Lesson 2: Missiles in Southern Asia

Now that you have learned about what missiles are and how they work, this lesson will delve into
how different missile types come together to form missile arsenals by highlighting the arsenals
of China, India, and Pakistan. It will also explore trends that may shape those arsenals and what
they mean for strategic competition in Southern Asia.
 2.1 Nuclear Doctrines
The following graphic provides a brief overview of the stated nuclear doctrines of China, India,
and Pakistan – e.g., when and how each of the Southern Asian nuclear powers would use nuclear
weapons. Understanding each country's declared doctrine will help you analyze the drivers and
implications of particular missile developments and contextualize strategic relationships in the
region and beyond.
The Southern Asian nuclear doctrines detailed above are all based on their respective stated
nuclear doctrines, e.g., the nuclear doctrines each state publicizes, which may or may not diverge
from their actual, internally held doctrines. For more on these debates in the Southern Asian
context, check out Lesson 7.2 of Deterrence in Southern Asia at the link provided: Section 7.2

To help explain the connection between nuclear doctrines and missile arsenals, Haleema Saadia
explores how a state's nuclear doctrine might motivate it to develop different types of missile
technologies.

Haleema Saadia explains the role of nuclear doctrine in informing a state's missile developments.

Haleema Saadia:

“A nuclear doctrine is a set of guidelines according to which states operate their nuclear
capabilities. It provides direction or rules for the deployment and management of nuclear
weapons. A nuclear doctrine defines the role of nuclear weapons in the state's national security
policy, and depicts how the country would use its nuclear capabilities to counter security
challenges.
Nuclear doctrines can be explicit and specific in their language, declared intent, and
communication, or they can be ambiguous. Whether technology drives policy or policy drives
technology depends on the state's security situation, organizational setup, and strategic culture.
Threat perception plays a key role in shaping the guidelines of a nuclear doctrine. A country
whose threat perception emanates from an adversary that is in the same region will not require
ICBMs.

A state with first-use posture will develop a missile capability so that it is ready to deploy and
launch its missiles at a short notice. For this state, a mobile, diverse and readily available missile
force is a key factor. It will prefer canisterization and solid-fueled missiles over de-mated and
liquid-fueled missiles. For a state with a no-first-use, or NFU, posture, the assurance of a
retaliatory strike is more important than the timing of the response. In this context, it needs to
build a survivable missile force. Hardened silos, and submarine-based nuclear force will be the
preference for this state."

According to Haleema Saadia, which of the following best describes the difference in nuclear
missile requirements for states that have a first-use posture compared to those with an NFU
posture?

A. States with a first-use posture require more cruise missiles; states with an NFU posture
require more ballistic missiles.
B. States with a first-use posture require more ballistic missiles; states with an NFU posture
require more cruise missiles.
C. States with a first-use posture require a higher level of readiness; states with an NFU posture
require a higher level of survivability.
D. States with a first-use posture require a higher level of survivability; states with an NFU
posture require a higher level of readiness.

Answer: C
 2.2 China's Missile Capabilities

China's declaratory nuclear doctrine, as mentioned above, consists of NFU and assured
retaliation. As such, China's nuclear missile arsenal is intended to preserve a second-strike
capability, or the ability to absorb and retaliate to a nuclear first strike by its adversaries,
primarily the United States.

The current Chinese arsenal mostly comprises land-based ballistic missiles. In general, China is
making a transition to longer-range, solid-fuel missiles.[1] Their missiles are intended to cater to
separate theaters, with longer-range missiles targeting the mainland U.S. and other missiles
preparing for any regional conflict in the Asia-Pacific.[2] There is currently no conclusive evidence
to suggest that China possesses nuclear-capable cruise missiles.[3]

Recent reports have recorded increases in the number and type of missiles in China's arsenal.[4]
There have been additions to both ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as more advanced missile
technologies that will be discussed below. China is also diversifying the platforms from which the
missiles can be launched.[5] Prevailing scholarly opinion holds that these improvements are
intended to make the arsenal more survivable against U.S. capabilities.[6][7]

References:

[1] Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Reynolds, "Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2023," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 79, no. 2 (March 2023): 121.
[2] Luke Caggiano, "China Deploys New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles," Arms Control Today, May
2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-05/news/china-deploys-new-submarine-launched-ballistic-missiles.
[3] Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "The Pentagon’s 2019 China Report," Federation of American Scientists, May 6,
2019, https://fas.org/publication/chinareport2019/.
[4] Jeffrey Lewis, David Joel La Boon, and Decker Eveleth, "China’s Growing Missile Arsenal and the Risk of a 'Taiwan Missile
Crisis,'" Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 18, 2020, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/chinas-growing-missile-arsenal-and-
the-risk-of-a-taiwan-missile-crisis/.
[5] Joby Warrick, "China Is Building More Than 100 New Missile Silos in Its Western Desert, Analysts Say," Washington Post,
June 30, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-nuclear-missile-silos/2021/06/30/0fa8debc-d9c2-11eb-
bb9e-70fda8c37057_story.html.
[6] Lewis et al., "China’s Growing Missile Arsenal and the Risk of a 'Taiwan Missile Crisis.'"
[7] Henrik Stålhane Hiim, M. Taylor Fravel, and Magnus Langset Troan, "The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma:
China’s Changing Nuclear Posture," International Security 47, no. 4 (January 4, 2023): 147–
87, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00457.

In an excerpt from a Brookings Institution report below, Caitlin Talmadge elaborates on China's
threat perception vis-à-vis a potential damage limitation strategy by the United States, which
would entail counterforce strikes to limit China's ability to inflict sufficient damage in a nuclear
war:

A damage limitation strategy consists of measures taken by a state to try to reduce the amount
of damage it suffers in the event of a nuclear war. Counterforce targeting is a key component of
a damage limitation strategy because destroying an adversary's nuclear forces limits their ability
to respond to a first strike.

