TRANSPORTATION LAW – IV.
COMMON CARRIER OF PASSENGERS
Assigned cases for digest
IV. Common Carrier of Passengers
Nature of responsibility, Definitions
G.R. No. L-42926 September 13, 1985
PEDRO VASQUEZ, SOLEDAD ORTEGA, CLETO B.
BAGAIPO, AGUSTINA VIRTUDES, ROMEO VASQUEZ
and
MAXIMINA CAINAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FILIPINAS PIONEER
LINES, INC., respondents.
Facts: When the inter-island vessel MV "Pioneer Cebu" left
the Port of Manila in the early morning of May 15, 1966
bound for Cebu, it had on board the spouses Alfonso
Vasquez and Filipinas Bagaipo and a four-year old boy,
Mario Marlon Vasquez, among her passengers. The MV
"Pioneer Cebu" encountered typhoon "Klaring" and struck a
reef on the southern part of Malapascua Island, located
somewhere north of the island of Cebu and subsequently
sunk. The aforementioned passengers were unheard from
since then.
Plaintiffs Pedro Vasquez and Soledad Ortega are the
parents of Alfonso Vasquez; plaintiffs Cleto Bagaipo and
Agustina Virtudes are the parents of Filipinas Bagaipo; and
plaintiffs Romeo Vasquez and Maxima Cainay are the
parents of the child, Mario Marlon Vasquez. They seek the
recovery of damages due to the loss of Alfonso Vasquez,
Filipinas Bagaipo and Mario Marlon Vasquez during said
voyage.
Due to the loss of their children, petitioners sued for
damages before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil
Case No. 67139). Respondent defended on the plea of force
majeure, and the extinction of its liability by the actual total
loss of the vessel.
Issue: The basic issue is with respect to the liability for
damages of private respondent for the presumptive death of
petitioners' children.
Ruling: They are liabe for damages.
Principle: Upon the evidence and the applicable law, we
sustain the trial Court. "To constitute a caso fortuito that
would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary
that (1) the event must be independent of the human will; (2)
the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and that (3) the
obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
injury to the creditor." 1 In the language of the law, the event
must have been impossible to foresee, or if it could be
foreseen, must have been impossible to avoid. 2 There must
be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of
injury or loss.
Application: Turning to this case, before they sailed from
the port of Manila, the officers and crew were aware of
typhoon "Klaring" that was reported building up at 260 kms.
east of Surigao. In fact, they had lashed all the cargo in the
hold before sailing in anticipation of strong winds and rough
waters.4 They proceeded on their way, as did other vessels
that day. Upon reaching Romblon, they received the weather
report that the typhoon was 154 kms. east southeast of
Tacloban and was moving west northwest.5 Since they were
still not within the radius of the typhoon and the weather was
clear, they deliberated and decided to proceed with the
course. At Jintotolo Island, the typhoon was already
reported to be reaching the mainland of Samar. 6 They
still decided to proceed noting that the weather was still
"good" although, according to the Chief Forecaster of
the Weather Bureau, they were already within the
typhoon zone. 7 At Tanguingui Island, about 2:00 A.M. of
May 16, 1966, the typhoon was in an area quite close to
Catbalogan, placing Tanguingui also within the typhoon
zone. Despite knowledge of that fact, they again decided
to proceed relying on the forecast that the typhoon
would weaken upon crossing the mainland of
Samar. 8 After about half an hour of navigation towards
Chocolate Island, there was a sudden fall of the
barometer accompanied by heavy downpour, big waves,
and zero visibility. The Captain of the vessel decided to
reverse course and face the waves in the open sea but
because the visibility did not improve they were in total
darkness and, as a consequence, the vessel ran aground a
reef and sank on May 16, 1966 around 12:45 P.M. near
Malapascua Island somewhere north of the island of Cebu.
Under the circumstances, while, indeed, the typhoon
was an inevitable occurrence, yet, having been kept
posted on the course of the typhoon by weather
bulletins at intervals of six hours, the captain and crew
were well aware of the risk they were taking as they
hopped from island to island from Romblon up to
Tanguingui. They held frequent conferences, and
oblivious of the utmost diligence required of very
cautious persons, 9 they decided to take a calculated
risk. In so doing, they failed to observe that
extraordinary diligence required of them explicitly by
law for the safety of the passengers transported by them
with due regard for an circumstances 10 and
unnecessarily exposed the vessel and passengers to
the tragic mishap. They failed to overcome that
presumption of fault or negligence that arises in cases
of death or injuries to passengers.
Breach of Contract of Carriage
G.R. No. 119995 November 18, 1997
CARLOS SINGSON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAY,
INC., respondents.
Doctrine: A contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Imbued
with public interest, common carriers are required by law to
carry passengers safely as far a human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with due regard for all the circumstances.1 A contract
to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree
from any other contractual relation. And this because its
business is mainly with the traveling public. In invites people
to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended
with a public duty.2 Failure of the carrier to observe this high
degree of care and extraordinary diligence renders it liable
for any damage that may be sustained by its passengers.
Facts: The instant case is an illustration of the exacting
standard demanded by the law of common carriers: On 24
May 1988 CARLOS SINGSON and his cousin Crescentino
Tiongson bought from Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd.
(CATHAY), at its Metro Manila ticket outlet two (2) open-
dated, identically routed, round trip plane tickets for the
purpose of spending their vacation in the United States.
Each ticket consisted of six (6) flight coupons corresponding
to this itinerary: flight coupon no. 1 — Manila to Hongkong;
flight coupon no. 2 — Hongkong to San Francisco; flight
coupon no. 3 — San Francisco to Los Angeles; flight coupon
no. 4 — Los Angeles back to San Francisco; flight coupon
no. 5 — San Francisco to Hongkong; and, finally, flight
coupon no. 6 — Hongkong to Manila.
On 6 June 1988 CARLOS SINGSON and Crescentino
Tiongson left Manila on board CATHAY's Flight No. 902.
They arrived safely in Los Angeles and after staying there for
about three (3) weeks they decided to return to the
Philippines. On 30 June 1988 they arranged for their return
flight at CATHAY's Los Angeles Office and chose 1 July
1988, a Friday, for their departure. While Tiongson easily got
a booking for the flight, SINGSON was not as lucky. It was
discovered that his ticket booklet did not have flight coupon
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no. 5 corresponding to the San Francisco-Hongkong leg of
the trip. Instead, what was in his ticket was flight coupon no.
