FEATURES | SECURITY | EAST ASIA

RIP, SSF: Unpacking the PLA’s Latest Restructuring

The Strategic Support Force is no more, and its functions are
being separated into three separate arms: the Aerospace Force,
Cyberspace Force, and Information Support Force.
By Ying Yu Lin and Tzu-Hao Liao

April 23, 2024

Gen. Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, left, attends the
opening session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in
Beijing, China, March 5, 2024.
Credit: AP Photo/Andy Wong

On April 19, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officially disbanded its Strategic
Support Force (SSF) and re-established the Information Support Force. While
some observers have dismissed this move as merely a change in nomenclature –
the same group of people under a different name – a closer examination reveals
significant implications when juxtaposed with the restructuring efforts within the
PLA and the framework of the U.S. and Russian militaries.

The decision to dissolve the SSF and establish the PLA Information Support Force
signifies a nuanced shift in China’s military organizational strategy. By aligning
with global trends and potential adversaries’ structures, this restructuring aims
to enhance the PLA’s capabilities in an era increasingly defined by information
warfare and cyber operations. Thus, beyond superficial alterations in
nomenclature, this move reflects a strategic response to evolving security
challenges and technological advancements.
The Unprecedented “Four Services and Four Arms”

At the close of 2015, the PLA underwent significant reforms and the SSF emerged
as a newly minted branch alongside the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force,
all commanded by officers of full theater-grade generals. With the unveiling of
the latest organizational framework, the PLA’s updated military structure
presents a nuanced evolution: While the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force
retain their status as full theater-grade services, the SSF undergoes significant
reconfiguration. It is no longer a full service, but will see its functions divided up
among new “arms” under what China now calls the “four services (军种) and four
arms (兵种).”

Formerly responsible for overseeing space affairs under its Aerospace Systems
Department at the theater level, this entity of the former SSF has now been
transformed into the Aerospace Force, one of the “four arms.” Similarly, the
Cyber Systems Department, previously tasked with cyber warfare, has assumed a
new guise as the Cyberspace Force. Moreover, the Electronic and Electromagnetic
Systems Department, which formerly oversaw C4ISR (Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), is
restricted into the Information Support Force (ISF).

These three arms will operate alongside the existing Joint Logistics Support Force
(JLSF), which was established back in 2016. This “arm” oversees logistical
operations and is commanded by a deputy theater-grade general. This
reorganization sees the SSF transition into three deputy theater-level branches,
thus forming the “four arms” along with the JLSF, which is now confirmed as one
of the arms.

This shift potentially opens the door for deputy theater-grade major generals or
lieutenant generals to assume command positions within these newly delineated
units. Such adjustments signal a strategic realignment within the PLA’s
organizational hierarchy, reflecting the evolving nature of modern warfare and
the imperative to enhance capabilities in emerging domains such as space, cyber,
and information warfare.

Convoluted Tasks and Responsibilities

The primary rationale behind the restructuring appears to be addressing

concerns stemming from the SSF’s previous mandate, which encompassed a wide
array of responsibilities, potentially hindering operational effectiveness.
The former service was tasked not only with information and communication
technology but also with aerospace, cyber operations, and electronic warfare. As
a result, the SSF found itself spread thin, with individual units vying for
resources. Furthermore, the expertise required to command such a multifaceted
force may have been lacking in singular appointees.

Of particular note is the decentralized nature of these tasks, which were not
consolidated under the command of the SSF following the military reforms. For
instance, while the Aerospace Systems Department within the SSF managed
backend systems for space-related affairs, aspects of equipment development
were also overseen by the Equipment Development Department and, notably, by
elements within the Rocket Force and Air Force. Such overlapping organizational
structures inevitably impeded operational efficiency.

U.S. Counterparts as Models?

A telling comparison can be drawn with the United States’ establishment of a

dedicated Space Force, which centralized all matters pertaining to space warfare.
This disparity underscored the need for a more streamlined approach within the
PLA.

In light of President Xi Jinping’s recent emphasis on cultivating new combat

capabilities (新质战斗力), a pragmatic reassessment of organizational structures
may be underway, possibly drawing inspiration from the U.S. military’s
framework.

