In the Indian traditions, including the Buddhist and Jain traditions, four formats of

discussions, debates and arguments are described. These are named as: Samvada, Vaada,
Jalpa and Vitanda.
The merit and esteem of each of these types of discussions is graded in terms of the honesty
of their purpose, the quality of debate, the decorum and the mutual regard of the
participants.
Of these four forms of discussions, Samvada is regarded the noblest type of dialogue that
takes place, in all earnestness, between an ardent seeker of truth and an enlightened
teacher. Most of the ancient Indian texts are in this format.
While Samvada is a discourse or imparting of teaching, the other three – Vaada, Jalpa
and Vitanda – are clever and structured (Tantra–yukthi) debates and arguments between
rivals.
Let’s talk of Nyaya (well-organized logical ways of ascertaining the true nature of the
objects and subjects of human knowledge) and Samvada on one part; and, the
debates/arguments on the other.
***
Nyaya Sutra
As is well known, there was a long and a time-honored tradition in ancient India where
philosophers and thinkers met to discuss metaphysical issues over which there were
multiple views. There are detailed narrations of such discussions, debates and dialogues
recorded in Chandogya-Upanishad, Brihadaranyaka Upanishad and Prashna-Upanishad.
The other early texts such as Aitareya Brahmana , Kathopanishad and others use terms
like : tarka (reasoning); Vada (debate); Yukti (sustained arguments), Prameya (object of
knowledge); Pramana (proof); Nirnaya (ascertainment) etc. which later became the
principal terminologies of the Nyaya School. It is also said that the idioms of inquiry
(Anveshiki) dealing with the theory of reasons (Hetu-vidya or Hetu-shastra) were mentioned
in Manu-samhita and Panini’s Astadhyayi.
Although the intellectual debates were quite common during the Upanishad-times, and even
later, there was perhaps no well laid out theory or an approved structure for conduct of
various types of debates. It is said; it was during the Sramana and the Buddhist period
that debates became really very serious.
As Bimal Krishna Matilal observes (in The Character of Logic in India):
.. The intellectual climate in India was bristling with controversy and criticism. At the
center of controversy were certain dominant religious and ethical issues. Nothing was too
sacred for criticism. Such questions as: “Is there a soul different from body?”; “Is the world
(loka) eternal?”; ”What is the meaning, goal, or purpose of life?”; and, “Is renunciation
preferable to enjoyment?” etc. were of major concern.
While teachers and thinkers argued about such matters, there arose a gradual awareness of
the characteristics or patterns of correct, acceptable and sound reasoning. There were
also concerns to evolve the norms to distinguish sound reasoning from pseudo-reasoning
(hetvabhasa) which is unacceptable.
According to Dr. Benimadhab Barua, even among the Sramanas, the wandering monks,
there were famed debaters who were “clever, subtle, and experienced in projecting
controversies; hair-splitters who ruthlessly splintered into pieces the arguments of their
adversaries”.
The debates tended to get more passionate, animated and even noisy. Gradually, the
notions of ‘good’ and acceptable debates took shape as distinct from wrong and ugly
arguments. That gave rise to the development of a branch of study dealing with theories of
reasoning and logic (Hetu-vidya or Hetu shastra). It was perhaps around the fifth century
BCE that manuals came to be written for conduct of proper and successful debates (Tarka
vidya or Vada vidya).
Such manuals included instructions and learning methods for the guidance of aspiring
debaters. The earliest known text of that genre was Tantra-yukti (structured argument)
compiled perhaps in the sixth-fifth century BCE to systematize debates conducted in
learned councils (Parishad).
Debates and arguments then came to be recognized both as art of logical reasoning ( Tarka-
vidya) and science of causes (Hetu-shastra) following the path of a well-disciplined method
of inquiry (ânvikŝiki) testing scriptural knowledge by further scrutiny.
The monks and priests belonging to various Schools and sects were imparted training
in Tarka–vidya: the art and skills of conducting impressive successful debates and
disputations (Sambasha or Vada vidhi) in learned assemblies (parishad).
Apart from methods of presenting arguments as per a logically structured format, the
training modules included ways to stoutly defend ones thesis by means of genuine criteria
of knowledge (Pramana) and to attack the opponent’s thesis by means of indirect arguments
(Tarka); estimating the strengths and weaknesses of arguments of either side; establishing
one’s own points while setting aside those of the opponent.
They were also trained for handling different types of challenges, such as: how to vanquish
a person of blazing fame; how to behave with a senior opponent; how to handle an
aggressive and troublesome opponent; and, how to conduct oneself in
prestigious Parishads, to influence the flow of debate and to impress the judges and the
onlookers etc.
These types of debates and arguments broadly came under the purview of Nyaya or Nyaya
Shastra.
[The Charaka Samhita , a principal Ayurveda Text (dated around the second century), in its third
part, called Vimanasthana, along with other topics like training of a physician, ethics of medical
practice, pathology, diet and nourishment, taste of medicines, etc., also contains a discussion on
the principles of debate
The related doctrines are treated in Caraka-samhita under three heads, namely:

o 1) Karyabhinirvrtti, the aggregate of resources for the accomplishment of
an action
o (2) Pariksa, the standard of examination, and
o (3) Sambhasha-vidhi, or vada-vidhi, the method of debate.
This is followed by detailed discussions on these three topics. For example, there is a discussion
on the various resources that are to be examined to accomplish an action.

These resources include Karana (the actor, or agent who accomplishes an action), Karya (the
action), Karya-phala (the effect), Desha (the place of the action), Kala (the time of the
action), Pravrtti (the activity or exertion put forth for achieving the action), etc. The second
head, Pariksa, deals with the standard of examination.
These standards are: aptopadesa (reliable
assertion); Pratyaksa (perception); anumana (inference); yukti (reasoning). The discussion under
the third head is much more elaborate.[
The examination of vada-vidhi begins by dividing debates into two classes, namely, anuloma
sambhasha (peaceful debate) and vigrihya sambhasha (hostile debate).
The respondents are then classified as superior, equal and inferior. Also, the assembly witnessing
the debate is classified as learned and ignorant. Each of these is then further classified as friendly,
indifferent or hostile. There are suggestions as to how to handle the debate depending on the
nature of the respondents and of the assembly. The treatise then goes on to give a list of 44 items
a thorough knowledge of which is essential for the successful conduct of a debate.]
**
Nyaya, as a system, is one among the six Darshanas (systems of Indian philosophy). It deals
with well-organized logical ways of ascertaining the true nature of the objects and subjects
of human knowledge (Pramana-Sastra). Nyaya is also called Tarka-vidya (logic) and Vada-
vidya or Vada’rtha (reasoned argument); and, is included among the fourteen principal
branches of learning.
Nyaya is founded on the belief that knowledge is not self-revealing; man must make effort to
gain correct knowledge ; and, to abandon incorrect knowledge, through a systematic
process. It asserts that the analytical way of Nyaya is the greatest protection to a young
person whose intellect is still in the process of growth and is yet to attain equanimity. And,
it is only by thorough examination of the modes and sources of correct knowledge that a
thinking person can gain a clearer perspective of life. It asks each one to think for himself;
and, not to tacitly accept beliefs handed down by the older generation. And, therefore, it
instructs, the teachings that have come down to us through traditions must be critically
examined before accepting them.
Vatsayana in his Nyāya Bhāṣya , a Commentary on Nyaya Sutra (1.1.1) , asserts that the
analytical investigation and examination (Anveshiki) of issues which bring clarity into the
intellectual aspects of man’s life help him to attain freedom (moksha) from delusions and
confusions in life. Nyaya which enables us to discern the true from the false is therefore
regarded as Moksha-Sadhana the way to absolute freedom or liberation.
nirdeśe yathāvacanaṃ vigrahaḥ|
cārthe dvandvaḥ samāsaḥ|
pramāṇādīnāṃ tatvamiti śaiṣikī ṣaṣṭhī|
tatvasya jñānaṃ niḥśreyasasyādhigama iti ca karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhyau|
ta etāvanto vidyamānārthāḥ|
eṣāmaviparītajñānārthamihopadeśaḥ|
so ‘yamanavayavena tantrārtha uddiṣṭo veditavyaḥ/ NyS_1,1.1 /
*
Nyaya, in particular, also denotes a method or a scheme of logic employed to prove or to
disprove a proposition through proper evidence (pramana). The employment of a Nyaya
would become necessary when the subject discussed was either vague or was disputed; and
when the other methods of reasoning were ineffective.
The Nyaya School was essentially logistic in its orientation. It tried to examine the sources
and contents of valid knowledge. It built a logical link between the subject, the knower
(pramata); the means or method of obtaining knowledge (pramana) ; and the object , the
knowable (prameya) . In addition, it put forth analogy (Upama) as the fourth method.
Analogy (Upama), it is said, comprehensively includes in itself the other three methods.
However, the main purpose of Upama is to illustrate. This models attempts to represent
something that which cannot be perceived. However, this Nyaya is like the finger; and, it is
not the moon. Therefore , Analogy, the Upama has its own limitations; it could be brittle at
times; and , if pressed too hard it might even crumble .
In its working method; Upama employs something that is already familiar , in order to
explain certain concepts that are at once abstract and real. But, an analogy cannot be
perfect; as there cannot be complete identity between the subject and the object.
Therefore, there cannot be a perfect analogy; and, mere argument is not evidence.
Which is to say; while the analogy or illustration is important, the more important than that
is the validity of the argument, its precision and its import. Therefore, there is always an
element of inadequacy in the Upama . One has to strive to extract from the model what is
called “a positive analogy”; or Samanya-guna a relevant factor that is common to both the
subject and the object . The notion of transformation (Vivarta) is thus what one could call a
logical construction.
Nonetheless, the value of these Nyayas consists in that they facilitate a passage from the
observable to the actual ; and, from the factual to the theoretical .
[ Prof. Surendranath Dasgupta explains in A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1
(p.406):
Pramana in Sanskrit signifies the means and movement by which valid knowledge is
acquired Pramata means the subject or the knower who cognizes, Prama – the result
of pramana i.e., right knowledge, knowledge of reality or valid cognition, prameya – the
object of knowledge and pramanya – the validity of knowledge acquired.
The verbal root ma of these terms derived with the prefix pra, means also to measure (apart
from meaning to cognize) . Thus, what is to be measured is the prameya; and, that by which
to measure is pramana.]
[In Sanskrit, the term Jnana stands for all kinds of knowledge – whether be it of truth or of
falsehood. The term Prama, however, is used to designate only a true cognition (yatartha-
jnana) as distinct from a false one (mithya-jnana). A Pramana is an active and a unique
cause of Prama or knowledge. Pramā means ‘knowing an object as it is’: tadvati tat prakārā-
anubhavaḥ pramā. The term pramāṇa is also understood as the actual experience
is pramā.
– pramāyāḥ karaṇam, pramāṇam. Alternatively, yathārthā-anubhavah pramā –
To see a rope as rope is pramā. If we see a snake instead of the rope, it is apramā-
ayathārtha-anubhavaḥ apramā.
The Samkhya and Yoga Schools of Indian philosophy accept three means of
cognition, Pramanas:
Pratyaksha : direct perception generated through sense organs – indriyārtha –
sannikarṣajanya . That is, when there is a contact between the senses and the object
– jñānamakam pratyakṣam. Gautama defines Pratyakṣa as meaning – ‘knowledge born of
sensory perception, such as eyes is pratyakṣa’.
– akṣam akṣam pratityutpadyate iti pratyakṣam
And. Pratyaksha is regarded as the basic (Mula) Pramana; because, the
other pramānas such as Anumāna, Arthāpatti, Upamāna and śabda are dependent on it.
Anumana (inference) literally means knowledge gained afterwards ; i.e. knowledge that
‘follows other knowledge’ – jñāna-kāraka-jñānam.). In Anumāna, first the liṅga (minor
primise) is seen, then by liṅga or hetu, the sādhya-sambandha-jñāna or vyāpti-
jñāna (invariable concomitant) takes place. This Sādhya (major primise) is known
as anumiti. Thus, since this knowledge takes place after liṅga-darśana, this is known
as Anumāna
And Sabda is verbal testimony , through scriptures. Bhartrhari asserts, the traditional
knowledge (Agama) which consists of the revealed (Sruti) or remembered (Smrti)
scriptures cannot be set aside by inference, since they are more dependable than inference.
*

The Mimamsa School accepts six types of

Pramanas: Pratyaksha, Anumana, Sabda, Upamana (analogy), Arthapatti (presumption)
and Abhava (non-apprehension).
The same set of six Pramanas is also stated by Vedanta. There are, of course, variations
among these Schools regarding the specific understang of each of the Pramans.
*

Within Vyakarana, Bhartrhari in his Maha-bhashya-tika accepts three Pramanas:

Pratyaksha (perception), Anumana (inference) and Agama or Sabda (scriptures). He argues
that perception, at times, could be erroneous because of weakness or improper functioning
of sensory organs. Some even think, he says, that inference is superior to perception. But he
asserts that Agama or Sabda which consists of the revealed (Sruti) or remembered (Smrti)
scriptures is a strong Pramana; and, it is more dependable than inference.
According to Bhartrhari, it is not justifiable to replace scriptures (Sabda) with inference
particularly in non-empirical matters. He also says that philosophical views (Vada) cannot
be independent of the scriptures. He argues that inference alone, without the steadying
influence of the scriptures is an inadequate means of valid knowledge. In
his Vakyapadiya (1.34), it is said: ‘whatever is inferred with great effort through clever
reasoning can easily be put aside by a much more clever reasoning or argument’.
yatnenānumito+apy arthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ / abhiyuktatarair anyair
anyathaivopapādyate -VP.1.34
The words of the Rishis convey super-sensory knowledge that cannot be set aside by
inference. Thus, Bhartrhari asserts that Dharma or right conduct cannot be determined by
reasoning alone, without the guidance of the scriptural traditions. Even the knowledge
which the sages possess has the scriptures for its reference (Vakyapadiya: 1.30). Thus, tor
true knowledge, the support of the scriptures (Sabda) is essential.
na jāgamād ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate / ṛṣīṇām api yaj jñānaṃ tad apy
āgamapūrvakam – VP.1.30
In this context, Bharthari says that the role of Vyakarana (Grammar) is very important, as
it helps to safeguard the correct transmission of the scriptural knowledge , and to assist the
aspirant in realizing the the truth of the revealed knowledge of Sabda.]
**
The Sutra text attached to Nyaya School is the Nyaya Sutra ascribed to Akṣapāda
Gautama (variously estimated between 6th-century BCE and 2nd-century CE). Nyaya
Sutra treats mainly five subjects: Pramana (instruments or means of right
knowledge); Prameya (the object of right knowledge); Vaada (debate or
discussion); Avayava (the elements or steps of syllogism); and, Anya-matha-pariksha (review
or examination of the doctrines of other Schools).
[Please click here for The Nyaya Sutras of Gotama; Translated by Mahamahopadhyaya Satish
Chandra Vidyabhushan; Published by The Panini Office, Bhuvaneshvari Ashram, Bahadurganj,
Allahabad – 1913 ]
**

While discussing Vaada, Nyaya Sutra talks about sixteen padarthas (topics or categories )
involved in the development of the debate (Vada marga); the four reliable means of
obtaining valid knowledge (pramāṇa) viz.:

o Pratyaksha (perception),
o Anumana (inference),
o Upamana (comparison) and
o Sabda (reliable testimony);
the five-part syllogism (Nyaya):

o the structure (vada vidhi);
o the ways of developing sound evidence (pramana);
o the logical reasoning (tarka) to support ones thesis which needs to be
proved (Pratijna) and its object (nirnaya);
o the disciplined (anusasana) mode of presentation (vadopaya); and
o the exceptions (prthaka-prasthana), as also the limits or the ‘dos and
don’ts’ (vada-maryada) of three formats of such debates.
(vāda-lakṣaṇam : pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntā-viruddhaḥ pañcā-
vayavopapannaḥ pakṣa-pratipakṣa-parigrahaḥ vādaḥ – NyS_1,2.1)
Gautama’s text was followed by commentaries; the first of which being Nyāya Bhāṣya by
Vātsyāyana (c. 450–500 CE). The commentary by Vatsayana was followed the ones by
the Nyāya-vārttika of Uddyotakāra (c. 6th–7th century); Tātparya-tīkā by Vācaspati
Miśra (9th century); Tātparya-pariśuddhi by Udayana (10th century); Nyāya-mañjarī by
Jayanta (10th century); Nyaya-sara by Bhasarvajna (10th century); and Tatva-chintamani by
Gangesa (12th century). These commentaries further developed the Nyaya Sutra expanding
upon Gautama’s work.
As per these texts, the debates and arguments are grouped under a broad head titled
‘Katha’. In Sanskrit, the term ‘Katha’, in general, translates as ‘to inform’, ‘to narrate’, ‘to
address or to refer to somebody’. In the context of Nyaya Shatra, which provides the
knowledge (Vako-Vakya or Vada-vidya) about the methods for presenting arguments as also
the rules governing the debates, the term ‘Katha’ implies formal conversation (Sambasha)
as in a debate. The conversation here is not in the casual manner as in day-to-day life. But,
it is articulate, precise and well thought out utterances.
The Katha is described as ‘polemical conversation’, meaning that it is passionate and
strongly worded , but a well balanced argument against or in favor of somebody or
something. That is why; the discussions (Vaada) are never simple. A Katha, in essence, is a
reasoned and a well-structured philosophical discussion.
Vatsayana at the beginning of his commentary on Nyaya Sutra (1.2.1) mentions that Katha
is classified into two kinds of debates (Dvi-vidha sambasha): Vaada (the good-Sandhya
sambasha) on one hand; and Jalpa and Vitanda (the bad- Vigrahya sambasha) on the other.
Uddyotakara in his Nyāya Vārttika further explains that this threefold classification is
according to the nature of the debate and the status of the persons taking part in the
debate.
(padārtha-uddeśa-sūtram:pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntāvayava-
tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍāhetvābhāsa-cchala-jāti-nigrahasthānānāmtattvajñānāt
niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ- NyS_1,1.1 )
The first variety , Vaada is an honest , peaceful and congenial (sandhaya) debate that takes
place between two persons of equal merit or standing, trying to explore the various
dimensions of a subject with a view to ascertain and establish ‘what is true’. The Vaada, at
its best, is a candid friendly discussion (anuloma sambasha or sandhya sambasha) or debate
in the spirit of: ’let’s sit-down and talk’.
The other two are hostile arguments (vigrhya sambasha) between rivals who desperately
want to win. Thus, by implication, while the goal of a Vaada is establishment of truth or an
accepted doctrine; and that of the other two hostile debates (Jalpa and Vitanda) is seeking
victory.
Of the two types of hostile debates, Jalpa is described (in Nyaya Sutra 1.2.2) as a disputation
or wrangling or a ’tricky’ debate between two rivals , where each is thoroughly convinced
that he is absolutely right and the other (termed as the opponent – Prativadin) is hopelessly
wrong. The first party to the debate is dogmatically committed to his own thesis, while the
other party takes a rigid contrary position (Prati-paksha) on a given subject; and,
sometimes at the cost of truth. Each is prepared to employ various deceptive or sophistic
devices, such as quibbling (Chala); unreasonable (A-hetu) responses; shifting the reason
or the topics (Hetvantara or Arthantara); irrelevant rejoinders provoking the opponent to
lose focus , to get perturbed and yet continue with the dispute (Jati) somehow; and , such
other devices to outwit the opponent.
(jalpa-lakṣaṇam : yathoktopapannaḥ chalajātinigrahasthānasādhanopālambhaḥ jalpaḥ-
NyS_1,2.2)

Unlike in Vaada, the purpose of Jalpa is not so much as to ascertain the truth, as to establish
one’s own position or thesis, and to prove the opponent wrong; and, make him accept
defeat. What is at stake here is the ‘prestige and honor’ of one’s School (Matha). And,
therefore, each will try to win the debate by fair or foul means. And, when one senses that
he might be losing the argument (nigrahasthāna), he will try to invent every sort of face-
saving device or ruse to wriggle out of a bad situation that is quickly turning worse , like
being trapped on quicksand sinking down each moment . Jalpa, predictably, could
therefore be noisy , unpleasant and even be desperate.
And, Vitanda is the worst type of argument or squabbling descending to the level of quarrel
and trickery. It is described as a destructive type of argument; the sole aim of each party
being not only to inflict defeat on the opponent but also to demolish and humiliate him .
The Vaitandika , the debater who employs Vitanda, is basically a refuter; he relentlessly
goes on refuting whatever the proponent says. He has no thesis of his own – either to put
forward or to defend. Sometimes he might pick up a thesis just for argument’s sake, even
though he may have no faith in the truth of his own argument. The
aggressive Vaitandika goes on picking holes in the rival’s arguments and destabilizes his
position , without any attempt to offer an alternate thesis.
Both the participants in a Vitanda are prepared to resort to mean tactics in order to
mislead, browbeat the opponent by fallacies (hetv-abhasa); by attacking the opponents
statement by willful misrepresentation (Chala) ; ill-timed rejoinders (Atita-kala) and, make
the opponent ‘bite the dust’. It is virtually akin to a ‘no-holds-barred’ sort of street fight.
The ethereal values such as: truth, honesty, mutual respect and such others are
conspicuously absent here.
(vitaṇḍā-lakṣaṇam : saḥ pratipakṣa-sthāpanā-hīnaḥ vitaṇḍā –NyS_1,2.3)

It is said; in the case of Jalpa the contending parties have a position of their own, fight hard
to defend it, and aim to make the rival accept it, by whatever means. However, in
the Vitanda, the disputant has neither a position of his own nor is he trying to defend any
specific thesis. He is merely trying to derange and humiliate the other party to the debate.
Vatsayana in his Nyaya-sutra Bhashya calls one who resorts to Vitanda (Vaitandika) as self-
destructive.
Even in the case of Jalpa and Vitanda, the disputants had to agree, beforehand, to certain
rules, norms and devices, so that the defeat could be forced by the judge (Madyastha) on one
or the other party.
A debate with the mere aim of win or humiliation of the other is looked down.
Therefore, Jalpa and Vitanda are deemed contrary to the overall aim of the Nyaya
Shastra which is oriented towards determination of the true nature of objects.
[The skills in waging debates and arguments (Vada-vidya) of the Jalpa and Vitanda might
have been relevant during the medieval times when the inter–religious or intra-religious
debates (Shastrartha) were held among the rival traditions (Sampradaya) or sects, each
trying hard to prove the superiority of its Matha (thesis or sect) over the others. In the
present context, such beliefs and arguments have become obsolete in India, though their
techniques are very well preserved and practiced in Tibetan Buddhist debates.
Having said that , Prof. A L Basham remarks : ” Modern logicians might make short work
of these rather pedantic systems of ontological and epistemological relativity, but they have
a fundamental quality of breadth and realism, implying a full realization that the world is
more complex and subtle than we think it, and that what is true of a thing in one of its
aspects may at the same time be false in another.”
Further . the syllogism, logical structure and methods of presenting reasoned arguments as
described in the ancient texts are still of great interest. Its methodology based on a system
of logic is the same for us today in our lecture halls and programming desks as it was for
the medieval scholars.]
Let’s look at each of these types of discussions and arguments in a little more detail.

Samvada

Samvada is a dialogue that takes between the teacher and the taught in all earnestness. The
one who approaches the teacher could be a disciple; student; friend (as in Krishna-Arjuna
or Krishna-Uddhava) ; son (as in Shiva-Skanda or Uddalaka-Swetaketu); or spouse (as in
Shiva-Prvathi or Yajnavalkya-Maitreyi); or parent (as Sage Kapila teaching his mother
Devahuthi); or anyone else seeking knowledge (as in Nachiketa -Yama or the six persons
who approach Sage Pippalada in Prashna Upanishad).
What characterizes the Samvada in such cases is the sincerity and eagerness of the learner;
the humility in his/her approach; and the absolute trust in the teacher. The wise teacher ,
in turn , with full of grace , imparts instructions out of enormous love for the ardent seeker
of truth.

(siddhānta-sūtra : jñāna-grahaṇā-abhyāsas tad-vidyaiśca saha saṃvādaḥ- 4.2.47) vidhya-

artha-vādā-anuvāda-vacanaviniyogāt;vidhiḥ-vidhāyakaḥ;stutiḥ-nindā-parakṛtiḥ-purākalpaḥ
itiarthavādaḥ; na-anuvādapunaruktayoḥ-viśeṣaḥ,-śabdābhyāsopapatteḥ ; śīghra-tara-
gamanopa-deśavat abhyāsāt na aviśeṣaḥ; mantrā-yurveda-prāmāṇyavat ca tatprāmāṇyam,
āpta-prāmāṇyāt (2.1.63-69)

Another remarkable text of this genre is The Vijñāna Bhairava Tantra (a component
of Rudrayamala Tantra), a principal text of the Trika school of Pratyabhijna (Kashmira
Shaiva Siddantha). It is composed as a discourse (Samvada) between the Lord Bhairava and
his consort Bhairavi. Here, Bhairava imparts instructions to the Devi; teaching her as
many as 112 Tantric meditation methods or centering techniques (Dharana or types of
Yoga). The Vijñāna Bhairava utilizes all the traditional techniques of Yoga (such as Mudra,
Pranaskthi, mantra-japa, awakening of Kundalini, bhakthi, jnana etc.). These include several
variants of breath awareness, concentration on various centers in the body, non-dual
awareness, mantra–chanting, imagination and visualization and contemplation through
each of the senses. These techniques are said to help / guide the aspirant along the path to
realize her/his identity with the highest reality – recognized here as Bhairava, the Absolute.
The Devi listens to the Lord with rapt attention : Shrutam deva maya sarvam rudrayamala
sambhavam.

