a pt .t . R C d a n a s
h i n e g u n s w e
Here we m u s t d
these attac
. m o r t a r s ,
c o n s i d e r . Bn. Recce Gp. proceeded
a t e d . T h e B n
i s b e l i e v e d c a u s e d
b e r e d t h a t the
evacu i o d , a n d i t It wil ] be r e m e m
r s t h a t o n e
h o u t t h a t p e r
d a w n o n 1 7 t h t h e e C . O . r e c e i v e d o r d e
acti o n t h r o u g J u s t b e f o r e S . 1 2 7 ; F r o m t h e r e t h
g
g t h e e n e m y : direct t o M . g r o u n d c o v e r i n
c a s u a l t i e s a m o n
n o t h e r s m a l l u n i t o n o y ,
able e r h e l d b y a r e m a i n a t M
a t e d t h e p e r i m e t
W i t h t h e Coy. would
Japs pe n e t r
p o s i t i o n u n t e n a b l e . e enemy. Z, Coy.
e o f o u r ; the r o a d t o t h 4
e r e d t h e w h o l
v e intercept the convoy
left, and ren d
? , t h e C . O . h a d n o a l t e r n a t i
b j e r g r e t u r n e d to M.S. 100
o f t h e s e n i 1o r c o m m a n c e e r Major Ty
c o n c u r r e n c e p a s s e d .
s i t i o n . o y . a s i t
i t h d r a w a l t o a n e w p o pull out Z C
but to order a w e C o y . o n t h e r i g h t a n d l e f t o f
p v i a t h e n u l l a h e t a k e n u p b y t h
t h e r p e r s o n n e l in the c a m Positio n s w e r
r c h . A
Evacuati on of al l o b y e a r l y m o r n i n g 1 4 M a
positions unti] d w e r e c o m p l e t e d
n w h i l e t h e B n . h e l d covering the roa d, a n
r f o r t h e
t h e N o r t h b e g a
h t h i s e n d e a v o u r t o f i n d w a t e
to
u t 0 6 3 0 h r s . o n t h e 1 8 t n t o u t t o M . S . 1 0 2 t o
a d b e e n c l e a r e d . B y a b o patr o l w e
h i s J e e p t o
the area h b y M a j o r T y b j e r g w h o w e n t o u t i n
t e d , a n d t h e B n . comm ence d to with draw , movi ng Coy., followed later
had been comple g e t t i n g o n , a s w a t e r w a s u r g e n t l y r e q u i r e d :
s to t h e Nort h with the inten tion of 35 HOw the patrol wa s
straight out acros s t h e hi ll h e d b y a party
t a b o u t 1 0 0 0 b r s . a n d w a s a m b u s
6 w h i c h it w a s h o p e d w a s st il l i n o u r h a n d s . He was return i n g a
making for M.S. 9 d i m m e d i a t e l y . M a j o r
The Driver
Jeep was ki l l e
of enemy.
over high features necessitating g o t a w a y , d e f e n d i n g
This was a gruelling march Tybjerg w a s la st s e e n b y hi s o r d e r l y who
sometimes the use of hands and feet to get up. Men carrying . No tr ac e of hi s bo dy wa s
himself by the Jeep with his pistol
heavy equpt such as machine guns, had a particularly difficult on su bs eq ue nt un of fi ci al in fo rm -
found, and it is believed, ba se d up
time. The only food available was the emergency ration on the d an d ta ke n pr is on er , th en re mo ve d to
ation that he was wo un de
man, and as there was no means of knowing just how far it would a wh er e he wa s ki ll ed by th e Ja pa ne se be ca us e he re fu se d to
Burm
be necessary to walk, even this meagre allowance had to be divulge information. In Major Tybjerg the Bn. lost a very fine
conserved. A halt for the night was made in a suitable area in officer indeed.
thick jungle. Starting again at Dawn, this by now exhausted
Capt. Squier took.over command of the Coy. which was from
body of men finally reached M.S. 96 which was found to be held
then continuously engaged by the enemy.
by a Bn. of Gurkhas, at about 1700 hrs. spent the night inside the
Gurkha perimeter, lying on the road, or in the ditch alongside During the afternoon Capt. B. P. Singh who had been delayed
the road, and the following morning, the 20th March moved back on the road reached the camp, and on hearing of the acute shortage
to M.S. 82 in M.T. to reorganise. of food and water, and the increasing strength of the enemy
& lifetime seemed to have passed since we left WANGING OREN SO to return to M.S. 82 to inform the Bde. Comd. of Se
em bsthe morning of the 13th March, until we reached position. As a result of his report two coys. of the 3/5th R.G.R
ee ae € evening of the 19th. First the difficult, and tiring were sent forward, and guided through the jungle by Capt. Wood
which in fact for the drivers started at 2,130 hrs. on the 12th reached the camp about midday on the 15th. By this time the
enemy under cover of diversionary attacks had worked
when they proceed to collect the advanced round to th
ed to th e ne w c a m p rearof the position cutting the road between
party. them and M.S. 82 :
From th orf, 0. zs Effective offensive action by the G
. S . 1 0 9 t h e y d r o v e c o n t i n u o u s l y urkhas supported by our
for about 36 fige e a r r i v a l a t M ss and M.M.Gs. resulted in drivin
Bn. had lit t l e r e s t d u r i n g t h e w h o l e p e r i o d g the enemy off several ]ocal
starting with ie f he ‘ca but water was exhausted
€ drive, four days in action, and ending with the and ammunition runni
walk across the hi a5 on the evening of the 1 o ut,,
Ser: . 8th the O.C. Gurkhas
M.S. 96 on the 19t ill
h, s, anned Were very tired indeed when they reached withdraw back to M.S. d e caided to
96. The road was still he
l a by the enemy

J
 23
the Bde. wii thdrew from M. S. 822 e
to ‘thet
On thee 3rd April
of concentrated shelling, the heaviest to date,
accompaniment
act 10ns, V era
ov per 1 od of
I a aceis Ss wa¢y bac Kina © serie > of r ea T g u a rd

days.
From M.S. 41 X Coy moved on 6th April to Ses: to the
Commander of the Box at KANGLATOMBI on the Dimapur—
Imphal Road, and having passed through 49 Bde. at M.S. 30 a
Bn.; after detaching Z Coy to 49 Bde., moved to a new camp ee
at LANGTHABALL to hold a series of high features covering
the TULIHAL air strip, and the country to the NORTH of the
main road, under command 23 Ind. Div.
X Coy.
Leaving the Bn. at M. S. 41 X Coy under Major Davies with
: ~ this Tact ws Ae
Capt. Dron as his 2 i/c moved in M.T. on the 6th April to
each others M.Gs.—the rest was confined ty
= 4 a 2 KANGLA TOMBI a defensive administrative box at M.S. 118
the 20tth
h
ere in at M.S: §2 Mrac;h
on Ma
on the DIMAPUR—IMPHAL Rad.. arriving about 1360 hrs. the
ate es
HITS
i Rie same day. Positions were hurriedly taken up on the West of the
perimeter, M.M.Gs. forward supported by their 3’”’ Mortars.

During the night the box was heavily shelled by: enemy
artillery from about 700 yds. range, and after heav
y fighting the
Japs penetrated the Northern face of the perime
ter.
The position was restored at first light
by counter attack by
tanks and a Company of the West
Yorks, but the enemy well
supported and in strength were gr
adually encircling the position.
the Bn. came, on our arrival in the position, At 1500 hrs. the 7th April the
and there we remain- box Commander ordered a with
ed holding a portion of the perimeter drawal towards Imphal. X Coy -
until the 3rd April. By thes with tanks formed a rearguard,
17 Div. had withdrawn through the position followed with R.A.F, Support, the a n d
later by withdrawal was carried out
#9. Bde.. on relief by. 37. Bde... The contact with the enemy who in cl os e
commanding ground around
J a p : in -o cc up at io n. of the however did not follow up
on ce our
M.S. 96, were able to ma forces were clear of the area.
k e the box” The Coy slept at the Side
Tather unhealthy with main road that night and of the
heavy Arty fire from on the 8th April rejoined
which our own Arty lo ng range agains the Bn. at
was outtanged, LANGTHABAL. Casualties had been 1 killed
4 wounded.
Lt. Creasy had to be evacuated with Z Coy.
on 2Ist March. This a b a d attack of Jaundice
had first started at M The Coy under Maj. Squie
.S. 109, and had r and Lt. Wood rem
become worse. a Ind. Inf. Bde, from 6th A ained with 49
In Spite of it he marched out pril until relieved by X
with the Bn. carryité April. The position at C o y- on the 20th
@ full pack, and “dupt, although onl M. S. 30 remained und
y sheer determination co” e r
have kept him goingo; g durin th ¥ 2 d enoug. b Artillery fire which cau
sed considerable dama
ven forafit man, < § the walk over the hills, ba knocked out, and ano g e .
ther badly damaged
while
 24
u r nt out. SGV: Nood had
anodneb
‘r e c t h i t t hit, two mj
a e d a d i r e c Minut
received 20 320
trucks bh re &s ° 10

p e w h e n
y esca i
; I N G T HE
narrov
f t i t t o v MAP CO V E R
h a d l e P l a t o o C A M P A I G N
afte r b e
h M a y o n e M . M . G . IMPRAL
l u n t i | t h e 9 t
l (paRT 1 REFERS)
1 2 t h A p r i
t o 9 I n f . B d e . o f v a
Fr o m t h e
a s a t t a c h e d i e e e e e
nks w daai S e t n Z
_ Ba p a r t i
Rd . , t a k i n g ACtions
UKRUL u r ia,
t s . I t w a s d
Divi s i o n ©
o f t h e 3 / 9 t h J a
e i n s u p p o r t n s h i e i
ify
“had
dint!
w h i c h w e r
f t h e 3 / 9 f h s w o
some o f
A bd u l H a f i z o C
a t J e m . M . S . 2 7 9 -
p e r i o d t h h o f M a y a t : n t h e
this t h e B n . o n t h e 9 t
o o n r e j o i n e d
T h i s p l a t
M M U r o a d .
TA L A N G T H A B
i n e d i n t h e 2

L
a e,

e t a c h m e n t s r e m a A
The Bn. less d t o P A L E L u n d e r c o m , ® «

M a y w h e n i t m o v e d M a n d > sy ®,

area until t h e 9 t h a SS IMPHA

n . Apart from daily air raids and patrollj

d . D i v i s i o
of 20 In during this period. Several Jap aircraft =o
BISHENPUR £y

a d h a p p e n e d
little h MMe
A . A . g u n s , and on one occassion Y Coys.
shot do w n b y
l o w f l y i n g Jap bomber aircraft whith ee
cl a i m e d h i t s o n a
r a s h e d s o m e m i l e s a w a y - Yo
seque n t l y c yyy
i t i o n o n the perimete LZ
The Bn. lessX Coy t o o k u p p o s
w h e n it a c e ‘ Y)MW,

y u n t i l t h e 1 2 t h
m 9 t h M a
BULL BOX fr o
“hy
wy
(i

Cy,
i l t o t h e East, under command of i a
ny

KACHIN, a b o u t f i v e m es
g h t f l a n k o f t h e vivi
tata l X
Inf, B d e . w i t h a t a s k o f p r o t e c t i n g t h e r i
|oh
PALEL airstrip. Addy
X Coy. °

a t
alluded
TY Y

h o
;
w e r e w i t h 3 2 I n fe. B d e . ° o
Mhyy
w a
1b,
It
n r eIlMi eRv e
d . Z C o y 49
ifif)
. S
M S. e e h. T I D D
4

t h e r e l i e f w a s d u l y
b y X C o y , a n d
April 12t
effected on Stan
Ry

May when the Coy rejoined the

Bet
we nie, el a the 14th
notable of which
of engagements,
were those of picioteateE and POTSANGBAM

Fierce attem t to dislodge our troops

ee made by the Japs
from this area, sie Any success by the enemy 2
only 17 mil which failed.
this area m a very
Imphal, would have constituted
serious threat to ast elbua nym
(tap

al plain from th e East.

:
7
WMipry 3
t h e TS
Here it mi ght b appropria: te to take a b r i e f g l a n c e a t
i €
hy
Dnsf

i t i : w a y t o t h e b o r d e r s
e
ge{nInar a l p o s lon a s t h en ef f e c t i n g t h i s v i t a l g a t e ong,
Phi
of India—the Imp
hal plain
 25
was r ll
in o fu=
the great battle for Ka OHEMA
To the North
of defenders stubbornly holding4
-¢ with its gallant band
of reinforcements from
the Jap until the arrival
m ore
effe ts
DIMAPUR.
to I m p h a l s t r a i g h t f r o m e e t
5 Ind. D i v . h a d b e e n f l o w n in
t h th e e n e m y a b o u t 2 7 m i l e s
a n d w e r e in c o n t a c t w i
inesthe Arakan, ?
Z
in
th e U K R U L rd to th e N . E .
North of I m p h a l , a n d al so on

S o u t h as p r e v i o u s l y st at ed 32 B d e .
On the Ti d d i m ro ad to th e
fu rt he r E N E a l o n g th at e s
were denying the enemy any
Div. in spite of w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g e e p r o p a g a n d a ha
17 Ind.
ei r o r g a n i s e d w i t h d r a w a l f r o m Tiddim, and were re-
completed th
s i v e s o o n to c o m e .
forming prior to the offen
S.E. 20 Ind. Div. had made a successful with-
Away to the
on s ar ou nd th e hi gh fe at ur es
drawal from TAMU to prepared positi
A M U - I M P H A L ma in ro ad .
near SHEENAM, astride the T

23 Ind. Div. were protecting the right, and left flank of this

southern area.

The fertile Imphal plain was indeed in a state of siege, but

moral remained high throughout, and even at the height of the
siege supplies, and personnel continued to arrive by air. Supplies
dropped by parachute on forward units because a common event,
yet the standard of rations remained at a very high level through-
out this difficult period.

The Jap after a series of initial successes had shot his bolt,
and was soon to suffer for his arrogance, and taste the real mettle
of the Indian Army.
Y Coy. under command Major Francis left KACHCHIN on
9—5—44 to report to 80 Inf. Bde. at SHEENAM where the M.G.
Platoons played an active part in the defence of that area, and
in supporting infantry attacks. Jap. artillery of all calibres from
his 75 m.m. guns to his 150 m.m. howitzers pounded the area day
and night, and his infantry made repeated attacks against
v arious
positions without success. On one important feature known as
Malta, the fighting was particularly severe,
and one M.M.G.
‘section, which had to be relieved every three da
ys, covered an
approach from which the Japs constantly
made night attacks,
 26
27
that on Maay y 23rd Havildar Phul Singh, distin.
sent to strengthen the
were
It was here ; io n ha vi ng Suirferedi! Several
From KACHIN mortar platoons
s e l f . His Oe aes barrage, and though“ASUhi
altiag
the West of the . Palel Sh .
strip From
guishe d h i m msey efences s of
def BULL+L BOX to
p r e l i m i n a r y e e e a ra ll ie d his remaining men to beat heir : tionss
posi they5 were frequently in action against enemy
fro m a their
t h i gy ny
o u n d e d i
1 n t h e once. ntrations,
badly w Cc
or harrasing their positions.
ipted to storm his M.M.G. Posts by Propping
off Japs. wie pee te throwing grenade Casualties in the Bn. during
after etenade, "Nt the the month were 2 killed
himself on his elbow ieee leaving many 9 wounded.
dead on the wire, An act
Japs. were as aie to duty which later earned him the Bn. H.Q. remained at KACHIN until the 22nd J uly. yes it
of gallantry a
ae... moved to M.S, 31 on the TAMU Rd. under command of 5 Bde. of
y 25° ¥ Coy. returned to Bn. H.Q. having been 2 Div.
On May 4 :
X Coy. mortars and M.M.Gs. supported Infantry attacks ae to
Ree see h the Bn. casualties amounted to 1] killeg
During this ae iS ieee aceide sel a high feature known as KHUDEI KHUNOU, and at one period
and 23 wounded including Jem Hila “ower filled a gap left by infantry personnel who had colic cesualties,
y
stepped on to a mine and was blown up, w is way holding the area against Jap. attacks, while the M.Gs. inflicted
to Sheenam. heavy casualties on the enemy, an action resulting in the capture of
Jap. equipment, and four P.Ws.
Capt. Hough with one platoon of Y Cox Mortars left op
10-5-44 for a position known as SITA a high feature out in X Coy.
the blue to the N.W. of WANGING to come under command Another M.G. platoon of X Coy. came under command
of the KALI BAHADUR Regt. where they remained of
unti 49 Ind.
Inf. Bde. who were to carry out a long
21st July, subsequently reverting to Bn. control. and difficult
outflanking movement in conjunction with
the main thrust down
During June Z Coy. remained in action around SHEENAM the TAMU road. M.Gs. were carried on pack, as the
movement
taking part in a number of spirited actions. The monsoon was in involved crossing wild and moun
tainous country by narrow foot
full swing and conditions were foul, heavy rain and mist paths. Lt. Ranganathan Comm
anded the platoon which with
Mahrattas, and Raj Rif,
t h e
prevailed, sometimes being so dense that visibility was NIL, rendered valuable supportin
g fi re i n
Inches of mud, and legions of rats in additional to the Japa several actions until the o
nese bjectiv € was reached.
variety all added to the general discomfort.
No. 4 platoon of X Coy.
came under comm and of 1 Inf. Bde.
Again a call for machine guns came from 5 Div., which at and on July 23rd moved o
n a mule basis in support
to capture the LOCHAO o f t h e Patialas,
that time was without a Machine Gun Bn. of its own and on the 6th Bridge, and subsequently
May, Lt. Banks with one platoon reported to the H.Q. attacks by the Raj Rifs supporting
123 Bde. at and Mahrattas.
KANGALA TOMB] (since retaken by Sie)i: :Thetoffensivennas
been resumed in this area, and the platoon afforded valuablé Y Coy.
assistance to Bns, of 123 Bde., an Y Coy. spent from the
d later of 9 Bde. including Ist to 19th July in K
ACHIN,
3/9 Jats. the moving to Occupy then
The Platoon was under command important fe atures c
of the 3/9 Jats, when SHEENAM, from wh
overing t he Ot © ate
as the leading Bn, of the Bde, ich active patrolling
co
ntact was made with 33 was carried out,
troops advancing towards Imphal on 22-6 Corps
-44, For the first time On the 29 July two
ae a a M.M.G. platoons o
poe Manipur road from ee mortar platoons of X f Y Coy. with t
Coy. reported to H wo
SHEENAM in rea . Q . 5 Bde. of 2 Div.
diness to move forw near
main L of C, Theles ¥ our control, and could be use ard down the TA
MU road.
“eee of IMPHAL had been broken !
 28 29
a c k again in
t e B n . w a s b
Z Coy: Y d o f A u g u s t t h e c o m p l e
t h e s i x
i n a c t i o n a t S H E E N A By the en c a m p a t W A N G I N G . I n
rei y a i n e d f o r t a t i t s © l d B n .
platoons ortin u p p v e c o m d e p a r t u r e , t h e
The two M.G. o t t e d a n e w t a s k s c o m p a r a t i
e d s i n c e i t s h u r r i e d
was 4l l a e h a d i n t e r v e n p a i g n ,
w h e n each t h e e n e m y t h a t t h e I m p h a l c a m
e 2 4 t h , t o c l e a r months n a l l f r o n t s o f
u n t i ] t h
c o u n t e r offen sive i n 0 p e r a t i o n s o
u r i n g
t a c k s 1n t h e
G G Y —LYNCH a had taken
p a r t
b y u l t i m a t e s u c c e s s . D
infantry at f e a t res, 45 S C R A
r e v e r s e s , b u t r e w a r d e d
— 2 Z 0
w e l l known
u
sufferin g i n i t i a l
h e s “ D i v 7 D i v .
such b y t h e n e v o c i a t e d u i e
o d o i n g t o p a v e t h
v a y f o r 5 B d e ' s . a d v a n c e t h e B n . h a d b e e n a s s
b e s a i d t h a t
T E . a n d b y s
l u c k h e n a s t r a y this t i m e
t m i g h t j u s t i f i a b l y
CR E w e r e m o s t u n y w 1 e h ¢ , D y v y . a n d i
o a d . 1 2 p l . D i v . a n a l @
down the TA
M U r
e y w e r e s p r e a 5
d o y t Div.—23
t h e m w h e n t h
150 M.M. s h e l l l a n d e d c l o s e t o
l d a r w a s k i l l e d o u t a we “got around”! joined
r d e r s . O n e H a v i
w i n g n e w officers had
i d e , a w a l t i n g o
w h o a g p a i g n t h e f o l l o
the road s s l y w o u n d e d , a n d ’

