1

One Thing It Lacks:

South Korea’s North Korea Policy
in 2023 National Security Strategy

Yang Gyu Kim (East Asia Institute)

On June 7th, 2023, the Office of National Security of the Republic of Korea published “The Yoon
Suk Yeol Administration’s National Security Strategy: Global Pivotal State for Freedom, Peace and
Prosperity.” The document presents the overarching principles, objectives, and directions of South
Korea’s diplomatic and security policies. Following the publication of South Korea’s first-ever
National Security Strategy document, “Peace, Prosperity, and National Security” under the Roh Moo
Hyun administration in 2004, this marks the fifth National Security Strategy document for South
Korea. It has not enjoyed significant public attention compared to Japan’s “National Security Strategy”
released last December, which received an immediate positive reception by the Biden administration
as well as statements of concerns from neighboring countries including China. Domestic assessments
of the document have varied greatly, ranging from criticism such as “strategy prioritizing great power
interests (Go and Jeong 2023)” to appraisal like “[a near-perfect strategy with] nothing more to add
or subtract (Han 2023).” Considering that (1) domestic debates have revolved around South Korea’s
policy orientation toward Japan and North Korea, and (2) the ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation
has been strengthened to respond to “North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats (Office of National
Security 2023, 44),” the main cause of the contentious divide between the ruling and opposition
parties lies in the DPRK policy encapsulated in the 2023 National Security Strategy document.
This study on the latest ROK National Security Strategy examines how the Yoon government
understands the nature of North Korea’s threat and South Korea’s corresponding response by
comparing the document with that of past South Korean administrations, the United States, and Japan.
By interpreting the current domestic debates on North Korea policy in the context of “spiral” and
“deterrence” models, this article explains the potential challenges that the North Korea policy
direction suggested in the recent strategy document may face. To overcome the stalemate on the
Korean Peninsula, South Korea must go beyond the mere distinction of whether North Korea is a
“revisionist” or a “status quo power” and advocate for strategic policymaking that could guide North

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Korea to alter its strategic orientation. This article recommends a 4D policy in place of the current
“3D (Deterrence, Dissuasion, Dialogue)” approach, adding the dimension of “alternative
future development path (the fourth D) of prosperity for North Korea.”

The Core Tenets of the 2023 National Security Strategy

The etymology of the word “strategy” can be traced back to the Greek term strategia, which originally
referred to the “art of a general” in military command (Harper, n.d.). Considering Clausewitz’s
theories on the “purpose” and “means” of warfare (Clausewitz 1989), the essence of strategy can be
organized around the goals to be achieved and the means employed to achieve them. South Korea’s
first National Security Strategy document defines the concept of national security strategy as a
“comprehensive plan that mobilizes the nation’s available resources to achieve national
security objectives within the domestic and international security environment [emphasis added by
the author]” (National Security Council 2004). Other countries also organize their National Security
Strategy documents in an organized manner, describing the means to safeguard vital national interests
in the face of challenges and outlining the corresponding response processes.
The United States’ National Security Strategy (NSS), released in October 2022, describes the
challenges facing the United States as the need to uphold the “rules-based” international structure
based on human rights, freedom, and the rule of law amid the clash between democracy and
authoritarianism. Also critical is the response to transnational threats such as climate change, food
insecurity, health issues, terrorism, and energy crises. The strategy outlines three response measures:
“1) invest in underlying sources and tools of American power and influence; (2) build the strongest
possible coalition of nations to enhance collective influence […] , and (3) modernize and strengthen
our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition.” “Out-Competing China” and
“containing Russia” are prioritized, and the NSS also underscores the need to enhance deterrence
toward Iran and North Korea (The White House 2022).
Japan’s National Security Strategy, announced in December 2022, identifies maintaining
Japan’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national security; creating an international
environment conducive to Japan’s prosperity and its assurance; and protecting universal values and
developing a free and open international order as Japan’s three core national interests. To achieve
these objectives, the Strategy presents: (1) strengthening and reforming Japan’s defense capabilities,
(2) international cooperation and leadership to uphold universal values, (3) defense-oriented
principles and non-nuclear principles, (4) enhancing the Japan-U.S. alliance, and (5) coexistence and
cooperation through multilateral engagement with like-minded countries. Japan prioritizes threats in
the following order: China’s strategic opacity and military buildup, North Korea’s missiles and
nuclear weapons, and Russia’s military actions toward neighboring countries and its strategic
coordination with China (Prime Minister’s Office 2022).
Existing National Security Strategy documents of previous South Korean governments share
a similar structure. While there may be differences in expression and priority, those released by Roh
Moo Hyun, Lee Myung Bak, and Park Geun Hye governments define the core national interests as

