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Transformation of the Intimate and the Public in Asian Modernity
 The Intimate and the Public
in Asian and Global Perspectives

Managing Editor

Ochiai Emiko (Kyoto University)

Editorial Board

Fran Bennett (University of Oxford)

Chang Kyung-sup (Seoul National University)
Barbara Hobson (University of Stockholm)
Ito Kimio (Kyoto University)
Barbara Molony (Santa Clara University)
Ito Peng (University of Toronto)
Tseng Yen-Fen (National Taiwan University)
Patricia Uberoi (Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi)

VOLUME 5

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ipap

 Transformation of the Intimate
and the Public in Asian Modernity

Edited by

Ochiai Emiko
Hosoya Leo Aoi

LEIDEN | BOSTON
Cover illustration: Shanghai, 2002. Photograph by Ochiai Emiko.

Original Japanese edition © 2013 Kyoto University Press, Kyoto University, 69 Konoe-cho, Yoshida, Sakyo,
Kyoto, 606-8315 Japan.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Shinmitsuken to kokyoken no saihensei. English.

Transformation of the intimate and the public in Asian modernity / edited by Ochiai Emiko, Hosoya
Leo Aoi.
pages cm. -- (The intimate and the public in Asian and global perspectives, ISSN 2213-0608 ; volume 5)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-25223-3 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-26435-9 (e-book) 1. Social change--Asia.
2. Asia--Social life and customs--21st century. 3. Intimacy (Psychology)--Social aspects--Asia.
4. Public spaces--Social aspects--Asia. I. Ochiai, Emiko, 1958- editor of compilation. II. Hosoya, Leo Aoi,
editor of compilation. III. Title.

HN652.5.S5513 2014
303.4095--dc23

2014007361

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issn 2213-0608
isbn 978-90-04-25223-3 (hardback)
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Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Global Oriental and Hotei Publishing.
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This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents

Preface ix
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xv

Introduction: Reconstruction of Intimate and Public Spheres

in Asian Modernity 1
OCHIAI Emiko
1 “First Modernity” and “Second Modernity”–A Redefinition Focusing on
Demography and Gender 2
2 Logics of Asian Modernity: “Compressed Modernity”
and “Semi-Compressed Modernity” 11
3 Asian Families and States 19
4 Structure of This Book 28

1 Individualization without Individualism: Compressed

Modernity and Obfuscated Family Crisis in East Asia 37
CHANG Kyung-Sup
1 The Paradox: Individualization of Familialist East Asians 37
2 Compressed Modernity, Family Change and Individualization 38
3 Family-centered (Compressed) Modernity and Defamiliation:
Institutionalized Familialism 42
4 Second Modernity and Its Institutional Ramifications:
Individualization as Risk Aversion 45
5 Individualization with Familialist Attitudes:
Empirical Evidence 49
6 Comparative Appraisal: The Japanese Experience in
Perspective 57

2 Unsustainable Societies: Low Fertility and Familialism in East Asia’s

Compressed and Semi-compressed Modernities 63
OCHIAI Emiko
1 Ultra-low and Lowest-low Fertility in East Asia 64
2 Paradox of Marriage in East Asia 69
3 Varieties of Familialism and their Failure 78
4 Conclusion 85
vi contents

3 Demographic Dividend and the Future of Asia 91

Patcharawalai WONGBOONSIN and Kua WONGBOONSIN
1 Introduction 91
2 Demographic Dividend 91
3 The Future of Asia 94
4 The Public Sphere 108
Summary 111

4 Shrinking of the Japanese Uniqueness: A Quantitative

Analysis of Life Course Changes 116
IWAI Hachiro
1 Japanese Life Course Patterns and Familialism 116
2 The Uniqueness of Japan Seen from a Comparison of the Welfare
Regimes 117
3 Stability of the M-shaped Employment Pattern and Its Changes 122
4 Changes in the Social Status of the Elderly and in the Meaning of Living
with Their Children 127
5 Educational Attainment of Young Men and Their Initial Career 131
6 Shrinking of the Japanese System and Its Implication 140

5 Factors in the Wage Differential between Standard and Nonstandard

Employment: A comparison of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan 144
TAROHMARU Hiroshi
1 Question: Why are Wages for Nonstandard Employment Low? 144
2 Nonstandard Employment Wage Reducing Factors 145
3 Model: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition 151
4 Data 154
5 Analysis Results 155
6 Discussion 159

6 Care Diamonds and Welfare Regimes in East and Southeast

Asian Societies 164
OCHIAI Emiko
1 Social Networks and Welfare Mix 166
2 Comparative Research on Asian Families 167
3 Social Networks for Childcare 169
4 Social Networks for Elderly Care 173
5 The Care Diamond and the Welfare Regime 176
6 The Reconstruction of Care Networks 182
c ontents vii

7 Incorporating Foreign Domestic Workers as Providers of Family Care:

Case Studies of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore 190
ASATO Wako
1 Introduction 190
2 Familialism in Asia 196
3 Conclusion 227

8 Social Investment Policy in South Korea 234

Ito PENG
1 Policy Learning and Transfer 235
2 Social Care Expansion in Korea 237
3 Political Economy of Policy Change since 2000: Policy Imperatives and
Policy Learning 240
4 The Post-2003 Child Care Reform Process: Advancing Social Care under
the Social Investment Paradigm 244
5 Conclusion 248

9 A Comparative Perspective on Japanese Family Law 254

MIZUNO Noriko
1 Introduction 254
2 The Image and Function of Law 254
3 Features of Japanese Family Law 256
4 The Idea of Family and the Protection of Family Members 260

10 The Development of Civil Society in East Asia: Focusing on the

Environment, Human Rights and Migrant Labor 266
IGARASHI Seiichi
Introduction 266
1 Analytical Concepts: Opposing, Complementary and Cooperative
Functions of Civil Society 267
2 Theoretical Reflection: Regional Governance Approach and New
Regionalism Approach 269
3 The Quantitative Evidence for Developing Civil Society
in East Asia 271
4 The Creation of Publicness from Below by Civil Society 275
Conclusion 292
Acknowledgments 293

Index 303
Preface

It is apparent to everybody in today’s world that most Asian societies have

achieved at least some aspects of economic and social development which can
be called “modernization.” The time is ripe to discuss “Asian modernity” and
actually there have already been quite a few attempts to tackle this theme from
various perspectives. However, as would-be researchers soon realize, theoriz-
ing it in a way that reflects Asian characteristics is not a simple task.
This volume aims to present a substantial conceptualization of the phe-
nomena of Asian modernity from the viewpoint of the reconstruction of the
intimate and public spheres. The innovative point is that we capture at the
same time both the changes in the private lives of individuals and families and
the transformation of wider social settings, such as labour market reconstruc-
tion, the changing roles of the state and civil society, and the overwhelming
trends of globalization, based on the conviction that they are profoundly inter-
twined with each other. Further, we want to show that the relationship between
the intimate and the public constitutes the essence of Asian modernity.
The chapters in this volume are the product of international research col-
laboration by Asian and Western researchers in the global network of more
than 30 partner universities and research institutes developed by the Global
COE for Reconstruction of the Intimate and the Public Spheres in 21st Century
Asia based at Kyoto University and funded by the Japanese government.
The current volume, Transformation of the Intimate and the Public in Asian
Modernity, holds a special position in this series by introducing key concepts,
theoretical frameworks and topics that we believe to be indispensable for the
study of the intimate and the public in Asian modernity, although most of the
research is based on solid case studies. In other words, this volume provides
the theoretical backbone of the series, The Intimate and the Public in Asian and
Global Perspectives, and it is largely based on the first volume of the Global
COE’s series in Japanese published by Kyoto University Press (KUP). Other vol-
umes in the series are the result of international research projects on specific
topics. Some are currently only published in English, while others are transla-
tions of volumes in the KUP series.
The publication of two series in different languages at the same time is the
manifestation of our conviction that Asian scholarship should be multilingual.
We hope to provoke discussion on how Asian scholarship should be, not only
in terms of theories and methodologies but also in the style of presentation
and publication, although our experiments remain far from perfect. In keeping
with this principle, references in most chapters are presented in original
x preface

languages as well as English, and names, including authors’ names, are pre-
sented according to the custom of the societies they belong to, to ease the
problems of cross-cultural research.
The greatest achievement of the GCOE (April 2008–March 2013) has been
the nourishment of mutual trust and friendship among the global network of
researchers. From the bottom of our hearts, we would like to express our appre-
ciation for our global partners’ enthusiastic contribution to the establishment
of a common foundation for Asian and global scholarship. We are very happy
to continue our collaboration after the establishment of Kyoto University
Asian Studies Unit (KUASU) and Asian Research Center for the Intimate and
the Public (ARCIP) which continues our activities.
Finally, we would like to express our gratitude towards our editors at Brill:
Paul Norbury, who has played the role of a “midwife” in giving birth to this
series, and Nozomi Goto, for her always patient and keen support, as well as Lil
Wills, our staff member in charge of English publication at the Global COE and
KUASU, for her help with endless editorial work.

Ochiai Emiko
Hosoya Leo Aoi
4 December 2013
List of Figures

Ochiai Emiko

0.1 Reconstruction of intimate and public spheres 3

0.2 Fertility and modernity 7
0.3 Gender and modernity 9
0.4 Fertility decline in Asia and Europe (TFR) 12
0.5 Fertility and modernity in Asia 13
0.6 Female labor force participation rates by age group. (1) Japan, (2)
Thailand, (3) China, (4) Singapore, (5) Korea and (6) Taiwan 17
0.7 Gender and modernity in Asia 18
0.8 Women’s attitude towards gender role division “Men work outside home,
women take care of home” 19
0.9 Trends in proportions of working-age population (15–64) 27

Chang Kyung-Sup

1.1 Total fertility rate (TFR) and married women’s desired number
of children 50
1.2 Rising ages at first marriage 52
1.3 Attitude to marriage 53
1.4 Attitude to divorce 53
1.5 Attitude on old-age care 57
1.6 Suicide rate of OECD countries (per 100,000) 58

Ochiai Emiko

2.1 Trends in TFR in five East Asian societies 66

2.2 Long-term trends in TFR in Europe and Asia 68
2.3 Trends in crude divorce rates in five East Asian societies 70
2.4 Trends in age at first marriage in five East Asian societies 72
2.5 Trends in proportion never married in Japan 72
2.6 Changes in women’s labour force participation by
age in Japan 82
2.7 Trends in proportion over 65 in selected countries 82
xii list of figures

Patcharawalai Wongboonsin and Kua Wongboonsin

3.1 Demographic divided and needed policy environment 93

3.2 Asian socioeconomic challenges 95
3.3 Percent of population below 15, 15–59, and 60 and above in Thailand
(Medium fertility assumption) 97
3.4 Dependency ratios in Thailand (High, Medium, and Low fertility
assumption) 97
3.5 Increasing DINK society in Thailand 100
3.6 Increasing SINK society in Thailand 100
3.7 World population ageing, 2000 and 2025 101
3.8 East Asia’s population to 2050 102
3.9 Percentage of population aged 50 and above in Asia 102
3.10 Ageing society in Thailand 105
3.11 Feminization of ageing 106
3.12 Female participation rates by age, Europe and Asia, 2005 107

Iwai Hachiro

4.1 Female labor force participation rate by age group in Sweden 118
4.2 Female labor force participation rate by age group in Germany 119
4.3 Female labor force participation rate by age group in the United
States 120
4.4 Female labor force participation rate by age group in Japan
(5-year age intervals) 121
4.5 Comparison of the labor force participation for elderly men aged 60–64
in Japan, Sweden, the United States and Germany 122
4.6 Women’s life course: the 1945–1949 cohort (N = 404) 123
4.7 Women’s life course: the 1972–1974 cohort (N = 349) 125
4.8 Income distribution of not-working men aged 60–69: living with their
children in 2005 130
4.9 Income distribution of not-working men aged 60–69 living with children
in 1995 131
4.10 Proportion of men with experience of not-working by birth cohort 132
4.11 Proportion of male senior high school graduates with experience of
not-working by birth cohort 133
4.12 Proportion of male university graduates with experience of not-working
by birth cohort 134
list of figures xiii

4.13 Proportion of male senior high school graduates with experience as a

non-regular employee by birth cohort 134
4.14 Proportion of male university graduates with experience as a non-regular
employee by birth cohort 135
4.15 Early career of male university graduates: 1966–1970 birth cohort
(N = 172) 137
4.16 Early career of male university graduates: 1971–1975 birth cohort
(N = 182) 138
4.17 Early career of male university graduates: 1976–1980 birth cohort
(N = 144) 138
4.18 Early career of male senior high school graduates: 1976–1980 birth cohort
(N = 175) 139

Tarohmaru Hiroshi

5.1 Nonstandard employee rate among employee in Japan, Korea,

and Taiwan 148
5.2 Relationship between the years of continuous employment and
hourly wage of standard workers who have never changed jobs.
All other explanatory variables are hypothetically set to zero.
Not to scale, so the y-axis scale has been omitted 157

Ochiai Emiko

6.1 Care diamonds in six Asian societies 178

6.2 Welfare regimes including socialist regime 179
6.3 Patterns of care provision in six Asian societies 181

Asato Wako

7.1 Ratios of social security spending from annual government

expenditure 192
7.2 Numbers of foreign domestic workers (resident post) 195
7.3 Transitions in foreign domestic worker numbers in Taiwan 199
7.4 Changes to employment tax in the construction industry 215
7.5 Migrant workers working as domestic workers, etc. hold a demonstration
in front of Taiwan’s Council for Labor Affairs 221
xiv list of figures

Igarashi Seiichi

10.1 Relations among the actors in the public sphere 268

10.2 Number of NGO networks within Asia 274
10.3 Timing of creation of human rights regimes in each region 283


List of Tables

Chang Kyung-Sup

1.1 Population redistribution between urban and rural areas and total
fertility rate changes (unit: %) 50
1.2 Sex ratio by birth order (unit: males per hundred females) 51
1.3 Changes in crude marriage rates and crude divorce rates (unit: per
thousand persons) 51
1.4 Never-married proportion of women in their thirties (unit: %) 52
1.5 Changes in household composition, 1975–2005 54
1.6 Unmarried person’s living arrangements (unit: 10,000 persons) 54
1.7 “Wild Geese”-household heads of dispersed families 55
1.8 Household structure of elderly population (%) 56

Ochiai Emiko

2.1 Total fertility rates in East Asia and other selected societies 65
2.2 Crude marriage rate, crude divorce rate, the ratio of divorce and
marriage in selected societies 71
2.3 Proportions who have ever experienced cohabitation 73
2.4 Family values in Asian societies 77

