Book 6 Module 5

CATEGORY B1 B2
FLY-BY-WIRE
ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS
ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT

Licence By Post

For best examination

results always use latest
issue number.

Licence By Post © Copyright B EASA 66 5.4 5.14 5.15 ISSUE 05 1213

© Licence By Post
No part of this study book may be re-produced or distributed in any form or by any means, or
stored in a data base or retrieval system in whole or in part without prior written permission
from Licence By Post.

Books in the LBP series are regularly up-dated/re-written to keep pace with the changing
technology, changing examination requirements and changing legal requirements.
AUTHORITY

It is IMPORTANT to note that the information in this book is for study/training

purposes only.

When carrying out a procedure/work on aircraft/aircraft equipment you MUST

always refer to the relevant aircraft maintenance manual or equipment
manufacturer’s handbook.

You should also follow the requirements of your national regulatory authority
(the CAA in the UK) and laid down company policy as regards local
procedures, recording, report writing, documentation etc.

For health and safety in the workplace you should follow the
regulations/guidelines as specified by the equipment manufacturer, your
company, national safety authorities and national governments.
CONTENTS

Page

Fly-by-wire 1
The A320 system 2
The B777 system 10
Power-by-wire 14
Ground proximity warning 14
Information management systems 23
ACARS 29
CMCS 31
Integrated modular avionics (IMA) 43
IMA systems 45
The Boeing system 46
The Airbus system 49
Electromagnetic environment 54
Electromagnetic Capability 55
Systems testing 61
Aerial earthing and static discharge devices 61
Earth loops 61
Appendix - Syllabus 62
HOW TO TACKLE THIS BOOK

Written for the B1/B2 engineer. The A line mechanic should study our books
specifically written to that level. The B1 engineer should check the syllabus in
book 1 to verify knowledge levels though with most of the book the level is the
same for the B1 and B2 person – level 2.

This book is similar to the others in the module 5 series as far as the advice is
concerned on how to study the contents.

You will need a sound knowledge of the subject and, at least, some knowledge
of the aircraft specific terms used.

Again, the examples of aircraft systems used are mainly those of Boeing and
Airbus – because they are the most prolific users of these technologies.

If you are currently working on aircraft then you should look at the systems on
your aircraft. If it has similar systems such as data systems, computer
systems etc, then you should study those systems so that you can compare
them with the systems described in this book. You should note the similarities
and the differences.

You should be able to describe each of the systems in this book to a person
who has little knowledge of them, so that person understands the function and
testing of the system/s.
 FLY-BY-WIRE (FBW)

A considerable weight saving is achieved by replacing all the mechanical

linkages (cables, rods, pulleys etc) by electrical wires and computers.

Many modern airliners are now using this technology to include the B777,
A320 and the A380.

The A320 has a fly-by-wire system where the pilot’s inputs are via a side stick
positioned on his/her left side (the right-hand side for the second officer) and
rudder pedals. The B777 is also fly-by-wire (with some fly-by-light) but has
conventional flight deck controls (control wheels and rudder pedals).

With both aircraft, when the pilot puts an input into the flying control system,
a signal from the control (in or near the flight deck) provides an electrical
signal to the flying control computers. These provide electrical analogue
signals to electrically controlled Power Flying Control Units (PFCUs) near the
flying control surfaces. The PFCUs are powered from the aircraft hydraulic
systems.

It is similar on the A380 except that all PFCUs are self-contained units, each
having its own electrically powered hydraulic system – similar, in principle, to
the VC10 PFCUs.

Control position and aircraft attitude is feed back to the computer so it can
monitor the aircraft’s movement.

The main advantages of fly-by-wire are:

* Saving in weight.
* Requires less maintenance.
* Is more responsive.
* Is more economic.
* Easier to provide in-built protection systems.

Disadvantages include the fact that the system is all electrical/electronic and
is supply critical, also electromagnetic interference such as lightning strikes
could be a problem. The system has back-up facilities such duplication and
triplication of hardware and software. To overcome the possibility of complete
electrical failure there is a mechanical standby mode. It gives limited flying
control authority but if all else fails it can be used.

The A320 and the B777 are typical of modern fly-by-wire aircraft which meet
the requirements of EASA CS25. In this respect it is important that you
understand the principles of their control systems but there should be no need
to commit any type details to memory.

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THE A320 SYSTEM

The flight control system, consist of primary and secondary systems. The
primary systems include ailerons, roll spoilers, elevators, trimable horizontal
stabiliser (tailplane) and rudder to control roll, pitch and yaw.

The secondary systems comprise leading edge slats and trailing edge flaps for
low speed flight handling, airbrakes/load alleviation spoilers for deceleration
/load alleviation at all flight speeds and lift dumpers for deceleration after
landing. The control surfaces are hydraulically actuated and electrically or
mechanically controlled. Input signals for the various controls are:

Pitch Control
Elevator - Electrical.
Stabiliser - Electrical for normal or alternate control.
Mechanical for manual trim control.
Roll Control
Ailerons - Electrical.
Spoilers - Electrical.
Yaw Control
Rudder - Mechanical (electrical for yaw damping,
turn co-ordination and trim).
Load Alleviation Spoilers - Electrical.
Slat/Flap Control - Electrical.
Speed Brake Control - Electrical.

Controls in the cockpit consist of two side sticks (in place of the normal control
column), rudder pedals and pedestal mounted controls and indicators.

Fig. 1 FLYING CONTROLS – A320

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Electrical control is achieved by three types of computer:

* The ELAC (Elevator and Aileron Computers). There are two of

these for aileron, normal elevator and stabiliser control.

* The SEC (Spoilers and Elevator Computers). These three achieve

upper wing surfaces (spoilers) control, standby elevator and
stabiliser control.

* The FAC (Flight Augmentation Computers). These two computers

control the rudder.

In addition the Flight Control Data Concentrator acquires data from the
ELAC’s and SEC’s and sends this to the ECAM (Electronic Centralised Aircraft
Monitor), the flight deck screen displays and CFDS.

Fig. 2 A320 FLY-BY-WIRE – GENERAL ARRANGEMENT

The Electrical Flight Control System (EFCS) includes the ELACs, SECs,
FCDCs and vertical accelerometers.

The EFCS is designed according to the following principles:

(a) Redundancy and Dissimilarity

The EFCS includes two ELACs, three SECs, two FCDCs and four
accelerometers. The ELACs and SECs are both able to achieve roll and
pitch control of the aircraft.

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 These two types of computer differ in their internal architecture,
hardware, type of microprocessor, software, and are built by different
manufacturers. For each computer type, the control and monitoring
software are also different.

By having the computers different in terms of hardware and software,

but both designed to satisfy the same parameters, the possibility is
remote that if there is a fault in one the chances are almost zero that the
same fault is in the other.

(b) Monitoring

The monitoring of each computer is achieved as follows:

* Monitoring channel. Each computer consists of two physically and

electrically separated channels, one being dedicated to the control
functions, the other to the monitoring functions. These two
channels perform the actuator command signal computation
using different digital processes. The monitoring channel
permanently compares the results of these computations and
inhibits the signal to the actuator, should a discrepancy occur.

* Self-monitoring capacity. Each channel is able to detect the failure

of the critical signals it receives or it emits and to detect internal
failures by testing of the processor and monitoring of its internal
power supply.

* Cross-talk. Each control and associated monitoring channel

permanently exchange information via digital buses, therefore
consolidating and validating information received from different
sensors.

* Automatic power-on and pressure-on safety tests performed

without movement of the surfaces.

Pitch Control

Pitch control is achieved by two elevators and a Trimable Horizontal Stabiliser

(THS).

Elevators

Two electrically controlled hydraulic servo jacks (sometimes called PFCUs –

Power Flying Control Units) are fitted on each elevator.

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Each servo jack has 3 control modes:

* Active = servo jack position is electrically controlled.

* Damping = servo jack follows control surface movement.
* Centring = servo jack is hydraulically maintained in the neutral
position.

In normal operation: - One servo jack is in active mode.

- The other one is in damping mode.
- Some manoeuvres (high load factors) may cause
the second servo jack to become active.

In case of failure of the active servo jack the damped one becomes active and
the failed jack is automatically switched to the damping mode.

If the servo jacks are not electrically supplied, they are automatically switched
to the centering mode.

