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1
 ISBN-10: 1494777037
Pakistan Army in
About the Author

East Pakistan

Understanding a

bitter conflict
Agha H. Amin , Retired Tank corps

major who served in five tank

Agha Humayun Amin
regiments and commanded an

independent tank squadron and

ISBN-13: 978-1494777036
served in various staff ,

instructional and research

2 3
assignmemts.

Editor in Chief of montly

Author Pakistan Army till 1965, Intellience Review and montly

History of Pakistan Army, Sepoy Military and Security Review

Rebellion of 1857-59,The

Essential Heads the think tank Centre for

Clausewitz,Developmemt of study of Intelligence Operations

Taliban Factions in Afghanistan established in early 2010

and Pakistan,Taliban War in

Afghanistan. Centre for study of Intelligence

Operations

Carried out various oil and gas

and power transmission line

surveys in West Asia.

4 5
 List of Publications by the author

 The Development of Taliban

Factions in Afghanistan and

Publishers of Monthly Intelligence Review, a journal

devoted to security and intelligence issues. Pakistan: A Geographical

Account, February 2010 .

Intelligence history and operations.Group includes
 The Pakistan Army till 1965
senior policy makers and decision makers including

recently retired DIA Head LTG (Ret) Patrick M  Atlas of Indo Pak Wars
Hughes as well as many CIA and Military Intelligence
 Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59
Analysts. The origin of the name is its founder Major

Agha.H.Amins first intellectual contact with United Reinterpreted

States Society of Military History and CIA History
 Pakistan Army through eyes of
Staff when he attended the April 1996 meeting of
Pakistani Generals
Society of Military History at Rosslyn Marriott ,

Arlington Virginia.The meeting was co-hosted by CIA  Military Leadership and Decision
History Staff.

6 7
 Making

 The Essential Clausewitz

 Mans Role in history

 Taliban War in Afghanistan-A

Writers Transformed Perceptions

Anthony Mascarenhas was a journalist
from 2001 to 2011
making is living by writing sensational
 USA, ISI, AL QAEDA and
things but his landmark article of June 13

TALIBAN Anatomy of Grand US 1971 , although hard hitting and

Strategic Failure sensational was not the whole truth but only

a fraction of the whole truth.

It is in the interest of all innocents, on all

sides , sans race or religion, who lost their

lives in that Red Year 1971 that the whole

truth be told.

8 9
Thus my motivation to write this account.

While the genocide carried out by the

Pakistan Army was deplorable and

June 13, 1971
unfortunate , there is more to it than meets
Anthony Mascarenhas
the eyes.
The Sunday Times
This work seeks to examine in brief the
-Anthony Mascarenhas, Former Assistant
events of 1971 in a balanced manner.
Editor, Morning News, Karachi,
Usurping of power while leading the largely
in Sunday Times, London, June 13, 1971
Punjabi based army by Ayub Khan increased

the East-West divide in 1958.

Things in Pakistani politics were then judged

on ethnic lines.

10 11
In 1950s West Pakistani newspapers wanted

provincial autonomy on te same pattern as

Sheikh Mujeeb later demanded in is Six

Points if Bengalis , who they saw as a lesser

race was ranted the right of one man , one

vote !

This point was clearly highlighted in the

famous book on the six points which I

reviewed in 2001

12 13
 Ayub was not a Punjabi , at least ethnically ,

but later in 1971 the Bengali Muslims

blamed the Punjabis for all their maladies!

In reality the Punjabis being leaderless were

manipulated by both Ayub and Yahya!

Bhutto who played a major role in

persuading Yahya to launch the military

action was a Sindhi!

The on ground realities were different.

14 15
 Yahya Kha

Trigger happy use of excessive military

force in 1971 precipitated a war which led

to the creation of Bangladesh.

It appears that the Two Nation Theory had

ceased to exist in the killing fields of East

Bengal in 1971.

But why was the army so actively

participating in the genocide?

The same Britishers who were so active in

criticising the Pakistani atrocities in 1971 as

in the had as a matter of fact created this

machine following 1857 based on

antiquated and irrational ideas of Robert in

the post-1880 period.

Figure 1 General Agha Mohammad
The disease started in 1857 when the

16 17
British reaped the harvest of the policy of of selective recruitment was in the old

divide and rule when they employed the NWFP region of pre-1947 India.

Gurkha against Indian, and within India the Here the British deployed one Pathan

Punjabi (whether Sikh or Muslim) against against another. Sometimes from the same

the Hindustani. tribe and sometimes from the other.

The Gurkha against the Punjabi. The Sometimes the Turi Shia against the non-

Jallianwalla massacre in which Gurkha Shia Wazirs or Mahsuds or Afridis.

troops fired on the public meeting

comprising Punjabi civilians in 1919 was a

good example of the fact that the British did

not love the Punjabis, but were merely

using them.

The Punjabis started learning this from

1919 but by the time the awareness was

growing the Britishers were already winding

up. The most glaring example of the policy

18 19
Figure 1 Royal Air Force planes bomb

Waziristan

Figure 2 Bombing Waziristan by

Westland Wapitis in 1933

The post-1947 rulers of Pakistan instead of

remedying a basically illogical recruitment

policy which had no logical basis became its

victim.

Thus whenever army was used in a province

other than Punjab it was perceived as

20 21
“Punjab against Sindh” or “Punjab against little has been learnt from the 1971

Bengal” or “Punjab against Baluchistan”! tragedy. These are two unique shipwrecks

The rulers were merely the instruments of a lying at the bottom of the Bay of Bengal.

pre-1947 policy. The army outside Punjab One is the shipwreck of the “Martial Races

was trigger happy because it was fighting in Theory”, one is the ship of “Two Nation

a foreign land. Theory”!

For short-term purposes this policy is viable The policy of EEIC before 1857 did not view

but for how long? In the long-term it will Indians as Muslims or Hindus or Sikhs.

only lead to creation of more Bangladeshis? There was no quota or caste system in the

The British divided us by their negative Bengal Army and all Indians regardless of

policies both in India and in Pakistan. their caste or religion or ethnicity were

In Pakistan the problem became more recruited as soldiers.

serious because the military usurpers were As a matters of fact before 1857 the EEIC

not interested in changing the recruiting did not even bother to exactly find out as to

policy. how many Hindus or Muslims were serving

The same trend continues and it seems that in each Regiment of the Bengal Army.

22 23
Though it was common knowledge that “Government certainly did put the two

some three fourth of the Bengal infantry antagonistic races into the same regiment,

consisted of Hindus while Muslims were but constant intercourse had done its work

about one fourth. Similarly it was an and the two races in a regiment had almost

established fact that bulk of the cavalry was become one. It is but natural and to be

Muslim. But this aspect was simply expected, that a feeling of friendship and

irrelevant. After 1857 “Religion” certainly brotherhood must spring up between the

became important. But the British made it men of a regiment, constantly brought

so, not the Indians. together as they are. They consider

themselves as one body and thus it was

Men like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan who were that the difference which exists between

acting as voluntary consultants for their Hindoos and Mahomeddans had, in these

British masters on how to avoid another regiments, been almost entirely smoothed

mutiny thus advised the British against away”

mixing Hindus with Muslim troops in an

army unit in the following words; We find this eminent Sayyid suggesting

24 25
some measures to communalize the British But there was no specific policy nor any laid

Indian Army in order to avoid another down regional guidelines about recruitment.

mutiny! The recruiting officer could recruit anyone

regardless of any laid down class or caste

considerations.

After 1849 when the Punjab (including

present NWFP) were annexed the British

extended the recruiting area to north of

Sutlej also. But there was no “Martial Race

Theory”. Human nature is essentially same,

man can fight or kill for anything and any

idea whether based on ideology, nationalism

It is true that before 1857 the British or class, it can divide people of the same

generally preferred men from the northern race, even the same religion and even of

plains of Oudh, modern UP province etc till the same family. The ulterior motivation is

1849. always personal or class interest disguised

26 27
in the garb of high sounding slogans! I want Republicans and Monarchists under

to give certain concrete historical examples Franco1, 600,000 Spaniards were killed! In

to prove this harmless assertion.Take Spain the Russians Civil War fought from 1917 to

of 1930s. One race, one country, one 1922 the casualties; killed only, were 1

religion, and one sect. The struggle is crore or ten million! Russian killed Russians

between the feudal-clergy-military junta simply because one was from Denikin

and the republicans asking for more Kolchak or Yudenich‟s White Army and

equitable distribution of resources! No Two- another from Trotsky or Lenin‟s Red Army!

Nation Theory but the Spaniards fight Even a Menshevik Communist killed another

savagely for three years! Mind you there Russian simply because the other man was

were no fighting in the Indian Freedom a Bolshevik Communist! The Chinese Civil

Struggle, as we like to call it, although the War lasting from 1911 with uneven intervals

transfer of power was more the result of till 1949 was equally brutal with Chinese

war exhaustion brought upon the British killing Chinese in the name of an ideology

Empire as a result of two world wars! The conceived by a German of Jewish ancestry

result of the fighting between the to liberate the workers of the world! The

28 29
Britishers were horrified with the brutal issue is never ideology but a piece of land

pillage and destruction of Muslim that was lost by folly of one king or a flawed

Rohailkhand following conquest of constitutional arrangement or a broken

Hindustani Pathan Muslim Rohailkhand by treaty concluded 100 years before. In the

Shia Muslim of Oudh through hiring a background is either class interest or ego of

British-Indian Brigade of the Honourable a leader or intrigue by a third party for its

English East India Company! own interest! It‟s a subtle combination of

“Ideology” “Ethnicity” “Opportunism” and

What is the lesson! That man can fight for
“Substance” that this scribe in his humble
anything, not because two nations are
capacity has discussed in some detail in a
different or war is inevitable between them
small book written a year ago. Journalists
or because Pakistan or India was inevitable;
make their living or channel their urges for
but simply because “Aggression” is
aggression by writing militaristic and
ingrained in the human character! It is
jingoistic sabre rattling articles about such
justified in the name of class war, war
issues, as is the case in Indo-Pak or any
between two nations, a football riot or wars
conflict dominated region! Leaders talk
of successions between real brothers! The

30 31
about these issues frequently as Indian and this was done by riotous civilians and the

Pakistani leaders do to galvanise their riff raff. Still the sepoys are to be blamed

electorate, so that their mind remains since overall they were in charge. The

distracted from the core issues of class British reprisals took place mostly in

exploitation economic disparity and retaliation but as the adage goes i.e. two

exploitation! wrongs don‟t make a right. The British

reprisals were, however, much less in

magnitude if we compare them with

atrocities against civilians committed by

Nadir Shah in 1739 or by Ahmad Shah in

1756-61 or even by the Indo-Pak armies in

1971 in Bangladesh, or later in Balochistan,

A Comparison with Indian Atrocities in
Indian Punjab or Kashmir.
1857

The British behaviour may perhaps be

The sepoys took the initiative in killing
closely compared to Pakistan Army
women and children although in most cases

32 33
behaviour in East Pakistan in 1971.

Atrocities are committed once law and order

breaks down and the fear of coercive power

The initial atrocities were committed by the
that keeps the beast in most men under
Bengalis but the martial races settled the
control is removed!
„score ‟ by a very large margin, exceeding

at least by 100,000 to 200,000 men These atrocities have no connection with

perhaps! ideology or even race.

The point that I want to drive home is the

simple fact that atrocities in 1947 or 1857

or 1971 were committed because the

multitude knew that there was no central

34 35
coercive authority to protect a particular The affect was positive and Kabul thereafter

community, which was momentarily remained more tranquil and calm! Probably

perceived as enemy or exploiters! Nawab Mohammad Hayat had accompanied

Roberts as sort of a political assistant.

The first point that I want to drive home is

the fact that atrocities in 1947 and 1971 A family anecdote told by my grandfather‟s

were committed by on both sides! But as brother thus goes that Nawab Mohammad

they say truth is the first casualty in a civil Hayat had advised Roberts that “Sahab, if

war or in any crisis situation. we hang them like Metcalfe Sahab did at

Delhi, it will have a good impact on these

Lord Roberts of Kandahrar adopted a novel
savages! In any case we are not going to
way of dealing with the Kabul mob in the
stay in this accursed place permanently”!
Second Afghan War!