3 — San Francisco to Los Angeles.
On 26 August 1988 SINGSON commenced an action for
damages against CATHAY before the Regional Trial Court of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
Thus he and his cousin Tiongson, who deferred his own
flight to accompany him, were forced to leave for San
Francisco on the night of 1 July 1988 to verify the missing
ticket.
Issue: Whether a breach of contract was committed by
CATHAY when it failed to confirm the booking of petitioner
for its 1 July 1988 flight?
Ruling: YES.
Application: CATHAY undoubtedly committed a breach of
contract when it refused to confirm petitioner's flight
reservation back to the Philippines on account of his missing
flight coupon. Its contention that there was no contract of
carriage that was breached because petitioner's ticket was
open-dated is untenable. To begin with, the round trip ticket
issued by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a
complete written contract by and between the carrier and the
passenger. It has all the elements of a complete written
contract, to wit: (a) the consent of the contracting
parties manifested by the fact that the passenger agreed
to be transported by the carrier to and from Los Angeles
via San Francisco and Hongkong back to the
Philippines, and the carrier's acceptance to bring him to
his destination and then back home; (b) cause or
consideration, which was the fare paid by the passenger
as stated in his ticket; and, (c) object, which was the
transportation of the passenger from the place of
departure to the place of destination and back, which
are also stated in his ticket.6 In fact, the contract of
carriage in the instant case was already partially executed as
the carrier complied with its obligation to transport the
passenger to his destination, i.e., Los Angeles. Only the
performance of the other half of the contract — which was to
transport the passenger back to the Philippines — was left to
be done. Moreover, Timothy Remedios, CATHAY's
reservation and ticketing agent, unequivocally testified that
petitioner indeed had reservations booked for travel.
Interestingly, it appears that CATHAY was responsible for
the loss of the ticket. One of two (2) things may be
surmised from the circumstances of this case: first, US Air
(CATHAY's agent) had mistakenly detached the San
Francisco-Hongkong flight coupon thinking that it was the
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
San Francisco-Los Angeles portion; or, second, petitioner's
booklet of tickets did not from issuance include a San
Francisco-Hongkong flight coupon. In either case, the loss of
the coupon was attributed to the negligence of CATHAY's
agents and was the proximate cause of the non-confirmation
of petitioner's return flight on 1 July 1988. It virtually
prevented petitioner from demanding the fulfillment of the
carrier's obligations under the contract. Had CATHAY's
agents been diligent in double checking the coupons they
were supposed to detach from the passengers' tickets, there
would have been no reason for CATHAY not to confirm
petitioner's booking as exemplified in the case of his cousin
and flight companion Tiongson whose ticket booklet was
found to be in order. Hence, to hold that no contractual
breach was committed by CATHAY and totally absolve it
from any liability would in effect put a premium on the
negligence of its agent, contrary to the policy of the law
requiring common carriers to exercise extraordinary
diligence.
Fortuitous Event as a Defense
G.R. No. L-19495 February 2, 1924
HONORIO LASAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellant.
Facts: The plaintiff are husband and wife and this action is
brought to recover damages in the sum of P20,000 for
physical injuries sustained by them in an automobile
accident.
It appears from the evidence that on February 27, 1918, the
defendant was the owner of a public garage in the town of
San Fernando, La Union, and engaged in the business of
carrying passengers for hire from the one point to another in
the Province of La Union and the surrounding provinces. On
the date mentioned, he undertook to convey the plaintiffs
from San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in a Ford
automobile. On leaving San Fernando, the automobile was
operated by a licensed chauffeur, but after having reached
the town of San Juan, the chauffeur allowed his assistant,
Remigio Bueno, to drive the car. Bueno held no driver's
license, but had some experience in driving, and with the
exception of some slight engine trouble while passing
through the town of Luna, the car functioned well until after
the crossing of the Abra River in Tagudin, when, according to
the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, defects
developed in the steering gear so as to make accurate
steering impossible, and after zigzagging for a distance of
about half a kilometer, the car left the road and went down a
steep embankment.
The defendant, in his testimony, maintains that there was no
defect in the steering gear, neither before nor after the
accident, and expresses the opinion that the swaying or
zigzagging of the car must have been due to its having been
driven at an excessive rate of speed. This may possibly be
true, but it is, from our point of view, immaterial whether the
accident was caused by negligence on the part of the
defendant's employees, or whether it was due to defects in
the automobile; the result would be practically the same in
either event.
In going over the bank of the road, the automobile was
overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down under it. Mr.
Lasam escaped with a few contusions and a "dislocated"
rib , but his wife, Joaquina Sanchez, received serious
injuries, among which was a compound fracture of one of the
bones in her left wrist. She also appears to have suffered a
nervous breakdown from which she had not fully recovered
at the time of the trial.
The complaint in the case was filed about a year and a half
after the occurrence above related. It alleges, among other
things, that the accident was due to defects in the
automobile as well as to the incompetence and negligence
of the chauffeur, and the case appears to have been tried
largely upon the theory that it sounds in tort and that the
liability of the defendant is governed by article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not the essential element of fortuitous
event (specifically: some extraordinary circumstance
independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees) is
present in this case?
Ruling: NO.
Principle: What is meant by "events which cannot be
foreseen and which, having been foreseen, are inevitable?"
The Spanish authorities regard the language employed as an
effort to define the term caso fortuito and hold that the two
expressions are synonymous. (Manresa, Comentarios al
Codigo Civil Español, vol. 8, pp. 88 et seq.; Scævola, Codigo
Civil, vol. 19, pp. 526 et seq.)
The antecedent to article 1105 is found in Law 11, Title 33,
Partida 7, which defines caso fortuito as "occasion que a
case por aventura de que non se puede ante ver. E son
estos, derrivamientos de casas e fuego que se enciende a
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so ora, e quebrantamiento de navio, fuerca de ladrones. . . .
(An event that takes place by accident and could not have
been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses,
unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers. . . .)"
Escriche defines caso fortuito as "an unexpected event or
act of God which could either be foreseen nor resisted, such
as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning,
compulsion, insurrections, destructions, destruction of
buildings by unforseen accidents and other occurrences of a
similar nature."