"China worries that the United States might use its counterforce capabilities to try to wipe
out China's nuclear forces in a first strike, and then use missile defenses to mop up any
'ragged retaliation' from China's surviving warheads. [. . .]

Viewed from this perspective, many of China's nuclear upgrades can be understood as
efforts to sustain the credibility of its assured retaliation posture. China likely does not
want the United States to ever feel confident that it can meaningfully limit damage to
itself in an all-out nuclear war with China. Even if the United States had no desire for
nuclear war, China might fear that such confidence might increase the United States'
relative willingness to bear the risk of nuclear escalation in a crisis or war, and thereby
allow the United States to acquire a deterrent advantage or coercive leverage over China.
[. . .] Seen in this light, China's improvements in redundancy, through the development of
more varied nuclear platforms, are an obvious way to try to disabuse the United States of
any belief that it could mount a splendid first strike or even limit damage."

- Caitlin Talmadge, "The US-China Nuclear Relationship: Why Competition is

Likely to Intensify," Brookings Institution, September 2019, 5,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/china-and-nuclear-weapons/

Next, Han Hua takes a broader view of the evolution of China's missile development programs
over time.
Han Hua discusses the evolution of China's missile development programs as a result of changing
geopolitical landscapes.

Han Hua:

"China started to develop a missile program in the 1960s called 两弹一星 (Liǎng dàn yì xīng). That
means nuclear bomb plus missiles plus satellite. This was an effort to accomplish coordination
during the initial period of nuclear development. It was a very initial nuclear program. So far, they
had the Dongfeng tier of missiles, short-range, long-range, and ICBMs.

In the beginning, China developed missile capabilities under the environment of having to deal
with two nuclear superpowers in the 1960s. Considering Chinese technology and the economic
considerations, China started to build short-range missiles but very quickly moved to middle-
range ballistic missiles, because, at the time, the Soviet Union was the main security concern for
China. Getting missile capabilities that were able to target the Soviet Union was the goal at the
time. development Chinese missile capabilities are characterized by the development of mid-
range missiles, ICBMs, and then later short-range missiles.

As everybody knows, China has very strong middle-range ballistic missile capabilities compared
to ICBMs in terms of numbers and capability."

Look at the graphic below to learn more about the ballistic and cruise missiles that China has in
its arsenal.

Note: China currently has dozens of different missiles and their variations. Only those with the
greatest strategic relevance are displayed in the graphic.
Ballistic Missiles
Cruise Missiles
Bibliography:

Congressional Research Service. "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues
for Congress." December 1, 2022. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf.

Dorminey, Bruce. "New Chinese Missile Upgrade Likely Designed with Taiwan in iIts Crosshairs." Forbes, February 15,
2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucedorminey/2017/02/15/new-chinese-missile-upgrade-likely-designed-with-taiwan-in-its-
crosshairs/?sh=2bce3038ba6d .

Gady, Franz-Stefan. "China's 'New' Carrier Killer Subs." The Diplomat, April 6, 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-
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Gertz, Bill. "China Reveals New Short-Range Missile." Washington Free Beacon, August 2,
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Horitski, Kristin. "DH-10 / CJ-10." Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, April 2016. https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-
threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/china/dh-10-cj-10.

Horitski, Kristin. "JL-2." Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, January 2016. https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-
and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/china/jl-2/.

Horitski, Kristin. "YJ-12." Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, January 2016. https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-
and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/china/yj-12.

Horitski, Kristin. "YJ-18." Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, March 2016. https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-
and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/china/yj-18.

Huang, Kristin. "China's Hypersonic DF-17 Missile Threatens Regional Stability, Analyst Warns." South China Morning Post,
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regional-stability.
Kristensen, Hans M. "Chinese DF-26 Missile Launchers Deploy to New Missile Training Area." Federation of American
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Williams, Ian and Masao Dahlgren. "More Than Missiles: China Previews Its New Way of War." Missile Threat, Center for
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7448447/Beijings-mysterious-DF-16-ballistic-missile-destroy-Washingtons-military-bases-Asia.html.

In recent years, China has prioritized increasing its ballistic missile brigades. Reports indicate that
in the early 2020s, China built about 300 missile silos in its northern region; if China were to
deploy nuclear missiles in these silos, it would represent a rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal
compared to the slow growth in its nuclear forces during previous decades.[1]

China has also been experimenting with fitting hypersonic glide vehicles – warheads that can
travel at hypersonic speeds and maneuver freely after separating from the missile body – to its
DF-17 MRBM and DF-41 ICBM.[2] Additionally, China has tested its DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle
multiple times since 2014.[3]

China is developing its arsenal of sea-based missiles as well by equipping its nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines with advanced JL-3 SLBMs that can target the continental United
States.[4]

References

[1] Matt Korda and Hans M. Kristensen, "A Closer Look at China’s Missile Silo Construction," Federation of American
Scientists, November 2, 2021, https://fas.org/publication/a-closer-look-at-chinas-missile-silo-construction/.
[2] Missiles of the World, China, "DF-17," CSIS Missile Defense Project, August 2,
2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-17.
[3] Franz-Stefan Gady, "China Tests New Hypersonic Weapon," The Diplomat, November 26,
2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/china-tests-new-hypersonic-weapon/.
[4] Luke Caggiano, “China Deploys New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles,” Arms Control Association, May
2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-05/news/china-deploys-new-submarine-launched-ballistic-missiles.

Recall that hypersonic weapons refer to those that can travel faster than five times the speed of
sound. A hypersonic glide vehicle is a warhead, carried by a ballistic missile, that can travel at
hypersonic speed after detaching from the missile that was carrying it. You will learn more about
hypersonic weapons in Section 2.6.

Knowledge Check: According to Han Hua, why did China prioritize medium-range ballistic missile
development in the 1960s instead of acquiring short-range ballistic missiles or ICBMs?

