Banking Laws

CASE DIGESTS ON BANKING LAWS
CASE NO. 1:
G.R. No. G.R. No. 221641
Ponente:HERNANDO, J.:
Student Assigned: ALARIAO
Topic under the Syllabus:

DOCTRINE:
FACTS: East West Banking Corporation filed a Complaint before the RTC for Sum of
Money with Application for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against
respondents Ian Y. Cruz (Ian) and Paul Andrew Chua Hua (Paul), seeking to recover the
total amount of P16,054,541.66. In the same Complaint, the Bank impleaded herein
respondents Francisco T. Cruz (Francisco), Ian's father, and Alvin Y. Cruz (Alvin), Ian's
brother, as unwilling co-plaintiffs.
The Bank alleged that Paul debited P16,054,541.66 from the accounts of Francisco
and Alvin and then credited the same amount to Ian's account by representing that
Francisco and Alvin undertook to "regularize" the transactions later on. Using the debited
amounts, Ian successfully obtained a "back-to-back" loan from the Bank. Ian then
purportedly used the same amount to pay for the said loan. However, instead of
"regularizing" the transactions, Francisco and Alvin demanded the payment of
P16,054,541.66 from the Bank as evidenced by Foreign Exchange Forward Contracts
(FEFCs). The Bank, however, rejected Francisco and Alvin's demand stating that the
FEFCs are spurious. The Bank asserted that the issuance of spurious FEFCs was part of
the scheme of Ian and Paul to defraud Francisco, Alvin, and the Bank.
A hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was
conducted by the trial court. Renato affirmed that Ian paid the loans and confirmed that
the Bank did not pay Francisco and Alvin after they demanded payment upon presentation
of the FEFCs, which was supposedly a legitimate transaction.
The RTC granted the Bank's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against Paul and Ian and declared that the Bank had "a sufficient cause of
action against the defendants [Ian and Paul.]
Ian filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Complaint failed to state a
cause of action. He explained that the Bank did not allege any right which belonged to it,
given that it rejected Alvin and Francisco's demand, thereby causing no damage on its
part. He asserted that since the deposit accounts belonged to Alvin and Francisco, the right
to these deposits belonged to them and not the Bank. The Bank had no legal personality to
institute the case since Francisco and Alvin, as owners of the debited accounts, were the
real parties-in-interest.
RTC:
RTC ruled that the Bank did not sufficiently allege its right, thus it dismissed its
complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The trial court ruled that Francisco and
Alvin were the real parties-in-interest, not the Bank, who would stand to be benefitted or
injured by the judgment in the suit.
The Bank elevated the case to the CA by filing a Notice of Appeal under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court.
CA
It held that the RTC's November 25, 2013 Order which dismissed the Complaint on
the grounds of failure to state a cause of action and lack of legal personality involved pure
questions of law. Hence, the Bank should have filed a petition for review on certiorari to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45 and not an appeal under Rule 41.
ISSUE: WON the Bank have right to the deposit accounts allegedly withdrawn
unauthorized?
RULING: With respect to the alleged unauthorized withdrawals, the Bank cannot validly
claim to have any right to such deposit accounts as it belongs to their owners, Francisco
and Alvin. The Complaint fails to allege that it was Ian who made the unauthorized
withdrawals, but what was mentioned in the Complaint is that the purported unauthorized
withdrawals were made only by Paul.
In relation to this, in deposits of money, a bank is considered as the debtor while the
depositor is the creditor. Since their contract is governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on simple loan or mutuum, the deposit must be paid upon demand by the depositor.
Thus, the Bank in this case would not stand to be injured as it is merely maintaining or
keeping the money in trust for the depositors.
It is known that "the business of banking is one imbued with public interest As
such, banking institutions are obliged to exercise the highest degree of diligence as well as
high standards of integrity and performance in all its transactions. The law expressly
imposes upon the banks a fiduciary duty towards its clients and to treat in this regard the
accounts of its depositors with meticulous care."
If the Bank deemed that it received damage in any way, it has no one to blame but itself, or
rather, its employees who allowed the transfer of funds without proper verification,
including the issuance of the alleged spurious FEFCs. Paul could not have successfully
completed the transactions without the approval of his superiors.
CASE NO. 2: ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES MARIO ANTONIO

MACAM** & ROSE TRINIDAD MACAM
G.R. No. 200635, February 01, 2021
Ponetente: HERNANDO, J.
Student Assigned: ALCAZAREN
Topic: DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY
Doctrine: Allied Bank, as a Bank, is required to exercise Extraordinary Diligence in

handling and care of its deposits. The Bank has fiduciary duty to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care. The Bank’s liability for damages arises from its negligence
in the performace of its obligation to its depositors.
Facts: Mario Macam invested in the cellular card business owned by Helen Garcia as per
recommendation of his brother and facilitate by Elena Valerio who was unit Manager in Helen's
business. Mario deposited P1,572,000.00 in Valerio's Savings Account with Allied Bank-Pasay
Road Branch.
On February 6, 2003, respondent Cana informed the bank teller to anticipate a deposit by
Helen in the amount of 46m and instructed the Branch Operating Officer to arrange for two
armored vans to pick up the 46m deposit. Thereafter, Cana gave the bank teller 5 filled out and
approved fund transfer receipts in the total of 46m. Berras protested to Cana that she cannot
credit the corresponding amounts to the five accounts as indicated in the fund transfer receipts.
Nonetheless, Cana effected a local override and approved the fund transfer even at that time
Helen bank account balance did not amount to P46 Million.
Valerio withdrew P1722,500 from her deposit account and deposited 1,590,00 to the
account of Sheila mario’s wife. Sheila deposited the said amount and opened a savings account
at allied bank pasong tamo.Subsequently Branch operation officer received a text message from
can a that the 46m deposit had been cancelled. Due to significant discrepancy allied bank
investigated the branch and its transaction and ordered the debit of the remaining 1.1m from the
account to sposes macam which resulted in the closure thereof.Spouses macam learned about the
closure and later then filed a complaint for damages against the bank.
Issue: Whether or not allied bank is liable for the ultra vires acts of its employee?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the act of Cana even though unauthorized still binds the
bank.
Under the doctrine of apparent authority, The authority of a corporate officer or agent
in dealing with third persons may be actual or apparent. The apparent authority to act for and to
bind a corporation may be presumed from acts of recognition in other instances, wherein the
power was exercised without any objection from its board or shareholders.I n this case, Caña's
act of approving the P46 Million fund transfer and the subsequent transfers to different accounts
in various branches of Allied Bank leading to the P1,590,000.00 transfer to the account of the
Spouses Mario Macam all appear to have been clothed with authority. Indeed, the subsequent
transfers (of funds) were approved by several Branch Heads.
The doctrine of apparent authority is derived not merely from practice. Its existence may
be ascertained through 1) the general manner in which the corporation holds out an officer or
agent as having the power to act, or in other words, the apparent authority to act in general, with
which it clothes him; or 2) the acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, with actual or
constructive knowledge thereof, within or beyond the scope of his ordinary powers.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, the lower courts were correct in sustaining Allied Bank's
liability to the Spouses Mario Macam for culpa contractual.
CASE NO. 3: Landbank of the Philippines vs. Gualberto Catadman

G.R. No. 200407
Ponente: Justice Gaerlan
Student Assigned: ALUMNO
Topic under the Syllabus: General Banking Act of 2000/New Central Bank Act
DOCTRINE:
Banks and Banking; Diligence Required of Banks; The law imposes on banks
high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 8791, declares that the State recognizes the “fiduciary nature of banking that
requires high standards of integrity and performance.”—Pursuant to Article 22 of the
Civil Code, Catadman must unconditionally return the P115,002.68 to Land Bank, less
the P15,000.00 he has already paid. Contrary to his claim, the doctrine on the fiduciary
nature of banking institutions in the cases of Simex and BPI Family Bank does not
preclude Land Bank from recovering the money from him. The ruling of this Court would
have been different if it were NEDA and Reyno who filed a complaint against Land Bank.
Finally, this Court reprimands Land Bank for its negligence. This shall serve as a
reminder to Land Bank that the law imposes on banks high standards in view of the
fiduciary nature of banking. Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791, declares that the
State recognizes the “fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity
and performance.”
Same; Same; The bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of all its
depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their
relationship. —The bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of all its depositors with
meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. This
fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe “high standards of
integrity and performance” is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a
bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a
degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. Likewise, Section 2 of
R.A. No. 8791 prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks — that banks must
observe “high standards of integrity and performance” in servicing their depositors.
FACTS:
On March 21, 1999, Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) received the
following Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) Checks: (1) No. 1731263 in the
amount of P8,500.00 payable to GCNK Merchandising, owned by respondent Gualberto
Catadman (Catadman), to be credited to his Land Bank Account No. 2562-0016-49; (2)
No. 151837 in the amount of ₱100,000.00 payable to National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA) - Regional Office XI and to be credited to its Land Bank Account No.
2562-001-46; and (3) No. 358896 in the amount of ₱6,502.68 payable to Benjamin S.
Reyno (Reyno) and to be credited to his Land Bank Account No. 2561-0135-70. These
three checks were all drawn by DBP Mati Branch and endorsed to Bajada Branch of
Land Bank thru its Davao Branch.
On May 26, 1999, all three checks were cleared. Two days later, however, NEDA's
DBP Check No. 151837 and Reyno's DBP Check No. 358896 were erroneously credited
to Catadman's account, while his DBP Check No. 1731263 was inadvertently credited
twice to his account. Hence, the total amount of P115,062.68 was credited to his
account.
On June 25, 2001, Land Bank discovered the erroneous transactions, which
prompted it to send a formal demand letter to Catadman for the return of the amount of
₱115,002.68 which represents the total amount credited to his account less the
₱8,500.00 which rightfully belonged to him. Catadman, however, did not heed Land
Bank's letter.
On October 8, 2001, Land Bank sent another demand letter to Catadman.

Thereafter, there was an exchange of correspondence between them. Finally, in his
February 11, 2002 letter, Catadman acknowledged that the amount was credited to his
account and that he had already spent it. As a way of settlement, he promised to pay the
amount of ₱2,000.00 monthly until the whole amount is returned.
Catadman did as he promised. However, after paying an accumulated amount of

₱15,000.00, he stopped and refused to make further payments. The matter was referred
to the legal counsel of Land Bank. Consequently, the bank sent its letter dated January
21, 2003 to Catadman demanding payment of the entire balance. Catadman failed to
respond to the letter. Land Bank was thus constrained to file a case for collection of sum
of money before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Davao City.
Ruling of the MTTC:
The MTCC ruled that the obligation of Catadman to reimburse Land Bank the
amount erroneously credited to his account was a natural obligation and not a civil
obligation. Accordingly, the bank had no right of action to enforce such reimbursement
against Catadman. It further ruled that the full reimbursement of the amount sought to be
recovered by Land Bank depends upon the conscience of Catadman. It explained that if
Catadman would not hearken to his conscience that he had availed of the money which
did not rightfully and lawfully belong to him and would not continue to pay the balance,
Land Bank must suffer its loss caused by its negligent employee. It advised Land Bank
to pursue its employee for reimbursement instead.
Ruling of the RTC:
Land Bank appealed the Decision of the MTCC before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) which, in tum, reversed the same and ruled that Articles 19, 22, and 1456 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code) are applicable to the case. It held that if
Catadman had observed honesty and good faith as required by the said provisions, he
should have returned the amount of P115,002.68 instead of keeping quiet about
receiving the money. It also ruled that since Catadman knew that the money was not his,
Article 1456 obliges him as a trustee to take care of the money which through mistake
came into his hands.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
Catadman filed a petition for review before the CA assailing the decision of the RTC
which reversed the decision of the MTCC.
Primarily anchoring its decision on the negligence of the bank employee and the
fiduciary nature of Land Bank's business, the CA ruled that Land Bank must, as a
consequence, bear its loss. In explaining its decision, the CA quoted the ruling in the case in
another case decided by the Supreme Court in which it cited the ruling in the landmark case
of Simex International. Particularly basing its decision on the role of the banks in the
economic life of every civilized nation, the CA held that to allow Land Bank to secure a
reimbursement of the subject amount would open the floodgates of public distrust in the
banking industry.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding the petitioner
liable for the full amount mistakenly credited despite concluding that the latter was unjustly
enriched at the expense of Land Bank and acted in bad faith.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court said that, Catadman, as a depositor, did not suffer any
financial loss or damage when his account was credited with an additional ₱115,002.68.
It was the bank which suffered the loss albeit it was primarily caused by the negligent act
of its employee. Truth be told, however, that Catadman was unjustly enriched when he
chose to not return and just appropriated to himself the ₱115,002.68 knowing fully well
that the same does not belong to him. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, "every person
who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him." In this case, the Supreme Court unjust enrichment is
present "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience." The principle of unjust enrichment has two
conditions. First, a person must have been benefited without a real or valid basis or
justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another person's expense or damage.
The Supreme Court also reprimanded Land Bank for its negligence and it said
that this present case shall serve as a reminder to Land Bank that the law imposes on
banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. Section 2 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8791, and declares that the State recognizes the "fiduciary nature of
banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance."
The obligation of Landbank is to treat the accounts of all its depositors with
meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. This
fiduciary relationship means that the bank's obligation to observe "high standards of
integrity and performance" is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a
bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a
degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. Likewise, Section 2 of
R.A. No. 8791 prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks - that banks must
observe "high standards of integrity and performance" in servicing their depositors.
CASE NO. 4:
G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: AROLLADO