During th e c a m
r v e r y s e r i o u d K h e m a R a m .
o m m a n d e N o b l e , a n
the platoon c l y w o u n d e d . Lt s . D i d a r S i n g h - B a l i -
u r o t h e r r a n k s b a d
l y a f t e r , a n d f o
short d s w e r e r e c e i v e d .
t h e C o y . u n d e r L t s . C . R . S i n g h The following awar
t w o m o r t a r p l a t o o n s o f
The
u n d B u l ] Mentioned in Despatches
s y t i m e o n f e a t u r e s a r o
and Didar Sing h w e r e h a v i n g a b u Capt. Squier
s a n d L A N G O L engaging enemy with defensiy Sub. Mohd. Afsar
bed

and Bull o c k b o x e e,
”
a s o p p o r t u n i t y o f f e r e d . Sub. Des. Ram
”
and offensive, fire
Sub. Khushal Khan bP) ”

es we re be in g tu rn ed , wi th th e Ja ps
In early August the tabl Hav. Mohd. Sabir = ” »”
pull in g ou t of th e T A M U ar ea mu ch fa st er th an th ey ha d
Hav. Lal Khan = oo :
entered it five months before. Two platoons of X Coy. and two of = : :
Sep. Rati Ram
Y Coy. moved to MOREH with 5 Bde. on Aug. 4 returning to Bn L/Nk. Aii Sher — M.M. f : ss
H.Q. on 9th Aug. Z Coy. had also reverted to Bn. command fe Hav. Gul Sher — I.D.S.M.
that for the first time for nearly six months the Bn. earl Hav. Phul Singh = I.D.S.M.
concentrated as a complete Bn.
an ue Bn. remained in WANGING throughout Sept. and
The first step towards chasing the Japs. out of Burma was ctober, until
al BY 21 November, engaged in reorganising training
RB, The Indian Army had achieved the impossible, first by an d g e t t i n g a s 1 d :
m a n y m e n a n o f f i c e r s a s p o s s i b l e a w a y o n
We cect at a place of our oe
and then at the choosing, ae
= ee hae Acie conditions so bad, that previously it The powers
=
. dé
that be ha decided ) I -
| 1 1
ae ete he st ath iopotensine action to be taken,) of M.M Gs..
“Gs and }
M
com nation

Lees ortars was an unsatisfactor y OrganisBe atioit n, and

es t offensive which quickly resulted in the ssued orders for the Bn to beco m ea n
eat of the Japs. in this area up to the R. Chindwin. of 4 Coys. each of 12 guns
all machin
1 e g
gun Bn .
: This Was aa po pular moOV
ve for (S V ery -
At thi body, as we |aad foun i ;
from
Sas African Division took over to continue
exper lence
the om ae
that Infan tr y re q uired
machine guns
ars, to support
»e annedws ntohtat mwoert a them. Even more
Chindwin, allowing 23 fa a valley, and on the East bank of the popular w a s t h e
we ll e a r n e d re st . reSe being Corps troo
. Div. and th e B n . a i i1 n ps and
As Corps a r would fultu
urree |
fio)rman
rt of
1ntteeg
gior
r
) al pa an Infantr ancien
and a suitable area a a ee then reverted to Corps command,
r e o r g a n i s a t i o n p e r i o d h a d t o b e Ind. Div. commanded by Maj
ones By good fortune a n d ake
it wi o u r o l d c a m p s ite 4!
ING was empty, and as found that
o c c u p y i t w a s obtained
tom 20 Ind. Diy. without e a i a c s t o
an yidifficulty. and our Incorporat
ion in 20 Div. as Di V . troop
S e
 30
; ed that th
3|
e w ere remind € war Wag
On the 26th S
o eepp t e m b e r W eel one pl atoon of M.Gs. to report ‘ ; AIAING
Lk
Creasv) returned : afte!
j} in WAN GIN G
u d d e n o r d e r t O S
t o i l i n g u p t h e T i d d i n ;
During this perios X mont} 1s: looking very fit, and a different
b y a s v a l l a n t l y S I = m
still on, wh o we re a t u r e i n e n c e o f a b o u t
I n d . D i v . , u n r e l e n
.

t i n g N b
a n abses e
n c e h i m .
9 a n n
>
s e e
to H . Q .
Japs. but e d l a s t -
y hen w e h a
n g n o t o n l in th ei r
Road, f i g h t i mud, and la nd sl id es , man to W
tthe “4 / Othn s it
j] Regty .
mist, the Bn. from
f t o r r e n t i a l rains; i SK alsS o
joIi ne
JJ 1n
d

form o d d i m. ic
V

|<e T i Ci
Lt.-Hov
F

to reta VI
magnificen t adv ance
K h u s h a j CHAPTER
u n d e r C a p t . W o o d a n d : S u b that the Div. would
t o o n o f Z C o y :
on 10-11-44
On e p l a p . 2 7 t h . t h e l a s t vere received
S e
d e t a i l e d a n d d e p a r t e ¢ i f o r M . S . 1 0 0 o n
s e i t a i e
th K A W B A W
4 v a l l e y’ in p r e p a r a t i o n c o rSdu e
r n e s
Khan was o m e m o n t h s . concentrate 1 n
t h e m fo r s
w e r e t o se Oo!
e d .
we
in Wanging - m o v e f o r w a r
contai n u e d
:
t h e n i g h t
intensive training n e w 7an aacdv anced party mov e d o f f o n
Meanwailhtiele Based u p o n t h e o h n s o n w i't h t h e
M
h a s e w i t h 2 0 D i v . Jajor J
1
t h e 2 t
6 t h , a n d b y
o n f o r t h e n e x t p b y t h e B r n . i n M . T . o n
prep a r a t i
. a 2st . f o l l o w e d
eo r g a n i s e d i n t o : of Nova r o u n d M . S . 3 6 .
. , t h e B n . w a s t e d i n t h e J u n g l e a
W.E Ist Dec . w a s c o n c e n t r a
m d . Ma j o r D a v i e s .
W Coy. J a t s — C o e n o t t o o p l e a s a n t . It
t h e K a w b a w v a l l e y w e r
Co n d i t i o n s i n
C o y . J a t s — C o m d . Major Francis. r a w a l r o u t e s o f G e n e r a l A l e x a n d r a ' s
X ha d b e e n o n e o f t h e w i t h d
. Major Hough. L of C for the Japanese, through
Y Co y . M . R s — C o m d " Army in 1942, then a main
dr aw n cl os el y pu rs ue d by th e [a st
Z Co y . P . M s — C o m d . Major Squier. which they had recently with
Maintenance on th e ro ad wh ic h at th e be st of
African Division.
According to the new W.E ., the Bn. tra nsp ort wa s to con sis t down, and the
time was third class, had been nil. 3ridges were
whi ch mea nt the eli min ati on of our tru sty
of 60 jeeps and trailers, surface of the road no longer existed, and fot almost its whole
The se tru cks wit h the ir wi nc he s had put
15 cwt. Dodge trucks. length from TAMU onwards consisted in the main, of miles of pot
up a splendid per for man ce, and had pr ov ed tha t the re wer e few
holes. The rains had drawn to an unmourned end, and what had
places a jeep cou ld go whe re the y cou ldn ’t, an d of cou rse had the
previously been a sea of mud, was then a narrow desert of sand,
advantage of additional “lift,” over the jeep. inches, and in places feet, deep. By virtue of the pot holes,
driving was uncomfortable at 10 M.P.H., but in convoy, clouds of
We were pleased therefore to learn that the additional jeeps
dust made even a speed of eight miles an hou dangerous. All
were not available, and that trucks would be retained, and were
suitable areas for camps had been utilised by the Japs.,
in fact kept throughout the campaign. and
thereby pol
sh luted from further use. The stench from these Jap.
time to come Jats were in camps arising from the insanitary conditions
At this time, and for a considerable normal tc > the Japs.
and from decaying corpses was
extremely short supply, so much so that throughout most of the horrible and it was a pleasure to
next campaign X Coy. were able only to put two platoons in the gi
Pi venithemaisea wi
adean
birth, é ee though it in| volved cons
iderable labour
field mstead of three. se 86 néw camp sites from virgin jungle. Flies
were a pest, andoe in addition
to the normal danger of é lariz
ma as |
7 d
wa s th at of Ma ch in e Gu mn s- added the possibility of Typht
or ta ge
fe:
Oe sh
om= |La
; a frien
Ithoougugah the mberer auaut
tne nunumb thor ; ed had been increased to 48, despit?
horis Ho Ve
AS.

wever tne YZ
medica
entations the additional weapons were not made
+
measures
Pa} al uth (?itj ieés
s ; 4 ér
we re e r€a
ea cdy wit
ith
k ¢ “Ount é 9 if
against disease.
by: the time Mepa
paccrriinnee
ne we | Wanging,
we left puiee cant stab©
and during the initial combat malaria, wh bebecczame a daily issue to
the
¢ advan
adv ance Sr.o Bu;rma
Int only 24 out of 48 guns could be put
ile weekly application of D.D.T. to all clo
reduced the chances thes
of Typhus. In addition the whole dix
area was
Sprayed wit‘ h D.D.T.
7isional
from the air
 32 33
fro m W a n g i n g a l l ,
t o 5 D i v . n
n e
e y
y o f t h e m
“ch had gone months t , a n d h a i r - r a i s i n g j o
o u
u r
r
a n a b s e n c e of two dou b t t h e m o s t d fi
iff i c u l
e w i t h i t s s h e e r
after a d e a l t i o n t h r o u g h t h e M Y T Y I A G o r g
y p h u s , andh i c u l a r l y t h e p o r
l y c o n t r a c t e d T par t r a b l e t w i s t s a n d t u r n s ,
fortuna t e
K h a n . ea f th en arr ow road, innume ie ee
S u b K h u s h a l liffon one side 0 e sk y, W it h a
- J e a v i ng to en d on ly wh en th ey me t th
* f o u g h t t e e : - inclines that appeared
d f r o m 5 D i v . h a d co
f i c e r o f t h e
evacuate o r o f
l
f
an

n o e a s y t a s k , s s o n t h e o t h e r s i d e . O n e
h a d b e e n t h t h e a , into inky nothin g n e
The i r s
o n n e d up
c t e w i ma:intained
charge. d u n t i l t h e y c a l c u t t a t o Lo nd on ,
i m a n d b e y o n
i o u s co n d i t i o n s a ese
. w h o h a d o n c e driven from C
way t o T i d d
t h e m o s t a t r o c Bn
, w e r e child’s play
n d e r o n g j o u r n e y
a t K A L E M O , u
that the very worst parts of that l
eans
; du ri ng w h i c h ou r g u n s h a d be e, e t c h n o w r e f e r r e d to .
E fu
ull n na tu re co ul d de vi se ; i compared to the str
ee ac ti on wi th va ri ou s Bn s. , an d m o s t ef fe ct iv e Te su lt s u t h a l o n g t h e
of the Div . w a s S o
constantly in The general line of advance
but no rout e f r o m M A U K K A D A W
obtained.
k h a q
Banks of the Chindwin,
t a t M . S . 3 6 , o u r m a i n t a s M . T . e x i s t e d , and it therefore became necessary
r i n g t h e t h r e e w e e k s s p e n capable of ta ki ng
D u on re pa ir in g i n to th e W e s t
fo r e m p l o y m e n t -c ro ss th e C h i n d w
to rovide lar ge wo rk in g pa rt ie s for the complete Division t o re
been to P ed had been most Bn. of the Division, obese
Ap th e ri ve r, an d th en re -c ro ss th e
bank, advance South on that side of
the road, as inde never have stood
ntial task thi s, for without 1 t, the road would river again fr om AN AU KT AW to KY AU KL EG A. Th e tw o
esse
s i n g f l o w of he av y tr af fi c us in g it. crossings presented a fairly formidable problem with the limited
o f t h e u n c e a
the strain
i v i l i z e d X m a s f a d e d a b r u p t l y number of DUWKS, and rafts at the disposal of the Div., but
p e s o f a c o m p a r a t i v e l y c
Ho on were in fact accomplished with remarkable speed, and expediency.
h e a d v a n c e d p a r t y t o m o v e o f f
when orders were recei v e d f o r t
All moves now were by march route, and moving from staging
by the Bn. on the 25th, Xmas day,
the night of the 24th, followed areas daily, the Bn. eventually concentrated at WINMANA on
The Div. task was to carry out a wide outflanking movement, January 9th.
flank of the Japs. withdrawing down the
around the left From MAUKKADAW one platoon of W Coy. under
SHWEBO Rad. Lt. HOWICK left to join 100 Inf. Bde., where they received
tin ati on was MA UK KA DA W a sma ll ste ame r DS to form part of a strong mobile column
Our first des which was to move
Eas t Ba nk of the R Ch in dw in , wh ic h was firs t as rapidly as possible through BUDALIN
statio n on the to occupy MONYWA
a large cantonment and steamer station
crossed at KALEWA, by the much publicised floating Baily onthe CHINDWIN. Th
force duly left on the 4th January,
Bridge, the longest of its kind ever built, and a great tribute to the but on approaching BUDALIN
found 32 Inf. Bde. in contact
skill of the Sappers. Movement was at night, and harbouring by with the enemy w ho contrary
expectations were making a st t o
day. Although the advanced party reached MAUKKADAW on ubborn stand
inside the village,
the evening of the third day after considerable difficulty due to and of 32
flooded tracks, the Bn. with Diy. H.Q. were forced to halt at 4
Coy. which
large chaung which had become impassible after the passing of ions,
vehicles of the advanced parties with 100 Bde. All personnel
were apa oe often knee deep in wat
er, on repairing the road, ang
on the 31st Dec. the Bn. was This was a four days
abl e to proceed and join up with the march thr ough hot
this time the Bn. w a n d dusty country.
advanced party. as in good marchi R y
ng trim and arri
15th in excellent o ved on the
rder, and in good
diea0
s. Bn. had experienced difficult drives before, and We heart.
Before leavinag ieth
e final Staging c
little less than bullock cart one platoon of 7 amp ae t MA UN
tracks, » b but: ee e e mi les on roads W y. under Lt. C, G D AUNG
the night driv e from KAL E A onwards. was without R, SINGH joi
ned 100 Bde
Kt

ee —
 34
35
k for this Bde. was by moving around the] n
e eft a r , a n d E e d b e ean s a
L I N . T h e tas
e n e m y b e t w ’ s f i r s t l a r g e p r i z e S O f
BU D A N Y W A to bottle u p a n y 1 A w a s t h e D i v .
s s i n g M O MONY W r r a w a d d y , b e i n g s a
k a n d b y e - p a
k o f t h e I r r a w a d q
fen
h e J a p s t h i s s i d e o f t h e I
flan t h e W e s t b a n 2a3s e f o r t
A , a n d M I N Y M U o n y. important b s e r v i c e o n t h e C H I N D W .
MON Y W , a n d s t e a m e r
both by 4 rai l w a y =
r i n g t h e w i t h d r a w a l
Fr o m t h e t i m ehf leavi
Ee ng
an KAL EYA
mer and to arri val at
maintenance BUD ALIy ing b the scene o f b i t t e r f i g h t i n g d u
had been t a g n a t i o n u n d e r t h e J a p s , p i e s
the Div. was with ou : . ie ae 4 b y t h r e e y e a r s . o f s
:
mipeycapely Dropping from the Alt. The Tact oeree Ieee ihe * artillery and ai r c r a f t in t h e p r e s e n t c a m p a i g n ,
ae iBmainta in a complete Division DESO: tt le r e m a i n e d e x c e p t r u i n s o f w h a t h a d
hardship ere p e u n e a e i e t h a t li
a n d th e Q st p l e a s a n t c a n t o n m e n t . . ;
enee a i e cr ed it on th e Ai r Fo rc es co nc er ne d, aff a s S H e e e a n d v e r y
re c otnce
e been a flouri
responsible. Without it this move out into the blue would Never r D A V I E S and Lt. HOWICK had playe
W Coy. u n d e r M a j o
have been possible. r e .
their s h a r e in it s r e c a p t u
At BUDALIN it was decided to cones a fair weather air
e si te se le ct ed fo r th e bu il di ng
strip capable of taking the largest transport SUSE and to builg The new Bn. area was to form th
an ce du mp in pr ep ar at io n fo r th e
up Div. stock of rations, equipment, etc. preparatory to a further up ofa large supply and ordn
advance. The airstrip was constructed by local labour under the crossing of the Irrawaddy.