Stabiliser (tailplane)

Actuated by a screw jack driven by two hydraulic motors. These two hydraulic
motors are in turn driven by one of three electric motors or the mechanical
trim wheel.

Mechanical control from the pitch trim hand wheel has priority over electrical
control.

Fig. 3 THE ELEVATOR/STABILISER SYSTEM

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Roll Control

Roll control is achieved by one aileron and four spoilers on each wing.

The Ailerons

Two electrically controlled hydraulic servo jacks are fitted to each aileron.

Each servo jack has two control modes, active and damping. Damping mode
is automatically selected in case of hydraulic low pressure or electrical failure.
When aileron demands come from the Load Alleviation Function (LAF)
computer, the two jacks of each aileron become active.

Fig. 4 THE AILERON SYSTEM

The ailerons are normally controlled from ELAC 1 in which case the left and
right ailerons are driven by the blue and green hydraulic systems servo jacks
respectively.

If a failure occurs in ELAC 1, the aileron control is automatically transferred to

ELAC 2. In the event of blue or green hydraulic system low pressure, ELAC 2
takes over control of the affected aileron.

In case of double ELAC failure, or both blue and green hydraulic systems low
pressure, all aileron servo jacks revert to damping mode (ie a zero aerodynamic
hinge moment deflection).

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Spoilers

Each surface is controlled by one servo control supplied from either the green,
yellow or blue hydraulic system, which is controlled from SEC 1, 2 or 3.

Surfaces are automatically retracted to zero position when a fault is detected

by the corresponding SEC, or when not electrically supplied.

In case of loss of hydraulic pressure the surface remains at the existing

position unless it is pushed down by the airflow.

Load Alleviation Function (LAF)

The load alleviation function, which operates through the ailerons and spoilers
4 and 5, becomes active only in turbulent conditions (pilot control authority is
not modified) in order to relieve wing structure loads.

The high hydraulic supply demands required to achieve the rapid surface
movements are provided with the help of dedicated hydraulic accumulators.

The LAF becomes active at more than 0.3g in which case:

* The ailerons are deflected symmetrically upwards (order computed

by the ELAC’s). Maximum 10° added to roll demand if required.
* The spoilers 4 and 5 are deflected symmetrically (order computed
by the SEC’s). Maximum 25° added to roll demand if required.

The load alleviation is inhibited when:

* FLAPS lever not in 0 position.

* Speed below 200kt, or
* Slats/flaps wing tip brake engaged (asymmetry detected).

Alternate Law

If the normal law cannot be achieved (ELAC fault, SEC fault, aileron/spoiler
servo jack fault, accumulator fault) an alternate law is provided. In this case
the maximum deflection is increased to 15° for ailerons and 35° for the
spoilers. Moreover the ailerons are pre-deflected to 6° up.

Yaw Control

The rudder is powered by three independent hydraulic jacks which operate in

parallel and are controlled from the flight deck via a conventional cable flying
control system from the rudder bar. It is not fly-by-wire and is always
available.

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Yaw Damping and Turn Co-ordination

In flight yaw damping and turn co-ordination functions are automatic.

In normal operation the three hydraulic servo jacks are driven by the green
hydraulic servo actuator controlled by FAC 1. A yellow servo actuator
controlled by FAC 2 remains synchronised and will take over in case of failure.

The yaw commands for turn co-ordination and yaw damping are computed by
the ELACs and transmitted to the FACs. There is no feedback to the rudder
pedals from yaw damping turn co-ordination functions.

Yaw Alternate Law

The alternate yaw damper becomes active if roll normal law control fails. Only
the yaw damping function is available and damper authority is limited to ± 5°
of rudder.

Rudder Trim

Rudder trim is achieved by two electric motors acting at the artificial feel unit.
In normal operation FAC 1/motor 1 are driving with FAC 2/motor 2 remaining
synchronised as back up.

Fig. 5 THE RUDDER SYSTEM

Manual Flight

The pilot can apply rudder trim at 1°/sec from the RUD TRIM rotary switch.

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Automatic Flight

Autopilot (A/P) commands (yaw auto trim) are applied.

Engine Failure

In manual control (roll normal law) asymmetry compensation is computed by

the ELACs and transmitted through the FACs is applied for fine trimming,
after the rudder has been approximately trimmed by the pilot. When the A/P is
engaged, rudder trim orders are computed by the FAC and FMGC.

Mechanical Control

The two pairs of rudder pedals are interconnected and drive a cable system to
the artificial feel unit, which is linked via a differential to the rudder hydraulic
actuator.

A/P Control

The trim actuator and yaw damper servo actuators are used to introduce the
A/P signals. The trim actuator drives the mechanical control (and pedals)
through the artificial feel unit.

In this mode the artificial feel breakout force is increased by a solenoid

actuated device (100N [about 10kg] although kg is strictly a mass and not a
force).

The ELAC and SEC also feed two computers and the FCDC. These monitor and
analyse ELAC and SEC maintenance messages at power on (on ground), in-
flight and after touch-down.

Fig. 6 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM – GENERAL ARRANGEMENT

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It stores the data and delivers failure indications, eg stored failures, failure
history, trouble shooting as well as failed LRUs to the Centralised Fault
Display Interface Unit for onward transmission to the Maintenance Control
Display Unit.

THE B777 SYSTEM

The Boeing 777, like the A320, has a highly integrated flying control system.
Unlike the A320 it uses conventional flight-deck controls. Signalling is via
ARINC 629 data buses, and various computers and control units. The control
surfaces are hydraulically powered via PCUs (supply from the aircraft’s
hydraulic systems) and electrically analogue signalled.

The flight deck controls consist of a control column for control of the elevators
with a hand wheel for control of the ailerons, flaperons, and roll spoilers. The
rudder bar controls the rudder.

These controls are provided with artificial feel and back-drive motors to move
them in the correct sense when the system is in autopilot mode. An aileron
trim actuator is also fitted in the system.

When the flight deck controls are moved transducers under the cabin floor
convert the movement to an analogue electrical signal to be sent to the
appropriate control computer where it is converted to a digital signal.

From here the signal is sent via the ARINC 629 to other computers in the
system.

The ARINC 629 data bus is a twisted pair of wires transmitting data in both
directions to all computers/LRUs (Line Replaceable Units). Each computer
/LRU is connected to the bus by untwisting the twisted pair locally and
clamping on an Inductive Couple Unit (which does not cut the insulation of the
bus).

In operation, each computer listens to the bus and waits for a quiet period
before it transmits. It then waits its turn until all the other computers/LRUs
have transmitted before transmitting again (the system of listening and
transmitting is called "protocol").

Transmitting and receiving is carried out on the same bus. Any computer/LRU
can listen to any data on the bus and receive the data according to how its
personality PROM (Programmable Read Only Memory) is programmed. In other
words the computer's permanent memory knows what information on the data
bus is for its use.

Having recognised that the information on the bus at that instant is to be

"read", it will take it in, put it in temporary store (RAM) and act on it according
to its pre-programmed instructions.

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The flight control system uses 3 buses (LEFT, CENTRE and RIGHT).

Fig. 7 FLIGHT CONTROLS ARINC 629 DATA BUS SYSTEM - B777

Note the TRIM ACTUATOR, FEEL UNIT, BACKDRIVE ACTUATOR and TRANSDUCERS (XDCRs)
Fig. 8 AILERON/FLAPERON FLIGHT DECK LINKAGE - B777

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Flight deck control movement is converted into an electrical analogue signal by
transducers (XDCRs) fitted to the flying control system under the flight deck
floor. This signal is then sent to the Actuator Control Electronics LRU (ACE).

The pilot's controls are connected via the ACE unit to the PCU. Other units
such as the Primary Flight Computer (PFC) are connected into the system by
the ARINC 629 bus. The drawing below shows a block schematic for the
ailerons and the rudder and elevators are similar in principle.

The hand-wheels are connected electronically to the ailerons and flaperons,

and mechanically by cable to some of the spoilers.

The flight deck control is connected to position and force transducers, which
signals the pilot's intention by an analogue signal to the ACE. This is in two
way communication via the data bus with the PFC. An analogue command
signal is sent to the PCU to move the ailerons in the desired direction.
Positional feedback is sent to the ACE which controls the range and speed of
movement of the PCU - and hence the control surface.