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securing safety of citizens and territorial sovereignty, promoting peace and prosperity on the Korean
Peninsula, and fostering mutual prosperity in Northeast Asia. The means to achieve these objectives
include strong ROK-U.S. alliance, international cooperation, and advanced security mechanisms,
among others (Jeon 2017). Moon Jae-in government aims to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue,
promote peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and the world, and safety of citizens. To achieve these
goals, it seeks to strengthen independent defense capabilities based on the South Korea-U.S. alliance,
adopt a pragmatic diplomacy centered on the people and national interests, and enhance the national
crisis management capability for a safe Republic of Korea (Office of National Security 2018).
Likewise, Yoon Suk Yeol government’s National Security Strategy also sets forth
“defend[ing] national sovereignty and territory, and enhancing the safety of citizens,” “establish[ing]
peace on the Korean Peninsula and preparing for future unification,” and “lay[ing] the foundation for
East Asia’s prosperity and expanding the nation’s global roles” as core national security objectives
(Office of National Security 2023). Apart from the expansion of diplomatic space from Northeast
Asia to the global stage, there are no significant differences in defining national interests compared
to previous strategy documents. While it does not explicitly emphasize concepts such as proactive
national defense or transfer of operational control (OPCON), the strategy aligns with the existing
National Security Strategy by highlighting increasing defense innovation, building a strong military
based on advanced technologies, and enhancing the South Korea-U.S. alliance to a more
comprehensive global partnership. The document also identifies the following elements as threats to
national interests: growing DPRK threat to security, intensifying competition between the United
States and China, deepening “protectionist tendencies and escalating economic security risks,” and
emerging threats such as infectious diseases, climate change, and cyber attacks. While there may be
differences in priority, the document bears significant resemblance to the United States’ perception
of threats (Office of National Security 2023).
Some voices have openly opposed this National Security Strategy, pointing out that it closes
the door to dialogue and diplomacy with North Korea, adopts a “submissive” attitude towards Japan
in relation to historical and territorial issues, and relies excessively on the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral
security (Go and Jeong 2023). However, this strategy, like the previous governments’
“omnidirectional diplomacy” and “pragmatic diplomacy,” adopts pragmatism as a key approach.
Consequently, it does not propose a strategy that is limited to fragmented and uniform means, refuting
the notion that it is one-sided and uniform.
However, the reason for such concerns is that the Yoon Suk Yeol government’s policy paper
presents a distinct approach of emphasizing “values diplomacy” and “principles and reciprocity.” By
promoting the principle of “enhancing solidarity in the international community based on the values of
freedom and democracy,” issues of “human rights” and “international norms” are highlighted. With the
United States and Japan, which share the same values, cooperation can be enhanced both in security and
economic, supply chain, and socio-cultural aspects. However, for countries like China and Russia that do
not share the same values, the strategy emphasizes a “safeguarding national interests with confident
diplomacy anchored in principles” and “stable bilateral relationship guided by international rules” (Office
of National Security 2023, 47; 52). Regarding North Korea, there is an emphasis on taking a “principled”

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policies and upholding “the national standing and core values of the Republic of Korea, while also
maintaining a pragmatic and flexible approach.” (Office of National Security 2023, 101).

The Spiral Model and Deterrence Model:

Two Models for Approaching the North Korean Issue and the 2023 National Security Strategy

The 2023 National Security Strategy, which emphasizes values, presents a distinct policy direction
towards North Korea. Since the release of the first-ever National Security Strategy, the South Korean
policy towards North Korea can be broadly categorized into two main streams. One is the emphasis on
“Korean Peninsula of co-prosperity” highlighted during the Roh Moo Hyun and Moon Jae In
administrations, while the other is the focus on “justice and peace” and the “trust-building process”
advocated during the Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye governments. The clash between these two
stances, which can be viewed as conflicting perspectives between conservative and progressive camps, is
often represented as the “Sunshine Policy” versus the “sanctions policy” (Ha and Cho 2010) This bears
similarities to the opposition within the U.S. policy community towards the Soviet Union during the Cold
War era. Robert Jervis explains this concept using the models of spiral and deterrence (Jervis 2017).
Deterrence model is based on the Game of Chicken. It suggests that mild and conciliatory
gestures are interpreted as a lack of determination to safeguard one’s core interests, thereby prompting
the opponent to exert stronger pressure. As a result, once concessions are made, one may find himself
in a situation where more concessions are required. Therefore, to avoid a diplomatic disaster where
more concessions are demanded, the key is demonstrating the ability and willingness to wage war. To
win the chicken game, one must show an unwavering commitment and a strong position. According
to the deterrence model, all issues are closely interconnected, so conceding on seemingly trivial
matters can be interpreted by the opponent as a vulnerability. Therefore, the United States must
respond firmly to all Soviet provocations occurring in every region of the world to prevent the Soviet
Union’s opportunistic expansion attempts.
Spiral model highlights the issues that arise when both parties involved in a conflict apply the
deterrence model simultaneously. As seen in the pre-World War I Anglo-German naval arms race,
attempts to ensure one’s own security definitively undermine the security of the other party. This is similar
to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the relentless pursuit of narrow self-interest ultimately undermines the
interests of all parties involved. When the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in simultaneous
deterrence, exchanging threats and punishments, it generated fear and suspicion, and led to a more severe
security crisis, resulting in losses on every side. To overcome this security dilemma, one side must make
the first concession, and the other party must reciprocate, thereby transforming the vicious cycle of threat
exchange into a virtuous cycle of conciliatory measures exchange.
The choice between these two models depends on the scope conditions of the two theories.
In other words, in the deterrence model, the other party is viewed as a revisionist power with an
aggressive intent to change the status quo if given the opportunity, while in the spiral model, it is
assumed that the other party seeks to maintain the status quo and has a defensive intent to secure its
own security. Hans Morgenthau asserts that if we apply these models in reverse, implementing a