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 5: Soriano vs. People, G.R. Feb. 1, 2010

G.R. No. GR 162336
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
Student Assigned: BALICOCO
Topic under the Syllabus: General Banking Act of 2000/ New Central Bank Act
DOCTRINE: A bank officer violates the DOSRI law when he acquires bank funds for his
personal benefit, even if such acquisition was facilitated by a fraudulent loan application. The
prohibition in Section 83 is broad enough to cover various modes of borrowing.It covers loans
by a bank director or officer which are made either: (1) directly, (2) indirectly, (3) for himself, (4)
or as the representative or agent of others. It applies even if the director or officer is a mere
guarantor, indorser or surety for someone else's loan or is in any manner an obligor for money
borrowed from the bank or loaned by it.
Facts: Sometime in 2000, the Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of BSP transmitted a letter to
Jovencito Zuño, Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ. The letter attached five affidavits, which
would allegedly serve as bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents, and for Violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795
(General Banking Act), against petitioner Hilario P. Soriano. These five affidavits, along with
other documents, stated that spouses Enrico and Amalia Carlos appeared to have an
outstanding loan of ₱8 million with the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM), but
had never applied for nor received such loan; that it was petitioner, who was then president of
RBSM, who had ordered, facilitated, and received the proceeds of the loan; and that the ₱8
million loan had never been authorized by RBSM's Board of Directors.
The investigating officer issued a Resolution finding probable cause and correspondingly filed
two separate informations against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
It basically alleged that petitioner and his co-accused, in abuse of the confidence
reposed in them as RBSM officers, caused the falsification of a number of loan
documents, making it appear that one Enrico Carlos filled up the same, and thereby
succeeded in securing a loan and converting the loan proceeds for their personal gain
and benefit. (Estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the RPC - Estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents)
The other Information was for violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD

1795. The said provision refers to the prohibition against the so-called DOSRI loans. The
information alleged that, in his capacity as President of RBSM, petitioner indirectly
secured an ₱8 million loan with RBSM, for his personal use and benefit, without the
written consent and approval of the bank's Board of Directors, without entering the said
transaction in the bank's records, and without transmitting a copy of the transaction to
the supervising department of the bank. His ruse was facilitated by placing the loan in
the name of an unsuspecting RBSM depositor, one Enrico Carlos.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, contending that the commission of estafa under paragraph
1(b) of Article 315 of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation of DOSRI law, hence,
a person cannot be charged for both offenses. He argued that a violation of DOSRI law requires
the offender to obtain a loan from his bank, without complying with procedural, reportorial, or
ceiling requirements. On the other hand, estafa under par. 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC requires
the offender to misappropriate or convert something that he holds in trust, or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to return the same.
RTC – Denied the motion to quash and further held that the two offenses were separate and
distinct violations, hence the prosecution of one did not pose a bar to the other.
CA - The CA found no merit in petitioner's argument that the violation of the DOSRI law and the
commission of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents are inherently inconsistent with
each other.
ISSUE: Whether a loan transaction within the ambit of the DOSRI law (violation of Section 83 of
RA 337, as amended) could also be the subject of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the
Revised Penal Code. / Whether or not a charge for DOSRI violation is proper wherein the
accused bank officer did not secure a loan in his own name
RULING : Yes. The two informations against petitioner contain allegations which, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime of DOSRI violation
and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
In Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001 for violation of DOSRI rules, the information alleged that
petitioner Soriano was the president of RBSM; that he was able to indirectly obtain a loan from
RBSM by putting the loan in the name of depositor Enrico Carlos; and that he did this without
complying with the requisite board approval, reportorial, and ceiling requirements.
In Criminal Case No. 237-M-2001 for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, the
information alleged that petitioner, by taking advantage of his position as president of RBSM,
falsified various loan documents to make it appear that an Enrico Carlos secured a loan of ₱8
million from RBSM; that petitioner succeeded in obtaining the loan proceeds; that he later
converted the loan proceeds to his own personal gain and benefit; and that his action caused
damage and prejudice to RBSM, its creditors, the BSP, and the PDIC.
In Soriano v. People, involving the same petitioner in this case (but different transactions), we
also reviewed the sufficiency of informations for DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents, which were almost identical, mutatis mutandis, with the subject
informations herein. We held in Soriano v. People that there is no basis for the quashal of the
informations as "they contain material allegations charging Soriano with violation of DOSRI rules
and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents".
Petitioner raises the theory that he could not possibly be held liable for estafa in
concurrence with the charge for DOSRI violation. According to him, the DOSRI charge
presupposes that he acquired a loan, which would make the loan proceeds his own
money and which he could neither possibly misappropriate nor convert to the prejudice
of another, as required by the statutory definition of estafa. On the other hand, if
petitioner did not acquire any loan, there can be no DOSRI violation to speak of. Thus,
petitioner posits that the two offenses cannot co-exist. This theory does not persuade
us.
The Court does not agree.
The bank money (amounting to ₱8 million) which came to the possession of petitioner was
money held in trust or administration by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity as the
President of said bank. It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the owner of the ₱8
million because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have been correct if the bank
knowingly extended the loan to petitioner himself. But that is not the case here. According to the
information for estafa, the loan was supposed to be for another person, a certain "Enrico
Carlos"; petitioner, through falsification, made it appear that said "Enrico Carlos" applied for the
loan when in fact he ("Enrico Carlos") did not. Through such fraudulent device, petitioner
obtained the loan proceeds and converted the same. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
said that petitioner became the legal owner of the ₱8 million. Thus, petitioner remained the
bank’s fiduciary with respect to that money, which makes it capable of misappropriation or
conversion in his hands.
Here, the Court also ruled that a charge for DOSRI violation is proper in such a situation
wherein the accused bank officer did not secure a loan in his own name, but was alleged to
have used the name of another person in order to indirectly secure a loan from the bank.
Section 83 of RA 337 reads:
Section 83. No director or officer of any banking institution shall, either directly or
indirectly, for himself or as the representative or agent of others, borrow any of the
deposits of funds of such bank, nor shall he become a guarantor, indorser, or surety for
loans from such bank to others, xxx
The prohibition in Section 83 is broad enough to cover various modes of borrowing.It covers
loans by a bank director or officer which are made either: (1) directly, (2) indirectly, (3) for
himself, (4) or as the representative or agent of others. It applies even if the director or officer is
a mere guarantor, indorser or surety for someone else's loan or is in any manner an obligor for
money borrowed from the bank or loaned by it.
The foregoing information describes the manner of securing the loan as indirect; names
petitioner as the benefactor of the indirect loan; and states that the requirements of the law were
not complied with. It contains all the required elements for a violation of Section 83, even if
petitioner did not secure the loan in his own name.
In sum, the informations filed against petitioner do not negate each other.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 6: Apolinario, Jr. y Llauder vs. People

G.R. No. 242977
Ponente: Leonen, J.
Student Assigned: BASILIO
DOCTRINE: Banking institutions are corporations imbued with public interest. They are required
to exercise the highest degree of diligence. By their nature, banks operate within certain
restrictions and limitations, one of which is the issuance of loans to its directors, officers,
stockholders, and related interests (DOSRI). The requirements under the General Banking Law
are straightforward. If all the elements provided by the law are present, erring directors and
officers can be held criminally liable for violating the DOSRI law.
FACTS:
In two separate Informations, Apolinario, Winefredo T. Capilitan (Capilitan), Motohiko
Hagisaka (Hagisaka), and Elmer T. Magpantay (Magpantay), directors and officers of the
Unitrust Development Bank (Unitrust), were charged with violation of Section 36 of Republic Act
No. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000), in relation to Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653
(The New Central Bank Act).
On December 18, 2001, Unitrust held a Special Stockholder's Meeting, wherein
Vasquez, Apolinario, Capilitan, Magpantay, Evelyn Mansit (Mansit), Loreta Oba (Oba) and
Quilatan, were elected as members of Unitrust's Board. On the same day, an Organizational
Meeting of the Board of Directors was held wherein: Unitrust Board of Directors elected
Apolinario as Acting Chairman and President; Capilitan was elected as Corporate Secretary;
Magpantay, Quilatan, and Vasquez resigned as members of the Unitrust Board of Directors;
Fujinori Tada (Tada), Hagisaka, and Kiyoshi Haneda (Haneda) were subsequently elected as
directors; and Hagisaka was nominated and elected as the Executive Vice President.
Subsequently, Capilitan applied for a personal loan of P1,000,000.00.
Vasquez, who was then the Vice President of Loans and Credit, informed Hagisaka that
without a board resolution approving the loan, Capilitan's loan application violated the rule on
DOSRI loans. Hagisaka responded that Vasquez should approve Capilitan's loan, or else he
would withhold their salaries and fire them. Vasquez hesitantly processed the P1,000,000.00
loan of Capilitan but insisted that he be furnished with a board resolution approving it. Atty.
Evelyn Gutierrez (Gutierrez), counsel of Unitrust, then showed Vasquez the Minutes of the
Board Meeting dated December 19, 2001 (December 19, 2001 Minutes) where the Board of
Directors allegedly approved Capilitan's P1,000,000.00 loan. The December 19, 2001 Minutes
was signed by Quilatan, Vasquez, Magpantay, Apolinario, and Hagisaka.
Later, Hagisaka informed Vasquez of another loan application for P27,000,000.00 and
filed by G. Cosmos Philippines, Inc. (G. Cosmos), represented by its President, Capilitan. The
Unitrust's Board allegedly approved the loan application on December 26, 2001 as evidenced
by a Board Resolution (December 26, 2001 Resolution) signed by Magpantay, Apolinario,
Capilitan, and Oba.
On the same day and after the two loans were released, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
through a letter from the Department of Thrift Banks and Non-Bank Financial Institutions,
notified Apolinario, Hagisaka, and Capilitan that the two loans violated the DOSRI law.
Upon review of the documents relating to the two loans, it was discovered that: (1) the
loans did not contain the necessary supporting documents such as loan application/information
sheet, disclosure statement, and board resolution approving the loans; and (2) both loans were
effectively unsecured since they were only secured by Capilitan's Unitrust shares of stock. Also,
it was found that the loans were not reported to the BSP.
BSP then filed a case against the Unitrust directors and officers before the Department
of justice. The Department of Justice found probable cause against Capilitan, Hagisaka,
Apolinario, Magpantay, Quilatan, and Vasquez for violation of DOSRI laws.
The RTC found petitioner Apolinario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction. The CA ruled that all the elements of the
crime charged were established. (1) Apolinario was a director and officer of Unitrust; (2)
Apolinario conspired with Capilitan in obtaining the two loans from Unitrust; (3) the two loans
were approved and released without the valid written approval by the majority of Unitrusts
Board; and (4) the required approval of the Unitrust's Board was not entered into the records of
Unitrust, and a copy of the approval was not transmitted to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas'
supervising and examining department.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of the offense and
contends that: (1) he is not a director of Unitrust; (2) he is neither a bank borrower nor did he
incur any contractual liability from the bank for himself or others; (3) he could not have approved
the loans as he was neither a stockholder nor a director but a mere employee of the bank; and
(4) assuming that the first three elements are present, Unitrust could no longer report because
of its subsequent closure.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the DOSRI Law
RULING: Yes.
To sustain a conviction for violation of the DOSRI restriction, the prosecution must prove
the existence of the following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the offender is a director
or officer of any banking institution; (2) the offender, either directly or indirectly, for
himself or as a representative or agent of another, performs any of the following acts: (a)
he borrows any of the deposits or funds of such bank; or (b) he becomes a guarantor, indorser,
or surety for loans from such bank to others: or (c) he becomes in any manner an obligor for
money borrowed from bank or loaned by it; and (3) the offender has performed any of such
acts without the written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank, excluding
the offender, as the director concerned.
The lower courts found petitioner to be a bona fide Unitrust director. Accused Apolinario
miserably failed to deny and rebut the positive declaration of Mr. Quilatan that during the
stockholders' meeting held on December 18, 2001, Mr. Quilatan nominated accused Apolinario,
as the Acting Chairperson of Unitrust and that on the same Board Meeting, accused Apolinario
was elected as the Acting President. Further, it must be underscored that while petitioner insists
that the board meetings were simulated, he never denied signing the Minutes of the Board
Meetings approving the two loans.
The December 19, 2001 Minutes approving the P1,000,000.00 loan contained the
signatures of petitioner, Magpantay, Quilatan, and Vasquez. On the other hand, the signatures
appearing on the December 26, 2001 Minutes approving the P27,000,000.00 loan were those of
petitioner, Capilitan, Magpantay, and Oba.
It was also ruled that petitioner acted in conspiracy with Capilitan. First, petitioner does
not dispute that Capilitan, a Unitrust director, obtained two loans from Unitrust. While petitioner
denies participation in the loan's approval and insists that it was Vasquez who approved the
loan, it has been established that Vasquez approved the loans under duress. Further, petitioner
admitted that the Vice President for Loans and Credit merely recommends a loan's approval
and the final decision rests on the board. Accordingly, since petitioner signed the minutes of the
board meetings during which the loans were allegedly approved, he had the "principal and
indispensable role" in their approval and release.
Second, petitioner admitted that after the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas investigation and
the bank run, he contacted Magpantay to pay PDIC the P13,000,000.00 loan of G. Cosmos.
Finally, as the RTC and CA correctly pointed out, petitioner is a lawyer who is presumed
to know the law. This notwithstanding, he signed the minutes of the board meetings and
participated in the preparation of the remedial documents after the loans had been released.
Under the General Banking Law, for a DOSRI loan to be valid, it is necessary that the
written approval of the majority of the bank's directors be entered into the bank's records. In
addition, a copy of the entry must be transmitted to the appropriate supervising and examining
department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Here, petitioner does not deny that the loans were not reported to the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas. However, he claims that they could not have met this requirement because of BSP
and PDIC’s subsequent takeover of Unitrust. He argues that the takeover effectively dissolved
Unitrust's operations, making it impossible for them to report the loans to Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas. He also maintains that since Dela Paz was then assigned as an examiner at Unitrust
from October 2001 until January 2002, he should have been aware of the loans' existence.
It must be stressed that the responsibility of entering upon its records the required
written approval and of transmitting a copy of the entry to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas is on
the subject bank, which in this case is Unitrust. While Dela Paz, a Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Assisting Examiner, was then assigned at Unitrust at the time material to this case, his job was
to monitor the transfer of ownership from the previous owners of Bank of Makati to the
Japanese group. Accordingly, his presence at Unitrust alone cannot equate to his knowledge of
the circumstances surrounding the two loans. Further, assuming that Dela Paz had acquired
information regarding these loans, Unitrust still had the duty to comply with the reportorial
requirements of the law.
The conviction of the petitioner is affirmed.
CASE NO. 7:The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Triumph
Savings Bank
G.R. No. 76118
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
Student Assigned: BAUZON
Topic under the Syllabus: The New Central Bank Act