The flight deck controls have artificial feel to simulate air loads on the control
surfaces and trimming is achieved by biasing the system neutral by a trim unit
actuator.

Note the analogue signals with all the other signals being digital.
Fig. 9 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM - NORMAL OPERATION - B777

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Should one side jam then the other side can be operated independently by
overcoming the force limiters. Should the spoiler control cables become
jammed then system operation is assured by the shear-out action of the cable
pulley.

The flight control system can operate in three modes: (1) Normal Mode;
(2) Secondary Mode - the same as Normal but some of the protection devices
such as bank angle protection do not work and; (3) Direct Mode where some of
the computers are not used. Direct Mode is selectable by the pilot or
automatically selected by the system.

Autopilot

When autopilot is engaged and a signal is sent to move the controls the back-
drive actuator will move the pilots controls in response to the autopilot
commands. Whenever the autopilot is engaged the back-drive actuators are
active. This system gives the same effect as some mechanical systems, ie when
autopilot commands a control surface movement the flight deck controls move
in the same sense (correct direction).

This simulates a conventional mechanical system - which most pilots are

conversant with, thus being more reassuring to the flight crew.

When autopilot is selected the PCU is controlled by the ACE, PFC and
Autopilot Flight Director Computer (AFDC) via the bus. The AFDC will also
send an analogue signal to the back-drive actuator to move the flight deck
controls to correspond to control surface movement. Thus the system
simulates closely the characteristics of a conventional mechanical flying
control system.

Fault Finding

Besides checking the AMM fault location section there is an on-board fault
finding computer which is accessed via the Maintenance Access Terminal
(MAT) on the flight deck.

The MAT comprises:

* A display screen.
* Keyboard.
* Trackball, similar to a mouse which controls the cursor.
* Selection switch.

A Portable MAT (PMAT) can be used which is plugged into the system at
various points on the aircraft.

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To use the MAT proceed as follows:

1. Check the logbook for any recorded defects.

2. Check any warning flags and/or displays in the flight deck (elect
power on). These are called Flight Deck Effects (FDEs).
3. Check for any displays on the EICAS CRTs. (EICAS = Engine
Indicating and Crew Alerting System) (elect power on).
4. At the MAT terminal on the flight deck select either:
* INBOUND FDEs
* LINE MAINTENANCE FDEs
* FAULT HISTORY
5. Under each FDE there will be a maintenance message. Select
MAINTENANCE MESSAGE DATA and the recommended
maintenance action will be displayed.

Some tests can also be carried out using the MAT. These can cause the control
surfaces to move as well as the flight deck controls, so it is important to
ensure that they are free to move with no obstructions, and warning notices
displayed.

POWER-BY-WIRE (PBW)

A new concept introduced by Airbus for the A380 whereby the flying control
systems are powered electrically using electro hydrostatic actuators (EHAs).
There are two duplicate PBW systems used as back-up to the two hydraulic
systems. The PBW systems are controlled electrically – ie is also a FBW control
system.

GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING

The purpose of the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) is to alert the
flight crew to the existence of an unsafe condition due to terrain proximity, or
a windshear condition. There are several different systems available and the
description that follows is based on the Sundstrand MARK V GPWS system.

GPWS Modes

The various hazardous conditions that can be encountered in flight are divided
into the following modes:

Mode 1 Excessive descent rate.

Mode 2 Excessive closure rate with respect to rising terrain.
Mode 3 Excessive altitude loss during climb-out (in take-off or during go-
around) when not in landing configuration (landing gear up
and/or flaps less than 25 units).

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Mode 4 Insufficient terrain clearance when not in landing
configuration (landing gear up and/or flaps less than 25 units).
Mode 5 Excessive deviation below glide slope when making a front
course approach with the gear down.
Mode 6 DH alerting – radio altitude call-outs.
Mode 7 Windshear, whenever windshear conditions are encountered.

Modes 1 and 2 are alert/warning modes. Modes 3 to 5 are alert only modes.
Mode 7 is a warning only mode.

Mode Annunciations

The GPWS modes are annunciated in the flight compartment by means of

aural messages and lights. The aural messages are announced over the aural
warning loudspeakers.

Lights

Warning annunciations include the illumination of the red PULL UP light, the
red WINDSHEAR light, and both master warning lights.

Alert annunciations include the illumination of the amber alerting light GND
PROX.

Fig. 10 GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM

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Note from figure 10 the following:

* The inputs into the GPW computer.

* The outputs from the GPW computer to the symbol generators,
light warnings, oral warnings and master warnings.
* The inputs into the electronic ADIs from the GPW computer.

Take a moment to study figure 11 and note that the inputs/outputs into/out
of the GPWC is similar to that shown in figure 10.

Fig. 11 GPWS – INPUT & OUTPUTS

Note from figures 12 and 13 the flight deck warnings given under various
circumstances. Take a moment to study the drawings and relate the details to
the text.

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 Fig. 12 FLIGHT DECK WARNINGS

EADI Displays

A windshear condition is shown by the red WINDSHEAR annunciation on the

EADI.

Mode Envelope Modulation

In earlier systems, at a number of locations around the world, nuisance

annunciations were generated because of specific terrain profiles. When the
aircraft is flying in one of these locations and the GPWS senses conditions that
would generate nuisance annunciations, the respective mode envelopes are
specially modulated to prevent such nuisance annunciations.

Figure 11 shows the inputs and outputs to the GPWS Computer (GPWC).

The GND-PROX-G/S INHIB light/switch has a dual function. It’s amber light
is used as an alerting indication for modes 1 to 5.

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 Fig. 13 MODE 5 & MODE 6 OPERATION

Its switch, when pressed, cancels MODE 5 when actuated below 1000ft on
approach. Figure 12 shows the indications when each mode is in operation.

Mode 7 is the ‘WINDSHEAR’ mode and figure 13 shows the flight deck
indications should this occur. When windshear has been detected this inhibits
all other warnings.

GPWS Flight Compartment Self-test

The GPWS flight compartment self-tests provide a means to check the system.
If the flight compartment self-test indicates the presence of a malfunction, the
GPWS self-test readout (initiated from GPWC front panel) will indicate the
faulty LRU.

Two types of flight compartment self-test are available. These are the
confidence self-test and the full vocabulary self-test.

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 Fig. 14 WINDSHEAR MODE ANNUNIATIONS

Both self-tests are started by actuating the ground proximity test switch in the
flight deck.

Flight Compartment Confidence Self-Tests

The confidence self-test can be performed either in flight, or on the ground.

The test is started at the time the test switch is momentarily actuated.

When the self-test is started, the aural message “GLIDE SLOPE” is voiced and
the amber alerting switch/light GND PROX-G/S INHB illuminates. Then
follows the aural message “WHOOP WHOOP PULL-UP”, and the red warning
light PULL-UP and the master warning lights illuminate. After that, the aural
“WINDSHEAR” is annunciated, the red WINDSHEAR light and the master
warning lights are illuminated, and the red “WINDSHEAR” indication appears
on the EADI.

If malfunctions are present, the self-test may be inhibited in part or

completely. Details are shown in figure 15.

BITE Test

The GPWS fail discrete is sent to EICAS when the GND PROX test switch is in
the TEST position or when the confidence test (or the full vocabulary test) is in
progress. This discrete causes EICAS to display the EICAS level M/S message
GND PROX BITE after a delay of six seconds.

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Fig. 15 FLIGHT COMPARTMENT SELF TEST

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Test Conditions

For the confidence self-test to be started in the air, the radio altitude must be
over 1000ft. For it to be started on the ground, the radio altitude must be less
than 1ft and the computed airspeed less than 60kt.

Flight Compartment Full Vocabulary Self-Test

The test is initiated by holding the ground proximity test switch in the test
position through the WINDSHEAR annunciations of the confidence test. The
full-vocabulary self-test can be initiated only on the ground.

On test initiation, the same internal computer checks are executed as the ones
in the confidence self-test on the ground. Subsequently, the confidence test
aural and visual indications are annunciated, followed by all the available
aural messages voiced in the order shown in the graphic.

Neither the red warning lights PULL-UP, WINDSHEAR, or the master warning
lights, nor the amber alerting light switch GND PROX-G/S INHB illuminate
during the full vocabulary self-test. During the full vocabulary test, the EICAS
level M/S message GND PROX BITE is displayed. This message comes on six
seconds after the initial actuation of the test switch. Figure 15 shows the self-
test procedure and annunciations.

