MENTAL STATES
Behaviorism
The chapter discusses the philosophical stance of
behaviorism and its implications for understanding
mental states, within the broader context of the
Philosophy of Mind. Behaviorism, particularly in its
two main forms—scientific and logical—approaches
the concept of mental states from a perspective that
prioritizes observable behavior as the primary evidence
of such states.
Scientific Behaviorism posits that the science of
psychology should base its understanding of mental
states solely on objective, empirical evidence that can
be observed and corroborated by multiple independent
observers. This approach stems from skepticism about
the reliability and existence of introspection as a means
to gain knowledge about our own mental states,
considering introspection to be inherently private and
subjective.
Logical Behaviorism takes a more radical stance by
asserting that to ascribe a mental state to someone is
essentially to ascribe to them a certain behavioral
disposition. This means that mental states are defined
in terms of tendencies or propensities to behave in
specific ways under certain circumstances. For
example, attributing the belief that it is raining to
someone is equated with attributing to them a
disposition to carry an umbrella when leaving the
house, to use windshield wipers while driving, or to
assert that it is raining if asked about the weather. This
approach applies not only to attitudinal states (like
beliefs) but also to sensational states (such as pain),
where experiencing pain is defined in terms of
behavioral reactions to stimuli.
However, logical behaviorism faces significant
challenges. Firstly, the definition of mental states in
terms of behavioral dispositions relies on open-ended
lists of behaviors that are supposed to be indicative of
those states. Yet, the criteria for generating such lists
presuppose an understanding of the mental states they
are meant to define, rendering the approach circular.
Secondly, the approach struggles with the fact that
individuals can possess a mental state (e.g., a belief)
without displaying the associated behaviors, due to the
influence of other mental states (like desires) or a
deliberate intention to deceive. This demonstrates that
no behavior is uniquely characteristic of any specific
mental state, undermining the basis of logical
behaviorism.
The failure of logical behaviorism, however, does not
negate the less stringent form of behaviorism—
Epistemic Behaviorism. This version holds that our
knowledge of mental states is grounded in observable
behavior, without making claims about the nature of
those states themselves. It suggests that while
behavioral evidence is essential for ascribing mental
states, a separate account of the nature of mental states
is needed, one that aligns with the epistemic
constraints behaviorism recognizes.
In conclusion, while logical behaviorism is critiqued
for its inability to adequately account for the nature of
mental states based on behavioral dispositions alone,
epistemic behaviorism maintains a role in the
discussion by focusing on the observable evidence for
mental states. The text suggests that a more
satisfactory account of mental states could be found in
functionalism, which presumably offers a way to
understand mental states that accommodates the
insights of epistemic behaviorism while providing a
robust account of what mental states are.
Functionalism
This part outlines the philosophy of functionalism
within the context of the philosophy of mind.
Functionalism is a theoretical approach that seeks to
understand mental states not by equating them with
physical states or behaviors, but rather by the roles
these mental states play in the causal processes leading
to behavior. The philosophy acknowledges the
challenge of directly linking mental states with specific
behaviors, opting instead to define mental states in
terms of their "functional roles" or "causal roles" in
influencing behavior.
Functionalism identifies three types of causal
relationships central to understanding mental states:
1. Environmental Causes of Mental States:
This involves how external stimuli can cause
specific mental states. For example, an injury
causing pain or light causing a visual
sensation.
2. Interactions Among Mental States: This
describes how different mental states within a
subject can interact and influence each other.
For instance, the pain from an injury may lead
to the belief that one is hurt.
3. Mental States Influencing Behavior: This
explains how mental states can lead to specific
actions, such as the belief and desire to
 alleviate pain causing one to take action to
reduce harm or discomfort.
Functionalism posits that mental states are real and can
be causally linked to behavior, stressing that
understanding behavior requires considering the
complex interactions between different mental states.
The approach acknowledges the interpretative nature
of ascribing mental states based on behavior,
suggesting that often only a probabilistic determination
can be made about a person's mental states based on
their actions and circumstances.
The text draws an analogy between mental states and
software states in a computer, suggesting that mental
states are to the brain what software states are to
computer hardware. This analogy emphasizes the
functionalist view that mental states, like software, can
be understood in terms of their input (environmental
stimuli), processing (interactions among mental states),
and output (behavior). The functionalist model aligns
with the view of the brain as a biological computer,
evolved to process information from the environment
and guide behavior accordingly.