A. The United States was not a strategic rival of China in the 1960s.
 B. China's medium-range ballistic missiles could target key U.S. assets in the Pacific Ocean.
C. China relied on Soviet-imported missiles to supply its arsenal, which mainly comprised
medium-range ballistic missiles.
D. China's medium-range ballistic missiles were capable of striking the Soviet Union.

Answer: D

According to Caitlin Talmadge, why is China in the process of modernizing and expanding its
nuclear missile arsenal?

A. To allow it to execute a damage limitation strategy against India by conducting a

disarming first strike on India's nuclear weapons.
B. To allow it to execute a damage limitation strategy against the United States by
conducting a disarming first strike on the United States' nuclear weapons.
C. To assure its ability to retaliate against a nuclear first strike by India.
D. To assure its ability to retaliate against a nuclear first strike by the United States.

Answer: D
 2.3 India's Missile Capabilities

Recall from the interactive graphic from Lesson 2.1 that Indian nuclear doctrine has three main
components: NFU, credible minimum deterrence, and massive retaliation. This means that its
arsenal is intended to deter an adversary's first strike by having the capabilities to do sufficiently
proportionate damage in response. Notably, India is also preparing its arsenal for adversaries on
two fronts, Pakistan and China.

As a result, India has commissioned several ballistic and cruise missiles since it began missile
research and development in the 1970s and 1980s.[1] Its SRBMs could target Pakistan from
launch sites near the border, while its MRBMs and IRBMs could reach Pakistan from more secure
locations, and the newer Agni III, IV, and V bring Chinese targets into range.[3]

The supersonic short-range BrahMos and subsonic greater-range Nirbhay have been described
by some analysts as dual-capable cruise missiles, though this has not been confirmed by official
sources.[4][5] There is no conclusive evidence on whether India possesses a nuclear warhead
that could be fitted on a cruise missile.

References

[1] Heather Foye, "India Tests Submarine, Land Missiles," Arms Control Today, December
2022, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-11/news/india-tests-submarine-land-missiles.
[2] Antoine Levesques, "India's Pralay Ballistic Missile: A Step Towards a Rocket Force?," International Institute for Strategic
Studies, April 6, 2022, https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2022/04/indias-pralay-ballistic-missile-a-step-
towards-a-rocket-force.
[3] Ashok Sharma, "India Tests Long-Range Missile for Nuclear Deterrence," Associated Press, December 15,
2022, https://apnews.com/article/politics-china-fires-india-government-a4dcdfa4415262304074a5aa58e2fc4d.
[4] "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," National Air and Space Intelligence Center, June
2017, https://www.nasic.af.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=F2VLcKSmCTE%3D&portalid=19.
[5] Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Nuclear Notebook: How Many Nuclear Weapons Does India Have in 2022?" Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists 78, no. 4, July 11, 2022, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-07/nuclear-notebook-how-many-nuclear-
weapons-does-india-have-in-2022/.
Below, Ashley Tellis outlines the objectives behind India's missile modernization program.

Ashley Tellis identifies two key objectives driving India's missile modernization program.

Ashley Tellis:

"The Indian modernization of its missile capabilities is aimed to satisfy two objectives. One is
increased range, because India wants to be able to hold at risk targets deep inside the Chinese
mainland, which are very far away from the Indian land mass, and the second is India wants to
develop a range of missiles that are relatively reliable in terms of technical efficiency.

Now, reliability has taken India primarily in the direction of building different kinds of solid fuel
missiles. Range has taken India in the direction of building missiles that have greater reach. Most
of the longest-range missiles in India are land-based missiles, but there is another dimension that
is increasingly going to grow in prominence and that is the Indian desire not only to build reliable
missiles and missiles of greater reach, but also missiles that are survivable.

One is likely to see in the years to come much greater emphasis being put in India on building
missiles that will be based and deployed on submarines because of the Indian judgment that
submarine-based missiles are likely to be the most survivable missiles in the Indian arsenal."

Look at the graphic below to learn more about the ballistic and cruise missiles that India has in its
arsenal.

Note: India currently has dozens of different missiles and their variations. Only those with the
greatest strategic relevance are displayed in the graphic.
Ballistic Missiles
Cruise Missiles
Bibliography:

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at https://web.archive.org/web/20230921064339/https://brahmos.com/content.php?id=27

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13/india/27899942_1_strike-ranges-surface-to-surface-missile-agni-iii.

Philip, Snehesh Alex. "Agni Prime Is the New Missile in India's Nuclear Arsenal. This Is Why It's Special." The Print, June 30,
2021. https://theprint.in/defence/agni-prime-is-the-new-missile-in-indias-nuclear-arsenal-this-is-why-its-special/687271/.

Philip, Snehesh Alex. "Pralay – India's First Tactical Quasi-Ballistic Missile, a Step Towards Its Own Rocket Force." The
Print, December 27, 2022. https://theprint.in/defence/pralay-indias-first-tactical-quasi-ballistic-missile-a-step-towards-own-
rocket-force/1283224/.

Press Trust of India. "'Dhanush' Ballistic Missile Successfully Test-Fired." Economic Times, February 23,
2018. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/dhanush-ballistic-missile-successfully-test-fired-1816462.
Press Trust of India. "India Successfully Tests Nuclear-Capable Agni 4 Ballistic Missile." Business Standard, June 7,
2022. https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-successfully-tests-nuclear-capable-agni-4-ballistic-
missile-122060700014_1.html.

Thakur, Vijainder K. "India Could Boost BrahMos Supersonic Missile's Range to 1000 km Thanks to Russian Upgrade of Onyx
Missile." Eurasian Times, December 10, 2022. https://eurasiantimes.com/india-could-boost-brahmos-supersonic-missiles-range-
to-1000-km.

