Vining Supp Gov Brief Motion To Suppress Fed Bus Stop

Case 2:21-cr-20715-TGB-DRG ECF No. 40, PageID.
280 Filed 02/17/23 Page 1 of 7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:21-cr-20715
v.
Hon. Terrence G. BERG
D-1 Steven VINING, Jr.,
Defendant.
__________________________________________________________________
United States’ Supplemental Reply to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress

__________________________________________________________________
The United States submits this supplemental reply in response to
Defendant’s motion (ECF No. 39).
Respectfully submitted,
Dawn N. ISON
United States Attorney
s/ C. Barrington Wilkins
Assistant United States Attorney
(313) 226-9621
211 West Fort Street, Suite 2001
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 226-9621
barrington.wilkins@usdoj.gov
Date: February 17, 2023
1
Case 2:21-cr-20715-TGB-DRG ECF No. 40, PageID.281 Filed 02/17/23 Page 2 of 7
Government’s Supplemental Reply Brief
Considering the extensive record which has been created, thus far,
in this case due to a comprehensive motion to suppress evidentiary
hearing, as well as wide-ranging supplemental briefs, this Honorable
Court is sufficiently acquainted with the material facts of this case.
Consequently, the government intents to be succinct in its
supplemental reply brief.
1. In its supplemental brief, the Government raised the issue of
legal abandonment. If the Court determines that the defendant
abandoned his bag at the bus terminal, as argued by the
Government and supported by the applicable case law, then
that finding obviates any subsequent analysis relative to the
three areas of focus identified by the Court for supplemental
briefing. A person, such as Mr. Vining, who abandons their
property abdicates their standing to claim Fourth Amendment
protections of the searched and seized property. See United
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980); see also Able v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960). “[S]tanding is ‘an
element’ of a Fourth Amendment suppression claim anyway.
2
So, the defendant bears the ‘burden’ of showing he
has standing.” United States v. Russell, 26 F.4th 371, 375 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 214 L. Ed. 2d 188, 143 S. Ct. 385 (2022).
2. In his supplemental response brief, the defendant cites United
States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1982). Tolbert is
factually inapposite to the instant matter. In the former case,
the defendant expressly denied ownership of the property. In
Vining, intent must be gleaned from the facts and surrounding
circumstances. The Government has sufficiently expounded its
position and reasonings on this point in the abandonment
section of its original supplemental brief.
3. “To make a warrantless arrest, law enforcement must – at the
time of the arrest – have probable cause that a crime occurred
based on the totality of the circumstances.” ECF No. 39: Def.’s
Supp. Resp. Br., PageID. 272-73. Prior to the positive dog sniff,
the defendant told law enforcement officers that he possessed 5
pounds of marijuana, which is a felony offense. Consequently,
the officers on scene did not need probable cause to search the
defendant’s bag based on the drug sniff, nor was the discovery
3
of the 2.2 kilograms of methamphetamine in his possession
required for his arrest. The defendant’s inculpating statement,
i.e., that he possessed 5 pounds of marijuana, alone was a
sufficient basis for his arrest.
4. The defendant incorrectly cites Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 753 (1969) to support his argument that “the search of the
bag exceeded any reasonable scope for a search incident to an
arrest.” ECF No. 39: Def.’s Supp. Resp. Br., PageID. 273. The
correct statement of the law governing this issue was
pronounced in Northrop v. Trippett, 265 F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir.
2001) (emphasis added), where the Sixth Circuit declared,
“[T]he right to search an item incident to arrest exists even if
that item is no longer accessible to the defendant at the time of
the search. So long as the defendant had the item within his
immediate control near the time of his arrest, the item remains
subject to a search incident to arrest.” See also United States v.
Mincy, 2022 WL 17176398, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 23, 2022).
5. Defendant argues that the length and manner of the Terry
investigation was unconstitutional because the officers moved
4
him to the non-public section of the bus terminal where the dog
sniff was then conducted. While it is true that the extent and
duration of a Terry investigation is an important factor in
determining whether a Terry investigation has exceeded its
scope, the Sixth Circuit has firmly held that “there is no rigid
time limit for a Terry stop,” and when the police’s “initial
inquiries do not dispel the suspicion that warranted the stop,
further detention and questioning are appropriate.” Phillips v.
Blair, 786 F. App’x 519, 526 (6th Cir. 2019).
6. Finally, the surveillance videos were not submitted by the
Government, and were never intended to be used by it in
support of any of its positions.
5
Conclusion
For the reasons identified above, United States respectfully
requests this Honorable Court to deny the defendant’s motion to
suppress.
Respectfully submitted,
Dawn N. ISON
United States Attorney
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 226-9621
Date: February 17, 2023
6
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on February 17, 2023, I electronically filed
the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF
system, which will send notification of such filing to ECF participants,
including:
Mr. Mark A. SATAWA, Esq.
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 226-9621

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Case 2:21-cr-20715-TGB-DRG ECF No. 40, PageID.

280 Filed 02/17/23 Page 1 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

United States of America,

United States’ Supplemental Reply to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress

The United States submits this supplemental reply in response to

Defendant’s motion (ECF No. 39).

Date: February 17, 2023

Government’s Supplemental Reply Brief

in this case due to a comprehensive motion to suppress evidentiary

hearing, as well as wide-ranging supplemental briefs, this Honorable

Court is sufficiently acquainted with the material facts of this case.

Consequently, the government intents to be succinct in its

supplemental reply brief.

1. In its supplemental brief, the Government raised the issue of

legal abandonment. If the Court determines that the defendant

abandoned his bag at the bus terminal, as argued by the

Government and supported by the applicable case law, then

that finding obviates any subsequent analysis relative to the

three areas of focus identified by the Court for supplemental

briefing. A person, such as Mr. Vining, who abandons their

property abdicates their standing to claim Fourth Amendment

protections of the searched and seized property. See United

States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980); see also Able v.

United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960). “[S]tanding is ‘an

element’ of a Fourth Amendment suppression claim anyway.

So, the defendant bears the ‘burden’ of showing he

has standing.” United States v. Russell, 26 F.4th 371, 375 (6th

2. In his supplemental response brief, the defendant cites United

States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1982). Tolbert is

factually inapposite to the instant matter. In the former case,

the defendant expressly denied ownership of the property. In

Vining, intent must be gleaned from the facts and surrounding

circumstances. The Government has sufficiently expounded its

position and reasonings on this point in the abandonment

section of its original supplemental brief.

3. “To make a warrantless arrest, law enforcement must – at the

time of the arrest – have probable cause that a crime occurred

based on the totality of the circumstances.” ECF No. 39: Def.’s

the defendant told law enforcement officers that he possessed 5

pounds of marijuana, which is a felony offense. Consequently,

of the 2.2 kilograms of methamphetamine in his possession

required for his arrest. The defendant’s inculpating statement,

i.e., that he possessed 5 pounds of marijuana, alone was a

sufficient basis for his arrest.

4. The defendant incorrectly cites Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.

bag exceeded any reasonable scope for a search incident to an

correct statement of the law governing this issue was

pronounced in Northrop v. Trippett, 265 F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir.

2001) (emphasis added), where the Sixth Circuit declared,

“[T]he right to search an item incident to arrest exists even if

that item is no longer accessible to the defendant at the time of

subject to a search incident to arrest.” See also United States v.

Mincy, 2022 WL 17176398, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 23, 2022).

5. Defendant argues that the length and manner of the Terry

investigation was unconstitutional because the officers moved

duration of a Terry investigation is an important factor in

determining whether a Terry investigation has exceeded its