Functionalism, thus, offers a framework for
understanding mental states and their relation to
behavior that emphasizes the importance of causal
roles and interactions rather than direct one-to-one
correspondences with physical states or behaviors.
This perspective has significant implications for
discussions on the nature of the mind, consciousness,
and the interpretation of mental states through
observable behavior.
Functionalism and Psychological Identity Theories
This part explores the relationship between
functionalism and psychophysical identity theories
within the Philosophy of Mind, highlighting their
differences and how they approach the question of
mental states in relation to physical states.
Functionalism, as described, does not commit to a
specific stance on whether mental states are identical
to physical states of the brain. This openness is seen as
an advantage, as functionalism focuses on the roles
that mental states play, emphasizing patterns of causal
relationships rather than the intrinsic nature of those
states. In other words, functionalism is about how
mental states interact with other states (both mental
and physical) to fulfill their functions, leaving open the
question of their physical constitution.
Identity theories are split into two categories: type-type
and token-token. Type-type identity theories suggest a
one-to-one correspondence between types of mental
states and types of physical states, a view that has
faced criticism for the 'multiple realizability' of mental
states. This concept argues that the same type of
mental state could be realized by different types of
physical states across different creatures, similar to
how different computers can run the same software
despite having different hardware. Token-token
identity theories, on the other hand, posit that each
instance (or token) of a mental state corresponds to a
particular physical state, allowing for a more
individualized correspondence that accommodates the
multiple realizability argument.
The text further elaborates on non-reductive
physicalism, a position that combines rejection of type-
type identity with acceptance of token-token identity.
This viewpoint suggests that while mental state types
are not identical to physical state types, they
nonetheless supervene on physical state types,
meaning there can't be a difference in mental states
without a difference in physical states, despite
allowing for different physical realizations of the same
mental state.
Functionalism is compatible with non-reductive
physicalism as it allows for mental states to be defined
by their causal roles rather than by their physical
makeup. However, functionalism's flexibility also
extends to compatibility with type-type identity
theories and even dualism, highlighting its agnostic
stance towards the exact ontological relationship
between mental and physical states. This openness is a
double-edged sword, presenting both an appealing
inclusivity and potential challenges in defining the
nature of mental states more precisely.
The discussion also touches on the nuances of
identifying mental states through their causal roles
versus their physical realizations, using analogies like
the role of a chess piece versus the material
composition of the chessman. This comparison
illuminates the complexity of determining the essence
of mental states and their potential identity with
physical states, underscoring the ongoing debates and
considerations within the Philosophy of Mind.
The Problem of Consciousness
This part delves into the criticisms against
functionalism, specifically regarding its approach to
consciousness, a central issue in the Philosophy of
Mind. Functionalism, with its liberal stance on the
nature of mental states—emphasizing their causal roles
rather than their intrinsic qualities—faces significant
opposition when it comes to explaining consciousness.
Critics argue that functionalism fails to account for the
subjective experience or the qualitative aspect of being
conscious, often referred to as "what it is like" to be a
subject of experience, a concept famously discussed by
philosopher Thomas Nagel.
The critique centers on the idea that functionalism, by
allowing that any system (including inanimate objects
like a pile of pebbles) could possess mental states if it
exhibits the right pattern of causal relations, overlooks
the intrinsic quality of consciousness. The argument
posits that there seems to be a fundamental difference
between the mental states of conscious beings and the
hypothetical mental states ascribed to non-conscious
entities like pebbles based on functionalist criteria.
In defense, functionalists might argue that
consciousness can be understood as a functional state,
specifically a second-order state where a subject has
awareness of its own mental states. This view suggests
that consciousness is marked by a particular pattern of
causal relations, distinguishing it from other types of
mental states. However, critics counter that such a
functionalist explanation still falls short of capturing
the essence of conscious experience. They question
how a non-conscious entity, even if it were to possess
complex causal relations among its states, could
genuinely be said to have states of consciousness.
The text mentions an exploration of this issue in a
future chapter, indicating a deeper examination of
functionalism's ability to account for consciousness. It
also hints at a broader debate on the criteria for
consciousness attribution, touching on themes of
observable behavior and the potential bias in denying
consciousness to entities based on their physical
constitution or complexity. This discussion reflects
ongoing philosophical debates about the nature of
mind, the requirements for consciousness, and the
limits of functionalist explanations in fully capturing
the phenomenology of conscious experience.