supervision of the Sappers, and the Bn. less detachments given the Col. SYER was placed in charge of the complete area, and its
task of protecting the various supply installations being set up, anq installations, responsible for patrolling, and organising the defence
to carry out local patrolling. The Bn. 2nd i/c was detailed as i/c of the area. Small Jap parties were still operating on our side of
airstrip pending the arrival of FAMO, his duties being to signal in the river, some holding villages, others moving about the country,
aircraft, control the unloading of stores, and despatching aircraft laying ambushes, jittering Camps, and trying to disrupt the L. of C.
after unloading. A favourite trick was to hide mines in potholes on the road at night
A few days after arrival at M.S. 19, two composite coys acting and cover them up with sand of which there was a plentiful supply.
Some casualties to vehicles were incurred, and it
as infantry were sent out to contact and contain a party of enemy became necessary
reported to bein KOTHAN a small village some miles off the for a dawn search of the road surface to be
made before it could be
main road. Prior to their arrival however the plan
opened to traffic, one stretch of road
had to be being allotted to the Bn.
changed as the enemy had slipped out of the This was not a particularly pleasant
village during the job, for it had to be done
quickly, which meant, a patrol movin
night. The two coys then moved into KOTHAN, establisheda g ina truck, with men riding
on the mudguards keeping a
patrol base from which active patrolling was carrie shar Pp look out for a
n y
d out for 5 days of disturbed surfaces. te ll-tail signs
after which they rejoined the Bn. Failure to spot suspicious
looking areas and
viously have been foll
___On the 23rdZ Coy, joined 100 Ind. Inf bution leaving little t o w e d by quick retri-
. Bde. at. KANDAW ime for regrets for th
p ee euntsth-Lt, CR: SINGH'S platoon prev ose concerned
The Coy. remained wi iously, deasateuem
th this Bde. from then
on.
While awaiting the arrival of m
a and a c h i n e guns, Bn, H.Q. with X
sees “e i selully employed in protecting dumps, a0
supply instal] se role they moved forward to the site of a neW
31-1-45 se zs AHPOGYIGON near ALLAGAPA oF Pposite bank and
the river, at
Returning to K
which W Co eecugh MONYWA which after stiff fighting ANDAW on
Y. took part With 32 Bde. awas- then cncon eenae by the rem ainder of Z 24-1-45, the
Coy. » and wi
th the Border
S, Carried out
 36
ae 27th, when the Coy,, Moved
37
s i n & u n t i l | m a n y f l y p a p e r=s
-. river Cros Q
n a dvertantly sat o n o n e o f t h e
i
Y E . S i i s -
U N B -
when Capt
oe : out
EALof
E the o u s o f h i s m
es, £0. at W Mess completel y uncons c i
and wa e m o r s e l e s s l y t o h i s b e h i n d ! !
o y s s t i l l “ M P l o y e g ly pa per
e f s t i c k i n g r
with Bo- H. Q . , X a n d Y C fortun e o r o f t h
| »began oined th e B n . a s C o y , O f t e
grace and afforded
at M A N had oyr.ecenwtiltyh j32 Bde. and Z Coy, With 10:9 4d 1 saving
sPOG Y ON W C l l n e s s h a d e i d pro Xl mity of the : Yr1Ve was

e e a t s fi t a g ain after hi s i Th e drone of spitfir

a aie ‘ S a u i k he a companimen
t of the
g lovely a hing (6)
roar of a
apt. o y . and the ear i ng
S$ plii tti

i s o l d C o y . Z C bark= of their cannon,

o u t t o h he sharp
and gone awa y up th
ne
a short dii stance
in actii on
of al5 pounders
battery
While in this camp the Mess Secretary had worked UP quite beach.
for the supply af exes
connection with villages nearby
a thriving X Coy.
chicken, onions, goats, and on one es a young pig for the
by bariet, 2 bar of Lux Soap us at ALLAGAPPA and
Mess. The system was mainly New machine guns had reached
oil eight, Or one chicken with eight guns, ee for
being worth four eggs, and a bottle of hair
it became p ossible to arm X Coy.
popular with the women, who longing to get into ed ee
etc. The hair oil became extremely two platoons. They had been
used it freely on their hair after an initial demonstration by our more, a n d on 11 th F e b . w i t h C a p t . E A L E S the two platoons joined
r H O U G H at L E Y E T M A to
sales manager Lt..CREASY! The males of the village looked upon one platoon of Y Coy. und e r M a j o
a waste of good eggs etc. and pandering to female form a co mp os it e co mp an y un de r co mm an d of 80 Inf . Bd e.
this as rather
vanity, however as the mess had a large stock of this hair oil, in several actions around PAUKTAW-
Platoons took part
bought by some previous misguided Mess Secretary, we supported mainly with the 9/12 F.F-.R. until
POZADAW and ANYON
the women, cleared our old stock, and benefited by the eggs and
19th Feb. when they crossed the Irrawaddy with 80 Bde. to take
chicken. up positions around KALAN YWATHIT-YEZIN and INYA SE
Preparations were going ahead for the crossing of the Irray.- of the Bridgehead.

addy, and as part of the plan two platoons of Y Coy under Major W Coy.
HOUGH moved to SATPANGON on 13 Feb. to take over the
While 32 Bde. was resting and regrouping after
defence of the proposed embarkation area, and a third platoon toa the fall of
MONYWA the Coy. moved forward, and
new airstrip and area for “Q” instsllations near ALLAGAPPA. came under command
of 80 Bde. with whom they moved to
SINNYE and NABET
Bn. H.Q. with X Coy. moved to a new area in ALLAGAPPA remaining until 8th Feb. when they
reverted to 32 Bde. again at
itself on 15th Feb. and on 26th Feb, crossea the Irrawaddy to MYAUNG. Sub BIR. SINGH greatly
distinguished hi ms el f
YEKADIPA, where the C.O. became responsible for co-ordinating while with the 3/Ist G.R, at
NABET winning high prais
magngniificent work under e e f o r
the defence of the many and varied units on the beach head. nemy Arty, grenade, and s
mall arms fire
This was not a pleasant camp. The sun beat down t€
ere ee onan area devoid of shade, diversionary landing f
which was not improved rom MYAUNG to the South of th
y the sandy nature of the soil. There CTOSSINg. No. 3 plato i
was often a strong wind on were to cross with
assist consolidation, t hea ssaulting trdogoh
p s
Which whipped u . . while No. 2 platoon n et o
P the sand to a frenz leaving everything pe g a v e supporting fire from
manently Covered, a sandbank in mid
Flies there were in wd legion Tiver, The landing
campaigners wh , well season® was effected accord
ing to
ich w ere far too we
Our desp ll tr ai ne d to be intimidated BM Lt. H OWICK wi
erate attem Pts to eliminate ti h Coy H.Q. and >
them, with flit, fly paper to join the platoo t he remaining pla
oil, curses, n with the Northa t oon cro ssed
and fly swats, Their delight must have eq nts on the bridg
ualled out ehead. 2
 39
1.y +to
o this surprise land
trong at }
developed in depth, and
foothold gradually
Ing, ang
100 Bde's
er the other mainly at night, a) sh el li
enemy ng wa s in te ns e,
on 32 Bde’s bridgehead
th e k n o w n en em y gu n ar ea s
ass r to th e cr os si ng
h w e r e repulsIseed,, nuous. Pr io
ra tors
whi c and cont!
bo mb in g by a fo rc e of 10 0 Li be
enemy e c t e d system
t o at ic
ll of the A
were subj
s een on this front so far, and this undoubtedly
s The brid
rgest fo rc e
Northants. the la of fire that could be
d , a n d no a t t h e su bs eq ue nt volume
sa n s o m e w h
very soit : reduced a d .
b e a r o n t h e b r i d g e h e
c h t t o
these con brou
l e o f t 2 p la to on on 14 Fe b. Z Co y. wa s ov er
the mo r a r o s s i n g o f 1
g a i n With the c nd s of
G H a n f a n t r y , fi re d th ou sa
BIR SIN th e M . C. J e m U M E D S I N G H a n e a n d m o v i n g f o r w a r d w i t h t h e i
,
a s a w a r d e d complet E T H A U N G
superb l e a d e r s h i p w
i n supp o r t a t A L E T H AUNG—B and
e M . C . fo r c o n s p i c u o u s b r a v e r y a n d l e a d e r s h i p d u r rounds in their
Iso a w a r d e d th : until the end of the
als aed ti CHAND opera tions which continued
n d f u r t h e r a w a r d s m a d e to ae SOBHA SINDAT, in
this period, a A N D RAM
H M . M . , L N k . C H : month.
,
M.M., Hav. S A R D A R SIN G e S
M.M. H a v s Q A D A R B A X , an d
M.M., L/Nk. DOD R A M M. M. , an d L Nk . B A L D E W A For gallantry, and devotion to duty
he ad wa s st il l fi rm ly ho ld in g e d th e M _ M . du ri ng th is pe ri od .
By the end of the mo nt h, th e br id ge
eb y MOHD. ALAM were both award
y at te mp ts to di sl od ge t h e m , th er
n g a l l e n e m were :—
out, and resisti rces who w o u l d o t h e r w i s e Casualties during the month
r r o l e o f c o n t a i n i n g e n e m y f o
»
g tthl e i
fulfilli n 7 killed.
have been available for the defence of the Division’s main
18 wounded.
bridgehead.
Y Coy. That most difficult operation of war “ A river crossing against

area, two opposition ’’ had been successfully effected, and a beachhead firmly
Leaving one platoon covering the embarkation
established, and thanks to our Div. Comd’s. superb planning, the
pla too ns und er Maj or HO UG H cro sse d the riv er on 24t h Feb . and
minimum of casualties. By a system of ferries of DUWK and
joi ned up wit h the X Coy . pla too n und er Cap t. EA LE S wit h 80
outboard motor rafts the hours of daylight saw a continuous flow
Bde., and with the Devons, F.F.R., and 3/8th G.R. took part in
of traffic, carrying personnel, tanks, equipt. and the many vehicles
actions around KALAN YWATHIT, KALAN and TALINGON,
which form part of a modern Division, across the river to concen-
Z Coy. trate on the East bank.

No. 10 and 11 platoons under the 14/13 F.F.R., and Border Briefly the Div. plan was to break off contact with remaining
Regt. respectively crossed the river with the assaulting troops on enemy forces to the East and S.E. of the bridgehead, and moving
the night of 13th Feb. from SATPANGON to establish the main Ede: groups as fast as possible across country ina generally N.
E.
bidgehead for the Division. The engines of some assault craft failed direction with a final objective of the important tomar of
in midstream which caused the boats to drift downstream before KYAUKSE to. the South of and_on the main railway line
the engines could be coaxed into starting again. However all to MANDALAY,
landed safely on the beach and positions taken up as planned, in se eee was of the utmost importance to the enemy for it
the face of fairly heavy small arms frre.
y yon his only escape route from MANDALAY to the
2 Little opportunity for consolidating was MEIKTILA area to the South.
allowed by the enemy, Success in this plan would
whoae attacked fiercely, and in force, bu
e le ee Ae he Jap Southern flank, and materially
' S, t s u ffered heavy assist the
and withdrew. The enemy maintain Div. in
ed his attacks, the North, as they moved on to
duriurnging whwhiich our M.Gs. di; d exce MANDALAY.
llent work. In the face of fierc?
 4()
speed of which would have to }‘
the spe
It was |' bo! Id F plan,
aay administrative » difhec
difficulties to be SOlyeq .
\\,4
vi s
ty by the many aes =
v i¢

Monywa WY
Me
dictat ed laree y Aes of the adva nce lay thro ugh miles of arid ALLA GAPAAS
pyte the Q aafl,
stall Thehabit
axised 0 country for - thisthis was the well known ,
Zeta mMINVYMU
od j r }aDILe . ‘i
waterless, 4! 2 tae n d undoubtedly lived up to its Name,
a
“Dry Zone of Burma
ind a decent bullock
cmaardte trbayck velhooF ked
Roads
)
{ didd not exl af, ‘
s h a d t o be
Frequeé!i tly
track Icles
a luxury: eee Z
upon as ross coutry, oF over fields, and the dustevaWas t
g 4 c b e e n d n
themselves
movi n
i d g e h e a d h a d
a r e a n e a r t h e br
b a b b
l ]
e . A l arge
indescri leaves, a source of interest
9 f tob
acco
fo the cultiv a
made4 and
ation :
leaves when dried
o f p r o f i t to the men, , for these
e e d
in d
indulgence in which had perforee
i t smoke
excellen
for hookhas,
t o l a c k o f t o b a c c o . Taungdwingy
heen restricted owil ig oS

Lt.-Col. SYER received news

While still in YEADIPPA,
to take 61 Days leave jn
ti on ha d be en gr an te d fo r him
that sa nc
a, an d le av in g Bn . H. Q. on Ma rc h 7t h, he cr os se d th e river
Australi
airstrip to leave on the first stage of his
to the ALLAGAPPA
journey. Major JOHNSON the 2nd in Command assumed com-
mand, and was later confirmed in the appointment.
N . 2) x N
{BINGO

CHAPTER VII
Bn. H.Q. with one platoon X Coy, and later one platoon of
Y Coy. which had returned on completion of its job at the embarka- MAP COVERING THE
point, left YEKADIPPA
BURMA CAMPAIGN
tion on March 11th for YWABO
(PART tI] REFERS)
NORTH, a badly damaged village along the L of C, taking up ip.
positions on the perimeter, The following day the remaining two i
Ss
platoons under Lt. NOBLE moved out in an infantry role to oc- SS.
Beet are known as Me 486, acting as a flank guard
ourMeIN
es pe CEE, to the East. By the 17th oa
the advance ah oe
BE Sehindstila YWABO lite cree oe ee ee
drawing the plato f eee Ag a G.P. tpt. coy. With- f
CHAUNGGWA oy rom Pt. 486 Bn. H.Q. moved forward to
there at short pis a W7th to Div. H.Q. area moving on from
area
r
of ONHMIN nha! recone day to occupy the village
mportant road brid aby Positions were taken up covering am
comparative aoe si Carrying out daily patrolling. Our
Bpportunity to
complete that Coy. with its plata... © Cov: With= 80"-Beiewase suitable
oon from Bp.
 4]

to Bn. H.O., the X Coy. Dinwoom under

and rith drawing
wit
Hie” SALES:
hi ch ha d se en so me st ir ri ng ac ti on s with the 9/12
Ww

re loathe to be taken out of action to Bn. Lor

They we means meant
EF: hey were soon to find out this by no

guns had now been issued, but Jats were short,

The deficient It had been
ere available in reinforcement Camps.
and none Ww Pg W Coy. by lending N.C.Os. and
r e
necessary ae as a result of which only two platoons could be
men from 4 t h r e e .
C o y . i n s t e a d o f
formed in X
The country side was beginning to change for the better
h e ith their attendant a g sun,
gift of shade from the blazin
W
gees i more numerous, the area was
) greener, and we
, becoming
ee: i e ll watered, and cultivated stretch of land
Mie a eae EVAUKSE. Although actually still in the
SORE from the point of view oe: annual rainfall, a Oe
comprehensive system of canal irrigation fed from the SAMON.
River had transformed the country side from barrenness to extreme
fertility. Attempts by the enemy to breech the various canals,
and flood the country side, restricted the movement of tanks
across country, but sappers soon had the water under control.

From ONHMIN due East ran a _ metalled road to

KYAUKSE, and in spite of years of neglect stretches still existed
in reasonably good condition. Along this road 80 Bde. with Y Coy-
were slowly advancing against determinal resistance—t
o the North
of the road 32 Bde. with W Coy. operating
across country on the
left flank, were also driving the Japs.
from village to village.
100 Bde. with Z Coy. were still in c
ontact miles to the rear around
MYOTHA and CHAUN GGWA, from
which area enemy parties
were withdraw ing,
and moving South of the main road
across
Country towards the KYAUKSE—MEKT
ILA rd. Although not
unduly aggressive these parties -in
some strength were a minor
threat to the exposed Right flank.
Bn. H.Q. with two Platoons
= X Coy. Were therefore sent ou
t to take up positions on the
eos to form a firm patrol base from which
to carry out
aggressive patrolling, against these parties trying to get
through to the East.
 qk
?
wa 43
ceced, that while eae = Ret as Machin occupied the Bns
new j iti ons
positi vith
wit
shen Ppié toons
pla ny : atone
vard of patrolling..wntle., ‘acking nga : pelling ™ ee Ities during the evacuation were 1 killed and o
er stance ack the skill of trained infantry, This y of
; the Bde.5 CE S ended a very
hus , trying
i period
1 D5 days,
of 25 7s, sp
spent in
gunn ) n did pet apie that what little time we had _ S wounded:
WwW
Tht
. -
subject to constant attacks, and continua
=> ae
i:wasprisin g 1” ot ‘n making the men 100% Proficien or posi tions,»
fully coe * mary task,
and Previous Practicg exp?osed added to Wy hich was blazing heat, and myriads of flies
: shelling: the necessarily primitive methods of sanitation
~ nachine — JL: However on diets March a atto| :
eee ing had ~ ae encouraged "» rrison by existing conditions. In addition to
SINGH eight miles
South of the eS ;mposed oF thGae g
a -