Similarly, the Svacchanda-bhairava-tantra, belonging to the Śāktāgama (or Śākta-

tantra) division of the Āgama tradition, is rendered as a Devī-Deva-saṃvāda, where Lord
Bhairava is drawn forward to teach the Goddess Bhairavi. The Devi implores , O
Parameśvara, you taught the Svacchanda Tantra a profound Tantra (mahā-
tantraṃ) having four parts (catuṣpīṭhaṃ ) and leading to the four types of attainments
(catuṣṭaya-phalodayam)
muditaṃ Bhairavaṃ dṛṣṭvā Devī vacanam abravīt || yat tvayā kathitaṃ mahyaṃ svacchandaṃ
Parameśvara || śata-koṭi-pravistīrṇaṃ bhedā-anantyavisarpitam | catuṣpīṭhaṃ mahā-tantraṃ
catuṣṭaya-phalodayam ||
Then the Devi requests : Teach me, O Maheśvara, how this Tantra will be successful now
that the Kali Age is upon us (kalim āsādya siddhyanti tathā brūhi maheśvara). |
The Lord responds : That was really good, O blessed Goddess. Now I will teach what you
have requested in order to bestow grace upon mortal beings.
sādhu sādhu Mahābhāge yat tvayā parichoditam || anugrahāya martyānāṃ sāmprataṃ
kathayāmi te

Another well known text , in the form of a Samvada, is the Siddha Kunjika Stotra , a Tanric
stotra, which occurs in the Gauri Tantra (section) of Rudra-yamala Tantra. Here, Lord Shiva,
the Adi Guru, imparts instructions to his consort Parvathi; and, extols the virtues of
the Kunjika Stotra.
It is said; the Kunjika is the Key ,which unlocks the powers of the Chandi Paatha. And, its
prefix ‘Siddha’ implies that the stotra leads to the attainment of the ideal state.
It is also said; Kunjika, here, is in form of the Devi Chamunda, the Supreme Goddess; and,
there is nothing beyond Her (Anuttara).
While invoking the Devi Chamunda, the Kunjika Stotra explains the meaning of the
syllables (Bija mantras) in the Navarna Mantra – Om̃ aiṃ hrīṃ klīṃ cāmuṇḍāyai viccey.
A Samvada is thus a discourse or a dialogue that teaches, imparts instructions or passes on
knowledge to a sincere seeker of Truth.
The bulk of the Upanishad teachings have come down to us in the form of Samvada, which
took place in varieties of contexts. Apart from intimate sessions where an illumined teacher
imparts instructions to an aspirant , there are instances of varied kind, say, as when : a wife
is curious to learn from her husband the secrets of immortality; a teenage boy approaches
Death itself to learn the truth of life and death; a king seeks instruction from an recluse
sage who speaks from his experience ; Brahmans advanced in age and wisdom sit at the feet
of a Kshatriya prince seeking instructions as also inspiration ; and , when sometimes the
sages are women who are approached by kings .There are other sorts of dialogues , say,
when Jabala is taught by bulls and birds (Ch. Up 4.4-9) , Upakosala by the sacred fires (Ch.
Up. 4.10-15), and Baka is by a dog (Ch. Up 1.12).
Nothing in the Upanishads is more vital than the relationship between a student and his
guide. The teacher talks, out his experience, about his ideas of the nature of the world, of
truth etc. or about particular array of phenomena visualized through mental images that
stay etched in memory.
An Upanishad-teacher ignites in the heart of the boy a spark that sets ablaze his desire to
learn and to know the central principles which make sense of the world we live in. The
guide inflames the sense of challenge, the urge to reach beyond the boy’s grasp and to know
the unknown. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad calls upon :
‘You are what your deep, driving desire is; as your desire is, so is your will (sa yathā-kāmo
bhavati tat-kratur-bhavati); as your will is, so is your deed (yat-kratur-bhavati tat-karma
kurute) ; as your deed is, so is your destiny (yat-karma kurute tad-abhi-saṃpadyate”- (Brhu.
Up. 4.4.5).
sa yathākāmo bhavati tat-kratur bhavati | yat-kratur bhavati tat karma kurute | yat karma kurute
tad abhi-saṃpadyate || BrhUp_4,4.5 |
In the end, all achievement is fueled by burning desire.
The Bhagavad-Gita suggests that an ardent seeker of truth should approach a learned
teacher in humility and seek instructions from him; question him repeatedly:
Tad viddhi pranipatena pariprasnena sevaya I Upadeksyanti te jnanam jnaninas tattva-
darsinah II (B G.; Ch.4; verse 34)
The student questions the teacher not because he doubts (samshaya) the wisdom or the
understanding of the teacher; nor is he / she questioning the authenticity of the
teaching . The questions are asked with open mind and guileless heart; and, are meant to
clear doubts, and to gain a flawless understanding of the teaching.
The teacher is neither annoyed nor does he discourage the student from asking questions.
On the other hand, he encourages the learner to examine, enquire and test the teaching
handed down to him. A true teacher, in a Samvada does not prescribe or proscribe. He lets
the student the freedom to think, to ponder over and to find out for himself the answers to
his questions. A student needs humility, persistence, and honesty of purpose to go
further and to arrive at his own understanding.
Yaska tenders sage-like counsel. Yaska instructs (Nir.1.18): what is taken from teacher’s
mouth, but not understood and, is merely repeated, never flares up. It is like dry firewood
flung on something that is not fire.
 Don’t memorize, seek the meaning
 What has been taken from the teacher’s mouth but not understood,
 Is uttered by mere memory recitation,
 It never flares up, like dry firewood without fire.
 Many a one, although seeing, do not see Speech,
 Many a one, although hearing, do not hear her,
 And many a one, she spreads out Her body, like a wife desiring her husband.
 The meaning of Speech is its fruit and flower.
yad gṛhītam avijñāta nigadena eva śabdyate/ anagnāv iva śuṣka edho na taj jvalatikarhicit/
sthāṇus tiṣṭhater artho arter araṇastho vā / Nir. 1.18 /

The Buddha, the best of the teachers, also adopted a similar approach. He insisted that his
followers should not try borrowing ideas or experiences from him; but they should arrive at
their own. In the first sermon he delivered (Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta) in the Deer-
park (Miga-daya) at Isipatana (Saranath), soon after attaining enlightenment, he asked his
listeners:
O monks and wise men, do not accept my Dharma merely out of respect for me, but analyze
and test it the way a goldsmith examines a pieces of gold by burning , cutting and rubbing
it on a touchstone.(please see the note below)
A teaching would not be true, valid or trustworthy merely because it was uttered by an
eminent person of great renown. It would be so only in case it is thoroughly tested, clearly
understood and truthfully brought into one’s own experience.
The Buddha guides the aspirant on the path that leads to right-understanding. But he
disclaims any personal authority; and asks the follower to work it out himself. The follower
when he succeeds in attaining the enlightenment will not become a second Buddha or a
replica of the Buddha. In the final analysis, both the Buddha and his follower free
themselves from the bonds of samsara; yet, each retains his individuality.
Note
[This often quoted analogy of testing a piece of gold appears in many texts ; such as :
Jnanasara-samuccaya (31) a Sanskrit text of a later period (perhaps a translation of the Tibetan
text – sTug-po bkod-pa’i-mdo); in Nyāya-bindu-pūrvapakṣa-saṃkṣipti, a commentary on
Dharmakīrti’s, Nyāyabindu (1.18–1.21) and also in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattva-saṁgraha (verse
3588) .
It reads in Sanskrit as :
Tāpāc chedāc ca nikasat svarnam iva panditaih / Parikshya blikshavo grāhyam madvaco na tu
gauravāt
However, the kalama Sutta (or Kesamutti Suta) – delivered to the Kālāmas of Kesamutti –
appearing in Aṅguttara Nikaya (III.653), which is a part of Tipitaka, merely lays down the
principle of taking an objective view after a thorough examination (charter of free inquiry); but, it
does not specifically mention the instance of ” jewel-testing” :
“Come, O Kālāmas, Do not accept anything thinking that thus have we heard it from a long time
(anussava). Do not accept anything thinking that it has thus been handed down through many
generations (paramparā). Do not accept anything on account of rumours (itikirā). Do not accept
anything just because it accords with your scriptures (piṭaka-sampadāna). Do not accept
anything by mere surmise (takka-hetu); nor upon an axiom (naya-hetu). Do not accept anything
by mere inference (ākāra-parivitakka). Do not accept anything by merely upon a bias towards a
notion that has been pondered over (diṭṭhi-nijjhān-akkh-antiyā). Do not accept anything by
coming under another’s seems ability (bhabba-rūpatāya). Do not accept anything merely
because the monk-teacher says so (samaṇo no garū). Do not accept anything thinking that the
ascetic is respected by us (and therefore it is right to accept his word.)
“Kalamas, when you know for yourselves —these things are immoral, these things are
blameworthy, these things are censured by the wise, these things when performed and
undertaken, conduce to ruin and sorrow – then indeed you do reject them.
“But Kalamas, when you know for yourselves – these things are good; these things
are blameless, these things are praised by the wise; these things when undertaken and observed,
lead to well-being and happiness- enter upon and abide in them. ]

Vaada is a debate between two persons of equal standing. The term Vaada by itself means a
theory, doctrine or thesis. In the debate, the proponent who puts forward arguments in
support of his doctrine (Vaada) is termed as Vadin. The opponent who refutes that theory
through his counter-arguments is termed as Prati-vadin. Unlike in Samvada, there is no
teacher-taught relationship here; nor is it a discourse.
Ideally, both the parties to the Vaada should have mutual regard, respecting each other’s
learning and status; and should participate with an open mind in order to explore various
dimensions of the subject on hand; to examine it thoroughly by applying the accepted
norms of logic and reasoning (Tarka), supported by passages from texts of undisputed
authority (Sabda Pramana). The principal aim of a wholesome Vaada is to resolve the
conflict; and, to establish ‘what is true’. The proceedings of the Vaada should be
characterized by politeness, courtesy and fair means of presenting the arguments. You
might call it a healthy discussion.
Vatsayana in his commentary Nyāya Bhāṣya, says that congenial debate (Anuloma
Sambasha) takes place when the opponent is not wrathful or malicious; but, is learned ,
wise, eloquent and patient ; is well versed in the art of persuasion ; and, is gifted with sweet
speech.
As regards the benefits (Sambasha prashamsa or prayojana) of such peaceful and congenial
debates : If a learned person debates with another scholar, both versed in the same subject,
it would increase the depth of their knowledge, clear misapprehensions, if any, and lead
them to find certain minor details which hitherto might have escaped their
attention . It was said: Vade Vade jayate tattvabodhah – Truth emerges out of debates
– Besides, it would heighten their zeal to study further; and bring happiness to both.
But, in cases where two scholars hold contrary views, the Vadin and Prati-vadin will each
try very hard to establish the doctrine which he believes is true; and to convince the other to
accept its veracity through fair and effective presentation and arguments. At the same time,
each is willing to understand and appreciate the arguments of the other; and accept any
merit they might find in it. In case, one is in doubt or unable to respond satisfactorily , one
can take a break to re-group his position or to re-examine the issue to see whether he can
refute the opponent’s argument more effectively or put up a sounder defense.
And, if one is convinced that the doctrine and the argument presented by the opponent is
valid, he adopts it with grace. And, at the end, one of the two might be proven wrong; or
both could be right. In any case, they accept the outcome of the debate, whatever be it; and,
part their ways without rancor.
***
The Buddhist text Milinda Panha (The Questions of King Milinda) dated between second
and first century BCE is said to be a record of the conversations that took place between the
Indo-Greek king Menander I Soter (who is said to have ruled over the regions of Kabul
and Punjab) and the Buddhist monk Nagasena.
[Menander (Milinda), originally a general of Demetrius, is probably the most successful
Indo-Greek king, and the conqueror of a vast territory. The finds of his coins are the most
numerous and the most widespread of all the Indo-Greek kings. From at least the 1st
century AD, the “Menander Mons“, or “Mountains of Menander”, came to designate the
mountain chain at the extreme east of the Indian subcontinent, today’s Naga Hills and
Arakan, as indicated in the Ptolemy world map of the 1st century.
Minander had expanded his kingdom into Gangetic plains, where Buddhism was
flourishing. He is reputed to have been a secular King , who protected the beliefs of his
Greek and Buddhist subjects.
Menander is remembered in Buddhist literature (the Milinda Panha) for
his conversations with the Buddhist elder Monk Nagasena. According to Milinda –panha,
the King Milinda carefully listens to Nagasena’s teachings; and, at the end of each discourse
exclaims ‘Very good, Bhante* Nagasena’.
[*Bhante (Sanskrit: Bhavantaḥ) is a respectful title used to address elder Buddhist monks in the
Theravada tradition. The term literally means “Venerable Sir’.]
Sagala , the city in which King Milinda met the Bhikku Nagasena is identified with Sialkot .
The Jatakas mention : There is , in the country of the Yonakas , a great center of trade , a
city that is called Sagala, situated in a delightful country, abounding in parks , groves , lakes
and tanks ; a paradise of rivers, woods and mountains.
Wise architects have laid out the Sâgala city; and its people know of no oppression, since all
their enemies and adversaries have been put down. Brave is its defense, with many and
various strong towers and ramparts, with superb gates and entrance archways; and with
the royal citadel in its midst, white walled and deeply moated. Well laid out are its streets,
squares, cross roads, and market places. Well displayed are the innumerable sorts of costly
merchandise with which its shops are filled. It is richly adorned with hundreds of alms-halls
of various kinds; and splendid with hundreds of thousands of magnificent mansions, which
rise aloft like the mountain peaks of the Himalayas. Its streets are filled with elephants,
horses, carriages, and foot-passengers, frequented by groups of handsome men and
beautiful women, and crowded by men of all sorts and conditions, Brahmans, nobles,
artificers, and servants. They resound with cries of welcome to the teachers of every creed,
and the city is the resort of the leading men of each of the differing sects. So full is the city of
money, and of gold and silver ware, of copper and stone ware, that it is a very mine of
dazzling treasures. And there is laid up there much store of property and corn and things of
value in warehouses-foods and drinks of every sort, syrups and sweetmeats of every kind. In
wealth it rivals Uttara-kuru, and in glory it is as Âlakamandâ, the city of the gods. ( The
Questions of King Milinda, translated by T. W.Rhys Davids, 1890)
Source : Greeks and Buddhism: Historical Contacts in the Development of a Universal
Religion by Demetrios Th. Vassiliades ]

