Legal and Judicial Ethics

Grant M. Magsombol

1. The significance of the inclusion of the concept of jus>ce in the new lawyer’s oath is that the officer who
make such pledge will assume the full responsibility of prac>cing law not by prevailing over the opposite party
in whatever means but by always considering the true essence of accep>ng the honor, privilege, duty and
responsibility by adhering to the preamble before any provision of law or of the Cons>tu>on. The terms truth,
jus>ce, freedom, love, equality, and peace being included in the new oath is the utmost considera>on for
every lawyer to discharge faithfully their du>es. It is always assumed that an outstanding lawyer knows all the
excep>ons to what the law provides but compromises the basic principles for its applica>on. This is not the
concept of jus>ce. Jus>ce must be fair and should not be achieved to prejudice any person or community, nor
shall it unjustly favor any party in any proceeding. As an agent of jus>ce, a lawyer must concur through ac>ons
to work in the spirit of fairness without abusing his or her power to manipulate the outcome of the case that
he or she is handling.

2. An aLorney is an officer of the court as he or she has been conferred with the honor, privilege, duty and
responsibility to represent his or her client in all proceedings filed in any court. The court is a place where a
par>cular ac>on or proceeding is being tried. Prior to the pronouncement or rendi>on of judgment, all courts
are to base their ruling from facts of the case or the law upon which such judgment is based. The applica>on of
the law is the life of a lawyer who has all the knowledge in terms of the effects or remedies that may be
applied if an outcome of the case is not favorable. This is the reason why a lawyer is an officer of the court. As
an officer of the court, there is a mastery in terms of the administra>on of jus>ce pertaining to the right of a
client that may be violated by the opposing party.

3. The excep>ons to the rule on protec>ng client confidences based on Sec>on 28, Canon III of the New Code
of Professional Responsibility and Accountability are the following:
a. When a written informed consent is obtained from the client;
b. When required by law, such as anti-money laundering statutes, or the Rules of Court;
c. To the extent necessary, to collect the lawyer’s fees;
d. In defense of the lawyer, or the lawyer’s employees or associates;
e. By judicial order, but only if material. chanrobles
4. Yes, a party may appear as his or her own counsel in a criminal or in a civil case. Under the fiXh sentence of
Sec>on 1 (c) Rule 115 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and under the second sentence of Sec>on 34, Rule
138 in the Rules of Civil Procedure, the following were stated:
Sec$on 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure: Upon mo$on, the accused may be allowed to defend
himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his right without the
assistance of counsel.
Se>on 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Civil Procedure: In any other court, a party may conduct his li>ga>on
personally or by aid of an aLorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by duly authorized member
of the bar.

5. The two concepts of aLorney’s fees are the following:

a. Ordinary concept. This is the reasonable compensa>on paid by the client to his lawyer in exchange for the
legal services rendered by the laLer. This is the compensa>on paid for the cost and / or results of the legal
services as agreed upon by the par>es or as may be assessed by the courts.

b. extraordinary concept. ALorney’s fee is deemed an indemnity for the damages ordered by the court to be
paid by the losing party to the winning party. As a general rule, it is payable to the client, not to his counsel,
unless the former agreed to give the amount to the laLer as an addi>on to, or part of the counsel’s
compensa>on.