The newly established Aerospace Force may mirror the role of the U.S. Space
Force, while the Cyberspace Force could resemble the U.S. Cyber Command, thus
allowing for a more coherent and effective utilization of resources and expertise
across different branches. This strategic realignment suggests a concerted effort
to enhance the PLA’s operational effectiveness and adaptability in the face of
evolving threats and challenges.

Russian Characteristics

Russia’s own military restructuring is another possible model for the PLA.

As early as 2012, then Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin proposed
the formation of a Russian Cyber Command. Subsequently, in 2013, Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu instructed the General Staff to initiate the
establishment of a Russian-style Cyber Command modeled after the U.S. Cyber
Command, directly under the purview of the Ministry of Defense.
The following year, reports emerged indicating the completion of the formation
of cyber units, with news outlets such as TASS reporting the establishment of the
Divisions of the Computer Attack Detection and Prevention System within the
Russian Strategic Rocket Forces.

Coincidentally, during the “Caucasus-2016” routine strategic exercises, the

Russian military participated for the first time in “live electronic, cyber, and
informational confrontation.”

In early 2017, the first deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee,
Andrei Krasov, denied the existence of cyber units in the Russian military but
acknowledged the trend among major powers toward establishing such units.
Subsequently, in February of the same year, the Russian Ministry of Defense
confirmed the establishment of cyber information units tasked primarily with
safeguarding Russian military command and control communications systems
from cyberattacks and undertaking counter-propaganda efforts.

By 2023, Russian Minister of Digital Affairs Maksut Shadayev publicly supported

the idea of the Ministry of Defense establishing a more comprehensive cyber
force and advocated for increasing recruitment to swiftly onboard digital talent,
expand real-time capabilities, and navigate the trends of the cyber battlefield.

This development underscores the deeply ingrained logic of “hybrid warfare”

within Russian strategic thinking, which diverges from the U.S. tendency to
compartmentalize units. Russian doctrine views cyber warfare merely as one
aspect of overall information warfare, encompassing electronic warfare,
propaganda, and psychological operations. Moreover, Russia’s official stance on
its cyber units remains highly secretive, both serving as a deterrent and signaling
ongoing strategic adjustments without definitive conclusions.

With this history in mind, it’s notable that the recent restructuring of the PLA,
transitioning from the previous configuration of five main services (the Army,
Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force) plus one direct-reporting
unit (Joint Logistics Support Centre) to the current “four services plus four arms,”
emphasizes the role of the Information Support Force. In fact, the announcement
of the restructuring came at a ceremony to launch the ISF, which was attended by
Xi himself.

This move bears a certain degree of resemblance to Russian practices. However,

in the abandonment of the SSF in favor of three separate branches and in terms
of future conceptualization, the PLA’s trajectory may lean more toward
emulation of US military practices.
In his remarks at the ISF launch ceremony, Xi called the new branch “a key pillar
in coordinating the construction and application of the network information
system,” adding, “It will play a crucial role in advancing the Chinese military’s
high-quality development and competitiveness in modern warfare.”

Conclusion

Since the establishment of the SSF in late 2015, there has been considerable
curiosity from external observers regarding this nascent military unit. However,
few anticipated that within a decade, the force would undergo another round of
restructuring. Similar to the reforms initiated at the end of 2015, the PLA must
once again engage in extensive training and exercises to solidify the core
organizational structure of the reconfigured force.

The question of whether the PLA, following its 2024 reorganization, can swiftly
adapt to the new institutional framework remains unanswered. With significant
personnel reshuffling at the senior levels and the organizational overhaul the
PLA has undergone, the timeframe required for the force to attain full
operational capability is uncertain. Additionally, there is the looming concern of
whether the new organizational setup might give rise to unforeseen challenges in
operational effectiveness.

These uncertainties raise questions about whether this restructuring could afford
Taiwan more time for defense transformation. These issues form the basis of new
research tasks for scholars studying the PLA, as they delve into the intricacies of
the military’s ongoing evolution and its implications for regional security
dynamics.