The reader may note that my great

He erected gallows in the city and hanged
grandfather‟s father who was from the
anyone suspected of being a potential
Punjab Police Department had also
trouble creator!
accompanied the British Expeditionary army

36 37
as a Persian interpreter. train was crossing it and considerable

movable wealth was lost and many Afghans

In those days Pan Islamism was not yet in
were drowned in the fast flowing Chenab
vogue. The Indians whether Muslim, Sikh or
river !
Hindu had different perceptions about

Afghans who were much hated because of The point is that the riots of 1947 which are

their raids on India from 1739 to 1799 as cited as the vindication of „Two Nation

mercenaries of Persia or as Abdali‟s army! Theory‟ in Pakistan as a matter of fact were

During these raids these Afghans had outbreaks which had a far deeper

indiscriminately looted all Indians whether connection with the bursting out of the

Muslim Indian or Sikh! innate animal aggression in human nature,

which in normal times is restrained by the

On one occasion the loot that Ahmad Shah
coercive machinery of the state!
Abdali‟s army was carrying from Delhi to

Afghanistan was so heavy that the Akhnur The atrocities committed by Muslim mobs

bridge of boats over the Chenab collapsed on non-Muslims and vice versa, mostly in

while the looters baggage West and East Punjab were acts of a hostile

38 39
mob against defenceless unarmed people the British Army after August 15”.

who were perceived as belonging to an

The most ironic part is that atrocities are
enemy country and thus an ideal pray for
never wholly ethnic or even religious.They
rape, loot and slaughter! The problem had a
have more to deal with group perceptions
deeper connection with the British failure to
regarding another group! Thus the atrocities
keep a large purely British force to restrain
of the Pakistan Army in 1971 in East
the Indians from killing each other in a
Pakistan when the Bengalis despite being
situation where no purely Indian force could
Muslims were perceived as enemies or
have effectively controlled the wild mobs!
traitors and the official policy was that of

Both Mr Jinnah and Nehru never foresaw endorsing all killings as necessary.

the amount of carnage and slaughter that

In addition the situation was made more
would accompany the transfer of power and
emotionally charged by similar atrocities
partition. Nehru even vetoed the proposal of
committed by Bengali mobs against non-
keeping British troops to control the mob by
Bengali civilians in the four weeks before
stating “ I would rather have every village
the army action. Similarly Indian Army
in India put to the flames rather than have

40 41
atrocities in Kashmir cannot be taken simply and Jamalpur.

in terms of bifurcation of religion!

Most of them in the 1880s were serving or

This reminds me of a unique true story of had retired from Skinners Horse, 1st and

ethnic hatred, which has little to do with 3rd Punjab Cavalry and 19 Lancers. They

religion! This story is based on the hated the Punjabi Sikhs and Muslims and

experiences of the Ranghar Muslims of a Pathan Muslims who in 1857 had committed

village Chak 130 LGB or Nao Rohtak in countless atrocities in Rohtak and Hissar

district Lyallpur! My great grandfather district as part of Hodson‟s Horse or as part

settled in that village in the 1880s as a of General Van Cortlandt‟s force!

colonist of the newly created Chenab

Colony. The settlers in that particular village

were mostly Ranghar Muslims from East

Punjab districts of Rohtak and Hissar. These

men hailed from the old Bengal Cavalry

villages like Kanar, Kalanaur, Jatu Satna

42 43
But then Karl Marx made some very himself.

profound remarks about 1857 and these can

be applied to any such situation.

Karl Marx said “However, infamous the

conduct of sepoys, it is only the reflex, in a

concentrated form, of England‟s own

conduct in India, not only during the epoch Yahya Khan and the Political Situation-

of the foundation of her Eastern Empire, but 1969-1971

even during the last ten years of a long

Now a word on Pakistan‟s internal political
settled rule. The characteristics that rule it
situation in 1969 and its negative effects on
suffices to say that torture formed an
the Pakistan Army.
organic institution of its financial policy.

There is something in human history like It appears that, had not Ayub Khan

retribution; and it is a rule of historic alienated the East Wing by his pro West

retribution that its instrument be forged not Pakistani elite policies and also had not

by the offended, but by the offender alienated the West Pakistani and East

44 45
Pakistani populace by his self-serving country‟s population entitled them to 54 %

policies, there would have been no East seats in the assembly! Both the wings now

Pakistan problem which resulted in started coming closer since issues were

Pakistan‟s break-up in 1971 or any anti- settled inside the parliament rather than by

Ayub agitation in both the country‟s subversion or agitation.

provinces of East and West Pakistan that

However Ayub in league with the president
finally led to the fall of the Ayubian system
Iskandar Mirza repeatedly conspired to
of government in March 1969.
derail democracy and in league with

The foreign readers may note that the East Iskandar Mirza finally usurped power in the

wing versus West wing rivalry had been country by imposing the first Martial Law in

constitutionally resolved through the October 1958.

passing of the 1956 Constitution, once the

He sidelined Mirza in less than a month and
representatives of the East wing had most
imposed a one-man rule on the country.
large heartedly accepted the principal of 50
Ayub despised the East Pakistanis and as
% parity in the country‟s legislature despite
Army C in C had stopped more raisings of
the fact that their actual ratio in the

46 47
infantry battalions of East Pakistanis. being a national army.

The East Pakistanis on the other hand were Once Ayub handed over power to Yahya

anti-Ayub and resented Ayub‟s policies of Khan on 25 March 1969 Yahya inherited a

allocating a predominantly large part the two-decade constitutional problem of inter

resources of the country on the provincial ethnic rivalry between the

development of the West Wing. Further Punjabi-Pathan-Mohajir dominated West

during the Ayub era, the strategic doctrine Pakistan province and the ethnically Bengali

that defence of East Pakistan lay in Muslim East Pakistan province.

concentrating the bulk of the Pakistan Army

In addition Yahya also inherited an eleven-
in the West wing was developed. This
year-old problem of transforming an
further alienated the East wingers since
essentially one-man ruled country to a
there was an unofficial ban on recruitment
democratic country, which was the
of Bengalis in the fighting arms of the army
ideological basis of the anti Ayub movement
and the expanded army increasingly
of 1968-69.
became a West Pakistani army, instead of

Herein lies the key to Yahya‟s dilemma. As

48 49
an Army Chief Yahya had all the Unit” meant the concentration of the

capabilities, qualifications and potential. previously four provinces, states and

territories into one huge monster of a

But Yahya inherited an extremely complex
province known as West Pakistan
problem and was forced to perform the
disregarded the huge differences between
multiple roles of caretaker head of the
the old provinces/territories/states in terms
country, drafter of a provisional
of ethnicity language social and cultural
constitution, resolving the One Unit
differences and distribution of resources.
question , satisfying the frustrations and the
The “One Unit” was viewed as an
sense of exploitation and discrimination
instrument of imposing Punjabi domination
successively created in the East Wing by a
on the population wise old smaller
series of government policies since 1948.
provinces/states/regions/commissionerates

The “One Unit” was an absurd of Sind Baluchistan NWFP Bahawlpur etc.

administrative arrangement legalised in the The concept reduced actual East Wing

1956 constitution and resented by the superiority in population from 54 % to

smaller provinces of West Pakistan. “One actual parity with west wing at 50 %.

50 51
All these were complex problems and the also on record that he did not act alone…All

seeds of Pakistan Army‟s defeat and the major actors of the period were

humiliation in December 1971 lay in the fact creatures of a historic legacy and a psycho-

that Yahya Khan blundered unwittingly into political milieu which did not lend itself to

the thankless task of cleaning dirt in accommodation and compromise, to

Pakistan‟s political and administrative bargaining and a reasonable settlement.

system which had been accumulating for Nurtured on conspiracy theories, they were

twenty years and had its actual origins in all conditioned to act in a manner that

the pre 1947 British policies towards the neglected agreeable solutions and promoted

Bengali Muslims. violent judgements”.

The American author Ziring well summed it The irrefutable conclusion is that Yahya

up when he observed that, "Yahya Khan has failed as an Army Chief not because he

been widely portrayed as a ruthless lacked the inherent capabilities but because

uncompromising insensitive and grossly he tried to do too many things at the same

inept leader…While Yahya cannot escape time. This as we earlier discussed was the

responsibility for these tragic events, it is prime reason for failure of the Pakistan

52 53
Army to develop and function as a dynamic vote, fair elections on adult franchise, a

entity beyond unit level in the 1965 war and basic human right which had been denied to

in the pre 1965 era. the Pakistani people since the pre

independence 1946 elections by political

In all fairness one cannot but admit that,
inefficiency, double play and intrigue, by
Yahya Khan, sincerely attempted to solve
civilian governments, from 1947 to 1958
Pakistan‟s constitutional and inter
and by Ayub‟s one man rule from 1958 to
provincial/regional rivalry problems once he
1969. However dissolution of one unit did
took over power from Ayub in March 1969.
not lead to the positive results that it might
The tragedy of the whole affair was the fact
have lead to in case "One Unit" was
that all actions that Yahya took, although
dissolved earlier.
correct in principle, were too late in timing,

and served only to further intensify the Yahya also made an attempt to

political polarisation between the East and accommodate the East Pakistanis by

West wings. He dissolved the one unit abolishing the principle of parity, thereby

restoring the pre 1955 provinces of West hoping that greater share in the assembly

Pakistan, promised free direct, one man one would redress their wounded ethnic regional

54 55
pride and ensure the integrity of Pakistan. It may be noted that at this time there were

Instead of satisfying the Bengalis it just seven infantry battalions of the East

intensified their separatism, since they felt Pakistanis. Yahya‟s announcement although

that the west wing had politically made with the noblest and most generous

suppressed them since 1958. Thus the rise intentions in mind was late by about twenty

of anti West Wing sentiment in the East years!

Wing, thanks to Ayub Khan‟s anti East Wing

Yahya cannot be blamed for the muck that
policies, had however reached such
had been accumulating for more than two
tremendous proportions that each of
decades. Yahya‟s intention to raise more
Yahya‟s concessions did not reduce the East
pure Bengali battalions was opposed by
West tension. Yahya announced in his
Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, the
broadcast to the nation on 28 July 1969, his
General Officer Commanding 14 Division in
firm intention to redress Bengali grievances,
East Pakistan, since the General felt that
the first major step in this direction being,
instead of raising new purely Bengali
the doubling of Bengali quota in the defence
battalions, Bengali troops should be mixed
services .
with existing infantry battalions comprising

56 57
of Punjabi and Pathan troops. ever challenge the martial Punjabi or Pathan

Muslim
Such was the strength of conviction of

General Khadim about not raising more The Bengalis were despised as non martial

pure Bengali battalions that once he came by all West Pakistanis. However much later

to know about Yahya‟s orders to raise more an interesting controversy developed in

East Pakistani regiments, he flew to the which the Punjabis and Hindustanis blamed

General Headquarters in Rawalpindi to each other for doing so! The Hindustanis

remonstrate against the sagacity of raising blaming Aziz Ahmad etc and the Punjabis

more pure Bengali units. blaming many Hindustani ICS old foxes of

the 1950s! There is no doubt that this

Khadim‟s advice that Bengali troops could
exercise in Bengali degrading was neither
not be relied upon in crisis situations should
totally or exclusively Punjabi led but a a
have been an eye opener for all in the GHQ.
true for all West Pakistanis business!
No one at least at that time took his advice

seriously. It appears that the generals were The foreign reader may note that Bengalis

convinced that the Bengali was too meek to were despised as a non martial race from

58 59
the British times. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan a fact that the Pakistani GHQ placed entire

Hindustani Muslim and an eminent Muslim reliance on the “Superior Valour and Martial

leader of the North Indian Muslims in late Qualities of the Pakistani (Punjabi and

19th century made open fun of Bengalis in Pathan Muslim soldier) vis a vis the Hindu

his various speeches, notably the one Indian soldier, as proved in 1965 war” and

delivered at Lucknow in 1887. I.H Qureshi felt that somehow, in the next war to

another prominent Hindustani Muslim and a miracles would occur and the Pakistan Army

post 1947 cabinet minister declared in a would do well! The tangible military facts of

roundabout manner that the Bengalis were the Indo Pak politico-military scenario were

an inferior race. Ayub made various not analysed in their true dimension! It was

remarks implying that the Bengalis were an a classic case of perceptual distortion and

inferior race in his memoirs written in 1967. losing sight of reality. Eric Berne an eminent

psychologist defined "adjustment" as

Inflated Perceptions about Pakistani
"ability to change one‟s images to
military effectiveness
correspond to a new reality”. Berne

The essence of the whole business was the rephrases "adjustment" as "flexibility" which

60 61
he defines as " ability to change your officers and research Organisations.

images as they should be changed

This sadly was not Pakistan‟s case where
according to reality". This in Berne‟s view is
one man from 1958 wielded all power, both
more important than intelligence. Berne
civil and military onwards. The situation was
thus concluded that „the successful man is
not so complicated till 1965 since Pakistan
the one whose images correspond most
enjoyed material and technical superiority
closely to reality, because then his actions
till 1965 and because the troop ratio
will lead to the results, which he imagines".
between Pakistan and India was relatively

This as a matter of fact are one of the prime manageable.

functions of a military and political leader.