previonsly mentio5 ned, many 2indiva

vidual acts of
ae det = = Japs., of whom the patrol killeg five = the two V.C. Spore and the Coy with Major DAVIES and
aushed a party © jae who was brought back to camp with he gallantry) were = : Ti
inne prisoner,
This was the Bn’s. first, Jap. Lt. HOWI >K can truly say they had done a difficult job well,
Prisoners an ex tr em el y hi gh lev el.
she
oride by the P between an
pa tr ol . hich mo ra le re ma in ed at
d as it: happened to throughout w
be the CO>s
were few few éand far | most =le A Ream
enna Shehe made a acce ptab present.
aT This
ff little SUCCEss sig5 nal was rec
: eived at Bn.ea H.OQO. from
birthaa! ost app é ive
apptreciat
tha n the ir ow n ha d an excellent effect, and aroused 2 :
+ a3 job
job oth er
oth petition as to who should t rthants, thanking W Co y. for tk
the ver y exc ell ent
be the next to repeat I 6.O. 0 f the No
compet ul
ae
support t the y
they had ren
ee der ed, an d for the ma gn if ic en t ma nn er in
The Div. Comd. personally rang up to Congratulate the
which they had carried it out.
on a good piece of work.
Oa
On the
the 28th. Bn. . H..Q. with its =:
zZotn. two 5 plat
: oons crossed the Tiver, As previously stated 32 Bde. were to advance across country
: ew patrol base at SINGUN some miles =further with the datention of cutting the MANDALAY road to the North
and formed a new |
South from which patrolling continued. A Coy. of the 4/2 GR of KYAUKSE. The move started on the 11th March, witha
outa i ee S. ae
came und der command,
4 ’ but were almost at once taken away to join platoon under command of each Bn. and driving the enemy before
them reached the area around MINEI on the 20th, approximatel
32 Bde. y
parallel to, and NORTH of 80 Bde’s. advance along the main
W Coy.
road, and included the line of the railway
to MANDALAY. For
apeats most of this advance normal m
We left W Coy. entrenched with the NoJort
rtlhants S on o heiFr aintainence by road w as impossib
le,
Lee ae 1: and once again suppl
all bridgehead across th1 e Irrawaddy.= NoT t a day , o or nigos les came from the air like “man
ht
heaven’’. na from
without incident, and th| e machin: e guns we; re Conse Mopping up. of nearby parties
nuy
out w i t h m a c h i ne gun support of enemy was carried
in action, }beating off enemy attacks,3 }: Ly jitter parties’ whenever require
dealin g wit h jitter p d. The last train
to leave MANDALA
ap shoots
ots and harrassing shoots. Y, and reporte
sap = d to hay € contained a
of Jap. Staff Of number
ficers, just ma
7 before the lead
naged to get through to KYAUKSE
/ arullery continued to pour , on to this ing ele; ments of
shells down
hour later and 32 Bde. reached the line
ve'y small . Half an
and completely exposed they w ould hav
e b een “ in the bag.”
area, making ye = Div. Comd A t this stage
movement by day a very hazardous —procedure, and one vf . decided to
switch th e Bde. fro
© night, first m the left flank to
in lightly, With the remainder of the Bde. a to concentrat
On the bank e in the area then h
eld by Bn. H.Q.
ter having moved round through the main bridgehead te
‘of the R, S
AMO N and sub
concen to SINGUT s e q u e ntly to move South
yin dSound KANLAN YWATHIT the by no W Coy. wit
h the Bde. move
2 ‘solat par ha c
w p e e d on t he 23rd and by the
ed t y d o m p l e t
= (ts withdrawal to the Bde. area.e d it s t a s k , a n d o r d e r s w eré = in in contact around
The evacuation of the pridgt NONGG.-YI
Dead was duly completed Lt. HOWICK was
on the 10th of March under & wy with thec ompany
- Officer an d freque
ntly out with deta
ched platoons.
 ted gan wae of X ae Coy, 45
ae W
nin 8 of the *<~: CnO
thmma d ON Ca pt ,
the 20th Lis j z y mine, thence to NATTH ADA in
byby an enem
; , -
an d on t 0) th e
a e ma
s
on was blow a CHAUNGWA
“UPPorting the 9/19 bridgeheag fi ee
Starting Ound h h d b Ope M Tch, but
With
*S state,
th a Be aye GAT ie part in mi no r ac ti on s en ro ut e wi th p

al . Here ¥ Co y. wa s y
co mp le
r
te d
th dr aw
7

e s = wi
i

yA U K S E
Ofvoeurgh @ PWeirtiod of gy, 1daysOe, Bat t in g ne N an d y y y , 2 2 eee
K
iB
the en em y §
“aint from Bn. {.
H.Q Q. in re li ef of th e X Co y.;
t h th © after wh Umber of Sharp the u company oat
reget lucky in having two
ae
RA
aI ih f ,M, an d Lt . H U N T S M A N to be
K AUKSE t goat z Part cof 80 B the Platoon matey,
jaa toon: eee ce s approac
heavy casualties q. ). Miles a ena county As our force hed
AMOuNt
ay o n e a c h a l l t h time.
e
of gtoy were inflicteg ‘an es East, ie Wat j
t wit h a p J a t o
re s i s t a n c e incre a s e d , a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y heavy
E e n e m y a
vehicles ae oor ammunition ‘i 5 mY, ang Which KY A U K S
fi re w a s be in g direct ed at ou r tr oo ps f r o m
e a r t i l l e r y
t .
-

a c c u r a al l a p p r o a c h e s to it
"ty pieces, “Wipt. Capty deat -
an ich do
=
m i n a t
;
e d th e t o w n , a n d ae ,
On the 16th ¢ Ueluin high feature Were
an
day for the company which was support
The 22nd wa s aco ! G
conta I ng mplete
=
y
1 gan
connected equipt. and stores received “ direct ES
sections guns. gun and burnt right out together with its valuable
from a 7) ™. m.
Shortl y afterw ards a Jeep was also knock
contents. undamaged by the shell, and dived intoa ed out. The
ditch at the side
driver was
d. A mi nu te la te r ho we ve r he wa s sh ot — — the head
as oe Ebi a tree. Next morning Major HOUGH rang up
eee re po rt ye t an ot he r Je ep di sa bl ed by ‘sh ell fir e th is ti me
and against eae truck He up
his own, and asking for replacements. eee
tions on the EAS
of the River. T bank by a mine this was his fourth vehicle casualty in a short period,
and although the machine guns could be replaced, our shortage
Here again quantities of Stores, some vehicles, an of transport made replacement of the vehicles extremely dificult,
d a 37mm,
anti-tank gun were captured. Enemy Artillery fire was intense, and to keep the company in action adjustments had to be made
and the F.F.R.on the WEST bank suffered heavily, although the within the Bn.

platoon was very lucky and had no casualties. KYAUKSE wae entered on the 30th and with the fall of this
f ? “ strongly contested town, 20 Div’s. objective for this part
On t h e 1 8 t h t h e p l a t o o n in c o n j u n c t i o n wi th an at ta ck Lhhe of the
campaign had been successfully
achieved.
9/12th on NYAUNGNUN fired 12000 eat ioe and
- 1es 0 ’ It is of interest here to record,
that from a study of compa-
flank in thick scrub known to contain sae Jatoon of Y Coy Tative tables showing casualties etc., infl
to B n . H . Q . on re li ef by a Pp icted on the enemy to date
on t h e 2 0 t h r e t u r n e d
“a by 19 D i v . — 2 Di y, , a n d 20 Di v. , th e la tt er h a d to its credit the
Y Coy. highest count
of ene my
killed, the most P.Ws., and the highes
i t h B o . 2 ' bag” of captur t
o y . l e s s o n e g o n ee HU S N T
ed a rtillery pieces: a record of
the mo n t h t h i s c which every body
During M , N the division
H E M A R A was justly proud.
u nder Maj o r H O U G H with Lt. K part of go Bae’\
wi ith the Devons an d 3/Ist GR, asLeavin . gT INuf Z Coy.
MAN operated U K n t s B a s t h r dSE. After the suce
t h e b r i d g e h e a d t o K Y A essful riy er cros
a dvan c e f r o m {0
around the bridgehea sing, and the subsequent fighti
ng
arpchiemdberSbouotrhs aptrek pelonginé
sag d Z

GON on the —_ AG YI Coy. (Major Squier - Capt Wood - Lt,

YWABO S O U T H —
 2
DIDAR 46
SINGH
and Lt, ¢
ueW Posit
ions arou
nd K A La
I
47
PAGODA e .
-
area to the 11 p l a t o o n t o o k u p S e
Was Sent EAST am H.Q. anc 1 No.
with a det to the NORI -
t rT Oo

miles
;

the POSiti we net

f
> some 30
on later t Coy. H.O. at
ake und
es Oth No 12 platoon rejoined
an attack On ae i
Supported by No. 10 platoon.
village of ] arly
THAGYIN :
n t he Bn . we re 5 ki ll ed an d 18
Incidents suuaa l t i e s 1 ; .

nth cas
i

of ing the mo! jany actions in

f i g ure, c o n s i d e r i n g t h e n
arka y t o l l t a k e n
t a k e n p a r t , a n d t h e h e a v
e e
gsuunnss h a d
ask of Capt
uring
L. of Cand
at the
was Succes -. had successfully concluded a wide pe
sfully effe
cted on again 20 ai over one hundred miles mainly through
command o vering V
f the Infant :
ry Bns ly
u nder comman ae
mos difficult country 1n Burma, and Pedeee: z
d of the Y b.
y = iv.
to M YOTHA some Of he jaterially to the capture of Mentos ;
, Carried
flank of the B
out contributing 0" along the main road from KYAUKSE in ;
de., cle with the Div. 4 caping from MANDALAY found their
eventually joini J. any enemy &€S z
; n g
20 th er SOUS cg route completely denied to th em , and sets aod
=At~ this {ime normal ee and heavy equipment and take to the difficult,
Sige Say a s previously WV
KYAUKSE es Was goi: ng > adv. abandon a treacherous hilly country of the Shan States,
HEVANCE towards I1é11
where
decided to the EAST, and fort to be continually harrassed
that 100 Bdiede.. orgSanainsiedsed i; nto and it wa by those staunch and loyaE l
a « i they were
Armoured a ccaars
rs ¢and 1 tta
annkkss., a< nd Iai
s antry. = ae
in M.T, Supspoob
r s
t e d clap pat
by Artil]
hillmen.
would make a surprise y Artillery
dash-to the SOUTH In this well watered, and pleasant area the complete division
WUNDWIN
y
yr and EAST with
9 on
KYAU KSE—MEKTILA the
~ ba > ro
was allowed a well earned and needed six day rest.
Toad as its
}

objective, By so doing it was hoped to

trap any enemy escaping Bn. H.Q. with X Coy. had moved
from .KAYUKSE to INGON onthe MANDA-
to the SOUTH. and to lin
k up wit 17h
Diy, LAY road on the 2nd April, holding the EAST
then fighting towards MEKTIL face of the Div.
A. H.Q. perimeter where there was abundant shade, and a large canal
on our doorstep, Coys. remained out in their
brigade aieas, from
lollowing the armoured column on foot came the remainder of which as many men as possible were allowed
to makea tripin M.T.
the brigade group to MANDALAY during the rest period.
.

including Z Coy., to occupy and exploit the gain

. . r - < oJ s) s

. This once delightful city

of the and to keep open the vulner. ableILat
armoured column, presented a doleful appearance, and its
destructions appeared com-
This move took the enemy completely by r surpenri
rise, and the mobil eie plete, first from the devastating
Japanese blitz from the air
: : in 1942,
:
column moved so fast that it was at times dif5ficult to know ] and subsequently from the frequent
visits of the R-A.F.
‘ n o which
whi ch they
the }
where they were. After an exhilarating dash during of ERAGE the outlines of o
gate and nce Proud buildings met the eye,
manyeesti
killed large numbers of the enemy, and captured sci Outline
tee Sno longer even and s ‘ :
earing§ Mut y m metrical, but jagged and
material, WUNDWIN was reached and duly : occupie¢,
e e wisthneeess to the tumult torn,
Ss ] wed at the W-indowl ess the that had passed. Roofless and
made with 17 Div., while the marching colimaste® DIDAR y lajy bare to th
e sardonic ga
7 to the Nqui ze of the sun
best pace they could make. No. 12 platoon with a vith sitive eyes of by day,
W U N D W I
a
N on th e 24 th; 10 platoon 6 and there Small p
Searching « arti
myriads of stars by
night. Her
SINGH moved to €s of people could
Regt. occuple’ Mongst the rubble
be seen eede
i s c o |
nsolatel: y’
Capt. WOOD under command of 23 Mtn. of what had pre
sumably once b
een
 48 49
their r h
| ome,af fore-
ru nners“. S of
RANGOON.
:
thos. e Needless to
roads, leading
ry

bai ck to the ciity. : - to

; to could we ge l
fl at feet: .
. sQOUTH
Inevi;tably ( everbody if $s mind was,
ardunithe our aky,e in bul a Carts, on p; ever
t h e n thet advan 4
tio. a Ound their 'CYcles On ty 4 , Corps‘ ng down
moviring a the
SiR Ne t h e r Divisions of
c aie but to meet only y aVayat 5 js1ght uppetmie
!- ( early|
th ba Xd oy predictions al this
Ba caneanet g e ven ae
: “ors, and the little shone e V1 th »oAeN G O O N R2d.?ital \ny
di pp
Ze
i rRangooe betor® of over
ae t e Ar ea f o r it i n v o l v e d a n advance
Ras aS usual.” Stock 2 ere th TILA r were pr em a| t u r e ,
Sie i t for pK EL c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,
é ’ mouldy cher ev e l t c o u n t r y w i t h b a d
; u g h d ! f i c u
pes: ar t l y t h r o t i o n , t h e d e g r e e
occa“ssssiloonnaaulllyy a stbaceket tne eee looking at , a g a i n s t o p p o s i ol

« of sugar - cane, all at ¢ patcOhal i t nt i A t e

o s
€s of b Nan Y of i n a d e q u a
speed of our advance
o m 4, supplies e t h e
mone y changed handsS. la e l y d e c i d
of course r g
nek eon ric esS, andpali
tttele ‘hich would
West, and Southwar ds
hopes that our
A tour cf Fort Duffer; , t h e r e were
ufferin ? follow ed However and give Us San initial
members, up the hundreds of Steps leadj the cli5 mb b e l y sur pt 1806 the enemy,
p l e t
vould com Events justified
at the top of MANDALAY Hii pa to the eee
ove V
at least as far as
eee a TAUNDWINGL.
advante age al n c e , w i t h it s threat both to
s u d d e n a p p e a r a
interest was raised at the sight s a n d our H a a t
g of wh: : these hope forces attempting
enemy
| » with
Station. ¢
Had been” at had been RANGOON, and to the large
¢ adequately dean l o n g t h e W E S T ba nk of th e
obvious that the Station, and its eny cribes it, h e oilf i e l d s , a n d a
ry ES
f r o m t s e d
i
I
draw c e r t e d , h e a l r e a d y d i s o r g a n
h a v e s e r i o u l y d i s c o n t
attention, than the worst damaged Irrawaddy m u s t
are s n d t h e i r s t a l l ,
h e r c o m m a n d e r a
Opportun
ot e ity2 to: a
visi y ALAY a
MAND Japanese hig
towards which they had marched
= : = arche
8 oF three months was greatly appreciated
advantage of it was taken by all ranks
ae CHAPTER VIII
of the Bn as
Bn. H.Q. and X Coy. moved from INGON to a temporary
e- General Sir Oliver Leese rd, West of MEK‘TILA
the C-in-C Allied Land Forces camp siteat M.S. 5 on the ZAYETKON
visited the division during its rest on llth April arriving in the late
and spoke glowingly of its afternoon of the same day
achievements. Hardly had the camp been prepared, than the sky darkened, and to
the accompaniment of strong winds, thunder and lightning, a
Speculation on the Division’s
became the chief next task deluge descended, transforming in a few minutes an orderly camp
topic, and though opinions within the Bn., differed regarding the into'chaos. The few officers tents were torn from the fastenings
method and route, it was unanimously agreed that RANGOON eee head cover for the men blown right across the camp and
would be the next stop. The average sepoy was surprisingly well ae ches
eh eb
) i
water. Every
.
man and his kit and bedding
informed regarding events, both of local importance and in other
theatres. Eventually the news every body was waiting for came My next morning
had been struck by a cyclone. the camp area looked as though it

through, and the school of thought which had backed an advance

On the |6th ¢
and 17th, Bo, a lA@} and xX Coy, moved
Straight down the main Rangoon road were wrong. RANGOOS ‘TKON 3 Pty
through

however was the objective, but 20 Div. were to mové ig Uninhabj Ited cSoOyU to KANGYGON passing through desolate and
MEKTILA due West to ZAYETKON and linking up with a the brid
b e h
L t
'
r y
T h
o n a p ‘ -
ar with that experience
)
,
d after leaving
allotted, e a d , e
of 7 Div. from the oilfield area around Mt. POPA, then SOUTH rhe local 1 HOONGY CHAUNG area was
45 Our ¢ ' :
across country towards TAUNGDWINGI, with one Bde. 4 Dleas AL
amp ,
which with ‘
its many Buddhas made .
anntt Cceamp fo
r a few day
MAGWE on the Irrawaddy. From TAUNGDWINGI rae 5s s
These P;
agodas, and PHOONGY
-_
CHAUNGS, found in every
road connecting up with the main road to PROME 2
ALLANMYO, and this was to become the main axis lll Urma ha d bec: ome common place, but the men could
 51 a
20 a t h e ring da -
rin in th e g
never understand t : INk set off
he necessity for th
e i r
often lavish expenditI ure and labour involved bein 8, and : ¢ the Police me
Cong; der notes
€ 1 o e sae a a ?
> a complet
d of captured
gat®e
~_estia a, them 2 large Wa . story be true, w hile a
From NATMAUK the road to MAGWE owes
branch we They cue Is s h o u l d u a
as kept beh i‘ 4 d n d i
inn c a m p as + 4
4
wards, along which ard the loca
large parties of en
80 Bde. were advancing
emy from the oilfi
, Tey °d off ith which
i ee of the Bu
ee ; fr ig ht en ed
-<
ing by his frighten l o o k q u i t
i e
e l d area we
escape southwards,
and crossing
o y fellow W ? "
this end, a : cee ean
k e s d, an d af te r an h o u r h
p
e
e
w a s
KYAGAN a small vil
lage half
:hos taingece: d that
: oat
W e s p
bi
e
he d
= o r vas to
t d e t e n t i o n by c a t e des o m e re
e
3