Qualia and The Inverted Spectrum Argument
This part presents a critique of functionalism in the
philosophy of mind through the lens of the "inverted
spectrum" argument, which focuses on the problem of
consciousness and, specifically, on the qualitative
features of conscious mental states known as qualia.
Functionalism is a theory that suggests mental states
are defined by their functional or causal roles in
generating behavior and mental processes. It
emphasizes how mental states interact with other states
and how they are influenced by sensory inputs and
lead to behavioral outputs. However, critics argue that
functionalism falls short in accounting for the
qualitative aspects of experience—what it's like to
experience something, often referred to as "qualia."
The inverted spectrum argument posits a scenario
where two individuals could have their color
experiences systematically inverted—what one person
sees as red, the other sees as green, and vice versa—
yet still agree on color discrimination and application
of color terms (e.g., both would agree that tomatoes are
red and grass is green). This thought experiment is
used to illustrate that even if two individuals are
functionally equivalent (i.e., their experiences have the
same causal relations to behavior, environmental
states, and other mental states), there could still be a
profound qualitative difference in their experiences.
The argument challenges functionalism by
highlighting that it cannot account for the qualitative
character of experiences because it only provides a
relational characterization of mental states without
considering their intrinsic properties. The qualitative
nature of an experience, such as the particular way red
looks or feels to an individual, is considered an
intrinsic property that seems to be overlooked by
functionalism.
The text also cautions against reifying qualia or
treating them as "private" or "inner" objects of
experience, a topic that is promised to be revisited in
the context of sense-datum theories. Instead, the focus
is on the observable fact that different experiences can
look or appear differently to subjects, which
underscores the importance of qualitative
characteristics in understanding consciousness and
challenges the adequacy of functionalism as a theory
of the mind.
In summary, the inverted spectrum argument serves as
a specific critique of functionalism, pointing out its
inability to adequately address the qualitative,
subjective aspects of consciousness, which are central
to the experiences of color and potentially other
sensory modalities.
Some Possible Responses to The Inverted Spectrum
Argument
The provided text discusses various potential responses
from functionalists to the inverted spectrum argument,
which challenges functionalism by highlighting its
inability to account for the qualitative, subjective
aspects of experience or qualia.
Intelligibility and Verificationism: One response is to
question the intelligibility of the inverted spectrum
hypothesis, arguing that since we cannot have
empirical evidence for such inversion (because our
understanding of others' experiences is based on their
behavior, which would be unchanged in the case of
spectrum inversion), the hypothesis might be
meaningless. This is critiqued as a form of
verificationism, a largely discredited view that
statements unverifiable empirically are meaningless.
Critics argue that we can understand what spectrum
inversion would entail, especially since we can
imagine a similar inversion occurring within our own
experiences.
Functional Equivalence and Emotional Responses:
Another response is to argue against the functional
equivalence of individuals with inverted color
experiences, suggesting that such inversion would
likely lead to different emotional responses and
behaviors due to the different qualitative experiences
of colors. This argument hinges on whether it is the
qualitative experience of color or the beliefs associated
with colors that elicit emotional responses.
Functionalists might lean towards the latter, suggesting
that despite inverted experiences, individuals wouldn't
necessarily have different emotional responses or
behaviors.
Intentional or Representational Content: Some
functionalists may argue that the qualitative character
of visual experiences is entirely about their intentional
or representational content—essentially, what those
experiences represent about the world. On this view,
experiencing a color is about the representation of a
property (like redness) rather than experiencing a
distinct "quale" separate from the object's physical
color. Critics of functionalism might argue this view
fails to capture the intrinsic qualitative character of
experiences, which is more than just representational
content.
Qualia as Epiphenomenal: Lastly, functionalists
could concede that their account omits the intrinsic
qualitative characters of mental states, arguing that
these qualities are causally inert and therefore
unimportant for the causal roles of mental states. This
perspective is criticized on the grounds that it
misunderstands the potential causal roles of qualia; if
qualia are causally inert, it would be challenging to
explain how we are aware of them. This view also
suggests a disconnect between the qualitative and non-
qualitative aspects of mental states, a division that can
be contested.
Overall, these responses illustrate the ongoing debate
in the philosophy of mind regarding the role and
significance of qualia, the limits of functionalism in
accounting for subjective experience, and the intricate
relationship between our mental states, behaviors, and
how we represent the world. Each response attempts to
defend functionalism against the inverted spectrum
argument, but also opens up further areas of inquiry
and critique, particularly regarding the nature of
consciousness, experience, and the explanatory power
of functionalism in the philosophy of mind.