Iwai Hachiro

4.1 Women’s life course and family formation 127

Tarohmaru Hiroshi

5.1 Regression analysis of logarithmic hourly wage (Japan) 155

5.2 Regression analysis of logarithmic hourly wage (South Korea) 158
5.3 Regression analysis of logarithmic hourly wage (Taiwan) 159
5.4 Results of Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of wage differentials between
standard and nonstandard employments 160
xvi l ist of tables

Ochiai Emiko

6.1 Social networks for childcare 169

6.2 Social networks for elderly care 174

Asato Wako

7.1 Overview of Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong 196

7.2 Breakdown of pre-arrival costs for Indonesian at-home care workers in
Taiwan (2007, NTD) 204

Igarashi Seiichi

10.1 Number of NGOs in East Asian countries and trends in Freedom House
ratings 273
10.2 Rights and protection of migrant workers in East Asian host
countries 288
Introduction
Reconstruction of Intimate and Public Spheres in Asian Modernity

Ochiai Emiko*

There have been fundamental social changes worldwide since the 1970s. These
changes were initially considered the essence of “post modernity,” but eventu-
ally they came to be considered a new aspect of modernity; hence, a number
of concepts were formed to express these changes adequately. These included
Ulrich Beck’s “Second Modernity,” Beck, Lash and Giddens’ “reflexive moder-
nity,” Zygmunt Bauman’s “liquid modernity,” and Anthony Giddens’ “transfor-
mation of intimacy.” It is not easy to summarize in a few words the nature of
this social change. However, one shared claim among those participating in
the debate is that while the basic principles of modernity remain, a number of
characteristics have appeared within society, distinguishing it from what Beck
called the “First Modernity,” which was characterized by the nation-state and
industrial capitalism. As Beck shows, with globalization and individualization
as its characteristics, this social change has, while concurrently dealing with
macro-level changes such as globalization and the relativization of nation-
states, been a phenomenon that also includes changes on micro-level scales
connected to individual lives and the family. We are living in the middle of a
comprehensive, fundamental social change that could be termed a “recon-
struction of intimate and public spheres.”
However, we would like to raise a question here: Is this social change hap-
pening in the same way everywhere in the world—including, for example, con-
temporary Asia? Conceptualizations related to new aspects of modernity are
largely based on the experiences in Western Europe since the 1970s. Most Asian
societies experienced modernization later than did those of Western Europe
or North America. As a result, even now, topics such as the formation of Asian
civil society, the rise in nationalism, the construction of a welfare state, and
other topics related to First Modernity are often debated as fundamental social
science themes in this region. On the other hand, many Asian societies now
have “ultra low fertility” (Straughan et al. 2008), which is even lower than that
of Second Modernity societies in Western Europe or North America. The
increased prevalence of events such as cross-border marriages and the employ-
ment of foreign domestic workers mean that the effects of globalization are
penetrating the farthest corners of the Asian lifestyle.

* 落合 恵美子, Kyoto University. Translated by Jeremy Phillipps

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004264359_002

2 Ochiai

While it may be that the “reconstruction of intimate and public spheres” is

happening in Asia, is it undergoing the same changes as present-day Western
Europe and North America, and in what ways are Asian changes different? In
what ways can social science theorize about the social changes of contempo-
rary Asia? Each of these are direct and obvious questions, and yet they have no
clear answers. However, to clarify the issues contemporary Asia faces and to
determine what direction policy design should take, these are questions we
must urgently find answers to.
This volume looks at a number of the key concepts, theoretical frameworks,
and topics that are required if we are to use social science approaches to the
issue of the “Reconstruction of the Intimate and Public Spheres” in contempo-
rary Asia. This chapter, which serves as the introduction to this volume, as well
as to the whole series on “The Intimate and the Public in Asian and Global
Perspectives” of which this book forms a part, lays out the theoretical frame-
work for reconsidering “First Modernity” and “Second Modernity” from the
perspective of “Reconstruction of the Intimate and Public Spheres.” In particu-
lar, it clarifies the issues that must be taken up explicitly within the Asian
context, and the theoretical threads that bind together all of the chapters that
follow, as well as the rest of this book series.

1 “First Modernity” and “Second Modernity”—A Redefinition

Focusing on Demography and Gender

1.1 The Rise of First Modernity

In order to build a framework that locates First Modernity and Second
Modernity within the context of the “reconstruction of intimate and public
spheres,” we start with Hegel, the father of modern social philosophy. Hegel’s
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821) divides the three levels of “moral
community” (Sitte): the family, civil society, and the state. The family is unified
by love, and by marriage men and women abandon their individual character
and form a single body and character. Civil society is formed by individuals,
with the family as background; each individual acts to seek his or her own hap-
piness and fulfill his or her desires. From there, relationships with other people
are created; rights and laws are gestated, and the public sphere known as the
state is created to systematically ensure them (Hegel 1821). This type of view of
the society—that all individuals have a family and are citizens of a specific
state—was typical and taken for granted in First Modernity. Fig. 0.1 shows a
model of this on the left.
Looking at the socio-historical background of his philosophy, we can say that
Hegel attempted to conceptualize the structure of the modern society that was
Introduction 3

First Modernity Second Modernity

Civil Society Civil Society

Public
State Sphere State

Intimate
Sphere

Family

Individual Individual

Figure 0.1 Reconstruction of intimate and public spheres.

being formed in his time. The modern nation-state was being formed, as was
the “modern family.” The “modern family” is a concept invented by social histo-
rians of the family, such as Philippe Ariès (Ariès 1960); this concept has been
characterized by intimacy, privacy, and domesticity. The immediate family, cov-
ering the narrow range of kin members—including the husband, wife, and
children—is cut off from a wider range of relatives and neighbors and shut up
in a world of privacy, creating an intimate sphere. In this area, family members
are tightly connected to each other through strong emotional bonds. It is the
role of the husband to go out into the external world and earn an income, and
that of the wife to remain in the home and devote herself to housework and
child rearing. This is the sort of family that was considered the standard, up
until a few decades ago; however, works pertaining to family history reveal that
this type of family is nothing more than a historical construct of family type
that was born in the era of modernity (Ariès 1960, Flindrin 1976, Stone 1977).
Das ganze Haus (the whole house), as described by Otto Brunner, seems
to serve as a good example of how the family previously was. According to
Brunner, “the house was a Gesellschaft [‘society’] at the same time as it was
a Gemeinschaft [‘community’]” (Brunner 1968). This can also apply to tra-
ditional families in other parts of the world. In periods when the household
had production-based functions, the house was a workplace, and the family
members were work colleagues. Servants and other non-kin members
worked together, and privacy existed only in the small space of the bed-
room where the husband and wife slept.
4 Ochiai

The public sphere was also not developed as an area clearly demarcated
from the private. In the patrimonial states of either the European Middle Ages
or the Japanese Early Modern Period, public and private relationships were
carefully ordered, and the houses of the nobility had public meaning for their
vassals (Mitsunari 2005: 44). A public meaning was attached to marriage and
sexual love and to its result, childbirth, as the queen would give birth in front
of her chief vassals. Alliances between houses through marriage were an
important political tool until the early modern period (Delille 2009). In addi-
tion to marriage, male homosexuality played a large role in politics (Hoshino
2006). In other words, an erotic public sphere was formed that was steeped in
intimacy. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the mixing of
public and private began to be considered “scandalous” (Hoshino 2006: 184),
and as a result, a public sphere formed that served as an “asexual” space in
which only homosocial bonds remained.

1.2 Public/Private Spheres and Intimate/Public Spheres

We now need to clarify the conceptual relationships among the three levels of
“moral community”—namely, the family, civil society, and the state—and the
concepts of “public” and “private.”
There are a number of ways we can look at the concept of “publicness” and
the social area that manifests it, or in other words the “public sphere.” One way
applies the “public sphere” to the level of the state only. The division of public
and private law uses this concept of “public.” In contrast, the second way consid-
ers civil society as the “public sphere”, and does not allow the state to have a
monopoly on it. This argument is represented by Jürgen Habermas (Habermas
1962), and he emphasizes the role of associations where the public gather. The
roles of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and volunteerism that have
been increasing in influence in recent years are found within this line of reason-
ing. In addition, in recent years a third stance that acknowledges the publicness
function of the market has gained strength. The market is normally considered a
private area in relation to the state, but since modern civil society was born
based on the formation of the modern market, participation in the market has
been a condition of being a citizen of a modern society (economic citizenship).
If we dig deeper, a fair market can be seen as public goods that creates the public
good through efficient distribution (Suga 2010). There are also social enterprises.
Mitsunari has termed these three public spheres “political publicness,” “social
publicness,” and “economic publicness” (Mitsunari 2005).
So how should we position the contrary concepts of the public sphere in
this three-layered structure? To denote the opposite of the public sphere, we
can use “intimacy,” “privacy,” or “domesticity.” As noted earlier, “privacy” is a
Introduction 5

term that points to a market or civil society in contrast to the state, as shown
by the way the English word “privatization” is used. However we can also
position “privacy” in the area of the “family.” The concept of “domesticity” is
connected to the family by definition, and “intimacy” is also seen as a nature of
the family. In other words, the area where the three concepts opposing public-
ness overlap is the “family.”
However, if we introduce historical changes, or in other words the axis of
time, into consideration then the situation is no longer as simple. As seen
above, the pre-modern family was not “private,” and in addition to the nobility,
much of the family lifestyle of commoners was also open to the villagers and
their relatives. In addition, intimate relationships did not remain within the
family alone. In fact, even in the modern era, the idea that intimacy was only
within the family was a fiction known by everybody. Moreover, once we enter
the Second Modernity, marriage rates in Europe drop, and it becomes common
for people to form intimate relationships without any connections of mar-
riage. Conversely, privacy of individual family members has become important
even within the family; “privacy” now appears to have reverted to single
individuals.
If a stable, three-layered structure exists in the First Modernity, the three
opposing concepts of the public sphere corresponded to the specific social
space known as the “family.” Regardless of whether the public sphere is
oriented to any of the state, civil society, or the market as another aspect of
civil society, it has been seen as remaining outside the family. However, once
this three-layered structure is shaken, the social spaces which accept all the
opposing concepts of the public sphere collapse. This is what Giddens has
termed the “transformation of intimacy” (Giddens 1992). This increased fluid-
ity must further act to change its opposing concept, the public sphere.
The reason that the “intimate sphere” or “intimacy” were selected as the
opposing concepts to the “public sphere” or “publicness” in this book series is
firstly because “intimacy” is not the opposite concept to “publicness” by defini-
tion, unlike the case of “privacy,” and secondly because “intimacy” is not related
to the family by definition as seen in the word “domesticity.” Rather, it is because
the concept of “intimacy” should allow us to show historical changes by some-
times opposing and sometimes intermingling it with the “publicness.”

1.3 Demographic Transitions and Modernity

Here I propose a framework to relate First Modernity and Second Modernity to
demographic changes, although Beck himself is not very clear about the impli-
cation of his concepts within this context. Demographic transition in its origi-
nal meaning (which was later termed “the first demographic transition,”
6 Ochiai

in contrast to the second one to be explained later) was considered an irrevers-

ible change from a high fertility–high mortality equilibrium to a low fertility
–low mortality equilibrium, the latter of which created modernity in a demo-
graphic sense. Just as the Industrial Revolution created “modernity in the pro-
duction of goods,” it was the Demographic Transition that brought about
“modernity in the production of people.” Low fertility, where each couple has
fewer children than has traditionally been the case, was both the cause and
result of the child-centeredness of the modern family, especially as parents
raised children with more love and money for each of them. Thus, the fertility
decline that forms part of the first demographic transition can be considered
an indicator that the modern family had become mainstream to the majority of
society (Ochiai 1997: chapter 5). In Western Europe and North America, the first
fertility decline happened almost everywhere (except France) from the 1880s to
around the 1930s (see Fig. 0.4). This is the very period when “mass society” was
being formed. I hold that it was in this period that the social structure of the
modern family and modern mass society—First Modernity—was established.
Fig. 0.1 shows a model of this on the left.
The mortality decline, another feature of the demographic transition, also
had a large effect on people’s life-courses and their families. With lowered
infant and adult mortality rates, lives had become increasingly stable and pre-
dictable, and a standard life-course that proceeded through the stages emerged
(Anderson 1983). With the advent of a public education system and the start of
the custom of seeking work at the time of graduation, the standardized life-
course became even more stable. With the chance of someone dying partway
through his or her life having been lowered, it was also possible for marriage
bonds to continue over a longer period (Anderson 1983). The Hegelian First
Modernity, in which everyone was assumed to be part of a family, was made
possible only through the formation of demographic conditions wherein
everyone was married and stayed together for almost their entire lives. In other
words, the first demographic transition created the basis of the First Modernity.
Following this demographic transition, there was a period of stability.
Fertility was maintained at around the replacement level, and a regime contin-
ued in which almost all men and women married and gave birth to two or
three children. However, by the end of the 1960s, fertility decline had restarted
in Western Europe. This time, the fertility rate dropped to the sub-replacement
level. This is shown to the right of Fig. 0.2.
Concurrent to this, the divorce rate started to increase. This change was ini-
tially assumed to be a short-term aberration, but it continued long enough to
be seen as irreversible; this began to be considered the second demographic
transition (van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 1991). At the same time, more and
Introduction 7

First Modernity Second Modernity

First fertility decline

Second fertility decline

Figure 0.2 Fertility and modernity.

more people were cohabitating without being legally married; it was even said
that in Europe, marriage as an institution had broken down and had become a
question of lifestyle. Cohabitation increased, and there were people living
“alternative” lifestyles with individuals of the same gender. The proportion of
children born out of wedlock in 2007 exceeded 50% in countries such as
Sweden, Norway, and France; in Germany and even Italy, those figures were
around 30% and 20%, respectively (Eurostat).
With the decline of life-long marriage and of the family as an institution, the
family was no longer the fundamental social unit; instead, the individual
became that unit. As a result, the concept of “intimacy” came to supersede that
of “domesticity,” bringing it to the forefront. “Intimacy” is defined as a “special
relationship between individuals” (Giddens 1992: 95); it happens in the family,
but it can also occur outside the family. Giddens calls this the “transformation
of intimacy,” wherein individuals have come to continuously seek “pure” rela-
tionships; while demands for other people become more intense, the relation-
ships with those people tend not to last. People do not turn away from intimate
relationships, but as they seek out “purer” ones, they are forced to individualize
themselves. The micro-characteristics of Second Modernity—such as “individ-
ualization” and the “transformation of intimacy”—have indeed become the fea-
tures of the second demographic transition. “Second Modernity,” in which the
forms of the intimate sphere, the space for intimacy, become more diverse, and
some individuals do not have an intimate sphere, is shown in the right of Fig. 0.1.