In discussing and analyzing the term caso
fortuito the Enciclopedia Juridica Española says: "In a legal
sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso
fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1)
The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or
of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must
be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible
to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if
it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the
obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor."
(5 Enciclopedia Juridica Española, 309.)
As will be seen, these authorities agree that some
extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the
obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of
a caso fortuito.
Application: Turning to the present case, it is at once
apparent that this element is lacking. It is not suggested that
the accident in question was due to an act of God or to
adverse road conditions which could not have been
foreseen. As far as the records shows, the accident was
caused either by defects in the automobile or else through
the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito.
Also: here the passengers had no means of avoiding the
danger or escaping the injury.
Duration of Responsibility
G.R. No. L-20761 July 27, 1966
LA MALLORCA, petitioner,
vs.
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO
BELTRAN, ET AL., respondents.
Facts: On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs,
husband and wife, together with their minor daughters,
namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4½ years old,
and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No.
352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned
and operated by the defendant, at San Fernando,
Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time,
they were carrying with them four pieces of baggages
containing their personal belonging.
After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it
stopped to allow the passengers bound therefor, among
whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With
respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then
carrying some of their baggages, was the first to get down
the bus, followed by his wife and his children. Mariano led his
companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of
the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle.
Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his
other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his
daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran
immediately jumped from the running board without getting
his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the
road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his
wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people
beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate
on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child
was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over
by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her
parents. (grabe ka sad gyud ani )
For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the
present suit against the defendant seeking to recover from
the latter an aggregate amount of P16,000 to cover moral
damages and actual damages sustained as a result thereof
and attorney's fees. After trial on the merits, the court below
rendered the judgment in question.
La Mallorca claimed that there could not be a breach of
contract in the case, for the reason that when the child met
her death, she was no longer a passenger of the bus
involved in the incident and, therefore, the contract of
carriage had already terminated.
Issue: Whether or not La Mallorca is liable for damages for
the death of Raquel Beltran?
Ruling: YES.
Principle: It has been recognized as a rule that the relation
of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the
passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place
selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but
continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And,
what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this
rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a
person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the
station platform is considered still a passenger.2 So also,
where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is
proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's
premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report
that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in
good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty,
returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and
necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger
entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company
and its agents.
Application: Under the facts as found by the Court of
Appeals, we have to sustain the judgement holding petitioner
liable for damages for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran.
It may be pointed out that although it is true that respondent
Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children (including the
deceased child) had alighted from the bus at a place
designated for disembarking or unloading of passengers, it
was also established that the father had to return to the
vehicle (which was still at a stop) to get one of his bags
or bayong that was left under one of the seats of the bus.
There can be no controversy that as far as the father is
concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong
which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and
carrier between him and the petitioner remained
subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and passenger does
not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from
the car, aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing
his baggage from the car.1 The issue to be determined here
is whether as to the child, who was already led by the father
to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of
the carrier for her safety under the contract of carriage also
persisted.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one
of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted
from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have
followed the father. However, although the father was still on
the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to
hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that
even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving
vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be
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near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances,
it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised
the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by
Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common
carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping
the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly,
he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave
him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading
part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and
family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was
not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered
still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection
under their contract of carriage.
C. Presumption of negligence
G.R. No. L-28692 July 30, 1982
CONRADA VDA. DE ABETO, CARMELO ABETO,
CECILIA ABETO, CONCEPCION ABETO, MARIA ABETO,
ESTELA ABETO, PERLA ABETO, PATRIA ABETO and
ALBERTO ABETO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INCORPORATED, defendant-
appellant.
Facts: Plaintiff's evidence shows that about 5:30 in the
afternoon of November 23, 1960, Judge Quirico Abeto, with
the necessary tickets, boarded the Philippine Air Lines' PI-
C133 plane at the Mandurriao Airport, Iloilo City for Manila.
He was listed as the No. 18 passenger in its Load Manifest
(Exhibit A). The plane which would then take two hours from
Iloilo to Manila did not reach its destination and the next day
there was news that the plane was missing. After three
weeks, it was ascertained that the plane crashed at Mt.
Baco, Province of Mindoro. All the passengers, including
Judge Abeto, must have been killed instantly and their
remains were scattered all over the area. Among the articles
recovered on the site of the crash was a leather bag with the
name "Judge Quirico Abeto.
When defendant-appellant would not hear demands for
settlement of damages, plaintiffs-appellees were compelled
to hire counsel for the institution and prosecution of this
case.
Defendant-appellant tried to prove that the plane crash at Mt.
Baco was beyond the control of the pilot. The plane at the
time of the crash was airworthy for the purpose of conveying
passengers across the country as shown by the certificate of
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
airworthiness issued by the Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA). There was navigational error but no negligence or
malfeasance on the part of the pilot.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant is liable for violation of
its contract of carriage.
Ruling: YES.
Principle: Article 1733 binds common carriers, "from the
nature of their business and by reasons of public policy, ... to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance ... for the
safety of the passengers transported by them according to all
the circumstances of each case." Article 1755 establishes
the standard of care required of a common carrier, which is,
"to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances."
Article 1756 fixes the burden of proof by providing that "in
case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extra-
ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755."
Lastly, Article 1757 states that "the responsibility of a
common carrier for the safety of passengers ... cannot be
dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of
notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise."
Application: The prescribed airway of plane PI-C133 that
afternoon of November 23, 1960, with Capt. de Mesa, as the
pilot, was Iloilo-Romblon-Manila, denominated as airway
"Amber l," and the prescribed elevation of the flight was
6,000 ft. The fact is, the plane did not take the designated
route because it was some 30 miles to the west when it
crashed at Mt. Baco. According to defendant's witness,
Ramon A. Pedroza, Administrative Assistant of the
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., this tragic crash would have
not happened had the pilot continued on the route
indicated.
Principle in relation to the topic of presumption of
negligence: At any rate, in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation by appellant as to how the accident occurred,
the presumption is, it is at fault.
In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need
not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the
part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the
damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of
carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to
transport the passenger to his destination safely and to
observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the
passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence
of the carrier (Art. 1756, New Civil Code). This is an
exception to the general rule that negligence must be
proved.
