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 WORLD POLITICS

PART 2

THE NEW COLD WAR:

STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL
DOMINATION by Kalim Siddiqui

Kalim Siddiqui concludes

his analysis of the global
geopolitical situation, with
reference in particular to
the US, China, and Russia,
comparing and contrasting it
with the Cold War period of
the late twentieth century.

2 THE WORLD FINANCIAL REVIEW AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2023

IV ECONOMIC AND TRADE
RIVALRY
administration
would continue
to support
US post-war military strategy was based on the pro-market
view that a rise in military expenditure would reforms in
have more than proportionate effects on growth China. He said
rates, jobs, consumption, and investments, i.e., that China was a
the well-known Keynesian multiplier effect. A huge market and
National Bureau of Economic Research study it was very impor-
(2019) found that defence spending of US$1 tant for US companies
billion raised the economy by US$1.5 billion. to engage with China.
The US has always maintained As Lixin writes, “The
superiority in defence to enhance China’s unprecedented engagement strategy
its industrial, financial, and tech- opening of its markets includes three aspects.
nological power. Cypher notes, First, support for China’s
“to conserve global ‘primacy’, US through trade and invest- Reform and Opening-up and
grand strategy requires a ‘core ment, while keeping its modernisation, a relaxation of
commitment’ to (1) maintenance national strategic indus- technology transfers to China,
and enhancement of US military granting China permanent
power projection capabilities; (2) tries firmly under the public most-favoured-nation status
preservation and expansion of sector, in the presence of the and encouraging American
the structural dominance of the
massive availability of cheap businessmen to invest in
laissez-faire economic ‘order’; China. Second is the promo-
and (3) protection and revision of labour, made China the most tion of extensive exchanges
the post-war global institutional important destination of the and cooperation in culture,
configuration” (Cypher, 2016: 800).
global supply chain after the education, academics, and
But compared to the earlier science between the two coun-
Cold War, in the new Cold War, country joined the WTO. tries, and the promotion of the
we find that, while the US is very spread of Western values in
critical of the ideas of the Chinese China. Third, support for and
Communist Party, the Chinese official media acceptance of China’s accession to the World
refrains from denouncing American values. Trade Organisation and other international
China and the US, unlike the former Soviet organisations and increasing China’s voting
Union, have engaged deeply in trade, invest- rights in the World Bank, the International
ment, the supply chain of vital products, and Monetary Fund, and other international institu-
student exchanges. This is the reason that the tions” (Lixin, 2021:8).
new Cold War is quite different and will involve China’s unprecedented opening of its
tremendous economic and social costs for both markets through trade and investment, while
sides. We do not see any direct military confron- keeping its national strategic industries firmly
tation between the countries and have no proxy under the public sector, in the presence of the
war. There is a potential flashpoint in the South massive availability of cheap labour, made China
China Sea. the most important destination of the global
Deng Xiaopeng in 1992 visited the southern supply chain after the country joined the WTO.
region of China and extended his full support By investing in China, MNCs attained economies
to the “market reforms” in China. Soon after, of scale and became internationally competi-
President Clinton granted China most-fa- tive in terms of reducing costs and thus raising
voured-nation treatment and said that his returns (Stiglitz, 2015).

www.worldfinancialreview.com 3
 WORLD POLITICS

However, indigenous manufacturing was gener-
ally located at the low end of the value chain and
hence operated with low profit margins and faced
a few challenges in acquiring and upgrading
advanced technologies. From 2006 onwards, the
Chinese government introduced a new policy to
facilitate indigenous innovation with the target to
achieve increased
high-tech innova- China produces
tion by 2022. The used to produce. And we find that the rapid reason is the US finan-
policy targeted
mainly unexploited development of communication technology
areas such as energy, and the fact that China can compete with
environment, high- the US have alarmed US leaders.
tech manufacturing,
and services.
For more than three
decades, China’s labour
productivity rose faster
than wages in the manu-
facturing sector and thus
rates of profits were much
higher than in the US. China
produces more goods than the
US used to produce. And we find that the rapid
development of communication technology
and the fact that China can compete with the US
have alarmed US leaders.
The rapid rise of high-tech Chinese
companies poses a major challenge to the
US manufacturing sector and that was the
reason that then-President Obama put forward
the slogan “Bringing manufacturing back to
America”. The Trump administration took it
forward but forgot to see that implementing such
a policy is not an easy task. The US does not have
a comparative advantage in the manufacturing
sector; one reason could be that US wages are
higher compared
more goods than the US to China. The other
cial sector, which is
built on various forms
of derivatives and its
size has grown enor-
mously since, in the
mid-1990s, it acquired
financial freedom in the name of efficiency and
high returns, while China’s financial sector is
strictly government-controlled and regulated
(Yao, 2021).
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, China
has narrowed its income and technological gaps
with the US, and this is seen as a threat to the US
that China is challenging US technological and
economic supremacy. China’s catch-up with the
US was staggering. For instance, in 2008, China’s
GDP was only 31.2 per cent of the US GDP but, 12
years later, the number has more than doubled. In
2008, there were only 35 Chinese companies in the
Fortune Global 500 list of the world’s largest compa-
nies based on revenues, which was far below the