The Absent Qualia Argument and Two Notions of
Consciousness
The "absent qualia argument" is another critique of
functionalism, related closely to the inverted spectrum
argument, that questions functionalism's account of
mental states solely in terms of their causal or
functional roles. The central concern is whether it's
possible for an entity to exhibit functional equivalence
to human mental states—demonstrating beliefs,
desires, and even pain—without experiencing qualia,
the subjective, qualitative aspects of consciousness.
This leads to the theoretical possibility of entities like a
pile of pebbles or the entire population of China
operating as a single mind, or the notion of "zombies"
that are functionally identical to humans but devoid of
any subjective experience (e.g., the taste of lemon or
the pain of a nettle sting).
This argument challenges functionalism by suggesting
it allows for the existence of entities that could be
considered to have minds like ours without any
qualitative experience. If such a scenario is deemed
implausible or impossible, as critics of functionalism
would argue, then functionalism's validity is called
into question.
The discussion moves to differentiate between two
concepts of consciousness that functionalism struggles
to reconcile: phenomenal consciousness (the subjective
experience of qualia) and apperceptive consciousness
(awareness of one's mental states, whether qualitative
or not). The absent qualia argument focuses on the
possibility—or, from the critic's perspective, the
impossibility—of entities that possess apperceptive
consciousness without phenomenal consciousness.
The text suggests that the notion of entities lacking
phenomenal consciousness but retaining apperceptive
consciousness contradicts our understanding of the
relationship between having conceptual content in
attitudinal states (e.g., beliefs and desires) and the
capability to experience qualitative states. This
relationship implies that experiencing qualia is integral
to the nature of cognitive beings, challenging
functionalism's implication that such experiences could
be absent in entities with a mind-like functional
organization.
In conclusion, the absent qualia argument raises
significant doubts about functionalism's ability to fully
account for the nature of consciousness, particularly
the intrinsic qualitative aspect of mental experiences. It
suggests a fundamental oversight in functionalism by
hypothetically separating the functional aspects of
mental states from their qualitative experiences,
thereby questioning the theory's completeness and
accuracy in describing the mind.
Eliminative Materialism and “Folk Psychology”
This part introduces a critique of functionalism from
the perspective of eliminative materialism, contrasting
it with both functionalism's aims and the stance of
reductive physicalism. Functionalism is criticized for
providing, at most, a partial account of mental states,
focusing particularly on its treatment of attitudinal
states like beliefs, desires, and intentions. These states
are considered by functionalists as real and causally
efficacious in explaining behavior, aligning with
common-sense understandings. However, eliminative
materialists argue against this view, suggesting that
such common-sense or "folk psychology" terms belong
to a pre-scientific understanding of the mind, likening
them to outdated concepts in folk physics, such as
witchcraft or alchemy.
Eliminative materialism is distinct from reductive
physicalism. While reductive physicalists aim to
identify each type of mental state with a specific
physical state (e.g., neuronal states in the brain),
asserting the real existence of mental states described
by functionalists, eliminative materialists deny the
very existence of states like beliefs and desires. They
argue that just as the scientific concept of phlogiston
(once thought to be involved in combustion) was
entirely discarded upon the discovery of oxygen's role,
so too should folk-psychological concepts like belief
and desire be abandoned. According to eliminative
materialists, nothing in the brain acts in the ways folk
psychology supposes, undermining functionalism's
attempts to characterize mental states in terms of their
causal roles.
The skepticism of eliminative materialists towards folk
psychology is grounded in the belief that folk
psychology fails as a theory: it does not provide
empirically testable laws for predicting and explaining
human behavior. Instead, it offers unfalsifiable
generalizations and remains silent on significant
aspects of human behavior, such as the experiences of
those with mental illnesses. This failure, according to
eliminative materialists, indicates that folk psychology
—and by extension, any theory reliant on its concepts,
like functionalism—is irreparably flawed and must be
replaced by a fundamentally different theory that does
not incorporate folk-psychological states.
In summary, the text outlines a profound challenge to
functionalism from eliminative materialism, which
argues that functionalism's reliance on common-sense
terms and concepts renders it incapable of forming a
scientifically viable theory of the mind. Eliminative
materialists call for a radical departure from traditional
theories of mind, proposing the need for a new
framework that eschews the flawed premises of folk
psychology.