At the outset, Nagasena remarks that the debate they would be having would be one
between two wise men; and it would not be a debate for the King.
Then, King Menander enquirers as to the distinction between the two.
Monk Nagasena explains:
When scholars debate, your Majesty, there is summing up and unraveling of a theory,
convincing and conceding; there is also defeat, and yet the scholars do not get angry at all.
When the Kings debate, your Majesty, they state their thesis, and if anyone differs from
them, they order him punished, saying ‘Inflict punishment upon him’.
Thus, in a good debate there could be defeat or censure or clincher (Nigraha-sthana) but no
animosity.
[This debate is justly praised for the incisive questions asked by Menander; and, it is
regarded by the Buddhists as equal in value to their canonical scriptures.
It is not certain whether Menander was converted to Buddhism; but, he seemed to have
taken a deep interest in it. Some of his coins show a wheel, similar to the
Buddhist Chakra. Plutarch reports that after Menander’s death his ashes were distributed
to all cities of his kingdom where monuments were then constructed to contain them—a
kind of commemoration which was in tune with Buddhist practice.]

[Dr. Sangeetha Menon, in her scholarly article, though she writes about Saṁvāda, she is actually
referring to Vada:
(Saṁ)vāda, is meant to lead to transforming experiences, in the process of which attempts are
made jointly to (i) ascertain what is true knowledge, (ii) to understand new ideas, and, (iii) to
understand the nature of the inquirer herself/himself.
(Saṁ) vāda plays a central role in understanding Indian philosophy as well as Indian
psychology. It has references not only to logical and epistemological methods but also to states
of mind which are important in the discussion about the primal nature of self. Hence, the
discussions on metaphysical and ontological issues are always interrelated to understanding
ethical, axiological, aesthetic and spiritual issues. There is a constant attempt to reconcile and
integrate different experiences, and the existence of contradictions so as to generate worldviews
based on an understanding of life with answers for fundamental questions about self-identity,
nature of world, creation, purpose of life, nature of knowledge, value systems etc.
Apart from the content of the dialogue, the process of dialogue plays an important role in
contributing to the well-being of the partners involved. It gives total and one-time attention to
how world views are formed, how mental and physical discipline are significant to conceive an
idea, how way of living is connected with the self-identity of the inquirer.
Being and Wellbeing In Upanishadic Literature by Dr. Sangeetha Menon ]

***
Nyaya Sutra in its First Book enumerates the steps or the categories (padartha) of the
methods (Vadopaya) for structuring the argument and for presentation of the subject under
debate, while the rest of the four Books expand on these steps. The Vada-marga (the stages
in the course of a debate) is classified under sixteen steps:
 1) Pramana (the means of knowledge);
 2) Prameya (the object of right knowledge);
 3) Samsaya (creating doubt or misjudgment );
 4) Prayojana (purpose);
 5) Drshtanta (familiar example);
 6) Sidhanta (established tenet or principle);
 7) Avayava (an element of syllogism);
 8) Tarka ( reasoned argument);
 9) Niranaya (deduction or determination of the question);
 10) Vada (discussion to defend or to arrive at the truth);
 11) Jalpa (wrangling or dispute to secure a win );
 12) Vitanda (quibble or mere attack);
 13) Hetvabhasa (fallacy, erratic contrary , ill-timed challenges);
 14) Chala (misleading or willfully misinterpreting the words);
 15) Jati (futile objections founded on similarities or otherwise) ;and
 16) Nigrahaslhana (disagreement in principle or no purpose in arguing further
or the point nearing defeat).
*

These sixteen steps are meant to ascertain and establish ‘what is true’ (yathartha).The first
four steps deal, mainly, with logic; while the latter seven perform the function of preventing
and eliminating the errors. Among the first fou; Pramana with its four reliable means of
obtaining knowledge is of cardinal importance
[Pratyaksha (perception), Anumana (inference), Upamana (comparison) and Sabda (reliable
verbal testimony)].
As said earlier, these sixteen categories are discussed in detail in four sections of the Nyaya
Sutra. The Nyāya Sūtra (verse 1.1.2) declares that its goal is to study and describe the
attainment of liberation from wrong knowledge, faults and sorrow, through the application
of above sixteen categories of perfecting knowledge.
duḥkha-janma-pravṛttidoṣa-mithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye tadanantarā pāyāt apavargaḥ
(1.1.2: )
**
Nyaya Sutra (1.2.1) – (vāda-lakṣaṇam) states that Vaada, the good or honest debate, is
constituted by the following characteristics:
1. Establishment of the thesis and refutation of the counter thesis should be based upon
adequate evidence or means of knowledge (pramana) as well as upon proper reasoning
(tarka). Pramana, the valid knowledge, is defined as the cognition of the objects as they
actually are, free from misapprehension (tatha bhuta rtha jnanam hi pramanam uchyate);
and, anything other than that is invalid A-pramana or Bhrama – the cognition of objects as
they are not (atha bhuta rtha jnanam hi apramanam). Pramana stands both for the valid -
knowledge, and for the instrument or the means by which such valid knowledge is obtained.
2. The conclusion should not entail contradiction with analytical or ‘accepted doctrine’;
3. Each side should use the well-known five steps (syllogism) of the demonstration
(Sthapana) explicitly.
4. They should clearly recognize a thesis to be defended and a counter thesis to be refuted.
(pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ
pakṣapratipakṣaparigrahaḥ vādaḥ– 1.21 )
***
Nyaya Sutra (1.1.32- avayava-uddeśasūtram; and 1.1.39- nigamana-lakṣaṇam) lays down a
five-part syllogism for proper presentation of the elements of the arguments (Vaada). It
states that any valid argument must include the following five factors, as they help to
establish the object of right knowledge. These five steps also combine in themselves the four
means of
cognition: viz., Pratyaksha (perception), Anumana (inference), Upamana (comparison)
and Sabda (reliable verbal testimony):
1. Pratijna – the proposition or the enunciation of the object – that needs to be proved in the
light of the approved texts (Sabda)
2. Hetu – the reason or evidence through the vehicle of inference (Anumana); it furnishes a
means to prove the proposition;
3. Udaharana – the citation of examples (well recognized, universally acceptable and
independently verifiable) that illustrates (Pratyaksha) the common principle underlying the
subject in question and the example . It provides the supporting reason or evidence;
4. Upanaya – the application (validity of the example cited- Upamana) evidencing that
present thesis is essentially similar to example cited.
And
5. Niranaya – the conclusion eliminates all plausible contrary conclusions against the
proposition; and re-states the proposition or the thesis as proved and established beyond
doubt – derived by bringing together all the four means of right knowledge (proposition,
reason, example and application)
( pratijñā-hetū-udāharaṇa-upanaya-nigaman āni avayavāḥ -1.1.32)

( hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanam nigamanam- 1.1.39)

Pratijna is enunciation of the thesis that is sought to be proved – (e.g. Purusha is eternal).
Sthapana is establishing the thesis through a process employing reason (hetu), example
(drstantha) , application of the example( upanaya) and conclusion (nigamana) — (e.g. the
statement – Purusha is eternal- has to be supported by valid reasoning (hetu)- because he is
uncreated; by examples (drstantha) – just as the sky (Akasha ) is uncreated and it is
eternal ; by showing similarity between the subject of the example and the subject of the
thesis (Upanaya) – just as Akasha is uncreated a , so the Purusha is uncreated and eternal :
finally establishing the thesis (Nigamana) – therefore Purusha is eternal.
Prativada is refuting the proposition or thesis put forth by the proponent. Thus when the
proposition of the thesis Sthapana is Purusha is eternal, the Prati-stapana, the counter
proposition, would be Purusha is non-eternal; because it is perceivable by senses and the
jug which is perceivable by senses is non-eternal; Purusha is like the jug; therefore Purusha
is non-eternal
***
At the commencement of the Vaada, the Judge or the arbiter (Madhyastha) lays down rules
of the Vaada. The disputants are required to honor those norms and regulations. They are
also required to adhere to permissible devices; and not to breach certain agreed limits
(Vada maryada).
For instance; in the case of debates where the Vadin and Prati-vadin both belong to Vedic
tradition it was not permissible to question the validity of the Vedas or the existence of God
and the Soul. And, any position taken during the course of Vaada should not contradict the
Vedic injunctions.
In the case of the Vada where one belongs to Vedic tradition and the other to Non-Vedic
traditions (say, Jaina or Bauddha) they had to abide by the rules and discipline specifically
laid down by the Madyastha.
As mentioned earlier, according to Nyaya Sutra (1.2.1) Vaada comprises defense and attack
(Sadhana and Upalambha). One’s own thesis is defended by means of genuine criteria of
knowledge (Pramana) and the antithesis (opponent’s theory) is refuted by negative
dialectics of Tarka (logic). But, when defense or attack is employed excessively, merely for
the sake of scoring a win, then there is the risk of the debate degenerating into Jalpa.
It is said; Vaada and Jalpa are contrasting counterparts. In Vaada, the thesis is established
by Pramana-s; and the anti-thesis is disproved by Tarka or different set of Pramana-s.
Whereas in Jalpa, the main function is negation; the Pramana-s do not have much use here.
Jalpa tries to win the argument by resorting to quibbling, such
as Chala, Jati and Nigrahasthana. None of these can establish the thesis directly, because
their function is negation. But, indirectly , they help to disprove anti-thesis. Thus, Jalpa in
general is the dialectical aid for Vada (Nyaya Sutra: 4.2.50-51
[It is said; at times, the Madhyastha might allow or overlook ‘Jalpa-like’ tactics ‘for
safeguarding the interests of truth, ‘just as a fence of thorny hedges is used to protect the
farms’.]
It is at this stage in the Vaada that the Madyastha might intervene to ensure that the
participants, especially the one who is at the verge of defeat (Nigraha-sthana) do not resort
to tricks such as quibbling (Chala) , false rejoinder (Jati) etc.
The Madyastha may even call off the Vada; and award to the candidate who in his view
performed better.
The Vada could be also treated as inconclusive (savyabhicara) and brought to an end if
there is no possibility of reaching a fair decision; or the very subject to be discussed is
disputed (Viruddha); or when arguments stray away from the subject that is slated for
discussion (prakarana-atita) ; or when the debate prolongs beyond a reasonable (Kalatita).
In this context, it is said the debate could be treated as concluded and one side declared
defeated: a) When a proponent misunderstands his own premises and their implications; b)
when the opponent cannot understand the proponent’s argument; c) when either party is
confused and becomes helpless; d) when either is guilty of faulty reasoning or pseudo-
reasoning (hetva-bhasa); because, no one should be allowed to win using a pseudo-reason;
or e) when one cannot reply within a reasonable time.
When one party is silenced in the process, the thesis stays as proven. Hence, in Vaada,
there is no explicit ‘defeat’ as such. The sense of defeat (Nigraha-sthana) becomes apparent
when there are contradictions in logical reasoning (hetvabhasa); and the debate falls silent.
And, at the end, one of the two might be proven wrong; or both could be right. In any
case, when one is convinced that the doctrine and the argument presented by the opponent
are valid, he adopts it with grace. Ideally, whatever might be the outcome of a Vaada, it
should be accepted; and, both – Vadin and Prati-vadin – should part their ways without
rancor.
[The most celebrated Vaada is said to be the one that took place between the young monk
Sri Sankara and the distinguished Mimamsa scholar, householder, Mandana Misra.
Considering the young age of the opponent, Mandana Misra generously offered Sri
Sankara the option to select the Madyastha (Judge) for the ensuing debate. Sri Sankara,
who had great respect for the righteousness of Mandana Misra, chose his wife Bharathi
Devi, a wise and learned person.
During the course of the lengthy debate when Mandana Misra seemed to be
nearing Nigrahasthana (clincher) Bharathi Devi raised questions about marital obligations.
Sri Sankara being a monk had, of course, no knowledge in such matters. He requested for
and obtained a ‘break’ to study and to understand the issue. It is said; he returned after
some time equipped with the newly acquired knowledge, renewed the Vaada and won it.
Thereafter, Mandana Misra and Bharathi Devi accepted Sri Sankara as their teacher, with
grace and respect.]