4 THE WORLD FINANCIAL REVIEW AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2023


number of US companies. But in 2021, China had
124 companies in the Fortune List, which was more
than the US. Such development has given Chinese
leaders more confidence in their economic policy.
Academics also in recent years began debating
China’s success and it was said that the dramatic
rise of China was due to its authoritarian govern-
ment policy with active state involvement in the
economy, i.e., state capitalism (Li, 2020).
In the past, virtually all the now-advanced
economies had adopted interventionist indus-
trial policies to promote domestic industries,
exports, and investments. They also supported
industrialisation in their take-off stage of
economic development and structural change. It
means that industrialisation must precede liber-
alisation. But to say that China did the opposite
by liberalising its economy before industrialisa-
tion from the mid-1980s onwards is incorrect.
In December 2017, the Trump administra-
tion unveiled the US National Security Strategy
Report, which proposed that the US was entering
into a new era of power competition. The report
portrayed China as a “strategic competitor” that
wants to shape a world antithetical to US values
and interests. US elites were alarmed by China’s
fast upgrading of its advancements in the tele-
communications sector. The US ban on Chinese
access to high-tech would affect innovation
because it needs markets to meet the costs. China
is the largest market for US products and cutting
off US companies from the Chinese markets
would adversely affect their global expansion and
would ultimately slow down their innovation.
According to statistics, the total volume
of services trade between the US and China
was US$120 billion in 2017 and the volume of
goods trade in 2018 reached US$633.5 billion.
By December 2018, the US’s total investment
reached US$85.2 billion in China. And in 2017,
the number of Chinese students studying in US
higher academic institutions was more than
350,000, which then accounted for nearly 33
per cent of the total number of international
students in the US. In 2019, five million people
travelled between the two countries.
In July 2018, President Trump imposed tariffs
on several goods imported from China, which
continued after Biden became president. Due to
this rising trade conflict, imports from China to
the US have been reduced (see figures 2 and 3).
Imports from China declined further from March
2020 as global trade collapsed due to the COVID-19
pandemic and have since then recovered gradu-
ally. Only recently, US imports from China have
returned to pre-trade-war levels, while imports
from the rest of the world are above the pre-war
level. China is now the source of only 18 per cent
of total US goods imports, down from 22 per
cent at the onset of the trade war. In contrast
to this, at present, US imports from the rest of
the world have risen to 38 per cent compared to
pre-trade-war levels and are even above that level
(blue line). With a few exceptions, these imports
were not hit with new US tariffs.
The value of US goods imports from China and
FIGURE 2 the rest of the world, 2016-22 (June 2018=100)
150 July 2018 March 2020
US starts trade war Global trade collapses as
the pandemichits
125
100
75
50
Aug 2016 Jan 2018 Jan 2019 Jan 2020 Jan 2021 Jan 2022 Aug 2022
Source: https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/four-years-trade-war-are-us-and-china-decoupling
www.worldfinancialreview.com 5
 WORLD POLITICS

FIGURE 3 Levels of tariffs on exports – US and China, 2018-20

25%
Chinese tariff on US export
American tariff on Chinese export
In fact, President Trump under Section 301 of the 20%
Trade Act of 1974 imposed a tariff of 25 per cent
on products of nearly US$34 billion of US imports 15%
from China in July 2018. China retaliated, the
trade war continued, and the US imposed 10 per 10%
cent tariffs on an additional US$200 billion of
imports in September 2018, increasing the rate of
5%
those duties to 25 per cent in June 2019.
Moreover, the goods that were affected by
0%
25 per cent tariffs by the US were largely inter-