GPWC Self-Test (Front Panel)

The computer front panel self-test checks the status of the computer. They
provide a front panel readout of its present status, or of faults that occurred
during the last ten flight segments as recorded in the fault memory. No aural
messages and no visual indications are annunciated in the flight compartment
during this GPWC self-test.

Computer PRESENT STATUS Self-Test

The present status self-test is initiated by momentarily placing the spring-

loaded status/history toggle switch to present status. The test message then
scrolls in the front panel BITE display window from right to left.

Normal Display. If no faults have been detected, the display includes:

(1) test pattern

(2) “IN TEST” message
(3) various system options selected
(4) “SYSTEM OK” message
(5) number of software version; and finally
(6) “END OF TEST” message.

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Fault Display. If there are faults, the display annunciates the detected faults,
such as, “RADIO ALTIMETER INVALID”, “ILS DATA INACTIVE”, “IRS DATA
INACTIVE”, etc. A full list of available messages is shown in figure 16.

Some faults do not cause the EICAS message “GND PROX BITE” to come on.
Others inhibit only parts of the self-test.

Computer FLIGHT HISTORY Self-Test

The computer flight history self-test is initiated by momentarily placing the

STATUS/HISTORY toggle switch to the flight history position.

Test Results - Flight Segments

The fault readout includes faults that occurred during any of the last ten flight
segments. A flight segment starts when RA is greater than 5ft and airspeed is
greater than 90kt or the air/ground discrete shows in-air.

A flight segment ends when RA is less than 1ft and airspeed is less than 60kt.
No faults can be written into the fault memory on the ground. Flight segment
numbering begins with flight 1 as the most recent flight segment.

Normal Displays

When no faults were stored in the fault memory, the display reads “PREVIOUS
TEN FLIGHTS OK”.

Fault Display

If there are faults recorded in the fault memory, the display announces the
recorded faults, such as, “GPWC FAILED”, “RADIO ALTITUDE INVALID”, or
“AIR DATA INACTIVE”, and the flight numbers during which these faults
occurred. A list of available fault messages is shown in figure 16.

blank

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 Fig. 16 COMPUTER SELF TEST

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

With the introduction of computers into aircraft it is possible to gather

information as to the status of all the systems (HUMS - Health and Usage
Monitoring Systems on helicopters for example) and down-load this to other
computers either via a ground link or, whilst in-flight, using sat-com. Up to
now large aircraft have relied on various systems data being available in more
than one computer. On modern aircraft this data is collected by an
information management system and stored in one computer – for easy access
by ground crew.

The B777 System

On the Boeing 777 an integrated digital avionics system allows for the
collection of large amounts of data. The Airplane Information Management
System (AIMS) integrates the avionic computing functions that require large
quantities of data collection, processing and calculations. On some aircraft
this would require the use of several LRUs to handle these functions.

The AIMS has two cabinets, each has eight line replaceable modules (LRMs),
four input/output modules (IOM) and four core processor modules. The
cabinets interface with 130 LRUs, sensors, switches and indicators. Figure 17
shows the main systems.

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 Fig. 17 777 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

As can be seen by reference to figure 18 the AIMS cabinets receive data from
different digital buses (analogue and discrete signals). LRUs within the
cabinets provide a data conversion gateway function (DCGF) and this provides
seven types of data conversion and transfers. These are:

1. Receives ARINC 429 data, analogue signals and analogue discrete

signals and transmits this to the Flight Controls (FC) ARINC 629
buses.
2. Receives ARINC 429 data analogue signals and analogue discrete
signals and transmit this data to the systems ARINC 629 buses.
3. Receive data from the FC ARINC 629 buses and transmit this to
the ARINC 629 buses.
4. Receive data from the ARINC 629 system buses and transmit this
to the FC ARINC 629 buses.
5. Receive data from the FC ARINC 629 buses and transmit ARINC
429 data, analogue signals and analogue discrete signals.
6. Receive data from the systems ARINC 629 buses and transmits
ARINC 429 data, analogue signals and analogue discrete signals.
7. Data transfers between same types of buses and data transfers
and data transfers between analogue and ARINC 429 buses.

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 Fig. 18 AIMS INTERFACES

The system (figure 19) consists of six flat panel liquid crystal displays:

* Two Primary Flight Displays (PFD)

* Two Navigation Displays (ND)
* Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS)
* Multifunction Display (MFD)

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Fig. 19 FLIGHT DECK MULTI FUNCTION DISPLAYS

- 26 -
Failure of a system is indicated by amber flags.

Similar to the previous system the ND can be switched to other display units
as can the EICAS and MFD. The MFD can display: secondary engine
parameters, status displays, synoptic displays, maintenance pages,
communication display and electronic check-lists.

The AIMS cabinet also feeds the :

1. Flight Management Computing System (FMCS).

2. Thrust Management Computing System (TMCS).
3. Aeroplane Condition and Monitoring System (ACMS).
4. Flight Data Recording System (FDRS).
5. Data Communication System (DCS).
6. Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS).
7. Global Positioning System (GPS).
8. Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS).
9. Central Maintenance Computing System (CMCS).

The CMCS collects, keeps and shows maintenance data for most of the aircraft
systems. The CMCS is used to carry out fault isolation and testing.

The crew uses a Maintenance Access Terminal (MAT) on the flight deck or a
portable MAT (PMAT) in the main equipment centre to operate the CMCS,
other locations are available on the aircraft to use a PMAT.

Fig. 20 GPS – GENERAL LAYOUT

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 Fig. 21 ATC MODE S TCAS

The Global Positioning System (GPS) uses navigation satellites to supply

accurate aeroplane position to the Flight Management Computer System and
the Air Data and Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU). The GPS calculates
aeroplane latitude, longitude, altitude and exact time. The ADIRU supplies
initial reference position and air data parameters to enable the Global
Positioning Sensor Units to find the best satellites during system initialisation.
The GPS reports faults and test results to the Central Maintenance Computing
System.
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There are a group of satellites that orbit the earth at about 10,900 miles
(17,500km) altitude. There are 21 operational satellites plus 3 spares. Each
satellite completes an orbit every 12 hours and 4 satellites are needed at the
same time for an accurate aircraft position to be computed.

The TCAS alerts the flight crew to possible collisions with other aircraft, using
the Air Traffic Control/Mode S Transponder System. The TCAS II gives two
types of advisory. The Traffic Advisory, giving information of another aircraft in
the area, and the Resolution Advisory, which tells the crew the best manoeuvre
to avoid a collision. This information is shown on the PFDs and NDs. The
Central Maintenance Computing System supplies test and fault reporting
functions for TCAS.

ARINC COMMUNICATION ADDRESSING

& REPORTING SYSTEM (ACARS)

This system enhances air-ground communications and reduces flight crew

workload through the use of high speed digital data link messages. These
messages down link from the aircraft to an operations centre by way of VHF
radio, then by landlines and the ARINC data link control station. Messages can
up-link to an aircraft through the same network. Voice communication
between the aircraft and ground telephone circuits is also possible. The
network covers the USA, Europe and many other countries. Figure 22 shows
the data link between the aircraft and the airline’s operations centre.

Fig. 22 ARINC COMMUNICATION SYSTEM DATA LINK SYSTEM

The ACARS Management Unit (MU) on the aircraft provides:

(a) Collecting data from the aircraft systems automatically or on

command.
(b) Sends data to a VHF transceiver.
(c) Sends and receives data between the aircraft and ground stations.
(d) Alerts the flight crew modularised avionics and warning assembly
(MAWEA) with a chime that a voice call is ready.

- 29 -
The ACARS Switch Module is used to connect the centre or right VHF
transceiver with either of the ACARS MUs.

The Control Display Units (CDUs) on the flight deck are used for:

(a) Control and down-link data input to the MU.

(b) Voice or data mode selection.
(c) Up-link message display.
(d) Centre or right VHF transceiver selection.

The EFIS/EICAS Interface Units (EIUs) inputs to the ACARS MU giving

chocks-off, take-off, landing, chocks-in and aircraft ident information.

The Airborne Data Loader (ADL) loads ACARS software.

The Central Maintenance Computer (CMC) sends system fault data to the
ACARS MU for down-link and receives ACARS fault data.