night, and laying up conv d to 8% richer | returned some four er eee ee

by day. As g0 Bde. push
h e pa tr o 0 8 2 a S 228 cee pee sates
leaving KYAGAN
empty, these Jap. P allo we te s. L
arties w Z
; ee 2 stor , y quite ene an
to camp he made a Giga ; .
> and of course b
constituted a threat to y thei
the 80 Bde. had forr some h
ti meeme
been
prevent heir
a arriva On aSThe villagers
enemy movement ng
Tac’ Bn. H.Q. and the
Southw
7wee eeve both in bringing
. — o 4 i n information, and 11 e| a : e
li
two Platoons of X Coy. t cooperati e i r v i l l a g e s f o t
wi mos
. V w h o c a m e t o t h
a r t i1 e s o f J a p s
s
any s m a l a p p a r a n t w h e n s a
it w a s
h o w e v e r o n l3 y b e c a m e
7 h a ni e
ge 9 f h e a r t
Thi s c m a w e r e O v e r ,
information of enemy p t h e J a p r u l e i n B u r
arties, and to lay ambus t h a t t h e d a y s o f
hes by night, obvious e n ha d me t th e
echel on and all transport to m “Rn in 19 oe
42 n u m b be rs Oo f ou r m
ove to NATMAUK there is little doubt th at
with Div. H.Q,, te ou t i
to th e J ap
a ps.
and to maintain Bn. H.Q. sal ne end, ; as was now be i
in n g g me
m e t e d
party from there. O n
H.Q. and two platoons mov t h e 18th Bn,
ed to KYAGON, where a On the 25th Bn. H.Q. moved to TAUNDWINGI, ee
was chosen under a clump o s u i t a b le site
f Mango trees just West of
the village, been deprived of its two remaining platoons which had been placed
and the remainder of the day s
pent in digging in, and prepari under command of ROCOL, and the 2/8 Punjab, and on the 208k
ng the
Position, which with eight machin
e guns around the perimeter, and moved into the Div. H.Q. perimeter at YWATAUNG, just
an excellent field of fire all around Wa
s extremely strong, and from SOUTH of ALANMYO.
which we could confidently take on a
ll comers. In this part of the
country trees were few and far between, and the W Coy.
hot weather at its
height. The unexpected presence therefore of this W Coy. with the remainder of 32 Bde. mad
large grove of e the most of their
mango trees, noted for their coolth was more than could be hope rest period from Ist April to.
d 9th April, including
for, and gave us the coolest camp organising etc. By good. work on the cleaning up,
we had experienced for months. part of the Q.M., they h
already been issued with ad
new clothes, and were
ae t h u s a b le to parade
Patrolling programmes were laid on and work commenced at ATESEA, looking
very spic and Shan:
once, and will be dealt with under X Coy. Just before aes avourably commented o Their
Stand to” on n b y b oth the C-in-C, and
the evening of the 24th, several villagers
lv. Comd.
appeared, and bya very
realistic show of pantomime, managed to convey information to sf ohne tg W Coy. received orders
effect that they had captured three Japs., cut the head of ee With the Aes, i
a as thie, spear he
to form a
Ambushes were being pre ‘ eed ies a e a d o f the, next adva
them, and still held one prisoner. ae uing TAU nce,
a few personn el of Bn. H.Q. only oe NDWING with the utmo
night, and apart from which oe saree. : "ere a I st
ble to react to t
men to man the guns had been left in camp. However a Uae THIS BF Ca
cti Pals The c
his Surprise mov
e,
olumn advan
Sorts was scraped together consisting of ‘odds and sods, ON KANYIGON
ced rapidly vig
and NATMAUK
to
 52 53
TAUNGWINDGI which was reached Six days lat pack to camp in the confus io n, The remalai
infid
dsey
body. Only minor opposition had been encountered ack - ;

supporting the 4/2nd G. R. successfully shot Up an er,

jsone?>
an d ma rc he d aw ay wi
i
th 2 the en
f
emy, At daay 1)
- pout 30 men under Major EALES wa. ear
convoy on the night of the 15th. On the 18th and 19th a
sunk several boatloads of enemy moving eefo) Jlow up the enemy party, and were reintor-
down the J; IS,
¢ Infantry from NATMUK. The enemy were tis .
From the 23rd to the 27th, one platoon un ra
be
de r IL t. HOW!c Waddy, )
e twelve miles away, where they were joy sae
guns and ammunition on bullock carts moved Sout é K With
h with the 4/2
G.R., and by the end of the month 5 but the enemy
the coy. haq a had had enough and surrendered
NORTH of ALLANM c o n
YO o n t he RANGOON a tel >

this very rapid advance to a man. Only one man of X Coy. from the capt
only sporadic attem pts at resi e Urin
iy ‘rp arms
stan nee till in their hands, the remainder having escaped, ar
been made, and it appeared that ce haq t was $
the enemy was pos
too disorganiseg e found their way back to camp. The force eventns
to undertake any coordinated effort. cours
25
due
out 21-30 hrs. that night complete with 7 oScers
X Coy. reached camp @
her ranks as prisoners. They looked an unhappy Senct
and 50 ot
Whilein the Bn. H.Q. camp but were a disciplined force and fully
WEST of MEKTILA the recrows, Amar
company sent out night amb z oe M.Gs., anda 2” Mortar and as such capable of mak
ushes on two nights running
hope of destroying enemy p i n th e rifles, Se a
arties who were believed f t h e m s e l v e s .
to be mining nuisance o
the caus eway at M.S. 12, but no enemy were seen. the es en ce
nréecence
pr of
of
On the 24th a report from villagers indicated
Beginning on the 19th April f 24 Ja ps . at KO YB IN IN . e pa tr ol wa s
rom KYAGON under orders of party of 1 officer and
Tac Bn. H.Q., the two platoons of t th em , an d ha vi ng op en ed up wi th sma ll
X Coy., in addition to forming out to contac
a firm base, carried out extensive day th e en em y su rr en de re d. on te ee
-light patrolling, and night and grenades
ambushes, on likely lines of enemy appro find that al th ou gh th e vi ll ag er s re po rt wa s co rr ec t In Du mD er S =
ach,
were all Indians and members of the INA.
Lack of interpretors for patrolling was a difficulty, fo
r contact ambush was laid fora party o1 Pao
with villagers was a valuable source of information. That night a strong
One of the with 60 bullock carts, but although every ee
Bn. H.Q. signallers had before the bei ara
war, been employed in Burma, ensure secrecy, they must have received ee had
selling tooth-brushes, soap, etc., during which he had acquired a fair
presence, and instead of continuing their move M eS
knowledge of the language and his services were used to the full in
been anticipated, they carried out a wide chucker to the
accompanying patrols, and interrogating evading the ambush. fi
villagers. and then South, completely
On the 21st one patrol contacted and captured a party of ten at T A U N D -
Bn. H.Q. and X Coy joined the B ” ec
aehelon
armed members of the INA and brought them back to camp s moved out to
. on the 25th from which the two a ne
WINGI
In the early hours of the morning of the 22nd a small listeniné
come under command of ROCOL and the 9
Post of six men just NORTH of KYAGON was surrounded and
Y Coy. pbx
captured by a party of 7 officers and 50 other ranks of the INA led
“432 Bde. a8 =
bya Capt. It was a filthy night, absolutely pitch dark, with heavy 80 Bdes. task was to move Belts er. MAGWE, 22
rain, and a strong wind, rendering visibility and hearing ae NATMAUK, and then strike WEST to etait two large
NIL, and the party of INA important town on the Irrawaddy, ae tg the Japanesé- On
were on top of the post, and
it, before our men even became aware all ae
of their presence: ie @itsttips which had been in constant use leaving Y Coy tempo-
Sepoy was shot and bayoneted by the officer, and another manag the 12th the Bde, moved off in M.T., but
 24
55
e fa5 ilure of t r o o p c a r r y i n g M . T
re b e h i n d o w i n g to th B e e
w a l e d s a n d M a j o r H o u c e e e wh ic h wa s he lg by Y Co v 4
On the {5th transport was still a u e i e e 7. 2: pe rimeter part of ALCENIUION;
as M E K T I L A , in t h e h o n e s ae particularly pea) “atid for ene
to Ferry the coy as fa r time
Anns
the necessary transport there. The first trip moveq off, and | g anbealthy spor 1 bere
3 ater Major FRANCIS who had just
the day, returned together with sufficient transport for th reported to Bn. H¢
main der of the Coy which arrived eventual] e KyAGON fresh, and blooming from a spell of home at
r y at NATMA UK feqyeo
7th April, just in time for the jetailed to take over command of Y Coy. from Major fet Tee
move westwards
Platoons

yt Regt. at SAHARANPUR, in place of Major THOMPSON

alloted to Bns, and moved with them by Stages to MAGWrE who was being transferred Beau Bn. representative with an Hae

after a brief battle during which 100 Japs were ki

, : : lled Ww
ured, together with a lot of enemy equipment an d Several
ie who had recently joined the Bn. The exchange was duly effede
cted
calibre AA guns in good condition, on the 24th when the C.O. drove Major FR -
o MAGWE,
A detachment ofr
field ambulance unit had just arrived in MAGWE ¢ peing saluted on arrival by a salvo from the Jap guns.
Tom
ORTH, and when captured complete the Doctor in char From MAGWE, the Bde. moved South along the banks of
ge,
most indignant at not being warned by his superiors oft the Irrawaddy. sweeping the area to clean up any i
he
. impending arrival! On the night of the 23rd
_one platoon parties of enemy. Only bullock carts tracks existed, and
the 4/17 Dogra were in positions covering the road running move had to be made on and bullock cart basis. all
a mule,
town from the NORTH. At 2345 hrs. an enemy M.T, ‘ncluding that of the Coy. being sent round by road via TAUND-
nn drove straight on to the position, and to their surprise WINGI. Pack transport and carts were very limited, and as it
were met by a volley of small arms fire, M.M.G. fire, plus a few was thought M.Gs. were unlikely to be required, they were loaded
rounds from anti tank gunners, whose presence in the area had on to the M.T. and sent round under Lt. HUNTSMAN, leaving ti
not even been expected by the Japs. Several of the leading Coy. with small arms only. For the series of marches that followed
vehicles were knocked out, and the occupants killed. One vehicle
attempted a mad dash through the position and was quickly ditched’
by the fire of our M.M.Gs. The driver was killed, and an L.M.G. job for even the least of imaginative minds.
in good condition taken from the vehicle by our men. Six Japs. In this capacity the coy. less one platoon marched 10 miles on
attempting to get round the position were also killed by our the 25th, and 13 miles the next day to MYINGUN. Here their
right section. beloved machine guns caught up with them, having moved from
TAUN DW IN GI acr oss cou ntr y by an exis ting trac k. Mul es
At dawn on the 22nd Hav. MOHD. SHAFFI from the Coy. were allotted for the guns, the M.T. returning to harbour ihe ar
H. Q. perimeter, saw a boat containing two armed Japs 4P. day. With the guns on pack the company then marched ic ay
about 10 mile s a day unti l they
proaching from the West bank. He held his fire until the boat had days with the bri gad e, ave rag ing
endo the
grounded in front of his position, and two more very surprised Japs reached INGON on the main PROME
~ ‘
road, at the endor
e
Me
were “ in the bag.” month,
i t e Z Coy.
Quite a number of Japs were known to be on the oppos! a t o o n
es ca pe d fr om tha t pla ce n y l e s s o n e p l
bank to MA GW E, so me of wh om ha d
y da ys of th e mo nt h th e co m p a :
For th e ea rl h e s r e
A unti l t
before its capture, others part of a force trying to withdraw under Capt, WOOD which remained at MYI1 ste x the mselves by
fr om uni ts of 7 Di vi si on . It soo n be ca me KU ME fo r th ei r re st pe ri od , en jo ln s
SOUTH un de r pre ssu re Soncentrated in o c c a s s i o n a l
w i t h
very obvious that they also had some artillery, which proceeded to bathing :
thing ina
;
stream running close to the 3 air ¢ a m p

pump shells into MAGWE from very short range. The Bde bTeaks for eating
; and sleeping !
 56
57
100 Bde. was ordered to move by stages to TA cleaning,
UNDWry a l o t o f
following the route taken 2 by the natre ma in de of the dj work and it made avy er y Co
r é
e Vision, Start; | easy reach of the y ari
ous bri Ba mfortable
M e
on the 10th. The available M.T. had been largely used Ne des gs,
, Officers
for a mea from Coy
maintaining and transporting the other two brigades P in coe land a d s
» and 109 Bde the fight rink,
including Z Coy. had to march. They footslogged along ing had
HE by no Me
the ee Atine be said to ans finis
h ed » the
and dusty roads halting and taking up perimeter Dp be in sight, end could
RANG OON
night. eventually reaching TAUNDWINGI twe] ve dasyistions each Was still some
later. 180 miles away but this i
n comparison ‘0 mileag already Covered
Here the Bde. was formed into a mobile striking for was not particular gre e
Intensance h
ce With ly at. The problem of ay owever was
tanks and armoured cars, a main body, and rear guard. to have the last word in the fina] Op
Their task erations, A large airstrip had
was to move through 32 Bde., and capture first ALLAN peen built at ALLANM t o w h i c h s u p p l i e s f o r the division
MEYo, Y O
fown. This however was some distance ba were
and then the important city of PROME. ‘The number ck, and could
of heayy not be
automatic used for maintenance much forward of the ex is
weapons with the armoured vehic] €s made our M.Gs ting Positions
of the
leading troops of 100 Bde. around PAUN GD
unnecessary, and consequently Coy. H.O. and two platoons moveg E. For a further
with the
main body during the first stages advance therefore supply dropping would have to be resorted to,
of the advance, ond
platoon moving with the rear guard. but owing to commitments elsewhere
it was learnt that jt would
only be possible for one brigade to be so supplied,
ALLANMEYO was captured on the
25th after a stiff fight, and
the advance continued to PROM The Div, Commander
E, one platoon having joined therefore decided to form 32 Bde. into a
the
J3 F.F.R. then the leading Bn. of the Bde., an mobile column, together with tanks, and fo
d another platoon r it to pass through 100
came under command of the 1/Ist G.R. Bde., and advance with all sp
eed to Rangoon. W Coy. was to.
Bn. H.Q. now for
accompany the Bde. At this stage it was still thought that 20
the first time
with all of its companies out
under command Div. had a good chance of being the first in
stayed at YWATAUNG until the Sth May when to the city, and the
it moved to PROME, with Div. H. OQ. word “ RANGOON ” with likely dates was the favourite topic of
conversation amongst all ranks. It was known that 4 Corps were
The long Burma monsoon had started, and although not yet
making good progress along the PEGU Road, and that it would be
fully in its stride rain was very frequent. Overlooking the town a close finish between us.
itself, and the Irrawaddy lay the European houses—or what was
left of them—built up on a series of high features, from which it About the middle of the month came the bald announcement
was possible to obtain an excellent view of the whole area, and that units of 15 Corps had entered the city from the Sea. It was
what was more important the benefit of whatever breeze that was Somewhat of an anti climax, after all the speculation that had been
blowing either from the river to the WEST, or from the or and caus ed some disap point ment.
going on amo ngs t ours elve s,
country to the East. The general effect of this small residential However there was still a lot to be done, both to the NORTH
area was that of a miniature hill station and before the war must around the EAST bank of the Irrawaddy, in the thick ae
have been extremely pleasant. The Japs. too had evidently found EAST of the Divisional L of C, and SOUTH from A ae
the area to their liking, but in the three years or so of their stay had
to RANGOON. Enemy in strength, although disorganise Fi
done nothing to maintain the condition in which they found it about had to be dealt with in each ne y ag 5
badly knocked
Most of the houses were in a bad state of repair, on the pt
SOUTH i ie ee
and anything but Large forces were withdrawing
water proof, and the unfettered jungle had made great ee of cros sing the river , re s ie
the tiver, with the intention
reclaiming the area as its Eastwards, As parties attempted the crossing in ie 2a
own. Bp, H.Q. was allotted
a dou a southwards, they learnt at heavy
Storied house right on top of one of the small features, and after ftom MAGWE
 28
presence: «\/This® resulted «in aa lar Be
thousand Concentra
on the WEST bank, tion ate
59
ALLANMYO Toughly in
and PROME, faced with CTO areg ypich they y blew up dias they iretineg,
a f
costs and escaping ssing Ww untry, and
age
Heavy o u s
EAST. or bein made diversions Tains had floodeg
i
and 7 Div adv ancing rer iO 9 between Ver at all the ©° and considerably slowed Up t d these dam
aroun
ts
down the WEST bank from the ee dificult, he advance 28ed bridges.
oy
All available forces
within the Divisio Up to the 7th May the Compa
to positions covering nw ere t
h mas ny m Oved
all like] Y Crossi e r e for, with 32 Bde
ngplace S C on getting a shoot at an enem . » Only on
sixty mile stretch of OVering plato t of KITCOL
y h eld Village, e
the river, Crossings wer “Te Coy, H.Q. and On the gth
at different places, but the enemy e a t tempt, at pj as Pie to capture the villa two p
latoons
ges of Tan Moved off
indiscriminate crossings S Oon realise thee sht BINGON a
were doomed t Ee a ae miles away to the E nd ONDAW
o failure, eee AST 0 f th
decided to make a indet command e road. O ne Platoon
co-ordinated effort, of the 9, 14th
building it up over by Seizing a raee Punjab, TA
a Period of days, an }.: captured on the 10t
h and two d ays
K i
N B INGON
out in strength to the d t h e n to atte latoon rejoined later Coy. H.Q wit: h one
,
Bde., H.Q. le
hills in the EAS e
e ™ m p t a b r e a k pia a v i n g : one pl atoon
bridgehead was in dense h e Site c hosen :
ith the 4/2 GR. a t TABINGON
jungle, with small for the wi From then until the end o
h i l l s , in Which f May the Coy.
extremely difficult uthwards as th e advance » Moved
to get at him, or ¢t© as it W so progresseq
until THARR A
obtain infor WADDY
movements either by ground. Mation of his was reached. On several occasions Bun
or air reconnaisa s were sent out to form
achieved some meas n c e, This plan ambushes, although no en
ure of success, in that a emy were contacted. The pla
n u m b toon with the
manage to get throug to e r of thei, did 9/14th passed to the command of a
h the YOMAS, althoug at h Gurkha Bn., preparatory to sup-
h eavy cost, portinga Bn., attack on toa strongly hel
d enemy position astride the
This then was the general picture durin g& the last large OKPU CHAUNG.
half of May, The 9/14th were to attack from the flank
The Bn. was split up over the full le supported by our guns from
ngth of the cordon, and the front together with the Gurkh
a
we vill
now follow thei r movements in more detail. Bn. The Jap however eluded the trap by w
ithdrawing to the East
the night preceeding the attack. The assumption from this surprise
On the 29th Bn. H.Q. moved from PROME to its last camp withdrawal was that the bulk of the main e
in this campaing nemy force had by them
ata village called TAIKKYI 50 miles from achieved a get away towards the YOMAS. THARRAWADDY
RANGOON. the Centre of a large district before the war rem
ained the base
W Coy. for W Coy., until they reverted to Bn., command on the 26
th dant
From their H.Q., located in a large house capable J ve,
This company formed part of the 32 Bde., pole to a
the complete company, platoons were frequently sent out in support
on RANGOON. Remnants of the RANGOON a ‘el of infantry dealing with odd partieF s of Japs.whileOn w
fall of that town had pushed up the eee o eRae
sio.ns
a SAGYAUNG was the scene of operations within pues
intention of escaping eastwards into the PEGU aac ne od and well over 20000
rounds were fired into
discovered that their main escape route are the i = ie second occasion a Jap. patrol worke it by our guns. tl} a
d round, and eed ‘i a
barred to them by 4 Corps. Joining up Ma ah from behind the gun position. Stiff fighting followec
ee :i
other parties pulling out from the Arakan, and é “ ay toad was cleared, and the platoon allowed to retur nto HY.
the whole forming a fairly considerable, and nite eine Ta
. N, by the time
soldiers, airmen, sailors, and even comfort ee ope Although the Bde. did not reach rn
they had caught up with NORTH, the
reported to have shaven their heads and donne forces of 26 Div. eis
; Bds-, forward elements were within 50 miles of the ¢ atthe village of
¢ - ainst 32
The enemy plan was to fight delaying ang TAIKKYI.
els bridge
taking full advantage of the man
y large river, a0
 60
the 26th lage 6]
t o B n . command on
u r n
The ret of a > €Ndeq
h 3 2 B d e . and its battalions
i a t i o n w i t an
as s o c Month fay when it was released to Bn.
a t i o n s . § of
con t i n u o u s o p e r
R R A W a p of ¥
o m p a n y a THA Z
h a d l e f t t h e c Dy,
Ma j o r D a v i e s o w i c k a f e
ving Leta. H By the 3rd of May the Coy,, arrived in SCHED
e i n I n d i a , l "ie
c e e d o n l e a v j , D a v e e 4
pro n c t i o n i n g M a AUNG from
c a m e t h r o u g h s a hich, platoons took up positions covering
o r d e r s i ,
h i
in I n d i a
a n d t h a t w a s t o b e i o Vv
bank of the and Carried ie
river,
out
likely en
emy
cof :Seta es
i e u o f r e p a t r i a t i o n , on the
leave in l enay concentrations on the WE “ Shoots at
m o n t h s . ST bank.
him for a b o u t s i x
On the 9th one platoon under Capt. . Wo
X Coy. th Od crossed
jrrawaddy from MYOTHA an
d took up Positions with the 4/19
ae around TATKIN ‘
Coy. H.Q. and one platoon remained with the 9/12th and later to PADAUNG.
FRR, i
while the other platoon formed part of a special column The role of this force force was to Prevent any e
Nown as nemy m
ROCOL. ment further South, and to dea
l with parties trying to get ey
from the Arakan. At this point the only road from t
During this period the platoons took part in Several ac tio hat area ee
a2 2 up with the river.
sinking several boatloads of enemy ae ns, It was thought at one time th
at the West
that with ROCOL African division
: ng the operating from the Arakan would ev
river. entually link
up with our forces at this point. This however did
not happen.
The other platoon operating from PROME supported attacks
On one occasion when our aircraft were carrying out a bomb-
by the F.F.R.
ing and strafing raid in this area Capt. Wood, and men of one
On the 29th May the company rejoined Bn. H.Q. at section had a narrow escape. He was sitting with the section
TAIKKYI and took up monsoon quarters. under a shed, when one of our aircraft dropped a heavy bomb by
mistake on to a building not more than 30 yds. away. Very
Y Coy. fortunately nobody was hurt although the roof of the shed was
damaged and they felt the full effect of the blast.
With platoons under command of the Bns. of 80 Bde. the
Coy. H.Q. moved with Bde., H.Q. to PAUNGDE, and later
company moved south from the area of M.S. 202 concentrating
on to LETPANDAN, platoons remaining under command of
finally at HMAWBI- M.S. 32 which. was reached on the
Infantry Bns.
22nd May. Two platoons were still out one with the Dogras at
t h a c o m p a n y of th e 1/ ls t G R .
PAUNGDALE, and the other with the Hyderabads operating On the 7th J u n e o n e p l a t o o n w i
n f r o m L E T P A N D O N to T H E R R A W A W Rl y.
around WETTIGAN and AUKCHAING EAST of the main proceeded b y t r a i
Station, covering the comparatively short journey at an unsteady
road, and opposite to the main Jap. break out area away to the and
o n s i s t e d 0 f a very old
North. The former platoon rejoined at Bn. H.Q. hour! The t r a i n i t s e l f c
on the. 26th. ten miles an
s h o w e d s c a r s o f
Thehe }latter Platoo
n wiith the Hyderabad v a g e d t r u c k s . all of which
e , a n d s a l e d .
actions against pa s t o ok part in some es pace eng i n
c h t h e y h a d b e e n s u b j e c t
rties of i a t t a c k s t o w h i
n e m y s o m e of w h o m we re SS bombing
definately on the offensivethe escapinp i n g e
again, presumably : e rive r to th e l a r g e t o w n
with a view {0 On the 9th June the platoon crossed the Qn several
Preventi
venting our forces closing
: the escape route. ;
At one time the
and occupied the Mission School. cohen
Position was vee 5 of HENZADA d o u t i n m o t o r l a u n c h e s w i | ,d l e
°Ccasions the guns move
Pletely surrounded, and the L of C through
s w a t o u n d s K A NA l H E D R O N M @ E N S E S
Maintena nce for this perio d had to tel'clears.uy carea
2

