Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 4

CIVIL PROCEDURE

CASE DIGEST
1-26

By Aguilar, Sandra Marie Tabumpa


G.R. No. 150274
IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG in the latter’s capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways. JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN, Petitioner.

FACTS:
Ombudsman Task force on Public Works and Highways filed a complaint to the
Ombudsman regarding dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of office rules and regulations
against petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen and others, in connection to the
payment of the government owned Bailey Bridge amounting to Php
553,900.00.
On March 28 1994, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman found the respondents guilty from the said complaint and
ordered them dismissal to the service with penalties pursuant to Sec. 23 of
Rule XIV, Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
(not sure) Motion for Reconsiderations were denied and three petitions were
filed to the court which they referred to the COA with regards to the ruling of
Fabian v. Desierto where decision of the Office of the Ombudsman should be
cited by the appellate court under Rules 43 of the Rules of Court.
On March 2, 2000, the COA affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman finding
the petitioner and others guilty and dismissed the from the service.
Petitioner and others appealed from the decision of COA and while it is still
pending, Secretary Datumanong sent a memorandum order which he
explained the order of the Ombudsman that the petitioner is found guilty
ordering him Dismissed/Dropped from the service with penalties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Memorandum order assailed by Secretary Datumanong
was contumacious, a gross and blatant display of abused of discretion and
unlawful with the proceedings of the court, and pre-empting the decision of
the court.
RULING:
It was found that the issuance of Memorandum Order by Secretary
Datumanong was not contumacious nor unlawful.
In connection with the case of Lapid v. COA, it was rules under R.A 6770, the
Ombudsman Act of 1989. Section 27 of the said Act provides as follows:
"Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – All provisionary orders of
the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written
notice.
This above Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is similar to
Sec. 7 Rule III:
"Sec. 7. Finality of Decision – where the respondent is absolved of the
charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent
to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from
receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or
petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27
of R.A. 6770."
It is evident that any other ruling made by the Office of the Ombudsman that
imposes fines not included in the aforementioned Section 27 is not final,
unappealable, or immediately executory. The ruling will not take effect right
away if an appeal is timely filed, like the one in this instance. This supports the
Rules of Procedure issued by the Ombudsman which states, “the decision shall
become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the
respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari.”
The respondent has the right to appeal to the COA within 10 days from the
written notice order which means the decision will become final after the
reglementary period of appeal. The judgement in the appellate tribunal
becomes final.
The only remedy of the petitioner is to raise the error to the higher court for
review and correction, not filing a petition to cite Secretary Datumanong.
The petitioner is suspended permanently while his case is for appeal, the
Office of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure are clearly followed in this case,
and no vested rights are violated.
WHEREFORE, the petition to cite Secretary Datumanong for issuing
Memorandum Order dismissing petitioner Tel-Equen from the service is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

You might also like