Unfortunately in Pakistan after 1971 all
The success of the western democracies lay
blame was heaped on Yahya‟s shoulders.
in the fact that one man was never totally in
The fact that the psychosis that had afflicted
command but civil and military functions
the Pakistani decision makers in the period
were divided and shared between various
1966-1971 and finally led to the great
appointment holders aided by a host of staff
humiliation of 1971, had a close connection

62 63
with the nature of Pakistan‟s experiences as greatness as " A great man is the one who

a nation in the period 1947-1971 was not either helps to find out what the world is

accepted and instead Yahya was made a really like or else tries to change the world

scapegoat for all that had gone wrong. to match his image. In both cases he is

trying to bring images and reality closer

We will analyse more of this in the next
together by changing one or the other”. In
chapter. I will quote Berne once again to
the period 1966-1971 Pakistan did not have
define greatness or the lack of it in Pakistan
the resources to change the world to match
during the period 1947-1971. But before we
its images nor great men who had the depth
do it we must understand that man is not
of character and intellect to find out what
fully autonomous but is a prisoner of
the world is really like and changing their
historical environmental and physiological
images!
circumstances.

Many Pakistani intellectuals with the naivety

There are very few truly great men who act
of a provincial farm maiden try to heap the
more autonomously than the multitude.
whole blame on liquor and Yahya or on
Berne thus defined individual human

64 65
liquor alone! Muslims by treachery!

This unfortunately is too simplistic a view! This was sadly not the case! In reality the

The Pakistanis as a nation were forming Muslims were saved from total defeat by the

wrong and unrealistic images right from British advent in India! A false image was

1947! Too much faith was based on formed by official propaganda right from

ideology (Islam) to unite two entirely 1947 that the Muslims were more martial

diverse regions of East and West Pakistan! than the timid Hindus were! It was a poor

Even Shauakat Riza a pro establishment modification of the "Martial Races Theory"

historian, commenting on religion as a of the British, which was a purely imperialist

common factor between the East and West theory to "Divide and Rule" India! But once

wings caustically noted that “Twenty four Pakistan was defeated in 1971, all blame

years is too long to gamble on one card”. was heaped on Yahya and liquor,

disregarding the fact that Yahya was merely

History was distorted to show that the
the tip of the iceberg, and the irrefutable
Muslims were ruling the timid Hindu when
fact that many great commanders in history
the British snatched power from the brave
were absolutely incorrigible and compulsive

66 67
womanisers and drinkers! expectations and myths that were being

created as a result of the official

This fact was noted by some officers soon
propaganda. Qayyum Sher told Siddiqi,
after 1965 but the majority were victims of
"Miracles he mused, „may indeed have
the psychosis of Islamic Martial Military
happened, but they happen only once. Let
superiority that overwhelmed the West
me tell you that your press chaps are doing
Pakistani psyche during the period 1966-
a lot of harm to the soldier psychologically
1971!
by publishing all those foolish stories. I

Brigadier A.R Siddiqi in his book on the wonder what they are really trying to tell

Pakistan Army‟s press image thus narrated the world. That the Pakistani soldier can

a thought-provoking incident soon after the fight his war only with the help of his

war. Siddiqi met Brigadier Qayyum Sher celestial allies. That he is facing an enemy

who as just discussed had distinguished inferior to him in all respects. I admit God‟s

himself as an infantry brigade commander help is of the utmost importance but it‟s no

in the battle opposite Lahore. Qayyum Sher substitute for one‟s own performance. It

was unhappy about the unrealistic would be quite stupid to forget that the

68 69
Indian soldier is as much of a professional the military performance became a taboo”.

as his Pakistani counterpart. He has been

Sher was not alone in entertaining these
trained in similar military systems and
views. Major General Tajammul Hussain
institutions and fights like hell when he has
Malik who very ably commanded the 3rd
to. The only reason why the Pakistani
Baluch opposite Lahore on the BRB states in
soldier put up a comparatively better
his memoirs that the Indian superiority
performance in this war was that he fought
opposite Lahore was not as overwhelming
largely on his own home ground as a
as later portrayed in the Pakistani official
defender”. Siddiqi further noted that "The
propaganda. Tajammul thus stated, "We
Pakistani image makers, however, had little
had Patton Tanks whereas Indians had
use for such sterile talk. They had their own
mostly Sherman Tanks which were
mental picture of the war and regarded it as
comparatively much inferior. Similarly
the only correct one. Anybody who dared to
our artillery guns out ranged the Indian
speak of the war more realistically simply
artillery guns. They had an overall
betrayed a „diffident and defeatist mentality‟
superiority of infantry, perhaps of
…The merest suggestion of the criticism of
about 1 to 2 but most of their divisions

70 71
were comparatively ill equipped and predominantly West Pakistani elite!

untrained and they had to guard a

Sultan Khan who served as Pakistan‟s
much bigger frontier”.
Foreign Secretary with Yahya during the

Many years earlier one of the greatest fateful year of 1971 noted at many places in

thinkers of this world Sigmund Freud rightly his memoirs that most Pakistani generals

noted that "the irrational forces in man‟s thought that the Pakistani soldier was more

nature are so strong that the rational forces martial and would somehow emerge

have little chance of success against them”. successfully through the East Pakistan War.

Freud thus concluded that "a small minority Gul Hassan, Sultan thus noted, was one of

might be able to live a life of reason but them and firmly believed in the power of

most men are comfortable living with their bayonet to solve all problems! The tragedy

delusions and superstitions rather than with is that after the war all the blame was

the truth". As a matter of fact whole nations heaped on Yahya and the fact that the

can be victims of delusions. This has whole elite and all those who mattered were

happened many times in history. The same under influence of highly irrational ideas

was true for the Pakistani nation, or the was deliberately suppressed. Till this day in

72 73
presentations and studies carried out in "ideology" "exploitation by feudal and

Pakistan Army‟s schools and colleges of capitalist classes" and above all "British

instruction, Yahya is made the scapegoat Colonial rule" during the period 1858-1947.

for the entire 1971 fiasco and the fact that In 1857 the common soldiers (sepoys), both

the whole of West Pakistani was under Hindu (some three fourth) and Muslims

influence of a psychotic state is ignored. (around one fourth) from modern UP

province attempted a rebellion against the

Historical Background of Superiority
British. This rebellion was crushed by the
Complex in the Pakistan Army
Britishers using European as well as Punjabi

It is necessary to examine the historical (largely Muslim and relatively less Sikh and

reasons for this false feeling of superiority in Hindu) Pathan (less in number than

the Pakistan Army in 1969-71. It may be Punjabis) Gurkha and Madrasi troops. The

noted that the vast bulk of Muslims, just rebellion‟s end in 1858 marked a major turn

like the vast bulk of Hindus of the Indo Pak in British policy in India. Till 1857 British

Sub Continent were caught in a vicious policy as executed by various Viceroys of

square of "ethnicity” the private English East India Company was

74 75
markedly egalitarian and anti feudal. A the British introduced the concept of One

major policy change was introduced from class companies with soldiers from one

1858 onwards once the British crown took religious as well as ethnic class in any single

over the governance of India. Feudals who infantry company or cavalry troop. Due to

were viewed as unnecessary anachronisms various reasons discussed in detail in the

by Dalhousie were now viewed as allies previous volume of this history the British

against future rebels while ethnic/religious actively followed a policy of Punjabising

factors which were not important in army from 1858 to 1911. As a result by 1911 the

recruitment before 1857, now became a Indian Army was largely a Punjabi although

matter of careful policy, since the pre 1857 not a Punjabi Muslim dominated army45.

was largely one in which soldiers were

The reader may note that during the
mixed down to platoon level regardless of
period 1885—1911 when the ethnic
race or religion. The British policy now
composition of the British Indian Army
changed since the Hindustani Hindus and
changed from a Hindustani
Muslims regardless of race or religion had
majority/Hindu/Non Muslim dominated
jointly rebelled. Thus from 1858 onwards
army to a Punjabi Majority/Punjabi

76 77
Muslim heavy army in 1911; no major army at any stage of its history. Many

war took place; that could prove that Britishers were crystal clear about the

Punjabi troops or Punjabi Muslim situational or historical relativity of the

troops were better than Hindu troops so called martial effectiveness even in

or the Hindustani troops, and the the first half of the nineteenth century.

concept that the British changed the Henry Lawrence a Civil Servant of the

ethnic composition based on proven English East India Company thus

fighting ability in actual combat; has no summed up the whole business about

connection with any reality of military martial effectiveness once he said

history. Thus the “Martial Races “Courage goes much by opinion; and

Theory” was based more on political many a man behaves as a hero or a

considerations than on any tangible or coward, according as he considers he

concrete military effectiveness or is expected to behave. Once two Roman

relative combat effectiveness in any Legions held Britain; now as many

war! In any case the pre 1947 Indian Britons might hold Italy". On the other hand

Army was never a Muslim majority , the reasons why the British preferred the

78 79
Punjabis in the army in preference to other administrative basis rather than anything to

races were rationalised by many Britishers do with real martial superiority. C.C Trench

by stating that the British preferred the thus wrote, “Reasons for preferring

Indian Army to be composed of “Martial northerners were largely racial. To

Races” . Kiplings contemporaries, the taller and

fairer a native, the better man he was

The "Martial Races Theory" in reality was an
likely to be…There was a general
Imperial gimmick to boost the ego of the
preference for the wild over the half
cannon fodder. Various British writers like
educated native as being less addicted
Philip Mason frankly admitted that the real
to unwholesome political
reason for selective recruitment was
thinking…Brahmins had been
political reliability in crisis situations which
prominent in the mutiny, and their diet
the Punjabis had exhibited during the 1857-
and prejudices made difficulties on
58 Bengal Army rebellion.
active service . The “Special Commission

Another British officer thought that "Martial appointed by the Viceroy” to enquire into

Races Theory" had a more sentimental and the organisation of Indian Army was more

80 81
blunt in outlining the political reliability world war the Punjabi case for priority race

factor once it stated that "lower stratum of for recruitment to the army was once again

the Mohammadan urban population, the reinforced when the Punjabi soldiers, Sikh

dispossessed landholders (many of them, Muslim and Hindu loyally served the British

off course, Muslims), the predatory classes, in France Mesopotamia Egypt Palestine and

and perhaps the cadets of the old Gallipoli. Philip Mason thus wrote that the

Muhammadan families (as)… the only "Punjabi Muslims were steady as a rock”

people who really dislike British rule” . The while “a faint question mark hung over the

reason why the Punjabis whether Sikh Pathans” .

Hindu or Muslim were more loyal to the

Such was the difference in reliability within
British at least till 1919 lay in complex
the units that when two Pathan squadrons
socio-political background of the province
of 15 Lancers passively refused to fight
and the complex relationship between the
against the Turks in Mesopotamia, the
Sikhs Hindus and Muslims of the province.
Punjabi Squadrons remained staunch and
Its discussion is beyond the scope of this
the Pathan squadrons were disbanded and
work. The fact remains that in the first
replaced by Hindustani Hindu Jat Squadrons

82 83
from 14th Murray Jat Lancers! confined to the martial races! The

commission ignored the fact that

The Hindustani/Ranghar Muslims were also
recruitment was done to fill ethnic quotas as
further discredited once the 5th Light
decided by the Indian government and was
Infantry a pure Hindustani/Ranghar Muslim
not open to all classes! As per this
unit composed of Delhi region Hindustani
commission‟s report some 86,000 or some
Pathans, and Ranghar Muslims rebelled and
54.36% Indian Army combatants out of a
seized Singapore for about a day in 1915.
total of 158,200 were from Punjab province.

It was more a question of political reliability These did include some Ranghar Muslims

than being more martial that led to further who were administratively Punjabi although

Punjabisation of the army after the first Hindustani ethnically/culturally, but there is

world war. Thus in 1929 as per the “Report no doubt that the vast bulk of these men

of the Statutory Commission on Indian were ethnically Punjabi. The important part

Constitutional Advancement”, military ability of the whole business was the fact that once

was not evenly distributed in the entire 19,000 Nepali Gurkhas, who were in reality

population and, the capacity to fight was foreigners, included in the above mentioned

84 85
total of 158,200 men are excluded the 1939 the Indian Army was only 37%

Punjabi share in Indian Army rose to Muslim, the rest being non Muslim including

61.8%. The Pathans thanks to their political about 12.8 % Sikhs 10.9% Hindu Gurkhas

record in the First World War had been and 37.6% other Hindus.

reduced to just 5,600 men 52 or just 4.02%

Immense demands of WW Two forced the
out of which at least a thousand were non
British to diversify the recruitment pattern
Pathans!
of the Indian Army and although Punjab

The same state of affairs continued till the remained the top contributor of recruits, it

outbreak of the Second World War with the provided about 754,551 out of a total of

major change being the Punjabi Sikhs who 24,61,446, or 30.65% recruits to the Indian

became relatively less reliable politically Army between 3rd September 1939 and 31

because of being under communist August 1945.

influences .
The reader may note that some 314,356

However the reader may note, so as not to or a total of 41.66% from the Punjab

be led astray by any false claims that in contribution and 12.77% recruits were

86 87
Punjabi Muslims. On the other hand the knowledge of

historical knowledge may be gauged from

Thus although Punjab led positionwise as a
the fact that as late as 1992 in a book
province in recruitment, there never was
written and published in the staff college a
any Punjabi Muslim majority or even
brigadier made the Mughal Emperor
Punjabi Muslim majority or even near
Humayun fight the second battle of Panipat,
majority in recruitment to the Indian Army
at a time when Humayun was already dead!
in WW Two. However a myth was widely

propagated in Pakistan that the Punjabi In August 1947 the British Indian Army was

Muslims were the most martial race and the divided into the Pakistan and Indian armies.