1.4 Gender and Modernity

As an indicator of the transformation of modernity, another aspect that
we need to examine is gender. Hegel states that the husband and wife form a
single individuality through marriage, but that the genders have mirroring
roles. The man was active outside the home, while the woman was passive and
8 Ochiai

subjective and her mission was limited to within the family. True, the family’s
mission was to raise the children and send them forth into civil society as inde-
pendent individuals, but it was on the understanding that the sons would be
heads of households and the daughters would be wives (Hegel 1821). Therefore,
the merged individuality of the couple was in fact the individuality of the
husband, and it was the husband who was the individual sent forth into civil
society, with the family behind him.
What does this mean, in terms of the actual situation in society? Capitalist
societies such as those in Western Europe and North America have experienced
the era of the modern family and a decline in female labor force participation
rates. This latter phenomenon refers to what can be called the “housewifiza-
tion” of women.1 The Indian economist J.N. Sinha (1965) analyzed data col-
lected by the United Nations and hypothesizes about a U-shaped relationship
between economic development and the labor force participation of married
women. In the initial stages of development, reductions in the sizes of agricul-
tural or other traditional industries reduce the number of opportunities for a
woman to work—and, as the family income increases, there is increasingly less
need for her to work. To again increase the number of opportunities for women
to work outside the home, modern industries must develop further and their
labor demand expand. This U-shaped pattern has also been demonstrated
through the results of other research, such as that by the ILO (Osawa 1993).
First Modernity is, in relation to gender, characterized by a gender-based
division of labor, in which the man takes on the role of breadwinner and the
woman devotes herself to housework and child rearing. We shall call this change
“housewifization.”2 However, since the 1970s when the Second Modernity
started, the labor force participation rate for women in Western Europe and
North America has begun to increase. The ascent along the right-hand side of
the U-shaped pattern, mentioned above, has started, which is symptomatic of
what can be called the “de-housewifization” of women (Ochiai 2008a), in a
reverse movement to “housewifization.” At first, there were regional gaps, and
there were regions like Germany where the ascent was slow compared to places
like Scandinavia and North America; however, at present, with the exception of

1 “Housewifization” is a concept created by Maria Mies. Mies argues that the concept of house-
wife was invented to remove from the concept of labor the work involved in the reproduction
of life—birth, childrearing, and housework—and make it invisible (Mies 1986: 4).
2 This refers to the creation of couples of, husbands, the breadwinners, and wives, who despite
being responsible for reproductive labor are not seen as doing such, but as supported by their
husbands, through the division of capitalistic labor (Mies 1986: 110). This term has been opera-
tionalized in this work to refer to the increase in non-working married women (Ochiai 2008a).
Introduction 9

Southern Europe, women in all regions of Western Europe and North America
work according to a table-shaped labor force participation pattern without
breaks, similar to men (Fig. 0.3).
In Western Europe and North America, behind the weakening of gender-
based divisions of labor was the deep and long-term economic recession that
started with the 1973 Energy Crisis (also called the “Oil Crisis”). In Europe, where
employment was protected by unions, unemployment among the youth was
severe, and fewer young men were able to economically support wives who were
housewives. Since employment was uncertain for both men and women, those
who had jobs at the time had to work, and there was no room for “luxuries” like
gender-based division of labor. The United Nations Decade for Women, starting
in 1976, was effective in making gender equality a cosmopolitan value, but it is
likely that the main reason for the weakening of gender-based division of labor
was, more so than these value-based factors, simple economic necessity.
Demographic conditions also demanded a weakening of gender-based labor
division. In Europe and North America, where the demographic change took
place early, the general aging of the population also came about early. Since the
1970s, the proportion of the elderly has topped 10% of the population, and in
the 1980s there were countries where it topped 15%. The labor mobilization of
women in their productive years is also necessary as a countermeasure to an
aging population.

1.5 Expansion of Civil Society: The New Social Structure of Second

Modernity
In this way, Second Modernity is marked by the second demographic transition
in terms of demography and in terms of gender, the de-housewifization of
women. It marks the end of the Hegelian era in which, if we focus on the

First Modernity Second Modernity

Housewifization De-housewifization

Figure 0.3 Gender and modernity.

10 Ochiai

micro-level situation, everyone had a family; this could be called “individual-

ization.” It was accompanied by a “transformation of intimacy” and the devel-
opment of gender equality. These changes happened along with demographic
and economic changes, but also gained a considerable amount of institutional
backing.
The law in the era of the modern family had a character whereby the effect
of the law differed, depending on whether it was inside or outside the family;
this situation is embodied in the phrase, “the law does not enter the family.”
Cases that normally would be dealt with as instances of bodily harm or theft
would, if they occurred within a family, not be considered incidents at all. With
respect to this, laws preventing domestic violence—which have been set in
many countries in recent years—are a new example of laws “entering the
household.”
In Western Europe and North America, laws and systems that presume that
the individual, not the family, is the unit of society are being codified; these
laws and systems are based on the idea that individuals should not be treated
differently according to their choices of lifestyle, including the choice of
whether to have a family or not. We can say that the family no longer acts as a
“wall” to prevent intrusion of the public sphere, and that the individual is
therefore directly exposed to this public sphere. We can consider this the inter-
nal expansion of civil society into a micro-level direction (Ochiai 2007). At the
same time, gender equality has, at least in Europe and North America, become
a value that goes beyond national borders, and systems and habits that have
previously obstructed gender equality were abolished.
On the other hand, if we look at the macro level, the flow of events that saw
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the concentration of US global power, and the
development of the global market has assisted in the establishment of some
sort of community that transcends national borders. While still developing,
we can perhaps call this an external expansion of civil society into a macro-
level direction or the emergence of the global civil society (Ochiai 2007).
Perhaps we could consider this a change towards what is termed “cosmopoli-
tan modernity” accompanied by concepts of human rights that are based on
the idea of global equality.
In this way, Second Modernity brings about a structural transformation of
the public sphere, in a sense different from when Habermas had originally
envisioned it. We are witnessing the internal and external expansion of civil
society in both the micro- and macro-level directions, with the macro-level
direction going beyond national borders and the micro-level direction break-
ing through the wall of the family. “Globalization” and “individualization” are
other names for these changes. Second Modernity is seeking a new social
Introduction 11

order, while bringing about a structural change in both intimate and public
spheres (right diagram, Fig. 0.1).3

2 Logics of Asian Modernity: “Compressed Modernity”

and “Semi-Compressed Modernity”

2.1 Demographic Transitions and Asian Modernity

Previously, we demonstrated the theoretical framework needed to understand
the structural changes of modern society in First Modernity and Second
Modernity; it was largely a theorization based on the historical experiences of
Western Europe and North America. As we turn our eyes to Asia, in what ways
can we theorize about the changes that are taking place there?
First, we should examine the demographic changes that have taken place in
various Asian societies. Fig. 0.4 shows the total fertility rate (TFR) of a number
of East and Southeast Asian countries, including Japan, as well those of Europe
and the US. The first thing we should notice is that, with very few exceptions,
societies within one region—i.e. Europe or Asia—experienced a fertility
decline almost simultaneously. We can consider the point at which fertility has
stopped declining or has dropped to the replacement level4 as the end of the
first fertility decline, which makes up the first demographic transition. In most
Asian countries, this took place from the 1960s to the 1980s. In the two regions—
with the exceptions of France in Europe and Japan in Asia—there is a gap of
about half a century in the periods of first fertility decline. It is well known that
the decline in fertility started early in France, immediately following the
French Revolution. Japan experienced the first fertility decline in the 1950s,
exactly halfway between the time of most European countries and that of most
East and Southeast Asian countries. This timing difference heavily influenced
the nature of social changes in Japan and other Asian societies (see this vol-
ume, Chapters 2 and 7).
So, when did the second fertility decline take place? In Europe and the US,
it started at the end of the 1960s, as noted earlier. However, within these regions,
there were slight differences in timing by area. Northern Europe was the first to
start a second fertility decline, followed by Western Europe, and then Southern
Europe in the mid-1970s. It was from the mid-1970s that Japan also started

3 The right-hand diagram in Fig. 0.1 also shows the emergence of transnational intimate
spheres (such as when family members live in different countries).
4 As noted below, there are societies where the primary and secondary drops in fertility contin-
ued without pause, so this form of definition is required.
12 Ochiai

experiencing a fertility decline. For the first fertility decline, there was a quarter-
century gap between Japan and most countries in Europe; however, the second
fertility decline comprised only a few years. The Korean sociologist Chang
Kyung-sup has analyzed modernity in South Korea as “compressed modernity”
due to the fact that it experienced in a short, compressed space of time the
modern era that developed in Europe over a long time. This also applies to
Japan’s modernity as well (Chang 1999, 2010; Chapter 1 of this volume).
The next question is, when did the second fertility decline take place in
Asian societies outside Japan? Examining Fig. 0.4 with this question in mind
can lead to confusion. In Asian societies, the fertility decline is continuing;
there, we cannot see any boundary between the first and second fertility
declines as we could for Europe, the US, or Japan. If we operationally define a
decline below replacement levels as the second fertility decline, then in
Singapore, the second fertility decline started only a few years after that in
Japan—in the mid-1970s. Meanwhile, the second declines in South Korea,
Thailand, and China started at the beginning of the 1980s, the second half of
the 1980s, and in the 1990s, respectively.
If we think of the period between these two fertility declines—when the
fertility rate was stable and at around the replacement level—as the “golden
age” of First Modernity, then the length of this period was about 50 years in
Europe and North America, 20 years in Japan, and almost nonexistent in the

6 Sweden
5 Japan
England and Wales
4
Italy
3 Germany
2 China
Singapore
1
S. Korea
0 Thailand
1900
1906
1912
1918
1924
1930
1936
1942
1948
1954
1960
1966
1972
1978
1984
1990
1996

Figure 0.4 Fertility decline in Asia and Europe (TFR).

Source: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook.
Introduction 13

rest of Asia. As Asian societies other than Japan have not experienced a stable
First Modernity, they have plunged headlong and directly into Second Modernity.
If we compare them in this way, it suggests that we need a term that can
differentiate Japan’s modernity with the “compressed modernities” of South
Korea and other Asian countries. The term “semi-compressed modernity” has
been proposed to describe Japan’s modernity (Ochiai 2011b). If Japan’s “semi-
compressed modernity” and other Asian societies’ “compressed modernities”
are added to the diagram in Fig. 0.2 showing modernity and fertility decline,
we get Fig. 0.5.
Since the economic crisis at the end of the twentieth century, a number of
societies in East Asia have begun to experience an “ultra-low fertility” that even
Europe has not experienced (Straughan et al. 2008). The lowest TFRs in the
region are Taiwan’s 0.895 (2010), Hong Kong’s 0.901 (2003), South Korea’s 1.08
(2005), Singapore’s 1.16 (2010), and Japan’s 1.26 (2005). These should be termed
“unsustainable societies.” The effects of extreme time compression do not stop
at mere “delays” but appear to creating a unique “Asian modernity” phenome-
non that differs in essence to “European modernity” (Chang 2010, Ochiai 2011b;
Chapter 2 of this volume).
The first demographic transition, as noted earlier, also had an effect on mar-
riage. The decline in mortality brought about marriage stability. However, tra-
ditional marriage customs differ greatly by society. As European society was
strongly characterized by the Christian prohibition against divorce, only the
death rate is a factor affecting the stability of marriage, but in Asia, due to the
wider range of cultural diversity, it is not possible to assume that modern
changes in that continent would all be in the same direction.
With respect to marriage customs, we see two types of countries in Asia. On
the one hand, in eastern and northern Asian and South Asian countries like
India, South Korea and China, there is a traditional resistance to divorce and
remarriage; on the other hand, there are countries in southeast Asia such as

First Modernity Second Modernity

Japan
Other Asian societies
First fertility decline

Europe

Second fertility decline

Figure 0.5 Fertility and modernity in Asia.

14 Ochiai

Thailand where divorce, remarriage, and premarital sexual encounters were

common (Reid 1993; Tsubouchi and Tsubouchi 1970). The former are classified
based on the existence of patrilineal kinship groups, whereas the latter are
agricultural societies focusing on rice cultivation where bilateral kinship orga-
nization and women’s labor were important. Premodern Japan, in terms of
marriage and sexual customs, was clearly more like that of Southeast Asia than
that of East Asia (Ochiai 2011a). The divorce rate in the Tohoku region of Japan
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was as high as it is in the United
States today, and most who were made single by death or divorce remarried
within three years (Ochiai 2000: 72–75).5 However from the Meiji Restoration
(1868) to around 1940, the divorce rate kept heading downwards (Fuess 2004)
and, in combination with the declining death rate, the stability of marriage in
Japan increased dramatically, far more so than in Europe (Fuess 2004). In con-
trast, in countries like Korea, China, and Vietnam, there were few divorces, and
as the Confucian teaching that “a chaste woman may not have two husbands”
shows, women were encouraged not to remarry.6 It was even stricter in India,
with women being prohibited from remarrying by Hindu law. In these societies
modernization was more connected with a rise in divorce and remarriage.
So what changes did the second demographic transition bring about for
marriage in Asia? Compared to the dramatic decline in fertility rates, the
changes in marriage in contemporary East Asia are not as simple. Despite the
rises in divorce rates, ages at first marriage, and the proportion of those who
never marry in many societies, there is only a gradual increase in cohabitation,
and births out of wedlock remain rare (Lesthaeghe 2011; Ochiai 2011b; Chapter
2 of this volume). Marriages in contemporary Asia are changing in some
respects, but in others remain resolutely resistant to change. If we are unable
to explain this through cultural similarities, then what are the factors pushing
marriages in contemporary Asia in a different direction from Europe? We will
come back to this question later on this volume (Chapter 2).

