Cover Page

Writing Sample:-
Case-Note:
Narayanaswami. vs. Pannerselvam (1972)

Theme: Constitutional Law

Name: Vikramaditya Mohanty

University: O.P Jindal Global University
Course: B.B.A L.L.B ‘18 (Hons.)

1
 Case: Narayanaswami v. Pannerselvam (1972)

Abstract:

This paper is a case note on Narayanaswami v. Pannerselvam (1972), which was an appeal that
arose against an election petition filed by the respondent of the aforementioned case. The initial
petition was filed because the respondents believed that Narayanswami’s election into the
Madras Legislative Council was not in tandem with the provisions enshrined in The Constitution
of India (COI). Taking the preceding statements into account, the object of this case
commentary/note is to (1) provide a brief synopsis of the Factual Matrix of the Case; (2) to
enumerate the Question(s) of Law arising from this case; (3) to explicitly detail the Holdings of
the Court; and (4) to provide the court’s rationale with respect to the holdings of the court. One
must mention that these 4 points are not directly used verbatim in the headings of the case note,
they are only meant to act as a guideline in understanding the general contents of this note.
Additionally, it is pertinent to mention the primary rule of interpretation that was used to analyze
this case: The Golden Rule. This rule will be appropriately applied in this case note mainly
because the Golden Rule was also highlighted in the ratio decendi of the court, which
automatically means that it will be of importance to this note since it will provide the necessary
context needed to understand the method of analysis incorporated by the court when it was
deliberating upon the merits of the case. Conclusively speaking, the main object of this
manuscript is to give readers an in-depth perspective on the case itself and into one of the three
primary rules of interpretation of statutes.

Key Words: Constitutional Law; The Golden Rule; Election Petition; Electoral Pro

***

1. Synopsis of The Factual Matrix:

As mentioned before, this appeal lies against the election petition which was filed by the
respondent of this case. The appeal was filed u/S. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act

2
 Case: Narayanaswami v. Pannerselvam (1972)

(RPA), 1951.1 This earlier petition arose due to the appellant’s selection into the Madras
Legislative Council from the Madras District Graduates’ Constituency vide date - 11 April
1970.2 The petition was filed on the following grounds: (a) That the purpose of Art. 171 of COI,3
and the concept of “functional representation,” was misconstrued, and that the provisional
justification of the aforementioned Article proves that the appellant cannot be considered a
graduate and thus cannot be elected into the Legislative Council of Madras from the Graduates’
Constituency;4 (b) That it would be absurd and destructive of the concept of representation since
the appellant was perceived to not be in possession of the essential or basic qualifications that are
expected from electors; and (c) That the Constitution must be interpreted in a broad & liberal
manner so as to correctly enforce the underlying principles of the system of representation that is
thought to be embodied within it.5
It is also important to point out that the election petition’s paragraphs 7 - 9
against the appellant mentioned that the Appellant, at the time of the election, had only just
passed the High School Leaving Examination and could hence not be considered a graduate. It is
important to understand that Art. 171 of the COI necessarily implies that the

2. The Issues & The Holdings of the Court:

The following substantial questions of law have been framed by the court, and by others,
pertaining to the impugned election process:

● Whether or not the respondent was qualified to stand for the election to the
Graduates’ Constituency?
● Whether there is any substantive claim arising out of the election petition’s grounds
enumerated in paragraphs 7 - 9 which justify why the respondent is not qualified?

1
Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act (1951): Appeals to the Supreme Court – subsection (1)
provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to
the Supreme Court on any question (whether of law or fact) from every order made by a High Court under section
98 or section 99 of the same act.
2
S. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 717.
3
Article 171 of the Constitution of India (1949) – Composition of the Legislative Council.
4
Functional Representation is essentially defined as a representation made in a legislative or political assembly,
which is based upon the social or economic groups found within the surrounding community (See, Singh SA and
others, “Paper: LB-6031 - Interpretation of Statutes and Principle of Legislation”).
5
Supra note 2.