[Please click here for a writing about Vada-vidhi (method of argumentation), a treatise about the
methods to mould flawless logic, ascribed to the celebrated Buddhist scholar Vasubandhu (4th to
5th century CE). Vāda-vidhi is the only work of Vasubandhu on logic which has survived.
Vasubandhu contributed to Buddhist logic and is held to have been the origin of formal logic in
the Indian tradition. His text paved the way for the later Buddhist scholars like Dignaga and
Dharmakirti, in the field of logic.
Vasubandhu’s methods for distinguishing fallacious arguments from valid ones rely heavily on
his theory of cognition.
He describes a number of logical fallacies, which he classifies into three types: reversed, incorrect
or unreal, and contradictory. He then moves on from the trivial examples to complex ones.
Vasubandhu’s formal system of argumentation is simple and practical, and especially well-suited
for the quick back-and-forth of the verbal debates that were very much in vogue in Vasubandhu’s
day. He had a reputation for being an experienced, ferocious debater, with a sharp mind.
His ideas on cognition are quite interesting. The underlying principle in Vasubandhu’s treatise on
logic is an unstated premise seemed to be that the objects in the argument structure have no
independent existence. Instead, they only come into existence provisionally, when cognized. He
further breaks down our process of cognition into direct perception, such as perceptions of
pleasure, pain, sound, or sight, and inferred perception, such as the perception of a mountain as
fire-possessing when it is observed to be smoke-possessing.
According to him : Knowledge through inference can be specified as an observation coming
when the means-of-evidence is directly observed, and the invariable concomitance between it and
what can be inferred is remembered. One does not occur unless something else is directly known.
Otherwise there is no inference.
Vasubandhu points out, we can never be absolutely certain about anything, because we can only
make inferences based upon our perceptions, which can be misleading, and memory, which is
unreliable. He goes on to give examples of problems with cognition, such as a false cognition-of-
silver arising from looking at mother-of-pearl, and cognition of objects that do not exist, such as a
luminous circle that is perceived when a torch is hurled in an arc.
This method makes the example and counter-example so vital to the argument. Any thesis can be
disproved by showing that the proposed invariable concomitance is not, in fact, invariable.
The last part of Vāda-vidhi is devoted to methods that can be used to distinguish logical fallacies
from valid arguments.
For more , please read, ]

Jalpa
As per the classification made by Akshapada Gautama in his Nyaya Sutra (1.2.2- jalpa-
lakṣaṇam), while Vaada is a ‘good’ or congenial debate (anuloma sambasha or Sandhya
sambasha), Jalpa along with Vitanda is treated as ‘bad’ or hostile argument (Vigrahya
sambasha).
Jalpa is described as debate between two rivals who are desperate to win, by fair or foul
means. It is characterized as clever or tricky disputation and a quarrelsome verbal fight
that is often noisy.
Unlike Vaada which is an honest debate aiming to ascertain ‘what is true’, Jalpa is an
argument where each strives to impose his thesis on the other. The question of ascertaining
the ‘truth’ does not arise here. Each party to the Jalap is already convinced that his thesis is
true and perfect; while that of the opponent is false and totally wrong. Each is not prepared
to understand and appreciate the rival argument; but, is over anxious to ensure the
opponent is ‘defeated’ and is made to accept his thesis. Even while it becomes apparent
that one might be on the verge of defeat , he will not accept the position; instead , he will
try to devise a strategy or will take a ‘break’ to gather some material or to concoct a
fallacious argument to evade defeat and , if possible, to prove the other wrong.
Both the Vadin and the Prati-vadin work hard to establish their thesis through direct and
indirect proofs. In Jalpa, the Pramana-s, the means of valid knowledge do not have much
role to play. The arguments in Jalpa relay more on negation or negative tactics, such as:
discrediting the rival argument, misleading the opponent or willfully misinterpreting rival’s
explanations. The main thrust of the arguments in Jalpa is not so much as to establish the
thesis directly, as to disprove or refute the rival’s thesis, through circumvention.
The reason why Jalpa is labeled as tricky is that apart from traditional means of proving
one’s thesis and for refuting the opponent’s thesis, the debater can use elusive and
distracting devices such as: quibbling or hair-splitting (Chala); inappropriate rejoinders
(Jati), and any kind of ruse that tries to outwit and disqualify the opponent
(nigrahasthana), circumvention, false generalization and showing the unfitness of the
opponent to argue; without, however, establishing his own thesis.
(yathoktopapannaḥ chala-jāti-nigrahasthāna-sādhanopālambhaḥ jalpaḥ -1.2.2)
Nyaya Sutra gives a fairly detailed treatment to the negative tactics of Jalpa. Nyaya
Sutra (1.2.11-14; 5.1.1- 39; and 5.2.1-25) enumerates three kinds of quibbling (Chala);
twenty-four kinds of inappropriate rejoinders (Jati); and twenty-two kinds of clinchers or
censure-situations (Nigrahasthana).
(jāti-lakṣaṇam — sādharmyavaidharmyābhyām pratyavasthānaṃ jātiḥ -1.2.18)
(nigrahasthāna-lakṣaṇamn – vipratipattiḥ apratipattiḥ ca nigrahasthānam-1.2.19)
(nigrahasthānabahutva-sūtram — tadvikalpāt jātinigrahasthānabahutvam-1.2.20)
It is said; such measures or tricks to outwit the opponent are allowed in Jalpa arguments,
since the aim of the debate is to score a victory. However, those maneuvers are like double-
edged swords; they cut both ways. Over-indulgence with such tactics is, therefore, rather
dangerous. One runs the risk of being censured, decaled unfit and treated as defeated, if
the opponent catches him at his own game.
**
Quibbling (Chala) is basically an attempt to misinterpret the meaning of an expression
(Vak-chala); or, improperly generalize its meaning (samanya-chala); or by conflation of an
ordinary use of a word with its metaphorical use (upacara-chala), with a view to derange
the argument.
(chala-lakṣaṇam — vacana-vighātaḥ artha-vikalpopapattyā chalam – 1.2.10)

(chala-bheda-uddeśa-sūtram – – tat trividham – vākchalam sāmānyacchalam upacāracchalam

ca iti- 1.2.11)
For instance; when one says: the boy has a nava kambala (= new) blanket; the other would
look horrified and exclaim: why would a little boy need nava (=nine) blankets !
And, when one says: he is a hungry man (= purusha) , the other would generalize Man
– Purusha as ‘ humans’ , and ask why are all the human beings hungry? and, all at the
same time?
Similarly, term ‘mancha’ ordinarily means a cot; but, its metaphorical meaning could be
platform or dais or the people sitting on it. The opponent would wonder ‘why on earth ,
would the couple choose to sleep on a public platform , while many persons are already
seated on it ?’.
There are many other similar words, such as: Mantapa which normally is understood as an
open-hall; but, its etymological meaning could be ‘one who drinks scum of boiled rice
(Ganji)’. And, the term Kushala is generally used to denote an expert or a highly skilled
person (pravina); but, its etymology analysis would lead to one who is ‘good at cutting
grass (kush). And, similarly, Ashva-gandha is literally ‘smell of the horse; but in common
usage it refers to a medicinal herb.
A mischievous quibbler would deliberately twist the meaning of such words; take them out
of the context; and, try to distract and confuse the his rival
Improper rejoinder or futile rejoinder (Jati) is generally through falsifying the analogy
given; and ridiculing it.
For instance; when one says: sound is impermanent because it is a product, such as a pot;
the other would ignore the ‘impermanent’ property of the analogy (pot), but would pick up
a totally un-related property of the analogy (say, the hollow space or emptiness in the pot)
and say that a pot is filled with space (akasha) which is eternal, then how could you say that
a pot is impermanent? And, further pot is not audible either.
Censures or the point at which the Jalpa could be force-closed (Nigrahasthana) by pointing
out that the opponent is arguing against his own thesis ; or , that he is willfully abstracting
the debate; or to his inappropriate ways.
***
There are also some statements that defend the Jalpa-way of arguments.
One reason adduced for allowing in the debate the diverse interpretations of the terms is
said to be the flexibility that the Sanskrit language has, where compound-words can be split
in ways to suit one’s argument; where words carry multiple meanings; and, where varieties
of contextual meanings can be read into with change in structure of phrases, sentences and
context of topics.
And, the other is that the ancient texts in Sutra format – terse, rigid and ambiguous – can
be read and interpreted in any number of ways. Each interpretation can be supported by
one or the other authoritative text. There is therefore, plenty of scope for legitimate
disputation.
It is said; that Jalpa way of arguments is at times useful as a defensive measure to safeguard
the real debate (Vada), ‘just as the thorns and branches are used for the protection of the
(tender) sprout of the seed’.
The other reason is that it would be in the interest of an aspiring debater to be familiar with
divisive tactics; and, also the ways and means of deflecting them.
It is also said that Jalpa-tactics might come in handy to a novice or an inexperienced
debater, as a ploy . If such a person, without adequate skills, enters into a debate, he might
not be able to come up with proper rejoinder at the right time to safeguard his thesis. In
such a crisis, he may get away with such tricky debate. In any case, if the opponent is not
quick witted, the (novice) debater may gain some time to think of the proper reason. Thus,
he may even win the debate and the sprout of his knowledge would be protected.
However, this justification was not altogether acceptable.
**
The next question would be why would a debater resort to such tactics as quibbling and
dishonest rejoinder? Or why would anyone waste his time and effort in learning those
tactics?
Bimal Krishna Matilal in his The Character of Logic in India explains:
‘ Uddyotakara, in the beginning of his commentary on chapter five of the Nyaya
Sutra explains that it is always useful to learn about these bad tricks, for at least one should
try to avoid them in one’s own debate and identify them in the opponent’s presentation in
order to defeat him. Besides, when faced with sure defeat, one may use a trick, and if the
opponent by chance is confused by the trick, the debater will at least have the satisfaction of
creating a doubt instead of courting sure defeat.
This last point was, however, a very weak defense; and not convincing at all , as the
Buddhist scholar Dharmakirti (c. 600-660) elaborately pointed out in his book on
debate, Vada-nyaya.’
***
The crucial difference between Vada and Jalpa appears to be that in the case of Vada the
‘truth’ is established by positive evidence; and, the invalid knowledge (A-pramana)
masquerading as a good reason (that is, a hetvabhasa) is detected and eliminated. No one is
really defeated and the truth is established.
In the case of Jalpa, it mainly depends on negation (which is non-committal) and on
effective refutation of the proponent’s argument. There is no earnest effort to build positive
irrefutable proof. And, the fear of defeat overhangs the whole proceedings.
The scholarly opinion is that the rejection or refutation of a position may not always
amount to the assertion of a counter-position. And, determination and establishment of
truth depends upon positive evidence; and not merely on refutation.

Vitanda
In Akshapada’s Nyaya-Sutra (1.2.3), Vitanda is classified as a ’bad’ or hostile argument
(Vigrahya sambasha) or wrangling, which does not allow the opponent to establish his
argument . In terms of merit; it is the worst; it is rated inferior to Jalpa, which also employs
such trickery as quibbling and illegitimate rejoinder. While Jalpa tries to argue for the
success of its thesis by whatever means, Vitanda does not seriously attempt to put up any
counter-thesis. That is because, its debater has no thesis of his own to put forward.
In other words, the debater here tries to ensure his victory simply by refuting or
demolishing the thesis put forward by the other side, by browbeating or misleading or
ridiculing the opponent. The whole purpose of its exercise seems to be to prove the
opponent wrong and incompetent; and to confuse and humiliate him. Vitanda is therefore
termed as a destructive debate.
(vitaṇḍā-lakṣaṇam — saḥ pratipakṣa-sthāpanā-hīnaḥ vitaṇḍā- 1.2.3 )
Vitanda is a ruthless debate, the major part of which is spent in denying the opponent’s
views, in discrediting him or in quarrelling. Vaitandika, the one who adopts Vitanda style of
argument, might at times pick up the opponent’s thesis (though he himself might not believe
in it) and argue in its favor just to demonstrate that the opponent is not doing a ‘good job’;
and rebuke him saying that his thesis might not be after all so bad, but he made it look
worse by making a terrible mess of it.
Vaitandika makes it a point to disagree with the other, no matter what the other says. It is a
way of saying: you are wrong, not because your statement by itself is wrong; but, it is wrong
because you said it. He tries to effectively undermine the credibility of the opponent; and
demonstrate to him that he is neither competent nor qualified to discuss the subtleties of the
logic. Then he would shout:” go back and study for one more year at the feet of your
teacher; you have done enough for today”.
What the Vaitandika says might be irrational or illogical; but, he tries to effectively silence
the opponent. In such type of debates either ‘valid knowledge’ or ‘truth’ has no place.
[ please also read about : How to Win Arguments with Stupid, Stubborn People]
**
Nilakanta Dikshita (16th-17th century), minister, poet and theologian of Nayaka-period,
known for his incisive satirical wit , in his work, the Kala-vidambana (A Travesty of Time),
avers:
If you want to triumph, do not be afraid; do not pay attention; do not listen to the
opponent’s arguments— just immediately contradict him. Unflappability; shamelessness;
contempt for the adversary; derision, and, praise of the king – these are the five grounds of
victory … If the opponent is not learned, you win by shouting at him. If he is a taught one,
then you have only to insinuate bias, such as: greed for money; thirst for fame; anxiety to be
in the good-books of the King; or advance oneself in the society. You have to unsettle and
insult the opponent. Such is the correct and effective syllogistic procedure.
**