2.2 Gender and Asian Modernity

In terms of gender, there is an even greater diversity of traditions and cultures,
as well as differences caused by the paths of modernization.
Traditional culture with regard to gender can largely be applied to the same
regional divisions we saw with marriage customs: East (and north) Asia and

5 See Kurosu, Tsuya and Hamano (1999) for a historical demographic analysis of marriage in
premodern Japan.
6 Women who remained unmarried after their husband’s death were sometimes lauded by the
state as “heroines”. For the case of Korea, see Kang (2009).
Introduction 15

South Asia, and Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, as was commented upon by
explorers from Europe in the Age of Exploration, women had active roles in
work and strong positions in owning assets (Reid 1993). This is because female
labor has been important in the rice-growing regions of Southern Asia
(Sechiyama 1996, 2013). There were only minor differences in male and female
costume: for example, in early modern Thailand it was hard to tell men and
women apart just based on their clothing (Hashimoto 2003). Sexual relation-
ships before marriage were widely seen, and divorce, as we have already noted,
was common. In contrast, Northeastern Asian societies which used cattle to till
fields were male labor-oriented societies. There was a clear division of labor
between men and women and women lacked strong ownership of assets.
However, while “women’s work was housework,” the definition of housework
itself was quite different from the modern concept of “housework.” An old
woman interviewed in a farming village in northeastern China answered a ques-
tion regarding gendered division of labor that “Yes, women’s work was house-
work, such as caring for people and livestock, as well as growing vegetables.”7
Japan before the modern era belonged to the Southeast Asian type in this
regard, and even globally it had high female workforce participation (Fig.0.6(1)).
In the 1880s, shortly after the Meiji Restoration, estimates suggest levels stayed
in the high 70% range for women in their 20s to 40s, and there is no indication
of a cut-off due to marriage or birth (just like in places like the United States
and Sweden today), forming a table-shaped pattern when plotted as a graph
(Umemura et al. 1988). Saito (1991) argues that the stem family system—in
which two generations of couples live together is the norm—made divisions
of labor with respect to household and farm work between the generations
possible; it also increased the labor participation of the younger generation of
women (most of whom were married). From that level, women’s participation
rates decreased before World War II, and after the war it started to form an
M-shaped pattern as women temporally retire from the workforce after mar-
riage and childbirth and then return once their children were grown. Just as in
modern Europe, we see a clear form of “housewifization” among women in
Japan (Fig. 0.6(1)).
In contrast, in other countries which are geographically located in Southeast
Asia, women continued to work in small shops, factories, and offices even
following modernization and urbanization. For example, in Thailand there
is almost no change over time in women’s participation in the workforce:
they remain working all their lives. Thailand had the same table-shaped

7 From a 2004 interview with a woman in her 90s living in a farming village near Fushun City
carried out by the author with the guidance of Professor Shuto Toshikazu.
16 Ochiai

pattern in the 1960s as it does now, although with a drop in working teenagers
due to the spread of school education (Fig. 0.6(2)).
On the other hand, China was home to Confucian moralism, and system-
atized an ideology of patriarchy and the division of labor between men and
women. However, after the 1949 revolution, China took a socialist policy that
emphasized productivity and therefore promoted the labor mobilization of
women, so rather than housewifization, we see de-housewifization. This is a
case of the path of modernization having a large influence on gender
(Fig. 0.6(3)). In Singapore too—which is not socialist—the labor mobilization
of women was promoted starting in the 1970s, due to that country’s develop-
mentalist policy of prioritizing economic development in line with strong
state leadership (Fig. 0.6(4)).
Korea has been heavily influenced by Confucianism particularly after the
seventeenth century, and in the home as well, men and women had separate
rooms, women were not allowed to go outside alone, and the spatial separation
of men and women was the norm. Current female workforce participa-
tion rates show an M-shaped pattern very similar to that of Japan, but we
cannot find evidence of the same decline as in Japan prior to that
(Park 2008). That is, the traditional workforce participation rate of women
does not appear to have been as high as Japan (Fig. 0.6(5)). In both South Korea
and Taiwan, we observe a gradual rise in workforce participation since the
1970s. However, the pattern arrived at as a result is the M shape in South Korea,
but one that is similar to Singapore’s in Taiwan. We also have to take into con-
sideration the underreporting of a high proportion of workers in the informal
sector in Taiwan (Fig. 0.6(6)).
As we have seen here, the responses to what modernity has brought to gen-
der in Asia vary depending on the differences in traditional gender patterns,
and on the pathways to modernity (Fig. 0.7). The examples we have looked at
show Thailand and Japan as societies where women were as active in the work-
force as men. Yet Japan experienced housewifization during the modern period,
but Thailand did not. In contrast, China, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea
were societies where, traditionally, women’s participation in the workforce was
low. Yet in China and later in Singapore, women’s participation was encouraged
through policies, and in South Korea and Taiwan there was a gradual rise.
Even more recently, we have seen new changes. In countries like Thailand
and China, where many women continue to work like their husbands even
while raising their children, there is a tendency for some women to become
housewives (Fig. 0.7). While many of these cases are involuntary due to
job losses or lack of childcare facilities, there are also many cases where well-
educated women are voluntarily choosing to dedicate themselves to raising
 Introduction 17

(1) (4)
(%) (%)
100 100
90 90
80 80
70 70
1880
60 1900 60 1970
1920 1980
50 50
1960 1991
40 1980 40 2003
30 2000 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60+ 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64

(2) (5)
(%) (%)
100 100
90 90
80 80
70 70
1960 1963
60 60
1970 1973
50 1980 50 1983
1990 1993
40 40
2000 2003
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+ 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64

(3) (6)
(%) (%)
100 100
90 90
80 80
70 70
1950
60 1960 60 1980
1970 1990
50 50
1980 2000
40 1990 40
2004
2000
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+ 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+

Figure 0.6 Female labor force participation rates by age group. (1) Japan, (2) Thailand,
(3) China, (4) Singapore, (5) South Korea and (6) Taiwan.
Sources:
(1) Japan: Umemura ET AL. (1998), NIPSSR (2010).
(2) Thailand: NSO, Population and Housing Census.
(3) China: 2000: China’s Ntional Bureau of Statistics, 2000 Census.
1990: State Statistical Bureau, Population Statistics of China.
1950-80: ILO (1986) (Estimated).
(4) Singapore: Singapore Dept. of Statistics (2002). Quah (1998), Saw (1984).
(5) South Korea: Statistics Bureau, Anual Report of Economically Active
Population.
(6) Taiwan: Statistics Bureau, Council of Labor Affairs, Executive Yuan
Taiwan (2001).
18 Ochiai

Singapore
Japan
Thailand Korea
Taiwan
Japan
Housewifization De-housewifization

De-housewifization Housewifization
China
China
Korea Thailand
Taiwan
Singapore

Figure 0.7 Gender and modernity in Asia.

their children (Wongboonsin 2004; Hashimoto 2008; Ochiai 2008b; Zheng 2012,
2013). Members of the Good Housewives Club (Hao Taitai Julebu 好太太俱乐部)
interviewed in 2007 in Harbin spoke of their pride in how their children’s test
scores had gone from poor to top of the class once they abandoned their
careers and started constantly watching over their children’s studies.8
Opinion surveys may help us predict the shape of society in the near future.
If we examine the results of opinion surveys on whether women agree with
gender-based labor division—where the man works and the woman stays at
home—many Asian countries show a trend that is clearly different from that
of the Western world. In the Western world, gender-based labor division is
considered old-fashioned, but in Asia, the trend is one where the higher the
current labor force participation is, as in Thailand, China, and the Philippines,
the stronger the support for gender-based labor division becomes. Conversely,
there are societies like South Korea where thoughts and ideas on this matter
are on par with those of the West, despite having a rather low actual labor
participation rate. Japan tends to oscillate between these two groups (Fig. 0.8).
A comparative analysis of television advertising in Thailand and Japan shows
that while in Japan there are many images of working women,9 most of the
images in Thailand are of housewives and mothers, showing an interesting
contrast to current realities (Pongsapitaksanti 2008). This may also be a reflec-
tion of ideals and desires.

8 From interviews conducted in Harbin in 2007 by the author and Zheng Yang. See Zheng
(2012, 2013) and Ochiai (2008b) for details.
9 This survey by Pongsapitaksanti Piya was done in 2003–2006. More recent Japanese adver-
tisements seem to have changed around 2009 to show women doing housework as some-
thing to be desired (Ochiai 2010: 10).
Introduction 19

Thailand 2005-6
The Philippines 2002
China 1995-2004
Agree
Japan 2002
Tend to agree
S. Korea 2002
Tend to disagree
USE 2002
Disagree
Germany 2002 Don’t know
UK 2002
Sweden 2002
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Figure 0.8 Women’s attitude towards gender role division “Men work outside home, women take
care of home ”.
Sources: China: China report on gender equality and women’s
development 1995–2005. Thailand: International Comparative
Survey on Home Education. Others: International Comparative
Survey on Gender Equality, Cabinet Office, Japan.

However, it is not quite as simple as the housewifization of women becoming

a reality in places like Thailand, China, and Singapore, and then going on to
create the sort of gender-differentiated modern family that Europe and Japan
experienced. This is because these societies have already gradually entered
Second Modernity, and along with demographic changes such as lower fertility
rates, we see very clear signs of Second Modernity such as increases in non-
regular employment rates and in unemployment rates, increases in the value
placed on investment in children’s education, and so on. We may no longer be
able to assume that developing countries will simply experience the same pro-
cesses as developed countries, just a few decades later, like in the Modernization
Theory widespread in the 1960s. Changes that happened in different historical
eras in Europe have taken place simultaneously under compressed modernity,
and this, as Chang notes, “leads to the construction and reconstruction of a
highly complex and fluid social system” (Chang 2010: 24; Chapter 1 of this vol-
ume). The complex path of gender changes in Asian societies is undoubtedly a
phenomenon of compressed modernity.

3 Asian Families and States

3.1 What Is Familialism?

So, what development does the three layer structure of modern society—
family, civil society, and state—show in Asian modernity?
20 Ochiai

When we discuss the features of Asian society, the term familialism

(or familism) often recurs. However this word has quite a range of meanings.
The first one is the one when everything is done with the family given prior-
ity over anything else. However, this “anything else” can be split into two catego-
ries. One is other social groups such as the company or the neighboring
community. In this sense, the value assessment for familialism has both positive
and negative sides because, on one hand, family love above all else is considered
to be valuable, but, on the other hand, it has negative functions that cause
“my home-ism” or “nepotism.” The other category is the one that prioritizes the
benefit of the family as a group rather than the benefit of individual family
members. The value assessment of this also has two aspects, and while there is
one view that praises sacrifice for the family and unselfish service, there are also
unceasing curses for the family that suppresses the individual happiness.
The second meaning of familialism is extolling the model family image for a
given society. This case is often linked with conservatism, and is about protect-
ing the family as the core of positive social traditions. Those who depart from
this family image are attacked mercilessly. However, the model family image
that is to be protected differs by society. In North American conservatism, the
nuclear family, with a father, mother, and children, is seen as the basic unit of
society, with single parents or homosexual marriages being frowned on. In
contrast, in Asia the extended family, with aged parents living with the family,
is often seen as traditional, and the nuclear family is looked on with suspicion
as being the start of the collapse of the family. In Confucian cultures, “filial
duty” is extolled to the extent of being made into an institution, but in
Southeast and South Asia where Confucianism is weaker or non-existent,
respect for and devotion to the parents is also seen as a core of the family
model but the ideologies behind it are different from Confucianism.
Thirdly, the expansion and application of human relationships seen within
the family to a range of social relationships outside the family can also be
termed “familialism” (Nakano 1984). In Japan, this reasoning has been central
to the explanation of the features of Japanese society. In prewar Japan, the
state was considered to be a family and the people to be the “Emperor’s chil-
dren.” After World War II, Japan’s rapid economic growth was made possible by
companies that considered themselves as a “family.” However, depicting the
state as a great family can be seen in China, Ancient Greece or in the absolute
monarchies of early modern Europe. This type of reasoning is not specific to
Japanese familialism.
In recent years there has been a rapid spread of a fourth concept of familial-
ism that sprung from the typology of welfare states. Esping-Andersen, who for-
mulated the “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (1990), or social democratic,
Introduction 21

conservative, and liberal, later moved to include familialism as a type of wel-

fare regime in order to demonstrate the characteristics of areas of Southern
Europe, and to discuss the nature of the welfare states which are emerging in
East Asia. According to Esping-Andersen, “familialism” is a welfare regime that
in both income distribution and care provision presumes that the family will
take responsibility for the welfare of its members. Familialistic welfare states
are characterized by (1) protecting the male breadwinner model through social
insurance or employment insurance systems, (2) emphasizing income protec-
tion, and limiting the provision of social services to the family to a minimum,
and (3) relying on social insurance more than taxes in terms of finances
(Esping-Andersen 2001, 2009). Until the 1960s, all welfare states had familialis-
tic tendencies, but they began to diverge after then (Esping-Andersen 2009:
80). Southern Europe and East Asia, where this familialistic trend remained
strong, are also the regions of ultra-low fertility. This is a paradoxical phenom-
enon where a society with “strong families” has low fertility (Dalla Zuanna and
Micheli 2004). Familialistic welfare regimes show little progress of women’s
participation in the workforce, and have insufficient systems to allow women
to both work and raise children. This means that each family needs to decide
whether to give up having children, or give up the mother’s working career.
This harsh choice leads to an undesirable scenario for society overall of low
fertility and increasing numbers of poor households. Indeed, familialism para-
doxically undermines the family (Esping-Andersen 2001).