DOCTRINE: The "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and legal
considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank's assets and as a valid exercise
of police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders and the general public. The
absence of notice and hearing cannot be deemed acts of arbitrariness and bad faith, and is
therefore, not a valid ground to annul a Monetary Board resolution placing a bank under
receivership.
FACTS: Based on examination reports submitted by the Supervision and Examination Sector of
the Central Bank (CB) "that the financial condition of TSB is one of insolvency and its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors and creditors," the
Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 596 ordering the closure of TSB, and placing it
under receivership, and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver.
TSB filed a complaint with the RTC against Central Bank and Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB
Resolution No. 596, challenging the constitutionality of Sec. 29 of R.A. 269, insofar as it
authorizes the Central Bank to take over a banking institution even if it is not charged with
violation of any law or regulation, much less found guilty thereof.
The trial court temporarily restrained petitioners from implementing MB Resolution No. 596,
thus prompting them to move for the quashal of the restraining order on the ground that it did
not comply with Sec. 29, i.e., that TSB failed to show convincing proof of arbitrariness and bad
faith on the part of petitioners;' and, that TSB failed to post the requisite bond in favor of Central
Bank.
The trial court granted the relief sought and denied the application of TSB for injunction. Thus,
TSB filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss premised on two grounds, namely, that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action and that the Triumph Savings Bank was without capacity to sue
except through its appointed receiver.
Petitioners claim that it is the essence of Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 that prior notice and hearing in
cases involving bank closures should not be required since in all probability a hearing would not
only cause unnecessary delay but also provide bank "insiders" and stockholders the opportunity
to further dissipate the bank's resources, create liabilities for the bank up to the insured amount
of P40,000.00, and even destroy evidence of fraud or irregularity in the bank's operations to the
prejudice of its depositors and creditors. Petitioners further argue that the legislative intent of
Sec. 29 is to repose in the Monetary Board exclusive power to determine the existence of
statutory grounds for the closure and liquidation of banks, having the required expertise and
specialized competence to do so.
ISSUES:
I. Whether absence of prior notice and hearing be considered acts of arbitrariness and bad faith
sufficient to annul a Monetary Board resolution enjoining a bank from doing business and
placing it under receivership
II. Whether it is only the receiver that may bring suit in behalf of the bank
RULING:
I. No. Under Sec. 29 of R.A. 265, the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, is vested with
exclusive authority to assess, evaluate and determine the condition of any bank, and finding
such condition to be one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to its depositors or creditors, forbid the bank or non-bank financial institution to do
business in the Philippines; and shall designate an official of the CB or other competent person
as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities.
Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing before a bank may be directed to stop
operations and placed under receivership. However, Sec. 29 does not altogether divest a bank
or a non-bank financial institution placed under receivership of the opportunity to be heard and
present evidence on arbitrariness and bad faith because within ten (10) days from the date the
receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank, resort to judicial review may be had by filing an
appropriate pleading with the court.
The law is explicit as to the conditions prerequisite to the action of the Monetary Board to forbid
the institution to do business in the Philippines and to appoint a receiver to immediately take
charge of the bank's assets and liabilities. They are: (a) an examination made by the examining
department of the Central Bank; (b) report by said department to the Monetary Board; and (c)
prima facie showing that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its
depositors or creditors.
Banks are affected with public interest because they receive funds from the general public in the
form of deposits. It is then the Government's responsibility to see to it that the financial interests
of those who deal with the banks and banking institutions, as depositors or otherwise, are
protected. That task is delegated to the Central Bank. Under both the 1987 Constitutions, the
Central Bank is tasked with providing policy direction in the areas of money, banking and credit;
corollarily, it shall have supervision over the operations of banks (Sec. 20, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution).
II. No. To rule that only the receiver may bring suit in behalf of the bank is, to echo the
respondent appellate court, "asking for the impossible, for it cannot be expected that the master,
the CB, will allow the receiver it has appointed to question that very appointment."
Consequently, only stockholders of a bank could file an action for annulment of a Monetary
Board resolution placing the bank under receivership and prohibiting it from continuing
operations.
In Central Bank v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained the purpose of the law —
“. . . in requiring that only the stockholders of record representing the majority of the
capital stock may bring the action to set aside a resolution to place a bank under
conservatorship is to ensure that it be not frustrated or defeated by the incumbent Board
of Directors or officers who may immediately resort to court action to prevent its
implementation or enforcement. It is presumed that such a resolution is directed
principally against acts of said Directors and officers which place the bank in a state of
continuing inability to maintain a condition of liquidity adequate to protect the interest of
depositors and creditors. Indirectly, it is likewise intended to protect and safeguard the
rights and interests of the stockholders. Common sense and public policy dictate then
that the authority to decide on whether to contest the resolution should be lodged with
the stockholders owning a majority of the shares for they are expected to be more
objective in determining whether the resolution is plainly arbitrary and issued in bad
faith.”
CASE NO. 8:
G.R. No. 70054 and 68878
Ponente:
Student Assigned: BERNARDO
Topic under the Syllabus: New Central Bank Act

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 9: Central Bank of the Phils. v. CA,

G.R. No. 88353, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 652, 684-685
Ponente: Davide, JR., J
Student Assigned: BILGERIA

DOCTRINE: The following requisites must be present before the order of conservatorship may
be set aside by a court: (1) The appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record
representing the majority of the capital stock of the bank in the proper court; (2) Said pleading
must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority stockholders of the
order placing the bank under conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proof, after
hearing, that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. In the instant case, the original
complaint was filed more than 3 years after PRODUCERS BANK was placed under
conservator, long after the expiration of the 10-day period mentioned in the requisites.
FACTS: Producers bank of the Philippines has been extending questionable loans worth 300
million without collaterals, but the paid in capital of Producers bank is only 140.544 million,
which means that the entire paid-in capital of the bank, together with some 160 million of
depositors' money, was utilized by Producers bank management to fund these unsecured loans.
Sometime later, several blind items about a family-owned bank in Binondo which granted
fictitious loans to its stockholders appeared in major newspapers which triggered a bank-run in
Producers bank and resulted in continuous over-drawings on the bank’s demand deposit
account with the Central Bank; reaching to 143.955 million which resulted in continuous over-
drawings on the bank’s demand deposit account with the Central bank. The over-drawings’
continued increase prompted the Monetary board to place Producers bank under
conservatorship on the basis of the report submitted by the Supervision and Examination
Sector.
The bank sent a rehabilitation plan to the central bank which states that 3 buildings owned by
Producers Properties, Inc. (PPI), its principal stockholder and the subsequent mortgage of said
properties to the CENTRAL BANK as collateral for the bank’s overdraft obligation but which was
not approved due to disagreements between the parties. No other rehabilitation plan was
submitted in over 3 years and this prompted the Central bank monetary board to approve in
principle what it considered a viable rehabilitation program for PRODUCERS BANK. There
being no response from both PRODUCERS BANK and PPI on the proposed rehabilitation plan,
the MONETARY BOARD issued a resolution instructing Central Bank management to advise
the bank that the conservatorship may be lifted if PRODUCERS BANK complies with certain
conditions.
Producers bank then filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the
Monetary board and central bank Governor alleging that the resolutions issued were arbitrary
and made in bad faith and that their placement under conservatorship was unwarranted, ill
motivated, illegal and utterly unnecessary and unjustified. Respondent Judge issued a
temporary restraining order and subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction. The Central bank
filed a motion to dismiss but was denied and ruled that the Monetary board resolutions were
arbitrarily issued. Central bank filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking
to annul the orders of the trial court but CA affirmed the order of the RTC
ISSUE: Whether or not the Producers bank was deprived of due process before being placed in
conservatorship
RULING: No. The following requisites must be present before the order of conservatorship may
be set aside by a court: (1) The appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record
representing the majority of the capital stock of the bank in the proper court; (2) Said pleading
must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority stockholders of the
order placing the bank under conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proof, after
hearing, that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. In the instant case, the original
complaint was filed more than 3 years after PRODUCERS BANK was placed under
conservator, long after the expiration of the 10-day period mentioned in the requisites.
Further, the fact that Producers bank is grossly overdrawn on its reserve account with the
Central bank which increased over the years amounting to 1.233 billion is not disputed. This
enormous overdraft evidences the patent inability of the bank’s management to keep Producers
bank liquid. This fact alone sufficiently justifies the remedial measures taken by the Monetary
Board.
The Monetary board Resolutions were not promulgated to arbitrarily divest the present
stockholders of control over PRODUCERS BANK, as is claimed by the latter. The same
contemplates an effective and viable plan to revive and restore PRODUCERS BANK. It is to be
noted that before issuing these resolutions, the MONETARY BOARD gave the management of
PRODUCERS BANK ample opportunity to submit a viable rehabilitation plan for the bank. MB
Resolution Nos. 751 merely reiterated the requirement set forth in Resolution No. 649 for
PRODUCERS BANK to identify and submit the list of new stockholders who will infuse new
capital into the bank for CENTRAL BANK approval. In this Resolution, the MONETARY BOARD
gave PRODUCERS BANK’s stockholders one (1) week from notice within which to signify their
acceptance or rejection of the proposed rehabilitation plan.
The foregoing resolutions refer to a recommended rehabilitation plan. What was conveyed to
PRODUCERS BANK was a mere proposal. There was nothing in the resolutions to indicate that
the plan was mandatory. On the contrary, PRODUCERS BANK was given a specific period
within which to accept or reject the plan. And, as petitioners correctly pointed out, the plan was
not self-implementing. The warning given by the MONETARY BOARD that should said proposal
be rejected, the CENTRAL BANK “will take appropriate alternative actions on the matter,” does
not make the proposed rehabilitation plan compulsory.
Whether or not there is a rehabilitation plan agreed upon between PRODUCERS BANK and the
MONETARY BOARD, the CENTRAL BANK is authorized under R.A. No. 265 to take
appropriate measures to protect the interest of the bank’s depositors as well as of the general
public. There is nothing objectionable to the actions of the MONETARY BOARD. We, therefore,
find to be completely without legal or evidentiary basis the contention that the impugned
resolutions are arbitrary, illegal and made in bad faith.
CASE NO. 10:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: CAAGBAY

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 11:

G.R. No. 201069
Ponente: Gaerlan, J.
Student Assigned: CARIAS

DOCTRINE: To be permissible under Section 27(d), loans taken out by BSP personnel
with institutions undergoing BSP examination must now satisfy three requisites: 1)
conduct of the transaction on arm's length basis; 2) full disclosure to the Monetary
Board; and 3) compliance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Monetary Board
The arm's length standard adopted in Section 27(d) means that BSP personnel must
transact with BSP-examined institutions in such a way that they will not be able to utilize
their position to gain undue influence with, or more favorable terms from, the target
institution.
FACTS:
Benjamin Jamarabo was a former Bank Officer I in the BSP’s Supervision and Examination
Sector. Rural Bank of Kiamba Sarangani was under an examination by the BSP. During the
period of examination, Jamorabo took out an unsecured loan in the amount of P200,000 with
Rural Bank of Kiamba. Since the amount was beyond the authority of the General Manager
Nero to approve, Nero accompanied Jamorabo to meet with Rural Bank of Kiamba’s president,
Falgui. Falgui wanted to deny the loan application, but he was afraid to do so, for fear of
offending Jamorabo. Jamorabo signed the loan documents as co-maker with his wife as the
principal but it was Jamorabo who filled out and signed the loan document in the name of his
wife. The loan became due Jamorabo was able to pay only his first and second amortization
and only after his first check had already bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds.
The third amortization became due and he called the bank cashier advising her not to deposit
his check for the 3rd amortization. Then, his communication with the bank suddenly stopped
even after his 4th amortization became due. Mr. Nero decided to deposit Jamorabo’s check but it
was dishonored because the account was already closed. Nero tried calling Jamorabo but
Jamorabo can no longer be contacted. Jamorabo later contacted Nero informing him that he
was sent to Malaysia for further studies by the BSP and promised that he would settle his loan
obligation. Jamorabo however did not make good of his promise. The Anti-Money Laundering
Specialist of the BSP conducted a regular examination of Rural Bank of Kiamba. Nero divulged
Jamorabo’s loan to the examiner in charge. The examiner in charge informed Nero that
Jamorabo had just retired and advised him to write to the BSP’s Financial Accounting
Department requesting assistance in deducting from Jamorabo’s retirement benefits the
outstanding balance of his loan. Bangko Sentral filed a complaint against Jamorabo for violation
of Section 27 (d) of RA 7653.
ISSUE: Whether Jamarobo violated Section 27 (d) of RA 7653 as amended by RA 11211.
RULING: Yes. To be permissible under Section 27(d), loans taken out by BSP personnel with
institutions undergoing BSP examination must now satisfy three requisites: 1) conduct of the
transaction on arm's length basis; 2) full disclosure to the Monetary Board; and 3) compliance
with rules and regulations prescribed by the Monetary Board. Jamorabo's transaction with the
bank does not meet any of these requisites.
The arm's length standard adopted in Section 27(d) means that BSP personnel must transact
with BSP-examined institutions in such a way that they will not be able to utilize their position to
gain undue influence with, or more favorable terms from, the target institution.
Jamarobo violated the arm’s-length standard. The loan was granted to Jamorabo due to undue
influence. Jamarobo was able to secure the loan due to his position as examiner-in-charge. He
applied for the loan during the examination period, he was granted a loan without security, and
the President of the bank wanted to deny the loan but he was not able to do so for fear of
offending Jamarobo.
Jamarobo also did not disclose the loan to the BSP. BSP discovered the loan only after Nero
diverged the loan to the Anti Money Laundering examiner of the BSP and to the Managing
Director of the BSP’s Financial Accounting Department after Jamarobo defaulted in his loan
obligation.
Thus, there was a violation of Section 27 (d) of Ra 7653.
CASE NO. 12: CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK V. TERESITA TOBIAS, ET. AL.,
G.R. No. 227990
Ponente: Reyes, JR.
Student Assigned: COBARTE
DOCTRINE: LIABILITY OF BANK TO 3RD PERSONS FOR ACTS DONE BY ITS

EMPLOYEES LIMITED TO ACTS PERFORMED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF APPARENT
AUTHORITY WHICH THE BANK VESTED
FACTS:
Rolando Robles, a certified public accountant, has been employed with Citystate Savings
Bank since July 1998 then as Accountant-trainee for its Chino Roces Branch. On
September 6, 2000, Robles was promoted as acting manager for petitioner's Baliuag,
Bulacan branch, and eventually as manager.
Sometime in 2002, respondent Teresita Tobias, a meat vendor at the Baliuag Public Market,
was introduced by her youngest son to Robles, branch manager of petitioner's Baliuag,
Bulacan branch.
Robles persuaded Tobias to open an account with the petitioner, and thereafter to place her money
in some high interest rate mechanism, to which the latter yielded.
Thereafter, Robles would frequent Tobias' stall at the public market to deliver the interest earned
by her deposit accounts in the amount of Php 2,000.00. In turn, Tobias would hand over her
passbook to Robles for updating. The passbook would be returned the following day with
typewritten entries but without the corresponding counter signatures.
Tobias was later offered by Robles to sign-up in petitioner's back-to-back scheme which is
supposedly offered only to petitioner's most valued clients. Under the scheme, the depositors
authorize the bank to use their bank deposits and invest the same in different business ventures
that yield high interest. Robles allegedly promised that the interest previously earned by Tobias
would be doubled and assured her that he will do all the paper work. Lured by the attractive offer,
Tobias signed the pertinent documents without reading its contents and invested a total of Php
1,800,000.00 to petitioner through Robles.
Later, Tobias became sickly, thus she included her daughter and herein respondent Shellidie
Valdez, as co-depositor in her accounts with the petitioner.
In 2005, Robles failed to remit to respondents the interest as scheduled. Respondents tried to reach
Robles but he can no longer be found; their calls were also left unanswered. In a meeting with
Robles' siblings, it was disclosed to the respondents that Robles withdrew the money and
appropriated it for personal use. Robles later talked to the respondents, promised that he would
return the money by installments and pleaded that they do not report the incident to the petitioner.
Robles however reneged on his promise. Petitioner also refused to make arrangements for the
return of respondents' money despite several demands.
Respondents filed a Complaint for sum of money and damages against Robles and the petitioner.
Respondents alleged that Robles committed fraud in the performance of his duties as branch
manager when he lured Tobias in signing several pieces of blank documents, under the assurance
as bank manager of petitioner, everything was in order.
RTC:
Judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Robles to pay plaintiff.
The plaintiffs claim for attorney's fees and litigation expenses are DENIED for lack of merit.
Further, defendant bank is absolved of any liability. Likewise, all counterclaims and cross-claims
are DENIED for lack of merit.
CA:
Reversed and set aside the RTC's decision.
ISSUE: WON CSB can be held liable for the transactions entered into by Robles, as its bank
manager, with Tobias, as depositor?
RULING:
YES, CSB is solidarily liable to Tobias and Valdez for the damages caused by the acts of Robles as
its employer.
The bank, in its capacity as principal, may be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority
wherein its liability is solidary with that of his employee. Under the said doctrine, it imposes
liability because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into
believing that the relationship or the authority exists. The liability of a bank to 3rd persons for acts
done by its agents or employees is limited to the consequences of the latter’s acts which it has
ratified, or those that resulted in the performance of acts within the scope of actual or apparent
authority it has vested.
In this case, the proximate cause of the loss of Tobias is the misappropriation of Robles, but CSB is
still liable under Art. 1911 of the NCC. Art. 1911 Even when the agent has exceeded his authority,
the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he
had full powers. CSB is estopped in denying Robles’ authority, because, as the branch manager, he
is recognized within his field as to third persons as the general agent and is in general charge of the
corporation, with apparent authority commensurate with the ordinary business entrusted him and
the usual course and conduct thereof. Moreover, the bank admitted the authority of its branch
manager to transact outside of the bank premises. The act of honoring the accounts of Tobias so
opened is an acknowledgement by CSB of the authority of Robles.
CASE NO. 13:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: COQUIA

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 14: BSP and Chuchi Fonacier vs. Hon. Nina Valenzuela, et. al.
G.R. No. G.R. No. 184778, Oct. 2, 2009
Ponente: J. VELASCO, JR.
Student Assigned: DU

DOCTRINE: There is no provision of law, no section in the procedures of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) that shows that the BSP is required to give banks copies of the Reports of Examination;
Sec. 28 of Republic Act 7653, or the New Central Bank Act, which governs examinations of banking
institutions, provides that the Report of Examination (ROE) shall be submitted to the Monetary Board
(MB) — the bank examined is not mentioned as a recipient of the ROE.
The actions of the Monetary Board (MB) under Secs. 29 and 30 of Republic Act 7653 “may not be
restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken
was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.” The banks’ remedy, as stated, is a subsequent one, which will determine whether the
closure of the bank was attended by grave abuse of discretion. Judicial review enters the picture only after
the MB has taken action; it cannot prevent such action by the MB. The threat of the imposition of
sanctions, even that of closure, does not violate their right to due process, and cannot be the basis for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
FACTS: The Supervision and Examination Department (SED) of BSP conducted examinations of the
books of certain banks, of which they found certain banks have deficiencies. For this reason, the said
banks were sent a list of findings containing the deficiencies and were then required to undertake
remedial measures which included the infusion of additional capital.
Although some banks claimed that they have made additional capital infusions, Chuchi Fonacier, the OIC
of SED sent letters to the banks informing them that they have failed to carry out the required remedial
measures. The banks then requested that they be given a copy of the Report of Examination (ROE). In
response, Fonacier reiterated the banks’ failure to comply with the directive for additional capital
infusions.
A complaint and writ of preliminary injunction was filed against Fonacier and BSP, among others. The
banks claimed that the failure to furnish them with a copy of the ROE violated their right to due process.
And so, the ROE should be nullified and that the Monetary Board (MB) should be enjoined from acting
on the basis of the said ROEs.
ISSUE: Whether the injunction against the MB is proper as the respondent banks are entitled to a copy of
the ROE. (NO.)
RULING: A writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued upon a clear showing of an actual existing
right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action.
The banks cannot point to any provision of law which entitles them to a copy of the ROEs. On the
contrary, Sec. 28 of R.A. 7653 (New Central Bank Act) which governs examinations of banking
institutions, provides that the ROE shall be submitted to the MB; the bank examined is not mentioned as a
recipient of the ROE.
The banks cannot claim a violation of their right to due process if they are not provided with copies of the
ROEs. The same ROEs are based on the lists of findings containing the deficiencies which were sent to
the respondent banks. As such, the banks were already made aware of the contents of the ROEs.
Moreover, there exists no necessity to prevent serious damage which would warrant the grant of the
injunctive writ. The actions of the Monetary Board (MB) under Secs. 29 and 30 of Republic Act 7653
“may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the
action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.” The banks’ remedy, as stated, is a subsequent one, which will determine whether
the closure of the bank was attended by grave abuse of discretion. Judicial review enters the picture only
after the MB has taken action; it cannot prevent such action by the MB. The threat of the imposition of
sanctions, even that of closure, does not violate their right to due process, and cannot be the basis for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
The "close now, hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and legal considerations to prevent
unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the
depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general public. The writ of preliminary injunction cannot,
thus, prevent the MB from taking action, by preventing the submission of the ROEs and worse, by
preventing the MB from acting on such ROEs.
The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the protection of the
public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits.
Unless adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against distressed and mismanaged
banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy
itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all
deserve the protection of the government. The respondent banks have failed to show their entitlement to
the writ of preliminary injunction.
CASE NO. 15:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: DULLAS

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 16: Hermosa Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. Represented by its statutory
liquidator, The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), Petitioner vs.
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Respondent.
G.R. No. 222972, February 10, 2021
Ponente: Inting, J.
Student Assigned: GONZALES, Anne Gelique


DOCTRINE: Section 30 of RA 7653 "is curative in character when it declared that the liquidation
court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the disputed
claims against the Bank." The Court explained that the rationale for consolidating all claims
against the bank with the liquidation court is "to prevent multiplicity of actions against the
insolvent bank and x x x to establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank,
to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness." The Court
stated that it was the intention, of the lawmaking body "that for convenience only one court, if
possible, should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court
should assist the Superintendent of Banks and regulate his operations."
FACTS: Hermosa Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.(Hermosa Bank) obtained a loan from the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) through the Industrial Guarantee and
Loan Fund (IGLF). Hermosa Bank applied for and was accredited by the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP) as a participating financial institution. Then Hermosa Bank applied for
IGLF loans relending to several subborrowers or investment enterprises. DBP approved
Hermosa Bank’s loans and released the proceeds to the bank. DBP then filed a complaint
against Hermosa Bank and its officers for failure to remit the amortizations due on its IGLF
loans and for defrauding on its subsidiary loan.
The BSP examined Hermosa Bank’s account and discovered fraudulent acts in the preparations
and execution of the loans and their collateral documents. DBP prayed for the issuance of writ
of Preliminary Attachment against the properties of all the defendants named in the complaint.
The RTC Branch 136 issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment, which was later lifted and
discharged but reinstated by the CA. Hermosa Bank was placed under receivership with the
PDIC as the appointed receiver. PDIC filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the
Hermosa Bank before the Liquidation Court. The RTC Branch 136 initially dismissed the
complaint but reinstated it upon DBP’s motion for reconsideration. The RTC Branch 136 again
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the ruling was that the Liquidation court has
exclusive jurisdiction over all claims against the Hermosa Bank.
It was reraffled to RTC Branch 57 as the RTC Branch 136 became a family court. The RTC
Branch 57 denied DBP’s motion for reconsideration, stating that all assets of Hermosa Bank are
in custodia legis and all claims should be lodged with the Liquidation Court to avoid multiplicity
of suits.
DBP then filed an appeal before the CA. The CA reversed and side the Order of the RTC. It
ruled that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties; thus it
continued until the case is terminated. Also, that the complaint was not only against HErmosa
Bank but also against the Bank Officers who were impleaded in their personal capacities. Of
which the CA ruled that it was not among the claims that court properly resolved by the
Liquidation Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC Branch 136 and RTC Branch 57 retained jurisdiction over the
complaint despite the pendency of the petition for assistance in the liquidation of Hermosa Bank
before the Liquidation Court.
RULING: The Court held in Barrameda v. Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc, that the rule on
adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute. One of the exceptions to the rule is when the change in
jurisdiction is curative in character. According to the Court, Section 30 of RA 7653 "is curative in
character when it declared that the liquidation court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the disputed claims against the Bank." The Court
explained that the rationale for consolidating all claims against the bank with the liquidation
court is "to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank and x x x to establish due
process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations
and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness." The Court stated that it was the intention, of the
lawmaking body "that for convenience only one court, if possible, should pass upon the claims
against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should assist the Superintendent of
Banks and regulate his operations."
It is of no moment that the complaint was filed by DBP before the Hermosa Bank was placed
under receivership. The Court had ruled that the time of the filing of the complaint is immaterial
as it is the execution that will obviously prejudice the bank's other depositors and creditors.
To allow the complaint of DBP to proceed outside the Liquidation Court could result to iniquity
not only to Hermosa Bank's depositors who were the most directly affected by its closure, but
also to its other creditors because it would prioritize DBP's claim over their claims. The CA also
committed a reversible error in ruling that the Liquidation Court has no jurisdiction over the bank
employees who are being sued in their personal capacities. Section 30 of RA 7653 gives the
liquidation court the authority to "adjudicate disputed claims against the institution, assist the
enforcement of individual liabilities of the stockholders, directors and officers, and decide on
other issues as may be material to implement the liquidation plan adopted." Hence, the
Liquidation Court may resolve the respective liabilities, if any, of Hermosa Bank's officers
pursuant to Section 30 of RA 7653.
CASE NO. 17:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: GONZALEZ, Alexandria