Jan-18

Mar-8

May-18

Jul-18

Sep-18

Nov-18

Jan-19

Mar-19

May-19

Jul-19

Sep-19

Nov-19

Jan-20

Mar-20
mediate inputs and capital equipment which,
because they were used by firms to make other
Source: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42533-021-00071-1
consumer goods or to provide services, were
less visible to consumers. Imports of some prod-
ucts were lower, despite rising demand in the US
during the pandemic, contributing to shortages, The US sees China under President Xi Jinping
and costs for firms using these imported inputs as becoming more assertive and stronger, both
rose sharply. As a result, such companies were economically and militarily, with its boosting
forced to either continue importing from China economy not even deterred by the recent
even with the tariff or find new suppliers from adverse impact of COVID-19 and backing its Belt
other countries. Other examples, such as IT hard- and Road Initiative (BRI) (Siddiqui, 2019b). It
ware and electronics, were in higher demand seems that any return to the pre-2017 world of
during the COVID-19 lockdown, i.e. modems, “strategic engagement” with China is unlikely.
routers, network servers, smart watches, and The Chinese economic policy of advancing
wireless headphones. In fact, US imports from its technological capability, particularly “Made
China of such goods declined from 62 per cent in China 25”, is certainly seen by the US as direct
after the imposition of 25 per cent tariffs. In competition with the US global companies in the
contrast, US imports from the rest of the world services and knowledge sectors. This Chinese
are now 60 per cent higher. China’s share of US attempt is taken as competition rather than
imports of IT hardware and complementary and seems
consumer electronics has The world has entered a new age to be a threat to US global
declined from 38 per cent to of intra-core rivalry and US and technological hegemony.
13 per cent. Thus, new development has
Other important prod- Chinese competition will shape created a rift between the US
ucts imported were vehicle the trajectory of the capitalist and China since 2018.
parts from China, which was world order for decades to come. China’s economic rise
seen by the US car industry is underlined by its growth
as a threat. Imports from China and the rest of model, which is perceived to have the desire
the world fell sharply during COVID-19, as the to re-divide the world and expand its sphere
car industry in the US stopped production due of influence. Therefore, it is predicted that
to the COVID-19 pandemic. After the end of the the US and China will continue to be strategic
pandemic, US imports from the rest of the world rivals, shaped by external and internal forces
have recovered and at present it is 20 per cent (see figures 4 and 5). The world has entered
higher, but imports from China due to the tariffs a new age of intra-core rivalry and US and
have only just returned to pre-trade-war levels. Chinese competition will shape the trajectory
However, China’s share of US vehicle parts imports of the capitalist world order for decades to
has only dropped from 15 per cent to 13 per cent. come.

6 THE WORLD FINANCIAL REVIEW AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2023

 FIGURE 4 Strategic rivals of the US compared (% of the US level)

USSR in the 1980s*

China now*
GDP (at purchasing During the past decade, China has printed a lot
power parity)
of money to stimulate growth. But capital control
GDP per head (at PPP) has been imposed to prevent capital flight and this
may hinder capital from fleeing the country when
Population
given the chance. Sharma notes, “Since 2015, the
Military spending Renminbi share of payments through the Swift
network for international bank transactions has
Exports
fallen by a fifth, from an already negligible level
0 100 200 300 400
under 3 per cent. A widely followed index that
USSR 1980 except exports (1981) and military spending (1987).
*
ranks 165 nations by capital account openness
China forecast for 2018 except military spending and exports (both 2017)
puts China at 106th... While Chinese investors are
Source: https://www.ft.com/content/c9e5ab54-dc2a-11e8-8f50-cbae5495d92b
restricted from investing abroad, foreigners are
scared away from China by erratic government
FIGURE 5
Trade dependence – exports to China attempts to control the market. That helps explain
over exports to the US, 2017
why unlike in other nations, stocks in China do not
PARITY
Export more to US Export more to China
rise and fall with economic growth” (Sharma, 2022).
0 2 4 6 8 In fact, at present in China, foreign compa-
Australia
Russia nies own only 5 per cent of stocks, while nearly
Taiwan
S Korea
28 per cent in other emerging markets, and about
Brazil 3 per cent of bonds in China, compared to around
Saudi Arabia
Indonesia 20 per cent in other developing nations (Sharma,
Thailand
Japan 2022). However, nearly 90 per cent of global
Germany
France foreign exchange transactions take place in US
Spain
Nigeria
dollars, and only 5 per cent are in Renminbi.
UK During the Japanese economic boom of the
Turkey
Italy 1980s, the country emerged as both a financial
India
Canada and economic power. The Japanese yen and stocks
Egypt
Mexico
reflected that strength and Tokyo emerged as a global
financial centre. However, at present, the Chinese
Source: https://www.ft.com/content/c9e5ab54-dc2a-11e8-8f50-cbae5495d92b
Renminbi is not considered by investors a safe desti-
nation. China is still a long way from becoming a
In 2010, China began to show its financial ambi- financial superpower.
tions by using the Renminbi in international
transactions and as a part of projecting the
Renminbi as a global currency. The reason for
China’s global financial desire was due to the fact
that its economic share of global GDP had almost
quintupled from 4 per cent to 18 per cent, and its
share of global trade had quadrupled to 15 per
cent in the last two decades. In recent human
history, no other economy in the world has grown
so fast and in such a sustained way for so many
years. Moreover, China’s stock market has been
performing well compared to other developed
economies, and the Renminbi raised its share of
global central bank reserves to 3 per cent in 2021,
up from 1 per cent in 2016 (Sharma, 2022).