3.2 Asian Familialism

When we look at the varying definitions of familialism this way, we can see
that under any definition, familialism is by no means an Asian-only concept.
It exists in Europe and North America as well. So why is “Asian familialism” so
emphasized?
If we look for an answer in historical studies, one strong hypothesis is that
offered by the British anthropologist Jack Goody, in his “The Development of
the Family and Marriage in Europe” (1983). In medieval Europe, the Church
expanded its role to subrogate the mutual aid functions of the family, and, by
prohibiting adoption, required those without heirs to donate their assets to the
Church. Thus, Goody argues that the Church weakened family ties in Europe.
According to him, it is not strong familialism in Asia but weakened family ties
in Europe that need explanation. Focusing on a later period, a French family
historian Gerard Delille, noted that marriage regulations by the Church weak-
ened the alliances of in-laws through marriage (Delille 2009). In other words,
this hypothesis holds that the influence of the Christian Church narrowed
the scope of the European family and blocked the institutionalization of kin
22 Ochiai

organizations that went beyond the scope of groups living together. In Asia, as
there was nothing corresponding to the Church in Europe, the family had high
importance as a social organization and tended to be institutionalized, in the
form of the relatively larger “family,” as the basic unit of society.10
However, other mechanisms were at work for the idea of “Asian familialism”
to become fixed. These mechanisms are orientalism and what is known as
“reverse orientalism” (Sakai 1996), or “self orientalism” (Ochiai 2012: 14). When
Europeans, with their smaller families, started traveling the world, they
must have found large families with many relatives quite unusual when they
encountered other societies, and so the families in each country were the tar-
gets of the colonists’ oriental gaze. Those who were targeted became aware of
the uniqueness of their culture, and created an ideology that was formed
around this cultural identity. Britain, having colonized India, created laws that
strengthened the patriarchal nature of Indian families, at the same time, the
suttee custom of the widow immolating herself on the remains of her late
husband became more common among Indians in the modern era. While
never a colony, in Japan too, drafts based on French law were rescinded after
criticism from people like Hozumi Yatsuka 穂積 八束, on the basis that “civil
law will destroy filial piety” and the Meiji Civil Code, drawing on German law
and emphasizing the “ie 家 (household),” was promulgated instead.
In fact even in Europe, in reaction to post-revolutionary France establishing
a civil code that presumed the nuclear family (regardless of regional diversity
within the country), the tenor of the argument in its neighbors Spain and
Germany were for the extended family as a national identity, with laws being
created for this (Douglas 1993; Schlumbohm 2009). While the more modern
societies were emphasizing the nuclear family and the individual, those
resisting modernization based their identity around their own families, an

10 When we look at the unit of population registers in each society, while life events (birth,
marriage, death) of individuals were recorded in European parish registers, in China and
Korea genealogy books for each lineage, or, in Japan, registers for “ie 家 (household)” were
created (Ochiai 2006). However, the lineage used as the unit in China and Korea and the
“ie” used as the unit in Japan are quite different things. “Lineage” is where descendents of
the same ancestor spread out and prosper. The “ie” is what Lèvi-Strauss has called the
“maison,” or the “house” (Levi-Strauss 1982), and is a lineal system where there is only one
heir per generation, and the other children form their own “ie.” In short, “ie” is a household
that continues over generations. Calling both these “families,” and furthermore calling the
nuclear family used as the unit in Europe “family,” is problematic. This shows us the limits
of using the English word “family,” which only has the concept of a simplified family, as an
academic term.
Introduction 23

arrangement which was repeated throughout modern history even as it

expanded in geographical scope.11
However, Asian societies experienced a more complicated process than a
simple self-orientalism. The concept of the “Good Wife and Wise Mother
(Ryosai kenbo 良妻賢母)” and similar ideas seen in Japan, China, and Korea are
often considered a classical, Confucian image of women, but in fact it started
out as a modern model of women created from the European emphasis on the
educational role of the mother in the nineteenth century. In the pre-modern
Confucian model, women were seen as foolish, so they were not expected to
play any role in education (Koyama 1991, 2012; Jin 2006). However, that origin
was gradually forgotten, and, with the appearance of the image of the “new
woman” in the early twentieth century. Asian people deemed her as a “Western
woman,” and, in contrast, the “good wife and wise mother” came to be seen as
an oriental tradition (Koyama 1991, 2012; Jin 2006). This is how the domestic
image of Asian women, connected with the modern housewife roles of house-
work, childrearing, and care, was formed. This can be called “traditionalization
of modern gender roles” (Ochiai 2012, 2013) or, even more generally, “tradition-
alization of modernity” in Asia (Ochiai and Johshita 2014).
Since the 1970s, families in the Western world have undergone a major trans-
formation through the second demographic transition. As a critique of the
increases in divorce and cohabitation, gender changes, the selection of free
lifestyles by the individual that are part of the “transformation of intimacy”
(Giddens 1992) in Second Modernity in the Western world, a tendency to
protect the family with a life-long marriage and gender-differentiated roles as
their own national tradition arose in Asian societies. For example, in Japan in
the 1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro 中曽根 康弘, emphasized the
Japanese tradition as a basis of the Japanese-style welfare state. However, what
he passed actually was the law for preferential taxation for households with
a male breadwinner and a housewife, which was a typically modern gender
division of labor (Ochiai and Johshita 2014; Chapter 2 of this volume).

3.3 Family and State in “Compressed Modernity”

However, tradition and ideology are not enough to explain Asian familialism.
Another important factor at work is policy decisions. Japanese politicians who
chose familialistic policies under the banner of the “Japanese-style welfare

11 If we apply this logic to the past, then it was a commonly accepted idea that the pre­
modern European family was an extended family, which worked as a symbol of the
good tradition for conservative people who were against modernization. However, Peter
Laslett, John Hajnal, and other British historical demographers have demonstrated using
24 Ochiai

society” referenced tradition primarily as an excuse to suppress government

expenditure needed for the construction of a welfare state (Miyamoto, Peng,
Uzuhashi 2003). In other words, while in fact they were choosing the fourth
meaning of familialism for political reasons, they justified this ideologically by
applying the second meaning. However, the model family image assumed
there was in essence the family image of First Modernity, while flavored to
some extent with Asian traditionalism, due to the process called the tradition-
alization of modernity.12
When we examine the issue like this, we can then explain Asian familialism
using the proposed framework for seeing Asian modernity as compressed
modernity. In compressed modernity, there is not enough time and wealth
build-up to develop a welfare state. Asian familialism may have been deliber-
ately selected as a policy option based on these conditions. Asian traditions
and their discourses are used as proofs justifying this policy option.
Following Japan, other Asian countries also gained confidence through the
1980s economic growth known as the “Asian Miracle,” and in the 1990s began to
express their own claims. At the 1993 UN Conference on Human Rights, there
was a clash between Western nations claiming the universality of human rights
and democracy and Asian nations, especially China and Singapore, emphasiz-
ing “Asian values” that stressed the maintenance of order and consensus.
This was the debate on “Asian values.” This debate was a clash of values and
ideology, but it is also clear that it was based on a political desire to deflect any
criticism by the West of these countries’ internal problems by flying the flags of
human rights and democracy. Even here culture was levered.
At the heart of the “Asian values” of these countries was “family values.”
Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew 李光耀 gave a talk in 1994 on “Family
Bonds: Why the East succeeded” (Tamura 1999). “Family values” is a concept of
the family that merges the modern family aspect of emphasizing the role
of the full-time housewife as the person responsible for caring for the elderly
and the children with the “traditional” aspect praising support of the elderly by
the family. In this line, Singapore and China established, respectively, the
Maintenance of Parents Act (1996) and the Law on Protection of the Rights
and Benefits of the Elderly (1996) (Shinozaki 1999). As the slogan “Look East”

historical materials that in the twelfth century England and other northwest European
countries were already nuclear family societies (Hainal 1983).
12 For example, Nakasone saw the ideal of the happy family as a male office worker return-
ing home and having a meal around the dining table with his family, to which is added the
image of grandparents holding their grandchildren on their knees (Ochiai and Johshita
2014).
Introduction 25

(look to Japan) suggested, Asian countries saw Japan as a model. Clearly, the
familialistic reforms promoted by the Nakasone administration in the 1980s
were one model. However, by making them legal requirements, these coun-
tries made the responsibility towards parents even clearer than Japan had.13
In China, the expression “wei fu xian lao 未富先老” or “becoming old before
becoming prosperous” is often seen. When this phrase is used for an entire
society, there is a clear awareness of and impatience with compressed
modernity.
On the other hand, South Korea is taking a somewhat different path. South
Korea was greatly affected by the Asian Financial Crisis that hit it at the end
of the 1990s, and brought in a neoliberal policy following IMF intervention
(in South Korea, this is called the “IMF Crisis”). Unemployment, suicide, and
divorce rates shot up, but as these were dealt with the administration of Kim
Dae Jung 金 大中 김대중 moved ahead with the construction of a welfare state.
The phrase used at the time was “productive welfare.” In this, there should be
no conflict between economic development and the construction of a welfare
state: in fact welfare is seen as supporting the economy.
Together with familialism, another phrase used to describe the features of
Asian society is “developmentalism.” This refers to the state-led economic
development seen in developing societies. South Korea’s “productive welfare”
can be seen as a continuation of developmentalist economic growth. As noted
above, South Korea at the time was moving in a new direction, guided by the
IMF towards neoliberalism, but even this was a policy that, by being state-led
neoliberalism, appeared to be a contradiction in terms. Compressed moder-
nity forced South Korea to take a difficult path of state-led economic growth
and welfare state construction at the same time.
Returning to the initial question of this section, the ways in which the three-
layered structure of modern society—family, civil society, and state—were
developed and expanded in Asia, we see that the family and the state both play
important roles to this day. There is no clear structural transformation as we
have seen brought by Second Modernity in the Western world. Nevertheless,
the three-layer structure of First Modernity has not remained intact. Increases
in the divorce rate and rapidly aging populations are acting on families in this
region. Asian families are being shaken, but as there are no policy-based
responses such as welfare state construction which has served as the basis for
institutionalized individualism in Europe, they are unable to move into new

13 In addition, in China, shequ 社区 or residential communities organized by the govern-

ment, are tasked with the provision of elderly welfare (see Osada 2008; Chapter 6 of this
book).
26 Ochiai

forms. The concept of Asian cultural identity has contributed to the immobili-
zation of First Modernity. At the same time, we see countries thrust into
nationalism that promote First Modernity, and the reactions in their neighbor-
ing countries to these movements actually end up strengthening nationalism
in the whole region. Since the 1970s, the feeling in Japanese society, which,
with people in the Western world, has had John Lennon’s “Imagine” on its
lips,14 is being pulled back to the concept of strong nation in First Modernity.
Compressed modernity is preventing societies in this region from moving
away from the First Modernity.

3.4 The Direction of Asian Society

So will Asian society head towards a reconstruction of First Modernity through
a strengthening of the family and state, even though they appear to have
already entered Second Modernity with regard to economics and demograph-
ics? Should this happen, would they create their own “Asian modernity” in
contrast to that of Europe and the United States?
However, this view of the future is doubtful due to a number of problems. To
start with, “Asia,” as has been noted many times in this Introduction, does not
share a common tradition. Confucianism is stronger in some countries, weaker in
others. Some countries are Buddhist, some are Muslim. “Asia” is not a traditional
inevitability, but is, rather, an uncertain existence that has been emphasized for
political and policy expediency and is being shaken through internal clashes.
In addition, even in the societies of the Western world, which have been
heading for social design based on the individual unit model since they entered
Second Modernity, under the pressures of population aging and increasing
public expenditures, the pendulum is swinging back again. For example, in
Britain since the Blair administration, the slogan “big society” has been used to
promote mutual aid in the community and among members of extended fami-
lies living separately in that community. The welfare retrenchment in Europe
and the construction of welfare states amidst difficulties in Asia, while not
enough to warrant the term “convergence,” do suggest that the societies will
become more similar in the future.
Finally, Fig. 0.9 shows a comparison of the long-term demographic trends
compared internationally. It shows the changes in the proportion of working-
age population in a number of countries in Europe and Asia. While European
countries and US were generally heading downwards after World War II having

14 The new values generated by the youth culture of around 1970, the so-called “counter-
culture,” could be said to have played a major role in giving direction to Second Modernity
in the Western world.
Introduction 27

75%

Sweden
70%
Germany
Italy
65%
USA

60% Japan
China

55% S. Korea
Thailand
50% Singapore
1948
1952
1956
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
Figure 0.9 Trends in proportions of working-age population (15–64).
Source: UNITED NATIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK.

completed their demographic transition at the beginning of the twentieth

century, Japan alone maintained a high proportion from the 1960s to the
first half of the 1970s, and from the 1970s on other Asian countries are like
the rising sun. This period with high proportion of working-age population
is termed the “population bonus” or “demographic dividend” (Wongboonsin
and Guest 2005).
The demographic dividend is a condition beneficial not just to the economy
but also to the family (Ochiai 1997: chapter 4). Since the working-age popula-
tion is large, taking care of elderly parents or raising children is something that
can be done with a larger number of siblings cooperating. From the period of
high economic growth to the period of moderate growth after the Energy
Crisis, Japanese families benefited from this favorable condition. Asian fami-
lies are still reaping the benefits. Could it be that familialism has only been
possible thanks to the support of these beneficial demographic conditions?
If that is the case, then was the construction of the welfare state in Europe an
unavoidable reaction to demographic changes?
Japan these days is not like it was in the 1960s. With fewer siblings and rela-
tives, the systems used in the 1960s no longer function. The second rise for
Japan, Germany and Italy in Fig. 0.9 is not good news at all because it is caused
by extremely low fertility and low proportions of children. Families in Asian
societies that are currently supported by strong networks of relatives will, in a
generation, face the same problems Japan does.
28 Ochiai

Gulliver’s Travels contains a story about a land of long-lived people. Its ironic
conclusion that achieving humanity’s dreams of longer lives is not always a
good thing could almost have been written about the twenty-first century.
However, we who live in these societies need wisdom more than irony, as we
need to come up with ways to enjoy the blessings of longer life by constructing
adequate social systems. This is why social innovation is becoming such an
issue everywhere. Asian societies which have gone through compressed
modernity are in a position to face these issues of humanity side by side with
the Western world. How much the past, arrived at through the route of “com-
pression,” will bind and limit the future of Asia is an all-too-real problem for
the future.