E. Responsibility for Acts of Employees,
Strangers and Co-Passengers
G.R. No. L-8034 November 18, 1955
CORNELIA A. DE GILLACO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Facts: That at about 7:30 a.m., on the morning of April 1,
1946, Lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband of the plaintiff, was a
passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad
Company from Calamba, Laguna to Manila;
That when the train reached the Paco Railroad station,
Emilio Devesa, a train guard of the Manila Railroad
Company assigned in the Manila-San Fernando, La Union
Line, happened to be in said station waiting for the same
train which would take him to Tutuban Station, where he was
going to report for duty;
That Emilio Devesa had a long standing personal grudge
against Tomas Gillaco, same dating back during the
Japanese occupation;
That because of this personal grudge, Devesa shot Gillaco
with the carbine furnished to him by the Manila Railroad
Company for his use as such train guard, upon seeing him
inside the train coach;
That Tomas Gillaco died as a result of the would which he
sustained from the shot fired by Devesa.
It is also undisputed that Devesa was convicted with
homicide by final judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not Manila Raillroad shall be held liable
for the acts commited by Emilio Devesa who is its train
guard?
Ruling: NO.
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Principle: There can be no quarrel with the principle that a
passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by
the carrier or its agents or employees, since the contract of
transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger
safely to his destination. But under the law of the case, this
responsibility extends only to those that the carrier could
foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of car
and diligence required of it.
No doubt that a common carrier is held to a very high degree
of care and diligence in the protection of its passengers; but,
considering the vast and complex activities of modern rail
transportation, to require of appellant that it should guard
against all possible misunderstanding between each and
every one of its employees and every passenger that might
chance to ride in its conveyances at any time, strikes us as
demanding diligence beyond what human care and foresight
can provide.
The only good reason for making the carrier responsible for
the misconduct of the servant perpetrated in his own interest,
and not in that of his employer, or otherwise within the scope
of his employment, is that the servant is clothed with the
delegated authority, and charge with the duty by the carrier,
to execute his undertaking with the passenger. And it cannot
be said, we think, that there is any such delegation to the
employees at a station with reference to passenger
embarking at another or traveling on the train. Of course, we
are speaking only of the principle which holds a carrier
responsible for wrong done to passenger by servants acting
in their own interest, and not in that of the employer. That
principle is not the ordinary rule,respondent superior, by
which the employer is held responsible only for act or
omissions of the employee in the scope of his employment;
but the only reason in our opinion for a broader liability arises
from the fact that the servant, in mistreating the passenger
wholly for some private purpose of his own, in the very act,
violates the contractual obligation of the employer for the
performance of which he has put the employee in his place.
The reason does not exist where the employee who
committed the assault was never in a position in which it
became his duty to his employer to represent him in
discharging any duty of the latter toward the passenger. The
proposition that the carrier clothes every employee engaged
in the transportation business with the comprehensive duty
of protecting every passenger with whom he may in any way
come in contact, and hereby makes himself liable for every
assault commited by such servant, without regard to the
inquiry whether or not the passenger has come within the
sphere of duty of that servant as indicated by the
employment, is regarded as not only not sustained by the
authorities, but as being unsound and oppressive both to the
employer and the employee.
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
Application: The act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger
Gillaco (because of a personal grudge nurtured against the
latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely
unforeseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no
means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor
could it reasonably foresee every personal rancor that might
exist between each one of its many employees and any one
of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains.
The shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito" within
the definition of article 105 of the old Civil Code, being both
unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances;
and pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of
appellant's contract of safe carriage with the late Tomas
Gillaco was excused thereby.
Another very important consideration that must be borne in
mind is that, when the crime took place, the guard Devesa
had no duties to discharge in connection with the
transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The
stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot and killed
Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San
Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station
awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the
train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty
was to start at 9:00 a.m., two hours after the commission of
the crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to
safeguard the passenger of the Calamba-Manila train, where
the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not
done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was
that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting
transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to
discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had assumed
by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's
assault cannot be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's
contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the
carrier.
G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO
ROMAN, petitioners,
vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR
NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.
Facts: On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven
o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered
the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token"
(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was
standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached
Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the
two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence,
however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or
who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how
Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment
that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the
moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor filed a
complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo
Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc.
(Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court,
contended that a contract of carriage was deemed created
from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station
and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all
the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and
that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman
liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise
extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Issue: Whether or not Roman shall be held liable for the
death of Nicanor Navidad?
Ruling: NO.
Principle: Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common
carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons
of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising
utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. 4 The
Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for
death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and
1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts
of the former’s employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation
of the orders of the common carriers.
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"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon
proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission."
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due
regard for all circumstances.5 Such duty of a common carrier
to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only
during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises and where they ought to
be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.6 The statutory
provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or
injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts
of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence
of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of due diligence could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.7 In case of such
death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
been negligent, and8 by simple proof of injury, the passenger
is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence
of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon
the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen
event or to force majeure.9 In the absence of satisfactory
explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred,
which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have
failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at
fault,10 an exception from the general rule that negligence
must be proved.
Application: The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the
contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim
arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure
to exercise the high diligence required of the common
carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the
safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the
common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under
the contract of carriage.
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse
and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is
concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that
"there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor
(Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee,
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." This finding of the
appellate court is not without substantial justification in our
own review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner
Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or
omission, he must also be absolved from liability.
Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and
Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and
Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own
fault or negligence.
Art. 586–608 –Shipowners and Ship Agent
G.R. No. L-13695 October 18, 1921
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
MANUEL LOPEZ CASTELO, defendant-appellant.
Facts: By contract of character dated February 8, 1915,
Manuel Lopez Castelo, as owner, let the small interisland
steamer Batangueño for the term of one year to Jose Lim
Chumbuque for use in the conveying of cargo between
certain ports of the Philippine Islands. In this contract it was
stipulated that the officers and crew of
the Batangueño should be supplied by the owner, and that
the charterer should have no other control over the captain,
pilot, and engineers than to specify the voyages that they
should make and to require the owner to discipline or relieve
them as soon as possible in case they should fail to perform
the duties respectively assigned to them.
While the boat was being thus used by the charterer in the
interisland trade, the standard Oil Company delivered to the
agent of the boat in Manila a quantity of petroleum to be
conveyed to the port of Casiguran, in the Province of
Sorsogon. For this consignment a bill of lading of the usual
form was delivered, with the stipulation that freight should be
paid at the destination. Said bill of lading contained no
provision with respect to the storage of the petroleum, but it
was in fact placed upon the deck of the ship and not in the
hold.