Burmese Dacoits.
 62
63
had trouble from, ba
generally has always agaj .
Burma
their weapons were anti. n S
Of dept?edatio ns ©: f dacoits, » aBainst who ™M action
but :
in the P ast : quate jearing up the Bn. area in TAIKK ad to be taken
Dacoits, The war however had changed all this, for the and After’anis e ourselves, and commence } YI it Was jn
unreliable. a r m s a n d ammunition “
Teh
peor’ P > ard train} tended to
ale opportun it y fo r ob ta in in g ‘ons outside Burma, To all
been ‘SP and parties were terrorizing the country side A oper4 t int ents
15% village was peac
to be a peace :
Station, P
with oni
apanesé, ©
es , an d ev en ( S R E T h e SU pP re g gsential duties, freedom of movement, and a]
ée ba
i ll, tarikefl time, and will undoubtedly be the
tosmatiwics
aund i

cg€ i
Ve
to the Burma
Si 76
administration, and
Source,
« at night. The fact that ‘such lights co
headaches
of ma)
districts. : “ Furricane Battie,” did not in any way lessen our a ‘ 2 the
worry to peaceful villagers, especially in outlying unrestricted use, after months of PPFeciation of
their : Partial, and somet;
number of fa ls e re po rt s of th e p r e s e n c e of Japs. in different nes lack-outs at night.
re of th e vi ll ag er s fo r tB Sp s 8 complete b
were thought to be du e to th e de si oy
to
be sent to the area, and thus keep away any of these bands of However
our peace was soon to be inte
rry pted, for on the
‘ pa5ring of the 18
robbers. th Jun. information was received tha a
t party of
Japs. had entered a village 3 mile f
- .
F

s rom TAIKKYI, tied up all

S od

At the end of the June, with the exception of this platoon, the
y was conce ntrat ed at LET PAN DAN . inhabitants, and forced one of them to give them details of the
compan
Jayout of our forces in TAIKKYI, with particular reference to
H. Qs,, and the living quarters of senior- officers, Needless to say
TAIKKYI the battalion’s monsoon station was a fair sized
the senior officers concerned took a poor view of this latter piece
village with the usual mixed population of Burman. Chinese and
suffered by the of information, much to the amusement of those more junior, who
Indian, and from all outward appearances had not
had suddenly discovered a previously unknown enthusiasm for their
Jap occupation. People seemed to be well fed, and certainly wel]
comparatively lowly ranks! Gurkhas went out to deal with the
dressed, compared to their less fortunate compatriates in the North
party, but no contact was made. In the Bn. area, defence positions
‘of Burma. Adequate for the complete Bn. could
accommodation
were prepared and additional precautions arranged for the night.
only have been made available by requisitioning a number of
One had been temporarily allotted to Bn.
of our isolated houses
private houses, but by the building of a complete company area of
H. Q., personal most of whom were non-combatants. This
Bashas, plus the local schoo] buildings and Police lines only three
disadvantage however was overcome by the presence in the QM.
private houses had to be taken over. ‘The ejected occupants were
store of two machine guns which were duly mounted, one in front,
found other accommodation by the S.D.O., any furniture or fittings
left behind, carefully listed, anda generous rent paid by Govt. for and one at the back of the house, and manned by the
the hire of the buildings. Our attitude was appreciated by the his Jemedar Q.M.!
villagers, and one in fact remarked on the difference between out
methods, and those of the Japs, which had been merely 4 curt At about 2 a.m. the following morning, t®
the tailway station area, just across
order to “ get out”,

f r o m p o s i t i o n s t a k e
CHAPTER IX 8tenade dischargers
Close range to t h e G u r k h a H . Q . The
had been anticipated that by the end of the first week of
h e f i r e f i g h t w i t h t l
June € Battalion would have concentrated in TAIKKYI, but ‘wo hours while t es
i e a g a i n s t o u r p e r i m e t e r .
although X & : attempt w a s m a d
d Z ha d to, re ma in ou t Wt by the Gursn2>.
their b Tigad paeost arrived,W an ‘ v e ntually forced to withdraw
8ades, owing to the existence of roving bands of Japs and Wi So ;
ithout some casualties to them
 64
5 attack, insignificent in itself,
65
thi :
The effect of to an operational basis. :
C
nge artillery, malaria, and typhu
area turn
to re : A Curf
the village dactive patrolling carried out in all direction,
Pees “peri beri” was rife amongst the re
ya 4 S had tak
™Ma inder,
mo
a
imposed, n ti
4a eu k n own to be living i
n the YOMAs ‘ t
and this had pre L a b l e a s t , they haq
numbers
sumably been s u n
tne Monstoon t aond apa ge Raa o n
a detach . rt from the misetreyndof ee
caterers
miles to ok oS food. f ;
Houses had been ran torrential rain, the flat paddy field country from nui €
them ste eral villagers kille sacked
d by the Japs, They k
attack, an Roses Sittang river had been turned into one vast lake
who was duly handed d ’
captured one Over to Bn ret several f e e t eep.
at dawn. Seldom can any for h
ce ave found the M
On the 8th July as it was position. s e l ves jn al
ponsluetcd
that the area was Clear They were caught liter yf €Ss enviab]
a] y like rats
ina trap,
of Japs, patrolling ceased, and conditions returned to normal, 20 Div. stru
ng along the T
HARRA\ VAD
road, although some 150 miles aw ay fr DY—yMAwre
The PEGU YOMAS have previousl
-
y bee n refe rreq to, and om the antic A W B I
ipated break
were beginning to come more, and more into the news. through front were to have a
share in the final hound ing down
They consist of a range of hills rising from the plain aro the Japs . in Bur ma, man y of who m owed their prese
o f
divisions rapid ou nt plight to the
und tflanking moveme
PEGU, and running NORTH to beyond PROME, thee nts. Three Infantry batt
and this Bn. were detailed to mo a l ionsSs
forming an effective barrier between the two main routes in ve by M.T, to come under
command of 4 Corps to thicken u
RANGOON, with the PROME road on the WEST and the p the cordon on the Pegu road,
MEKTILA—PEGU road on the EAST. Features in this range The Bn. received orders’ to move
to PEGU in the first place,
rose in places to over 2500 ft. and throughout its length was on the 16th July. Z Coy, still out with 100 Bde. was to foll
covered in virgin jungle in many parts impenetr ow
able. It was independently onthe 17th. At PEGU the Bn. was ordered to stay
malarious in the extreme, and a home of bush typh the night at the village of DAIK-U (M.S. 86), leave
us. Communi- one company
cation from WEST to EAST apart from a few roug at DAIK-U under
h jungle tracks 48 Bde.’one company to report to63 Bde, at
were nil and it is not surprising that this unsavour PENWEGON ; Bn. H.Q. to be
y stretch was located at PENWEGON with
almost completely uninhabited. H.Q.17 Div. and one company to proceed to the area around
However the remnants of a defeated army ca NYAUNGBINTHA MSS. 136 to come under command of a
nnot pick and
chose their terrain, and it was into the YOMAS special force from 19 Div. known as FLEWFORKCE, commanded
that thelarge
forces of Japs. which had escaped our ne by Brigadier Flewett, Companies were thus widely separated over
t from the NORTH, and
WEST were concentrating prior to neatly 60 miles of road, from NORTH to SOUTH. Owing to
attempting to cross th
the norma] Shortage of Jats, plus the fact that a number had been
i, towards the EAST. Once acrcss the SITTANG
sent on leave from TAIKKYI, it had been necessary to form one
uld be back into Japanese held territory. But the ;
not to be allowed to escape so easily. “omposite company of Jats from platoons of W ! anand d XX CoCompmpanies.
From TOUNGOO
The R ee companies
aie PEGU, a large force of all arms of 4 Corps b# Bn. was therefore operating with only thre
Positions astride the main ro INStead of four.
ad, forming
a0 almost
foil any attempt at the break through #2 AYuthough w a s to b e2 ou our
0Al gh tt itit was ; not real ised at th e time, this
Conditions for the enemy in th #8 rn ae ‘e s
activeof Y an d f
Z Co ys ;
.
indesc
e Y o u r action against the Japs, and the acti
ribable. Fhe wer
y eco u
mpletely t ©’ j A 1 ie Bp osite com pany of

> and ammunition - harras therefore given in some detail. The compos
sed by our aircraft, and! vital points around
Jats had bee n kept ina purely defensive role on
 66

DAIK-U against attacks which were expected, byt Whj 67

ise. This company therefore failed to get a hoe diq be puring the night
material at SEIKTANGIN
4 6 ur
onjuction with Arty. on a Party of Suns Opened
Y Coy. G J
enemy ‘
Coming
UD in
from the
soUTH.

During the period of operations this coy. was und 23-7-45

of FLEWFORCE in the area from PYU M.S. 143 to fae zh
CHAONG M.S. 128, and was attached to the W/15 Baga y A.Sec, obey i Anodes large number of belts ; t
9932; together with our Arty, About 190 ate ye THAZI
| Jab ana ete counted,
6/15 Punjab. of a party of 15 who attempted to break out
On 20-7-45 yjlled
<1 by our guns. me villgs 12 were
5 Pls. guns at Bn. at M.S. 1332 engaged parties ee The Section carried
gun and amp. a tot al
of 12 tiles, 25
area NGANTHUAN and nala area during the day, also es more bodies were credited to our guns during t
his period,
harrassing fire. Results not known. "ing 23-7-45
8 Pl. in MYINBIN 9325 _ supported infy patrols A Section of 8 P1 during a night ambush at KYUAKTAING
THINBANGIN capturing one P,W. en route. - 9334 killed 30 Japs. and captured-six swords.

24-7-45
21-7-45
One section proceeded to OKSHITKIN 9733, engaging
One sec. of 9 PI. under command C Coy. 6/15 Punjab Were
several targets indicated by Infy. Results could not be checked.
action NORTH and NE of NYAUNGBINTHA.
26-7-45
They first engaged a Jap convoy of mules and bul lock cart
mio aris2
Y Coy. less one P1 under command 6/15 Punjab moved with
a range of 1800 yds. dispersing it in confusion, and causing many
the Bn. for operations EAST of the Road towards the SITTANG
casualties.
River.
They then took up positions covering nearby villages whic
Guns were carried to INBINTHA 0031.
were being shelled by our Arty, shooting down the enemy as they
ran from the villages. 27-7-45__28-7-45
Guns were in action in support of Infy. around ZAHA 03
After carrying their guns f 32—
YEDWINGON 0333—KYIYO 0433—area 059320.
in some long grass conHia
taili
inigfs
ng hi
sitdiive
be verified as the had to re m | Several successful shoots were carried out. 120 bodies counted
iio n xrT
K
K} Y Ix7YO, but impossible to state actual casualties from i a S ,
i [
32 counted bodies were credited ns, but acta ‘ a p s.
to these gurs, 08 but the proportion must have been
crossi= ng a field 100% casualties werehigin
h. .flic O f o n e 13e
2 te d at 00*e“ rarao
ngnge.e
22-7-45 iles through
Long carry on one section in three days was ist
No. 2 sec. with D Coy ast 2a *Xtremely difficult going.
. 6/1
patrol NYAUNGBINTHA g, Full
9630—SEIKTAUNGI
i )
9 Pl. with 1/15th Punjab fired, about Be a killed
N 9728—INI] sualties inflicted could not be ascert
base. 3 Japs. walk ained—27 on on excellent
ing across b MMGs. Inf. Coy. Comd. congratulated
THITPAT by the atic
= uns. *Upport, On one
esr aR one platoon
ie Laer a section of guns mat
 68
69
f Infy . wer e sub jec ted to concentrated fire from 3 Jap
O 0 7
ile fire from a village thought to be unoccupied and to )
San The ‘Break out Battle” hag bee
Ww q : 0 bro
. Lh e gu ns im me di at el y We nt conclusion, and although fightin t Ught to a MOst syc-
our force was moving aOmenWhich gsful
g Continy
lose sup por tin g fire , und er i whi ch the Inf y 3 cti on, a forces had been destroyed. Fo, ie ed, the bulk of the
€
giving C ;
€ ab] “be
to withdraw, and later put in an atta ck on the
: Vil lag e, Scat te..
:
enemy. No. 1 of one gun was killed during this Action ae pusiness under the eagle eye oe Cur Aircraft, ang the y ae
n 0 Ne
man wounded. our Artillery. ies: wise Giathe river, they Still had
numbers of Burman irregulars who were waiting forto aee eee
Total bodies counted to the credit of this Coy, wae
123, rate figures of those who
Prisoners taken ..- 2 eventually reached Jap tettitory ene
... 1 killed the total force ne mene the attempt wil Probably never
Own casualties mown, but it is certain rhat they representeq a 8
1 wounded minute Proportion
;
of the whole. A total of something in the Tegio
n of 12,000 bodies
In a signal from 6/15 Punjab to FLEWFORCE were counted during the operations, excludj
read— MG. Jat were excellent and most enthusiastic”, ’ Extract
ng large numbers
drowned in the river, and many more whose bodies lay unseen
beneath the waters of the paddy fields.
Z Coy.
The coy. was under command For the first time in the campaign Jap P.Ws, became a very
63 Inf. Bde. and Pls. attached common sight all along the road. Unshaven,
to 7/10 Baluch and 1/10 GR. initially with tasks on the wet, and bedraggled,
perimeter normally without boots and feet dreadfully lacerated ;with tatters
of PENWEGAON (17 Div. H.Q.) and KYAUKTAGA.
of what had once been uniform hanging around them, they were a
22-7-45. symbol of a defeated Army. A large proportion of them were weak
At first light after the attack on the PENWEGON from continued exposure, and lack of food, and suffering from Beri
perimeter
one of our guns opened up on a party of Japs. kill Beri.
ing 19, and
according to local reports wounding many more. Villagers were of great assistance in giving information, and
A section of 12 Pl. with 7/10 Baluch killed 22, all by MMG. brought in prisoners who had strayed into their villages. There is
fire,in GANESH 0701. the story of an officer of a Bde. H.Q. Staff driving along the road,
The same section fired two bursts at
and meeting a small Burmese boy leading a securely bound Jap
Japs. with an LMG. killing both and capturing the LMG.
officer towards the nearest camp.
Other guns of this Pl. fireda total of about 12000 rds., into a
On another occasion a Ja p off ice r ca pt ur ed by vil lag ers wa s
wooded area around GULAB 0899 in conjuction with Inf. and
du ly br ou gh t in as tr id e a bu ll oc k! Ne ed -
Arty. Subsequently 176 bodies were counted and PWs. unable to walk and was
taken. on ou r si de wa s as hi gh as th at of the Ja ps i e
PWs. stated heavy casualties caused by MMG. less to say mo ra le
fire.
low, and there was keen competition amongst all unis, 2
23-7-45,
formations to head the list of “ enemy killed”. .
A further action in GANESH village with Arty. fire, resulted ae oops and during the
Conditions had not been easy for our troop»,
in a count of 35 and several mules, from action, 10
both MMG. and Arty By ‘en days of the main battle they web? OE afta:
On the 29th July orders were t Pouring rain, and after upito their waists 10 nie eidjeand th?
TAIKKYI and revert to 20 received for the Bn. to retu™ ;
Div. Y Coy. were still in ™Z work ploughing through fields of water > infantry across
the SITTANG River ae he time, and could action ae
a the following day, but by the beginning
not be withdr4 te Platoons of Y and Z Coys.
their
which
MMGs
ACCT
and amm
oa deservedly
of August the comple country, manhandling
n. was concentrated at Won tribute from the Infantry.
TAIKKYI.
 70 71
eractic! the day from the Div. Comg. Sater
ies Camo
pt.nth,
Wooan
d d prthoc ee de di on sl ed ay en ea ys
is was to be the last we ytow IndiaA ;
In a speci a 5 ¢
attle had begun, all ranks were Warned to In the middle
nt that . the bat ie ™ Wag
& 5