3
 Case: Narayanaswami v. Pannerselvam (1972)

● Whether or not the Constitution provides for any prerequisite qualifications wrt to the
election process?6

2.1. Holdings:

The following points represent the Holdings of the Court:-

(a) Graduates are not considered “occupational or vocational groups,” they
are instead thought of as a body of persons who meet specific educational qualifications. Hence,
one can come to the conclusion that it is incorrect to include within this definition of the word
‘graduate’ additional representation sought to be given to them in the Legislative Council as a
clear attempt to introduce some form of ‘functional’ representation.
(b) The qualifications of the elector constituting the electorate, which is
contemplated by the Constitution and then further supplemented by the Parliament, are found to
be separately set out for each House [(1.) Legislative Council and (2.) Legislative Assemblies].
In relation to the Legislative Council in particular, the qualifications for all 4 of the electors are
enumerated under Art. 171 (3) (a), (b), (c) and (d). Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that the
“plain and ordinary” meaning of the term “electorate” was found to be in reference to a body of
persons who elect, and that it was not inclusive of other definitions such as a body of persons
who elect their own representatives from amongst themselves - which also means that the word
“elector” does not impose a restriction on people to the effect where a person who is eligible to
be chosen must also be a part of the electorate beforehand.
(c) Regarding the qualifications of candidates for seats in the Legislative
Council, the aforementioned is provided under S. 6 of the RPA. The provision essentially lays
down the notion that although a member of the Legislative Assembly must be an elector in the
constituency from which he/she stands, it is not a strict requirement in and of itself. Thus, the key
prerequisites for such a position are that the person to be chosen as a “member of the Legislative
Council” should be an elector for an “Assembly constituency” in the “State” to whose
Legislative Council he/she is chosen to be part of.
(d) Whether or not the opinions of the Constitution of other State agencies
say something otherwise, upon a cursory glance of Art. 171 of COI one may say that definition

6
Supra, note 2.

4
 Case: Narayanaswami v. Pannerselvam (1972)

of the aforementioned words and “Members of the Council” was not meant to provide for a
‘functional’ or “vocational” body of persons.
(e) Therefore, the court set aside the judgement and the order(s) of the
Madras High Court and dismissed the election petition’s grounds enumerated under paragraphs
7-9, in other words allowing the appeal. To put it more conclusively, the court found that the
appellant possessed all of the qualifications and met all the criterias laid down for candidates
involved in the election process from the Graduates’ Constituency of the Legislative Council of
Madras.7

3. The Court on Interpretation - Analysis of the Holding(s):

Before elucidating the meaning of the Interpretative rule the ‘Golden Rule’ which the ratio
decendi of this case is based on, it is necessary to mention the rule which predates it - The Literal
Rule of interpretation. Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes makes it clear that Statutory
interpretation should consist of an understanding of legislations purely on the basis of their
“plain meaning” or what is written down explicitly in provisions.8 He termed it as the primary
rule when it comes to interpreting statutes and legislations. In fact, the length and detailed
structure of “modern legislations'' reinforces the idea that a claim of “literal construction” is by
itself a “safe rule”.9 A famous line used in relation to the literal rule is that judges should give the
words that make up a law “their ordinary signification”10 and should be interpreted based on their
plain meaning. However, the modern day use of the ‘literal rule’ deviates from the preceding
statements, since the literal rule is sometimes interchangeably used with the Golden Rule when
judges are faced with situations where the context - the object and legislative intent behind a
particular legislation or provision - proves to be of direct relevance to the case.11
The Golden Rule is normally applied when the literal meaning of legal
words or words used in a legal context leads to ambiguity, contradictions, or an absurd result. In
other words, this rule is only used when a court tries to avoid the anomalous consequences that

7
Ibid.
8
Maxwell PB, “On the Interpretation of Statutes.”
9
River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson. (1877) – Quoting Lord Blackburn.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.