Pathan Muslims were the second most Two divergent recruitment policies were

martial race. followed in both the armies. The Indians

broadened their army‟s recruitment base,

I may add that I heard this ridiculous and
officially declaring that recruitment was
irrational myth thousands of times in the
open to all Indian nationals.
course of my 13 years service in Pakistan

Army. Thus the post 1947 Indian Army drifted

88 89
away from being the pre 1939 Punjabised Ayub although allegedly guilty of tactical

army. In Pakistan, Mr Jinnah the politician- timidity in the WW Two in Burma had a low

statesmen who created Pakistan almost opinion about the Bengalis and

single-handedly, as the country‟s first Head discontinued the expansion of the East

of State, adopted a sensible policy, to make Bengal Infantry Regiment from 1951 to

the army a national army. Jinnah ordered 1966.

immediate raising of two infantry battalions

Thus by 1966 the Pakistan Army was a
of Bengali Muslims in 1948 reversing the
predominantly West Pakistani (Punjabi
anti Bengali policy of the pre 1947 British
dominated) army. In addition the vast bulk
colonial government.
of it except one infantry division was

Jinnah‟s far sighted as well as just policy of stationed in West Pakistan in line with the

bringing Bengalis in the fighting arms of the strategic concept evolved in Ayub‟s time

Pakistan Army was discontinued by General that the defence of East Pakistan lay in

Ayub Khan who was the first Pakistani West Pakistan. Thus the “Martial Races

Muslim C in C of the Pakistan Army and Theory” was carried on till 1971 and in 1971

became the Army Chief in January 1951. the vast bulk of West Pakistanis really felt

90 91
that they were a martial race. This real reason for the Indian Army‟s martial

superiority complex played a major part in fervour or relatively better performance was

the wishful thinking in the Pakistani High the British factor, keeping in mind the net

Command that somehow the Indians would total available resources of British Empire or

not invade East Pakistan in strength or even its allies in the two world wars.

if they did so, the troops of this martial race

Tangibles and Intangibles - The
(which was subdued by an 8 % Sikh
Pakistan and Indian Army‟s military
minority from 1799 to 1849, till it was
worth by January 1971
liberated by the English East India

Company!) would frustrate the Indian Army, By January 1971 the Pakistan Army was a

despite all the tangible numerical and reasonable military machine. Its main battle

material Pakistani inferiority. Foreign tank was the Chinese T-59 which was

Secretary Sultan Khan‟s memoirs are full of almost as good as any Indian tank.Its

the existence of this irrational belief in the strategic reserves had the potential to deter

Pakistani High Command. Whatever the any Indian aggressive military move. It was

case at least the 1971 War proved that the on its way to becoming a really national

92 93
army since Yahya‟s announcement of 1969 more higher organisational flexibility by

to allow recruitment of Bengalis in the virtue of having two full fledged armoured

fighting arms. Organisationally the divisions as against one Indian armoured

command was coherently and logically division.

distributed in corps and divisions and the

Later events of 1971 clouded our perception
organisational imbalances of 1965 had been
and we in Pakistan tend to view things as
totally removed. Yahya Khan had not failed
entirely simple for the Indian military
as the C in C.
planners. The Indian military dilemma was a

The Indian Army was numerically larger but possible three front war with the Indian

the advantage was not overwhelming since Army divided between West Pakistan East

the Indian Army was divided between the Pakistan and the Indo Chinese border. The

Chinese Border West Pakistan and East Pakistani defence problem was a two front

Pakistan. Technically the Indians had war with its army divided into two parts i.e

relatively better Soviet tanks one defending the East Pakistan and the

but numerically the Pakistani armour was major part defending West Pakistan. The

larger than Indian armour and possessed Pakistani planners had evolved a clear-cut

94 95
strategy to overcome this dilemma. The period was between 8 and 26 October when

Indian strategy as it was later applied in 1 Corps and 1 Armoured Division were still

1971 war was based on a choice of time outside Western Command. Had Pakistan

which reduced the likely threats that it put in a pre-emptive attack during that

faced from three to two since the December period the consequences would have been

snow effectively nullified chances of Chinese too dreadful to contemplate and all our

intervention and enabled release of Indian efforts would have been trying to correct

Mountain Divisions earmarked for the the adverse situation forced on us”.

Chinese Border to participate in a war

There were however major shortcomings in
against Pakistan. Even then the final Indian
both the armies at the higher leadership
plan was a gamble and would have failed if
level. These pertained to the "Intangible
Pakistan had launched a pre-emptive attack
aspects of military leadership". The
in October 1971. The C in C Indian Western
mercenary origins of the pre 1947 Indian
Command admitted this fact. General
Army had resulted in the creation of an
Candeth who was C in C Western Command
orders oriented machine! This was true for
states in his book that “the most critical
both Indian and Pakistani Armies. These

96 97
shortcomings had their origin in the pre officers. The Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951

1947 British era and were common with the had however started a witch-hunt and many

post 1947 Indian Army. The Indian Army‟s dynamic officers were removed or sidelined.

military worth was retarded and This conspiracy against originality and

downgraded because of a civilian leadership boldness had intensified when Ayub Khan

which viewed the army as a reactionary started manipulating extensions from

entity consisting of mercenaries who had politicians and the army was reduced to a

collaborated with the British rulers. This personal fiefdom of Ayub during the period

attitude was revised once India suffered 1951-1969! In the process the Pakistan

serious loss of prestige in the Sino-Indian Army lost the services of many more

Border War of 1962. However changes in experienced officers simply because they

military spirit of an army occur very slowly were sidelined through political

and by 1971 Indian Army was still trying to supersession or were retired. The gap

recover from many teething problems. The between the two Indo Pak armies in quality

Pakistan Army in 1947 had consisted of of experience may be gauged from the fact

relatively talented as well as spirited that the first Indian C in C was eight years

98 99
senior to Ayub in service and the course than in the basics of higher military

mate of Musa, the second Muslim C in C of organisation or operational strategy!

the Pakistan Army i.e Manekshaw became

The reader must bear in mind that the only
the Indian C in C eleven years after Musa!
major difference despite all other
This may have worked positively for the
differences between the Indian and Pakistan
Pakistan Army had Musa been a man with
Armies was that the Indian Army was
an independent outlook! Musa on the other
numerically larger than the Pakistan Army
hand as Gul Hassan‟s memoirs revealed
was. In quality of higher military leadership
lacked independent judgement dynamism or
both the armies by virtue of being chips of
talent! The Pakistan army during the period
one pre 1947 block were little different from
1951-71 became a highly orders oriented
each other! Both the Indian and Pakistan
machine! Smart on the drill square,
Armies of 1971 were like the Austro-
tactically sound but strategically barren and
Hungarian armies of 1809. They consisted
lacking in operational vision! One whose
of perhaps equally brave junior leaders but
first Pakistani C in C was more interested in
were severely handicapped since rapid
political intrigue and industrial ventures
expansion since the Sino-Indian war of

100 101
1962 and since the 1965 war. Having more Corps which was shortly created before the

corps and division despite being impressive 1965 war was a newly raised formation

on paper had not made the Indian or whose corps commander and armoured

Pakistani military machine really effective divisional commanders were about to retire

because of poor training at divisional and in 1965 when war broke out. The Indian

brigade level. Both numerically larger than commanders beyond unit level, as was the

they were in 1965, but were case with Pakistan Army, consisted of men

organisationally ineffective beyond battalion who had experience of infantry biased

level, having dashing young leaders but operations in WW Two and did not

tactically and operationally inept brigade understand the real essence of armoured

divisional and corps commanders from the warfare. It was this lack of understanding

older pre 1947 commissioned generation that led to the failures in achieving a

whom were initially supposed not to go decisive armour breakthrough in both sides.

beyond company level, had the transfer of It was a failure of command as well as staff

power not taken place in 1947. The strike system where even the staff officers on

corps was a new concept and the Indian 1 both sides were too slow for armoured

102 103
warfare and worked on yards and furlongs interested in doing the job of those one step

rather than miles. Their orientation was junior to him that led to the lack of dash

position oriented rather than mobility and initiative at brigade and battalion level.

oriented and their idea of a battlefield was a They were trained that way and there

typical linear battlefield. Their Burma or behaviour as far as the timidity at brigade

North African experience where the and divisional level has to be taken in this

Japanese and Germans frequently appeared context. Yahya was not a superman who

in their rear had made them extra sensitive could clean up the Pakistani political system

about their flanks. These were men who and reform Pakistan Army within an year or

thought in terms of security rather than two! He started the job of reorganising and

speed. Conformity rather than unorthodox reforming the Pakistan Army but had to

dynamism, having been trained in the leave it half way once he was forced to

slavish colonial orders oriented British clean up the political mess in 1969. He

Indian Army was the cardinal script of their made an admirable attempt to clean the

life. It was this British system in which political garbage which had accumulated

every senior commander was more since 1948 but was over taken by the tide

104 105
of history which in 1971 was too powerful to resolutely poised to go with India through

be manipulated by any single man! thick and thin! Yahya made unique and

brilliant moves to bring the USA and China

The Indian Army of 1971 was much larger
together and vainly hoped that the
than the Indian Army of 1965! It was many
Americans would help him! Unfortunately
times superior strategically and
the US betrayed a country which had been
operationally to the 1965 Indian Army in
loyally served US interests since 1954!
terms of material strength, technological
Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan‟s memoirs
strength and numerical strength. The
recognise Yahya‟s contributions and dismiss
Pakistani defence problem was far more
many myths about Yahya having gone out
complex in 1971 than in 1965. Even in
of his way to annoy the Soviets. This aspect
terms of foreign policy Pakistan had just
is however beyond the scope of this article.
been ditched by one superpower in 1965.

The situation in 1971 was far more worse The Pakistan Army and Yahya inherited a

since India had been adopted by another complex historical problem, which had many

superpower which, unlike the Naive half fathers, at least half of whom were civilians

hearted, American Village maiden, was and politicians! The Bengali alienation

106 107
started from 1948 over the language unity came in 1958 when Ayub took over

question, was increased through Liaquat‟s and allied with the West Pakistan civil-

political intrigues to sideline Suharwardy military-feudal-industrialist clique to sideline

and delay constitution making and thus the Bengalis for eternity from the corridors

holding elections which held a threat of a of power! Familiar names , and a familiar

Bengali prime minister challenging the combination constituted the ruling clique! A

Hindustani-Punjabi dominance of Muslim Punjabi financial wizard, one Dawood, some

politics! The first sin was committed once generals, some civil servants, some

Suharwardy was sidelined! This was Hindustani specialists, one old fox who

followed by coercion and intrigue to force knew how to twist the law, then young, and

parity on the Bengalis! They even accepted some younger whiz kids constituted the

this unjust formula in 1956! Ask the ruling clique! They took Pakistan back to

Punjabis today to agree to a 50% parity as 1864 or even 1804! Local bodies, two huge

against all three provinces and then provinces like the Bengal and Bombay

evaluate the generosity and magnanimity of Presidency etc! The seeds of the division

the Bengalis! The death verdict of Pakistan‟s were laid between 1958 and 1969! Yahya

108 109
Khan whatever his faults was a greater man peacefully to enjoy his hard earned wealth.

than Liaquat or Ayub! He held the first ever Ayub‟s son has remained in the corridors of

general elections based on adult franchise! power in one form or another and is still a

Something that the so called Quaid e Millat running horse! Yahya Khan is much

had failed to hold for four long years, not criticised for problems with which he had

withstanding all hollow rhetoric by his nothing to do! For having done a job which

admirers that he was going to make a great Liaquat should have done in 1950! The

announcement on 16 October 1951, the Pakistan Army was a relatively good fighting

original D-Day in 1999 too! Yahya restored machine in 1971! Great reforms were made

provincial autonomy, brought the Bengalis in organisation, education and training! It

in the army, and reorganised the army! He was recovering from the curse of one-man

did everything that was right but it was too rule! The cyclone of 1970 in words of an

late! He was fighting against the tide of Indian general destroyed everything! Yes

history! The Pakistan Army was tossed into there was a far more dangerous intangible

a volcano whose architect enjoyed total and invisible cyclone that had been building

power for eleven years and retired up since 1948! This cyclone had four great

110 111
fathers! Yahya Khan was not one of these child as far as the child‟s genetic codes are

four great men! The "Martial Races Theory" concerned! The failure of 1971 was not an

that played a major role in Pakistani individuals failure but failure of a system

overconfidence in 1971 before actual with flawed constitutional geographic

operations had many fathers and dated philosophic and military organisational and

from British times.These British officers had conceptual foundations! I find nothing

in 1930s described Jews as non martial! better to repeat once again the saying that

Compare the four Arab-Israeli wars with this “Success surely has many fathers and

attitude! The military action in 1971 was failure is an orphan! We must however not

widely hailed in West Pakistan! Yet in forget that the failure of 1971 had roots

December 1971 only Yahya was blamed! that go back to 150 years of history!