In a Vitanda, where both the parties employ similar tactics, the debate would invariably get
noisy and ugly. The Madhyastha or the Judge plays a crucial role in regulating a Vitanda.
He has the hard and unenviable task of not merely controlling the two warring debaters
and their noisy supporters, but also to rule on what is ‘Sadhu’ (permissible) or ‘A-
sadhu’ (not permissible) and what is true (Sat) what is just a bluff (A-sat). And, when one
debater repeatedly oversteps and breaches the accepted code of conduct, the Madyastha
might have to disqualify him and award the debate to the other; or, he may even disqualify
both the parties and scrap the event declaring it null and void.
**
Vatsayana, the commentator of the Nyaya Sutra finds the Vitanda debate irrational and
rather pointless. He observes that it is unfair that a debater is simply allowed to get away
with irresponsible statements, particularly when he is neither putting forward a thesis nor
is defending one. In fact, most of the times, he has no position of his own, but attacks
rabidly whatever the other debater utters. This is a travesty and abuse of the platform.
According to Vatsayana, the format of Vitanda is totally wrong. Vatsayana insists,
whatever might be the tactics adopted by Vaitandika, he must be forced to specify his stand.
And, when the opponent states his thesis, the Vaitandika must be asked either to accept it or
oppose it. If he concedes, the debate is virtually over. And, if he argues against the thesis,
he must argue logically, in which case he gives up his status of Vaitandika (refuter). And, if
he does not choose either of the options then, his rationale should be questioned; or, the
debate be brought to an end, if need be, by disqualifying him.
Vatsayana’s observations and recommendations are sound and healthy. But, sadly, they
were hardly acted upon.

Sources and References:

A History of Indian Logic: Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern Schools
By Mahamahopadyaya Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana
The Character of Logic in India Edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal, Jonardon Ganeri, Heeraman
Tiwari
The Nyâya Sûtras of Gotama by Nandalal Sinha
Hindu Philosophy by Theos Bernard
Categories of Cognition and Proof – Shodhganga
A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 By Surendranath Dasgupta
The Birth of Meaning in Hindu Thought by David B. Zilberman
History of Indian philosophy: The philosophy of the Veda and of …, Volume 1 By Erich
Frauwallner
1 Comment
Posted by sreenivasaraos on April 7, 2016 in General Interest, Indian Philosophy, Nyaya, Samvada-Vada-
jalpa, Sanskrit, Uncategorized
Tags: Akshapada Gautama, anuloma sambasha, Chala, Jalpa, Jati, Katha, Madhyastha, Nigrahasthana, Nyaya, Nyaya
Sutra, Pramana, Sandhya sambasha, Uddyotakāra, Vaada, Vada, Vatsayana, Vigrahya sambasha, Vitanda

Discussions, Debates and Arguments: Ancient

India- Part One
06APR
Discussions, Debates and Arguments: Samvada – Vaada – Jalpa and Vitanda
Part One
In the Indian traditions, including the Buddhist and Jain traditions, four formats of
discussions, debates and arguments are described. These are named as: Samvada, Vaada,
Jalpa and Vitanda.
The merit and esteem of each of these types of discussions is graded in terms of the honesty
of their purpose, the quality of debate, the decorum and the mutual regard of the
participants.
Of these four forms of discussions, Samvada is regarded the noblest type of dialogue that
takes place, in all earnestness, between an ardent seeker of truth and an enlightened
teacher. Most of the ancient Indian texts are in this format.
While Samvada is a discourse or imparting of teaching, the other three – Vaada, Jalpa
and Vitanda – are clever and structured (Tantra–yukthi) debates and arguments between
rivals.
Let’s talk of Nyaya (well-organized logical ways of ascertaining the true nature of the
objects and subjects of human knowledge) and Samvada on one part; and, the
debates/arguments on the other.
***
Nyaya Sutra
As is well known, there was a long and a time-honored tradition in ancient India where
philosophers and thinkers met to discuss metaphysical issues over which there were
multiple views. There are detailed narrations of such discussions, debates and dialogues
recorded in Chandogya-Upanishad, Brihadaranyaka Upanishad and Prashna-Upanishad.
The other early texts such as Aitareya Brahmana , Kathopanishad and others use terms
like : tarka (reasoning); Vada (debate); Yukti (sustained arguments), Prameya (object of
knowledge); Pramana (proof); Nirnaya (ascertainment) etc. which later became the
principal terminologies of the Nyaya School. It is also said that the idioms of inquiry
(Anveshiki) dealing with the theory of reasons (Hetu-vidya or Hetu-shastra) were mentioned
in Manu-samhita and Panini’s Astadhyayi.
Although the intellectual debates were quite common during the Upanishad-times, and even
later, there was perhaps no well laid out theory or an approved structure for conduct of
various types of debates. It is said; it was during the Sramana and the Buddhist period
that debates became really very serious.
As Bimal Krishna Matilal observes (in The Character of Logic in India):
.. The intellectual climate in India was bristling with controversy and criticism. At the
center of controversy were certain dominant religious and ethical issues. Nothing was too
sacred for criticism. Such questions as: “Is there a soul different from body?”; “Is the world
(loka) eternal?”; ”What is the meaning, goal, or purpose of life?”; and, “Is renunciation
preferable to enjoyment?” etc. were of major concern.
While teachers and thinkers argued about such matters, there arose a gradual awareness of
the characteristics or patterns of correct, acceptable and sound reasoning. There were
also concerns to evolve the norms to distinguish sound reasoning from pseudo-reasoning
(hetvabhasa) which is unacceptable.
According to Dr. Benimadhab Barua, even among the Sramanas, the wandering monks,
there were famed debaters who were “clever, subtle, and experienced in projecting
controversies; hair-splitters who ruthlessly splintered into pieces the arguments of their
adversaries”.
The debates tended to get more passionate, animated and even noisy. Gradually, the
notions of ‘good’ and acceptable debates took shape as distinct from wrong and ugly
arguments. That gave rise to the development of a branch of study dealing with theories of
reasoning and logic (Hetu-vidya or Hetu shastra). It was perhaps around the fifth century
BCE that manuals came to be written for conduct of proper and successful debates (Tarka
vidya or Vada vidya).
Such manuals included instructions and learning methods for the guidance of aspiring
debaters. The earliest known text of that genre was Tantra-yukti (structured argument)
compiled perhaps in the sixth-fifth century BCE to systematize debates conducted in
learned councils (Parishad).
Debates and arguments then came to be recognized both as art of logical reasoning ( Tarka-
vidya) and science of causes (Hetu-shastra) following the path of a well-disciplined method
of inquiry (ânvikŝiki) testing scriptural knowledge by further scrutiny.
The monks and priests belonging to various Schools and sects were imparted training
in Tarka–vidya: the art and skills of conducting impressive successful debates and
disputations (Sambasha or Vada vidhi) in learned assemblies (parishad).
Apart from methods of presenting arguments as per a logically structured format, the
training modules included ways to stoutly defend ones thesis by means of genuine criteria
of knowledge (Pramana) and to attack the opponent’s thesis by means of indirect arguments
(Tarka); estimating the strengths and weaknesses of arguments of either side; establishing
one’s own points while setting aside those of the opponent.
They were also trained for handling different types of challenges, such as: how to vanquish
a person of blazing fame; how to behave with a senior opponent; how to handle an
aggressive and troublesome opponent; and, how to conduct oneself in
prestigious Parishads, to influence the flow of debate and to impress the judges and the
onlookers etc.
These types of debates and arguments broadly came under the purview of Nyaya or Nyaya
Shastra.
[The Charaka Samhita , a principal Ayurveda Text (dated around the second century), in its third
part, called Vimanasthana, along with other topics like training of a physician, ethics of medical
practice, pathology, diet and nourishment, taste of medicines, etc., also contains a discussion on
the principles of debate
The related doctrines are treated in Caraka-samhita under three heads, namely:

o 1) Karyabhinirvrtti, the aggregate of resources for the accomplishment of
an action
o (2) Pariksa, the standard of examination, and
o (3) Sambhasha-vidhi, or vada-vidhi, the method of debate.
This is followed by detailed discussions on these three topics. For example, there is a discussion
on the various resources that are to be examined to accomplish an action.

These resources include Karana (the actor, or agent who accomplishes an action), Karya (the
action), Karya-phala (the effect), Desha (the place of the action), Kala (the time of the
action), Pravrtti (the activity or exertion put forth for achieving the action), etc. The second
head, Pariksa, deals with the standard of examination.
These standards are: aptopadesa (reliable
assertion); Pratyaksa (perception); anumana (inference); yukti (reasoning). The discussion under
the third head is much more elaborate.[
The examination of vada-vidhi begins by dividing debates into two classes, namely, anuloma
sambhasha (peaceful debate) and vigrihya sambhasha (hostile debate).
The respondents are then classified as superior, equal and inferior. Also, the assembly witnessing
the debate is classified as learned and ignorant. Each of these is then further classified as friendly,
indifferent or hostile. There are suggestions as to how to handle the debate depending on the
nature of the respondents and of the assembly. The treatise then goes on to give a list of 44 items
a thorough knowledge of which is essential for the successful conduct of a debate.]
**
Nyaya, as a system, is one among the six Darshanas (systems of Indian philosophy). It deals
with well-organized logical ways of ascertaining the true nature of the objects and subjects
of human knowledge (Pramana-Sastra). Nyaya is also called Tarka-vidya (logic) and Vada-
vidya or Vada’rtha (reasoned argument); and, is included among the fourteen principal
branches of learning.
Nyaya is founded on the belief that knowledge is not self-revealing; man must make effort to
gain correct knowledge ; and, to abandon incorrect knowledge, through a systematic
process. It asserts that the analytical way of Nyaya is the greatest protection to a young
person whose intellect is still in the process of growth and is yet to attain equanimity. And,
it is only by thorough examination of the modes and sources of correct knowledge that a
thinking person can gain a clearer perspective of life. It asks each one to think for himself;
and, not to tacitly accept beliefs handed down by the older generation. And, therefore, it
instructs, the teachings that have come down to us through traditions must be critically
examined before accepting them.
Vatsayana in his Nyāya Bhāṣya , a Commentary on Nyaya Sutra (1.1.1) , asserts that the
analytical investigation and examination (Anveshiki) of issues which bring clarity into the
intellectual aspects of man’s life help him to attain freedom (moksha) from delusions and
confusions in life. Nyaya which enables us to discern the true from the false is therefore
regarded as Moksha-Sadhana the way to absolute freedom or liberation.
nirdeśe yathāvacanaṃ vigrahaḥ|
cārthe dvandvaḥ samāsaḥ|
pramāṇādīnāṃ tatvamiti śaiṣikī ṣaṣṭhī|
tatvasya jñānaṃ niḥśreyasasyādhigama iti ca karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhyau|
ta etāvanto vidyamānārthāḥ|
eṣāmaviparītajñānārthamihopadeśaḥ|
so ‘yamanavayavena tantrārtha uddiṣṭo veditavyaḥ/ NyS_1,1.1 /
*
Nyaya, in particular, also denotes a method or a scheme of logic employed to prove or to
disprove a proposition through proper evidence (pramana). The employment of a Nyaya
would become necessary when the subject discussed was either vague or was disputed; and
when the other methods of reasoning were ineffective.
The Nyaya School was essentially logistic in its orientation. It tried to examine the sources
and contents of valid knowledge. It built a logical link between the subject, the knower
(pramata); the means or method of obtaining knowledge (pramana) ; and the object , the
knowable (prameya) . In addition, it put forth analogy (Upama) as the fourth method.
Analogy (Upama), it is said, comprehensively includes in itself the other three methods.
However, the main purpose of Upama is to illustrate. This models attempts to represent
something that which cannot be perceived. However, this Nyaya is like the finger; and, it is
not the moon. Therefore , Analogy, the Upama has its own limitations; it could be brittle at
times; and , if pressed too hard it might even crumble .
In its working method; Upama employs something that is already familiar , in order to
explain certain concepts that are at once abstract and real. But, an analogy cannot be
perfect; as there cannot be complete identity between the subject and the object.
Therefore, there cannot be a perfect analogy; and, mere argument is not evidence.
Which is to say; while the analogy or illustration is important, the more important than that
is the validity of the argument, its precision and its import. Therefore, there is always an
element of inadequacy in the Upama . One has to strive to extract from the model what is
called “a positive analogy”; or Samanya-guna a relevant factor that is common to both the
subject and the object . The notion of transformation (Vivarta) is thus what one could call a
logical construction.
Nonetheless, the value of these Nyayas consists in that they facilitate a passage from the
observable to the actual ; and, from the factual to the theoretical .
[ Prof. Surendranath Dasgupta explains in A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1
(p.406):
Pramana in Sanskrit signifies the means and movement by which valid knowledge is
acquired Pramata means the subject or the knower who cognizes, Prama – the result
of pramana i.e., right knowledge, knowledge of reality or valid cognition, prameya – the
object of knowledge and pramanya – the validity of knowledge acquired.
The verbal root ma of these terms derived with the prefix pra, means also to measure (apart
from meaning to cognize) . Thus, what is to be measured is the prameya; and, that by which
to measure is pramana.]
[In Sanskrit, the term Jnana stands for all kinds of knowledge – whether be it of truth or of
falsehood. The term Prama, however, is used to designate only a true cognition (yatartha-
jnana) as distinct from a false one (mithya-jnana). A Pramana is an active and a unique
cause of Prama or knowledge. Pramā means ‘knowing an object as it is’: tadvati tat prakārā-
anubhavaḥ pramā. The term pramāṇa is also understood as the actual experience
is pramā.
– pramāyāḥ karaṇam, pramāṇam. Alternatively, yathārthā-anubhavah pramā –
To see a rope as rope is pramā. If we see a snake instead of the rope, it is apramā-
ayathārtha-anubhavaḥ apramā.
The Samkhya and Yoga Schools of Indian philosophy accept three means of
cognition, Pramanas:
Pratyaksha : direct perception generated through sense organs – indriyārtha –
sannikarṣajanya . That is, when there is a contact between the senses and the object
– jñānamakam pratyakṣam. Gautama defines Pratyakṣa as meaning – ‘knowledge born of
sensory perception, such as eyes is pratyakṣa’.
– akṣam akṣam pratityutpadyate iti pratyakṣam
And. Pratyaksha is regarded as the basic (Mula) Pramana; because, the
other pramānas such as Anumāna, Arthāpatti, Upamāna and śabda are dependent on it.
Anumana (inference) literally means knowledge gained afterwards ; i.e. knowledge that
‘follows other knowledge’ – jñāna-kāraka-jñānam.). In Anumāna, first the liṅga (minor
primise) is seen, then by liṅga or hetu, the sādhya-sambandha-jñāna or vyāpti-
jñāna (invariable concomitant) takes place. This Sādhya (major primise) is known
as anumiti. Thus, since this knowledge takes place after liṅga-darśana, this is known
as Anumāna
And Sabda is verbal testimony , through scriptures. Bhartrhari asserts, the traditional
knowledge (Agama) which consists of the revealed (Sruti) or remembered (Smrti)
scriptures cannot be set aside by inference, since they are more dependable than inference.
*