5
 Case: Narayanaswami v. Pannerselvam (1972)

may arise from an interpretation of the literal words of a Statute.12 To find other methods of
interpretation besides looking at the literal construction of words is the first and foremost
important distinction between the Golden Rule and the Literal Rule.13 For example: According to
the court in N. vs. Pannerselvam, the reason why a broadened definition of electors, graduates,
and Members of the Council may have been deliberately omitted from the Constitution and other
provisions is probably because the legislative intent of law-makers may have been such that the
intentional omission was required in order to pander to higher standards of justice, fairness and
procedural efficacy.14
The previously mentioned is in tandem to the test laid down by Blackburn
J. in re R. vs. Cleworth, which states that the correct presumption regarding a specific provision’s
interpretation arises when addressing the question as to whether or not law-makers were aware of
a particular omission in a Statute/Provision? If the legislators knew of said omission, by omitting
something “intentionally,” they have allowed such an action in furtherance of the object of the
relevant Statute.15 This argument can be further advanced by the case U.P Bhoodan Yaguna
Samiti v. Brij Kishore, which stresses on the significance of figuring out and correctly
interpreting the legislative intent behind a piece of legalese more than simply focusing on the
text literally.16
Even if Pannerselvam & Ors were convinced that narrowing the scope of
application of provisions relating to the electoral roll of a particular Constituency should be
given more weightage than the idea that a deliberate omission of certain definitions was made by
the law-makers, Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. provides that if two
constructions arise out of statutory interpretation, then the court will avoid the one that prevents
the object of the Statute from ever being realized.17
To provide context to the aforementioned, just looking at Art. 171 of COI
and the detailed and exhaustive lists of qualifications or disqualifications pertaining to
Legislative Council members and other electoral processes which fall within its ambit,18 one can
say that it would be near ‘impossible’ for legislators and drafters to not know the consequences
12
Singh SA and others, “Paper: LB-6031 - Interpretation of Statutes and Principle of Legislation”
13
Cadoux AT, “The International Journal of Ethics.”
14
Supra note 2.
15
R. v. Cleworth, (1864) 4 BSS 927
16
1988 AIR 2239
17
[1940] UKHL J0801-1
18
Supra note 3.

6
 Case: Narayanaswami v. Pannerselvam (1972)

of omitting certain definitions related to members of State Legislatures. By way of explanation,

this means that the construction regarding functional or “occupational” representation made by
the original petitioner is an absurd result of interpreting the COI and the RPA, and if some
significance is attributed to the judgement of S.R Batra v. Taruna Batra (2007), then one will
find that any interpretation which leads to “absurdity” is unwelcomed and therefore,
unacceptable by courts of law.19

4. Reflection & Rationale:

Upon reflection, it becomes increasingly evident that the intent behind the provision Art. 171 of
COI was to allow Houses to be heterogeneous and to let them be a more broad-based body of
law composed of individuals of different ‘walks of life’.20 This however does not mean that there
is no base criteria of knowledge, wisdom and expertise which individuals who are being elected
for certain positions have to be in possession of.21 But it is necessary to see, inferring from the
Harbhajan Singh 2002 Case, that Legislatures often times appropriately choose words that are
reflective of their intentions, and that if there is no material - intrinsic or external - which can
prove something to the contrary, then legislative intent is found to be assessed correctly by a
court as long as the manifested intent does not dissolve into something absurd or can cause chaos
if legally enforceable.22 If every student who had passed the High School Leaving Examination
was discredited from being elected as a member of a Legislative Council, then that would mean
that the drafters of provisions Art. 171 to 173 and S. 5, S. 6 and S. 16 of the RPA had
intentionally omitted a part of the aforementioned provision(s) which, if literally interpreted as
leaving out any candidate not explicitly stated, would create confusion since the provisions
would not be in tandem to the principle of functional representation,23 thus leading to an almost
absurd result. To make sense of the aforementioned provisions, it is not a far-reaching claim to
say that the drafters of the Act may have left out information that they believed would be
compensated, in the future, through the evolution of laws and common-sense or logical
reasoning.
19
S.R. Batra And Anr vs Smt. Taruna Batra (2007)
20
Supra note 4.
21
Supra note 14.
22
Harbhajan Singh vs. Press Council Of India And Ors (2002)
23
Supra note 4.