The Data Management Unit (DMU) sends Aircraft Condition Monitoring System
(ACMS) report data to the ACARS MU for down-link. The Audio Management
Unit (AMU) turns on the VHF call lights on the Audio Control Panels (ACPs)
when a voice call is ready.

ACARS can send data to the flight deck printer. The ACARS MU select switch
controls which ACARS MU is active.

Fig. 23 ACARS - OVERVIEW

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The VHF transceiver, down-links data from the aircraft to the ground station
and receives up-link data from the ground to the aircraft. The Radio
Communication Panels (RCPs) are used for voice or data mode selection.
Outputs from the active ACARS MU go through the ACARS/VHF switching
module.

CENTRAL MAINTENANCE COMPUTER SYSTEM (CMCS)

What follows is based on the Boeing system, but all modern aircraft have
systems which perform similar functions.

The CMCS consists of two identical CMCs. These computers, in conjunction

with the three flight deck mounted CDUs, an optional electrical equipment bay
mounted CDU, the IDS, and an optional cockpit printer, provide maintenance
functions for the various aircraft systems.

These functions include:

a) Selection and display of maintenance messages corresponding to

equipment faults for present and past flights.
b) Selection and de-selection of maintenance page displays for the
IDS.
c) Flight deck initiation and display of individual subsystem BITE.

Fig. 24 CMCS FLIGHT DECK COMPONENT LOCATION

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 Fig. 25 CMCS COMPONENT LOCATION

Fig. 26 CMCS FLIGHT DECK DISPLAYS & CONTROLS

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The CMCS has the capability to print maintenance information on the optional
multiple-input cockpit printer and to output maintenance information through
the optional ACARS system.

Fig. 27 CMCS COMPONENTS

Central Maintenance Computers

Two identical CMCs are provided for redundancy and any one is capable of
providing a complete CMCS function. Both CMCs continuously process all
inputs and generate all outputs.

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The inputs to both CMCs are connected in parallel. The outputs of the right
CMC are connected to the selection relay in the left CMC. This relay normally
selects the left CMC as a source of output data to the aircraft systems.
However, if the left CMC fails, the relay will then connect the outputs of the
right CMC to the aircraft systems. For the outputs of the right CMC to be
connected to the aircraft systems the left CMC must be installed. If only one
CMC is installed, it must be in the left CMC position.

Fault Processing and Display

The CMCS continuously processes aircraft system information relating to

failed or faulty LRUs and the flight deck effects associated with these failures
or faults.

The CMCS displays menus which allow access to this information at all times,
in the following forms:

a) A list of flight deck effects and associated LRU faults.

b) A list of LRU faults and associated flight deck effects in real-time.
c) A list of LRU faults and associated flight deck effects, as recorded in
the CMC fault history.

All faults recorded by the CMC, on the ground or in the air, are Line Relevant
Faults (LRFs). These faults include those recorded in Present Leg Faults,
Existing Faults and Fault History.

Printed Reports

EICAS Maintenance Page Reports and LRU Fault and Failure Reports are
generated and formatted by the CMCS. These reports are transmitted to the
Multiple Input Printer (if it is installed).

The prompt REPORT > on the CMCS screen displays, provides access to a
Report Menu, for transmission of the selected report to the printer.

Functions Using ACARS

Downlink Functions

a) Present Leg Faults reports, Fault History reports and individual

Maintenance Messages are generated and formatted by the CMCS
for the ACARS. These reports and messages can be down-linked
by the flight crew to a ground facility, through ACARS (if installed).

b) The prompt REPORT > on the CMCS screen displays, provides

access to a Report Menu, for transmission of the selected report to
the ACARS.
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Uplink Functions

a) The CMCS responds to requests, which are up-linked from a

ground facility through ACARS. On an up-linked request, the
CMCS provides ACARS with Present Leg Faults reports, Fault
History reports and EICAS Maintenance Page reports.
b) Other CMCS functions are not affected when the CMCS responds
to an ACARS request. There are no flight deck annunciations of an
ACARS request or a CMCS report.

Airline Notes and Help

Airlines can enter and store strings or text in the software of the CMC airline
database. The text for Notes may contain supplemental data relating the
specific LRU faults or failures, while the text for Help may provide instructions
on how to use the CMCS.

The prompt NOTES > and HELP > on the CMCS screen displays, provide
access for viewing stored text, for Notes and Help respectively.

Software Loading Requirements

Software Module

The CMC software is comprised of two separate modules. These are:

* Operational Software.
* Airline Database (Notes and Help).

A separate software part number is assigned to each software module. Any of

the two modules can be loaded independently of the other, both on the aircraft
and on the test bench. Loading the software on the aircraft is accomplished
using a data loader in the flight deck. During software loading, the CMC
hardware is monitored to verify software compatibility with the hardware.

IDS and CMC Interface

The IDS performs the functions of EFIS and EICAS and presents the functions
on six IDUs. The six IDUs receive data from the three EFIS/EICAS Interface
Units (EIUs).

The EIU provides signal input interface, data manipulation, signal output
generation and system monitoring. The EIU performs the master caution
driver function so that outputs are provided for both the master caution lights
and aural warning. Each EIU is capable of supporting all six IDUs with
independent display formats.

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Data from many aircraft systems is transmitted to the EIUs. The EIUs then
output the data to the six IDUs and to both CMCs, so that the CMCS can
monitor the data. The CMCS, therefore, receives the data from the aircraft
systems indirectly through the EIUs. For these systems the IDS reports flight
deck effects to the CMCS, which isolates and correlates faulty LRUs or faulty
interfaces to the flight deck effects.

Several aircraft systems transmit data directly to the CMCS, without

transmitting the data to the IDS. The IDS, therefore, will not report flight deck
effects to the CMCS for these systems. The CMCS, however, will monitor and
isolate faults in the systems.

Fig. 28 IDS & CMC INTERFACE

- 36 -
CMCS Member Systems

The CMCS interfaces with and monitors the member systems. The member
systems in turn monitor many active or passive components. If these
components fail, or become faulty, the respective member system will report
these failed or faulty components to the CMCS.

Most of the member systems interface indirectly (through the IDS EIU) with
the CMCS. Some systems, such as the Flight Control Computers,
Communication Radios, ATC, WXR and certain MAWEA printed circuit cards
interface directly with the CMCS.

System Operation

Access

a) Central Maintenance Computer System control and display is

effected through any one of the three flight deck mounted CDUs,
or through the optional electrical equipment bay mounted CDU.
Only one CDU is used for control and display at any one time.

b) The CDUs are inhibited from controlling and displaying CMCS

data when the aircraft is in the air and below 10,000ft. Access to
the CMCS is inhibited during this period, but all CMCS functions
continue to operate, regardless of the CDU inhibit.

Menu

a) The CDU will cause the CDU MENU page to be displayed when the
CDU MENU key is pressed. The CDU MENU page provides for
selection of communication between the CDU and a specific
subsystem. If a system other than the CMCS is selected, the CDU
will initiate a CDU log-off procedure and discontinue
communication with the CMC.

b) When the CMC is selected the CMCS will generate all required
data display formats and govern the number of display pages, line
select entries per page and line headers. Each function of the
CMCS is selectable through a menu structure.

Line Select Keys (LSK)

The CMC will provide access to data or functions that are identified by text
and a caret “<” or “>”, when a LSK adjacent to the text and caret is pressed. If
the text is without a caret, the data or functions cannot be accessed.

- 37 -
Next Page

The next higher numbered page of multiple page displays will appear on the
CDU screen when the NEXT PAGE key is pressed. If no higher numbered page
exists, the display “wraps around” back to page 1 of the display.

Previous Page

The next lower numbered page, of multiple page displays, will appear on the
CDU screen when the PREV PAGE is pressed. If no lower numbered page
exists, the display “wraps around” to the next highest numbered page of the
display.

Fig. 29 CONTROL DISPLAY UNIT

Present Leg Faults

A flight leg is defined as the period of time beginning when the first engine is
started and ending the next time the first engine is started. The aircraft must
be on the ground during the engine starts. If all engines are not shut down
when on the ground, the flight leg ends when the last door is closed.

- 38 -
Once a new flight leg begins, it cannot end until the parking brake has been
released and engine take-off thrust has been reached by engine 2 or engine 3.
Once a flight leg ends, a new flight leg begins immediately.