6. The rule on prohibi>on against influence through social media is embodied in Sec>on 42 Canon II of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA) wherein it explained that such plaaorm should
not be a way for a lawyer to affect the judgment of any officer of any court or tribunal. Such ac>on of using
social media is a threat against fair judgment because by way of pos>ng a comment in an official page of any
court or tribunal, the facts pertaining to the case will be exposed just by a mere comment whether such post is
a compliment or a violent reac>on in an honorable office. The direct or indirect communica>on of lawyers to
court officers builds a rela>onship between both par>es and for such event, it may rise to a situa>on of being
bias. Viola>on of this prohibi>on may also lead to the loss of trust of the public in the legal system of the
country because nowadays, many people are reliant on what they have read mostly from social media posts.
This is the importance of adherence to this prohibi>on especially to those lawyers that are using social media
as an extension of their office even if it is for informa>ve purpose only.
7. To enlighten whether Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno violated the sub judice rule, defini>on of such rule is
essen>al wherein it pertains to the maLers under or before a judge or court or maLers under judicial
considera>on. It restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to pending judicial proceedings.
By going over such case, the former Chief Jus>ce has repeatedly discussed the merits of the quo warranto
pe>>on in different conference and for cas>ng aspersions and ill mo>ves to the members of the court even
before a decision is made, designed to affect the results of the court’s vote and influence public opinion. Verily,
the former Chief Jus>ce opposed the rule in ques>on.
Applying the canon provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability Rule 13.02, a lawyer
shall not make public statements in the media regarding pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party, and applying also the the Rule 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, members of the judiciary is en>tled also for freedom of expression but not absolute and
s>ll bound to adhere to the propriety of becoming the supreme leader of the judicial department. Viola>on of
the basic rule leads not only to a less serious offense of contempt proceedings but may result to an
administra>ve sanc>on supported by probable cause.

8. In accordance with the Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, students may exercise limited prac>ce of law which
covers appearances, draXing and submission of pleadings and documents before trial and appellate courts and
quasi-judicial and administra>ve bodies, assistance in media>on and other alterna>ve modes of dispute
resolu>on, legal counselling and advice, and such other ac>vi>es that may be covered by the Clinical Legal
Educa>on Program of the law school as provided. No law student shall be permiLed to engage in any of the
ac>vi>es under the clinical legal educa>on program of a law school unless the law student has the following
cer>fica>on:
a. Level 1 cer>fica>on, for law students who have successfully completed their first-year law courses, and / or
b. Level 2 cer>fica>on, for law students currently enrolled for the second semester of their third-year law
courses; provided, however, where a student fails to complete all their third-year law courses, the Level 2
cer>fica>on shall be deemed automa>cally revoked.

9. The qualifica>ons of a notary public based on 2004 Rules of Notarial Prac>ce are the following:
a. Must be a ci>zen of the Philippines;
b. must be over twenty-one years old;
c. must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and maintains a regular place of work or business
in the city or province where the commission is to be issued;
d. must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing with clearances from the Office of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
e. Must not have been convicted in the first instance of any crime involving moral turpitude.

10. Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the following are the quali>es that a
judge must possess:
a. Independence. This is in terms of judicial independence in the basis of the judge’s decision. Such decision
must not be based on other judge or jus>ce’s own point of view. It must be based on a judge’s accountability
and of course based on facts and on exis>ng laws that are applicable to the uniqueness of each case.
b. Integrity. The behavior and the conduct of a judge must be with an honor so he or she may decide on every
case fairly and impar>ally. In this behavior, such will put the people’s faith in the judicial system of the country
into a most reliable and fairest decision any judge could have ever made.
c. Impar>ality. The decision of each judge must be fair and without prejudice to the par>es. In this quality, a
judge is basing his or her decision on facts and the law upon which such decision is based. Also, the judge of
whatever court is basing an order or decision through a humanitarian and compassionate reason on a case-to-
case basis.
d. Propriety. Before assuming the func>on for a judicial post, aspiring judge is being examined to determine his
or her fitness to the posi>on. A judge must possess the qualifica>ons based on established laws to defend the
interpreta>on and applica>on of fairness in all trials.
e. Equality. Every judge must always exercise this characteris>c to discharge his or her du>es with integrity and
utmost civility. Regardless of a person’s status, the ac>ons and decisions during and aXer the trial must be fair
and that all courts presided by a judge must exhibit due process as strictly provided and must be complied with
based on the cons>tu>on.
f. Competence and diligence. The professional abili>es of all judges must be exercised in the discharge of their
du>es. He or she shall maintain the proper decorum in court and must always adhere to prac>ce hearing the
argument of both par>es in all trials before rendering a decision.