4 Structure of This Book

This book is, as noted at the beginning, a collection of works which are dealing
with frameworks and key concepts for approaching “Asian Modernity.”
Chapter 1 (by Chang Kyung-Sup) is a discussion, by its originator, of the con-
cept of “compressed modernity,” a key concept in approaching “Asian moder-
nity” throughout this volume. According to him, one outcome of compressed
modernity is individualization which is not led by individualism. Instead, indi-
vidualization in Asian societies is paradoxically caused by familialism where
the family members are considered to be responsible for supporting each
other, because there will be flight from the family in order to avoid the risk of
being put in a position to help family members and as a result, people are indi-
vidualized. This topic is examined using South Korea as a case example.
Chapter 2 (by Ochiai Emiko) takes the concept of compressed modernity
from Chapter 1, and uses it to explain the extreme demographic changes in East
Asia in recent years. It also points out the significant difference in degree of com-
pression between Japan and other Asian societies, and proposes labeling Japan’s
case “semi-compressed” modernity. The differences between “semi-compressed”
and “compressed” modernity lie in the effects on policy choices: the former leads
to an anachronistic fixation on “familialism,” whereas the latter has generated a
neoliberal familialism that is directly connected with global markets.
Chapter 3 (by Patcharawalai Wongboonsin and Kua Wongboonsin) focuses
on the gains and losses of the favorable conditions of a demographic dividend
in discussing the demographic trends in contemporary Asia following Chapter
2. Demographic conditions form the basis for all social changes. The authors
are Thai demographers, a country still benefiting from a demographic divi-
dend, and propose policies that will extend the effects of this bonus.
Introduction 29

Chapter 4 (by Iwai Hachiro) looks at individual life courses from a micro-
scale viewpoint in examining the changes in Japanese society, which has been
termed “familialist.” By focusing on women, we can see a division between
unmarried women who continue to work, whether full-time or part-time, and
married, full-time housewives. Focusing on men, the proportion in non-
regular employment is increasing. Focusing on the elderly, we can see that
while there was an increase in the group that was able to draw on public pen-
sions and thus were not dependent on their children for economic support,
the 2000s have seen the appearance of mutually dependent cohabitation of
low-income children and elderly parents. The growing social and economic
gap in Japanese society, and the increase in the groups excluded from the sys-
tem, is observed. The foundations of familialism, or a society with the
family as its unit based on men’s full employment, have weakened, but there
have been no systems developed to replace them.
Chapter 5 (by Tarohmaru Hiroshi) examines a labor issue common to the
contemporary world, that of increasing non-regular employment and com-
pares the situation in South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. He suggests that a factor
behind the wage gap in regular and non-regular employment in Japan is the
effects of social closure or the exclusion of non-regular employees from
the system created and maintained by regular employees and managers. Also,
the number of years of education has a major effect on the wage gap between
regular and non-regular employees in South Korea and Taiwan, but in Japan it
is gender. The conclusion is close to that of Chapter 4; that the shrunken but
remaining existence of the social system that exclude non-regular workers,
particularly women, is increasing the gaps in Japan.
Chapter 6 (by Ochiai Emiko) shifts the focus from employment to care.
The results of comparison of patterns of care provision to children and the
elderly in six societies in East and Southeast Asia are presented in diamonds
showing the balance between the four sectors of state, market, family and rela-
tives, and community. The liberal familialism defined in Chapter 2 appears as
an expansion of the care market, and in particular the employment of foreign
care workers. The reason for the larger size of the state’s role in Asia tends towards
socialism or developmentalism rather than welfare states. Japan is shown to be
unable to expand state or market, with familialism fixed here as well.
Chapter 7 (by Asato Wako) is a comparison of immigration policies for
migrant care workers in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, liberal familialist
societies. Liberalism, which exposes the family to the global market, is in
fact promoted as a policy based on careful control by the state. In these
societies we see a strong, shared ideological discourse on the family. As typi-
cally demonstrated by Singapore, a country which announced it would
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perpetuo e curatore Felice gli disse: — Obbedisci e consegna le
Scritture, che tu possiedi. — Euticio rispose: — Io non ne ho. — Il
flamine perpetuo e curatore Felice disse: — La tua risposta sarà
messa a verbale. — Quando si fu alla casa di Codeone, la di lui
moglie portò sei volumi. Il flamine perpetuo e curatore disse: —
Cercate, se ne avete altri ancora e portateli. — La donna rispose: —
Io non ne ho più. — Il flamine perpetuo e curatore Felice disse allora
a Bos, schiavo pubblico: — Entra e cerca se essa ne possiede degli
altri. — Lo schiavo pubblico disse: — Ho cercato e non ne ho trovati.
— Il flamine perpetuo e curatore Felice disse a Vittorino, Silvano e
Garoso: — Se voi non avete fatto tutto ciò che avreste dovuto, ne
sarete tenuti responsabili — » [506].
Questi pochi brani di un processo verbale forniscono una chiara idea
della diligenza e della durezza della ricerca, nonchè del danno, che
alla cultura del tempo e a quella dei secoli successivi dovette
arrecare la persecuzione di Diocleziano. Si salvarono le sole
biblioteche di Gerusalemme e di Cesarea, e, per l’astuzia del
vescovo, un po’ quella di Cartagine [507]. Altrove la devastazione fu
ovunque gravissima, e tutto il patrimonio della cultura cristiana dei
primi tre secoli, insieme con quello delle civiltà, che vi avevano
attinenza, andarono miseramente perduti.
 VIII.

Ma, se così tristi furono le sorti della cultura cristiana, la mancanza di

guerre estere e la nuova tranquillità, che, col governo della
Tetrarchia, si era andata ovunque diffondendo, non avevano
mancato, e non mancavano, di produrre, come sempre, i loro
benefici effetti, specie in quelle provincie dell’impero, che godevano
dei principi più tolleranti e più illuminati.
Un altro sopravvenuto motivo di bene era adesso il frazionamento
dell’impero in quattro governi sufficientemente autonomi. Questa
nuova condizione politica si traduce in un vivo stimolo ad occuparsi,
ciascuno, dei territori, sottoposti alla sua giurisdizione, con quella
sollecitudine, che mai non aveva potuto usare l’accentrato governo
di Roma. Da questo momento perciò si hanno i più significativi indizi
della cura imperiale, intesa ad estendere in Oriente e in Occidente la
lingua latina e a far fiorire ovunque tutti i più svariati generi di
studi [508].
Il mezzo è triplice: l’assunzione, quasi esclusiva, di dotti e di letterati
alle supreme magistrature; l’eccitamento ai singoli comuni alla
fondazione di nuove scuole; l’invito a maestri famosi di trasferire colà
le loro cattedre. Così il retore Eumenio è subito nominato magister
memoriae del reggente delle Gallie; [509] così Diocleziano chiama a
Nicomedia il grammatico Flavio e il retore Lattanzio; [510] così
Costanzo Cloro, vero «princeps iuventutis», come lo definisce un
suo apologista, [511] sceglie ufficialmente per Augustodunum, il
maggior centro intellettuale delle Gallie, quello stesso Eumenio, che
già aveva chiamato al suo gabinetto imperiale.
Ma questa ultima nomina ha per noi assai più valore di quello che
l’atto materiale non possa significare.
Le Gallie toccavano ormai, nel IV. secolo di C., la pienezza della loro
civiltà e della loro romanizzazione. L’opera, iniziata fin da Augusto,
aveva maturato i suoi frutti migliori. In circa tre secoli, esse si erano
dappertutto popolate di scuole famose, da Autun (Augustodunum) a
Vienne, da Arles a Tolosa, da Lione, a Bordeaux, da Poitiers ad
Angoulème, da Besançons a Treveri.
Ma a questa germinazione spontanea, nella quale, se facili a
supporsi, difficili a precisarsi erano, fino ad ora, i meriti ufficiali, si
aggiungono, nel IV. secolo, gli sforzi assidui e diretti del governo
imperiale.
La Gallia aveva molto sofferto durante il secolo precedente: era stata
teatro di guerre civili fra gli autocandidati a l’impero, teatro di
invasioni di Franchi e di Alemanni, aveva subito gli assedii e la
distruzione di parecchie città, era stata devastata da insurrezioni di
contadini e da scorrerie di briganti. Essa ben meritava dunque le
cure speciali del nuovo governo, di cui, per giunta, era divenuta una
delle residenze privilegiate. E quelle cure, come a tutto il resto, si
volsero alla restaurazione degli istituti scolastici.
Augustodunum aveva più di ogni altro sofferto dei torbidi precedenti.
Le sue scuole e i suoi monumenti erano stati devastati e
saccheggiati; il titolare di quella cattedra di eloquenza, che l’aveva
sin allora resa la regina delle Gallie, era morto, e Costanzo Cloro,
intervenendo per la prima volta in un campo di amministrazione, che,
fino a questo momento, era rimasto, in Gallia, dominio privato o
municipale, sceglieva uno dei più insigni maestri del tempo, allora
addetto alla sua cancelleria imperiale, il retore Eumenio [512].
La lettera di nomina, che noi conosciamo, è uno dei documenti più
significativi dell’interessamento del principe verso gli uomini di studio
e le cose dell’intelligenza, e, se fa onore a chi la ricevette, ne fa
altrettanto a chi ebbe ad inviarla [513]. Ma Eumenio stesso, che più
ne era in grado, come quegli, il quale avea occupato uno dei più
eccelsi uffici a corte, illustra, in una sua orazione, gli intenti sociali e
politici, che ispirarono quella manifestazione della politica imperiale.
«Gl’imperatori», egli dice, «si sono curati della sorte delle lettere, con
sollecitudine pari a quella fino ad ieri usata nell’amministrazione
militare. Essi hanno stimato loro obbligo provvedere a che la scuola
avesse un maestro, affinchè coloro, i quali occorreva formare all’arte
della parola o alle cariche delle sacrae cognitiones o ai magisteria
Palatii», «ricevessero una acconcia preparazione» [514].
Secondo Costanzo, dunque, spettava alla scuola media e superiore
del tempo preparare alle professioni liberali e ai più alti uffici nello
Stato. Ma lo studio delle lettere, non ha — per lui — soltanto uno
scopo professionale; ne ha uno più elevato e spirituale.
«Le lettere, spiega l’antico magister memoriae di Costanzo, sono la
base di tutte le virtù; sono maestre della continenza, della vigilanza,
della pazienza. Esse, allorquando hanno piegato lo spirito fin dalla
più tenera età, lo rendono atto a tutti gli uffici della vita, anche a
quelli della milizia, che ne sembrano in più categorica
opposizione...... Esse preparano le menti dei giovani ad amare un
genere migliore di vita....» [515].
L’insegnamento è dunque una scuola di morale civile. Ma è anche
scuola di patriottismo. I giovani imparano dai maestri «a celebrare le
gesta dei Principi più illustri — (quale ufficio migliore potrebbe infatti
spettare all’eloquenza?)». «Essi, nei locali scolastici, vedono, e
ammirano, ogni giorno, le carte, in cui sono segnati tutti i paesi, tutti i
mari, tutte le città, le genti, le nazioni, che gl’invitti Principi romani
proteggono con il loro amore, avvincono con la loro virtù, tengono
schiave col terrore» [516].
Per tali motivi, o anche per essi, è bene che l’istruzione sia impartita
pubblicamente, e non privatamente. «Importa molto alla gloria dei
Principi romani» «che i giovani, i quali sono istruiti per celebrarne le
virtù, sentano il grande palpito, che li accompagna dal cuore di tutta
la nazione» [517].
Ma non sono questi soltanto i particolari, che interessano di quella
elezione. Fatto, per noi egualmente notevole, è che l’imperatore
destini un pubblico docente ad una cattedra istituita, non già dal
governo centrale, ma dalla città, e che tale circostanza non gli vieti di
nominarvi egli stesso il titolare, nè di fissare il suo stipendio.
Continuiamo, secondo si vede, a procedere per la china delle
ingerenze imperiali nella istruzione pubblica municipale. Già dai
Severi era stato concesso — come qualcosa che s’aveva diritto a
concedere — la facoltà di destinare una parte dei redditi locali agli
stipendii dei maestri; con i Gordiani, il principe stesso deferisce ai
Consigli dei municipi le attribuzioni disciplinari su quei docenti;
quaranta anni di poi, l’imperatore Probo municipalizza le scuole di
uno dei centri più notevoli dell’impero; ora, il principe stesso impone
il titolare di una cattedra comunale, e ne fissa il relativo stipendio.
Uno stipendio tutt’altro che trascurabile e il cui ammontare ha un ben
alto significato! Esso fu di sexcena milia nummum, [518] pari, giacchè
l’atto è posteriore alla riforma monetaria dioclezianea, a L.
15.000 [519]. Or bene, quando noi pensiamo che Eumenio aveva, fino
a quel momento, occupato uno dei maggiori uffici dello Stato, quello
di magister memoriae [520], il quale era retribuito in misura elevata al
confronto di parecchi altri; [521] e che, ciò non ostante, il suo
stipendio di insegnante di retorica ad Augustodunum ne rappresenta
una cifra precisamente doppia, possiamo ben farci un’idea del
favore, di cui Costanzo volle circondare la restaurazione della scuola
di Augustodunum, e, in buona parte anche, dell’importanza, che,
nella società e nella politica del tempo, riscoteva il ministero
dell’insegnamento medio e superiore.
Tuttavia è bene subito soggiungere che lo stipendio di Eumenio, a
cui raramente si accostarono quelli dei suoi colleghi dell’Oriente e
dell’Occidente, deve pur sempre considerarsi come un’eccezione,
anzi propriamente come uno stipendio ad personam. Egli aveva
occupato un ufficio notevolissimo nel gabinetto imperiale; e, quando
aveva abbandonato quel posto per fare la volontà del suo sovrano,
andando a dirigere una modesta scuola di provincia, era
ragionevole, non solo che egli non vedesse assottigliato il proprio
utile, ma che ricevesse un’indennità compensatrice. Ciò che,
naturalmente, fu, a suo vantaggio, ordinato.
 CAPITOLO V.
L’istruzione pubblica nell’impero romano,
Costantino il Grande e i suoi figli.
(312-361)

I. La monarchia Dioclezianea — Costantiniana e il trasporto

della capitale a Costantinopoli. Ripercussione di ciò sulle sorti
della istruzione pubblica nell’impero. — II. Costantino e la
coltura. L’Università Costantinopolitana. — III. Una nuova
biblioteca pubblica. Costantino e l’istruzione professionale.
L’istruzione primaria; fine delle fondazioni alimentari. — IV.
Privilegi e garanzie ai docenti privati e pubblici nelle città di
provincia. — Ampliamento delle immunità e suoi motivi.
Immunità ai professionisti delle arti edilizie e industriali. — V.
Costantino e la cura delle opere d’arte. — VI. I figli di
Costantino ne continuano la politica; gl’imperatori, il Senato e
i governatori nella scelta dei maestri. Riforme nell’Università
Ateniese. Dichiarazione dei nuovi criterii di governo in fatto
d’istruzione pubblica. — VII. I figli di Costantino e probabile
limitazione delle immunità.

I.