The Mimamsa School accepts six types of

Pramanas: Pratyaksha, Anumana, Sabda, Upamana (analogy), Arthapatti (presumption)
and Abhava (non-apprehension).
The same set of six Pramanas is also stated by Vedanta. There are, of course, variations
among these Schools regarding the specific understang of each of the Pramans.
*

Within Vyakarana, Bhartrhari in his Maha-bhashya-tika accepts three Pramanas:

Pratyaksha (perception), Anumana (inference) and Agama or Sabda (scriptures). He argues
that perception, at times, could be erroneous because of weakness or improper functioning
of sensory organs. Some even think, he says, that inference is superior to perception. But he
asserts that Agama or Sabda which consists of the revealed (Sruti) or remembered (Smrti)
scriptures is a strong Pramana; and, it is more dependable than inference.
According to Bhartrhari, it is not justifiable to replace scriptures (Sabda) with inference
particularly in non-empirical matters. He also says that philosophical views (Vada) cannot
be independent of the scriptures. He argues that inference alone, without the steadying
influence of the scriptures is an inadequate means of valid knowledge. In
his Vakyapadiya (1.34), it is said: ‘whatever is inferred with great effort through clever
reasoning can easily be put aside by a much more clever reasoning or argument’.
yatnenānumito+apy arthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ / abhiyuktatarair anyair
anyathaivopapādyate -VP.1.34
The words of the Rishis convey super-sensory knowledge that cannot be set aside by
inference. Thus, Bhartrhari asserts that Dharma or right conduct cannot be determined by
reasoning alone, without the guidance of the scriptural traditions. Even the knowledge
which the sages possess has the scriptures for its reference (Vakyapadiya: 1.30). Thus, tor
true knowledge, the support of the scriptures (Sabda) is essential.
na jāgamād ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate / ṛṣīṇām api yaj jñānaṃ tad apy
āgamapūrvakam – VP.1.30
In this context, Bharthari says that the role of Vyakarana (Grammar) is very important, as
it helps to safeguard the correct transmission of the scriptural knowledge , and to assist the
aspirant in realizing the the truth of the revealed knowledge of Sabda.]
**
The Sutra text attached to Nyaya School is the Nyaya Sutra ascribed to Akṣapāda
Gautama (variously estimated between 6th-century BCE and 2nd-century CE). Nyaya
Sutra treats mainly five subjects: Pramana (instruments or means of right
knowledge); Prameya (the object of right knowledge); Vaada (debate or
discussion); Avayava (the elements or steps of syllogism); and, Anya-matha-pariksha (review
or examination of the doctrines of other Schools).
[Please click here for The Nyaya Sutras of Gotama; Translated by Mahamahopadhyaya Satish
Chandra Vidyabhushan; Published by The Panini Office, Bhuvaneshvari Ashram, Bahadurganj,
Allahabad – 1913 ]
**

While discussing Vaada, Nyaya Sutra talks about sixteen padarthas (topics or categories )
involved in the development of the debate (Vada marga); the four reliable means of
obtaining valid knowledge (pramāṇa) viz.:

o Pratyaksha (perception),
o Anumana (inference),
o Upamana (comparison) and
o Sabda (reliable testimony);
the five-part syllogism (Nyaya):

o the structure (vada vidhi);
o the ways of developing sound evidence (pramana);
o the logical reasoning (tarka) to support ones thesis which needs to be
proved (Pratijna) and its object (nirnaya);
o the disciplined (anusasana) mode of presentation (vadopaya); and
o the exceptions (prthaka-prasthana), as also the limits or the ‘dos and
don’ts’ (vada-maryada) of three formats of such debates.
(vāda-lakṣaṇam : pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntā-viruddhaḥ pañcā-
vayavopapannaḥ pakṣa-pratipakṣa-parigrahaḥ vādaḥ – NyS_1,2.1)
Gautama’s text was followed by commentaries; the first of which being Nyāya Bhāṣya by
Vātsyāyana (c. 450–500 CE). The commentary by Vatsayana was followed the ones by
the Nyāya-vārttika of Uddyotakāra (c. 6th–7th century); Tātparya-tīkā by Vācaspati
Miśra (9th century); Tātparya-pariśuddhi by Udayana (10th century); Nyāya-mañjarī by
Jayanta (10th century); Nyaya-sara by Bhasarvajna (10th century); and Tatva-chintamani by
Gangesa (12th century). These commentaries further developed the Nyaya Sutra expanding
upon Gautama’s work.
As per these texts, the debates and arguments are grouped under a broad head titled
‘Katha’. In Sanskrit, the term ‘Katha’, in general, translates as ‘to inform’, ‘to narrate’, ‘to
address or to refer to somebody’. In the context of Nyaya Shatra, which provides the
knowledge (Vako-Vakya or Vada-vidya) about the methods for presenting arguments as also
the rules governing the debates, the term ‘Katha’ implies formal conversation (Sambasha)
as in a debate. The conversation here is not in the casual manner as in day-to-day life. But,
it is articulate, precise and well thought out utterances.
The Katha is described as ‘polemical conversation’, meaning that it is passionate and
strongly worded , but a well balanced argument against or in favor of somebody or
something. That is why; the discussions (Vaada) are never simple. A Katha, in essence, is a
reasoned and a well-structured philosophical discussion.
Vatsayana at the beginning of his commentary on Nyaya Sutra (1.2.1) mentions that Katha
is classified into two kinds of debates (Dvi-vidha sambasha): Vaada (the good-Sandhya
sambasha) on one hand; and Jalpa and Vitanda (the bad- Vigrahya sambasha) on the other.
Uddyotakara in his Nyāya Vārttika further explains that this threefold classification is
according to the nature of the debate and the status of the persons taking part in the
debate.
(padārtha-uddeśa-sūtram:pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntāvayava-
tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍāhetvābhāsa-cchala-jāti-nigrahasthānānāmtattvajñānāt
niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ- NyS_1,1.1 )
The first variety , Vaada is an honest , peaceful and congenial (sandhaya) debate that takes
place between two persons of equal merit or standing, trying to explore the various
dimensions of a subject with a view to ascertain and establish ‘what is true’. The Vaada, at
its best, is a candid friendly discussion (anuloma sambasha or sandhya sambasha) or debate
in the spirit of: ’let’s sit-down and talk’.
The other two are hostile arguments (vigrhya sambasha) between rivals who desperately
want to win. Thus, by implication, while the goal of a Vaada is establishment of truth or an
accepted doctrine; and that of the other two hostile debates (Jalpa and Vitanda) is seeking
victory.
Of the two types of hostile debates, Jalpa is described (in Nyaya Sutra 1.2.2) as a disputation
or wrangling or a ’tricky’ debate between two rivals , where each is thoroughly convinced
that he is absolutely right and the other (termed as the opponent – Prativadin) is hopelessly
wrong. The first party to the debate is dogmatically committed to his own thesis, while the
other party takes a rigid contrary position (Prati-paksha) on a given subject; and,
sometimes at the cost of truth. Each is prepared to employ various deceptive or sophistic
devices, such as quibbling (Chala); unreasonable (A-hetu) responses; shifting the reason
or the topics (Hetvantara or Arthantara); irrelevant rejoinders provoking the opponent to
lose focus , to get perturbed and yet continue with the dispute (Jati) somehow; and , such
other devices to outwit the opponent.
(jalpa-lakṣaṇam : yathoktopapannaḥ chalajātinigrahasthānasādhanopālambhaḥ jalpaḥ-
NyS_1,2.2)
Unlike in Vaada, the purpose of Jalpa is not so much as to ascertain the truth, as to establish
one’s own position or thesis, and to prove the opponent wrong; and, make him accept
defeat. What is at stake here is the ‘prestige and honor’ of one’s School (Matha). And,
therefore, each will try to win the debate by fair or foul means. And, when one senses that
he might be losing the argument (nigrahasthāna), he will try to invent every sort of face-
saving device or ruse to wriggle out of a bad situation that is quickly turning worse , like
being trapped on quicksand sinking down each moment . Jalpa, predictably, could
therefore be noisy , unpleasant and even be desperate.
And, Vitanda is the worst type of argument or squabbling descending to the level of quarrel
and trickery. It is described as a destructive type of argument; the sole aim of each party
being not only to inflict defeat on the opponent but also to demolish and humiliate him .
The Vaitandika , the debater who employs Vitanda, is basically a refuter; he relentlessly
goes on refuting whatever the proponent says. He has no thesis of his own – either to put
forward or to defend. Sometimes he might pick up a thesis just for argument’s sake, even
though he may have no faith in the truth of his own argument. The
aggressive Vaitandika goes on picking holes in the rival’s arguments and destabilizes his
position , without any attempt to offer an alternate thesis.
Both the participants in a Vitanda are prepared to resort to mean tactics in order to
mislead, browbeat the opponent by fallacies (hetv-abhasa); by attacking the opponents
statement by willful misrepresentation (Chala) ; ill-timed rejoinders (Atita-kala) and, make
the opponent ‘bite the dust’. It is virtually akin to a ‘no-holds-barred’ sort of street fight.
The ethereal values such as: truth, honesty, mutual respect and such others are
conspicuously absent here.
(vitaṇḍā-lakṣaṇam : saḥ pratipakṣa-sthāpanā-hīnaḥ vitaṇḍā –NyS_1,2.3)

It is said; in the case of Jalpa the contending parties have a position of their own, fight hard
to defend it, and aim to make the rival accept it, by whatever means. However, in
the Vitanda, the disputant has neither a position of his own nor is he trying to defend any
specific thesis. He is merely trying to derange and humiliate the other party to the debate.
Vatsayana in his Nyaya-sutra Bhashya calls one who resorts to Vitanda (Vaitandika) as self-
destructive.
Even in the case of Jalpa and Vitanda, the disputants had to agree, beforehand, to certain
rules, norms and devices, so that the defeat could be forced by the judge (Madyastha) on one
or the other party.
A debate with the mere aim of win or humiliation of the other is looked down.
Therefore, Jalpa and Vitanda are deemed contrary to the overall aim of the Nyaya
Shastra which is oriented towards determination of the true nature of objects.
[The skills in waging debates and arguments (Vada-vidya) of the Jalpa and Vitanda might
have been relevant during the medieval times when the inter–religious or intra-religious
debates (Shastrartha) were held among the rival traditions (Sampradaya) or sects, each
trying hard to prove the superiority of its Matha (thesis or sect) over the others. In the
present context, such beliefs and arguments have become obsolete in India, though their
techniques are very well preserved and practiced in Tibetan Buddhist debates.
Having said that , Prof. A L Basham remarks : ” Modern logicians might make short work
of these rather pedantic systems of ontological and epistemological relativity, but they have
a fundamental quality of breadth and realism, implying a full realization that the world is
more complex and subtle than we think it, and that what is true of a thing in one of its
aspects may at the same time be false in another.”
Further . the syllogism, logical structure and methods of presenting reasoned arguments as
described in the ancient texts are still of great interest. Its methodology based on a system
of logic is the same for us today in our lecture halls and programming desks as it was for
the medieval scholars.]