The CMCS numbers the present flight leg -00. Previous flight legs are
numbered -01, -02, -03, etc, counting backwards in time from the present
flight leg.

Present Leg Faults provides many displays for flight deck effects and correlated
CMCS fault messages. Fault messages not correlated to a flight deck effect can
be accessed by pressing the LSK next to the prompt < NON-FDE FAULTS.

Maintenance Message (see figure 30)

A maintenance message provides information regarding a specific fault and the

CMCS will provide approximately 6500 maintenance messages.

The text of the Fault Message, which describes a faulty LRU or faulty interface,
is adjacent to LSK 1L. The flight deck effect, correlated to the fault message, is
adjacent to LSK 4L. The caret < next to the flight deck effect indicates that
more than one flight deck effect is correlated to the fault message. Pressing
LSK 4L displays additional flight deck effects on the maintenance message.
The caret < next to READ SNAPSHOT indicates that a snapshot of a correlated
Maintenance Page was automatically recorded in the EICAS. Pressing LSK 5L
generates a request to the IDS to display the snapshot on the auxiliary EICAS
display.

The flight phase during which the fault occurred is identified by a two
character code on the right side of the maintenance message. The code is an
abbreviation of the flight phase; for example, CL represents CLIMB.

Confidence Tests

The CMCS displays menus which allow quick access to and selection of
confidence tests. Confidence tests are system ground tests that the crew
traditionally have access to.

The tests can be selected for individual systems. When a test is selected, the
CMCS provides digital and/or analogue discrete signals to the appropriate
system, which then performs the test.

The CMCS displays the test results, as supplied by the system performing the
test. Additional data is provided for a given LRU after a Confidence Test failure.

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EICAS Maintenance Page Selection

The CMCS displays menus which allow selection of real time EICAS
Maintenance Pages and Manual or Automatic snapshots stored in the IDS
memory. The pages are displayed on the auxiliary EICAS display when
initiated for display by the CMCS.

The following systems, which are of interest to maintenance personnel, have

maintenance pages which display parameter data in tabular form:

* ECS
* Electrical systems
* Flight Controls
* Fuel systems
* Hydraulic systems
* Configuration
* Gear
* APU
* EPCS
* Performance data
* Engine Exceedances

Maintenance Pages allow the display of data from a particular subsystem in

real-time. Also the data displayed on these pages at a particular point in time
can be stored in the non-volatile memory of the IDS EIU. This process can be
initiated manually using the CMCS (or by pressing the Event Record button on
the EICAS Control Panel), or automatically triggered by an incoming signal.
The former is called a manual snapshot, the latter an automatic snapshot.

Ground Tests

Ground Tests are first selected by individual ATA chapter and system name.
Particular ground tests are then selected for individual LRUs. When a test is
selected the CMCS provides digital and/or analogue discrete signals to the
LRU, which then performs the test. Additional data is provided for a given LRU
after a ground test failure.

Existing Faults

The Existing Faults menu provides a list of systems which have active fault
messages. These systems are listed in ATA chapter order, beginning with the
lowest chapter number. If more than five chapters are listed then the list
continues on to subsequent pages.

- 40 -
Fault History

Fault History Storage. The CMCS can store up to 500 fault messages in non-
volatile memory (NVM). A fault is stored in memory for a minimum of 10 flight
legs to a maximum of 99 flight legs.

Fault History Synchronisation. The CMC provides an automatic means of

maintaining an identical Fault History in both the left and right CMCs. Any
disagreement in Fault History, between the left and right CMCs, is
annunciated by a Disagree message on the Main CMC menu.

Fault History Validity. The CMC uses logic representing the aircraft tail
number to determine that the CMC Fault History is valid for the aircraft in
which the CMC is installed. If the Fault History is determined to be invalid the
CMC will automatically clear its Fault History.

Automatic Fault History Cross-load. If a CMC is replaced the replacement

CMC will automatically obtain valid Fault History from the other CMC.

Manual Fault History Crossload. Crossloading of Fault History may be

manually initiated. The crossloading can be from the left CMC to the right
CMC, or from the right CMC to the left CMC.

Fault History Displays. The Fault History menu provides a list of systems
which have faults stored in Fault History. These systems are listed in ATA
chapter order, beginning with the lowest chapter number. If more than five
chapters are listed then the list continues on to subsequent pages.

A summary is provided of the flight legs during which the CMC recorded an
occurrence of a fault. The hard or intermittent nature of the fault is displayed
for each recorded occurrence. A maximum of nine occurrences can be
displayed for each fault.

Shop Relevant Fault Data. The CMC can request and display shop relevant
data on a page-by-page basis from a selected LRU. The data is requested from
only one LRU at a time.

The shop relevant fault data is transmitted to the CMC one page at a time,
starting with the first page, in response to a CMC discrete. Pressing the CDU
NEXT PAGE or PREV PAGE key will cause the CMC to issue another discrete
to the LRU for transmission of a new page of data.

Shop Fault Displays. The Shop Faults menu provides access to systems that
contain LRUs with accessible shop fault data. These systems are listed in ATA
chapter order, beginning with the lowest chapter number. If more than five
chapters are listed then the list continues on to subsequent pages.

The Shop Faults page displays the shop fault text transmitted by the LRU.

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Fig. 30 MAINTENANCE MESSAGES

- 42 -
Input Monitoring

Provision is made in the CMC to select and access up to 8 digital bus input
signals at a time for constant monitoring on the CDU. The signals are those
signals that are input to the EIU or CMC. The signals are identified by port,
octal label and Source Destination Identifier (SDI).

Input Monitoring Displays

Input Monitoring consists of up to 8 pages. Any valid input port, label and
SDI can be selected on each of the pages.

The data displayed for each port is in Binary or Hexadecimal as requested

by the operator.

Configuration Function

The CMC can display configuration information from selected LRUs. This
consists of hardware part numbers, software part numbers and program pin
status.

Configuration Displays

The Configuration menu displays the ATA chapter and the name of the system
with configuration data available to the CMC. The systems are listed
numerically by ATA chapter beginning with the lowest chapter number.

Configuration information is displayed per LRU. For other LRUs in the same
system the configuration information can be accessed by using the CDU NEXT
PAGE and PREV PAGE keys.

One example of the CMCS providing a maintenance message through the CDU
is shown in figure 30.

INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS (IMA)

A Brief History of the Development of IMA

A major step towards facilitating integration of avionic sub-systems was the

adoption of the ARINC specifications for avionic systems and equipment, ie
equipment made to ARINC specification is interchangeable between
manufacturers.

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By the latter half of the 1960’s the development of processors allowed them to
carry out sub-system computing tasks, however, up to the early 1970’s most
aircraft were still largely analogue. With the continuing growth of avionic sub-
systems a way had to be found to reduce the number of plugs, sockets and
cables, thereby reducing weight, size and intermittent fault problems.

Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) was introduced, ie staggering the different

channel samples in time to form a composite pulse train. Each signal is
transmitted as a serial digital pulse at a given slot in a clock cycle. So, for
example, if 30 different signals are to be transmitted between two units only
two wires are required compared with up to 60 wires in the old system.

Further development (1970’s – 1980’s) saw the microprocessors being used

and avionic sub-systems being connected via digital data buses. In these
systems there were some problems:

* LRU’s, processors, memory, software, interfaces and power

supplies were made specifically for each system. This meant high
design and support costs because there was no interchangeability.

* Sub-system designed with limited introduction of fault tolerance.

The cost of building redundancy into every sub-system was high.

* Maintenance costs where high because of removal, refitment and

maintenance of spares of sub-system “boxes”.

Since the mid-1980’s research and development has concentrated on better

ways of building avionic systems as an integrated aircraft system. The
availability, today, of cost-effective and powerful processors with high-speed
data buses has changed the situation considerably. This brought the concept
of ‘modular avionics’ built from a small number of standard modules housed
in standard racking, communicating over standard data networks. Thus
bringing a savings in:

* Weight.
* Power.
* Space.
* Cost.

Full advantage of modular avionics is achieved by integration of sub-system

boundaries, so there are spare resources, shared between the systems, which
improved system availability. Hence Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA).
Additional benefits of IMA include:

* Fault tolerance.
* Application flexibility.