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policy based on the spiral model when the other party is a revisionist power, similar to Britain’s
appeasement policy towards Hitler before World War II, significant diplomatic failures could occur.
On the other hand, if we apply the deterrence model even when the other party seeks to maintain
simply the status quo, as was the case with Britain’s containment policy towards pre-World War I
Germany, it could ultimately result in a war (Morgenthau 2005).
Therefore, Jervis suggests that choosing which model to apply in formulating policies
towards the Soviet Union should begin with accurately understanding the intentions of the Soviet
Union. This requires a comprehensive examination of how the Soviet Union perceives the intentions
of the United States. However, Morgenthau argues it is impossible to accurately ascertain the
intentions of the other party, and intentions can easily change relative to capabilities. Thus, he advises
that diplomatic policies should be based on capabilities rather than intentions. In applying these two
perspectives to the case of North Korea, we understand two things. First, a strategy that closely
monitors changes in North Korea’s capabilities is fundamentally necessary. Second, rather than
pursuing either the sunshine policy or the sanction policy, it is important to respond flexibly by
considering both North Korea’s strategic orientation and its perception of the intentions of South
Korea and the United States.
Within this context, it is possible to anticipate the challenges the 2023 National Security
Strategy will face in presenting a North Korea policy centered around values featuring principles and
reciprocity. It is natural for South Korea, a mature democracy, to prioritize the values of freedom, rule
of law, and human rights. However, when determining the direction of its diplomatic policy based on
these values, South Korea faces the difficulty of simultaneously satisfying both “principles” and
“pragmatic approaches and flexibility” in terms of (1) with whom it will form solidarity and (2) the
means it will choose to shape its diplomatic policy toward that country.
For instance, while the current National Security Strategy emphasizes “flexibility” as the
guiding principle of its North Korea policy, close examination of specific policy measures reveals
that the central emphasis lies on strengthening deterrent capabilities such as the Kill Chain, Korea Air
and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR); establishing
a ROK Strategic Command to enhance deterrence via cutting-edge technology; and securing
independent surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities by utilizing reconnaissance satellites,
microsatellites, and medium altitude unmanned aerial vehicles.
Furthermore, while the three principles for denuclearization negotiations mentioned in the
National Security Strategy are “deterrence, dissuasion, and dialogue,” there is insufficient discussion
on the specific means to realize the third principle (dialogue). The content of the “Audacious Initiative”
is contingent on North Korea “genuinely return[ing] to negotiations for denuclearization.” The basis
for the normalization of inter-Korean relations also lies on “upholding a principle of zero tolerance
against North Korea’s military provocations and ensuring that North Korea faces consequences for
any wrongdoing. (Office of National Security 2023, 101-102).
The North Korean government has explicitly rejected the underlying principles of South
Korea’s policy. In a statement released on August 19, 2022, Kim Yo Jong lambasted South Korea’s
proposal, stating that “[President Yoon’s] ‘bold plan’ is the height of absurdity as it is an impracticable
one to create mulberry fields in the dark blue ocean.” (Shin 2022) Additionally, Kim Jong Un, in his

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address to the 7th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly on September 8, 2022, asserted
that the intentions of the United States and South Korea were to persuade North Korea to abandon its
nuclear weapons and relinquish or weaken its self-defense capabilities in order to eventually collapse
the North Korean regime. North Korea responded to the recently announced National Security
Strategy not through official channels but through external propaganda outlets, describing it as an
“extremely hostile confrontation scenario” that attempts to confront North Korea with the power of
foreign forces. They criticized South Korea’s efforts to enhance its response capabilities as a
“desperate attempt to accelerate preparations for an invasion by expending massive military
expenditures to develop and purchase more weapons of war and murder” (Yoon 2023).