Yahya was not the architect of the problems

that destroyed the united Pakistan of 1971!

He paid for the sins of all that ruled Pakistan

from 1947 to 1969! He could do little more

than what a midwife can do in birth of a

112 113
I interviewed Brigadier Taj in July 2001 the army and the civilian population. The

and below is his version :-- hatred grew with the passage of time. The

East Pakistani non-Muslim intellectuals,

YOU WERE GSO-1 (INTELLIGENCE) 14
particularly those who had economic hold
DIVISION IN EAST PAKISTAN IN 1970.
on that wing of the country, fanned the
WHAT WAS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE
flames of hatred in a very systematic
SITUATION AT THAT POINT IN TIME
manner. The organization headed by
AND DID YOU EVER IMAGINE THAT
Maulana Bhashani and Jamaat-i-Islami did
CIVIL WAR AND SECESSION WAS
oppose Sh. Mujib and his party but they
IMMINENT? HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS
were no match to the sway of latter. My
THE REACTION TO YOUR REQUESTS?
assessment was that the alarming situation

On joining 14 Division my analysis was that could be resolved by politicians and not by

Sh. Mujib Ur Rehman was a popular leader military commanders who were at the helm

and his Six-Point programme was on the of affairs at that time.

lips of almost every East Pakistani. There

PLEASE TELL US ABOUT YOUR
was hatred against West Pakistanis both in
EXPERIENCES IN EAST PAKISTAN IN

114 115
THE MONTH OF MARCH 1971? East Pakistan establishment, either out of

fear for reprisal or wilful determinations,

During the 1970 elections, Sh. Mujib‟s
also supported the agitation and walked out
Awami League won all the seats in East
of their offices. The army was called in to
Pakistan leaving of course one or two which
control the situation but it was too late. The
was inconsequential. With a pretty less
East Pakistanis, with the help of Mukti
sway, the same phenomenon was witnessed
Bahinis and Indian agents, virtually
in West Pakistan, where PPP emerged as
launched a war against West Pakistanis
the dominant party. In all fairness, the
irrespective of any differentiation between
majority party Awami League, should have
the army and the civil population, who were
formed the government, but a combination
vastly outnumbered. Government officials
of inauspicious circumstances, created by
from West Pakistan callously killed along
politicians, forced General Yahya not to hold
with their wives and children. Food supplies
the NA session on the scheduled date and
to the cantonments were stopped and banks
postpone it. This was not acceptable to East
were ordered not to encash cheques of
Pakistanis who came out on the streets to
West Pakistanis. There was complete revolt
agitate against the decision. Most of the

116 117
and anarchy and all the shots were called Yaqoob who had resigned following his

by Sh. Mujib and his party. Given the differences with Gen. Yahya, Gen. Tikka,

particular nature of the situation and its having assessed the situation also

political contours, it was not easy for the suggested a political solution and requested

army to set its targets. Lt. Gen. Sahibzada Gen. Yahya to come to East Pakistan for

Yaqoob, Commander Eastern Command, dialogue with Sheikh Mujib and his party

requested Gen. Yahya to come to Dacca to associates. A number of West Pakistanis

handle the situation but he refused to do so. leaders were also present in Dacca at that

Sheikh Mujib also planned a big rally on time, they included Sardar Shaukat Hayat,

March 6, 1971 where it was feared that he Mufti Mahmood, Wali Khan, Akbar Bugti and

would announce UDI (Unilateral Declaration some others, on March 19, Z.A. Bhutto also

of Independence). In the meantime, killing arrived with his entourage which; included

of West Pakistanis continued and atrocities J. A. Rahim, Hayat Sherpao, Rafi Raza and

against them remained unchecked. On Ghulam Mustafa Khar. Gen. Yahya had

March 6, Gen. Tikka Khan arrived in Dacca come four days earlier on March 15. He held

to take over the Command from Gen. a series of meeting with the leaders of both

118 119
the wings but the issues at stake could not CORRECT?

be settled. Sheikh Mujib presented a

As I have said earlier, the law and order
document of confederation before the
situation had gone completely out of control
President. Obviously this could not be
and there was no other course available but
accepted under the circumstances existing
military action to restore normalcy. We
at that time. This led to complete change in
started on March 25 and the situation was
the attitude of the army and it was decided
brought under control by the middle of
to take military action to control the law and
April. After that, the government and the
order situation.
politicians should have joined hands to

IT HAS BEEN ASSERTED IN SOME install a political setup in the premises but,

QUARTERS THAT EVENTS OF 25TH OF unfortunately, this was not done.

MARCH 1971 CONSTITUTED THE POINT

WAS SECESSION AND CIVIL WAR
OF NO RETURN AS FAR AS SOLVING
INEVITABLE IN 1971 OR WAS IT
THE EAST PAKISTAN CRISIS WAS
AVOIDABLE?
CONCERNED. HOW FAR IS THIS

It was, no doubt, avoidable provided the

120 121
democratic process was allowed to take its 1971?

course. There were too many vested

No comparison can be made between the
interests both in the army and among the
two. Tikka was every inch professional and
politicians.
dedicated soldier.

WHAT HAPPENED POST-MARCH 25,

IS IT TRUE THAT THERE WAS A DIVIDE
1971?
BETWEEN THE OFFICERS WHO WERE

The military action proposed was highly PRESENT IN 1970 IN EAST PAKISTAN

successful and law and order situation was AND THOSE WHO CAME IN AND

under control. The violent elements went AROUND 25 MARCH, 1971?

underground. The government did try to

Yes, to some extent it is true. The new
install civilian government but the popular
comers did not appreciate the actions of the
leaders of Awami Party were missing.
officers already posted there. The

HOW WOULD YOU COMPARE TIKKA disagreement was more visible among

WITH NIAZI AS A COMMANDER IN senior officers.

122 123
HOW DID THE MEN TAKE THE CIVIL borders where they had their hideouts.

WAR?

As there was complete anarchy in East

Pakistan, the West Pakistanis, including

army men were being humiliated and

butchered, the men took the military action

as the only answer. The 1971 War

An examination of the strategic concept

HOW DO YOU RATE THE MUKHTI
of war
BAHINIS WHO FOUGHT AGAINST YOU?

The strategic concept of Pakistan‟s defence

Mukhti Bahini were not a properly trained
i.e. „Defence of East Pakistan lies in the
force but their venom against West
West‟ was formulated by Ayub Khan in late
Pakistanis was high. They could not stand
fifties and became the foundation of
against regular army and this was one
Pakistan‟s defence policy.
major reason that they scattered too soon

and went either underground or beyond the The concept envisaged having bulk of the

124 125
army in the northern half of the West Wing Forces of the country as defenders of the

and was based on the assumption that this country‟s integrity‟ etc etc. External front

arrangement would force India to keep bulk includes the country‟s Armed Forces, and its

of its army/strategic reserves on its western foreign policy. A country‟s defence is based

front. We will analyse the various aspects of on both and any weakness in one will

this concept as following:- weaken the other. This inter-relationship

was ignored by Pakistan‟s civilian and

a. The interconnection between
military leadership during the period 1947-
the internal and external fronts. The
71. The Muslim League was initially
basis of defence and stability of a country is
dominated by a partnership of refugees
absolute harmony and in consonance with
from Muslim minority provinces and later by
the internal and external fronts. The
a combination of Punjabi Muslims and civil-
internal front means „morale of the civilian
military bureaucrats. The Bengalis were
population‟ „their belief in the legitimacy and
alienated first because of the National
moral credibility of the political government‟
language issue and later because of the
„belief in national aims and ideology of the
constitutional representation issue. The
country‟ „identification with the Armed

126 127
Bengalis were initially patriotic and only intellectually naive and tactically timid man

demanded linguistic equality and had even became the Pakistan Army‟s C in C in 1951.

agreed to political parity in 1956. This Ayub was biased against having Bengalis in

arrangement was seriously disturbed once the army. During his tenure an unwritten

Ayub usurped political power in 1958. policy of not raising any more Bengali

Immediately after independence the infantry battalions was followed. Ayub also

founder of the nation Mr Jinnah made an retired the most promising Bengali officer

attempt to broaden the army‟s recruitment Major General Majeed soon after taking

base by ordering the raising of the East over. The East Bengal Regiment was limited

Bengal Regiment in 1948. This was a purely to two units and the expanded Pakistan

political decision taken by Mr Jinnah and Army remained a largely Punjabi dominated

implemented by a British C in C. By army. The irony of the whole affair was the

December 1948 two battalions of this unit fact that during this entire period all the

composed of Bengali Muslims had been army chiefs were non-Punjabi! In any case

raised. This process was, however, this was the first serious negation of the

discontinued once Ayub Khan an concept of having a national army. The

128 129
Army was on the other hand firstly viewed West Wing. The Army was increasingly

as a Punjabi Army in the East Wing. viewed as a coercive instrument which was

Secondly and far more worse; it was viewed aimed at perpetuating the West Wing‟s

as an organisation designed primarily for political and economic exploitation of the

the defence of the West Wing. The 1965 East Wing. By 1971 Pakistan‟s „Internal

war further convinced the Bengalis that the Front‟ was seriously eroded and this in turn

army was not a national army but one greatly weakened its external front.

designed to defend the West Wing. Thus

b. The Military Capability to
from 1965 the rift between the internal and
implement the strategic concept. Till
external fronts became much wider and the
1962 the military balance between Pakistan
army was increasingly viewed as a foreign
and India was equal. The Sino-Indian
entity in the East Wing. The seeds of the
conflict led to a major change in Indian
events of 1971 were laid during the Ayub
defence policy and the Indians initiated a
era. The Bengali populace viewed the
major programme of military expansion. In
federal government as a neo colonial
1965 when the second Indo-Pak War took
government with its political base in the
place; the relative Indo-Pak military

130 131
capabilities were not as significant; and strategic reserves since Pakistan‟s armour

Pakistan was better placed at least in terms potential was severely reduced because of

of strategic reserves. Stoppage of US stoppage of US aid. The Indians on the

military aid in 1965 brought a major change other hand almost completely replaced their

in the military sphere. Pakistan concluded ancient tank fleet of 1965 with brand new

an alternate defence arrangement with Vijayanta-Vickers or Russian supplied T-

China but this was not sufficient to redress 54/55 Tanks. In brief Pakistan did not

the imbalance. India on the other hand possess the military capability to implement

more rapidly expanded her Armed Forces the strategic concept.

and the gap between India and Pakistan in

c. Pakistan‟s Internal
terms of infantry formations became far
Situation. The military regime of Yahya
more wider than in 1965. Thus India‟s
made an honest attempt to bring
overall military superiority over Pakistan
democracy in Pakistan and successfully held
increased from 1965 when it was about 20
Pakistan‟s first ever general elections based
to 35 in Infantry to 15 to 32 in 1971. The
on Universal Suffrage since 1946. The
situation became far more worse in terms of
country was already polarised because of

132 133
the political legacy of the Ayub era and the with a civil war as well as an external war.

