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Baleros vs. People
Baleros vs. People
Baleros vs. People
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006
RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991
was corroborated by Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), ….
xxx xxx xxx
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 o’clock in the evening of
December 12, 1991. xxx by the time CHITO’s knocking on the door
woke him up, …. He was able to fix the time of CHITO’s arrival at 1:30
A.M. because he glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed when he
was awakened by the knock at the door ….
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white
T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23) when he let the latter in. …. It was at around 3
o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991 when he woke up again
later to the sound of knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard Baptista
(Bernard), ….xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOU’s room
and thereat was shown by Bernard the open window through which the
intruder supposedly passed.
FINDINGS:
Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens
gave the following results:
Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ – POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison.
Exhs. ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ are insufficient for further analysis.
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ contain chloroform, a volatile poison."6 (Words in
bracket added)
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner
himself. He denied committing the crime imputed to him or making at
any time amorous advances on Malou. Unfolding a different version of
the incident, the defense sought to establish the following, as culled from
the same decision of the appellate court:
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of … (UST). With
Robert Chan and Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a member of the
Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity …. MALOU, …, was known to him being also a
medical student at the UST at the time.
From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building …, CHITO, wearing the
prescribed barong tagalog over dark pants and leather shoes, arrived at
their Fraternity house located at … Dos Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at
about 7 o’clock in the evening of December 12, 1991. He was included
in the entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members scheduled for a
Christmas gathering at the house of their senior fraternity brother, Dr.
Jose Duran, at No. 3 John Street, North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool ….
Soon after, … the four (4) presidential nominees of the Fraternity,
CHITO included, were being dunked one by one into the pool. xxx. xxx
CHITO had anticipated his turn … and was thus wearing his t-shirt and
long pants when he was dunked. Perla Duran, …, offered each … dry
clothes to change into and CHITO put on the white t-shirt with the
Fraternity’s symbol and a pair of black shorts with stripes. xxx .
Again riding on Alberto’s car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white t-
shirt with the symbol TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants with stripe, socks
and shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15), CHITO left the party with Robert
Chan and Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M. of December 13, 1991 and
proceeded to the Building which they reached at about 1:30 A.M. (Ibid.,
p. 19). He had left his gray traveling bag containing "white t-shirt, sando,
underwear, socks, and toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the
afternoon of the previous day ….
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and …, S/G Ferolin, looking
at his watch, approached. Because of this, CHITO also looked at his
own watch and saw that the time was 1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G Ferolin
initially refused CHITO entry …. xxx.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 …. xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in,
already about ten (10) minutes had lapsed since CHITO first arrived
(Ibid., p. 25).
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the
opened jalousie window and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to open the
door until Rommel Montes, … approached him and even commented:
"Okey ang suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto (Ibid., pp. 26-29).
Rommel tried to open the door of Unit 306 … but was likewise
unsuccessful. CHITO then decided to just call out to Joseph while
knocking at the door.
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph, …,
at last answered the door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala diyan"
Joseph immediately turned his back on CHITO and went inside the
bedroom. CHITO , …changed to a thinner shirt and went to bed. He still
had on the same short pants given by Perla Duran from the fraternity
party (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 20).
At 6 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up ….
He was already in his school uniform when, around 6:30 A.M, Joseph
came to the room not yet dressed up. He asked the latter why this was
so and, without elaborating on it, Joseph told him that something had
happened and to just go to Room 310 which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody,
whom MALOU was not able to identify, went to the room of MALOU and
tried to rape her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 36). xxx.
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of
the Building …. When two (2) CIS men came to the unit asking for
Renato Baleros, CHITO presented himself. Congressman Rodolfo B.
Albano, father of MALOU, then asked him for the key to Room 306….
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17271.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated
January 13, 1999, affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the
findings of the court a quo, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
CA in its equally assailed resolution of March 31, 1999.12
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred -
1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have committed the
attempted rape imputed to him, absent sufficient, competent and
convincing evidence to prove the offense charged.
2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis merely of
circumstantial evidence since the prosecution failed to satisfy all the
requisites for conviction based thereon.
3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict the
petitioner are unreliable, inconclusive and contradictory.
4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his case.
5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the fact that
the award was improper and unjustified absent any evidence to prove
the same.
6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional presumption of
innocence and that moral certainty has not been met, hence, he should
be acquitted on the ground that the offense charged against him has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on
whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape.
After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of
applicable jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for petitioner’s
acquittal, but not necessarily because there is no direct evidence
pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemical-soaked cloth who
pinned Malou down on the bed in the early morning of December 13,
1991.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per
se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the
crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may
identify a suspect or accused as the offender as an eyewitness to the
very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence.