Tiwari, Anuj. "Take a Look at India's Agni Missile Series, It's a Nightmare for India's Adversaries." India Times, December 16,
2022. https://www.indiatimes.com/trending/social-relevance/agni-i-to-agni-v-and-agni-prime-indias-agni-missile-series-
587789.html#Agni_I_short_range_ballistic_missile.

India's missile arsenal is currently undergoing additional developments that are geared toward
both China and Pakistan. One such development is canisterization of its newest missile systems,
a process that allows warheads to be stored inside of a missile to reduce the time needed to
prepare for launch.[1] India is also increasing its missile accuracy and producing faster (including
hypersonic) and more advanced cruise missiles. These developments and others contribute to
concerns that India may be shifting away from its NFU policy toward a first-strike counterforce
posture against Pakistan.[2]

Another important development in India's arsenal is potentially deploying accurate short-range

missiles, such as the Pralay SRBMs and BrahMos cruise missiles, on the border with China for
battlefield use.[3] This could, however, involve conventional and nuclear-armed missiles being
part of the same command-and-control apparatus, creating new risks of misinterpretation.[4]

References

[1] Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen, "India's Nuclear Arsenal Takes a Big Step Forward," Federation of American Scientists,
May 9, 2023, https://fas.org/publication/indias-nuclear-arsenal-takes-a-big-step-forward/.
[2] Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, "India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and
Capabilities," International Security 43, No. 3 (Winter 2018/19): 7-52, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00340.
[3] Pradip R. Sagar, "How Indian Military Is Planning 'Rocket Force' to Counter China's Aggression," India Today, April 18,
2023, https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/how-indian-military-is-planning-rocket-force-to-counter-chinas-
aggression-2361607-2023-04-18.
[4] Debak Das, "The State of Nuclear Instability in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and China," Lawfare, September 3,
2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-state-of-nuclear-instability-in-south-asia-india-pakistan-and-china/.

Debates persist over India potentially modifying its nuclear doctrine to allow for the first use of
nuclear weapons as part of a counterforce strike to destroy an adversary's nuclear forces. But
how might Pakistan or China respond to the expansion of India's missile arsenal and a change in
posture?

According to Ashley Tellis, why is India modernizing its missiles by increasing their range
capabilities?
 A. India wants to be able to hold at risk targets deep inside China.
B. India wants to maintain deterrence equilibrium with Pakistan.
C. India wants to ensure it can strike both China and Pakistan simultaneously in the event of
a two-front war.
D. India wants to station its missiles high in the Himalayas to enhance their survivability.

Answer: A

Match each of the following missiles with their correct classifications.

1. Agni -V A. Short-Range Ballistic Missile

2. Agni-III B. Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
3. Agni-P C. Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
4. BrahMos D. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
5. Prahaar E. Cruise Missile

Answer: 1=D, 2=C, 3=B, 4=E, 5=A

What is canisterization?

A. Canisterization is a process that allows multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles

(MIRVs) to be placed onto newer missiles.
B. Canisterization is a process that allows greater manuverability of missiles while they are
mid-trajectory.
C. Canisterization is a process that allows for warheads to be placed inside of a missile
beforehand to reduce the time needed to prepare for launch.
D. Canisterization is a process that allows for the incorporation of greater stealth capabilities
to ensure that missiles go undetected.

Answer: C
 2.4 Pakistan's Missile Capabilities

While Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is ambiguous as compared to India and China, it adheres to full-
spectrum deterrence, as you will recall from the nuclear doctrines interactive graphic in Lesson
2.1. Specifically, it relies on land-based ballistic missiles to deter India, its main adversary, from
the tactical to the strategic level.[1] The country launched the Hatf program in the 1980s to create
missiles that could rival India's Prithvi program.[2]

Pakistan has continued to develop its ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, which are likely dual-
capable, for Indian targets.[3] As of 2021, it has six kinds of operational nuclear-capable land-
based ballistic missiles.[4] Three other ballistic missiles have also been under development at this
same time.[5]

To facilitate its strategic goals, longer-range missiles such as Shaheen-II and Shaheen-III allow
Pakistan to target all strategic and operational Indian bases.[6] Simultaneously, shorter-range
ballistic missiles deter Indian conventional operations with the threat of limited first use of
nuclear weapons.[7]

References

[1] Mansoor Ahmed, "Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability," Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, June 30, 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-their-
impact-on-stability-pub-63911.
[2] "Pakistan Missile Overview," Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 5, 2019, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/pakistan-
missile/.
[3] "Nuclear Disarmament Pakistan," Nuclear Threat Initiative, February 6, 2023, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/pakistan-
nuclear-disarmament/.
[4] Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Pakistani Nuclear Weapons, 2021," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 77, no. 5
(September 2021): 271.
[5] Kristensen and Korda, "Pakistani Nuclear Weapons, 2021."
[6] "Missiles of Pakistan," CSIS Missile Defense Project, June 30, 2022, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/pakistan/.
[7] "Missiles of Pakistan."
Naeem Salik discusses the transformation of Pakistan's strategy to acquire missile technologies.

Naeem Salik identifies how Pakistan's missile development program changed to fit its offensive
and defensive needs.

Naeem Salik:

"In the beginning, Pakistan had missiles which could reach major Indian cities, particularly Delhi
and other major cities, particularly Delhi and other major cities, which were sensitive from the
point of view of India. These were short to medium-range missiles. Later on, Pakistan
developed longer-range missiles like Shaheen-II and Shaheen-III, which are multi-stage missiles.

On the other side, Pakistan introduced short-range missiles like the Nasr missile system. That
well covers the whole spectrum of threats, from tactical, to operational, to the strategic level.
There's a whole inventory of missiles from Nasr, which is the shortest range at 70 kilometers, to
Shaheen-III which is 3,500-kilometer range."

Note: Official documentation released by the Inter-Services Public Relations office states that
the Shaheen-III missile has a range of 2,750 km.