East Wing was on the verge of secession. This adverse internal situation nullified the

This situation was not of Yahya‟s making whole concept.

but inherited by him. The situation

d. Lack of clarity in the Pakistani
demanded extraordinary political vision
Military Higher Command about the
which was sadly missing in the country‟s
„Modus Operandi‟ of executing the
political as well as military leadership.
Strategic Concept. It may be noted that at
Yahya although sincere at heart believed in
least till 1968-69 the Pakistani GHQ was not
the power of bayonet and thought that the
clear about „what action should be taken in
East Wing could be kept within the
West Pakistan if an Indian attack was
federation through military action. The
mounted against East Pakistan‟. In brief the
consequences of the surgical and brief
Pakistani military leadership was confused
military action were not fully grasped by
and vague about the method of execution of
Yahya and most of the West Wing‟s
the strategic concept; i.e. „Defence of East
politicians. In 1971 the country was divided
Pakistan lies in West Pakistan‟ as late as
and in no position to simultaneously deal
1968-69 at the time when defence plans

134 135
were revised under General Yaqub Khan‟s operations and the counter offensive‟ or

tenure as CGS. The concept was based on „that the reaction to any Indian invasion of

the assumption that Indian pressure/threat East Pakistan should be an all out offensive

against East Pakistan could be dealt with by by Pakistan‟s Strike Corps i.e. the I Corps‟.

launching a major counter offensive taking Yahya and his Chief of Staff General

the war inside Indian territory on the Hameed felt otherwise. They were of the

Western Front. This was a very generalized view that „preliminary (local level tactical

assumption and was interpreted by different attacks) operations by the holding

officers in a different manner. General Gul formations should be launched first and

Hasan who took over as CGS had more when the preliminary objectives had been

clear ideas about the implementation of this secured and the enemy‟s attention had

concept; but Gul‟s views were not shared by been diverted, the main counter offensive

the higher military leadership. One school of should be set in motion. Yahya and Hameed

thought led by the CGS General Gul Hassan failed to realise that the only chance of

felt that this could be best done by salvation in 1971 when Pakistan was facing

„simultaneous launching of preliminary serious odds was in resorting to the boldest

136 137
measures. Gul‟s views were not accepted had no offensive role. In brief once Pakistan

and Yahya and Hameed decided on a vague embarked on war its strategic plans were

plan of „first launch preliminary operations confused and vague and its strike formation

followed by counter offensive‟. The final was not clear about when it was to be

strategic plan was vague and confusing on launched. This conceptual confusion

two counts; i.e. firstly it did not take into doomed Pakistan‟s strategic plans from the

account the fact that the Indians enjoyed onset.

overwhelming superiority in the Eastern

The Validity of the Chinese Card
Theatre and possessed the potential of

overrunning East Pakistan; secondly no time The Chinese card on which so much hope

frame was fixed for launching the counter was based had limited and seasonal

offensive of 1 Corps. It may be noted that validity! The Himalayan snow fall blocked

Pakistan possessed relatively superior the passes through which China could

strategic reserves on in the Western militarily influence the war! This seasonal

Theatre and its 1 Corps two strike divisions factor was never incorporated as an

i.e. 6 Armoured Division and 17 Division important factor in the Pakistani strategic

138 139
plan. If China was to be involved or Chinese The Pakistani GHQ did well in case of the

friendship tested the ideal time to launch a first and created a strong strategic reserve

pre-emptive attack on India was mid-June by new raisings and by economising sectors

or mid-July or even September. Manekshaw which were relatively less vulnerable. Its

the Indian Chief realised this and forced response to the East Pakistan insurgency in

Indira to wait till December when the the first phase in March 1971 was praised

Himalayan snowfall had completely nullified even by Indian military writers as „a

chances of Chinese overland intervention remarkable performance on Pakistan‟s part‟.

and had freed India‟s Mountain Divisions China aided Pakistan immensely and two

facing China for the attack on East Pakistan. new infantry divisions were raised to replace

the 9 and 16 Divisions which were

The Fate of Pakistan Army‟s Strategic
Pakistan‟s strategic reserve till March 1971.
Plan in Actual Execution
In addition Pakistan raised 18 and 23

Foch defined two broad essentials of Division in June July 1971 and the 33 and

strategy i.e. „Economy of Force‟ and 37 Division on the eve of the war. It may be

„Preservation of Freedom of Manoeuvre‟. noted that apart from this Pakistan had also

140 141
raised two independent armoured brigades Pakistan launched its counter offensive

in 1970 by withdrawing the integral immediately after the war started. If this

armoured regiments of some of its existing had been done it was possible that the

infantry divisions. All these measures gave Indians could have been forced to pull out

the Pakistani commanders a significant some of their formations from the Eastern

strategic reserve to implement the official Theatre; thereby reducing the pressure on

strategy of launching a counter offensive on Pakistan‟s Eastern Command. Since no such

the Western Front aimed at ensuring that counter offensive was launched; India was

the Indians could not concentrate their allowed to invade and conquer East Pakistan

entire strength and over run East Pakistan. at leisure. In the meantime two Pakistani

However, the Pakistani GHQ failed in the armoured divisions; one independent

actual execution of this strategic plan. armoured brigade (3 Armoured Brigade-

Lahore) and three infantry divisions (17, 7

It was in preservation of „Freedom of action‟
and 37) remained uncommitted during the
that the Pakistani GHQ failed. This freedom
entire war.
of action could be preserved and denied on

the other hand to the Indians only if Once the war started the Indians were

142 143
extremely cautious. Once they realised that In addition the other half of 33 Division was

Pakistan was irresolute; they became more committed to the defence of the Southern

audacious and stepped up their offensive Sector once the 18 Division attack towards

operation. In Shakargarh for example the Loganewala failed. As a result of this

Indian 1 Corps Commander had initially increased pressure the Indians were unable

earmarked five of his nine infantry brigades to impose their will on the Pakistani GHQ in

for a holding role. Once he realised by 7th strategic terms.

September that Pakistan was not launching

This was despite the fact that Pakistan had
any major attack in his area of operations
a relatively better offensive potential in the
he switched three of his holding infantry
Western Theatre.
brigades into an offensive role. This

increased pressure, forced the Pakistani Yahya Khan based the entire Pakistani plan

GHQ to pull out one armoured regiment on the wishful thought that the Indians

from its 23 Division attack in Chamb and to would never invade East Pakistan. Once the

commit half of its 33 Division (a part of the Indians did so he became indecisive and

strategic reserve) to defence of Shakargarh. kept on delaying the decision of launching

144 145
Pakistan‟s strategic reserve in order to division (T-59/T-54/55 Tanks) and two

reduce Indian pressure on the Eastern infantry divisions (7 and 37 Division) which

Command. He only decided to launch the were based in area Arifwala-Pirowal-

counter offensive on 16 December when the Burewala-Bahawalnagar. This strike corps

Eastern Command had surrendered. Thus was to launch the main attack inside Indian

the strategic concept i.e. defence of East territory from general area Sadiq Ganj-

Pakistan lies in West Pakistan; whatever it Amruka-Minchinabad and thrust towards

was worth in words of General K.M Arif was Bhatinda; thereafter, swinging north

never tried or implemented. towards Ludhiana. The Indians were

relatively well placed in this area and had

Chances of Success of Pakistani I Corps
their 1st Armoured Division in Muktsar area
Offensive
consisting of four armoured regiments

We will examine in brief the chances of (Vijayantas) and three mechanised infantry

success of the Pakistani 2 Corps offensive; battalions. Apart from this they had two

in case it had been launched in brief. The covering troop forces i.e. the „Mike Force‟

Strike Force consisted of one armoured (T-54 and T-55) comprising one tank

146 147
regiment and one tank regiment minus, one of armour which may have led to a draw or

squadron in area in Ganganagar area. This one side inflicting relatively greater losses

force was tasked to threaten the flanks of on the other without making much headway

Pakistani 1st Armoured Division in case it in the final reckoning.

attacked India while the 1st Indian

This means that the 1 Corps attack even if
Armoured Division manouvred into action.
launched held no guarantee of success in
In addition the „Foxtrot Force‟ (T-54/55)
terms of relieving the pressure on East
consisting of one tank regiment and another
Pakistan or in terms of capturing a strategic
tank regiment less one squadron was
objective. There was, however, one
already under command 67 Independent
guarantee of success for Pakistan‟s 2 Corps
Brigade tasked with defence of Fazilka.
too! This was in case Pakistan launched a

The above mentioned dispositions meant pre-emptive attack on India in early

that force wise the Indians were well poised October. This would have been a good

to defend the area where Pakistan‟s main option. Pakistan in any case had been

counteroffensive was to be launched. The condemned for human right violations and

result would surely have been a fierce clash genocide and this allegation is levelled even

148 149
today. Unfortunately its leadership 1st Armoured Division north of Beas River.

remained obsessed with diplomatic niceties This was a far better option since an

and hairsplitting and tried to play an all advance of 15 to 20 miles would have

correct conduct game. Thus this golden enabled Pakistan to sever the Indian line of

chance was lost. communication. In the case of 2 Corps

counter offensive the operation involved an

Other Offensive Options
advance of more than 60 miles in face of an

Pakistan had other offensive options to Indian armoured division. In 1 Corps area

relieve pressure on East Pakistan. These the Indians had two armoured brigades as

included employment of its northern strike against one Pakistani Armoured Division and

corps i.e. the 1 Corps (6 Armoured Division one independent armoured brigades. The

and 17 Division) to launch a thrust in the far Pakistani GHQ, however, made no plans for

more vulnerable Indian belly between any offensive employment of 1 Corps,

Pathankot and Chamb; thereby threatening offensive employment and this formation

the lifeline of four Indian divisions in was left unutilised throughout the war.

Kashmir; forcing the Indians to switch their Initially two of its armoured regiments were

150 151
employed in the 23 Division attack in neighbour having full support of USSR;

Chamb and after 10 December once, one of while at the same time facing a civil war

its armoured regiments reverted back to it; created because of ambition of two crafty

it was given no other task except to be politicians. The odds with which Yahya was

prepared to launch a counterattack in faced were high and demanded the strategic

Zafarwal. vision of Moltke and the operational talent

of a Rommel or Manstein. There were some

Pakistani Military Leadership‟s Dilemma. It
Rommels like General Eftikhar but no
became fashionable after the war to heap
Moltke‟s to give higher strategic direction.
all the blame on Yahya and his cronies.
Yahya was initially dynamic but successively
Yahya, as a matter of fact was a far more
became more timid and cautious at a time
capable chief than Musa. He inherited a
when the only salvation was in resorting to
situation which was of Ayub‟s making.
the boldest measures. Even the Indians
Yahya did his best to remedy the serious
praised Yahya‟s initial conduct. One author
military imbalances; raised new formations;
thus wrote: „Nevertheless Yahya showed a
improved plans where none as a matter of
good sense in taking decisions and his
fact had existed. He was faced with a hostile

152 153
command decisions were generally well necessary by force‟. Kissinger in his White

deliberated upon and sound. He had been House Years has asserted that it was USA‟s

thrown into a rotten situation, which had intervention which saved West Pakistan

come into being the day Pakistan came into from being overrun by India. This is a vague

being with its two wings. His only hope lay statement. It is doubtful whether India was

in somehow getting round Mujeeb and willing to invade West Pakistan in force after

getting him to see reason, he tried that... the fall of East Pakistan.

he had perhaps achieved a measure of

The answer to Pakistan‟s dilemma was a
success too... but the cyclone of 12/13
bold attack and only a bold all out attack
November destroyed everything... the
could have forced India to drop the idea of
elections gave the Bengalis an
invading East Pakistan. Long ago Clausewitz
overwhelming majority. The Six Points
well summed up the solution for states like
would have meant a virtual dismemberment
Pakistan in 1971 when he said „Offensive
of Pakistan. This could not be permitted. So
war, that is the taking advantage of the
the only course open was to hold military
present moment, is always commanded
rule and restore the law and order if
when the future holds out a better prospect

154 155
not to ourselves but to our adversary‟. In completely to an issue before the worst

this case the future had better prospects for time arrives or of gaining at least in the

India and Pakistan‟s only hope was an all meantime some advantages which it may

out offensive posture. Clausewitz defined hereafter turn to account‟.

the solution in yet more detail in the

Indian General Candeth who commanded
following words „Let us suppose a small
the Indian Western Command made a very
state is involved in a contest with a very
thought-provoking remark in his memoir of
superior power, and foresees that with each
1971 war which proves that Pakistan‟s only
year its position will become worse: should
chance lay in offensive action. Candeth thus
it not; if war is inevitable, make use of the
wrote:-
time when its situation is furthest from

worst? Then it must attack, not because the „The most critical period was between 8 and

attack in itself ensures any advantages Ñ it 26 October when 1 Corps and 1 Armoured

will rather increase the disparity of forces- Division were still outside Western

but because this state is under the Command. Had Pakistan put in a pre-

necessity of either bringing the matter emptive attack, during that period, the

156 157
consequences would have been too dreadful Pakistan Civil servants and the then army C

to contemplate and all our efforts during the in C had ganged up in the period 1951-58

war would have been spent in trying to to keep the much despised Bengali in his

correct the adverse situation forced on us‟. place! The civilians did well in creating the

1956 Constitution which solved all major

Conclusion
political problems of Pakistan. The

Only a Napoleon or a Frederick could have politicians were, however, never allowed to

saved Pakistan in 1971 from being divided implement this constitution since its

and humiliated and cut to size! There were implementation through holding of a

potential Napoleons and Fredericks in the general elections in 1959 may have led to a

Pakistan Army in 1947-48 but these were East Bengali victory, thus seriously reducing

systematically sidelined or weeded out from the civil-military dominance of Pakistani

1950 to 1958. A conspiracy against politics. Thus martial law was imposed in

originality and boldness! Ironically the 1958 to avoid a general election! Ironically

political situation that the Pakistan Army the army finally saw the light of the day a

inherited was created once the West bit too late once a martial law was imposed

158 159
in 1969 to hold a general election ! The tide

of history in these 11 years had become

irreversible! Strategic insight could at best

have averted total humiliation! But there

was no strategic insight since Ayub Khan

Some Reflections on 1971-A Different
had ensured from 1950 to 1969 that no
Perspective
strategic insight should be groomed and
Even a school child in today's
cultivated!
Pakistan condemns the army, General

Yahya (Khan???) and Mr Bhutto for

the 1971 fiasco. This has become

fashionable. The recent declassification

of the Hamood ur Rahman Commission

Report has added fuel to fire.