the
r
, j ere
of thejy bee XDect of f our impending : .
c

evide an d as ke d to gi ve move further East tO see of him for

nse strain,
a period
o f i n t e
esponded nobly,, andand were
wer amply ;
Tewardeg
in vie
G 10)
} and ¢}
! elease Group number, it was Nearness of
dediedse 1e

usual t h e m e n pis R : h at h
i r y
his leave report to the Training Cait = Would on the
ex p of
results. We were all very sorry to see him go Not return to
t h e B n .
esa end of the Jap rule in the greater Part of
WwW . By On August 11th the officers gave g party to
hose forces in and around MOULMAIN una,
leaving only th *gLoube dealt umber of guests had been invited, including se Which a large
l a t e r d a t e . Veral
with at a Members
X of the 3/9th Jat peers who very kindly brought with them fro
CHAPTER tneir camp 25 miles away, six excellent Pipers, P i
who w ere a
real asset and greatly c o n t r i b u t e d
to the success of the eve
Back in TAIKKYI, the Bn. ages for the first time for y ning,
Appro p r i a t e l
enough the first whispers of Possible Jap
about seven months, settled down in Pos tools accomodation tg surrender had came through that day, and although nothing was
resume training for what was to come. “Spit and polish” and definite, even the possibility gave added joy to the party. In due
drill received its due share of attention, and the Opportunity taken course the surrender became a “fait accompli,’ and it looked
to hold 2nd and 3rd class school examinations. A few miles away as though our fighting was over. W Coy. who had been detailed
was the GYOBU Reservoir, a huge man made lake, which to accompany 32 Bde. on a special operation “stood down,”
supplied the drinking water for Rangoon 50 miles away, and which
and there followed a period of uncertainty. Would we stay in
was ideal for swimming, and for water regattas. On one occasion Burma? return to India? or move further East to disarm Japs?
organised water sports were held, in which besides. ourselves three g e
L a c k of kn o w l e d was no deterrent to speculation and gossip. At
other units took part. Most of the Bn. attended, and our entries one period the Bn. was standing by to move to an unknown
were most successful, walking off with Rs. 80 altogether in prizes, o n
d e s t i n a t i within three days, though nothing came of it and the
out of a total of Rs. 120. Unfortunately the following e d
day, a d a y s l e n g t h e n into weeks. Staff tables were prepared for a
senior member of the Rangoon water supply i e s ,
organisation paida y
variet of contin g e n c such as; one coy., to move by Air,
visit to the Reservoir and caught three gurkhas bathing in his remainder by sea, leaving all transport in Burma; or the whole Bn,
Precious water, which resulted in the place being put out
of bounds,
by air, with some vehicles, or without vehicles; the whole Bn.
auus ending an agreeable form of recreation. The water expert h h i c l e s i t h o u t e h i c l e s ; the Bn., to move by air as
b y s e a , w i t v e w v
was highly indignant and finding the three men bathing—what his
gactions would have been had he
arrived the day before, and seen Infantry, MMGs. by sea with the MT. etc.
‘undreds of men in the water, can best
w e r e t o l d t h a t S A I G O N i n F . I. C . w a s ou r
The arrival of an occasj i :
be left to the imagination!
Eventually we we were still uncertain how we were ‘
bile ‘destination, though
cinema, made a welc idieitene 3,ates a
Was the “WASBI”. . change for the men. Set there. To the officers SAIGON, e known ae
Equally popular e
the quality of its pre-war Radio programmes, conjured ie se
THARRAWADDY, angpn canteen Which came down from of the East complete with the an _ ae
Of a Paris
lines, » and op
‘The Men ened up shop for a few hours in the
forme
ttractive l
ooking dup in’ queues to purchase strange, but Amenities of its original in the West, and the Dees nother place
thing With enthusiasm. ON was Just 4
For the men SAIG
Ing gum, S ~ "88 such as toothbrushes—toothpaste—chew”
oap,
. isited, but to date
Sitls tiOnna g it Wa
in; diit
d in
exgceMa
llte
enri
t als, ? and €veven tii ns oO f butter!gO
The in the world they would be able to say those? ee negeur”
have seen their canteen » 1: work, bnt we would have like Its ver y exii stence was un heard of. They“ Achha
- bat sable
hib,:”
“0 a little more freque Prise at the news, and witha polite
ntly than we did.
 Me 73
‘missed the matter, and waited for the Orde;
dismissed : le, tl to er s and
all ranks were deli ighteq
Offic
ae our destination been the North ne ie,would have disp et boob Khan had at last been appointed eC hear that S. yy
hs c t that it BS op ae
the same fatalistic outlook. No ‘denoted indifference, ‘a ‘
. . 7 Ma of promotions to mark the eng of the
Z : Lieut, iN a special a

from it, for the Indian soldier lov os SECS aNew Places, and th: IS edar- Major of the Bn. from the date of ie" ate had been
as no great wishae to return to India.
Wea So long ag they eoulg ete Su er 31 years service. Hie was in fact the aia ee and haq
back to their families once eevee on leave; they were More ee ov sie General Gracey our Commander nae
sold; f ; ‘&
dier in 20 iiey
content to remain on service indefinitely €njoyin Bl ex ee ie
i ssike i Months.
rations, ’ and increased pay, and accepting ri5 sks;
ie
and discomfory a Asasmall gesture, the officers Presented him with af
a fortitude that deserves and gets the admiration of the officers ut a of a photograph of himself Shaking hands with _ 5
0 66 : ” : . neta
aes i
Auchinleck C in oi ere ane: a short time Previously when
In due course it was decii ded that the complete Bn ral
the Genera P paid a visit to the Division. cs
The back of the photo-
move by air, but less machine guns whic5;h were to Proceed * by
Woulseqd grap h was signed by all officers present.
with our vehicles. We were loath to be parted from our guns, byt The long awaited
it was not anticipated that they would required, order came at last f
and the Available out on the 9th and 10t o r the Battalion to fly
air lift was limited. h October. G, Pp. Tra
On the 19th Sept. the Bn, M.T. was nsport arrived on the
due to morning of the 8th to lif “
leave for Rangoon to embark. All M.Gs. t us to the airstrip at HM
and connected equipment, WABI, and
plus all heavy kit of the Bn. was loaded, ready to every thing loaded ready to move. At 13
move but a last to say No flying for three days”! 00 hr s, came a message -
minute order was received postponing The Mess had been stripped
the move until the end houses, barracks, and furnitur
of the month. e handed Over, and men, and
were waiting tpt. a
on the road ready to move. It was
The departure of our vehicles and decided
equipment in due course therefore to carry out the move, and if necessary bivouacing
left the Bn. in the Strange position of near
having no machine guns to the airstrip for a few days. Luckily however an empty tented
continue training, and for the first time, w
ithout a Jeep, or truck of camp was found, and the question of going into bivouac did notarise.
our own. Two three tonners of a G.P. tpt.
Coy. were loaned to us
for essential maintenance, and instead of M. Four very pleasant months had been spent in TAIKKYI.
G. parades the time
was given over to increased Drill, musketry, The Bn. had been together,
school, and P.T. A in good accommodation, there
considerable amount of time was little or no sickness; plenty of work, aud plenty wa s
devoted to games, and the men of play, adequate
kept busy during our remaining days
in Burma.
rations, and above all good “ Pani”, all combined
to make it the best
An inter platoon Volley Ball, camp we had known. Rangoon was within easy reach, and opportu-
and Basket Ball competition
held during this was nities given to the men to visit it, although on accoun
t of the very
per iod » which aroused great enthusiasm, and as
resulted jn a win for Bn, H,Q. at Volley Ball, and a platoon of high Prices prevailing, interest very quickly dropped. The eee
X Coy, at of some Sisters in the nearby hospital was an elie ar, ~
emae
vents, Basket Ball. The B.Os. entered a team for both far as BOs concerned, and
but were defeated in the first round of Volley Ball; a after a long period a ae
NO part it was something of a novelty. Relations with ie ee =
® Scra tch, from the Basket Ball due to casualties after 0?
drawn game,
; trines eac :
Yaie Oy. showed 8reat enterprise by making
tug-of-war ropes Wi: ckly forgotten, at least the monumental la
frsom a fo high and 15 yards long with a ‘It ar ou nd the m will
o tm of the hemp, under the uidance large Basha but 5 come, While =
g o f s o m e o f t h e n d i j a n
Se t s , and although I SeIVORG Perpetuate our memory for som
e timet
than skill, their effo t i n g ; these necessary
they had rts were given more to shoul’? Admittedly a strange subject to enthuse 4 a bout, ; a
a lot of fu
n n d w e w e r e ju st ly i
abitations were excellent pieces of work;
 74 =,
15
‘siting medical officers
m—e ven VI expresse ‘ richness, and
er d eo ferti}; ‘
proud of the d is praise indeed ! ™Ple e of
aviden® f ur,
: richness, a rj
praise
. from them,
and on our arrival tility, But the DBtedients
approval, a n
tees cpent ened S
>O ’ e there Was no milk “ANS hac |
ANd lit
in camp at HMWABI ‘ furl
the province of COCHIN tle honey"
Unti] ,
Three days In
Jation is predominately
CHINA whicl 1 inc
ludes Sa
Bn. H.Q. , W and X Coys. flew out, Anami te, igon
ber when the P
opuls
a rac € of Mon
the next day. ring peopl ated from Ch golian
ee
M and Z PoY unter,iewshot originally migr ir Na.
As in Mo
‘on of the men had flown Previously, here is also a very s t
but tO the astern a ly i C o n s i d e rable Chine
rtion n the towns, i Se element
3
It was a non sto n big business or
x Eanate as a new lg ga t e ‘ found re AoeER as Shop-kee
majority it W covering over 700 miles, P flight of Bal observer Pers andas
over terrain Offering litte far a s ” 4 c o u l d ‘they controlle d
about six a f the wealth of the countr a large
of a forced landing. Weather Conditions Whic jon 0
ortion
y,
scope in ae improved co h
n s i d e r a b l y a n d t h e trip WAS com, ae ofdidcour ainlytherone pa rer th e entictm 1
had been va h rnse wepe ate thFr who governed
the
n t . um € of the arrival
pleted w i t h o u t i n c i d e countrys of the
of 20 Div
1 rst elements
fi
Perhaps th 0|e biggest surprise of al
drove out to the airstr : l was af: ter landing in Saigon
ip, and instead sult of political intrigues and un
when oe er, Jap. dr of °
the famili
‘ye ar ae rest during the war
ae encouraged
ivers hoped out, and and_ supported by the Japs. had
G.P.Tpt., river, ra n round to salute, ha electsel te
§ trong Nationalistic aspira
tions, and taken advan-
ise is understandable when afte:r a loong e period with one digicieluele Ss pee sieleeee
Su rprise ele on the sudden collapse of th
e Japs
tage of the nie ee
in object, that of killing Japs—the ~ Jawans the latters connivance,
uae tae and eee ie h ad formed aso called
seized power. The French had very
co
onfhron ted with their enemies m) oving freely about, driving lorries, Government < meagre
gu
bo] arding buildings and vital points, etc. ar med
f )Tre
- es! in the co untry 9 and were represented mainly by
sre a |
For a few days the Bn. remained concentrated in fee d Government Officials. There was necessarily a wis
barracks built by the Japs. until W Coy. moved one ae ays ples 2 British forces could reach the country to deur
. . . .

the wireless station, and petrol dump, under Cee - ee

Japs and from
fr the French point of view the situation rapidly
Fae
and Y Coy. took up position in the dock area on KA nnn deteriorated.
under the 3/lst G.R. with fire tasks across the had
Internal politics however was no | ameturs,* raned mitee
ete
DERIVATION. Bn. H.Q. with X and Z Coys. were allo oe been clearly announced that British forces wou e eRe
3 : s
100 Bde. which was preparing to move from SAIGON to ta and solely for the purpose of disarming, and ae ek NO
TUDUC—BIEN HUA and TUDUMOT, ip s s in
Japap i the country. : The early elementsos0
the hands of the Anamities.
three towns then
i ndly reception on arriva
therefore given a frie
pe d in what was an
The M.T. with our gun In spite of a desire to avoid being involve
s h ad arrived by sea four days vee the to be taken to
Bn. flew in, and essential French question, certain re Se
we were extremely glad to see them, r eiteissts and
f o
witho ut MT. and MMGs. Prevent complete, and
was a great disadvantage, from evely installations essential ut te r de struction = our forces:
Point of view,
to the pee ye
nit machinery had broken dow French had no ae
CHAPTER XI enforcing orders, and the Anamint,e sleeadte rs little control sahara
It would be a Arson, and eae
PPropriate here er People even if they had wished nee
Stran8 position in the to give an outline serious Propo!
country in which of the sat
The application we had found French Property, and buildings
of the term,a ees ight iene ees m en,
well “land of Milk ‘0d: the diveee of large
have been applied in and Honey aes numbers ©
normal times, for there was 4 children endang
ered.
pus
poe—
myo

eg
 76 Ti)
n b y o u r f o r c e s P e a 3
s u l t o f t h e a c t i o n t a k e
AS a re
a n d or de r, R r 4 tasks for our guns seldom Present e
m a i n t e n a n c e e o f la w t h e T e v o l u t i Wy
a n d H.Q. in SAIGON On :thethem selv es,
protec tion ma ke it quite cle Natigs everted to 80 Bde. 28th. Tac
t e ho st il it ie s, an d to
i
1 n
0 i t i a . 2 ar that t
saw fit to , i e s . I n d i a n troops -
x e. c o n s i d e r e d a s e n e m In early November our existing Megs
British wet and Officers S in Japanes
d p osts frequently sniped. In a fe 2 changed for that of a palatial] house in © barracks
vere ambushed, an Ww MStances
wa
a t t a c k s o n p o s t s a t n i g h t xs ne of seven houses bel
Ppae of r e b e l s p u t 1 2 UPPorteg by It was e) ONBING sto. a Chingse Wr
and grenades thrown into vehicles llionaire,
MMGs, LMGs from hoy
y built with all
peautifull modern cquveneea atndsMifu
of cas ual tie s, and this metho Ses
Our stay however was short for after only 14 days w
rnished,

iiged quite a num ber d b

it ecame & we re tol d to
ps bec ame necessary to combat by £NClosinSgo moves this time to a smaller, but very nice houseree
frequent tha t ste cently vacated
i
.
t h r a b i
:
t w i
:
r e . by General Manaki the local Jap Commander.
vehicles w
s t t h e r e b e l s , w h i c h .
f a r m s a m o n g
There was no lack o Sisted No change occurred in our dispositions during Novembe
L M G s , r i f l e s , a n d p l e n t i f y l o e
of some MMG s , a n u m b e r o f -
s e e e e : Major Eales with W Coy. carried out a few
i c h w e r e o b t a i n e d f r o m J a p a n e disarming cane
of grenades all of w h
d e d J a p d e v e r e e e e of small parties of Japs. which on one Occasion resulted in 24
a n k s o f t h e r e b e l s i n c l u
was known that the r swords. Those of the warrant officers were handed to the Coy
,
u n d o u b t e d l y f o r m e d t h e “ h a r d c o r e ’ , a n d t r a i n e d t h e A n a m i t e s j p H. M.—the officers swords being handed to Jem Umed Singh the
minor tactics. In additions,to tshpeesaers,noramnadl ewveeanponas, foarmforomf toefarCI=
Oss senior V.C.O. of the Coy. at the time. The O.C. unit a Major
bow with poisoned arrow
v k t a i l w a s a l s o e n c o u n t e r e d , handed over his sword to Major Eales.
were used. A local type of Ma l o t o C o c
Although therefore the revolutionaries lacked organisation, and Y Coy. area included some large warehouses which were used
training, they had the means, and fully showed their intention of
as a dump for handed in Jap, arms, equipt, etc, and for the
waging war. In the early stages of the conflict Jap troops were guarding of which Y Coy. were responsible—a task very much to
employed on guarding certain areas, and in some cases came
their liking! The Bn. H.Q. Dak Orderly hada grenade thrown at
under command of British Officers for operations. It appeared a only a few hundred yards from H.Q.
his Jeep one morning when
Strange combination, but it was fitting that they should be used,
Fortunately it failed a explode, and no harm was done.
for without their assistance before our arrival the rebel moyement
could never have reached the proportions it had. X and Z Coys remained out at BIEN HUA and TUDAU
lot of wor k pat rol lin g, and clea ring area s with
MOT, put tin g in a
3Z oeOn th e 23rd October X Co y un de r Ca pt . B. P. Si ng h, an d e not oft en foun d. alt hou gh on one
) under Lieut. C. R, Singh with a “tac” Bn. H.Q. moved Infant ry. MG , Tar get s wer
Sccasion when a pla too n of Z Coy ., wer e cov eri ng the flan k of a
out with 100 Bde. to secure an area NORTH
and N.E. of SAIGON
Gurkha search par ty Ana mit es ope ned fire on our gur e from the
See ttars were to be concentrated after being cise an imm edi ate repl y in the form
other side of the river, and rec eiv ed
less than ut ie “
Without incid een expected but the operation was complet of bursts from 4 MMGs. As the ran ge was

forces clearing out before we alt hou gh it was !mpo ss! e

arrived, TU the Anamite for the ir act ion s,
rebels paid dea rly
hext, and Ty sh wa s re ac he d th e da y, BI EN HO A fh e
ma in ed “Toss the river to check up results.
at BIEN-HUA e M O R on th e th ir d da y, Z Co y re
Nov emb er, 4 Y Coy:
TU-DAU-MOT. ptheir old friends 14/13 FFR, and X Coy: at On a night during the latter P art of
fro m 4
susp! ciou s nois es
de ta ch me nt s fr om ea ch a N O I I s l a n d , h e a r i n g
accompanied Ae rom these plac es outine patrol on HA a r t y o f t e n r e b e l s ;
Country side, B besie Infantry columns on sweeps of t f o u n d in si de a P
ones h o u s e , s u r r o u n d e d it , a n d s o n e f .
Tushes with Anamites frequently occurred put 5 5 : take n p r i