www.worldfinancialreview.com 7
 WORLD POLITICS

US President Joe Biden, in a joint speech to the

US Congress, declared that the US is in compe-
tition with China “to win the 21st century”, as
he put it. However, the US government under
Biden, and of course before, under Trump, has
imposed several rounds of sanctions on Russia
and China. So, while on the one hand, he is
continuing the nationalistic trade policies of
the Trump administration, Biden is escalating
the new Cold War against Russia and China, in
the belief that the US can impose sanctions and
isolate them, which will lead to the fall of their
governments (Kovalik, 2017).
The US attempted to isolate Russia, so that
it can recapture the resources and resume the
sale of Russia’s national resources and public
utilities to the US-based MNCs. This is unlikely
to be repeated. The actual effect of the sanctions
on Russia and China has been to drive them
together, rather than isolate them.
The question in this is, what about Europe?
In the last few weeks, there has been a lot of
discussion about cutting Russia off from the US, while China is trying to avoid the rentier
SWIFT bank clearing system, and of other sanc- policies, as well as the financialisation and
tions against Russia. Russia has already worked privatisation that has made America so high-
with China to develop its own alternative to the cost and so ineffective. And the US is blaming
SWIFT banking clearing system. So Russian China for over-regulating and supporting its
domestic payments are not going to be that businesses (Siddiqui, 2021).
disrupted, after the week or two that they say it For the classical economists, the whole
will take to put the new system in. But certainly, concept of free markets, from Adam Smith to
cutting off Russia from the SWIFT system does John Stuart Mill, was to free industrial capi-
block its trade and its economic talism from the rentier class, from
relations with Europe. The US the landlords, and from banking
would like to see Europe more There is a serious threat and the monopolies that banks
dependent on the it for the supply of escalation beyond created in organising trusts. So,
of vital resources. the US realises that the economy
In the US, money is not made by Ukraine, not to mention has been transformed in the last
its companies investing in industry the danger of nuclear war. 40 years, since the 1980s, since
and in production. But its big Ronald Reagan and Margaret
companies can make huge profits, Thatcher, when Margaret Thatcher
largely via monopoly rents, resource rents, said, “There is no alternative.” Of course, there
or other forms of rent extraction. And 90 per were many alternatives. But the US would like to
cent of corporate income in the US is spent on create the “rules-based order” of free markets,
share buybacks and dividend pay-outs, not on meaning no government power to regulate or
investing in new industries and it is no longer tax the corporate and rules-based order that
expected that any dramatic increase in private supports the rentier class – a hereditary, finan-
investment in manufacturing will occur in the cial, small minority of rich corporates of the