160 161
This brief article is an attempt to see implemented by the civil-military clique

things in a different perspective. It is who took power in 1958. Once the

neither a defence of the army nor of Ayub dictatorship finally overthrown in

any individual but an attempt to see 1969 the army once again was forced

things as they were. to set the house in order. No one in

today's Pakistan realizes that the Army

Pakistan as it was till 1971 was not a under General Yahya successfully held

geographically coherent state. Its the first general election of Pakistan in

defence was the strategist's nightmare. just one year while Pakistan's first

Even drafting its constitution keeping elected prime minister had failed to do

in view its ethnic and cultural makeup the same in four years!

was a politician's nightmare! The

politicians of the first decade must, The alienation of East Pakistanis was

however, be commended for creating a not a suddenly mechanical knee jerk

constitution in 1956! This constitution reaction that started with the

was, however, not allowed to be enforcement of Pakistan's second

162 163
martial law in 1969. It started right Pakistan Army intervened in March

from 1948 over the language question 1971. Even a hostile observer like an

and successively intensified after the Indian military historian admitted that

army under Generals Iskandar Mirza 'Mujib's Six Points would have meant a

and Ayub Khan usurped power in virtual dismemberment of Pakistan'

1958. The process gained the .The observer in question is Brigadier

momentum of an invincible avalanche Jagdev Singh writin in is book

by 1971. Dismemberment of Pakistan-1971-Indo

Pak War published by Lancer

Even dispassionate observers agree International - New Delhi in 1988.

that in 1971 the East Pakistanis wanted

complete autonomy and adoption of the

Six Point Programme of Sheikh Mujib General Yahya who led Pakistan in the

which would have led in any case to dual capacity of political and military

Pakistan's political disintegration. It chief had three broad options after the

was in these circumstances that the bloody military crackdown in East

164 165
Pakistan in March-April 1971: 1) arrive of the process of political

at a political compromise with the East rapprochement and bitter feelings

Pakistani political leadership, 2) start created in the East Wing as a result of

a pre-emptive war by attacking India in excesses committed by the army.

response to Indian active military aid

to the Bengali rebels before the The second option was not exercised

Himalayan snowfall blocked the passes since the U.S. leadership lulled Yahya

thus closing any chances of Chinese into a false sense of security into

intervention and 3) merely save West thinking that India would not start an

Pakistan. all out war. Pakistan's only sincere

friend and ally, China warned Pakistan

Yahya attempted to do the first but and repeatedly asked its leadership to

failed because of various reasons arrive at a political solution.

including determined Indian attempts

to sabotage any attempt at arriving at a It will be worthwhile to quote an

political settlement, delayed initiation Indian military observer at this point.

166 167
Brigadier Jagdev Singh thus wrote that "the only course open was to hold

"Yahya showed a good sense in taking on to the military rule and restore the

decisions and his command decisions law and order, if necessary by force" .

were generally well deliberated upon

and sound. He had been thrown into a Once the war finally started in 1971,

rotten situation, which had come into Yahya had two options. Start a counter-

being the day Pakistan with its two offensive from day one in an attempt to

wings was born; it was a totally reduce Indian pressure against East

unnatural alliance...but Yahya faced the Pakistan, or to save West Pakistan from

situation with tact and intelligence, and being overrun by the Indians in phase

made a damn good try to keep the two after the Indians had captured East

Eastern Wing within Pakistan" . Pakistan.

In Pakistan the military crackdown of The main criticism against Yahya has

March 1971 is much criticized. Even an been that he did not start a counter

Indian admitted quoted above admitted offensive immediately after the war

168 169
started. First of all, we will discuss why Muktesar-Ganganagar area. Thus, an

this may have happened and what attack by the 1st Armoured Division

would have happened in case Pakistan would not have relieved the Indian

had started an all out offensive from pressure on the Eastern Front and

day one on the Western Front. Eastern Command's chances of

surviving as a credible military entity

All Indian accounts prove that by were bleak.

November 1971 the Indian Army

opposite West Pakistan was well poised The Indians were well prepared to

to meet any Pakistani attack on the meet Pakistan's Northern Strategic

Western Front. Had Pakistan's main Reserve (i.e the 6 Armoured

strike force, the 1st Armoured Division, Division/17 Division) in the Shakargarh

been launched it could not have gone Bulge, and any attack by this formation

beyond 10 or 20 miles since the Indian could not have possibly influenced the

1st Armoured Division was war in the Eastern Theatre.

concentrated opposite it in the

170 171
Later the Pakistani High Command dilemma once he said "There are two

was much criticized for having been led considerations which as motives may

by drunkards who did not launch an practically take the place of inability to

offensive in 1971. If we keep the above continue the contest. The first is the

background in mind any sane and improbable, the second is the excessive

dispassionate reader would agree that price of success" !

it was not the question of being drunk

or not drunk, but a simple strategic Did Pakistan Army have the ability to

reality that a counter-offensive continue an unnecessary contest

launched by Pakistan Army in defending an area whose people were

December 1971 could not have saved irrevocably alienated. The price of

the Eastern Commander from the success, which was impossible in any

ignominy of surrender. case in December 1971, was excessive!

It later became fashionable in Pakistan

Long ago Carl Von Clausewitz with the benefit of hindsight to criticize

beautifully summed up Yahya Khan's Yahya alone as the principal culprit of

172 173
1971. future!

It goes to Pakistan Army's credit that The men who died in 1971 gave their

they saved West Pakistan without lives so that future generations may

committing its strategic reserves! have a better tomorrow. The Hamood

Today this fact is not understood at all! ur Rahman Commission Report was

If the Bengalis got their independence unfortunately drafted with the help of

in 1971, the West Pakistani Muslims some retired military windbags who

were saved from Indian slavery would do anything for a 'crate of

through the ceasefire of 1971! Today Whiskey'! Bhutto or Yahya were no

with a nuclear capability the Indians angels but neither was Mujeeb! These

will have to think 1000 times before men, all of them, acted rightly in their

attacking Pakistan! Today we forget own manner, none was an angel as I

that by swallowing the bitter pill of earlier said but none was great a villain

defeat in 1971 our elders saved us to as they are today made out to be.

be able to fight in a better manner in Yahya is still remembered by those

174 175
officers and soldiers who saw him.

Mujeeb, whatever we may say was the

founder of a nation. Bhutto whatever

anyone may say was a great man who

did many things which made Pakistan

stronger than it was in 1971!

What more can I say but repeat that

excellent verse "Never set a squadron

in the field, nor knew the division of

battle, more than a spinster"!

Figure 3 Colonel Nadir Ali -The Commando officer who was a direct
participant in events of March 1971

176 177
Recollections of a Pakistan Army Officers My first action was in mid April 1971. "It is

about East Pakistan Civil War of 1971 Mujib-ur-Rahman's home district. It is a

hard area. Kill as many bastards as you can

Colonel Nadir Ali (Retired)
and make sure there is no Hindu left alive,"
http://www.viewpointonline.net/a-khaki-
I was ordered.
dissident-on-1971.html

"Sir, I do not kill unarmed civilians who do

During the fateful months preceding the
not fire at me," I replied.
dismemberment of Pakistan, I served as a
"Kill the Hindus. It is an order for everyone.
young Captain, meantime promoted to the
Don't show me your commando finesse!".
rank of the Major, in Dhaka as well as

Chittagong. In my position as second-in-

command and later as commander, I served

I flew in for my first action. I was dropped
with 3 Commando Battalion.
behind Farid Pur. I made a fire base and we

fired all around. Luckily there was nobody to

178 179
shoot at. Then suddenly I saw some caught up to make contact. They arrived

civilians running towards us. They appeared firing with machine guns all around and I

unarmed. I ordered "Stop firing!" and saw smoke columns rising in villages behind

shouted at villagers, questioning them what them. "What's the score?" the Colonel

did they want. "Sir we have brought you asked.

some water to drink!", was the brisk reply.

"There was no resistance so we didn't kill

I ordered my subordinates to put the anyone," he was informed.

weapons away and ordered a tea-break. We

He fired from his machine gun and some of
remained there for hours. Somebody
the villagers who had brought us water, fell
brought and hoisted a Pakistani flag.
dead. "That is the way my boy," the Colonel
"Yesterday I saw all Awami League flags
told this poor Major.
over your village" I told the villagers. That

was indeed the fact. I didn't know whether

to laugh or cry. Later the main army column I was posted there from early April to early

180 181
October. We were at the heart of events. A course mate as well as a room-mate at the

team from my unit had picked up Sheikh Pakistan Military Academy (PMA). He was

Mujib Ur Rehman from his residence on also a fellow officer in SSG. Brig Abu Tahir,

25th March, 1971. We were directly under who brought General Zia back to power in a

the command of Eastern Command. As SSG counter-counter coup, was also a friend and

battalion commander, I received direct fellow officer in SSG. He was a leftist, jailed

orders from General Niazi, General Rahim and later hanged by Gen Zia Ur Rehman

and later Gen Qazi Majid of 14 Div Dhaka. whom he brought back to power in the

fateful months in Bangladesh's history, after

the murder of founding father, Sheikh Mujib

Ironically, the resistance was led by General
Ur Rehman.
Zia Ur Rehman (later to become
Another leftist friend was Major Zia Ud Din.
Bangladesh's military ruler) was a fellow
He was a freedom fighter and as Naxalite
instructor at Pakistan Military Academy.
remained under ground from 1971 to1989
Similarly, General Khalid Musharaf, who
when a general amnesty was declared.
overthrew Zia in a counter-coup, was my

182 183
 I was fortunately not even witness to any

massacre. But I knew what was going on in

I came back to West Pakistan for getting my
every sector. Thousands were killed and
promotion to Lt. Colonel, in my parent corp,
millions rendered homeless. Over nine
Ordnance, in October 1971.From December
million went as refugees to India. An order
1971 onwards, I began to suffer memory
was given to kill the Hindus. I received the
loss till my retirement on medical grounds
same order many times and was reminded
in 1973. I remained in the nut house for six
of it . The West Pakistani soldiery
months in 1973. As a Punjabi writer, I
considered that Kosher. The Hamood Ur
regained my memory and rebuilt my life. I
Rehman Commission Report mentions this
remember every moment from the year
order. Of the ninety-three lakh (9.3 million)
1971.
refugees in India, ninety lakh were Hindus

.That gave us, world-wide, a bad press and

For operations and visits to my sub units, I morally destroyed us. Military defeat was

travelled all over East Pakistan. I never easy due to feckless military leader ship.

killed anybody nor ever ordered any killing. Only couple of battalions in the north

184 185
offered some resistance. For example, the sixties, my fellow Bengali officers called

unit of Major Akram, who was awarded each other general, a rank they would have

highest military medal, Nishan-e-Haider, in an independent East Pakistan. We all took

resisted and he lost his life. it in good humour. But 1971 was not a joke.