11. A judge should disqualify his or herself from par>cipa>ng in any proceeding on the following maLers:
a. To sit in any case pertaining to a hearing of his rela>ve up to the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity.
b. To counsel any person within the fourth degree of his or her consanguinity.
c. To preside a case which he or she has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or counsel.
d. To preside in any inferior court when his or her ruling or decision I is the subject of review, without the
wriLen consent of all par>es in interest.
e. In the account of his sound discre>on or for a just and valid reasons other than the prescribed above.

12. By being a witness for estafa case involving his wife, Judge Gio is viola>ng the New Code of Judicial Conduct
in a way that he is par>cipa>ng in such hearing. As provided in Sec>on 5, Canon 3 of the abovemen>oned
code, he must disqualify himself from par>cipa>ng in any proceeding which may result to the impar>ality of
the decision. Judge Gio is a material witness to the maLer in controversy as he was present in the men>oned
transac>on of Kathryn and Daniel. However, as sworn in his oath of becoming a judge, holding a posi>on to
decide on every case must not be impar>al, and by being a witness as well as having the en>tlement of being a
judge, the presider might be influenced by such status of a judge being a witness and it such decision resulted
from this impar>ality.

13. The denial of Judge Maverick’s mo>on of ALy. Andrea is erroneous. It was well established on the facts
that the opposing counsel, ALy. Zymon, is a classmate and fraternity brother of the respondent judge. There is
an affinity between ALy. Zymon and Judge Maverick. The integrity of the presiding judge might be ques>oned
as it may result to a bias decision. Impar>ality might also be assailed which all judge, under the Canon 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct, should possess. In spite of the denial of the mo>on of ALy. Andrea, she may file
for a grave abuse of discre>on resul>ng to lack or excess of jurisdic>on. This is a remedy to determine if the
respondent judge really abused his authority for outright denial of ALy. Andrea’s mo>on.

14. Judge Hernandez and ALy. Uychu>n commiLed an act of impar>ality in the subject case. If this may be
proven that the judge and the counsel has conspired for a common mo>ve, they will be sanc>oned
administra>vely for manipula>ng the result of the decision. Even if it is not expressly provided that they will
benefit from a sale transac>on of a condominium unit, the erring officials knew that the defendant is into a
business of developing residen>al units. If it will be proven that they have the mo>ve of acquiring a unit on the
account of favoring the defendant’s case, the judge and the counsel may be held administra>vely liable under
Sec>on 5a Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct wherein the judge has actual bias or prejudice
concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed eviden>ary facts concerning the proceeding. If this will
be proven upon inves>ga>on, such ac>on will be dealt with seriously.

15. A temporary restraining order which is being issued by the judge within his or her jurisdic>on is not just a
legal order that maybe availed of by any person. A party must convince the judge that he or she will suffer
immediate irreparable injury and such order is not obtainable through sale. An administra>ve charge leveled
against Judge Abunda under Sec>on 1 Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. In here, judges shall
exercise judicial func>on independently based on their assessment of facts and in accordance with a
conscien>ous understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. In avoidance of any liability, Judge Abunda
must establish clear and convincing evidence that the issuance of TRO is based on his personal knowledge that
the party reques>ng for such is in unpleasant situa>on requiring immediate protec>on. Judge Abunda has the
burden of proof to make it jus>fiable in terms of fair issuance of TRO and also prove that there is no probable
cause on the charges against him.

16. Judge Cherrie incurred an administra>ve liability by way of her cri>cism against the order of the Supreme
Court which is a viola>on of the Cons>tu>on. Under Sec>on 6 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
judges are also considered as a ci>zen who can invoke their freedom of expression, belief, associa>on and
assembly. However, such right of being a judge has limita>on. Judges should conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impar>ality and independence of the judiciary.
The incorpora>on of Judge Cherrie of such opinion as an obiter dictum may also held her administra>vely
liable. Although it is not legally binding on other courts, it may s>ll be cited as persuasive authority in future
hearing of a par>cular case. If such speech will be considered as obiter dictum, it must be presented in a
formal manner that there should be factual and legal basis upon which she will come up on a decision if she
will be the one assigned to decide on a case. Like in dissen>ng opinions of jus>ces in a specific case, those have
no effect on the finality of the case but may be cited as reference for future adjudica>on for similar cases.
Those who pronounced a dissen>ng opinion are not administra>vely liable because it is just a mere point of
view based on the facts or previous ruling from similar or related cases.