Let’s look at each of these types of discussions and arguments in a little more detail.

Samvada

Samvada is a dialogue that takes between the teacher and the taught in all earnestness. The
one who approaches the teacher could be a disciple; student; friend (as in Krishna-Arjuna
or Krishna-Uddhava) ; son (as in Shiva-Skanda or Uddalaka-Swetaketu); or spouse (as in
Shiva-Prvathi or Yajnavalkya-Maitreyi); or parent (as Sage Kapila teaching his mother
Devahuthi); or anyone else seeking knowledge (as in Nachiketa -Yama or the six persons
who approach Sage Pippalada in Prashna Upanishad).
What characterizes the Samvada in such cases is the sincerity and eagerness of the learner;
the humility in his/her approach; and the absolute trust in the teacher. The wise teacher ,
in turn , with full of grace , imparts instructions out of enormous love for the ardent seeker
of truth.

(siddhānta-sūtra : jñāna-grahaṇā-abhyāsas tad-vidyaiśca saha saṃvādaḥ- 4.2.47) vidhya-

artha-vādā-anuvāda-vacanaviniyogāt;vidhiḥ-vidhāyakaḥ;stutiḥ-nindā-parakṛtiḥ-purākalpaḥ
itiarthavādaḥ; na-anuvādapunaruktayoḥ-viśeṣaḥ,-śabdābhyāsopapatteḥ ; śīghra-tara-
gamanopa-deśavat abhyāsāt na aviśeṣaḥ; mantrā-yurveda-prāmāṇyavat ca tatprāmāṇyam,
āpta-prāmāṇyāt (2.1.63-69)

Another remarkable text of this genre is The Vijñāna Bhairava Tantra (a component
of Rudrayamala Tantra), a principal text of the Trika school of Pratyabhijna (Kashmira
Shaiva Siddantha). It is composed as a discourse (Samvada) between the Lord Bhairava and
his consort Bhairavi. Here, Bhairava imparts instructions to the Devi; teaching her as
many as 112 Tantric meditation methods or centering techniques (Dharana or types of
Yoga). The Vijñāna Bhairava utilizes all the traditional techniques of Yoga (such as Mudra,
Pranaskthi, mantra-japa, awakening of Kundalini, bhakthi, jnana etc.). These include several
variants of breath awareness, concentration on various centers in the body, non-dual
awareness, mantra–chanting, imagination and visualization and contemplation through
each of the senses. These techniques are said to help / guide the aspirant along the path to
realize her/his identity with the highest reality – recognized here as Bhairava, the Absolute.
The Devi listens to the Lord with rapt attention : Shrutam deva maya sarvam rudrayamala
sambhavam.

Similarly, the Svacchanda-bhairava-tantra, belonging to the Śāktāgama (or Śākta-

tantra) division of the Āgama tradition, is rendered as a Devī-Deva-saṃvāda, where Lord
Bhairava is drawn forward to teach the Goddess Bhairavi. The Devi implores , O
Parameśvara, you taught the Svacchanda Tantra a profound Tantra (mahā-
tantraṃ) having four parts (catuṣpīṭhaṃ ) and leading to the four types of attainments
(catuṣṭaya-phalodayam)
muditaṃ Bhairavaṃ dṛṣṭvā Devī vacanam abravīt || yat tvayā kathitaṃ mahyaṃ svacchandaṃ
Parameśvara || śata-koṭi-pravistīrṇaṃ bhedā-anantyavisarpitam | catuṣpīṭhaṃ mahā-tantraṃ
catuṣṭaya-phalodayam ||
Then the Devi requests : Teach me, O Maheśvara, how this Tantra will be successful now
that the Kali Age is upon us (kalim āsādya siddhyanti tathā brūhi maheśvara). |
The Lord responds : That was really good, O blessed Goddess. Now I will teach what you
have requested in order to bestow grace upon mortal beings.
sādhu sādhu Mahābhāge yat tvayā parichoditam || anugrahāya martyānāṃ sāmprataṃ
kathayāmi te
Another well known text , in the form of a Samvada, is the Siddha Kunjika Stotra , a Tanric
stotra, which occurs in the Gauri Tantra (section) of Rudra-yamala Tantra. Here, Lord Shiva,
the Adi Guru, imparts instructions to his consort Parvathi; and, extols the virtues of
the Kunjika Stotra.
It is said; the Kunjika is the Key ,which unlocks the powers of the Chandi Paatha. And, its
prefix ‘Siddha’ implies that the stotra leads to the attainment of the ideal state.
It is also said; Kunjika, here, is in form of the Devi Chamunda, the Supreme Goddess; and,
there is nothing beyond Her (Anuttara).
While invoking the Devi Chamunda, the Kunjika Stotra explains the meaning of the
syllables (Bija mantras) in the Navarna Mantra – Om̃ aiṃ hrīṃ klīṃ cāmuṇḍāyai viccey.

A Samvada is thus a discourse or a dialogue that teaches, imparts instructions or passes on

knowledge to a sincere seeker of Truth.
The bulk of the Upanishad teachings have come down to us in the form of Samvada, which
took place in varieties of contexts. Apart from intimate sessions where an illumined teacher
imparts instructions to an aspirant , there are instances of varied kind, say, as when : a wife
is curious to learn from her husband the secrets of immortality; a teenage boy approaches
Death itself to learn the truth of life and death; a king seeks instruction from an recluse
sage who speaks from his experience ; Brahmans advanced in age and wisdom sit at the feet
of a Kshatriya prince seeking instructions as also inspiration ; and , when sometimes the
sages are women who are approached by kings .There are other sorts of dialogues , say,
when Jabala is taught by bulls and birds (Ch. Up 4.4-9) , Upakosala by the sacred fires (Ch.
Up. 4.10-15), and Baka is by a dog (Ch. Up 1.12).
Nothing in the Upanishads is more vital than the relationship between a student and his
guide. The teacher talks, out his experience, about his ideas of the nature of the world, of
truth etc. or about particular array of phenomena visualized through mental images that
stay etched in memory.
An Upanishad-teacher ignites in the heart of the boy a spark that sets ablaze his desire to
learn and to know the central principles which make sense of the world we live in. The
guide inflames the sense of challenge, the urge to reach beyond the boy’s grasp and to know
the unknown. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad calls upon :
‘You are what your deep, driving desire is; as your desire is, so is your will (sa yathā-kāmo
bhavati tat-kratur-bhavati); as your will is, so is your deed (yat-kratur-bhavati tat-karma
kurute) ; as your deed is, so is your destiny (yat-karma kurute tad-abhi-saṃpadyate”- (Brhu.
Up. 4.4.5).
sa yathākāmo bhavati tat-kratur bhavati | yat-kratur bhavati tat karma kurute | yat karma kurute
tad abhi-saṃpadyate || BrhUp_4,4.5 |
In the end, all achievement is fueled by burning desire.
The Bhagavad-Gita suggests that an ardent seeker of truth should approach a learned
teacher in humility and seek instructions from him; question him repeatedly:
Tad viddhi pranipatena pariprasnena sevaya I Upadeksyanti te jnanam jnaninas tattva-
darsinah II (B G.; Ch.4; verse 34)
The student questions the teacher not because he doubts (samshaya) the wisdom or the
understanding of the teacher; nor is he / she questioning the authenticity of the
teaching . The questions are asked with open mind and guileless heart; and, are meant to
clear doubts, and to gain a flawless understanding of the teaching.
The teacher is neither annoyed nor does he discourage the student from asking questions.
On the other hand, he encourages the learner to examine, enquire and test the teaching
handed down to him. A true teacher, in a Samvada does not prescribe or proscribe. He lets
the student the freedom to think, to ponder over and to find out for himself the answers to
his questions. A student needs humility, persistence, and honesty of purpose to go
further and to arrive at his own understanding.

Yaska tenders sage-like counsel. Yaska instructs (Nir.1.18): what is taken from teacher’s
mouth, but not understood and, is merely repeated, never flares up. It is like dry firewood
flung on something that is not fire.
 Don’t memorize, seek the meaning
 What has been taken from the teacher’s mouth but not understood,
 Is uttered by mere memory recitation,
 It never flares up, like dry firewood without fire.
 Many a one, although seeing, do not see Speech,
 Many a one, although hearing, do not hear her,
 And many a one, she spreads out Her body, like a wife desiring her husband.
 The meaning of Speech is its fruit and flower.
yad gṛhītam avijñāta nigadena eva śabdyate/ anagnāv iva śuṣka edho na taj jvalatikarhicit/
sthāṇus tiṣṭhater artho arter araṇastho vā / Nir. 1.18 /
The Buddha, the best of the teachers, also adopted a similar approach. He insisted that his
followers should not try borrowing ideas or experiences from him; but they should arrive at
their own. In the first sermon he delivered (Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta) in the Deer-
park (Miga-daya) at Isipatana (Saranath), soon after attaining enlightenment, he asked his
listeners:
O monks and wise men, do not accept my Dharma merely out of respect for me, but analyze
and test it the way a goldsmith examines a pieces of gold by burning , cutting and rubbing
it on a touchstone.(please see the note below)
A teaching would not be true, valid or trustworthy merely because it was uttered by an
eminent person of great renown. It would be so only in case it is thoroughly tested, clearly
understood and truthfully brought into one’s own experience.
The Buddha guides the aspirant on the path that leads to right-understanding. But he
disclaims any personal authority; and asks the follower to work it out himself. The follower
when he succeeds in attaining the enlightenment will not become a second Buddha or a
replica of the Buddha. In the final analysis, both the Buddha and his follower free
themselves from the bonds of samsara; yet, each retains his individuality.
Note
[This often quoted analogy of testing a piece of gold appears in many texts ; such as :
Jnanasara-samuccaya (31) a Sanskrit text of a later period (perhaps a translation of the Tibetan
text – sTug-po bkod-pa’i-mdo); in Nyāya-bindu-pūrvapakṣa-saṃkṣipti, a commentary on
Dharmakīrti’s, Nyāyabindu (1.18–1.21) and also in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattva-saṁgraha (verse
3588) .
It reads in Sanskrit as :
Tāpāc chedāc ca nikasat svarnam iva panditaih / Parikshya blikshavo grāhyam madvaco na tu
gauravāt
However, the kalama Sutta (or Kesamutti Suta) – delivered to the Kālāmas of Kesamutti –
appearing in Aṅguttara Nikaya (III.653), which is a part of Tipitaka, merely lays down the
principle of taking an objective view after a thorough examination (charter of free inquiry); but, it
does not specifically mention the instance of ” jewel-testing” :
“Come, O Kālāmas, Do not accept anything thinking that thus have we heard it from a long time
(anussava). Do not accept anything thinking that it has thus been handed down through many
generations (paramparā). Do not accept anything on account of rumours (itikirā). Do not accept
anything just because it accords with your scriptures (piṭaka-sampadāna). Do not accept
anything by mere surmise (takka-hetu); nor upon an axiom (naya-hetu). Do not accept anything
by mere inference (ākāra-parivitakka). Do not accept anything by merely upon a bias towards a
notion that has been pondered over (diṭṭhi-nijjhān-akkh-antiyā). Do not accept anything by
coming under another’s seems ability (bhabba-rūpatāya). Do not accept anything merely
because the monk-teacher says so (samaṇo no garū). Do not accept anything thinking that the
ascetic is respected by us (and therefore it is right to accept his word.)
“Kalamas, when you know for yourselves —these things are immoral, these things are
blameworthy, these things are censured by the wise, these things when performed and
undertaken, conduce to ruin and sorrow – then indeed you do reject them.
“But Kalamas, when you know for yourselves – these things are good; these things
are blameless, these things are praised by the wise; these things when undertaken and observed,
lead to well-being and happiness- enter upon and abide in them. ]
 Continued in Part Two
.. Vada, Jalpa and Vitanda
Sources and References:
A History of Indian Logic: Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern Schools By Mahamahopadyaya
Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana
The Character of Logic in India Edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal, Jonardon Ganeri, Heeraman
Tiwari
The Nyâya Sûtras of Gotama by Nandalal Sinha
Hindu Philosophy by Theos Bernard
Categories of Cognition and Proof – Shodhganga
A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1 By Prof. Surendranath Dasgupta
The Birth of Meaning in Hindu Thought by David B. Zilberman
History of Indian philosophy: The philosophy of the Veda and of …, Volume 1 by Erich
Frauwallner
All images are taken from Internet