Some Responses to Eliminative Materialism
This passage addresses potential criticisms of
eliminative materialism, particularly focusing on the
perceived incoherence of the eliminative materialist's
stance and the mischaracterization of 'folk psychology.'
Incoherence Concerning Belief and Truth:
A preliminary objection to eliminative materialism
might suggest that it is incoherent because if
eliminative materialists argue that beliefs do not exist,
they paradoxically cannot claim to believe in the truth
of their own theory. However, this critique is initially
dismissed as too simplistic, with the counterargument
being that the truth of the eliminative materialist's
theory is what matters, not whether it can be believed
in the traditional sense. The passage goes deeper,
though, to suggest a more substantial potential
incoherence: the notions of truth, falsehood, and
rational argument are intimately linked with the
concepts of belief and other propositional attitudes. By
rejecting the category of belief, eliminative
materialism might inadvertently undermine the
foundation of rational discourse and the scientific
method itself, leading to an ironic contradiction where
the pursuit of a scientific understanding of human
behavior could destabilize the conceptual groundwork
of science.
Mischaracterization of Folk Psychology: Another
criticism targets the eliminative materialist's portrayal
of folk psychology as an aspiring scientific theory,
akin to outdated models in physical science. This
criticism argues that when we attribute beliefs and
desires to explain behavior, we're not conducting a
scientific exercise similar to explaining physical
phenomena through forces and laws. Instead, these
explanations are rational and normative, involving
judgments about the reasons for actions, which is a
fundamentally different process from the causal
explanations found in physical sciences. Unlike
inanimate objects, humans act for reasons, and our
explanations of their actions are subject to normative
evaluation, not just causal description.
Moreover, the passage suggests that
understanding and predicting human behavior through
the lens of folk psychology is less about applying
lawlike generalizations and more about empathetic
simulation. We mentally place ourselves in others'
situations, imagining how we would act with their
beliefs and desires. This process, deeply rooted in our
evolutionary history, is essential for effective
cooperation and competition within social groups.
Thus, folk psychology is not merely an inadequate
scientific theory waiting to be replaced but
a fundamental aspect of what it means to be human,
enabling meaningful interaction with others.
In summary, these criticisms challenge
eliminative materialism by highlighting its potential
conceptual self-defeat and by defending folk
psychology not as a flawed proto-scientific theory but
as an indispensable part of human nature and social
interaction.
Conclusion
The concluding section of this chapter reflects on the
nature of mental states, examining criticisms of various
philosophical accounts, including logical
behaviourism, functionalism, and eliminative
materialism, and pondering the implications for
understanding consciousness and subjectivity.
Logical behaviourism is dismissed for oversimplifying
the relationship between mental states and behavior,
suggesting that identifying mental states solely with
behavioral dispositions misses the complexity of how
mental states relate to actions. Functionalism, which
characterizes mental states in terms of their causal
roles, appears initially more promising as it
accommodates the behavioral evidence for mental state
ascriptions while acknowledging the relational
properties of these states. However, functionalism
faces its own challenges, particularly in accounting for
the qualitative character of conscious experiences (the
"what it's like" aspect) and in its ontological
commitments, which lead to speculative scenarios like
the existence of "zombies" who are functionally
similar to humans but lack phenomenal consciousness.
The critique from eliminative materialism, which
denies the existence of propositional attitudes such as
beliefs and desires, highlights another problem with
functionalism's reliance on folk psychological
categories. Yet, eliminative materialism itself is
critiqued for potentially undermining the concepts of
reason and truth, and thus, by extension, the scientific
enterprise it aims to uphold. This critique also suggests
that folk psychology, rather than being an inadequate
scientific theory, is an essential aspect of human nature
and social interaction that cannot simply be discarded.
The text concludes by emphasizing the difficulty in
fully capturing the essence of mental states through
their causal roles alone. The unique features of mental
states—consciousness and subjectivity—are identified
as resistant to both functionalist and physicalist
explanations. This resistance points to a fundamental
asymmetry between first-person and third-person
knowledge of mental states, underscoring the personal,
introspective access to one's own mental states
contrasted with the observational knowledge of others'
mental states. This distinction sets mental states apart
from purely physical states and suggests that
understanding the distinctive nature of mental states
requires acknowledging the importance of first-person
experiences. Instead of viewing this as a problem for
scientific inquiry, it might be more fruitful to consider
it as part of the solution to understanding what makes
mental states uniquely subjective and conscious.