Look at the graphic below to learn more about the ballistic and cruise missiles Pakistan has in its
arsenal.
Ballistic Missiles
Cruise Missiles
Bibliography

Khan, Feroz. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, Stanford University Press, 2012.

Kristensen, Hans M. and Matt Korda. "Nuclear Notebook: How Many Nuclear Weapons Does Pakistan Have in 2021?" Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists 77, no.5, September 7, 2021. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2021-09/nuclear-notebook-how-many-
nuclear-weapons-does-pakistan-have-in-2021/.

Missile Defense Project. "Ababeel." Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 16, 2016, last
modified July 31, 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ababeel/.

Missile Defense Project. "Abdali (Hatf 2)." Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 25, 2016, last
modified August 2, 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-2/.

Missile Defense Project. "Babur (Hatf 7)." Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 16, 2016,
last modified August 4, 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-7/.

Missile Defense Project. "Exocet." Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 30, 2016, last
modified August 2, 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/exocet/.

Missile Defense Project. "Ghauri (Hatf 5)." Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 16, 2016,
last modified August 2, 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-5/.

Missile Defense Project. "Ghaznavi (Hatf 3)." Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 16, 2016,
last modified August 5, 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-3/.

Missile Defense Project. "Hatf 1." Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 16, 2016, last
modified August 5, 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-1/.

Missile Defense Project. "Nasr (Hatf 9)." Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 16, 2016, last
modified August 4, 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-9/.

Missile Defense Project. "Ra'ad (Hatf 8)." Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 16, 2016, last
modified August 12, 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-8/.

Missile Defense Project. "Shaheen 1 (Hatf 4)." Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 16,
2016, last modified August 5, 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-4/.

Missile Defense Project. "Shaheen 2 (Hatf 6)." Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 16,
2016, last modified August 9, 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-6/.

Missile Defense Project. "Shaheen 3." Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 16, 2016, last
modified July 31, 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/shaheen-3/.

"Pakistan Missile Chronology." Nuclear Threat Initiative, last updated 2011. https://media.nti.org/pdfs/pakistan_missile.pdf.

Panda, Ankit. "Pakistan Conducts Second Test of Babur-3 Nuclear-Capable Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile." The Diplomat,
April 1, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/pakistan-conducts-second-test-of-babur-3-nuclear-capable-submarine-launched-
cruise-missile/.

Weiner, Tim. "U.S. Says North Korea Helped Develop New Pakistani Missile." The New York Times, April 11,
1998. https://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/11/world/us-says-north-korea-helped-develop-new-pakistani-missile.html.
Pakistan is currently developing three types of cruise missiles that can be launched through
land, air, and sea, including the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCMs) known as Babur-
3.[1] These newer cruise missiles are believed to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads as
well.[2]

In general, its missile arsenal is developing to incorporate stealth capabilities, build up its cruise
and hypersonic programs, and improve accuracy.

References

[1] "Pakistan Missile Overview," Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 5, 2019, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/pakistan-
missile/.
[2] Mansoor Ahmed, "Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability," Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, June 30, 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-their-
impact-on-stability-pub-63911/.
[3] Missile Defense Project, "Ababeel," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 16, 2016, last
modified July 31, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ababeel/.

Recall that Pakistan abides by doctrinal ambiguity and full-spectrum deterrence, aiming to deter
conventional attacks by threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons. As a result, Pakistan seeks
to acquire new technology that can be used on the battlefield or to deter an Indian assault, such
as dual-capable missiles and cruise missiles with greater maneuverability.

Fill in the blank: Pakistan relies primarily on ____ to deter India.

A. Sea-launched cruise missiles

B. Land-based ballistic missiles
C. ICBMs
D. Air-launched cruise missiles

Answer: B

Fill in the blank: Once completed, Pakistan's ____ missile will be its longest-range missile, with
the capability to strike the furthest Indian targets in the Bay of Bengal.

A. Shaheen-2
B. Nasr
C. Shaheen-3
D. Abdali
Answer: C

According to Naeem Salik, how has Pakistan's missile arsenal changed over time?

A. Pakistan has diversified its arsenal to include canisterized medium- and long-range
missiles.
B. Pakistan has diversified its arsenal to include canisterized short-, medium-, and long-
range missiles.
C. Pakistan has diversified its arsenal to include short- and medium-range missiles.
D. Pakistan has diversified its arsenal to include short-, medium-, and long-range missiles.

Answer: D

2.5 The Strategic Chain

The strategic chain links the nuclear arsenals of the United States, China, India, and Pakistan.
Developments on one end of the strategic chain influence the behavior of states on the other
end of the chain. For example, a shift in nuclear posturing or missile acquisition by the United
States could precipitate China recalibrating its strategic behavior, affecting India and Pakistan.
Missile development programs similarly have precipitated shifts in missile acquisition schemes
and threat perceptions among China, India, and Pakistan.

Learn more about the role that the strategic chain plays in missile developments across Southern
Asia below.
A (China): Han Hua analyzes Chinese threat perceptions of India and its missile programs.

Han Hua:

"In the last several decades, India's strategic circle has claimed that China is the main strategic
threat for India, rather than Pakistan. In that sense, India has developed missile capabilities – the
kind of capability to cover China's land. For example, the Agni-III; many Indian analysts believe
that is China-centric. After that, Agni-V is a long-range ballistic missile, maybe 3,500 kilometers.
That could cover the large chunk of China's land.

Also, I think that India's missile arsenal has expanded since then with very different types of
missile capabilities: hypersonic or other short-range, long-range. Even now, India has talked
about how they will develop ICBM missile capabilities. So far, I still think in Chinese nuclear
thinking, India has not stood out as a nuclear threat in the way India claimed that China is. It is a
not balanced mutual nuclear dynamic. Among Chinese analysts, some people still think it's a one-
sided nuclear dynamic.