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 IMA SYSTEMS

It is important to remember that IMA is a concept not a specific set of

technologies or components. The integration allows multiple system
applications executed on the same computer and data communications onto a
high-speed multiplexed network. Modularity allows set standard non-system
specific computers and other computers that can be configured to provide part
of their resources to a particular system application.

IMA has:

* Layered architecture. Interface layers hide hardware and

applications from each other.
* Reconfiguration of applications can be static (aircraft not in use)
or dynamic (aircraft in use).
* Partitioning allows:
1. Protection mechanisms for shared memory functions.
2. Applications to be inserted/removed without affecting the
rest of the system.
* Flexible scheduling to meet deadlines of all applications.
* Code re-use function and portability.
* Operating system to manage applications.
* Physical integration of networks, modules and I/O devices.
* Built-in growth and design potential.

Fig. 31 LAYERED ARCHITECTURE

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Developed initially for the Airbus A380 and Boeing B787 Dreamliner and now
used on other aircraft also.

Boeing have a Common Core System (CCS) for the aircraft and Airbus use an
Open IMA (OIMA) system.

The computing units are capable of hosting different functions and are
connected together via a network (figure 32). Core Processor/Input Output
Modules (CPIOMs) hand I/O modules have identical memory and power supply
cards but have different I/O cards.

The concept is used on many large modern aircraft and here we will give a
brief summary of two, the B777 and the A380.

THE BOEING B777 SYSTEM

The system on this aircraft is called the Airplane Information Management

System (AIMS). AIMS integrates the computing functions for the avionic
system and consists of two cabinets, each cabinet has eight line-replacement
modules (LRM’s), four I/O modules and four core processor modules.

Fig. 32 AIRPLANE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (AIMS)

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Software partitioning, which ensures the performance of each system is
unaffected by any other by strict timing allocation to each system application.
This partitioning keeps the necessary separation between computing
functions, which allows integration of multiple computing functions in a single
core processor module. The AIMS cabinets interface with 130 LRU’s, sensor
switches and indicators.

Figure 32 shows the AIMS cabinets, the system interfaces, Data Conversion,
Gateway Function and Primary Display System Interface.

Figure 33 shows the same system but includes more detail. Note the use of
ARINC 429, 453, 629, 618 and 717 buses, and the analogue signals from the
transducers/sensors. Note also the various systems that are connected to the
system.

blank

- 47 -
Fig. 33 AIRPLANE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM INTERFACES

- 48 -
Figure 34 shows the seven types of data transfers using the 429 and 629
buses, and figure 35 shows the interface between the AIMS cabinet and the
flight-deck controls and displays.

Fig. 34 DATA CONVERSION GATEWAY FUNCTION

The onboard maintenance system uses the AIMS cabinets for the computing
function. The maintenance crew uses a maintenance access terminal (MAT) to
control the central maintenance computing system and the aircraft condition
monitoring system.

THE AIRBUS A380 SYSTEM

The Ethernet* on the A380 is a data link system where the data is divided into
frames and each frame contains source and destination data together with
error checking data so the info can be se-sent if not received correctly.

AFDX (Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet) is used on safety critical

systems using a dedicated bandwidth to provide a deterministic Quality of
Service (QoS) system. Uses ‘off the shelf’ networking components and used on
later aircraft such as the A380 and B787 Dreamliner. It is based on the
10/100 MBit commercial system and the protocol is based on the IEEE 802.3
standard.

- 49 -
* The Ethernet is a system of inter-connected computers to form a Local Aero
Network (LAN). Originally the system used a single coaxial cable, now full
duplex Ethernet uses two separate pairs of strands for transmission and
reception of data (twisted pair) or fibre optics.

AFDX provides:

* Full Duplex collision free system.

* Redundancy (redundant pair of networks).
* Deterministic timing.
* High speed.
* Switched data flow.
* Profiled networking.

End systems (LRUs) communicate with the system using Virtual Links (VLs)
with traffic shaping using Bandwidth Allocation Gaps (BAGs).

BAG Rate

This is the maximum rate that data can be sent, and is guaranteed to be sent
at that interval. BAG rate for each VL has to take into account the band-width
required for the other VLs and transmission speed cannot exceed 100Mbits/s

The AFDX system uses:

* End systems (LRUs).

* AFDX switches.
* AFDX link systems such as ARINC 664

AFDX switch functions include:

* Switching traffic according to configuration tables.

* Data filtering to ensure that data is ‘clean’.
* Policing the system.
* Monitoring the end systems.
* Monitoring the network operation.
* Can buffer transmission and reception date.

- 50 -
End systems include:

* Cockpit avionics.
* Flight controls.
* Air conditioning and pressurisation.
* Power plants.
* Fuel systems.
* Landing gear systems etc.

The Airbus system consists of 8 self-contained modules. Seven of the modules

(Core Processor Input Output Modules – CPIOMs) consist of a central
processing unit, operating system, memory, power supply and I/O and one
module is dedicated as an I/O gateway (IOM). All modules have identical
memory and power supply cards and integrate with the aircraft systems as
shown in figure 36.

Note the aircraft systems that have an output/input onto the data bus.

The system uses ARINC 653 operating system and application software is
independent of hardware. The system uses partitioning, again by segregated
allocation to each application via timing on the operating system.

Fig. 35 PRIMARY DISPLAY SYSTEM

- 51 -
Fig. 36 A380 IMA ARINC 664 AFDX NETWORK

Fig. 37 PARTITIONING

- 52 -
On the A380 the Avionics Data Communication Network (ADCN) is a set of
connected switches based on the Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet
(AFDX) technology (figure 38). The switches are ‘intelligent’ and able to buffer
transmission and reception packets (information). The Avionic computers
(LRUs/LRMs) are connected with switches through a duplex link (2 twisted
pairs) at 100MBits/s.

Fig. 38 ADCN NETWORK

Virtual Links

Also part of the AFDX network is the use of ‘Virtual Links’ (VLs). They can be
configured to use one or other of the networks only.

The VL is a unidirectional link from one source system to one or more

destination systems and uses a Virtual Link ID for each frame of information –
unlike traditional Ethernet switches which switch frames based on their
Ethernet destination or MAC address.

The VL ID is a 16 bit word that follows the constant 32 bit field. The switch is
designed to route an incoming frame from one (and only one) end system to
one or more predetermines end systems.

Each VL is allocated a dedicated bandwidth defined by the system integrator

and has a frozen specification that ensures that the network has a designed
maximum traffic capability – hence is deterministic.

Data is read by VLs that have data to transmit in a round robin sequence.

VLs will reject any erroneous data transmissions and are switched in cascade
star sequence so the total number of VLs that can be fitted to the system is
nearly limitless – although this will be determined by the BAG rates,
maximum frame size and Ethernet data rate.

Sub-VLs may be fitted to carry less critical data and are assigned to a
particular VL.

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 Fig. 39 VIRTUAL LINKS

The concept of modular equipment is not new, however, what is different with
IMA is the use of a small number of standard modules which:

* Reduces initial development costs.

* Reduces maintenance costs (less spares to hold).
* Reduces running costs, cheaper to carry a spare set of modules
than to carry a complete spare system.
* Reduces second line avionic costs due to high level of in-built fault
detection and isolation (built-in test facility).
* Reduces weight.

The AFDX system is used on many aircraft including Airbus A380, A400M,
A350, Boeing B787, Sukhoi Superjet 100, Bombardier C series,
AugustaWestland AW101 and AW149.

ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT

Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)

Failure of equipment and systems can be caused by severe electromagnetic

disturbance if the equipment is not effectively screened from EMI.

Electromagnetic interference can arise from:

1) Lightning strikes – where large pulses of high field strength and

wide range of radiation frequencies can be produced.

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 2) Over-flying high power radio/radar transmitters – some flight
control systems with analogue electronics have been affected due
to inadequate electromagnetic screening. The later digital flight
control systems are designed to a much higher Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMC) so are less prone.

3) Failures in the electromagnetic screening system – this can result

from breaks in the screening or high resistance in the earth
connections to the aircraft structure and the electrical bonding of
the structure due to corrosion or poor quality of installation.

ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATABILITY (EMC)

Aircraft equipment must not exceed specified emission levels for a wide range
of radio frequencies and must not be susceptible to external sources of high
levels of radio frequency energy over a wide frequency band. The equipment
must also be able to withstand the high electromagnetic pulses arising from
lightning strikes.

Checks must be made that all equipment shall meet specified performance
requirements when operated with all other equipment on the aircraft.