7
 Case: Narayanaswami v. Pannerselvam (1972)

And while what was written in Craies on Statute differed from the
position set out in R. v. Cleworth by stating that sometimes omissions are a result of an
“oversight” by judges,24 it is important to know that in this case, it would be extremely difficult
for judges to not know about the said omission since Articles like Art. 171 and Sections such as
S. 6 & 16 of the RPA have explicitly noted down the qualifications one must possess to be
considered a “qualified” person according to the relevant Statutes. For example, S. 16 of the RPA
lays down through Sub-sections (a) to (c) the grounds on which a person may be “disqualified”
from being considered an elector,25 in doing so also stating the limitations incumbent on
individuals who are trying to stand in the elections. The only definition(s) that may resemble
‘vague’ words are those related to persons involved in the election process such as graduates -
which according to the ‘omission theory’26 may be an intentional action committed by the
legislative drafters of the aforementioned Statutes. Furthermore, in re New India Sugar Mills ltd.,
the Golden Rule consists of bringing into light the object of the legislations, which is given more
precedence than any other construction possible.27 Since the court has resorted to finding the true
legislative intent behind the Constitution and the RPA, one can say that it has resorted to using
the Golden Rule of Interpretation.28

Conclusion:

To conclusively sum up the aforementioned, this case, much like the S.R Batra Case, avoids
leaning on the literal interpretation of words since such interpretations or constructions will
eventually lead to legally enforceable sanctions that may have the effect of introducing unfair
laws that do not pursue the moral standards of judicial processes, but instead only devolve
society into complying with absurd results arising from just a simple reading of available texts.
This is particularly why the Golden Rule of Interpretation proves to be of more use to the Court,
since it allows the judiciary to critically analyze the text by going above and beyond it, and at the
same time affords it the luxury to include other interpretations into the ratio which are said to
have a similar effect like the focus on the text of legislations. Emphasis needs to be added to the
24
Edgar S.G.G, Craies on Statute (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1971)
25
Section 16 of The Representation of the People Act, 1951
26
Supra note 14.
27
1963 AIR 1207
28
Union Of India And Ors vs. Filip Tiago De Gama Of Vedem Vasco (1989) 1990 AIR 981

8
 Case: Narayanaswami v. Pannerselvam (1972)

fact that the Golden Rule in no way disvalues the credibility of solely focusing on the texts
present in statutes such as the RPA, since the basic cornerstone elements of any legal system are
the legislations and statutes which were originally drafted with the intention to apply their plain
meaning to cases and see whether or not a wrongful act or offence or abrogation of justice has
been committed. The point of using the golden rule is that textual interpretations, at times, fail to
take into account larger implications which can result from simply referring to the plain meaning
of a particular text or provision; sometimes a broader approach must be included in the ratio of a
case when rationalizing the fundamental aspects of the case while applying legal principles
already present within a legal system. Simply put, not all things can be considered as they are if
their result does not make sense in the modern world. The law is always going to be incomplete
since it is a machine that constantly requires evolution in some aspects in order to strengthen the
harmony between society and the sanctions or rules that govern it. Thus, the same evolution must
be reflected in interpretations of the law, since different interpretative rules are a major
component that streamlines the activity of legal systems.

9
 Case: Narayanaswami v. Pannerselvam (1972)

Bibliography

1. Representation of the People Act (1951).

2. S. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 717.
3. The Constitution of India (1949).
4. Singh SA and others, “Paper: LB-6031 - Interpretation of Statutes and Principle of
Legislation”.
5. Maxwell P.B, On the Interpretation of Statutes.
6. River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson. (1877)
7. Cadoux AT, “The International Journal of Ethics.”
8. R. v. Cleworth, (1864) 4 BSS 927
9. 1988 AIR 2239
10. [1940] UKHL J0801-1
11. S.R. Batra And Anr vs Smt. Taruna Batra (2007)
12. Harbhajan Singh vs. Press Council Of India And Ors (2002)
13. Edgar SGG, Craies on Statute (7th ednSweet & Maxwell Ltd 1971)
14. New India Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar (1962) 1963 AIR 1207
15. Union Of India And Ors vs. Filip Tiago De Gama Of Vedem Vasco (1989) 1990 AIR 981

10