“© of whom e s c a p e d , t h e r e m a i n i n g e i g h t b e i n é
 7Q
ike
79
+ and attemps at Arson Continued ‘i December more and more Fren¢
e t h rowin od?) Un Abateg
h force
Gren u b o f C h o l o n
‘s in the G hin e s e s u b r and in 39 qually began to take over the coyp S began {0 arr)
part icularly. Twn ._ Two huge fires were started deg, gia oncentrate on the ma
in task of disa
tr y, t h u s enablingblin: ©, and
5 T of the 10” } :
On the : a the country. Tming an
Tie hand over could not ae Centrating Our forces
area SE Rowenat about 8-30 p.m. the quie to
the
t of the
‘ht of the 44 f : we JaP
nigh caentaneely disturbed by a number of heavy ae and brushes with Anamites cont Cted at once
poweve® i os ;
evening sm al l ar ms a m i n g e e e wehich includ nued Partic ularly in 100
ne cr ac ki ng of bu rn in g ed X and Z Coys
ug
‘ned with t
an enormous blaze. 10n
pde's area
AS some
)

which developed into : Althou gh it wy On one occasion a party of Xx Coy. from r

‘Jes from the Mess the explosions were so loud {hat they
ae, ve though it was but a few hundred
yards away.
U-DU-Mor
At the moving 12 support of the Gurkhas in M.T, were ambushed
On these columns machine guns at

granted that Anamites had been at short ranee-

ane :was taken for Work,
mounted ready for action In the trucks. The opening }
but it transpired that a lighted lamp had fallen on to SOme ust
ammuniti o n in a Fr en ch st or e, an d b l o w n th e whole dump sky of Anamite Big saoe6 eae and rifles was heavy and directed
at one of the trucks containin g a machine gun, and its crew. The
high. At the same time another se fire was started a mile or
two to the NORTH, by the Anamites setting fire to a petrol latter suffered heavy casualties as they attempted to open fire on
the enemy, and when several of them had been ioc oe
dump, the flames from which lighted the sky until it was bright
remaining Jat sepoy, with great determination, and tegardless of
as day light.
personal danger kept his gun in action giving the Infantry covering
On the 25th November Lt.-Creasy was evacuated to India fire while they debussed, to take on the ambush. This excellent
with his old trouble of a form of Lumbago. This was a particularly effort gained a well earned M.M.
had attack, and he suffered considerably.
Coys. took part in a number of Disarming Ceremonies includ-
At this time the Bn. was very short of officers indeed. Capt. ing one of a party of the infamous “ KEMPIE TAI.”
Dron the Adjutant who left on 16 days leave from TAIKKYI in
Sept. had been admitted to hospital in Bareilly—Creasy who had In spite of the nightly curfew, social life in SAIGON continued
been officiating for him had in turn reported sick, and as an ata great pace. There was every opportunity for enjoyment, and
interim arrangement Major Thompson had to take on Adjutant even if the standard was not up to that of Pre War times, it was
Lt.-Huntsman had flown to Singapore to see his father a released nevertheless high and late nights were frequent. Every Mess in
internee from Malaya, and Lt. Didar Singh to Rangoon for an turn held official parties usually including dancing, and in
interview for a Regular commission. Major Davies was some between, a number of unofficial parties were always taking place,
leave, The Bn. took its full share and maintain ed its reputatio n for
Where in India waiting to get to Saigon after his home
generous hospitality. A variety of country wi2nes Vvliquors, e2ttC.c,
and Lt. Howick in a similior plight after 16 days leave in India,
Some good, and some not so good were available, : thi
pee te
were
having already been away over two months. To add to these
temporary difficulties Lt.-Col. Johnson had been together with our no rm a rin
sanctioned three Suitable for cocktails and these
k of
eS “a i ie For nine months the Bn. had been tation from the N.A.A.F.1., ensured at least 2 complete lac
depression at these parties, and no necessity for empty glasses:
ost2 earlieler r in espite frequent applicatio ns. One had been
j the month, but our r d was abundant. In
elief was short lived as the
Feminine company to those intereste
Posting was cancelled a y.A.Ds. etc.,
few days later
In early December Lt.-Col. : : Addition to a large number of British goieets ings” only too
Johnson left SAIGON ;
of
6
yo un g t
by a a a de le ct ab le ch oi ce
Ww hich even the
On three months | . 5 ; ; SAIG ON of fe re d
e . 10 chats
. a

yeaa India, leaving Major Thompson

of the Bn.
ae to subscribe to the © Entent Cordia
ifficulty of different languages failed to dampen
 80 81
eas al French Cl anot consider personal feelings, and as Pee
«Cire Sportif, thelgce ub threw 4
The i nominal fee offered the ugyay ie Itsg c:a, nto th
e class Organizi atio5 n of the Post War |M, - Bn, di' q Not
a very 7 lit goes t
withoucae : litie
and y g Ndia
and bathing; pad to 8° Army, we
o p e n i
i n n V vain. | st diffi
t t h r o w ? hal The greatest
dooors w e r e n o
a p e o f i e n e dl ficulty was to explain to the me
d i n t h
h e s h
w e r e a fif o r d e
f a c i l i t i e s
Further ows. wh we were one of the three
. N . S s , A . s h Senior M.G. Bae na full Well
a n d E
date Films, ativelY recently converted Bns. were remaining Nd that compa-
CHAPTER XII sq .

A farewell parade was held on March 20th b

é é fore the men
By y the beginning of February the Division’soS) taskce was ne ating started to 8° away. This was a most impressive pa Tade, and
and once more came the question What pn which no man of the Bn. wanted to miss, One
completion, ext,” Unfortunat
ely Genera}
At first it appeared likely that the Bn., would concentrate in Gracey our late Divisional Commander w as u
JOHUR State in MALAYA, but that was changed, and about the nabl e to atten
d—
a gre at pity, as the men and officers would have been de lighted
middle of Fe br ua ry 194 6, the Bn ., em ba rk ed at SA IG ON ts to
have seen him. The General sent a very nice signalt0 the
Bn,
return to India, and the sad news was received that 20 Division regretting his inability to be present and thata Bn. wi th suc
ha
would soon cease to exist. The voyage fortunately was completed fine war record should have to be disbanded. Brigadier RODHAM
in calm seas throughout, and on the 3rd of March the Bn., was also unable to get to BAREILLY, and so the M. G. Bn.
disembarked at BOMBAY, arriving at BAREILLY on the 8th, paraded for the last time without them but undoubtedly left behind
just over two years since their departure. them an impression of a fine body of seasoned and well trained
A warm welcome awaited the Bn., at the station. Col, men to the large number of spectators who were present,
ADAMS, and Officers from the Regimental Centre, and the Centre It was decided that all men in Release Groups up to 29
band greeted them, and there were many enthusiastic reunions would leave the service, the reminder to proceed on leave on
between the men and their friends and relatives. completion of which they would be absorbed within the Jat. Regt.
Good accommodation had been allotted, and the first few days The process of disposing of the men as quickly as possible
spent in settling in, cleaning up, etc. Major HOWSE, appointed involved a tremendous amount of work for all officers, but once
Bn. 2nd in Command to fill the year old vacancy, had taken under way proceeded smoothly. The biggest headache was the
over the advanced party, and on arrival of the Bn., had assumed large amount of stores and equipment to be got rid of, and through
command. Major SQUIER was also in BAREILLY waiting to normal channels would have been a slow business. By arranging
rejoin after his leave in England. We were also pleased to find for the bulk of it to be returned to Arsenal by M. T. in one convoy,
Lt. CREASY fit again after his illness, and awaiting our arrival. expedited considerably. On arrival at Bombay the Bn.
it was

At this time nothing was known of the Bn’s future, but eve?
had been landed with a completely new Jeep engine in S4ciai®,
which was neither authorised, nor on our charge. Disposing of
then rumours began to fly around that it was to be disbanded.
The arrival back from leave of Lt.-Col. JOHNSON coincided this Single item was about as difficult as the reminder of the it
with
the official intimation that the M only right at the end, were We able to hane!
.G. Bn. was to complete
disbant Put together, and
ment by Apr, 15. g to- ver to a hearby M. T. Unit. agai
soften the blow, and
The previous
Eamiours rolgis is did nothin

the news hit the whole Bn. hard. During the period before the men Jaws aa
last days
a to en te rtain th em an d o e u m a
In the few years of j ts existance ey) effort wa s ma de
Spirit of the Bn. had developed iN the Bn. passed pleasantly, including 4 urré
which any tegular a yely
happy fa mily which now fa Bn. could b d, and it was LR mance, and on
AO D te all ranks in the lines followed by a conjuring es
ced disbandment. However, ¢
 82
n avery excellent display of Indian Dang;
age 3 Ng, Q 83
ae,
Ir occasio
anes the wives and families of Indian membere nd
f ;ng :
comedy,y tabs i Bareilly. Duri the evening every APPENDIX I
man
the I.C.S. #1 sweetmeats, a bottle of lem Onade : Officers and Addresses
; late of Indi‘anan
received 4 P and Rank Name Appt. Address,
several Ppackets of cigarettes. It: was, a mostiexcellent even
men, and the Commissioner of Bareil] in rrr
’ c sor ‘ | Bolts Cross House
m e n t f o r t h e B.R. Godly (3% KOK Rotherheld Peppord, Oxdn
ent ertain Y and Brigadier
Browne deserve the highest ae
a n d M r s.
his wife Mr. se for
Lt.-Col. |
R.H,. Lowe 2 ile & C.O. c/o Imperial Bank, Bareilly
arranging it.
o u g h fu ll y p e c t p i e d day, found pleut at = =
The Officers th
Ss.BP. Kauefield 2 ifc & C.O. | Not Known
n
opportunity for enjoyi tg h e m s e l v e s at n i g h t , a n d On e v e r y d a n c e ut Kerney |

night at the Club, and often on non dance nights, the cone
* H.E. Syer CEO; c/o Grindlays Bank, Bombay
Bn . C o r n e r ” of th e m a i n r o o m was the cca
nicknamed “M.G.
ly
of live pa rt ie s w h i c h i n v a r i a b l y c o n t i n u e d in to t h e e a r l y ho ur s, a E: jounees 2 ile & C.O. “a ae? Club, Charles Str.

“ Release” began to take tall of the Officers, Peter Dron being

; Annesly Theole, Reading,
the first to leave for England early in April. Next went Pete; Major R.D. Howse 2 i/¢ Berkshire

Francis beating Barney Dav is by a shor t head . By the time the

‘ Harwell Down, Newton
disbandant was completed Ted Creasy was expecting to leave at ” D.W. Squier Coy. Com: St. Eyres Nr. Exeter Devon

any time, though he was heading East to China to take up his old
|B.J.A. THompson 2 i/c |34, Lea Road, Harpenden, Herts
job. All of these had been with the Bn. for most of its existance,
and under normal circumstances would have been a greatloss. As A Massabielle Prescat Rd.
uD |
B. M. Dayies Coy. Comd. St., Helens Lancs
it was their departure coinciding with the disbandment, came at the
best possible time. a |P.W. Francis
° F
Coy. Comd.
Priory Cottage
LO.w.
Freshwater,

Those of us remaining in the service wish them all the best of

ates 12 Westbroke, Avenue
luck in their civilian careers, and from talk of the reunions in ue A.D.C. Eales me 4! Margate Kent
Picaddilly which was a favourite topic in the Mess, that hub of the
Empire'will hear more of the M.G. Jats. A W.R. Hough *, 11 Brooks Str., Lancaster

dd le of Ap ri l, Lt .- Co l. Jo hn so n re ce iv ed orders Fe c/o Lloyds Bank, Rawalpindi

Me ns mi i E.O.M. Skinner

ng al or e as Ch ie f In st ru ct or . On his
gah ag: the O.T.S. Ba Jama)pur (Chara)
command of the Bn. or perhaps
it itn Major Howse assumed pipe eAep o nf ine Me P.O. & Dist. Gujrat
bility for diesen net © SAY th at on hi m de vo lv ed th e re sp on si
th e re mn an ts of wh at ha d on ce Ba.
be en a | om
; ing of
A thankless Spos AG M. Tybyerg A Killed in Action

Job and one not wi th ou t a mo di cu m of mun or . =

headaches.
4 | BE. Nield ' ' 9 Sunny Bank Rd. Manchester

Coy. Offr 59 Amberley Rd., Palmers

Capt. P. W. Dron | & Adjt Green, London

ve T. W. King
| |Q. M. H.Q. No, 1 Corps, Karachi
1 |
i
 Appt. Address
85
APPENDIX II
M.T.O. & Coy-| Not Known
|w.R. Stevens Comd.
: List of Awards to Men of The Battalion
” | | ea

Sore | Adjt and | c/o Patons Baldwins, Name

No. Rank
Lieut ||Beene’ asSig- Olr: Halifax Yorks
| c/o H. S. Kent Military Cross
: Coy. Offr. | Parliamentary Coung;
Jamedar UMED SINGH
40762-1.0.
p. A. Banks
l.T.0. & Coy.|
|| Off.
KIAORA Branber Rd
Sussex + Seaforg Ly 34828-1.0. Subedar BIR SINGH

| Seas [Ss I.D.S.M.

a= r
| Coy. Offr. | Not Known
| J. Havtorn
A/ Havildar GULSHER
10424
ime 18150 Havildar PHUL SINGH
Capt. |J. B. Joshi Adjt. Not Known
Military Medal
F. E. Wood Coy. Offr. Redcliffe 14 Chine Eastborne ALI SHER
16545 Sepoy
C.Q.M.H. QADIR BUX
| Q. M. Coy 11559
| 5 ALAM
Major |B. P. Singh se fi Haswar Estate, Fyzabad U.P.
| 10552 Havildar MOHD.
Havildar SARDAR SINGH
25636
Santi Villas
Capt. |S. Ranganathan] Coy. Offr. 16677 L/Naik CHANDRAM
4 Se : Satyanarayanapet, Bellary
11526 Havildar SHOBHACHAND
}
Lieut. |C. R. Singh Coy. Offr. | Chandra Giri Post, M.S.M. Rly. 16935 Naik DOD RAM

17571 Sepoy BALDEWA

Capt. R.A. Russell 40400 Sepoy RANDHIR SINGH
| Coy..
Coy OffOffrr. GrotTu
tals
n.e.25,
Hall,Ming
Losm
ndes
ond S.
BeW.
ad 2
O.B.I. 1st Class
ieut.
Lieu | Khema
Khem2 Ram
Ra The
1 R
Jat Regt. F
Centre, Bareilly
3737-10 SUB. MAJ. MAHBUB KHAN,S.B. O.B.I.

Capt. | P. K. Noble M.T.O Mentions in Despatches

1A-142 Lt.-Col. H. E. SYER

B. M. Bali O.M.—Adjt. 1A-120 Major R. H. LOW
Lient - R . B . Howick
| R. B. Howick Coy. Offr. W e Ban
The Bannk i 1-A1034 = Major D. W. SQUIER
Eddesbugh, Dunstable 6631 Captain D. A. BANKS
TIS
ye ee
3737-1.0. Sub. Major MAHBOOB KHAN S.B., O.B.I.
W.T. Huntsman |
a, Re . s | 2nd Bn. The Jat Regt. 11085-I.0. Subedar MOHD. AFSAR (TWICE)
20824-1.0. Subedar KHUSHAL KHAN (TWICE)
oy Didar Singh
et oe = da Se
34828-1.0. Subedar BIR SINGH
Capt ‘ 53003-1.0. Jamadar SUDHAN SINGH
i a C Rose M a
M_O. = ~
Subedar DES RAM
’? 7 Pr >» ——z_
J K Kary ' °
M_O | Raipura District
Noh
© aka
=) li, Bengal
 86
Rand Name

LAL KHAN
Havildar
Havildar SABIR ALI
Havildar HAFIZ
Havildar MUBARIK ALI
Havildar TAJU KHAN
L/Havildar TAJ MOHD.
Naik SIRI KISHAN
Naik MOLU RAM
L/Naik WILAYAT BEG
L/Naik NEK MOHD.
L/Naik BOSTAN KHAN
Sepoy RATI RAM
M/Cook GHULAM MOHD.