Policy Recommendation:
Deliberations on the 4D Model of Deterrence-Dissuasion-Dialogue-Development

As Morgenthau pointed out, the fundamental strategy of foreign policy should always begin with
consideration of adversary’s capabilities, and in a situation where North Korea’s intentions are
unclear, it is safer to formulate national security strategies as cautiously as possible. Therefore,
measures to strengthen South Korea’s deterrence capabilities in response to North Korea’s
advancements in nuclear and missile capabilities are necessary, especially with North Korea’s
adoption of the “Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces” on September 9, 2022. With this law
that legalizes the use of nuclear weapons not only against non-nuclear states but also for the purpose
of gaining control in the early stages of war, it would be risky not to prepare for such contingency.
However, it is difficult to definitively conclude that North Korea’s enhancement of nuclear
capabilities and adoption of an assertive nuclear strategy will determine its diplomatic orientation for
the next 50 or 100 years. The reliance on nuclear weapons as a security strategy by states with
conventional inferiority is a relatively common phenomenon, and is in fact a strategy that the United
States employed during the Cold War to protect its European allies from Soviet threats.
One crucial aspect to consider is that South Korea’s policy towards the North Korean nuclear
threat forms a feedback loop that influences North Korea’s threat perception and strategic orientation. As
a result, South Korea’s North Korea policy goes beyond merely choosing between engagement or
deterrence, Sunshine Policy or sanctions, and dialogue or dissuasion. Instead, it extends to the issue of
determining what kind of stimuli and information South Korea will inculcate in the course of North
Korea’s establishment of own national strategies.
In this context, strengthening U.S.-South Korea integrated deterrence and building on
international cooperation to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions is essential in order to prove to the
North Korean regime that an obsession with nuclear weapons is not a viable solution for the survival of
the regime. Simultaneously, it is also important to pursue measures that enable Pyongyang to understand
that regime stability and prosperity can be guaranteed upon denuclearization. Therefore, attention should
be given to alternative models suggested by the previous studies such as the quadruple complex strategy
incorporating “sanctions, deterrence, engagement” and “reform” (Ha and Sohn 2021), or the 4D model

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of “Deterrence, Dissuasion, Dialogue, and Development” in the form of “Audacious Initiative 2.0” (Chun
et al. 2023).
Specifically, the “Development” portion within the 4D model should include a lucid vision of the
“alternative future and developmental path of North Korea.” Rather than a conditional approach that
engages in negotiations about the future of the Korean Peninsula only after North Korea changes its
strategic orientation by first abandoning nuclear weapons, there is a need for South Korea to send a signal
to the North that it is seriously contemplating the future survival strategies of North Korea as well as inter-
Korean co-prosperity. To achieve this, it is necessary to engage in dialogue and cooperation with not only
like-minded, but also non-like-minded countries. For instance, potential security guarantee measures
acceptable to the North Korean regime can be discussed with China, which succeeded in economic reform
while maintaining similar political establishment. These measures can then be materialized through a
ROK-Japan-China strategic dialogue and mediation of U.S.-North Korea dialogue.
Furthermore, it is vital to include North Korea in negotiations over the global supply chain,
which is being reshaped under the “de-risking” principle between the United States and China (The
White House 2023), and discuss pathways to ensure sustained economic growth for North Korea
through Track 2 or Track 1.5 dialogues. Ultimately, in order to encourage North Korea to voluntarily
seek the path of denuclearization, South Korea must demonstrate its sincere pursuit of coexistence
and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, rather than the collapse of the North Korean regime. In this
context, while there may be nothing to subtract in this National Security Strategy, there is certainly
an element to add.

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Office of National Security. 2018. The National Security Strategy of the Moon Jae In
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 Yang Gyu Kim is the Executive Director (Principal Researcher) at the East Asia Institute and a
Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National
University. .

The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean
government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility
of the author or authors.

“One Thing It Lacks: South Korea’s North Korea Policy in 2023 National Security Strategy”

Date of Issue: 30 June 2023 979-11-6617-630-2-95340

Typeset by: Jisoo Park

For inquiries:
Jisoo Park, Research Associate

Tel. 82 2 2277 1683 (ext. 208) jspark@eai.or.kr

The East Asia Institute

Sajik-dong 261, Jongro-gu,
Seoul 03028, South Korea
Phone 82 2 2277 1683 Fax 82 2 2277 1697
Email eai@eai.or.kr Website www.eai.or.kr

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