8 THE WORLD FINANCIAL REVIEW AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2023

population, which could hold the rest of the
population in debt, or keep them in permanent
dependency and job insecurity.
The US has often used its military power to
enhance its political, industrial, and financial
base. As Brooks et al. emphasised, “Deep engage-
ment allows the United States to institutionalise
its alliances and wrap its hegemonic rule in
its rules-based order. The result is to make the
US alliance system – especially among its core
liberal members – far more robust and harder to
challenge than if the United States were to disen-
gage” (cited in Cypher, 2016:801).
On Ukraine’s current crisis, Professor John
Mearsheimer (2022) argues, “The West, and espe-
cially America, is principally responsible for
the crisis which began in February 2014. It has
now turned into a war that not only threatens
to destroy Ukraine but also has the potential to
escalate into a nuclear war between Russia and
NATO. The trouble over Ukraine started at NATO’s
Bucharest summit in April 2008… Russian leaders
responded immediately with outrage, character-
ising this decision as an existential threat to Russia
and vowing to thwart it. According to a respected
Russian journalist, Mr Putin “flew into a rage”
and warned that “if Ukraine joins NATO, it will
do so without Crimea and the eastern regions…
America ignored Moscow’s red line, however,
and pushed forward to make Ukraine a Western
bulwark on Russia’s border… These efforts even-
tually sparked hostilities in February 2014, after
an uprising (which was supported by America)
caused Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor
Yanukovych, to flee the country… The next major
confrontation came in December 2021 and led
directly to the current war. The main cause was
that Ukraine was becoming a de facto member
of NATO… Unsurprisingly, Moscow found this
evolving situation intolerable and began mobi-
lising its army on Ukraine’s border last spring
to signal its resolve to Washington. But it had no
effect, as the Biden administration continued
to move closer to Ukraine.” He further states,
“America and its allies may be able to prevent
a Russian victory in Ukraine, but the country
will be gravely damaged, if not dismembered.
Moreover, there is a serious threat of escalation
beyond Ukraine, not to mention the danger of
nuclear war” (Mearsheimer, 2022).
www.worldfinancialreview.com 9
 WORLD POLITICS
Russian President Putin appears to be
concerned about the security threat to his
country. But due to this security threat, he
opposes the IMF policy not because the IMF is
basically a promoter of international finance
capital but because the IMF is promoting US
foreign policy. Putin is concerned with the role
of the IMF in facilitating the US hegemony over
Ukraine. But in the case of the confrontation
between Russia and Ukraine, there seems to be
a close intermingling of the US foreign policy
interests with the IMF. Therefore, it is not only
the question of the role of the IMF but here
in this instance, keeping Ukraine under IMF
control. Moreover, the IMF insists that to borrow
more, Ukraine has to meet certain conditionali-
ties including a reduction in real wages and cuts
in welfare spending, particularly in the health-
care and education sectors.
Putin has presided over the growth of
tremendous inequality in Russia. However, it
10 THE WORLD FINANCIAL REVIEW AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2023
began with the collapse of the Soviet Union
and then, under President Boris Yeltsin, Russia
witnessed a huge rise in inequality.
In the name of efficiency and competition,
the IMF would like to eliminate the role of
the government to intervene in the economy.
It means the removal of subsidies to small
and medium producers and their role to keep
essential goods prices low and remove its
role to provide education, healthcare, and
employment.
There is a general objective of the MNCs
that all countries should be open to the free
movement of capital and finance and even
commodities. In fact, that is the essence of the
neoliberal economic policy that fundamen-
tally economies should be opened. It is not just
for capital to come in and set up industries or
capital to come in and buy up industries. But
capital must come in also to take control of the
sources of raw materials (Siddiqui, 2022).
CONCLUSION
During the Cold War with the Soviet Union,
there was an ideological confrontation between
communism and capitalism. It was generally
believed that the hegemony of international
finance capital was thwarted by the Soviet Union
and East European countries, as these countries
were part of the centrally planned economies
and not integrated with the US and EU markets.
Under it, the state played a very important role
in generally directing the way in which the
economy was to develop. Therefore, that was a
regime in which the Soviet Union was opposed
to the free operation of the market and the free
operation of international finance capital.
Putin is by no means against the hegemony
of international finance capital. He is not in an
ideological battle against the domination of a
neighbouring country by an organisation that
acts in the interests of international finance
capital. His concern is only with
Russian security. He is, in other
words, concerned only with the China’s phenomenal growth no comparison in human history.
role of the IMF as a promoter of over the last four decades
US geostrategic interests, not with
the role of the IMF as a promoter has had no comparison
of neoliberalism in general. In in human history. China
fact, the gross inequality and has done quite well so far
even absolute destitution that a
neoliberal regime created is not in terms of growth and
too far from what Putin himself has been able to reduce
has achieved. We should not
poverty significantly in the cially between the US, China,
forget that after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the IMF’s neoliberal last less than four decades.
reforms were adopted by Russia
and resulted in a huge drop in the country’s GDP,
a huge fall in the national income, and a massive
increase in unemployment.
In the 1980s, when China opened its economy
for foreign capital and technology with its low
unit costs attracted foreign capital, China became
a new “workshop of the world”. Due to the avail-
ability of cheap labour and good infrastructure,
China was able to retain a large proportion
of surplus value generated in the case of most
developing countries and successfully created
joint ventures and part-
nerships with global
businesses and access
to acquire new technology
from Western companies.
In the 1990s, when China opened to inter-
national trade and was admitted to the WTO
in 2001, this opened a huge market to foreign
companies and investors where MNCs based
in the West could sell their products and get rid
of the overproduction crisis. And also, taking
advantage of a huge pool of educated and
low-cost workers and earning higher profits
under such circumstances, China became the
“workshop of the world”. During the 1990s,
China’s exports enjoyed low-tariff access to the
US market, which encouraged China to join
WTO in 2001. In February 2020, the US and
China kept the same level of tariffs. Compared to
the pre-trade-war period, US tariffs on Chinese
products increased 2.5 times (Yao, 2021).
China’s phenomenal growth
over the last four decades has had
China has done quite well so far
in terms of growth and has been
able to reduce poverty signifi-
cantly in the last less than four
decades.
This study has discussed
the rising tension on economic
and strategic issues, espe-
and Russia, and it seems that
following the end of the Cold War,
the US in its quest to consolidate
its global hegemony has attempted to redraw
the imperialist spheres of influence globally.
At present, the US economy is performing
poorly in terms of growth, productivity, and
investments compared to China. The chal-
lenger, i.e., China, has to figure out in which
areas the US is weak and how to strengthen its
economy and global influence. This is the same
strategy the US adopted a century earlier when
it was trying to replace Britain. Recently, China
has made an alliance with Russia.
www.worldfinancialreview.com 11
 WORLD POLITICS