There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not
have actually witnessed the very act of commission of a crime, he may
still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator
of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person or one of the
persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification,
which forms part of circumstantial evidence.13 In the absence of direct
evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial
evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret
and under condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct
evidence is insisted under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious
felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will
be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.14
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when
circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The provision
reads:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient – Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if –
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part
of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with the other
pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and
reasonable conclusion, which is that petitioner was the intruder in
question.
We quote with approval the CA’s finding of the circumstantial evidence
that led to the identity of the petitioner as such intruder:
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had
access to the room of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the night
over had a window which allowed ingress and egress to Room 306
where MALOU stayed. Not only the Building security guard, S/G Ferolin,
but Joseph Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a
black "Adidas" shorts and fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the
Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991. Though
it was dark during their struggle, MALOU had made out the feel of her
intruder’s apparel to be something made of cotton material on top and
shorts that felt satin-smooth on the bottom.
From CHITO’s bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot
where witness Renato Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered
the most incriminating evidence: the handkerchief stained with blue and
wet with some kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin short pants; and
a white fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness, this
time, Christian Alcala, identified these garments as belonging to CHITO.
As it turned out, laboratory examination on these items and on the
beddings and clothes worn by MALOU during the incident revealed that
the handkerchief and MALOU’s night dress both contained chloroform, a
volatile poison which causes first degree burn exactly like what MALOU
sustained on that part of her face where the chemical-soaked cloth had
been pressed.
This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced by
the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malou’s
face the piece of cloth soaked in chemical while holding her body tightly
under the weight of his own, had commenced the performance of an act
indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim. It is argued that
petitioner’s actuation thus described is an overt act contemplated under
the law, for there can not be any other logical conclusion other than that
the petitioner intended to ravish Malou after he attempted to put her to
an induced sleep. The Solicitor General, echoing what the CA said, adds
that if petitioner’s intention was otherwise, he would not have lain on top
of the victim.15
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a
man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any
of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2)
When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
(3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under
Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape
is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape
directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.16
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking
thru Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang,17 stated that "the
attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical
connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning
of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading
directly to its realization and consummation." Absent the unavoidable
connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect,
as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain,
meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous,
then what obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense,
which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.18
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse
or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus
comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the
pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes
an overt act of rape.1avvphil.net
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere
planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically
and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.19
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too
strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth
in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act
that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner
did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an
intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that
petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to
undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason
petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his
immediate intention, is anybody’s guess. The CA maintained that if the
petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the
complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the next
step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim had been rendered
unconscious. Wrote the CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have
to come later. His sexual organ is not yet exposed because his intended
victim is still struggling. Where the intended victim is an educated
woman already mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist would be in
his naked glory before even starting his attack on her. He has to make
her lose her guard first, or as in this case, her unconsciousness.20
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a
practice disfavored under the rule on evidence in criminal cases. For,
mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required
to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.21
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
( On Leave )
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ*
Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA
Asscociate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S .PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On Leave.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in
by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner (ret.) and Eloy R. Bello, Jr.
(ret.); Rollo, pp. 198-237.
2 Id., p. 273.
3 Id., pp. 120-155.
4 Original Records, pp. 1-3.
5 Id., p. 42.
6 Rollo, pp. 201-212.
7 TSN, December 15, 1993, pp. 18-19; TSN, December 20, 1993,
pp.23-24.
8 TSN, January 17, 1994, pp. 7-10.
9 TSN, January 17, 1994, p. 24.
10 Rollo, pp. 120-155.
11 See Note #1, supra.
12 See Note #2, supra.
13 People vs. Cubcubin, Jr., 413 Phil. 249 (2001), citing People vs.
Gallarde, 382 Phil. 718 (2000).
14 People vs. Sevileno, 425 SCRA 247 (2004), citing People vs.
Navarro, 407 SCRA 221 (2003).
15 Comment, pp. 20-21; Rollo, pp. 302-303.
16 People vs. Campuhan, 385 Phil. 912 (2000).
17 61 Phil. 703, 705 (1935).
18 Ibid.
19 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 1998 Edition, p. 91.
20 Rollo, pp. 222-223.
21 People vs. Canlas, et al., 423 Phil. 665 (2001).
22 431 Phil. 786 (2002).
23 416 SCRA 506 (2003).
24 Sec. 14(2), Art. III.
25 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1997 ed., Vol. III, p. 81.
26 Ibid., citing People vs. Lilian Gozum, CA 54 O.G. 7409; People vs.
Reyes, 60 Phil. 369 [1934].
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