I think the two countries, Asian giants as I mentioned earlier, have a very different kind of nuclear
relationship compared to that of the Cold War era. The two countries have not emphasized a
large number of nuclear arsenals. They still take a very defensive nuclear posture or nuclear
strategy. Even though they have encountered some difficulties or disputes along the border, but
they have not really talked about a nuclear role in solving these disputes."
B (India): Ashley Tellis analyzes the impact of Chinese missile acquisition on India’s nuclear
strategy.

Ashley Tellis:

"There are two categories of Chinese missiles that have an impact in India. The first category, of
course, is strategic missiles. Missiles like the CSS-10, which are intercontinental range ballistic
missiles that have relatively large warheads and which are most probably aimed at Indian cities
or at area military targets. There is nothing that India can do about these missiles except attempt
to neutralize them to deterrence. There's a second category of Chinese missiles, which are
tactical missiles. Now, the tactical missiles are more interesting, or rather, I think I should call
them theater missiles.

These are sub-strategic systems. They have ranges of anywhere up to 5,000 miles, but they have
smaller warheads and they are extremely accurate. In my judgment, these are the missiles that
India ought to be most concerned about. In principle, these missiles can be used by China for
counterforce targeting that is holding India's nuclear capabilities at risk rather than simply
countervalue targeting, which is targeting India cities. For the moment, India appears to be
primarily in a watch-and-wait mode and is waiting to see how China's nuclear and missile
modernization evolves before it develops any concrete countermeasures to those capabilities."

C (Pakistan): Zafar Nawaz Jaspal discusses Pakistan’s threat perception of India’s missile
technology acquisitions, highlighting cruise missiles in particular.

Zafar Jaspal:

"I think that India's missiles [ . . .] having ranges around 3000 or plus. Agni-I-A, Agni-II, Agni-III,
they are very much seriously taken in Pakistan. Agni-V with a range of 5,000+ normally we ignore.
We say it's China specific. On the other side, the most important thing for Pakistan is India's
investment in the missiles, especially cruise missiles."

To better understand the present and future status of the China-India nuclear relationship, Toby
Dalton and Tong Zhao reviewed relevant Chinese literature and interviewed senior Chinese
experts. Read more about Chinese perspectives on India's missile and nuclear weapons
development at the link provided. Click here.

How does Han Hua describe concerns among Chinese analysts about India's nuclear missile
arsenal?
 A. Chinese analysts are concerned about India's development of long-range ballistic missiles.
B. Chinese analysts are concerned about India's development of cruise and hypersonic
missiles.
C. Chinese analysts are concerned that a border conflict with India could escalate to the
nuclear level.
D. Chinese analysts tend not to be concerned about India as a nuclear threat and see the
China-India relationship as an unbalanced nuclear dynamic.

Answer: D

According to Ashley Tellis, what should worry India the most about China's tactical missiles?

A. China can use its tactical missiles for counterforce targeting against Indian nuclear forces.
B. China can use its tactical missiles for countervalue targeting against Indian nuclear forces.
C. China can use its tactical missiles for counterforce targeting against Indian cities.
D. China can use its tactical missiles for countervalue targeting against Indian cities.

Answer: A

According to Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, which Indian missiles are Pakistan concerned about?

A. India's shorter-range ballistic missiles and longer-range ballistic missiles.

B. India's longer-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
C. India's shorter-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic missiles.
D. India's longer-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic missiles.

Answer: C

Acquiring new technologies to enhance and modernize missile arsenals can complicate deterrence
relationships and destabilize strategic relations among nuclear-armed rivals. In the next section,
you will explore some of the missile technologies that have the greatest strategic implications for
Southern Asia.
 2.6 Emerging Trends

Missile Accuracy

One technological advancement that China, India, and Pakistan have all made significant
progress in improving in recent years is the accuracy of their ballistic and cruise missiles.
Christopher Clary discusses the implications of this trend for regional strategy and security.

Christopher Clary explains that more accurate missiles allow additional targeting options at the
nuclear and conventional levels.

Christopher Clary:

"There is no hard and fast rule for the destruction that nuclear weapons need to achieve in order
to scare an enemy to stop them from doing something disadvantageous to a nuclear weapons-
possessing state. We don't know – what is required is all in our minds. When India first tested in
May of 1998 with its overt nuclear weapons test, it moved to this posture of minimum credible
deterrence.

What does that mean? Nobody knows what it means, but in those earliest years, informed Indian
commentators said, "We need to be able to destroy a city. Cities are pretty big. That means our
missiles don't need to be very accurate." Nuclear ones make a big bang, you can get nearby and
still cause plenty of destruction, which is enough to deter anyone from taking risks that would
threaten India's national survival. Those are pretty minimal needs.
But scientists like to pursue accuracy. Sometimes scientists and bureaucrats like to present their
political leaders with options and for India, for China, for Pakistan, in all of those places, there
have been accuracy improvements. With accuracy improvements, this means that missiles can
hit targets they might not previously have been able to hit. You might be able to go after
leadership bunkers. You might be able to go after leadership bunkers. You might be able to go
after military targets. You might be able to go after hardened silos.

As accuracy improves, that presents different options to national leadership. They might be
willing to consider using nuclear weapons in a counterforce role to attempt to disarm an enemy
before they can damage India with nuclear weapons, or they might be interested in using those
missiles in a purely conventional role, like we've seen in the Russia/Ukraine war since 2022. As
missiles become more accurate, there are options both conventionally and for nuclear strategy
that flow from those accuracy improvements."

As Christopher Clary explained, more accurate missiles allow not only for conventional missile use
against tactical targets in a conflict, but also for counterforce strikes against an adversary's
nuclear missiles.

In an article for International Security, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press describe how improvements in
missile accuracy and remote sensing introduce new difficulties for ensuring the survivability of
nuclear arsenals. Click here.

Cruise Missiles

The increasing popularity of incorporating cruise missiles, which are especially accurate compared
to ballistic missiles, into nuclear arsenals has additionally transformed deterrence dynamics in
Southern Asia. Beenish Pervaiz shares her assessment of the utility and risks of cruise missile
technologies in the region.