EMC is also required with supporting systems external to the aircraft, eg

ground support equipment (ground power units etc).

All aircraft (and vulnerable systems) are screened from the effects of
electromagnetic radiation as well as systems that might produced
electromagnetic radiation are themselves screened. The example we shall
consider is the B777 protection system – which would not be too unlike any
other modern aircraft.

The requirements for lightning protection is laid down in EASA CS 23 (small

aircraft), CS 25 (large aircraft). CS 27 (small helicopters) and CS 29 (large
helicopters). The requirements include the following:

* That all the airframe should be electrically bonded.

* All moving linkages should be primary bonded.
* All external non-metallic parts should have lightning diverters
fitted.

Lightning protection is provided by having an all metal airframe or composite

structure with metal clading/layers of wire mesh to provide an electrical path
through the structure of the aircraft's outer surface to a static discharger
point. Protection systems for use in aircraft must protect critical and non-
critical electronic equipment.

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Aircraft lightning protection provides an electrical path having a plurality of
conductive paths that, upon exposure to a high voltage field form an ionization
channel due to the coinductor’s breakdown voltage. Composite-to-metal or
composite-to-composite structural joints are protected by making the interface
areas conductive for transfer of lightning current.

Some aircraft lightning protection systems use a shielded cable system. These
systems consist of one or more conductors enclosed by a conductive shield
which is grounded at both ends to the metal airframe
This also provides protection from electromagnetic interference. This reduces
the electromagnetically induced voltage in the shielded conductor. This
network provides a normally-high impedance which breaks down to a low
impedance in response to a momentary voltage surge induced in the shield.

This establishes a conductive path between the shield and ground. Any surge
voltage from a lightning strike creates a current through the cable. This results
in an electromagnetic field in the opposite direction, which reduces the
magnitude of the electromagnetic field within the shielded cable.

BOEING 777 PROTECTION

With the introduction of computers and Fly-By-Wire on such aircraft as the

A320 and the B777, regulations were introduced to increase the protection
levels of certain systems from the effects of High Intensity Radiated Fields
(HIRF) and lightning strikes. These regulations require that critical and
essential systems be protected to higher standards than was the case
previously. The regulations also require that a maintenance programme be
put into effect to ensure the continued airworthiness of such systems.

The systems that require extra protection are specified and include Fly-By-
Wire systems, databases, LRUs (Line Replacement Units) etc.

The requirement of the level of protection from HIRF and other electrical
sources (lightning strikes etc) is decreased by the use of light transmission
systems such as those used on some Fly-By-Light systems. Instead of the data
being transmitted electrically/electronically (analogue or digitally) it is
transmitted by light pulses.

Whilst external electrical inputs to a data transmission line will have an effect
on electrical/electronic based data transmission systems their effect on light
based data systems is considerably reduced.

Of course, there can always be mechanical damage, from lightning strikes for
example and the data transmission/reception modules can be affected by
HIRF, as they are electronic.

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To provide the regulatory requirements with regards to HIRF/lightning
protection the LRUs are fitted with EM filters, these attenuate any EMI
induced transient voltages before the circuits are affected inside the LRU.
These filters are housed within a screened enclosure around the connector to
the LRU. The integrity of the screening of the cables coming into the LRU must
be high.

With digital systems any corruption of the input signal by EMI can be sensed
by error check encoding and thus the corrupted data can be ignored. The
system is ‘frozen’ for this lost period, however, only a short transient loss can
be tolerated.

The extra screening and wire design for LRUs/equipment etc includes the
following:

a) Single layer of metal braiding internal to the fuselage.

b) Two layers of metal braiding external to fuselage.
c) Extensive use of twisted pairs and triples.
d) No power or signal grounds external to the fuselage.
e) Single point grounding for actuator control electronics and power
control units and signals.
f) Nickel coating for fly-by-wire shields.
g) Metal back-shell and shield termination for connectors.
h) Equipment interface protection.
i) Bonding system must be of high integrity.

Protection for the systems is also provided by aluminated honeycomb wall,

floor and ceiling panels around the flight deck and electrical equipment bays.

Metal Protected Areas

These may include whole parts of the airframe such as the flight-deck and
equipment racks. Aluminium coated honeycomb structure may be used (as on
the B777 for example – figure 40) to ensure that whole areas are encased in a
“metal box”.

In this way HIRF should not get through to sensitive equipment.

Existing electrically conducting window coatings (electric windscreen heater

film elements) on the flight deck windscreens are used as part of the protection
system.

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 Fig. 40 METAL PROTECTED AREAS – B777

Fig. 41 TYPICAL BUNDLED WIRE CONSTRUCTION – B777

Equipment racks may also be “metal box” shielded and special attention is
paid to grounding and earth returns – both for power and signal systems.

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Cables

Cables on the B777 internal to the fuselage have a single metal braid
screening whilst cables outside the fuselage have 2 layers with the outer layer
terminated at the fuselage bulkhead. The braid is tinned copper. To help
reduce HIRF, twisted pairs and triples are used wherever possible.

Transfer resistance of shielding should be in the region of 2.7mΩ/m and

transfer inductance should be 1.0nH/m. Check the manual on your aircraft
for specific values.

Plugs and Sockets

These may vary in design from aircraft to aircraft. The design may also be
affected depending on where they are fitted in the aircraft, eg within the
pressure hull or outside it.

Shielding is achieved using mechanical connection of the cable braid to the

metal plug/socket body. In some cases individual wire jumper leads are used
and mechanically connected from their respective wires to the metal part of the
plug/socket by a metal band.

Fig. 42 CONNECTOR – B777

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Maintenance Practices

All wiring, plugs, sockets, and screening on the aircraft should be inspected as
laid down in the maintenance schedule and the AMM. Special checks may be
required at intervals such as at 4 and 8 years aircraft life. The inspections are
normally visual but will require bonding testing where necessary and the use
of specialist test equipment as specified in the AMM.

For example:

* Every 4 years. Detailed inspection of all critical wiring external to

the fuselage.
* Every 8 years. General inspection of all critical and essential
wiring inside the fuselage.
* Every 8 years. Detailed inspection of specified essential wiring
external to the fuselage.

Visual Inspection

This is a general visual inspection using a light source if necessary, to check

for damage, deterioration, contamination, signs of burning, security, open
circuits, correct assembly, correct torque of plugs/sockets, locking, chafing,
corrosion, broken strands, broken screening, etc. All wires, shields, ground
leads, screen jumpers are to be intact. Panels and access doors may have to be
removed/refitted. All this will be specified in the AMM and the maintenance
schedule. There is normally no routine requirement for dismantling.

Fig. 43 PCU CONNECTOR – B777

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All metalised airframe (and other) screening to be secure, undamaged and
complete. Any defects found should be repaired or the part replaced, and the
system tested.

Detailed inspections will also involve the use of specialist test equipment.

SYSTEMS TESTING

When testing a HIRF sensitive system other systems may produce radiated
signals which can be picked up as noise. It is important that the AMM is
consulted reference the precautions to take prior to testing any system so that
other systems and/or aircraft are not affected.

The actual test will depend on the system to be tested but it will be in
accordance with AMM and will normally involve a functional test. It may
require that other electric/electronic systems are working at the same time to
check for any cross-interference. It may require the use of a special test
programme in include simulated interference signals (noise).

Remember that testing of some equipment on the ground requires safety

precautions to be carried out to prevent injury to personnel. This includes
safety distances for radar antennae and radio aerials for example.

Test equipment must be electromagnetic compatible to the aircraft systems to

ensure no problems are caused to the system under test or other systems.

AERIAL EARTHING & STATIC DISCHARGE DEVICES

These are provided to minimise the damaging effects of lightning strikes and
also to dissipate accumulations of static charges in aerials. Most commonly
used for high power HF communication systems.

These devices may be either incorporated within the radio equipment or

mounted at the lead-in terminal locations of aerials. There are 3 main types:

1. Electrically operated earthing switches or relays.

2. Gas filled spark gaps.
3. Discharge resistors.

EARTH LOOPS

In systems where the signal carrying cables are screened, the screen must be
earthed. If both ends of the screen are earthed then a ‘loop’ is formed. Possible
potential differences may occur between the ends of the screen which will
cause interference.
””””””””””

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APPENDIX – SYLLABUS

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