1 Pipeline Risk Management

Goal of Zero

• All Trade Associations

have embraced zero
incidents as a goal
• AGA
• API / AOPL
• INGAA
• APGA

2 Image courtesy of INGAA

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 INGAA Initiative
• Zero is the Target – we might never get there but if we don’t
try we’ll never make it

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 Drive Incidents to Zero
• Corporate Safety Culture & Management Initiatives
• Mandatory Safety Management and Risk Mitigation + audits:
• INGAA’s leadership workshop on building a strong corporate
safety culture, annually in Houston in December
• Reduce Risk with “Beyond the Baseline,” new IMP language
5.5 Risk Methodology & 7.2 Response Time improvements
• Ensure the Root Cause analysis is shared for all incidents

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 Drive Incidents to Zero

• Strengthen Continuous Improvement Forums

• PRCI growing solutions for gas & liquid pipelines
• AGA, API, & INGAA industry representation on codes etc
• API, ASME & Biannual International Pipeline
Conference
• NACE Spring Meeting - Technical Committees &
Conferences

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How Are We Doing Over 45 Years?

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 Natural Gas Transmission Onshore:
PHMSA’s site All Reported Incidents Summary Statistics: 1996-2015

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ASME B31.8S –
Integrity Management Process
1. Gather, review and integrate historical & current
inspection & related data.
2. Evaluate susceptibility threat for each threat.
3. From the data, for each threat, perform a risk
assessment.
4. Define assessment methods to address threats

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ASME B31.8S –
Integrity Management Process
5. Implement P&M measures to reduce high risks
6. Respond to integrity assessments
• Repairs
• Prevention & Mitigation
• Set re-inspection intervals
7. Update, integrate & review data
8. Revise plan as appropriate & start all over again.

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Periodic Re-Assessment Intervals

All pipe and facilities

Integrity Assessment Interval

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IM Process – Still 2002 Version

Integrity
Management
Program

Integrity Performance Communications Management Quality

Management Plan Plan of Change Control
Plan Section 9 Section 10 Plan Plan
Section 8 Section 11 Section 12

Figure 1 - Integrity Management Program

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 Integrity Management - 2015
Start
Start
B31.8S

Gather
Gather and
and Threat
Threat Risk
Risk
Integrate
Integrate Data
Data Identification
Identification Assessment
Assessment

Assessment
Assessment Assessment
Assessment Response
Response to
to
Planning
Planning Execution
Execution Assessments
Assessments

Preventive and
Integrate and
Mitigation Measure
Evaluate Data
Selection

Quality
Management of Performance
Control/Quality Communication
Change Measurement
Assurance

B31.8 Incident Records and IM process steps

Investigation Documentation
Management System Elements
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Terms & Definitions
• Tend to be used differently in different companies and unfortunately
sometimes in different standards
• We will define as they appear (ask if unsure)

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 Key Definitions

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Time Independent Threats

• PHMSA Incident Reports Forced these Classifications into a

Single Primary Threat
• Trending Down over Time?

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 Time Dependent & Resident Threats

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 Risk Assessment – Interactive Threats
• Looking forward to anticipate threats
• Consider addressing potential threat interactions through
probabilistic or deterministic engineering models
• Align with coincident location of Resident features (subcritical
or prequalified imperfections)

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Interactive Threats
Resident – Mill Construction Equipment

Weather and Outside Force

Floods, Earthquake, Landslides,
Lightening, Wind, etc

Time Dependent -
External Internal Corrosion
& SCC
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 Strengthen Collective Mining of Data
• Looking back at incidents in the rear view mirror
• Mill & Construction
• Vintage Pipe – LF-ERW is a worry, but not all,
• All pipe incidents need both the mill and year installed
• Each incident must be assigned to 1 of the same 9 (+ other)
• EC, IC, and SCC Corrosion,
• Material, Construction, Equipment
• 3rd Party, WOF, Incorrect Operations,

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 Strengthen Collective Mining of Data
• Mill & Construction
• Remove inconsistencies in PHMSA incident records
• 1970 to 1984, 1984 to 2001, 2002 to 2009, 2010 to now
• Other data sets in Australia, Canada and Europe?
• Equipment still not well defined - improve solutions
• Incident Record & Annual Mileage represents a problem in
estimating rates in # /103 mile-years

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 INGAA – Sharing Industry Data
• Strong Industry Need to Communicate with the
Regulatory and Public Communities
• Before -No shared ownership
• Previously on an Ad Hoc basis by a few Individual Members
• Developing an INGAA Data Management Plan
• Mirror API’s - Pipeline Performance Tracking System (PPTS)
• Provide effective, coordinated, timely, and successful
communication to internal and external stakeholders,

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 INGAA – Sharing Industry Data (cont)
• Developing an INGAA Data Management Plan
• Build in a Stable Platform & INGAA Members share
pipeline performance data
• Focus on further improvements in Pipeline Safety Performance.
• Industry to operator, industry to industry
comparisons
• Build SharePoint library of PHMSA enforcement, interpretations,
as a library of PHMSA actions, etc. as a tool for INGAA
membership
• Move to communicate effectively with public and
regulators
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ILI – Going Beyond Wall Loss

• One run but multi analyses

• More bang for your $$$
• Use ILI inspections & consider contracting for 3 analyses

1. Estimate Pf for wall loss and cracks found, sometimes dent geometry too
2. Use GEOPIGs to improve knowledge of centerline, ovality, and joint locations
3. Locate record inconsistencies for pipe wall thickness, diameter, seam type &
o’clock location, plus unexpected material differences (grade surprises?)

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 Going Beyond the Baseline
• Threats & Interactive Threats
• Add: Management processes that encourage Safety Culture
• Know: B31.8S Resident Threats & Improve Risk Assessment
language,
• Interactive: imperfections + threats + conditions
• Six act on Mill, Construction, & Equipment Threats,
• Improved Monitoring
• Reduce: Response times all along the pipeline

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Progressive Risk
• Move from Prescriptive Threat
Silos towards Performance
Based IMPs
• More complexity but targets
a more realistic level of safety
allocations
• Comparative magnitudes
• Must demonstrate equivalent
or improved safety
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• Continuous Improvement in Data
Gathering and Integrating
• Lever Innovative Inspections and
force Data Interrelationships
• Conduct Root Cause Analyses
• Validate Mill & Construction
records using ILI
• Locate & Identify nearby
structures with interactive
consequences
Questions?

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