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 18: Sps. Cristino and Edna Carbonell vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company
G.R. No. 178467
Ponente: J. Bersamin
Student Assigned: GUANIO
Topic under the Syllabus: General Banking Act of 2000 / New Central Bank Act
DOCTRINE: The General Banking Act of 2000 demands of banks the highest standards of
integrity and performance. As such, the banks are under obligation to treat the accounts of their
depositors with meticulous care. However, the banks' compliance with this degree of diligence is
to be determined in accordance with the particular circumstances of each case.
In order for gross negligence to exist as to warrant holding the respondent liable therefor, the
petitioners must establish that the latter did not exert any effort at all to avoid unpleasant
consequences, or that it wilfully and intentionally disregarded the proper protocols or procedure
in the handling of US dollar notes and in selecting and supervising its employees.
In every situation of damnum absque injuria, the injured person alone bears the consequences
because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act that does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong.
FACTS: Petitioners Sps. Cristino and Edna Carbonell withdrew US$1,000.00 in US$100 notes
from their dollar account at respondent Metrobank’s Pateros branch and traveled to Bangkok,
Thailand. While in Bangkok, they had exchanged five US$100 bills into Baht, but only four of the
US$100 bills had been accepted by the foreign exchange dealer because the fifth one was “no
good”.
Unconvinced by the reason for the rejection, they had asked a companion to exchange the
same bill at a bank in Bangkok, only for the bank teller thereat to inform them that the dollar bill
was fake, confiscate the US$100 bill and threaten to report them to the police.
Using four of the remaining US$100 bills as payment, the petitioners bought jewelry, only to be
confronted by the shop owner at the hotel lobby the next day that their four US$100 bills had
turned out to be counterfeit. The petitioners claim that the shop owner had shouted at them:
“You Filipinos, you are all cheaters!”; and that the incident has occurred within the hearing
distance of fellow travellers and several foreigners.
Upon their return to the Philippines, the petitioners confronted the manager of the respondent’s
Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had insisted that the dollar bills she had
released to them were genuine inasmuch as the bills had come from the head office.
The counsel of the petitioners had submitted the subject US$100 bills to the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) for examination and the BSP had certified that the four US$100 bills were near
perfect genuine notes. The petitioners demanded moral damages of P10 Million and exemplary
damages. They sent a written notice to the respondent, attaching the BSP certification and
informing the latter that they were giving it five days within which to comply with their demand,
or face court action.
In response, the respondent’s counsel wrote to the petitioners on March 1996 expressing
sympathy with them on their experience but stressing that the respondent could not absolutely
guarantee the genuineness of each and every foreign currency note that passed through its
system; that it had also been a victim like them; and that it had exercised the diligence required
in dealing with foreign currency notes and in the selection and supervision of its employees.
The petitioners filed an action for damages, alleging that they had experienced emotional shock,
mental anguish, public ridicule, humiliation, insults and embarrassment during their trip to
Thailand because of the respondent's release to them of five US$100 bills that later on turned
out to be counterfeit.
Prior to the filing of the suit in the RTC, the petitioners had two meetings with the respondent’s
representatives. The latter’s representatives reiterated their sympathy and regret over the
troublesome experience that the petitioners had encountered, and offered to reinstate US$500
in their dollar account, and, in addition, to underwrite a round-trip all-expense-paid trip to Hong
Kong, but the petitioners were adamant and staged a walk-out.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for lack of merit.
The petitioners appealed, but the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC with the modification of
deleting the award of attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Metrobank should be held liable for damages (— NO)
RULING: The General Banking Act of 2000 demands of banks the highest standards of integrity
and performance. As such, the banks are under obligation to treat the accounts of their
depositors with meticulous care. However, the banks' compliance with this degree of diligence is
to be determined in accordance with the particular circumstances of each case.
The petitioners argue that the respondent was liable for failing to observe the diligence required
from it by not doing an act from which the material damage had resulted by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution in the performance of its duties. Hence, the respondent was
guilty of gross negligence, misrepresentation and bad faith amounting to fraud.
The petitioners' argument is unfounded.
Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one's duties; it is a negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
is duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
In order for gross negligence to exist as to warrant holding the respondent liable therefor, the
petitioners must establish that the latter did not exert any effort at all to avoid unpleasant
consequences, or that it wilfully and intentionally disregarded the proper protocols or procedure
in the handling of US dollar notes and in selecting and supervising its employees.
The CA and the RTC both found that the respondent had exercised the diligence required by
law in observing the standard operating procedure, in taking the necessary precautions for
handling the US dollar bills in question, and in selecting and supervising its employees. Such
factual findings by the trial court are entitled to great weight and respect especially after being
affirmed by the appellate court, and could be overturned only upon a showing of a very good
reason to warrant deviating from them.
It is significant that the BSP certified that the falsity of the US dollar notes in question, which
were "near perfect genuine notes," could be detected only with extreme difficulty even with the
exercise of due diligence. Ms. Nanette Malabrigo, BSP's Senior Currency Analyst, testified that
the subject dollar notes were "highly deceptive" inasmuch as the paper used for them were
similar to that used in the printing of the genuine notes. She observed that the security fibers
and the printing were perfect except for some microscopic defects, and that all lines were clear,
sharp and well defined.
Here, although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of the
counterfeit US dollar bills, the respondent, by virtue of its having observed the proper protocols
and procedure in handling the US dollar bills involved, did not violate any legal duty towards
them. Being neither guilty of negligence nor remiss in its exercise of the degree of diligence
required by law or the nature of its obligation as a banking institution, the latter was not liable for
damages. Given the situation being one of damnum absque injuria, they could not be
compensated for the damage sustained.
CASE NO. 19: Bank of the Philippine Islands and Ana C. Gonzales vs. Spouses Fernando V.
Quiaoit and Nora L. Quiaoit
G.R. No. G.R. No. 199562, January 16, 2019
Ponente: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio
Student Assigned: MANGABAT
Topic under the Syllabus: Diligence required of a bank/Liability of Bank for Negligence
DOCTRINE:
The General Banking Act of 2000 demands of banks the highest standards of integrity and
performance:
Proximate cause is defined as the cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which the result would not have occurred.
Doctrine of Lasgt clear chance- The doctrine of last clear chance in banking transactions is that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence.
FACTS:
Fernando V. Quiaoit (Fernando) maintains peso and dollar accounts with the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) Greenhills-Crossroads Branch (BPI Greenhills). On 20 April 1999, Fernando, through
Merlyn Lambayong (Lambayong), encashed BPI Greenhills Check No. 003434 for US$20,000. The dollar
bills were handed to Lambayong inside an envelope and in bundles. Lambayong neither check nor count
them.
In a complaint filed by Fernando and his wife Nora L. Quiaoit (Nora) against BPI, they alleged that Nora
purchased plane tickets worth US$13,100 for their travel abroad, using part of the US$20,000 bills
withdrawn from BPI.
On 22 April 1999, the spouses Quiaoit left the Philippines for Jerusalem and Europe. Nora handcarried
US$6,900 during the tour. The spouses Quiaoit alleged that Nora was placed in a shameful and
embarrassing situation when several banks in Madrid, Spain refused to exchange some of the US$100
bills because they were counterfeit. Nora was also threatened that she would be taken to the police
station when she tried to purchase an item in a shop with the dollar bills. The spouses Quiaoit were also
informed by their friends, a priest and a nun, that the US dollar bills they gave them were refused by third
persons for being counterfeit. Their aunt, Elisa Galan (Galan) also returned, via DHL, the five US$100
bills they gave her and advised them that they were not accepted for deposit by foreign banks for being
counterfeit.
The spouses Quiaoit alleged that BPI failed in its duty to ensure that the foreign currency bills it furnishes
its clients are genuine. According to them, they suffered public embarrassment, humiliation, and possible
imprisonment in a foreign country due to BPI’s negligence and bad faith.
BPI countered that it is the bank’s standing policy and part of its internal control to mark all dollar bills with
“chapa” bearing the code of the branch when a foreign currency bill is exchanged or withdrawn. The dollar
bills did not bear the identiying “chapa” from BPI Greenhills and as such, they came from another source.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the spouses Quiaoit. Accordingly, BPI and the bank manager,
Nora Gonzales are ordered to pay jointly and severally the Spouses Quiaoit the following:
1. the amount of Four Thousand Four Hundred US Dollars (US$4,400) as and for actual
damages;
2. the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as and for moral damages;
3. the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as and for exemplary damages;
4. the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as and for attorney’s fees.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision. According to the Court of Appeals, BPI had been
negligent in not listing down the serial numbers of the dollar bills. The Court of Appeals further ruled that,
assuming BPI had not been negligent, it had the last clear chance or the last opportunity to avert the
injury incurred by the spouses Quiaoit abroad. The Court of Appeals ruled that BPI was the proximate,
immediate, and efficient cause of the loss incurred by the spouses Quiaoit.
ISSUES:
A. Whether BPI exercised due diligence in handling the withdrawal of the US dollar bills.
B. What is “Proximate cause”?
C. Whether the action of BPI is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the spouses Quiaoit?
D. What is the “Doctrine of last clear chance”?
E. Whether the spouses Quiaoit are entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees?
RULING:
A. BPI failed to exercise due diligence. In Spouses Carbonell v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company [G.R. No. 178467,26 April2017], the Court emphasized that the General Banking
Act of 2000 demands of banks the highest standards of integrity and performance. The Court
ruled that banks are under obligation to treat the accounts of their depositors with meticulous
care.
In this case, BPI failed to exercise the highest degree of diligence that is not only expected but required of
a banking institution.
It was established that on 15 April 1999, Fernando informed BPI to prepare US$20,000 that he would
withdraw from his account. The withdrawal, through encashment of BPI Greenhills Check No. 003434,
was done five days later, or on 20 April 1999. BPI had ample opportunity to prepare the dollar bills. Since
the dollar bills were handed to Lambayong inside an envelope and in bundles, Lambayong did not check
them. However, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, BPI could have listed down the serial numbers of
the dollar bills and erased any doubt as to whether the counterfeit bills came from it. While BPI Greenhills
marked the dollar bills with “chapa” to identify that they came from that branch, Lambayong was not
informed of the markings and hence, she could not have checked if all the bills were marked.
BPI insists that there is no law requiring it to list down the serial numbers of the dollar bills. However, it is
well-settled that the diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family [Philippine
National Bank v. Spouses Cheah 686 PhiL 760 (2012)]. Banks are required to exercise the highest
degree of diligence in its banking transactions.In releasing the dollar bills without listing down their serial
numbers, BPI failed to exercise the highest degree of care and diligence required of it. BPI exposed not
only its client but also itself to the situation that led to this case. Had BPI listed down the serial numbers,
BPI’s presentation of a copy of such listed serial numbers would establish whether the dollar bills came
from BPI or not.
B. Proximate cause is defined as the cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which the result would not have occurred.
C. The action of BPI is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the spouses Quiaoit. Granting that
Lambayong counted the two bundles of the US$100 bills she received from the bank, there was no way
for her, or for the spouses Quiaoit, to determine whether the dollar bills were genuine or counterfeit. They
did not have the expertise to verify the genuineness of the bills, and they were not informed about the
“chapa” on the bills so that they could have checked the same. BPI cannot pass the burden on the
spouses Quiaoit to verify the genuineness of the bills, even if they did not check or count the dollar bills in
their possession while they were abroad.
D. The Court has also applied the doctrine of last clear chance in banking transactions. In Allied Banking
Corporation v. Bank of the Philippine Islands [705 Phil. 174 (2013)], the Court explained:
The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the part of the
defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply except upon that
assumption. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from
recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair
chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in situations where the
doctrine has been applied, it was defendant’s failure to exercise such ordinary care, having the last clear
chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury.
BPI had the last clear chance to prove that all the dollar bills it issued to the spouses Quiaoit were
genuine and that the counterfeit bills did not come from it if only it listed down the serial numbers of the
bills. BPI’s lapses in processing the transaction fall below the extraordinary diligence required of it as a
banking institution. Hence, it must bear the consequences of its action.
E. Respondents are entitled to moral damages and attorney’s fees but not exemplary damages.
We sustain the award of moral damages to the spouses Quiaoit.