Beenish Pervaiz discusses how cruise missiles fit into India's and Pakistan's respective strategies.

Beenish Pervaiz:

"The spread of cruise missiles has been ushered in by the revolution in military affairs, which is a
very important thing to keep into mind as these emerging technologies are being more and more
incorporated into the military. This is transforming a lot of the systems. It is a delivery system
that can be launched from a variety of different platforms. It offers deep penetration into enemy
territory. It is fast, it is stealthy. It is also more maneuverable. All these different characteristics
of cruise missiles give it a different type of characteristic when we think about adding it to nuclear
arsenals.

These capabilities can not only improve the ability to launch preemptive attacks but also, more
tactically oriented attacks, which can, again, further enhance the capability of both first-strike
and second-strike capability. This is really important to keep into mind when we think about the
impacts that these technologies have had in both India's and Pakistan's arsenals. We see that
both India and Pakistan have been investing a lot in cruise missile technology. You see that now;
on the Indian side you have the BrahMos and the Nirbhay missiles. On the Pakistani side, the
Babur and the Ra'ad are the two big cruise missiles that have had a huge impact on their nuclear
arsenals.

I think, from the Indian perspective, cruise missiles not only help India maintain a credible,
minimum deterrence strategy against China, but what is really important from the Pakistani
perspective, they help India argument a limited strike capability against Pakistan. This also
increases the probability of a limited nuclear use from the Indian side which, again, can have
consequences for the instability paradox and can, really, when we think about crisis situations,
have a very detrimental effect on the way in which these crises are de-escalated.

From the Pakistani side, I feel the cruise missiles really offer Pakistan a way to augment their
defenses against Indian forces. Especially thinking about neutralizing Indian ballistic missile
defenses, this is the technology that is really helping lead that effort. I feel the other aspect from
the Pakistani side that's really important to keep in mind when thinking about cruise missiles is
that both Babur and Ra'ad have increased Pakistan's strategic standoff capability when it comes
to both land and sea leg. Especially the sea leg is important because this is something that
Pakistan is still developing. Until it gets to a point where it has reached a certain threshold, these
cruise missile capabilities are offering it a greater standoff capability which it needs.

It is giving them a strategic incentive to deploy these weapons. Also, this allows Pakistan to
counter any sort of naval blockade that India might have. It, again, enhances their targeting and
deployment option, both in conventional and nuclear modes. It is really important in that realm.

One risk factor I would like to highlight is that these cruise missiles can be dual capable. They
have the ability to carry both, nuclear and conventional payload. This can create a lot of
uncertainty in a crisis situation, which I would like to underline. It can really make a state contend
with its adversary when it comes to the potential use of nuclear weapons. This, again, has
concerning implications for crisis stability. This is something I would just like to underline when
we think about the overall impact of incorporating these types of technologies into nuclear
arsenals."
Learn more about the growing importance of cruise missiles in Southern Asia and the challenges
created by the relative lack of norms surrounding their proliferation and testing in an article from
the Nuclear Threat Initiative, at the link provided. Learn more here.

Dual-Use Missiles

As Beenish Pervaiz said, dual-use missiles, which can be used to carry conventional or nuclear
warheads, are another technological advancement coming to the fore in Southern Asia.

Below, Manpreet Sethi and Antoine Levesques elaborate on the advantages and disadvantages
countries must weigh when deciding whether to deploy these missiles in their arsenals. Learn
more about the growing importance of cruise missiles in Southern Asia and the challenges created
by the relative lack of norms surrounding their proliferation and testing in an article from the
Nuclear Threat Initiative, at the link provided. Learn more here.

Manpreet Sethi and Antoine Levesques on the utility and risks of dual-use missiles in Southern
Asia.

Manpreet Sethi:

"The idea of dual-use missiles is fairly recent, I think. During the Cold War period when the U.S.
and USSR were at their peak of confrontation, the understanding was that you need to keep the
missiles separate. The conventional and the nuclear payload missiles were in separate categories
so that there would not be any confusion leading to an advertent escalation. In the 2000s, the
U.S. came up with the idea of conventional global prompt strike, which was the concept basically,
that they would use conventional payload on their strategic missiles to be able to hit out at time-
sensitive terrorist targets.

This has brought in the idea of dual-use missiles, that you can use your strategic missiles also for
conventional delivery. We have seen in Southern Asia then, Pakistan and China have resorted to
the idea of dual-use missiles. Pakistan, in fact, claims all of its missiles, ballistic and cruise, as dual
use, and we find China has also a large number of missiles which are capable of dual-use delivery.
India has maintained, consciously, this distinction between conventional and nuclear delivery
systems.

Now, of course, there is a cost advantage that you can use the same platform for both
conventional and nuclear, but the problem that comes with this, and particularly for strategic
stability, is the problem of entanglement, where the adversary is not sure about whether a
nuclear or a conventional missile is coming at you when he sees an incoming missile. Therefore,
assuming the worst, you could stumble into nuclear war, even if the incoming missile is
conventional, but if you assume that it is a nuclear missile and have a retaliatory strike, which is
ready with nuclear, then you have gone into nuclear exchange.

The other problem is when you hit the missile, believing that you are going to be hitting a
conventional missile, but if they are co-located in a particular unit or in a particular silo, and the
adversary believes that what you have done is an attack on its nuclear forces, then begins a
nuclear war again. These are some of the entanglement issues that come with dual-use missiles,
and that is the basic problem that we have seen in Southern Asia where the chances of
inadvertent escalation go up as a result of this capability.