La nuova riforma dello assetto politico dello Stato, che, iniziata sotto
Diocleziano, ebbe a consolidarsi definitivamente con Costantino, e la
fondazione di una seconda capitale in Oriente, la quale veniva ad
accrescere il lustro e le esigenze di quest’altra vasta porzione
dell’impero, sono le due grandi determinanti di quel meraviglioso
progresso delle sorti dell’istruzione pubblica, di cui il primo
imperatore cristiano si rese benemerito nella storia della civiltà.
Queste due condizioni bastarono perchè quest’uomo, che consacrò
la nuova fede con la più solenne delle approvazioni, dovesse poi, in
tutta la sua vita, in tutta la pratica di ogni giorno, negarne il principio
fondamentale: il regno degli uomini non essere di questo mondo, e il
regno di questo mondo volesse adorno di tutte le grazie più
squisitamente pagane.
Già avvertimmo che la nuova e macchinosa burocrazia, le cui sorti
andavano strettamente connesse alle recenti riforme politiche,
richiedeva, in modo indispensabile, un più diretto e palese intervento
dello Stato nelle cose dell’istruzione pubblica. Il governo ormai, per
funzionare, aveva bisogno di uomini, che sapessero, e potessero,
starne a capo [522]; meglio ancora, aveva bisogno di produrli. La
responsabilità di questa produzione come del funzionamento dello
Stato, era passata, da un’anonima classe sociale, nella persona
stessa del dirigente supremo. Onde tutta quella serie di
insegnamenti, che, fin allora, parevano risolversi soltanto nell’utile di
privati, e di cui solo i più chiaroveggenti scorgevano l’intimo rapporto
con la vita pubblica e sociale, diventavano ora insegnamenti
professionali di prima necessità. E fra essi il posto di onore doveva
toccare all’insegnamento indispensabile per dei buoni
amministratori: la giurisprudenza. Tutto ciò — ripetiamo — maturava
da tempo, senza aver potuto determinare una crisi risolutiva di
effetti; ma ecco, avvenire con Costantino, la fondazione della nuova
città, che doveva essere anche la città capitale. Tutto quanto in
Roma, od altrove, l’opera dei secoli aveva lentamente formato,
dovea quivi essere creazione immediata del governo centrale. Onde,
come tutto il resto, bisognava — e bisognò — suscitare nella nuova
metropoli, sin dai più elementari, tutti gli organi della pubblica
istruzione; il che bastava a far sì che questa creazione ex novo non
fosse ritardata dalla tradizione, ma si adattasse immediatamente ai
sopravvenuti bisogni, alle sopravvenute influenze dell’ambiente
sociale.
Ma il fatto stesso della nuova città, che si fondava, si popolava e si
abbelliva, richiese tutta un’altra serie di cure per altri ordini di
insegnamenti, esclusivamente professionali, a cui, fino a quel giorno,
quasi nessun imperatore aveva pensato. Bisognò all’uopo evocare
tutte le energie delle industrie del tempo; e questo, Costantino, nei
limiti delle sue forze, e a seconda delle circostanze, non esitò a
tentare gloriosamente.
I nuovi rivolgimenti dovevano provocare altri effetti sull’equilibrio
della cultura nell’impero romano. Ed essi furono gli stessi, che,
nell’ordine politico, avrebbe arrecato la fondazione di Costantinopoli
e la residenza, che ivi, stabilmente, fisseranno, gl’imperatori. Il
mondo civile avrà ora due soli, uno, pallido, del tramonto, l’altro,
luminoso e fulgido, dell’oriente; ed esso si volgerà con preferenza a
quest’ultimo. In Costantinopoli, e non più in Roma, preferiranno d’ora
innanzi accorrere i più illustri dottori del tempo; in Costantinopoli,
dove essi, sotto gli occhi imperiali, potranno più facilmente sperare
onori e ricompense. Ma il danno, che per ciò stesso ne consegue
all’antica metropoli, torna eziandio a vantaggio di altre città di
provincia. L’incantesimo del suo monopolio intellettuale è rotto, e la
nuova capitale irradia della sua luce anche altri centri di cultura. Gli
studii, fino ad ora ristretti e raccolti in una sola città, si spargono
intorno. I dotti non disdegnano rimanere nella breve patria
provinciale; onde, insieme con la decadenza di una città, si assiste
allo spettacolo di altri fari luminosi, che le si accendono intorno — da
presso e da lungi — effetti imprevisti di cause inconsapevoli e di atti
compiuti con intendimenti diversi.

II.

Costantino il Grande, che aveva iniziato la sua carriera imperiale tra

le battaglie e le vittorie, non fu solamente un guerriero valoroso; non
soltanto quel grande uomo politico, che ebbe agio di rivelarsi in
parecchie delle più difficili circostanze; fu egualmente — ed in pari
misura — persona colta ed amante d’ogni disciplina intellettuale. Il
padre suo Costanzo Cloro, aveva cominciato a praticare, nel seno
della sua stessa famiglia, quel culto dell’istruzione, che aveva
ispirato buona parte della sua amministrazione. E Costantino
adolescente aveva frequentato un corso regolare di studii letterari e
vi si era distinto fra i coetanei. Gli amori dei primi anni non lo
abbandonarono facilmente. E adulto e glorioso, aveva proseguito a
coltivare le lettere, aveva amata la compagnia dei filosofi, aveva,
come Augusto, gradito la conversazione delle Muse e gli omaggi dei
poeti, e, come Augusto, s’era compiaciuto di asserire (e di darne la
prova!) che i poeti e gli scrittori del suo secolo avevano sempre
trovato presso di lui il più benevolo ascolto, come gli studiosi,
l’adeguata ricompensa del loro valore. [523]
Nè le tempestose vicende del primo periodo della sua vita avevano
mancato dal confermarlo in questa tendenza politica. Il suo più fiero
avversario, Licinio, era stato un barbaro infesto alle lettere, [524] onde
un’elementare opportunità di governo obbligava l’antagonista a
brillare per qualità opposte.
Così Costantino, primo imperatore cristiano, il quale teneva
mostrarsi soltanto alla Croce debitore di ogni suo trionfo, e che alla
gloria di questa aveva innalzato una nuova capitale nell’impero, non
tralasciò per tutta la vita di onorare al tempo stesso quell’Atene, che
rimaneva ancora l’invitta e sdegnosa cittadella del disprezzato
Paganesimo, dichiarando che egli, imperatore universale, preferiva a
tutti gli onori e a tutte le cose l’umile carica di stratego ateniese e il
modesto ricordo, che di lui quella città aveva voluto scolpire nella
pietra. [525] Così le virtù della guerra e la saviezza dell’opera
legislativa egli aveva voluto alternare con le opere della cultura, e
fare in modo che gli imparziali avessero a tramandare ai posteri il
suo nome come quello di uno dei principi romani, che più, e meglio,
avevano favorito il progresso delle lettere e delle discipline
liberali [526].
Grandi cose erano dunque da aspettarsi da quest’uomo, appena le
cure materiali e più urgenti del governo gli avessero dato pace. Il che
doveva avvenire (ed avvenne) subito dopo la guerra con Licinio e la
edificazione di Costantinopoli.
Alessandria aveva il suo Museo, Roma il suo Ateneo; era pur
necessario, e non soltanto per desiderio di simmetrie architettoniche,
che la nuova capitale del mondo possedesse qualche cosa di
corrispondente all’uno od all’altro, od all’uno ed all’altro insieme. E
Costantino vi provvide. Non certo con l’erezione di quell’edifizio, che
dal numero de’ suoi portici venne denominato Ottagono, e che i
cronisti bizantini [527], insieme con la maggior parte degli storici
moderni, s’accordano ad attribuire a Costantino ed anche a definirlo
un istituto pubblico destinato all’istruzione superiore dei cittadini
constantinopolitani [528]. Questo locale, ove — secondo ci si informa
— abitavano, mantenuti a spese pubbliche, un collegio di religiosi,
non era che un seminario teologico [529] e, quindi, una scuola,
espressione di assai più matura fase della civiltà cristiana ed
orientale [530]. Ma la vera e propria Università constantinopolitana
doveva sorgere altrove.
E sorse, infatti, in quella, che le fonti bizantine denominano la
Basilica, e che noi rimaniamo dubbiosi se sia da identificare con la
Βασιλικὴ Κινστέρνα o non piuttosto con altro edifizio omonimo,
situato sul Campidoglio, nell’ottava Regione costantinopolitana, là
dove, più tardi, una costituzione di Teodosio II. ci additerà la sede
ufficiale dei docenti le principali discipline, che, al suo tempo, si
impartivano alla gioventù della metropoli [531]. Ma, al pari della
Κινστέρνα [532], è quasi certo che la seconda Basilica sia stata
costruita da Costantino il Grande, [533] sì che l’uno o l’altro edifizio
troviamo destinato al pubblico insegnamento già fin dalla giovinezza
dell’imperatore Giuliano, che lo frequentava coi suoi condiscepoli e
col suo pedagogo, durante il suo primo, breve soggiorno a
Costantinopoli [534].
I docenti, che vi insegnavano, non erano certamente dei privati. Ce
lo dice, oltre l’analogia con Roma e la universale consuetudine del
tempo, il fatto che noi, sin da questo momento, troviamo dei
professori ufficiali a Costantinopoli e anche la succennata
costituzione di Teodosio II. — la quale regolava definitivamente un
assetto di cose, che esisteva da molti anni [535] — da cui si desume
come i maestri di discipline liberali, nell’apposito pubblico edifizio sul
Campidoglio, fossero degli stipendiati del governo.
Quali discipline insegnassero, noi lo ricaviamo da varie fonti.
Giuliano vi cominciò i corsi di grammatica (lingua e letteratura) greca
e di retorica; [536] un epigramma dell’Antologia parla a chiare note
dell’insegnamento del diritto; [537] i docenti ufficiali, che noi andiamo
fin d’ora conoscendo in Costantinopoli, sono maestri di retorica
latina; [538] e dal ruolo dei professori, fissati da Teodosio II., come da
qualche altra minore disposizione, [539] si desume l’esistenza di
cattedre di lingua e letteratura greca e latina, di retorica, di filosofia e
di giurisprudenza, di cui almeno quelle fondamentali dovevano avere
avuto principio con Costantino.
Chi nominava questi insegnanti?
Sotto Teodosio II. sarà investito di tale diritto ed ufficio il senato; [540]
ma tale consuetudine, che già da tempo troviamo in vigore nelle città
di provincia, si deve, nella nuova capitale, ritenere sincrona della
prima istituzione di quella Università, sincrona quindi del governo del
primo Costantino.

III.

Abbiamo così un corpo organico d’istituti imperiali per l’istruzione

media e superiore della gioventù. È, dopo questo, supponibile che
Costantino non avesse pensato a edificare, in Costantinopoli,
almeno una pubblica biblioteca, che facesse degno riscontro alle
ventotto, che in quel tempo adornavano la consorella
dell’Occidente? [541] Può anzi supporsi che, a Costantinopoli, i
giovani, i quali subito vi accorsero numerosi, [542] riuscissero a
dedicarsi alle varie discipline, e i vari ordini di docenti, ad attendere
al culto della scienza, senza l’ausilio di biblioteche? E poichè una
pubblica biblioteca [543] esisteva nella Basilica antonomastica, di cui
discorrono le fonti, e che oggi noi non sappiamo se identificare con
la Basilica Cisterna, o con i locali dell’Università, sul Campidoglio, e
poichè, come in Roma, essa era annessa al massimo istituto
cittadino di istruzione, la sua origine si lascia facilmente ricondurre al
primo fondatore di quell’edificio e di quell’istituto.
.
Fin qui noi troviamo le sollecitudini di Costantino quasi
esclusivamente limitate agli insegnamenti tradizionali nell’impero
romano, cioè a quella cultura umanistica, che tutti i secoli precedenti
e tutti i centri principali dell’impero avevano conosciuta. Ma, come
accennammo, il solo fatto della fondazione di Costantinopoli mise
subito in evidenza le lacune di un tale ordinamento, e — maggiore
fra tutte — quella degli insegnamenti professionali, pressochè
ignorati nell’impero romano. E in verità, l’impero, che sapeva dare al
mondo filosofi ed oratori, non era in grado di fornire, o di fornire a
sufficienza, uomini, che potessero dirigere e compiere il lavoro di
edificazione e d’ornamentazione di una sola città. Perciò, in una sua
lettera al Prefetto d’Italia, la cui giurisdizione si estendeva anche
all’Africa, Costantino raccomanda di tentare ogni mezzo, perchè,
nella grande deficienza d’architetti, si stabilissero, nelle provincie
africane, delle scuole con appositi professori e vi si istituissero premii
e privilegi, che valessero ad eccitare allo studio dell’architettura
quanti più giovani, già istruiti nelle discipline liberali, si potesse. Uno
dei mezzi, atti a raggiungere tale scopo, doveva essere perfino lo
stanziamento di annue borse di studio. [544]
Tale circolare non fu forse l’unica diramata a tale scopo, nè l’Italia, o
l’Africa, le sole regioni, in cui Costantino ebbe a curare la fondazione
di vere e proprie scuole professionali. [545] Viceversa, come sempre,
come sotto i precedenti imperatori, il governo centrale continuò,
anche adesso, a trascurare le sorti della istruzione elementare, e
tale condizione viene forse con Costantino ad aggravarsi, in quanto
con lui si chiude la tradizione delle istituzioni elementari, così
felicemente inaugurate da Traiano.
Costantino — è noto — compie a tale proposito una radicale riforma,
inaugurando un’opera di sovvenzione universale dell’indigenza, i cui
particolari furono profondamente pervasi di spirito cristiano [546]. Ma
appunto per questo, la sua opera benefica divorzia — nei risultati e
negli scopi — quasi interamente, dalle sorti dell’istruzione
elementare. Costantino non offre, a una parte qualsiasi della società
romana, costantinopolitana, o di altre città, i mezzi per educare e
istruire la propria prole. Egli, invece, con i nuovi provvedimenti,
disperde per tutto l’impero, nei mille rivoli di una saltuaria
beneficenza individuale, gran parte delle pubbliche entrate. Per tal
guisa, la sua opera porta seco tutte le caratteristiche, tutta la vanità,
tutti i disinganni di quelli che ora possono dirsi i vecchi sistemi della
carità cristiana, i quali nè elevavano le classi sociali, nè
assicuravano l’avvenire dei singoli, ma fugacemente sanavano le
occasionali strettezze — e, fra queste, le peggiori soltanto — di
qualche individuo, in qualche ora del tempo.

IV.