17. The act of Judge Almira by appearing in the court where the elec>on protest of her brother has been heard
and decided incurs viola>on of Sec>on 3 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. It states that judges, in
their personal rela>ons with individual members of the legal profession who prac>ce regularly in their court,
avoid situa>ons which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favori>sm or par>ality. It
could not be disregarded that there is a pressure in terms of judgment on the part of the presiding judge on
the elec>on protest as one of the party’s witnesses in protester’s side is Judge Almira’s who is also a court
presider in some other cases. Such presence of a court officer during the trial may result to unfair trial and
par>ality of judgment. This is the reason why does a judge must not appear in courts where his or her rela>ve
within sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity is a party li>gant.
18. ALy. Salud and Jus>ce Bacong are both guilty of unethical conduct. The former uses his connec>on just to
have a favorable outcome for the issuance of a writ of amparo, while the laLer, by virtue of the rela>onship
between the former, issued on his or her own impulse what was prayed in the pe>>on disregarding the proper
conduct to incorporate the signature of the other two jus>ce-members of the Court of Appeals Third Division.
Under the Sec>on 2 Canon 3 of the New Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability, the ac>on of
aLorney involved violates the fidelity of being a responsible and accountable lawyer. A lawyer shall uphold the
Cons>tu>on, obey the laws of the land, promote respect for laws and legal processes, safeguard human rights,
and at all >mes advance the honor and integrity of the legal profession. ALy. Salud contradicted such provision
as he did not comply with the legal process which was expected of him. Being a Jus>ce of the appellate court,
Jus>ce Bacong is liable for tolera>ng acts of lawyer or court personnel who violates or conducts a legal process
on his or her own ini>a>ve. Under Sec>on 3 Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges should take
or ini>ate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of
which the judge may have become aware. Thus, ALy. Salud and Jus>ce Bacong are guilty of unethical conduct.

19. Diana’s conten>on may either be meritorious or has no effect. If Jus>ce Patricia will appear for Landbank of
the Philippines, she must present any fact that she has the interest in the success of the li>ga>on. Supposed
that she has an interest in the property subject to li>ga>on, her representa>on for Landbank is an
interven>on. The judge as intervenor must present facts to support her appearance or that if such proceeding
will prejudice her right or interest. However, if there is no substan>al argument to jus>fy Jus>ce Patricia’s
interven>on, then the Supreme Court may deny such mo>on to intervene in the proceeding. Before gran>ng
or denying the mo>on for interven>on, the court must first iden>fy if such interven>on will delay or prejudice
the rights of the original par>es, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
Lastly, in the case of re>rement of a judge, Diana’s conten>on that Jus>ce Patricia’s act is unethical has no legal
basis. In Sec>on 11 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges shall not prac>ce law whilst the
holder of judicial office. The authority of the judge to decide was ex>nguished by re>rement which then allows
him or her to s>ll prac>ce law.

20. Achieving the top spot in the bar exams and the honors earned by a law student during his or her law
school life is a pres>gious dis>nc>on which may be publicized in some documents. However, some of the
informa>on in the case of Judge Sarah must not be disclosed in public that may seem to be in a form of the
term ‘Know all men by these presents’. As provided by Sec>on 9 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
confiden>al informa>on acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any
other purpose not related to their judicial du>es. In its plain context, it is verily understood that a judge in legal
sense is the person vested the authority to decide on cases submiLed before the courts. It is the reason why
disclosing a judicial capacity acquired during one’s judgeship is prohibited. For the purpose of the security of
the judge, the new code included this provision because by assuming the posi>on of deciding all cases
submiLed before the court might entail risks in performing the du>es and responsibili>es of such posi>on.