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Legislative Drafting - Harla v. State of Rajasthan
Legislative Drafting - Harla v. State of Rajasthan
Legislative Drafting - Harla v. State of Rajasthan
I. FACTS
Natural justice makes it necessary that for a law to take effect, it must be announced and made public
through a valid and recognized process, ensuring that everyone can understand its content. The
information should be made available in a recognizable manner, or alternatively, there should be
specific rules, regulations, or official channels through which individuals can acquire knowledge with
due and reasonable diligence.
In this particular case, it was brought to attention that the ruler of Jaipur possessed the authority to
enact legislation. However, a complication arose when the reigning monarch passed away, and the
successor, who was a minor, became the next in line for the throne. Consequently, during the period of
the successor's minority, the administrative authority appointed a council of ministers to legislate for
the territory.
On December 11, 1923, the Council passed a resolution attempting to enact the Jaipur Opium Act.
The crucial question is whether the mere passage of the resolution, without promulgation or
publication in the Gazette or any other means to inform the public, was sufficient to establish the law.
Around the same time (approximately 1923, exact date unspecified), the Council also enacted the
Jaipur Laws Act, 1923. Section 3(b) of this Act stated that, the law to be administered by the Court of
Jaipur State would include all existing regulations within the territories and any future enactments
published in the Official Gazette, subject to the ruler's liberty. This law came into effect on November
1, 1924.
It is acknowledged that the Jaipur Opium Act was never published in the Gazette before or after this
date. The argument is made that publication was unnecessary because it was considered a "regulation"
already in force on that date.
Another significant fact is that on May 19, 1938, section 1 of the Jaipur Opium Act was amended by
adding sub-section (c), stating that it would come into force on September 1, 1924. The appellant's
conviction, however, relates to an offense on October 8, 1948.
II. JUDGEMENT
In this judgment, the appellant was convicted under section 7 of the Jaipur Opium Act and fined Rs.
50. Although the case seemed trivial, the High Court of Rajasthan in Jaipur granted special leave to
appeal because an important point concerning the validity of the Act was raised.
The judgment draws on legal principles that goes beyond national borders. It cites the Code Napoleon
in France, which emphasizes the importance of promulgation for laws to become effective. Similarly,
the judgment references instances in India, specifically under Rule 119 of the Defence of India Rules,
where the principle of promulgation has been applied in legal matters.
The court notes that the Council of Ministers that passed the Jaipur Opium Act was not a sovereign
body, rather it was established by the Crown Representative, and its powers were defined and limited
by the Jaipur Gazette Notification dated August 11, 1923. The judgment argues that, in the absence of
a specific law or custom to the contrary, a mere resolution of this Council without further publication
or promulgation would not be sufficient to make a law operative.
The judgment emphasizes the principles of natural justice underlying the British Constitution. The
court states that it is unbelievable to them that a representative of the Crown of Great Brittain would
create a body with powers that are in violation with fundamental principles of natural justice. The
court holds that, without specific legal provisions or established customs to the contrary, a resolution
alone is insufficient to bring a law into effect.
The judgment also addresses an argument regarding section 3(b) of the Jaipur Laws Act of 1923,
which was raised to suggest that it saved all regulations then in force from the necessity of publication
in the Gazette. The court acknowledges this possibility but asserts that the Act only saved laws that
were valid at the time and not resolutions that had never acquired the force of law.
In conclusion, the court allows the appeal, setting aside the appellant's conviction and sentence. The
judgment establishes the crucial requirement of promulgation for the effectiveness of laws,
emphasizing the principles of natural justice and the need for specific legal provisions or customs to
bypass this requirement.
AUTHOR’S FINDINGS
Addressing the 1938 amendment first, it can be disregarded because, unless the Opium Act was valid
when enacted, the addition of a clause fourteen years later would be meaningless. In 1938, a law
required all enactments after November 1, 1924, to be published in the Gazette. Therefore, if the
Opium Act was not valid at that date, its validation could not occur by publishing only one section in
the Gazette fourteen years later. The Jaipur Laws Act of 1923 mandated the entire enactment to be
published; hence, publishing only one section would not validate it if it was not already valid. The
question of whether a law could be made retroactive to take effect from 1924 by publication in 1938,
though argued, need not be considered.
This brings us back to the situation in 1923 and raises the question of whether a law could be set in
motion by a mere resolution of the Jaipur Council. In the absence of information on the laws
governing the commencement of enactments in Jaipur and the lack of any demonstrated custom, we
believe that it would be contrary to the principles of natural justice to subject the residents of a state to
punishment or penalties under laws of which they had no knowledge and could not reasonably have
acquired any knowledge. Natural justice dictates that for a law to become effective, it must be
promulgated or published in a recognizable manner so that all individuals may be aware of its content.
In the absence of any specific law, rule, regulation, or custom, we assert that a law cannot be
established solely through the passage of a resolution. Promulgation or publication of a reasonable
nature is deemed essential.