La legislazione di Costantino non poteva andare disgiunta da

provvedimenti speciali, che riconfermassero gli atti degli imperatori
precedenti o regolassero i nuovi emergenti rapporti amministrativi e
sociali. E le costituzioni sue su questa materia furono animate da
uno spirito veramente rivoluzionario.
Una legge del 321 [547] conferma anzitutto le immunità godute dai
medici, dai grammatici e dai restanti professori di lettere nelle città
dell’impero; viene quindi a porre le persone dei docenti al riparo da
eventuali procedimenti giudiziarii, sancendo ch’essi non possano
venir tradotti in giudizio, al riparo da qualsiasi ingiuria avesse mirato
colpirli, sia per parte di schiavi che di liberi, fissando all’uopo delle
gravi pene contro i colpevoli e contro i magistrati, che non avessero
ottemperato alla legge; e richiama, infine, i privati ed i municipii alla
osservanza del pagamento degli onorarii o degli stipendii (mercedes
et salaria) ai docenti, professanti nelle varie città.
Con questa legge, il principe, se, da una parte, vuole sottrarre le
persone, in essa nominate, ai munera publica e civilia, nonchè ai
pubblici soprusi, dall’altra, vuole che le città e i privati, oltre che a
pagare i maestri, siano tenuti a rispettarli: alle quali due cose si
doveva da tempo, spesso, mancare, forse anche a motivo della
sopravvenuta intolleranza dei municipii cristiani contro i docenti, che
erano in genere pagani o usciti da scuole pagane [548].
Ma una seconda legge di Costantino del 326 [549] largisce, e
specifica, una nuova serie di immunità — forse implicite nelle antiche
formule generiche, certo non mai così solennemente dichiarate — a
favore dei medici e agli ex-medici di corte, nonchè — fatto più
notevole — delle famiglie dei privilegiati. E, finalmente, un’ultima
legge del 333, [550] confermando i precedenti beneficii ai medici e ai
professori di lettere, li estende, anche per queste due categorie, alle
loro mogli ed ai loro figliuoli.
Le tre leggi dànno luogo a qualche non trascurabile osservazione.
La immunità infatti, largita da Costantino, è la più ampia che si
conosca nelle serie delle concessioni imperiali. Essa per la prima
volta oltrepassa le persone stesse dei docenti e si estende ai
componenti le loro famiglie. Meglio ancora, essa abroga le gravi
limitazioni fissate da Antonino Pio, e rimaste in vigore fino a questo
tempo, e parifica i diritti delle città di provincia con quelli delle
capitali, ove i maestri da tempo non soggiacevano più alle restrizioni
imposte al loro privilegio fin dalla metà del II. secolo di C.
Se non che, ad osservare con attenzione, tali leggi impressionano
meno per il grande numero di persone, che esse beneficano, di
quello che per la loro intima liberalità. Infatti, secondo le clausole
della prima costituzione, sono, fra l’altro, concesse, ai medici e ai
docenti, una forma e una misura d’inviolabilità, che oggi, nei nostri
regimi costituzionali, non godono neanche i rappresentanti politici
della nazione, ed è forse unicamente riservata al sovrano:
l’inviolabilità cioè da ogni procedimento giudiziario, concretata nel
divieto di tradurre i privilegiati in giudizio.
Evidentemente, se questa è la esatta interpretazione di una delle
clausole della legge, noi ci troviamo al cospetto di un beneficio — il
così detto privilegio del ἱερᾶσθαι — che pel passato era stato
concesso solo in via eccezionale a qualcuno dei più illustri maestri
dell’impero, [551] e che, reso così universale, sembrerebbe dovesse
abbattersi contro la impossibilità di una pratica applicazione. O la
legge dunque doveva, sia nel pensiero dei delegati ad applicarla, sia
nella parola di altre disposizioni, essere temperata da consuetudini e
da norme complementari; o essa doveva rispondere a una
straordinaria condizione del momento. Ma può darsi anche che noi
non siamo più in grado di interpretare rettamente il passo, e che si
tratti dell’antico diritto dei medici e dei docenti di non fungere da
giudici, o di una nuova facoltà di non comparire personalmente in
giudizio, e di potervisi fare rappresentare da procuratori — un che di
simile ai privilegi concessi per le testimonianze giudiziarie ai nostri
così detti grandi ufficiali dello Stato — nel quale caso, Costantino o
nulla di nuovo, o nulla d’incredibile avrebbe accordato.
Ma, a parte codesta clausola, impressiona il fatto che in quelle leggi,
anche nelle due (la prima e la terza) in cui più si sarebbe attesa,
manca una esplicita menzione dei docenti di filosofia, sebbene
costoro godessero da tempo gli stessi privilegi dei grammatici, dei
medici e dei retori. L’omissione è difficilmente concepibile, e bisogna
ben ammettere che con la dizione generica di professores litterarum
artium si accenni anche agli insegnanti di filosofia. Infatti, nella più
tarda legge del 333, in cui si dichiarava di confermare i beneficii
largiti dai predecessori, le litterae sono identificate con gli studia
liberalia, e, in una costituzione di Teodosio II., [552] la quale ripristina
questa di Costantino, i filosofi sono esplicitamente elencati insieme
con i loro colleghi.
Ma la soluzione, relativa ai professori di filosofia, non può adottarsi,
come forse si attenderebbe, per quelli di giurisprudenza: i giurisperiti,
i quali non possono comprendersi fra i professores litterarum artium,
rimangono, non ostante tutto, esclusi ancora dal beneficio di ogni
immunità, [553] e tali rimarranno sino a Giustiniano.
Quali furono intanto i motivi delle nuove, e certo gradite, liberalità?
Ce li illustra la chiusa della terza legge. Essa spiega che tanta
generosità era mossa dal desiderio che i beneficati si dedicassero
largamente all’insegnamento, e formassero quindi il maggior numero
di discepoli. [554] Il che, mentre da un lato avverte che i medici, gli
archiatri e gli ex-archiatri, a cui Costantino si riferisce sono favoriti
delle immunità, non solo in quanto medici curanti, ma altresì in
quanto docenti di medicina, dimostra che lo scopo delle tre leggi
rientra interamente nei rapporti del pubblico insegnamento, e che,
favorendo i docenti, si voleva appunto favorire la più grande
diffusione della coltura e rendere più frequente l’esercizio di carriere
determinate.
Tutto questo per i docenti di arti liberali. Ma come Costantino aveva
curato con provvedimenti diretti l’insegnamento professionale, così
altri beneficii escogitò a favore di coloro, che avrebbero dovuto
esserne i promotori ed i maestri.
Una sua legge, promulgata dopo la di lui morte, largisce l’immunità
dai pubblici oneri a tutta una lunga serie di professionisti, specie di
arti edilizie, perchè — dice il dispositivo — coloro che avranno a
goderne, abbiano agio di dedicarsi a quelle arti, «e ne diventino più
esperti essi stessi, ed esperti ne facciano i propri figliuoli». [555] La
lunga serie dei beneficati, che avrebbero potuto risiedere in
qualunque città dell’impero, riguarda i seguenti ordini di persone:
architetti, costruttori di soffitte, stuccatori e intonicatori, [556]
falegnami, medici (?), [557] tagliapietre, lavoratori dell’argento,
muratori, veterinari, scalpellini, inargentatori e indoratori, [558]
costruttori di pavimenti o di scale (scasores o scansores), pittori,
scultori, trapanatori, di pietre e di metalli preziosi, intagliatori,
statuari, mosaicisti, lavoranti in bronzo, ferro, marmo, doratori,
fonditori di metalli, lavoranti in fino di metalli o tintori in rosso di seta
(bractearii o blattiarii), lastricatori di pavimenti, orafi, costruttori di
specchi, carpentieri, conduttori d’acque, vetrai, lavoratori dell’avorio,
lavandai, stovigliai, lavoratori del piombo, pellicciai. [559]
La portata della legge è chiara. Costantino, che aveva dovuto
sperimentarlo nella costruzione della nuova metropoli, aveva notato
nell’impero romano una grande deficienza di esercenti professioni
speciali, segnatamente professioni meccaniche, e voleva ad ogni
costo provvedervi. Il suo editto al Prefetto del pretorio d’Italia, circa le
nuove scuole d’architettura, ne era stato un primo segno. Adesso,
egli trovava necessario formare, non soltanto degli architetti, ma
tutta la serie di artisti, di meccanici e di artefici, richiesta da una
società civile, e agli uni e agli altri largiva, per la prima volta, una
serie di immunità, come, fino a quel tempo, si era solo usato verso i
rappresentanti le professioni liberali. E questo era il primo vigoroso
affermarsi di quelli, che oggi si direbbero i diritti dell’insegnamento
professionale.

V.

L’opera di Costantino a vantaggio della coltura e dell’istruzione

pubblica è coronata da nuovi provvedimenti, tendenti alla difesa e
alla conservazione delle opere d’arte, ch’erano state tramandate
dall’evo antico.
Già notammo come, fin da Adriano e dai primi due Antonini, alla cura
semplicemente edilizia delle città si era accompagnata l’altra delle
loro opere d’arte. Ma adesso ci troviamo in un tempo, in cui più vivi e
numerosi dovevano essere i motivi di una tale preoccupazione. La
storia del periodo, che adesso s’inizia, segnala il disastro di
demolizioni inconsulte, per opera di privati o di imperatori, gli uni e gli
altri, sospinti da zelo religioso, da ignoranza, da misoarcaismo. La
preoccupazione degli eccessi di tale andazzo è palese nelle
costituzioni de operibus publicis, che si succedono fin da Costantino,
e in esse è degno di rilievo l’insensibile sfumare della cura edilizia in
quella delle antichità e delle belle arti, sì che difficile riesce segnarne
il preciso confine.
Ma, in questa medesima età, dopo i lunghi torbidi di oltre un secolo,
riappare altresì quella forma specifica di sorveglianza delle opere
d’arte, che, creata dagli Antonini, assume via via nuove
denominazioni. Troviamo ora, in Roma, un curator statuarum,
addetto alla erezione e alla manutenzione delle statue urbane, [560]
e, poco dopo, ma quale magistratura già da tempo in vigore, un
centurionato rerum nitentium, a cura e tutela degli oggetti d’arte,
nonchè dell’abbellimento dei pubblici monumenti della città [561]. E
tutte queste non piccole preoccupazioni di un imperatore, sospinto
dall’ironia della sorte a difendere, contro le ingiurie del tempo e le
intransigenze dei seguaci della religione favorita, i segni superstiti
del passato, che così vigorosamente egli aveva cooperato ad
abbattere, devono andare, non soltanto a discarico di quella minima
parte dell’opera sua, che fu accusata di irriverente iconoclastia
artistica, [562] ma a merito grande — e positivo — della sua
amministrazione.

VI.

I figli e gli eredi di Costantino proseguono, con diligenza unica più

che rara, l’opera del padre nel campo della pubblica istruzione, e,
sebbene, nel loro legiferare su questa materia, nulla di caratteristico
li distingua dai predecessori, pure le disposizioni particolari, da essi
emanate, sono la più meritoria esecuzione di ciò che quelli, fin allora,
avevano creato e immaginato.
Verso il 342 o 343, Costante chiamava a insegnare a Treviri — uno
dei maggiori centri di studio della Gallia — il più celebre sofista del
tempo, Proeresio, e lo faceva suo commensale. Di qua, per esaudire
un di lui desiderio, lo manda a Roma a impartire il suo insegnamento
dalla maggior cattedra del mondo. E da Roma il fratello suo e
collega, Costanzo II., colui che tra breve raccoglierà ancora una
volta tutto l’impero nelle sue mani, gli concede di trasferirsi in Atene,
e lo colma di doni regali, e lo nomina stratopedarca, incaricando al
tempo stesso il prefetto dell’Illiria di celebrare il giorno del
conferimento di tanta dignità con una solenne gara di eloquenza
nella Università ateniese. [563]
Nel 344, Costanzo II. e Costante insieme largiscono una serie di
immunità agli ingegneri, agli architetti, agli aquae libratores, e, per la
prima volta, ai matematici, i quali, benchè la loro disciplina rientrasse
nel circolo delle arti liberali, erano, fin a quel tempo, rimasti esclusi
da ogni esenzione. [564]
E la determinante della liberalità — si dichiara — è ancora una volta
quella, che aveva sospinto Costantino il grande: il bisogno di
persone adatte alle professioni edilizie, cui quei beneficati
attendevano, e, quindi, il desiderio di moltiplicarne il numero e di
migliorarne la specie, [565] come in verità doveva essere richiesto dal
nuovo incremento edilizio di Costantinopoli, di Antiochia e di altre
città orientali.
Lo stesso Costanzo si cura di rifornire copiosamente, ed a proprie
spese, la pubblica biblioteca di Costantinopoli, che sembra solo ora
assurgere a quel grado di importanza, che nella nuova capitale si
richiedeva, [566] non che di fornire Costantinopoli dei migliori maestri
del mondo. Ed invero, nel 342, noi vi troviamo un retore di
Cappadocia, fattovi appositivamente venire dall’imperatore, [567] e,
nel 351, questi vi chiamava da Nicomedia, Libanio — uno tra i più
insigni maestri di retorica di quell’età — nominandolo pubblico
docente di sofistica con uno stipendio vistosissimo, e facendolo
segno alle maggiori dimostrazioni di stima. [568]
E, come sempre avviene in questi casi, l’esempio del principe
provoca l’emulazione fra le maggiori autorità dello Stato. Vediamo, in
questo tempo, e il Senato e i governatori gareggiare di zelo per le
sorti della istruzione pubblica nelle varie città e nelle varie province.
Ciò che una volta era stato detto a carico del governo romano:
ch’esso non si curava d’altro se non dei porti, degli edifici e dei
pubblici passeggi, non solo sarebbe adesso contrario a verità, ma
suonerebbe come audace calunnia. Per decidere sui problemi,
relativi alla pubblica istruzione, le città si rivolgono ora ai governatori,
che dispensano consigli, avanzano proposte e intervengono con le
loro iniziative. Il retore di Cappadocia, che noi troviamo nel 342 a
Costantinopoli, era stato, prima che dal principe, richiesto
insistentemente dal Senato; [569] Libanio stesso si era recato a
professare a Nicomedia, invitatovi dal pretore di Bitinia, che n’era
stato sollecitato dalle preghiere di quella popolazione [570]. Nel 351,
l’anno del ritorno di Libanio, quale pubblico docente a Costantinopoli,
vive pratiche del Senato e del pretore di Bitinia avevano preceduto
l’intervento imperiale. [571] E poco dopo, agli Ateniesi, preoccupati
della decadenza della loro Università, il luogotenente imperiale della
Grecia, Strategio, rispondeva, formulando acconce proposte, e
consigliandoli a invitarvi sofisti valorosi di altre città. Libanio ci ha
conservato un passo di quella risposta: «Voi», aveva detto Strategio,
«che avete fama universale di inventori e di maestri dell’agricoltura,
non trovate nulla di disonorevole a cibarvi di grano importato
dall’estero; se faceste lo stesso per la istruzione pubblica, credete
forse che la vostra gloria ne sarebbe compromessa?» [572] Ed anche
ad Atene era stato chiamato Libanio.
«I Romani volevano», scrive uno degli antichi espositori della vita
scolastica ateniese in questa età, «i Romani volevano che ad Atene
ci fossero numerosi sofisti e numerosi scolari.» [573] E noi abbiamo
gravi motivi per non dubitare di una riforma, quivi compiuta dal
governo, verso il 340, alla morte di un altro fra i titolari di quella
cattedra di retorica, il sofista Giuliano. Quando questi spirò, si ebbe
una vera e propria ressa di concorrenti alla successione. Le brighe
fra i candidati e le lotte tra i commissarii giudicanti e i senatori
ateniesi dovettero essere vivacissime. Ne seguì la proposta di ben
sei titolari, e il governatore romano non esitò a ratificarla. Così,
invece di una, si ebbero sei cattedre ufficiali di eloquenza greca.
Per tal guisa, Atene potè godere largamente della munificenza dei
dominatori. E non Atene soltanto. Accorreva quivi tutta la gioventù
della Grecia, dell’Oriente, dell’Asia, dell’Asia Minore, dell’Arabia e