Every single Bengali felt oppressed. Their

life and death was now in the hands of what

East Pakistan, part of the country a
they called "Shala Punjabies".
thousand miles away, was "a geographical

and political absurdity" as John Gunther

said in "Inside Asia Today". I granted a long interview, recounting what

I saw and felt in 1971, to BBC Urdu Service

in December 2007. The Bangladesh

With federal capital in Islamabad,
Liberation Museum asked for a copy of the
dominated by West Pakistani civil servants
interview. It was too lengthy for me to
and what they called a Punjabi Army, East
transcribe, translate and type. Here, I
Pakistanis felt like subjects of a colony.
attempt to re-collect bits and pieces yet
They never liked it ever since 1947. In early

186 187
again. General Tikka was branded as "Butcher Of

Bengal". He hardly commanded for two

weeks. Even during those two weeks, the

What drove me mad? Well I felt the
real command was in the hands of General
collective guilt of the Army action which at
Mitha, his second-in-command. General
worst should have stopped by late April
Mitha literally knew every inch of Bengal. He
1971. Moreover, when I returned to West
personally took charge of every operation
Pakistan, here nobody was pushed about
till General Niazi reached at the helm. At
what had happened or was happening in
this juncture, General Mitha returned to
East Pakistan. Thousands of innocent fellow
GHQ. General Tikka, as governor, was a
citizens had been killed, women were raped
good administrator and made sure that all
and millions were ejected from their homes
services ran. Trains, ferries, postal services,
in East Pakistan but West Pakistan was
telephone lines were functioning and offices
calm. It went on and on .The world outside
were open. There was no shortage of food,
did not know very much either. This owes to
anywhere by May 1971. All in all, a better
the fact that reporters were not there.
administrative situation than Pakistan of

188 189
today ! But like Pakistan of today, nobody Cantonment, Dacca Club, Hotel

gave a damn about what happens to the Intercontinental, the Chinese restaurant

poor and the minorities. My worry today is near New Market. Like most human beings,

whether my granddaughter goes to I was not looking beyond my nose. I moved

Wisconsin University or Harvard. That around a lot in the city. My brother-in-law,

nobody gets any education in my very large Riaz Ahmed Sipra was serving as SSP

village or in the Urdu-medium schools of Dhaka. We met almost daily. But the site of

Lahore, where I have lived as for forty years rendezvous were officers' mess, some club

so called concerned citizen, does not worry or a friend's house in Dhan Mandi. Even if I

me or anyone else. could move everywhere, I did not peep into

the hearts of the Bengalis. They were silent

but felt oppressed and aware of the fact

In Dhaka, where I served most of the time,
that the men in uniforms were masters of
there was a ghostly feeling until about mid
their lives and properties. I frequently met
April 1971. But gradually life returned to
Mr Fazlul Qadir Chaudhry, Maulana Farid
normal in the little circuit I moved:
Ahmed and many other Muslim League and

190 191
Jamaat leaders in one government office or part also matters in history. Two Bengali

the other. Prof. Ghulam Azam and Ch soldiers whom I released from custody,

Rehmat Elahi also used to meet me to were issued weapons and put back in

provide me volunteers to carry out sabotage uniform. They became POWs along 90

across the Indian Border. thousand Pakistani soldiers and spent three

years in Indian jails. I discovered one of

them serving as a cook in 1976 in Lahore. I

Dr Yasmin Sakia, an Indian scholar teaching
had regained my memory. "Kamal –ud-Din
in America, told me once an anecdote.
you?" I exclaimed on sighting him. "Sir you
When she asked why in the 1990s she could
got me into this!"
not find any cooperation in tracing rape-

victims of 1971, she was told by a victim,"

Those who offered us to the Army are rulers The Pakistani Army had thrown them out.

now." The other guy teaches in Dhaka now.

One can tell and twist the tale. The untold The untold part of the story is that one day

192 193
I enquired about one soldier from "There were six sir, but two survived. They

Cammandos unit. He used to be my pretended to be dead but were alive," came

favourite in 1962. "Sir, Aziz-ul –Haq was the reply.

killed", the Subedar told me rather

sheepishly.
"Where are they ?"

"How?" was not a relevant question in those

"In Cammilla sir, under custody".
days. Still I did ask.

"Sir! first they were put in a cell, later shot

in the cell". I flew from Dacca to Commilla. I saw two

barely recognizable wraiths. Only if you

know what that means to a fellow soldier! It

My worst nightmare even forty years later is
is worse than suffering or causing a
the sight of fellow soldiers being shot in a
thousand deaths. I got them out, ordered
cell. "How many ?" was my next question.
their uniforms and weapons. "Go, take your

194 195
salary and weapons and come back after were in two minds. We were single-

ten days." They came back and fought mindedly murderous! In the Air Force Mess

alongside, were prisoners and then were at Dacca, over Scotch, a friend who later

with difficulty, repatriated in 1976. Such rose to a high rank said, " I saw a gathering

stories differ, depending on who reports. of Mukti Bahini in thousands. I made a few

runs and let them have it. A few hundred

bastards must have been killed" My heart

All these incidents, often gone unreported,
sank. "Dear! it is the weekly Haath (Market)
are not meant to boast about my innocence.
day and villagers gather there," I informed
I was guilty of having volunteered to go to
him in horror. " Surely they were all Bingo
East Pakistan. My brother-in-law Justice
Bastards!," he added. There were friends
Sajjad Sipra was the only one who criticized
who boasted about their score. I had gone
my choice of posting. "You surely have no
on a visit to Commilla. I met my old friend,
shame," he said to my disconcert. My army
then Lt. Col. Mirza Aslam Beg and my
friends celebrated my march from Kakul to
teacher, Gen. Shaukat Raza. Both
Lahore. We drank and sang! None of us
expressed their distaste for what was

196 197
happening. Tony, a journalist working with

state-owned news agency APP, escaped to

London. He wrote about these atrocities

that officers had committed and boasted

about. It was all published by the 'Times of

London'. The reading made me feel guilty as

if I had been caught doing it myself! In the

Army, you wear no separate uniform. We all

share the guilt. We may not have killed. But

we connived and were part of the same

force. History does not forgive!

The writer is a retired Army Officer , Punjabi

poet and short story writer.

INTRODUCTION

198 199
No less a person than Brigadier Ghulam Dastagir had been left behind

Tajammul Hussain Malik admitted that at Quetta as he was a Bengali) and

atrocities were committed in 1971.But narrates that by a coincidence General

then most occurred in Dacca (Major nazar , the Bengali Session Judge and

General Khadim Hussain Raja) , the DC were all old boys of Aligarh

Chittagong and Khulna (south west). University and had an excellent

16 Division under Major General Nazar understanding and rapport.

Hussain Shah by and large had the best

record and this explains why Nazar My father who was his GSO 2

Hussain Shahs life was saved by a Operations and closely associated with

Bengali . the 16 Division operations from move

from Quetta to East Bengal in a record

This scribes father was the GSO 2 time of 5 days describes Nazar as a fine

Operations with Major General Nazar officer and a great human being !

Hussain Shah (the GSO 1 an

outstanding officer Lieutenant Colonel

200 201
 Major General Nazar Hussain Shah was a

genuine down to earth soldier , bulky by

build but genuine at heart and full of

humanity ! This went a long way in civilising

conduct of 16 Division ! Ironically typical of

Tikka Khan Nazar Hussain Shah was retired

while Rahim khan guilty of being ruthless in

the crackdown was elevated to be secretary

defence !Brigadier Nisar of 25 Cavalry who

202 203
was praised by Indian historians as promotion in Pakistan Army had nothing to

outstanding in delaying battle in Shakargarh do with war performance or real soldiering !

as commander of changez Force was also Pathetic !

sidelined because he was not close to Tikka

Khan and company and did not possess Zias Interestingly Brigadier Irshaad heading the

mastery of art of sycophancy and military intelligence in 1965 and guilty of

appeasement of seniors ! Pakistan Armys greatest intelligence failure

It was typical of Pakistan Army that of 1965 i.e disregarding a genuine report

Brigadier Rahimuddin who did not join his that Indian Armoured division was in

brigade in Chamb on pretext of martial law kashmir , dismissing it as a deception plan ,

duty was promoted to general rank while was promoted to two and three star after

Nisar who fought both the 1965 and 1971 the war .He played hell with Pakistans 1

wars exceedingly well sidelined ! Corps in 1971 War !

In 1965 Nisar by his singular action at Major General Sarfaraz whose conduct as

Gadgor had literally saved Pakistan ! But GOC was outstanding in 1965 War was not

204 205
promoted because his ability was regarded his Major General lachman Singh .

as a threat by Ayub Khan !

A special commission was appointed by

Brigadier Qayyum Sher who launched one Indian Army to study Tajammuls brigade

of the finest brigade size counter attack of actions !

1965 war was also not promoted !

The tragedy is that Tikka Khan and Bhutto

In words of Ayub Khans closest associate sidelined the best officers of 1971 ! Nazar

Altaf Gauhar Yahya Khan was promoted as Hussain shah was sidelined because he was

army chief because he had hit the bottle not a Rajput (!) and Tajammul was

hard and was regarded as politically sidelined because he was not a pathetic

harmless ! sycophant with no war record like Zia ul

Haq !

Brigadier Tajammul Hussain Malik was

praised as an outstanding commander by a Mr Z.A Bhutto by selecting a man with a

person no less than the Indian opponent of pathetic personality and no war record as

206 207
army chief paid the price with his head ! soldiers.

The tragedy is that Pakistan Army has not NBC Report some time in 1971

learnt its lesson and the illegitimate usurper

musharraf has created a new potential East http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J

Pakistan in Balochistan and FATA ! XVOfR7rnaU

Tragedy par excellence !

Genocide by Pakstani soldiers at Daca

VIDEOS FROM 1971 EAST PAKISTAN University.

WAR

Where massacre started by killing

their intellectuals.

VIDEOS CAN BE MADE WITH A VESTED NBC News

AGENDA AND MAY REPRESENT THE

ENTIRE OR PARTIAL REALITY http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s

Mg9Ly9nK0g

Rapes during 1971 by pakstani

208 209
Genocide in some where in Bangladesh 8TCXGRPSDg&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7 Genocide form Khulna Bangladesh

W9e456uZAs&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8

QiTIxBWMnc&feature=related

Another Genocide 1971 BBC report

Surrender ceremony

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q

HlDwu6tigg&feature=related BBC Report

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x

Another Genocide Repost by CBS Qb6mhgBVmE

Indian Army proctecting pakistan

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K army soldiers after surrender from

210 211
Bengalis. Evacuating the prisoners to India

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G

CAUGeke7kM Djfq-CQULk&feature=related

Indian Army Chief addressing Soldiers Indian General tell a story how

after liberation pakstani general use to cry in front of

them

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3

cR_eItFWXs http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z

4xYihSwR_w&feature=relmfu

Surrender Ceremony

We in Pakistan have twisted “Two Nation

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N Theory” very subjectively .

3yr2KrC9xk&feature=related

We have forgotten that Mr Jinnah the

212 213
founder of Pakistan favoured creation of an was divided in 1947. Mr Jinnah saw in 1946

Independent Bengal in 1946. H.V Hodson i.e the inadvisability of having Bengal in

perfectly reliable authority states that Mr Pakistan without Calcutta. Something that

Jinnah said that he would be delighted if the Pakistani policy makers failed to grasp

Bengal stayed united and independent and till 1971! It is to Jinnah‟s credit that he

added, “What is the use of Bengal without brought Bengalis in the army by raising the

Calcutta? They had much better remained first two battalions of the East Bengal

united and independent: I am sure they regiment. A process, which was stopped by

would be on friendly terms with Pakistan”. Ayub from 1950 to 1966, as a result of

(Refers-Page-246- The Great Divide- H.V which Pakistan Army instead of becoming a

Hodson- Oxford University Karachi-1985). broad based national army like the post

Bengal did not become independent 1947 Indian Army, remained, a Punjabi

because of Bengali Hindu fears about being dominated army. A factor which

in a Muslim majority independent Bengal. contributed a great deal to the separation

Thus the connection with “Two Nation of East Pakistan. The Two Nation Theory

Theory” was not the reason why Bengal was created due to certain reasons which

214 215
at that time were valid albeit relatively. It ancestry! As a matter of fact the Hindu

did not exist in 711 AD or in 1857 but was Rajputs of the north of Chenab area from

enunciated in the period 1860-1940. In where the vast bulk of Pakistan army is

1971 it was no longer valid at least for the recruited were far more difficult to govern

Bengali Muslims and they rejected it. before they were converted to Islam!

My second contention pertains to the

author‟s quoting a Pakistani General stating The only positive connection that these

that “Never before had a Muslim army races had with the Muslim Turks was the

surrendered before a Hindu army or the fact that one of their members killed Sultan

assertion that the Pakistan Army was a Ghauri! Even the Pathans, the second

bearer of traditions of the early Muslim largest group of Pakistani soldiers, had

conquerors of India! This assertion is little connection with Turkish invasions of

absolutely false ! The problem is that we India! Babar did not like the Pathans and

have to get out of this “Martial Races the Pathans generally remained in conflict

Syndrome”. The vast bulk of Pakistan army with the Muslim governments in Delhi!

consists of men with Hindu or Buddhist Many Muslim forts surrendered to the

216 217
Hindu Marathas during the Maratha war in attacked Delhi for the first time in

the south. The Marathas captured Delhi September 1857 and in phenomenal

long before 1971 in mid -18th century and staunchness of Punjabi soldiers while facing

held it with uneven gaps till 1803 once the the Muslim Turks in WW One! The Punjabis

British captured it. As a matter of fact the once totalled as Muslim Hindu and Sikh, as

problem is that most of our worthy an ethnic group became the largest single

generals have not read military history of group and the vast bulk of the British

the sub-continent. The Pakistan Army is Indian Army in the period 1883-1911.

not the descendant of the Turk armies that

invaded India! Of course with the

exceptions of some genuinely Mughal

villages like Lehr Sultanpur etc! The

Pakistan Army is a chip from the block of

the old mercenary British army with its

origins in the “Mutiny Loyalty of Punjabi

Muslim Pathan and Sikh soldiers” who

218 219
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