Antoine Levesques:

"Every nuclear deterrent relationship relies on a degree of ambiguity between the two
adversaries. Dual-capable missiles fits that requirement very well. In so far as there are no
technologies available to distinguish the warhead, which may or may not be present, on a given
type of missile. You maintain ambiguity, which serves your purpose, by developing and by
deploying dual-capable missiles. This requirement for ambiguity is to be balanced against the
need to provide assurances about your behavior to the opponent. That balance is dynamic, and
therefore, the relevance of dual capability evolves over time as arsenals mature and deterrent
relationships evolve."

As Manpreet Sethi explained, the entanglement of conventional and nuclear capabilities can
create risks for deterrence stability. Read more about entanglement risks in this explainer from
James Acton at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at the link provided. Click here.

Hypersonic Missiles

Hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles are favorable for their speed,
maneuverability, and low flight altitude, allowing them to evade detection from radars and
missile defense systems more efficiently.[1]

However, introducing emerging technologies can cause destabilizing effects because it risks
undermining preexisting deterrence structures and eroding trust among states. Frank O'Donnell
elaborates on these dynamics below.

Frank O'Donnell explains how hypersonic weapons can impact deterrence stability.
Frank O’Donnell:

"Hypersonic weapons are normally divided into two categories: hypersonic cruise missiles and
hypersonic glide vehicles. Even though ICBMs fly at hypersonic speeds, meaning roughly at least
one mile per second, when we talk about hypersonic weapons, we normally refer to hypersonic
cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles.

Hypersonic cruise missiles share many of the same advantages of cruise missiles as compared to
ballistic missiles, so greater maneuverability, greater ability to evade enemy detection, enemy
air missile defenses, but they can just fly at even higher speed, adding greater ability to evade
enemy defenses that way.

Hypersonic glide vehicles are often paired to ballistic missiles, but in the ballistic missile arc,
which you will see in the course, it is often released from the ballistic missile earlier in the process,
and it forms reentry stage. Then it has greater maneuverability, and it can fly at a much higher
speed and being able to evade enemy air defenses that way.

The challenge for Southern Asian stability of these technologies being introduced is that, to their
rival, it will look like the state that is building them is building them in order to gain greater
accuracy and greater precision in the types of either conventional or nuclear weapons that are
being targeted at it. Especially with that emphasis on speed and precision, it begins to look similar
to what a state would be building if it was starting to pursue a counterforce, either conventional
or nuclear, strategy.

If you want to retain a countervalue strategy in which nuclear weapons are only there as a last
resort, you do not need to have technologies this sophisticated if you are only going to target
enemy cities and you feel that that is all that's required of a nuclear deterrence. If you are
focusing on much greater precision and a much greater range of strategies, including
counterforce, hypersonic weapons factor into that explanation a lot more, and they give the
adversary concern that that is where you are going toward with potential arms race effects."

To learn more about hypersonic missiles, watch an explainer video from the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace below.

Hypersonic Missiles Arms Race: What You Need to Know

Hypersonic missiles can travel faster than five times the speed of sound. Russia and China have
invested heavily in different types of hypersonic missiles capable of carrying both nuclear and
conventional warheads. The United States has also invested in its hypersonic missile
technology.

View on YouTube

Fractional Orbital Bombardment

China is also reportedly incorporating a new warhead delivery system, the Fractional Orbital
Bombardment System (FOBS), into its missile arsenal.[2] While FOBS technology dates back to the
Cold War, China could become the first country to operationally integrate FOBS into its arsenal.

Navigate the graphic below to learn how states can use FOBS technology to target their
adversaries.
FOBS is particularly beneficial for China because the system grants it an additional angle with
which to strike the United States. Currently, U.S. missile defense systems are aimed at the
North Pole and at the Pacific Ocean since the United States has been primarily concerned about
attacks from North Korea, Russia, China, or a future nuclear Iran. However, they are not as
capable against attacks from the Southern Hemisphere. FOBS would allow China (or another
state that would pursue them) to launch missiles at adversaries from a less expected direction.

References

[1] "Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, February 13,
2023, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf.
[2] Timothy Wright, "Is China Gliding Toward a FOBS Capability?," International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 22,
2021, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis//2021/10/is-china-gliding-toward-a-fobs-capability.

"The FOBS missile test demonstrates to India China's missile technological superiority and
range superiority, and that could in turn propel India to start thinking about developing
similar technologies out of a perceived need to match what China is doing. It also
underlines that despite India's S-400 ballistic missile defense systems and indigenous
systems it has deployed around Delhi and Mumbai, India is still vulnerable to China's
missile attacks. "

Frank O'Donnell, Non-resident Fellow, Stimson Center, Strategic Learning

Interview, March 2023.

According to Christopher Clary, why do missiles with greater accuracy allow for more targeting
options?

A. Less accurate missiles can only hit big military targets; more accurate missiles can hit
smaller targets like civilian populations.
B. Less accurate missiles can only hit big targets like cities; more accurate missiles can hit
smaller military targets and missile silos.
C. Less accurate missiles can only hit small military targets; more accurate missiles can hit
big targets like cities.
D. Less accurate missiles can only hit small civilian targets; more accurate missiles can hit big
targets like missile silos.

Answer: B

Select all that apply: According to Manpreet Sethi, which of the following are escalation risks
associated with the deployment of dual-use missiles?

A. A state might incorrectly assume that an incoming conventional missile is carrying a

nuclear warhead.
B. A state might mistakenly fire a missile carrying a nuclear warhead instead of a
conventional one.
C. A state might mistakenly fire a missile carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads.
D. A state might interpret an attack on its dual-use missiles as a counterforce strike on its
nuclear weapons.

Answer: A,D
According to Frank O'Donnell, how does the development of hypersonic weapons reshape
deterrence between nuclear adversaries?

A. It suggests that countries are more interested in missile speed than missile accuracy.
B. It suggests that a country could abandon its counterforce strategy in favor of a
countervalue strategy.
C. It suggests that a country could abandon its countervalue strategy in favor of a
counterforce strategy.
D. It suggests that countries are interested in pursuing arms control negotiations.

Answer: C