Until recently, the US was motivated by the
hope that Chinese elites would become a
countervailing force against the military and
Communist Party establishment. It seems that
the present criticism against China is built on
its economic success rather than its ideology.
China’s success is based on a careful application
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Siddiqui, K. (2009). “The Political Economy of Growth in China and India”, Journal of Asian Public Policy 1(2):17-35, March.
Siddiqui, K. (2018a). “U.S. - China Trade War: The Reasons Behind and its Impact on the Global Economy”, The World
Financial Review, November/December, p. 62-8.
Siddiqui, K. (2018b). “David Ricardo’s Comparative Advantage and Developing Countries: Myth and Reality”,
International Critical Thought, 8(3):1-28, September.
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Asian Profile, 47(3):243-59.
Siddiqui, K. (2019b). “One Belt and One Road, China’s Massive Infrastructure Project to Boost Trade and Economy: An
Overview”, International Critical Thought. 9(2):214-35.

of state capitalism through gradually promoting
and enhancing industrialisation by taking
advantage of low-cost production and access to
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Review, November/December, 65-77.
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Financial Review, September October, p. 40-9.
Siddiqui, K. (2020c). The Impact of COVID-19 on the Global Economy, The World Financial Review, May-June 25-31.

global markets.
This study concludes that the US has long
applied economic sanctions as a means to try
to undermine the governments that oppose US
policies. The US-China economic rivalry could
generate a “sphere of influence” in which coun-
Siddiqui, K. (2020d). “The US Dollar and the World Economy: A critical review”, Athens Journal of Economics &
Business 6(1):21-44, January.
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November-December, p. 76-84.
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Siddiqui, K. (2021d) “The Importance of Industrialisation in Developing Countries”, The World Financial Review, January February,
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Siddiqui, K. (2022). “Capitalism, Imperialism, and Crisis”, The European Financial Review, June/July, p.16-32.
Stiglitz, Joseph (2003) “The ruin of Russia”, Guardian, 9 April, London.

tries could be drawn into the sphere of influence
and thus, could possibly divide the world. So,
we are seeing an intensification of economic
warfare, especially against China and Russia,
and the US is hoping that somehow this will
weaken and divide them.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Kalim Siddiqui is an economist specialising in International Political Economy, Development

Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines
elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy,
economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which
policies promote overall development in less-developed countries. Kalim teaches international
economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield,
UK. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and the UK.

12 THE WORLD FINANCIAL REVIEW AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2023

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