In Pilipinas Bank v. Court of Appeals [304 Phil. 601 (1994)], the Court sustained the award of moral
damages and explained that while the bank’s negligence may not have been attended with malice and
bad faith, it caused serious anxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation to respondents. We apply the same
in this case. In this case, it was established that the spouses Quiaoit suffered serious anxiety,
embarrassment, humiliation, and even threats of being taken to police authorities for using counterfeit
bills. Hence, they are entitled to the moral damages awarded by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, we delete the award of exemplary damages since it does not appear that BPI’s negligence
was attended with malice and bad faith. We sustain the award of attorney’s fees because the spouses
Quiaoit were forced to litigate to protect their rights.
CASE NO. 20:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: MARCOS

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 21:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: MILA

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 22:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: NEO

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 23: INTINGEN vs CA

G.R. No. G.R. No. 128996
Ponente: DE LEON, JR., J.
Student Assigned: OMAR

Bank Secrecy Law/Foreign Currency Deposits Act
DOCTRINE:
When the accounts involved are US dollar deposits (or any other foreign currency), RA
6426 of the “Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines” is applicable and not RA 1405 or
the Bank Secrecy Law. RA 6426 provides only ONE exception to the absolutely confidential
nature of bank deposits, this is: upon written permission of the depositor.
FACTS:
Citibank filed a complaint for violation of Sec. 31 in rel. to Sec. 144 of the Corporation
Code against its 2 officers Dante L. Santos and Marilou Genuino when the higher manager of
Citibank assigned its VP Vic Lim to investigate certain anomalous/ highly irregular activities of
the Treasurer of Global Consumer and its Assistant VP, Santos and Genuino respectively. Ms.
Marilou Genuino apart from being an Assistant Vice President in the office of Mr. Dante L.
Santos also performed the duties of an Account Officer. An Account Officer in the office of Mr.
Dante L. Santos personally attends to clients of the bank in the effort to persuade clients to
place and keep their monies in the products of Citibank, N.A., such as peso and dollar deposits,
mortgage backed securities and money placements, among others.
Records show that Santos and Genuino, contrary to their disclosures and the
aforementioned policy of the bank, appeared to be actively engaged in business endeavors that
were in conflict with the business of the bank. It was found out that with the use of 2 companies
in which they have personal financial interest, namely Torrance Development Corp. and Global
Pacific Corp., they managed or caused existing bank clients/ depositors to divert their money
from Citibank to products offered by other companies that were commanding higher rate of
yields. This was done by transferring bank clients’ monies to Torrance and Global which in turn
placed the monies of the bank clients in securities, shares of stock and other certificates of third
parties. It also appeared that out of these transactions, Santos and Genuino derived substantial
financial gains.
The clients which Santos and Genuino helped/caused to divert their deposits/ money
placements with Citibank was Intengan, Neri and Brawner who have long standing accounts
with Citibank in savings/dollar deposits and/or in trust accounts and/or money placements.
Thus, Lim presented bank records purporting to establish the deception by Santos and
Genuino, some of these documents pertain to the dollar deposits of Intengan, Neri and Brawner
(Petitioners). Petitioners then filed their respective motions for exclusion and physical
withdrawal of their bank records that were attached to Lim’s affidavit on the ground that such
disclosure was unwarranted and illegal for violation of RA 1405. RTC and CA denied the
motions.
CA - The disclosure of petitioners' deposits was necessary to establish the allegation

that Santos and Genuino had violated Section 31 of the Corporation Code in acquiring "any
interest adverse to the corporation in respect of any matter which has been reposed in him in
confidence." To substantiate the alleged scheme of Santos and Genuino, private respondents
had to present the records of the monies which were manipulated by the two officers which
included the bank records of herein petitioners. As long as the bank deposits are material to the
case, although not necessarily the direct subject matter thereof, a disclosure of the same is
proper and falls within the scope of the exceptions provided for by R.A. No. 1405.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Citibank may be held responsible for the disclosure of the records of the
accounts.
RULING:
No, it is incorrect as the accounts herein were dollar accounts, thus RA 6246 applies.
Consequently, RA 6246 prescribes only one exception to the rule on absolute confidentiality of
bank accounts, and that upon written permission of the depositor. Nonetheless, as the case was
improperly filed as a violation of RA 1405 and the prescriptive period of 8 years (as provided for
under Sec. 1 Act 3326) has lapsed, prescription has set in. Thus, petitioners are left with no
other alternative remedy.
In the case at bar, a case for violation of Republic Act No . 6426 should have been the
proper case brought against private respondents. Private respondents Lim and Reyes admitted
that they had disclosed details of petitioners' dollar deposits without the latter's written
permission. It does not matter if that such disclosure was necessary to establish Citibank's case
against Dante L. Santos and Marilou Genuino. Lim's act of disclosing details of petitioners' bank
records regarding their foreign currency deposits, with the authority of Reyes, would appear to
belong to that species of criminal acts punishable by special laws, called malum prohibitum .
However, applying Act No. 3326, the offense prescribes in eight years. Private
respondent Vic Lim made the disclosure in September of 1993 in his affidavit submitted before
the Provincial Fiscal. The case is decided in 2002. Thus, per available records, private
respondents may no longer be haled before the courts for violation of Republic Act No. 6426.
Likewise, it cannot be argued that the filing of the complaint or information in the case at
bar for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 1405 had the effect of tolling the prescriptive period,
for it is the filing of the complaint or information corresponding to the correct offense which
produces that effect.
CASE NO. 24:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: PAVIA

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 25: Marquez v. Desierto

G.R. No. 135882
Ponente: PARDO, J.
Student Assigned: PEPINGCO
Topic under the Syllabus: Bank Secrecy Law
DOCTRINE: Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case
before a court of competent jurisdiction. The account in question must also be clearly identified,
and the inspection must be limited to the subject matter of the pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and account holder must also be notified to be
present during inspection, with the inspection only covering the account identified in the pending
case.
FACTS:
1. Lourdes T. Marquez is a branch manager of Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP).
Marquez received an order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto to produce
several bank documents for inspection in camera 1. The documents pertain to accounts
involved in a pending case before the Ombudsman2.
2. The pending case (Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Lagdameo) involves
51 manager’s checks purchased by an individual, totalling P272.1M at Traders Royal
Bank. 11 of those manager’s checks, totalling P70.6M, were deposited and credited to
an account maintained in UB.
3. Marquez wrote to the Ombudsman, explaining that the accounts in question cannot be
readily identified, requesting for more time. This is partly due to the fact that the checks
were issued in cash/bearer, and partly to the fact that the accounts to which they were
deposited have long been dormant.
1 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “in camera” as “a judicial action that is taken when court is not in
session.”
2 Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Sec. 15), and pertinent jurisprudence, the
Ombudsman has the power to investigate and require the production and inspection of records and
documents.
4. Not satisfied with this line of reasoning, as well as the fact that the in camera inspection
was already extended twice, the Ombudsman issued an order directing Marquez to
produce the documents relative to the accounts in issue.
5. This prompted Marquez and UB to file a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition, and
injunction with the RTC Makati against the Ombudsman. The petition was intended to
seek a declaration from the court of her rights, since the provision Ombudsman Act and
the Bank Secrecy Law seem to be in contradiction.
6. The Ombudsman filed a motion to dismiss the petition for declaratory relief on the
ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear a petition for relief from the orders of the
Ombudsman, per Ombudsman Act (Sec. 14 and 27).
7. The RTC denied the Ombudsman’s motion to dismiss (as well as Marquez’ motion for
reconsideration filed at the same time).
8. Back to the case pending with the Ombudsman, FFIB motioned to cite Marquez for
contempt. Marquez filed an opposition to this motion on the ground that the filing was
premature due to the petition pending with the RTC. Marquez reiterates that she simply
wanted to clarify how she should comply with the Ombudsman order without violating
the Bank Secrecy Law.
9. The Ombudsman denied Marquez’ opposition to the contempt hearing, and ordered her
to appear before it. Marquez motioned for reconsideration, but this was also denied.
Case elevated to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned
account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R. A. No. 1405), or
not.
RULING:
1. The Court explains that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. The account in question must
also be clearly identified, and the inspection must be limited to the subject matter of
the pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction.
2. The bank personnel and account holder must also be notified to be present during
inspection, with the inspection only covering the account identified in the pending case.
3. The Court cites Union Bank of the Philippines v. CA, in which it held that Sec. 2 of the
Bank Secrecy Law declares that bank deposits must be absolutely confidential, except:
a. In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a
bank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being
satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious
irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into
the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,
b. In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to
conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes
only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank,
c. Upon written permission of the depositor,
d. In cases of impeachment,
e. Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, or
f. In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
4. The Court further explains that there is no pending litigation yet, before any competent
authority, only the investigation by the Ombudsman. Thus, no reason for the opening of
the bank account for inspection.
5. Lastly, Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law,
the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.
CASE NO. 26: 26) Karen E. Salvacion, et. al vs. Central Bank, et. al, G.R. No. 94723. Aug.
21, 1997
G.R. No. 94723
Ponente: Torres, Jr., J.
Student Assigned: QUIAMCO
Topic under the Syllabus: Foreign Currency Deposits

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, foreign currency deposits cannot be garnished. However,
in this case, the court made an exemption due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding
the case wherein a foreign transient raped a filipino citizen.
FACTS: Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, detained and repeatedly raped Karen
Salvacion, a 12-year old the victim, in the apartment of the accused in Makati City. That, on the
4th day of detention, Karen was finally found by the policemen after a neighbor heard her crying
and screaming for help. The accused was immediately arrested within the premises of the
building, and eventually brought to Makati Municipal Jail.
After thorough investigation and medical examination, the victim, as represented by her parents,
together with the Fiscal filed criminal cases against Greg Bartelli y Northcott for Serious Illegal
Detention and for Four (4) counts of Rape. The petitioners also filed a separate civil action for
damages with preliminary attachment against the accused that had several dollar accounts in
COCOBANK and China Banking Corporation. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a
hearing for Bartelli’s petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.
The deputy sheriff served Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation but the latter
declined to furnish a copy as it invoked R.A. No. 1405. The sheriff again sent a letter stating that
the garnishment did not violate the bank secrecy law as it was legally made by virtue of a court
order but China Banking Corporation invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, that
dollar accounts are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever. The Central
Bank sent a reply after a demand from the court asking if the Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No.960 is absolute in nature of which it replied in affirmative.
After the accused was declared in default, the court rendered a judgment in favor of the
petitioners based on the heinous acts of the accused and the grave effects on social, moral and
psychological aspects on the part of the petitioners. China Banking Corporation refused the Writ
of Execution of the court. Thus;
Petitioners file a Petition for Relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dollar accounts of the accused is absolutely exempt from
attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court.
RULING: As a general rule, foreign currency deposits cannot be garnished.
However, in this case, the court made an exemption due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding the case wherein a foreign transient raped a filipino citizen.
If we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient,
injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg
Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano
de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those
fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used
as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the
expense of the innocent
CASE NO. 27:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: RAMIREZ

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 28:

G.R. No. 168644
Ponente: Peralta. J.
Student Assigned: RENTUTAR

DOCTRINE: What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation, the inquiry into bank
deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the money deposited
in the account is itself the subject of the action.
FACTS: Ricardo Bangayan is the president of BSB Group, Inc., a duly organized domestic
corporation. Respondent Sally Go is Bangayan’s wife, who was employed in the company as a
cashier.
Bangayan filed a complaint for qualified theft against respondent, alleging that several checks
were, instead of being turned over to the company’s coffers, deposited by respondent to her
personal account maintained at Security Bank. The Information provides specifically that the
accused stole and carried away cash money in the total amount of ₱1,534,135.50.
The prosecution presented in court the testimony of Elenita Marasigan (Marasigan), the
representative of Security Bank. Marasigan testified that respondent, while as cashier, was able
to run away with the checks and credit the amounts to her personal account in Security Bank.
Marasigan also identified the checks.
Respondent filed a Motion to Suppress, seeking the exclusion of Marasigan’s testimony and
accompanying documents thus far received, bearing on the subject Security Bank account
invoking the privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying documents are violative of the
absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405
RULING: YES. Petitioner claims that the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying
documents are exempted from the coverage of the confidentiality rule. Petitioner in the instant
case posits that the account maintained by respondent with Security Bank contains the
proceeds of the checks that she has fraudulently appropriated to herself and, thus, falls under
one of the exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 – that the money kept in said account is the
subject matter in litigation.
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation has already been pointedly and amply
addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, in which the Court noted that
the inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that
the money deposited in the account is itself the subject of the action.
In the criminal Information filed with the trial court, respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain
language, is charged with qualified theft by abusing petitioner’s trust and confidence and
stealing cash in the amount of ₱1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no factual allegation
that in some material way involves the checks subject of the testimonial and documentary
evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said Information make mention
of the supposed bank account in which the funds represented by the checks have allegedly
been kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security Bank account
is the ostensible subject of the prosecution’s inquiry. Without needlessly expanding the scope of
what is plainly alleged in the Information, the subject matter of the action in this case is the
money amounting to ₱1,534,135.50 alleged to have been stolen by respondent, and not the
money equivalent of the checks which are sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is that,
which the prosecution is bound to prove with its evidence, and no other.
CASE NO. 29: JOSEPH EJERCITO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 157294-95
Ponente:Justice Carpio Morales
Student Assigned: ROSARIO
Topic under the Syllabus: Bank Secrecy

DOCTRINE: If the money deposited under an account may be used by banks for authorized
loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor
relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the
law precisely seeks to protect
FACTS: In lieu of the Criminal Case “People v. Estrada” for plunder, the Special Prosecution
Panel filed before the Sandiganbayan a request for issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum
directing the President of Export and Industry Bank or his/her authorized representative to
produce documents namely, Trust Account and Savings Account belonging to petitioner and
statement of accounts of one named “Jose Velarde” and to testify thereon during the hearings.
Sandiganbayan granted both requests and subpoenas were accordingly issued. Sandiganbayan
also granted and issued subpoenas prayed for by the Prosecution Panel in another later date.
Petitioner now assisted by his counsel filed two separate motions to quash the two subpoenas
issued. Sandiganbayan denied both motions and the consequent motions for reconsideration of
petitioner.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the trust accounts of petitioner are covered by the term “deposits” as used in
R.A. No. 1405
(2) Whether or not plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty not exempted from protection
of R.A. No. 1405
(3) Whether or not the unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence
obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence.
RULING:
(1) YES. An examination of the law shows that the term “deposits” used therein is to be
understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor
relationship between the depositor and the bank.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1. If the money deposited under an account
may be used by banks for authorized loans to third persons, then such account,
regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and
the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect
for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the country.
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between
petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers “deposit, placement or
investment of funds” by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited
under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank
but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A.
1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by banks in
other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.
Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term “deposits” was
intended to be understood broadly. The phrase “of whatever nature” proscribes any
restrictive interpretation of “deposits.” Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted
provision that, generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those
which are invested. This further shows that the law was not intended to apply only to “deposits”
in the strict sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase “or
invested.”
(2) NO. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty
and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making
bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the
other. This policy expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any person who
enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his
duty, is open to public scrutiny.
The crime of bribery and the overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes committed by public
officers, and in either case the noble idea that “a public office is a public trust and any person
who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to
his duty, is open to public scrutiny” applies with equal force.
Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases
of bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.
(3) NO. Petitioner’s attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails.
R.A. 1405, it bears noting, nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of bank
accounts shall render the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence. Section
5 of R.A. 1405 only states that “any violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction,
to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand
pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.”
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule applies in principle to cases
involving R.A. 1405, the Court finds no reason to apply the same in this particular case. Clearly,
the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine presupposes a violation of law. If there was no
violation of R.A. 1405 in the instant case, then there would be no “poisonous tree” to
begin with, and, thus, no reason to apply the doctrine.
CASE NO. 30:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: SANTOS

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 31:

G.R. No. 174269
Ponente: Tinga, J.
Student Assigned: STA. ANA
Topic under the Syllabus: AMLA

DOCTRINE:
The Court’s construction of Section 11 of the AMLA is undoubtedly influenced by right to privacy
considerations. If sustained, petitioner’s argument that a bank account may be inspected by the
government following an ex parte proceeding about which the depositor would know nothing
would have significant implications on the right to privacy, a right innately cherished by all
notwithstanding the legally recognized exceptions thereto. The notion that the government could
be so empowered is cause for concern of any individual who values the right to privacy which,
after all, embodies even the right to be "let alone," the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized people.
FACTS:
A series of investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by
the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff of petitioner Anti-Money Laundering Council.
The Office of the Solicitor General wrote the AMLC requesting the latter’s assistance “in obtaining more
evidence to completely reveal the financial trail of corruption surrounding the NAIA 3 Project.” The AMLC
issued Resolution No. 75, whereby the Council resolved to authorize the Executive Director of the AMLC
“to sign and verify an application to inquire into and/or examine the deposits or investments of Pantaleon
Alvarez, Wilfredo Trinidad, Alfredo Liongson, and Cheng Yong, and their related web of accounts
wherever these may be found, x x x;” and to authorize the AMLC Secretariat “to conduct an inquiry into
subject accounts once the Regional Trial Court grants the application to inquire into and/or examine the
bank accounts” of those four individuals.
Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire into or examine
the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the RTC of Makati.
The Makati RTC rendered an Order granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject
accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong.
The Republic, through the AMLC filed an application before the Manila RTC to inquire into and or
examine thirteen accounts and two related web of accounts all having been used to facilitate corruption in
the NAIA 3 Project. The Manila RTC issued an Order granting the Ex-Parte Application.
ISSUE:
Whether an application for authorization of an inquiry order ex-parte is valid.
RULING:
We are unconvinced by this proposition, and agree instead with the then Solicitor General who conceded
that the use of the phrase "in cases of" was unfortunate, yet submitted that it should be interpreted to
mean "in the event there are violations" of the AMLA, and not that there are already cases pending in
court concerning such violations. If the contrary position is adopted, then the bank inquiry order would be
limited in purpose as a tool in aid of litigation of live cases, and wholly inutile as a means for the
government to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain an intended prosecution of the
account holder for violation of the AMLA. Should that be the situation, in all likelihood the AMLC would be
virtually deprived of its character as a discovery tool, and thus would become less circumspect in filing
complaints against suspect account holders.
Still, even if the bank inquiry order may be availed of without need of a pre-existing case under the AMLA,
it does not follow that such order may be availed of ex parte. There are several reasons why the AMLA
does not generally sanction ex parte applications and issuances of the bank inquiry order. Of course,
Section 11 also allows the AMLC to inquire into bank accounts without having to obtain a judicial order in
cases where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for
ransom, certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, hijacking and other
violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder. Since such special circumstances do not
apply in this case, there is no need for us to pass comment on this proviso.
Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze order under Section 10 and the bank inquiry
order under Section 11 are similar in that they are extraordinary provisional reliefs which the AMLC may
avail of to effectively combat and prosecute money laundering offenses. Crucially, Section 10 uses
specific language to authorize an ex parte application for the provisional relief therein, a circumstance
absent in Section 11. If indeed the legislature had intended to authorize ex parte proceedings for the
issuance of the bank inquiry order, then it could have easily expressed such intent in the law, as it did with
the freeze order under Section 10.
The Court could divine the sense in allowing ex parte proceedings under Section 10 and in proscribing
the same under Section 11. A freeze order under Section 10 on the one hand is aimed at preserving
monetary instruments or property in any way deemed related to unlawful activities as defined in Section
3(i) of the AMLA. The owner of such monetary instruments or property would thus be inhibited from
utilizing the same for the duration of the freeze order. To make such freeze order anteceded by a judicial
proceeding with notice to the account holder would allow for or lead to the dissipation of such funds even
before the order could be issued.
On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical
seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the
particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The monetary
instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical
sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder’s record of deposits and
transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to be inspected under a bank
inquiry order cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder.
CASE NO. 32:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: TIU

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 33:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: VALENZUELA

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 34: Subido vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 216914
Ponente: Perez, J.
December 06, 2016
Student Assigned: VELASCO

DOCTRINE: Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into
certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive due process, there being no physical
seizure of property involved at that stage. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such
banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details
such as the account holder's record of deposits and transactions.
The sole investigative functions of the AMLC find more resonance with the investigative functions of the
NBI. In Shu vs. Dee, the Court ruled that the functions of NBI are merely investigatory and informational in
nature. Since the NBI's findings were merely recommendatory, the SC found that no denial of the
respondent's due process right could have taken place; the NBI's findings were still subject to the
prosecutor's and the Secretary of Justice's actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable
cause.
FACTS:
In connection with the investigation regarding the disproportionate wealth of VP Binay and his family,
various news reports announced the inquiry into VP Binay’s bank accounts, including accounts of
members of his family. SPCMB was most concerned with the article published in the Manila Times on
entitled "Inspect Binay Bank Accounts" which provides that the AMLC asked the CA to allow to peek into
the bank accounts of Binay, their corporation and SPCMB, the law firm which Abigail Binay was a former
partner. SPCMB then wrote to CA Justice Reyes inquiring the veracity of the report. Within 24 hrs, Justice
Reyes replied saying that petition is strictly confidential and cannot disclose anything about it.
Subsequently, Manila Times published another article entitled, "CA orders probe of Binay's assets"
reporting that the appellate court had issued a Resolution granting the ex-parte application of the AMLC
to examine the bank accounts of SPCMB. Believing that it had no other remedy, SPCMB filed this present
case questioning the constitutionality of Section 11 of AMLA. It alleged that the ex-parte proceedings
authorizing the inquiry of the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments is unconstitutional due to
the violation of its rights to due process and privacy.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Section 11 is violative of SPCMB right to due process. - No.
2. W/N Section 11 is violative of SPCMB right to privacy – No
RULING:
1. W/N Section 11 is violative of SPCMB right to due process – No.
The right to due process has two aspects: (1) substantive which deals with the extrinsic and intrinsic
validity of the law; and (2) procedural which delves into the rules the government must follow before it
deprives a person of its life, liberty or property. Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte application
and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive due
process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage. It is the preliminary and actual
seizure of the bank deposits or investments in question that brings these within reach of the judicial
process, specifically a determination that the seizure violated due process.
What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of particular deposits or investments in banking
institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such
banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details
such as the account holder's record of deposits and transactions.
Concerning the procedural due process, the SC emphasized that AMLC only exercised investigative
powers and not quasi-judicial powers. The enabling law itself, the AMLA, specifies the jurisdiction of the
trial courts, RTC and Sandiganbayan, over money laundering cases, and delineates the investigative
powers of the AMLC. The sole investigative functions of the AMLC finds more resonance with the
investigative functions of the NBI. In Shu vs. Dee, the Court ruled that the functions of NBI are merely
investigatory and informational in nature. Since the NBI's findings were merely recommendatory, the SC
find that no denial of the respondent's due process right could have taken place; the NBI's findings were
still subject to the prosecutor's and the Secretary of Justice's actions for purposes of finding the existence
of probable cause. Thus, SPCMB is not entitle to any notice of such proceedings.
2. W/N Section 11 is violative of SPCMB right to privacy – No.