While the boat was on her way to the port mentioned, and off
the western coast of Sorsogon, a violent typhoon passed
over that region, and while the storm was at its height the
captain was compelled for the safety of all to jettison the
entire consignment of petroleum consisting of two hundred
cases. When the storm abated the ship made port, and
thirteen cases of the petroleum were recovered, but the
remainder was wholly lost.
To recover the value of the petroleum thus jettisoned but not
recovered, the present action was instituted by the Standard
Oil Company against the owner of the ship in the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
No question is made upon the point that the captain
exercised proper discretion in casting this petroleum
overboard, as a step necessary to the salvation of the ship;
and in fact it appears that even after the vessel was thus
eased, she was with difficulty prevented from capsizing, so
great was the intensity of the storm.
Issue: Who is the person, or persons, who are liable to make
good this loss, and what are the conditions under which the
action can be maintained?
Ruling: Principle: That the owner of the ship is a person to
whom the plaintiff in this case may immediately look for
reimbursement to the extent above stated is deducible not
only from the general doctrines of admiralty jurisprudence
but from the provisions of the Code of Commerce applicable
to the case. It is universally recognized that the captain is
primarily the representative of the owner; and article 586 of
the Code of Commerce expressly declares that both the
owner of the vessel and the naviero, or charterer, shall be
civil liable for the acts of the master. In this connection, it
may be noted that there is a discrepancy between the
meaning of naviero, in articles 586 of the Code of
Commerce, where the word is used in contradistinction to the
term "owner of the vessel" ( propietario), and in article 587
where it is used alone, and apparently in a sense broad
enough to include the owner. Fundamentally the word
"naviero" must be understood to refer to the person
undertaking the voyage, who in one case may be the owner
and in another the charterer. But this is not vital to the
present discussion. The real point to which we direct
attention is that, by the express provision of the Code, the
owner of the vessel is civilly liable for the acts of the captain;
and he can only escape from this civil liability by abandoning
his property in the ship and any freight that he may have
earned on the voyage (arts. 587, 588, Code of Comm.).
In considering the question now before us it is important to
remember that the owner of the ship ordinarily has vastly
more capital embarked upon a voyage than has any
individual shipper of cargo. Moreover, the owner of the ship,
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TRANSPORTATION LAW – IV. COMMON CARRIER OF PASSENGERS
Assigned cases for digest
in the person of the captain, has complete and exclusive
control of the crew and of the navigation of the ship, as well
as of the disposition of the cargo at the end of the voyage. It
is therefore proper that any person whose property may have
been cast overboard by order of the captain should have a
right of action directly against the ship's owner for the breach
of any duty which the law may have imposed on the captain
with respect to such cargo. To adopt the interpretation of the
law for which the appellant contends would place the
shipowner in a position to escape all responsibility for a
general average of this character by means of the
delinquency of his own captain. This cannot be permitted.
The evident intention of the Code, taken in all of its
provisions, is to place the primary liability upon the person
who has actual control over the conduct of the voyage and
who has most capital embarked in the venture, namely, the
owner of the ship, leaving him to obtain recourse, as it is very
easy to do, from other individuals who have been drawn into
the venture as shippers.
Application: It results that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
in this action; and the only additional point to be inquired into
is the amount that should be awarded. In this connection it
appears that the total value of the jettisoned cargo, belonging
partly to the plaintiff to another shipper, was P880.35, of
which P719.95 represented the value of the plaintiff's
petroleum. Upon the apportionment of this total loss among
the different interests involved, to wit, value of ship, value of
cargo, and the earned but lost freight, it appears that the
amount of the loss apportionable to the plaintiff is P11.28.
Deducting this from the value of the petroleum, we have as a
result, the amount of P708.67, which is the amount for which
judgment should be given.
Arts. 587– 590,837 – Doctrine of Limited
Liability
G.R. No. L-42926 September 13, 1985
PEDRO VASQUEZ, SOLEDAD ORTEGA, CLETO B.
BAGAIPO, AGUSTINA VIRTUDES, ROMEO VASQUEZ
and
MAXIMINA CAINAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FILIPINAS PIONEER
LINES, INC., respondents.
Facts: When the inter-island vessel MV "Pioneer Cebu" left
the Port of Manila in the early morning of May 15, 1966
bound for Cebu, it had on board the spouses Alfonso
Vasquez and Filipinas Bagaipo and a four-year old boy,
Mario Marlon Vasquez, among her passengers. The MV
"Pioneer Cebu" encountered typhoon "Klaring" and struck a
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
reef on the southern part of Malapascua Island, located
somewhere north of the island of Cebu and subsequently
sunk. The aforementioned passengers were unheard from
since then.
Plaintiffs Pedro Vasquez and Soledad Ortega are the
parents of Alfonso Vasquez; plaintiffs Cleto Bagaipo and
Agustina Virtudes are the parents of Filipinas Bagaipo; and
plaintiffs Romeo Vasquez and Maxima Cainay are the
parents of the child, Mario Marlon Vasquez. They seek the
recovery of damages due to the loss of Alfonso Vasquez,
Filipinas Bagaipo and Mario Marlon Vasquez during said
voyage.
Due to the loss of their children, petitioners sued for
damages before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil
Case No. 67139). Respondent defended on the plea of force
majeure, and the extinction of its liability by the actual total
loss of the vessel.
Issue: Whether the total loss of the vessel extinguished
private respondent’s liability pursuant to Article 587 of the
Code of Commerce?
Ruling: With respect to private respondent's submission that
the total loss of the vessel extinguished its liability pursuant
to Article 587 of the Code of Commerce 12 as construed in
Yangco vs. Laserna, 73 Phil. 330 [1941], suffice it to state
that even in the cited case, it was held that the liability of a
shipowner is limited to the value of the vessel or to the
insurance thereon. Despite the total loss of the vessel
therefore, its insurance answers for the damages that a
shipowner or agent may be held liable for by reason of the
death of its passengers.
Arts. 609–621 –Captains and Masters of
Vessels Arts. 622–624 –Maritime Protest Arts.
627–651 -Officers and Crew
G.R. No. 180719 August 22, 2008
CENTENNIAL TRANSMARINE, INC., CENTENNIAL
MARITIME SERVICES CORPORATION AND/OR B+H
EQUIMAR SINGAPORE, PTE. LTD., petitioners,
vs.
RUBEN G. DELA CRUZ, respondent.
Facts: On May 9, 2000, petitioner Centennial Transmarine,
Inc., for and in behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner
Centennial Maritime Services, Corp., hired respondent Dela
Cruz as Chief Officer of the oil tanker vessel "MT
Aquidneck," owned by petitioner B+H Equimar, Singapore,
Pte. Ltd., for a period of nine months.
On May 15, 2000, respondent boarded "MT Aquidneck" and
performed his functions as Chief Officer. However, on
September 14, 2000, respondent was relieved of his duties
and repatriated to the Philippines. Failing to get a satisfactory
explanation from petitioners for his relief, respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for payment of his
salaries for the unexpired portion of contract, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees on October 7, 2000.
Petitioner alleged that respondent was relieved of his
functions as Chief Officer due to his inefficiency and lack of
job knowledge. Capt. Kowalewski allegedly informed them of
respondent’s lack of experience in tanker operations which
exposed the vessel and its crew to danger and caused
additional expenses. Petitioners allegedly advised
respondent to take a refresher course in order to facilitate his
deployment to another vessel. However, instead of taking a
refresher course, respondent filed a case for illegal
dismissal.
On April 23, 2001,6 Labor Arbiter Francisco A. Robles
rendered a Decision dismissing respondent’s complaint. He
found that respondent was validly dismissed because he
committed acts in violation of his duties as Chief Officer,
amounting to breach of trust and confidence. He noted that
on September 6, 2000, Capt. Kowalewski wrote in the official
log book of the vessel that respondent failed to follow entry
procedures in loading oil tanks while the vessel was
navigating to Aruba; that the Safety Officer of the vessel also
submitted a report on the violations committed by respondent
regarding safety rules on entry procedures; that respondent
admitted his inadequacy or lack of knowledge in tanker
operations; and that respondent was properly apprised of his
violations and was given ample opportunity to be heard.
Respondent appealed to the NLRC which was dismissed –
elevated to the Court of Appeals and reversed the decision
of the NLRC.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the position of Chief Officer of an
ocean going vessel is a managerial position or one of trust
and Confidence; (2) Whether or not entries in the official
logbook of a vessel should not be given weight for being self-
serving?
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TRANSPORTATION LAW – IV. COMMON CARRIER OF PASSENGERS
Assigned cases for digest
Ruling: First issue: YES; Second issue: NO.
Principle: With respect to the first issue: With respect to a
managerial employee, the mere existence of a basis for
believing that such employee has breached the trust of his
employer would suffice for his dismissal. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required, only substantial evidence
which must establish clearly and convincingly the facts on
which the loss of confidence rests.13
Article 627 of the Code of Commerce defines the Chief Mate,
also called Chief Officer or Sailing Mate, as "the second chief
of the vessel, and unless the agent orders otherwise, shall
take the place of the captain in cases of absence, sickness,
or death, and shall then assume all his powers, duties, and
responsibilities." A Chief Officer, therefore, is second in
command, next only to the captain of the vessel.
The exercise of discretion and judgment in directing a ship’s
course is as much managerial in nature as decisions arrived
at in the confines of the more conventional board room or
executive office. Important functions pertaining to the
navigation of the vessel like assessing risks and evaluating
the vessel’s situation are managerial in nature.15
Application: Thus, respondent, as Chief Officer, is a
managerial employee; hence, petitioners need to show by
substantial evidence the basis for their claim that respondent
has breached their trust and confidence.
Principle (with respect to the second issue): Petitioners’
basis for dismissing respondent was the alleged entry by
Captain Kowalewski in the ship’s logbook regarding
respondent’s inexperience and inefficiency. A ship’s
log/logbook is the official record of a ship’s voyage which its
captain is obligated by law to keep wherein he records the
decisions he has adopted, a summary of the performance of
the vessel, and other daily events. A logbook is a
respectable record that can be relied upon when the entries
therein are presented in evidence.
Application: In the instant case, however, respondent
correctly pointed out that the issue is not whether an official
logbook entry is acceptable in evidence, but whether a
document purporting to be a copy of a logbook entry has
been duly established to be authentic and not spurious.
In the instant case, respondent has consistently assailed the
genuineness of the purported entry and the authenticity of
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
such copy. He alleged that before his repatriation, there was
no entry in the ship’s official logbook regarding any incident
that might have caused his relief;20 that Captain
Kowalewski’s signature in such purported entry was
forged.21 In support of his allegations, respondent submitted
three official documents22 bearing the signature of Capt.
Sczepan Kowalewski which is different from the one
appearing in Annex E. Thus, it was incumbent upon
petitioners to prove the authenticity of Annex E, which they
failed to do. Likewise, the purported report of Capt.
Kowalewski dated September 1, 2000 (Annex D), 23 and the
statements of Safety Officer Khaldun Nacem Faridi and
Chief Officer Josip Milin (Annexes G24 and H25) also cannot
be given weight for lack of authentication.
Although technical rules of evidence do not strictly apply to
labor proceedings, however, in the instant case,
authentication of the above-mentioned documents is
necessary because their genuineness is being assailed, and
since petitioners offered no corroborating evidence. These
documents and their contents have to be duly identified and
authenticated lest an injustice would result from a blind
adoption of such contents. 26 Thus, the unauthenticated
documents relied upon by petitioners are mere self-
serving statements of their own officers and were
correctly disregarded by the Court of Appeals.
BILLS OF LADING
Arts. 706–718,353–375
G.R. No. L-25783 February 25, 1975
MACONDRAY AND COMPANY INC., in its capacity as
ship agent of the S/S "TAI PING", petitioner,
vs.
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondent.
Facts: On November 2, 1962, the vessel S/S TAI PING", of
which petitioner is the local agent, arrived at the port of
Manila from San Francisco, California, U.S.A., conveying
various shipments of merchandise, among which was a
shipment of one (1) coil carbon steel, one (1) bundle carbon
steel flat and one (1) carton containing carbon tool holders
carbide cutters, ground, all of which appeared in the Bill of
Lading No. 22, consigned to Bogo Medellin Millings Co., Inc.
The shipment, except the one (1) coil carbon steel was not
reflected in the Inward Cargo Manifest as required by
Section 1005 in relation to Section 2521 of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines. Allied Brokerage
Corporation, acting for and in behalf of Bogo Medellin Milling
Co. requested petitioner Macondray & Co., agent of the
vessel S/S TAI PING", to correct the manifest of the steamer
so that it may take delivery of the goods at Customs House.
Meanwhile, the Collector of Customs required herein
petitioner to explain and show cause why no administrative
fine should be imposed upon said vessel.
Counsel for petitioner wrote a letter: Upon investigation by
our client, it was verified that the vessel actually carried on
board and discharged at Manila 3 as called for in the bill of
lading. By a letter dated November 15, 1962, our client
immediately applied with your Bureau for the appropriate
amendment on an approved customs form to reflect the true
correct description of the shipment and to effect its release
from the customs house.
Collector of Customs replied: The records of this Office
show that the vesels under your agency have oftentimes
failed to declare correctly the cargoes they convey as
covered by the pertinent bill of lading. Intentionally, or
otherwise, such incorrect preparation of cargo manifests
cannot be tolerated for it does not only enhance the
commission of fraud but also makes smuggling suspicious
since it renders difficult tracing of the source of contraband
goods. In passing, it may be stated that your vessels have
been found committing the same violations despite the
warnings heretofore given and which your company has not
given any concern. As a matter of fact, your vessel have
oftentimes been reported committing the same violations,
which conduct is tantamount to willful and deliberate
defiance of constituted authority.
The fine of P1,000 was paid by herein petitioner under
protest on December 4, 1963.
Issue: Whether or not the Collector of Customs erred in
imposing a fine on the vessel, S/S TAI PING, for alleged
violation of section 1005 in relation to section 2521 of the
Tariff and Customs Code for landing unmanifested cargo at
the port of Manila.
Ruling: NO.
Petitioner herein contends that from "the fact the whole
shipment was indicated in the bill of lading, it is clear that the
deficiency of the original vessel's manifest was adequately
supplied by the entries of said bill of lading and, therefore, no
violation of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code,
was committed." The Supreme Court disagreed.
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TRANSPORTATION LAW – IV. COMMON CARRIER OF PASSENGERS
Assigned cases for digest
Principle: Sections 1004 and 1005, in relation to section
2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code, explicitly provide:
Section 1004. Documents to be
produced by master upon entry of a
vessel — For the purpose of making
entry of a vessel engaged in foreign
trade, the master thereof shall
present the following documents, duly
certified by him, to the customs boarding
official:.
a. The original manifest of all cargo
destined for the port, to be returned with
the indorsement of the boarding official;
b. Three copies of the same manifest,
one of which upon certification by the
boarding official as to the correctness of
the copy, shall be returned to the
master;
c. ...
Section 1005. Manifest required of
vessel from foreign port. — Every vessel
from a foreign port must have on board
a complete manifest of all her cargo.
All of the cargo intended to be landed at
a port, in the Philippines, must be
described in separate manifests for
each port of call therein. Each manifest
shall include the port of departure and
the port of delivery with the marks,
numbers, quantity and description of the
packages and the names of the
consignees thereof. Every vessel from a
foreign port must have on board
complete manifests of passengers and
their baggage, in the prescribed form,
setting forth their destination and all
particulars required by the immigration
laws; ...
Section 2521. Failure to supply requisite
manifests. — If any vessel or aircraft
enters or departs from a port of entry
without submitting the proper manifests
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
to the customs authorities, or shall enter G.R. No. 136888 June 29, 2005
or depart conveying unmanifested
cargo other than as stated in the next
PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE
proceeding section hereof, such vessel
CORPORATION, petitioner,
or aircraft shall be fined in a sum not
vs.
exceeding ten thousand pesos.
CHEMOIL LIGHTERAGE CORPORATION, respondent.
The same fine shall be imposed upon any arriving or
Facts: On 24 January 1991, Samkyung Chemical Company,
departing vessel or aircraft if the master or pilot in command
Ltd., based in Ulsan, South Korea, shipped 62.06 metric tons
shall fail to deliver or mail to the Auditor General a true copy
of the liquid chemical DIOCTYL PHTHALATE (DOP) on
of the manifest of the incoming or outgoing cargo, as
board MT "TACHIBANA" which was valued at US$90,201.57
required by law.
under Bill of Lading No. ULS/MNL-1 3 and another 436.70
metric tons of DOP valued at US$634,724.89 under Bill of
Application: The inclusion of the unmanifested cargoes Lading No. ULS/MNL-24 to the Philippines. The consignee
in the Bill of Lading does not satisfy the requirement of was Plastic Group Phils., Inc. (PGP) in Manila.
the aforequoted sections of the Tariff and Customs
Code. It is to be noted that nowhere in the said section is the
PGP insured the cargo with herein petitioner Philippine
presentation of a Bill of Lading required, but only the
Charter Insurance Corporation against all risks. The
presentation of a Manifest containing a true and accurate
insurance was under Marine Policies No. MRN-30721 5 dated
description of the cargoes. This is for the simple reason that
06 February 1991 for ₱31,757,969.19 and No. MRN-
while a manifest is a declaration of the entire cargo, a bill of
307226 for ₱4,514,881.00. Marine Endorsement No.
lading is but a declaration of a specific part of the cargo and
27867 dated 11 May 1991 was attached and formed part of
is a matter of business convenience based exclusively on a
MRN-30721, amending the latter’s insured value to
contract.1 The object of a manifest is to furnish the customs
₱24,667,422.03, and reduced the premium accordingly.
officers with a list to check against, to inform our revenue
officers what goods are being brought into the country, and
to provide a safeguard against goods being brought into this The ocean tanker MT "TACHIBANA" unloaded the cargo to
country on a vessel and then smuggled ashore. 2 In short, Tanker Barge LB-1011 of respondent Chemoil Lighterage
while a bill of lading is ordinarily merely a convenient Corporation, which shall transport the same to Del Pan
commercial instrument designed to protect the importer Bridge in Pasig River. Tanker Barge LB-1011 would unload
or consignee, a manifest of the cargo is absolutely the cargo to tanker trucks, also owned by the respondent,
essential to the exportation or importation of property in and haul it by land to PGP’s storage tanks in Calamba,
all vessels, the evident intent and object of which is to Laguna.
impose upon the owners and officers of such vessel an
imperative obligation to submit lists of the entire loading
Upon inspection by PGP, the samples taken from the
of the ship in the prescribed form, to facilitate the labors
shipment showed discoloration from yellowish to amber,
of the customs and immigration officers and to defeat
demonstrating that it was damaged, as DOP is colorless and
any attempt to make use of such vessels to secure the
water clear. PGP then sent a letter to the petitioner dated 18
unlawful entry of persons or things into the
February 19918 where it formally made an insurance claim
country.3 Since therefore, the purpose served by the
for the loss it sustained due to the contamination.
manifest is far different from that of the bill of lading, We
cannot acceptor place an imprimatur on the contention of
petitioner that the entries in the bill of lading adequately The petitioner paid PGP and by virtue of the Subrogation
supplied the deficiency of the manifest and cured it of its receipt, an action for damages was instituted by the
infirmity. The mandate of the law is clear and We cannot petitioner-insurer against respondent-carrier before the RTC.
settle for less. The law imposes the absolute obligation,
under penalty for failure, upon every vessel from a foreign
port to have "on board complete written or typewritten Trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner-insurer
manifests of all her cargo, signed by the master". Where the and ordered the defendant to pay Philippine Charter
law requires a manifest to be kept or delivered, it is not Insurance Corporation’s claim. Aggrieved, the respondent
complied with unless the manifest is true and accurate. sought relief with the Court of Appeals where it alleged in the
main that PGP failed to file any notice, claim or protest within
9
TRANSPORTATION LAW – IV. COMMON CARRIER OF PASSENGERS
Assigned cases for digest
the period required by Article 366 of the Code of Commerce,
which is a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of
action against the carrier.17 A telephone call which was
supposedly made by a certain Alfred Chan, an employee of
PGP, to one of the Vice Presidents of the respondent,
informing the latter of the discoloration, is not the notice
required by Article 366 of the Code of Commerce.
Issue: Whether or not the notice of claim was filed within the
required period?
Ruling: NO (but take not that a telephone call constituted
substantial compliance with the requirement of notice.)
Principle: Article 366 of the Code of Commerce has
profound application in the case at bar. This provision of law
imparts:
Art. 366. Within twenty-four hours following the receipt of the
merchandise a claim may be made against the carrier on
account of damage or average found upon opening the
packages, provided that the indications of the damage or
average giving rise to the claim cannot be ascertained from
the exterior of said packages, in which case said claim shall
only be admitted at the time of the receipt of the packages.
is fatal to the accrual of the right of action against the
carrier.27
Therefore: Both courts held that, indeed, a telephone call
was made by Alfredo Chan to Encarnacion Abastillas,
informing the latter of the contamination. However,
nothing in the trial court’s decision stated that the notice
of claim was relayed or filed with the respondent-carrier
immediately or within a period of twenty-four hours from
the time the goods were received. The Court of Appeals
made the same finding. Having examined the entire records
of the case, we cannot find a shred of evidence that will
precisely and ultimately point to the conclusion that the
notice of claim was timely relayed or filed.
Principle #2: The object sought to be attained by the
requirement of the submission of claims in pursuance of this
article is to compel the consignee of goods entrusted to a
carrier to make prompt demand for settlement of alleged
damages suffered by the goods while in transport, so that the
carrier will be enabled to verify all such claims at the time of
delivery or within twenty-four hours thereafter, and if
necessary fix responsibility and secure evidence as to the
nature and extent of the alleged damages to the goods while
the matter is still fresh in the minds of the parties. (Roldan v.
Ponzo)
The second paragraph of Article 366 of the Code of
Commerce is also edifying. It is not only when the period to
make a claim has elapsed that no claim whatsoever shall be
admitted, as no claim may similarly be admitted after the
transportation charges have been paid.
Application: In this case, there is no question that the
transportation charges have been paid, as admitted by the
petitioner, and the corresponding official receipt 32 duly
issued. But the petitioner is of the view that the payment for
services does not invalidate its claim. It contends that under
the second paragraph of Article 366 of the Code of
Commerce, it is clear that if notice or protest has been made
prior to payment of services, claim against the bad order
condition of the cargo is allowed.
We do not believe so. As discussed at length above, there
is no evidence to confirm that the notice of claim was
filed within the period provided for under Article 366 of
the Code of Commerce. Petitioner’s contention
proceeds from a false presupposition that the notice of
claim was timely filed.
Considering that we have resolved the first issue in the
negative, it is therefore unnecessary to make a resolution on
the second issue.

After the periods mentioned have elapsed, or after the
transportation charges have been paid, no claim whatsoever
shall be admitted against the carrier with regard to the
condition in which the goods transported were delivered.
Application: The Supreme Court agreed with the decision of
the Court of Appeals, it stated:
We are inclined to sustain the view that a telephone call
made to defendant-company could constitute
substantial compliance with the requirement of notice
considering that the notice was given to a responsible
official, the Vice-President, who promptly replied that
she will look into the matter.
However, it must be pointed out that compliance with the
period for filing notice is an essential part of the
requirement, i.e.. immediately if the damage is apparent, or
otherwise within twenty-four hours from receipt of the goods,
the clear import being that prompt examination of the goods
must be made to ascertain damage if this is not immediately
apparent. The Supreme Court then explained that there is
no proof of compliance with the required period, which
More particularly, where the contract of shipment contains a
reasonable requirement of giving notice of loss of or injury to
the goods, the giving of such notice is a condition precedent
to the action for loss or injury or the right to enforce the
carrier’s liability. Such requirement is not an empty
formalism. The fundamental reason or purpose of such a
stipulation is not to relieve the carrier from just liability, but
reasonably to inform it that the shipment has been damaged
and that it is charged with liability therefore, and to give it an
opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the injury.
This protects the carrier by affording it an opportunity to
make an investigation of a claim while the matter is fresh and
easily investigated so as to safeguard itself from false and
fraudulent claims.30
The filing of a claim with the carrier within the time limitation
therefore actually constitutes a condition precedent to the
accrual of a right of action against a carrier for loss of, or
damage to, the goods. The shipper or consignee must allege
and prove the fulfillment of the condition. If it fails to do so,
no right of action against the carrier can accrue in favor of
the former. The aforementioned requirement is a reasonable
condition precedent; it does not constitute a limitation of
action.31

Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman 10