Unlike in the US, wherein the US Supreme Court ruled that there was no legitimate expectancy of privacy
as to the bank records of a depositor, in the Philippines, although our Constitution did not allocate specific
rights peculiar to bank deposits, it is quite clear that such privacy is respected pursuant to Bank Secrecy
Act. The general rule of absolute confidentiality is simply statutory i.e., not specified in the Constitution,
which has been affirmed in jurisprudence. The exceptions to the general rule of absolute confidentiality
have also been carved out by the Legislature which legislation have been sustained, albeit subjected to
heightened scrutiny by the courts; and such legislated exception is Section 11 of the AMLA.
Moreover, although the government can indeed into the privacy of the bank account owners, Section 11
have sufficient safeguards like: AMLC is required to establish probable cause, the CA should also
establish probable cause, bank inquiry for related account should be preceded by bank inquiry for the
principal account and that it should comply with Art 3, Section 2 and 3 of the Constitution.
CASE NO. 35:

G.R. No. G.R. No. 176944
Ponente: BRION, J.:
Student Assigned: ALARIAO

DOCTRINE: The effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the CA for a period not exceeding six
months. Before or upon the lapse of this period, ideally, the Republic should have already filed a case for civil
forfeiture against the property owner with the proper courts and accordingly secure an asset preservation
order or it should have filed the necessary information. Otherwise, the property owner should already be able
to fully enjoy his property without any legal process affecting it.
FACTS: Lt. Gen. Ligot declared in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth
(SALN) that as of December 31, 2003, he had assets in the total amount of Three Million
Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand and Three Pesos (₱3,848,003.00). In contrast, his
declared assets in his 1982 SALN amounted to only One Hundred Five Thousand Pesos
(₱105,000.00). The Ombudsman’s investigation revealed that Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family
had other properties and bank accounts, not declared in his SALN, amounting to at least
Fifty Four Million One Thousand Two Hundred Seventeen Pesos (₱54,001,217.00).
Bearing in mind that Lt. Gen. Ligot’s main source of income was his salary as an officer of
the AFP, and given his wife and children’s lack of any other substantial sources of income,
the Ombudsman declared the assets registered in Lt. Gen. Ligot’s name, as well as those in
his wife’s and children’s names, to be illegally obtained and unexplained wealth. The
Ombudsman’s investigation also looked into Mrs. Ligot’s younger brother, Edgardo
Tecson Yambao. Despite Yambao’s lack of substantial income, the records show that he
has real properties and vehicles registered in his name, amounting to Eight Million Seven
Hundred Sixty Three Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱8,763,550.00), which he
acquired from 1993 onwards. The Ombudsman concluded that Yambao acted as a dummy
and/or nominee of the Ligot spouses, and all the properties registered in Yambao’s name
actually belong to the Ligot family.
Compliance and Investigation staff (CIS) of the AMLC conducted a financial investigation,
which revealed the existence of the Ligots’ various bank accounts with several financial
institutions. On May 25, 2005, the AMLC issued Resolution No. 52, Series of 2005,
directing the Executive Director of the AMLC Secretariat to file an application for a freeze
order against the properties of Lt. Gen. Ligot and the members of his family with the
CA.The appellate court granted the application in its July 5, 2005 resolution, ruling that
probable cause existed that an unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense had been
committed by Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family, including Yambao, and that the properties
sought to be frozen are related to the unlawful activity or money laundering offense.
Accordingly, the CA issued a freeze order against the Ligots’ and Yambao’s various bank
accounts, web accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of 20 days from the date of issuance.
On July 26, 2005, the Republic filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Effectivity of
Freeze Order. The CA granted the motion in its September 20, 2005 resolution, extending
the freeze order until after all the appropriate proceedings and/or investigations have been
terminated.
In November 15, 2005, the "Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset
Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing,
Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense under
Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended" (Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases) took effect. Under
this rule, a freeze order could be extended for a maximum period of six months.
Lt. Gen. Ligot argues that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it extended the freeze order issued against
him and his family even though no predicate crime had been duly proven or established to
support the allegation of money laundering. He also maintains that the freeze order issued
against them ceased to be effective in view of the 6-month extension limit of freeze orders
provided under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases.
ISSUE: 1. WON the CA erred in extending the effectivity period of the freeze order against
Ligot, given that they have not yet been convicted of committing any of the offenses
enumerated under RA No. 9160 that would support the AMLC’s accusation of money-
laundering activity.
2. WON the CA erred in extending the effectivity period of the freeze order against Ligot
for six years.
RULING: 1. NO.
Contrary to the Ligots’ claim, a freeze order is not dependent on a separate criminal
charge, much less does it depend on a conviction.
The legal basis for the issuance of a freeze order is Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended
by RA No. 9194, states:
Section 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. – The Court of Appeals, upon
application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that
any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as
defined in Section 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately.
The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court.
Based on Section 10 quoted above, there are only two requisites for the issuance of a freeze
order: (1) the application ex parte by the AMLC and (2) the determination of probable
cause by the CA. The probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order differs
from the probable cause required for the institution of a criminal action, and the latter was
not an issue before the CA nor is it an issue before us in this case. As defined in the law, the
probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order refers to "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe
that an unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is about to be, is being or has
been committed and that the account or any monetary instrument or property subject
thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful activity and/or money
laundering offense."
In other words, in resolving the issue of whether probable cause exists, the CA’s
statutorily-guided determination’s focus is not on the probable commission of an unlawful
activity (or money laundering) that the Office of the Ombudsman has already determined
to exist, but on whether the bank accounts, assets, or other monetary instruments sought to
be frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal activities enumerated under RA No.
9160, as amended. Otherwise stated, probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the relation
between an unlawful activity and the property or monetary instrument which is the focal
point of Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended.
The Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases expressly provides –
SEC. 28. Precedence of proceedings. - Any criminal case relating to an unlawful activity
shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any offense or violation under Republic
Act No. 9160, as amended, without prejudice to the filing of a separate petition for civil
forfeiture or the issuance of an asset preservation order or a freeze order. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. [italics supplied; emphases ours]
Section 10 of RA No. 9160 (allowing the extension of the freeze order) and Section 28
(allowing a separate petition for the issuance of a freeze order to proceed independently) of
the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases are only consistent with the very purpose of the freeze
order, which specifically is to give the government the necessary time to prepare its case
and to file the appropriate charges without having to worry about the possible dissipation
of the assets that are in any way related to the suspected illegal activity.
2. Yes.
A freeze order, however, cannot be issued for an indefinite period. A freeze order is an
extraordinary and interim relief issued by the CA to prevent the dissipation, removal, or
disposal of properties that are suspected to be the proceeds of, or related to, unlawful
activities as defined in Section 3(i) of RA No. 9160, as amended. The primary objective of a
freeze order is to temporarily preserve monetary instruments or property that are in any
way related to an unlawful activity or money laundering, by preventing the owner from
utilizing them during the duration of the freeze order. The relief is pre-emptive in
character, meant to prevent the owner from disposing his property and thwarting the
State’s effort in building its case and eventually filing civil forfeiture proceedings and/or
prosecuting the owner.
Our examination of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended, from the point
of view of the freeze order that it authorizes, shows that the law is silent on the maximum
period of time that the freeze order can be extended by the CA. The final sentence of
Section 10 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 provides, "the freeze order shall be
for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court." In contrast, Section 55 of
the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases qualifies the grant of extension "for a period not
exceeding six months" "for good cause" shown.
We observe on this point that nothing in the law grants the owner of the "frozen" property
any substantive right to demand that the freeze order be lifted, except by implication, i.e., if
he can show that no probable cause exists or if the 20-day period has already lapsed
without any extension being requested from and granted by the CA. Notably, the Senate
deliberations on RA No. 9160 even suggest the intent on the part of our legislators to make
the freeze order effective until the termination of the case, when necessary.
The silence of the law, however, does not in any way affect the Court’s own power under
the Constitution to "promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights xxx and procedure in all courts." Pursuant to this power, the Court
issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, limiting the effectivity of an extended freeze order to six
months – to otherwise leave the grant of the extension to the sole discretion of the CA,
which may extend a freeze order indefinitely or to an unreasonable amount of time –
carries serious implications on an individual’s substantive right to due process.
Thus, as a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the CA for a period not
exceeding six months. Before or upon the lapse of this period, ideally, the Republic should
have already filed a case for civil forfeiture against the property owner with the proper
courts and accordingly secure an asset preservation order or it should have filed the
necessary information. Otherwise, the property owner should already be able to fully enjoy
his property without any legal process affecting it. However, should it become completely
necessary for the Republic to further extend the duration of the freeze order, it should file
the necessary motion before the expiration of the six-month period and explain the reason
or reasons for its failure to file an appropriate case and justify the period of extension
sought. The freeze order should remain effective prior to the resolution by the CA, which is
hereby directed to resolve this kind of motion for extension with reasonable dispatch.
CASE NO. 36: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Anti-Money

Laundering Council, Petitioner, v. FIRST PACIFIC NETWORK INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 156646
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.
Student Assigned: ALCAZAREN

DOCTRINE: History of the amended sec.10 of RA 9160.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9160, which: the AMLC may issue a freeze order, which
shall be effective immediately, on the account for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days the
AMLC may be extended upon order of the court, provided that the fifteen (15)-day period shall
be tolled pending the court's decision to extend the period. On March 5, 2003 Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 9194 amended sec.10 of RA 9160 into” the Court of Appeals may issue a
freeze order which shall be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of
twenty (20) days unless extended by the court”.
Meanwhile, on November 15, 2005, The Supreme court promulgated Rule of Procedure
in Cases of Civil Forfeiture Section 53(b) of this rule, a freeze order could be extended for a
maximum period of six months.
Congress further amended Section 10 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 with
Republic Act No. 10167 which was made into law on June 6, 2012 as follow “Court of Appeals
may issue a freeze order, which shall be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a
period of twenty (20) days from filing of the petition.unless extended by the court”.
Republic Act No. 10365, which was enacted on February 15, 2013, further amended
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9160 by mandating that the Court of Appeals may issue a freeze
order the duration of which shall not exceed six months otherwise it would be considered lifted.
FACTS:AMLC received a report from Reynaldo Geronimo that the respondent FPN engaged in
an Illegal securities trading and the proceeds thereof were deposited in Standard Charted Bank in
ayala Makati. Subsequently, a searched warrant issued by the RTC and the NBI forthwith able to
seize several documents, client files, documents showing the share transactions of client and that
First Pacific was not registered with the SEC to engage in the buying and selling of securities.
The AMLC directing the immediate issuance and service of the freeze order upon First Pacific's
account.
Before the lapse of the freeze order, AMLC requested the Court of Appeals to extend the
effectivity of the freeze order against respondent First Pacific Network, Inc.'s (FPN) bank
account with the main branch of Standard Chartered Bank. On September 5, 2002 the Court of
Appeals gave the AMLC an extension of not more than 30 days. Dissatified after petitioner’s
motion for partial reconsideration denied by CA filed a petition for review of CA decision for
extension of free order.
ISSUE:whether the freeze order issued against respondent's bank account should be further
extended beyond the thirty (30)-day period?
RULING: The SC finds no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals to extend Freeze Order.
In Ligot v. Republic, A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim relief issued by the
CA to prevent the dissipation, removal, or disposal of properties that are suspected to be the
proceeds of, or related to, unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of RA No. 9160, as
amended. The primary objective of a freeze order is to temporarily preserve monetary
instruments or property that are in any way related to an unlawful activity or money laundering,
by preventing the owner from utilizing them during the duration of the freeze order. The relief is
pre-emptive in character, meant to prevent the owner from disposing his property.
(Doctrine supplied). In the case at bar, The state of law and jurisprudence at the time of
the issuance of the assailed ruling of the Court of Appeals gave the appellate court discretion to
extend a freeze order only for a reasonable period of time which was later clarified by Rule in
Civil Forfeiture Cases (sec.53 (b)) as not exceeding more than six ( 6) months.
CASE NO. 37:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: ALIPIO

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 38:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: AROLLADO

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 39:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: BALICOCO

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 40:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: BASILIO

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 41:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: BAUZON

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 42:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: BERNARDO

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 43:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: BILGERA

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 44:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: CAAGBAY

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
CASE NO. 45:

G.R. No.
Ponente:
Student Assigned: CARIAS

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

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CASE DIGESTS ON BANKING LAWS

Student Assigned: ALARIAO

Topic under the Syllabus:

CASE NO. 2: ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES MARIO ANTONIO

Topic: DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY

Doctrine: Allied Bank, as a Bank, is required to exercise Extraordinary Diligence in

CASE NO. 3: Landbank of the Philippines vs. Gualberto Catadman

Student Assigned: ALUMNO

On October 8, 2001, Land Bank sent another demand letter to Catadman.

Catadman did as he promised. However, after paying an accumulated amount of

Ruling of the MTTC:

Ruling of the RTC:

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

Student Assigned: AROLLADO

Topic under the Syllabus:

CASE NO. 5: Soriano vs. People, G.R. Feb. 1, 2010

Student Assigned: BALICOCO

The other Information was for violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD

The Court does not agree.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 6: Apolinario, Jr. y Llauder vs. People

Student Assigned: BASILIO

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the DOSRI Law

Student Assigned: BAUZON

Topic under the Syllabus: The New Central Bank Act

Student Assigned: BERNARDO

Topic under the Syllabus: New Central Bank Act

CASE NO. 9: Central Bank of the Phils. v. CA,

Ponente: Davide, JR., J

Student Assigned: BILGERIA

Topic under the Syllabus: New Central Bank Act

CASE NO. 10:

Student Assigned: CAAGBAY

Topic under the Syllabus:

CASE NO. 11:

Student Assigned: CARIAS

Topic under the Syllabus: New Central Bank Act

ISSUE: Whether Jamarobo violated Section 27 (d) of RA 7653 as amended by RA 11211.

Thus, there was a violation of Section 27 (d) of Ra 7653.

G.R. No. 227990

Ponente: Reyes, JR.

Student Assigned: COBARTE

DOCTRINE: LIABILITY OF BANK TO 3RD PERSONS FOR ACTS DONE BY ITS

Judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Robles to pay plaintiff.

Reversed and set aside the RTC's decision.

CASE NO. 13:

Student Assigned: COQUIA

Topic under the Syllabus:

Ponente: J. VELASCO, JR.

Topic under the Syllabus:

CASE NO. 15:

Student Assigned: DULLAS

Topic under the Syllabus:

Student Assigned: GONZALES, Anne Gelique

Topic under the Syllabus:

CASE NO. 17:

Student Assigned: GONZALEZ, Alexandria

Topic under the Syllabus:

Student Assigned: GUANIO

The petitioners' argument is unfounded.

Student Assigned: MANGABAT

We sustain the award of moral damages to the spouses Quiaoit.

CASE NO. 20: