Participation in relation to the Causes:

Introduction:
Realistic cognition help us to perceive in nature that there are many things and that
particular beings exist in compositional way. We are able to see the complexities of
the universe, and also its unity. Existing beings are composed of essence and
existence (e.g, a Socrates exist as a man, or an apple exist as a tree) Yet, these two
contents are unified in a being. Thus, pluralism and unity, challenge us to learning
about a new problem: How to define and determine the relations between beings and
between the elements within being?

We can assert from the coming-into-being of things in our world, that everything must
owe their existence to a cause or source. Hence, things in our world are contingent,
and since from the principle that a contingent being cannot owe its explanation to
itself, there must be some extrinsic being who accounts for their existence as
individuated beings. A major concern, is thus, how beings relate with their cause?

Participation finds its ontological rational-justification in the pluralistic and

compositional conception of being. Identity-based cognition, such as a, monistic
interpretation - an interpretation of all reality under one principle, does not allow
the knowing of relational character of being- of reality blurs the apprehension of
relationship of beings in our world . The interest in participation is hinged on the real
order of relation (between beings or within beings), and a pluralistic and a
compositional conception of being.

Thomistic metaphysics see participation as the culmination of metaphysical cognition,

this is because, through it, we are able to find the ultimate reason for the existence of
contingent and non-necessary beings. It reflects the ordering of contingent being to
the Absolute. This theory situates the cognition of being and of all reality in the
perspective of the Absolute’s existence. That is, there is a relational ordering of
contingent beings to the being of the Absolute, which is the reason of the being of all
beings.

One of the dimensions in which the doctrine of participation is applied is the theory of
causes. The extent of application is so far reaching that we connect it with the relation
between non-necessary (contingent) beings and the necessary being (absolute). From
the perspective of ultimate causality (coming-into-being = existence), the necessary
being is the cause of the contingent beings, with respect to efficiency (creative cause),
exemplarity (formal cause), and finality (teleology or final cause). Notably, the
doctrine of causes is a formulation of Aristotle, where tries to give an account for the
Why- question (dia ti), which perplexed his predecessors. For him the causes attempt
to show the relationship between two elements of a metaphysical explanation of
being, namely – the caused and the uncaused.

Etymology and Definition of Participation

The term participation (Greek methexis) is a conjoint of two Latin words
pars,meaning “ a part of”, and capere, “to take hold of”. The expression partem
capere or partem habere means to possess some part in a whole, or to get some part
from a whole.
Zofia J. Zdybicka offered an all compassing definition of participation: as the
relation that occurs between two realities, where one of the member of the relation,
which usually contains series of elements, is to the other as a part to a whole, as many
to one, as imperfect to the perfect, the non-identical to the self-identical, the limited to
the unlimited, the similar to the identical, that which is posseses to that which is, the
composite to the simple, the derivative to the original, the caused to the uncaused.
Thus, participation means a share in a certain whole, which implies the existence of
some whole (a unity or community), and kinship, a community between parts and a
whole (plurality and unity) and between particular parts...
Platonic conception of Participation
Plato’s transcendental realism is fundamental to his theory of participation. Plato,
according to Aristotle, disagreed that a general definition can be referred to a thing in
the sensible changing world of things. Plato identified a second kind of being - ideas-
through which the independent existing sensible things derive their names from( an
Idea such as good, where we can have good man, good cat, good table). Through their
participation in ideas, many individuals that are one in name with the ideas, exist.
Plato simply borrowed from the Pythagoreans, their doctrine of imitation - that things
exist by imitation of numbers. Plato simply changed the terminology to participation
and said that things exist by participation. Participation connects the world of
Becoming with the world of true immutable Form: what comes to be is explained by
reference to an eternal paradigm, which is the truth behind the changing reality of our
experience. Participation entails the presence of the higher in the lower, of the
universal Form in the particular instance of that Form. It explains why a particular
thing is subject of a universal predicate. For instance, Just men exists because, these
men participate in the immutable idea of justice. A red car participates in the eternal
idea of Red-ness. However, despite his philosophical input, Plato is not credited with
resolving the problem of One and many since the Forms are multiple in relation to
other Forms.
Aristotelian conception of causality
In Aristotle, the description of relations (between beings and within a being), and the
determination of relations is made completely sufficiently within the theory of the
four causes. In Aristotle, matter exists by necessity. In rejection to platonic imitation
of a transcendental idea, Aristotle insisted on the immanence of concrete idea
(forms - ousia [substance]) and on the true causality of particular causes on
particular effects. Unlike Plato, the world does not mediate (derive) its existence in
anything or anyone. Reality is not defined on the basis of a pre-existing ideas. The
world only mediates the form of its existence. In his four causes, Aristotle gives
primacy to the formal cause as the highest reason for the beings of things (Although,
form is not the reason for the existence of a being, it simply confers to a being an act
of existence, through its internal organization within a being, it make a being to exist
with a definite content , nature and essence, and also the reason for its knowability).
Thus, for Aristotle, the theory of causes is sufficiently necessary to explain the
relation within beings and between beings; the theory of potency and act, guarantee
that only the unity and holistic nature of reality is cognitively apprehended.

Thomistic conception of Participation

Unlike Aristotle, Thomistic metaphysics offers a new dimension: the world does not
exist by necessity. A composite being is a contingent being. Thus, for Thomas, the
reason for the organization of matter to a proper type of being demands
explanation, the fact of matter’s existence needs to be explained. Also, that which
constitute the content of that existence. Thomas averred that: Nothing in a being is
necessary, and nothing is explained through itself. Thus, the whole of being and
the world requires explanation.
Both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas believe in the universal dependence of all things
in a First Cause. According to Aristotle: if there is no first cause (proto arche), there is
no cause at all (Met III 994a 19); Aquinas on the other hand says: “Whatever is first in
any order is the cause of all that come after it (ST IIIa, q.56, a. 1 resp). However, what
the First Cause is, its functionality, and the relationship with its effect, vary between
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas according to their cosmological views.

For Aristotle, as for other early Greek thinkers, ex nihilo, nihil fit – nothing can come
out of nothing.(this limits the possibility of creatio ex nihili, because of the belief of
the eternity of matter) Every substance in the material world is composed of matter
and form, related as potency and act. Generation and corruption is explained as a
movement from potency to act, initiated by the Unmoved Mover. Act is that which
limits potency. So motion is understood as reduction from potency to act and so the
First Mover is unmoved because he is without potency (Actus purus). Despite the idea
of the unmoved mover as an efficient cause, Aristotle fails to demonstrate
metaphysical explanation of total dependence between the Unmoved mover and the
universe. (creature has or show partial dependence to the unmove mover, because
matter precedes the unmove mover.)

In de Hebdomadibus, Aquinas defines participation thus: “to take part in something;

and so when something receives in a particular way that which pertains to another
universally, it is said to participate in that thing.” He further explains the term in his
commentary on the Metaphysics, thus: “…that which is something in its entirety does
not participate in it but is essentially identical with it, whereas that which is not
something in its entirety but has this other thing joined to it, is said properly to
participate in that thing” (In I Met. Lect. 10, n. 154). Aquinas identifies three modes
of participation:
 Logical Participation: species participates in the wider genus, and a
particular participates in species. Eg, man participates in animal. Here man
participates in animal, or “socrates participates in man”. Here, the participation is
per participationem, because man and socrates are participating in a name which
we give to many different creatures.
 Ontological Participation: subject participating in an accident, and matter
participating in form. “Socrates participates in man”. The distinction is that in
 ontological mode, matter really receives form; and substance really receives an
accident.
 Causal Participation
An effect participates in its cause, especially when its cause is superior. This
relationship of participation is that of beings(entia) participating in being (esse), ie,
creatures participating in God.

With this Aquinas shows that participation occurs both in the logical (as in i) and in
the ontological (ii and iii) order. Aquinas creates these categories of participation in
order to respond to Boethius who claimed that participation only occurs in the
accidental order. Boethius had asked the question: Are created things good by
participation or by substance? He replied:
i. They cannot be good by substance
ii. They cannot be good merely by participation, since what is good only by
participation is not good in itself but merely by accident.
For Boethius, participation is accidents of substances. In showing how species
participates in the genus, Aquinas suggests that participation is possible in the
substantial/ontological order. What can be predicated by participation, can be
predicated substantially. Aquinas thus delves into the metaphysical structure of
created being in relation to God, the first cause, to show how, in God’s
communication of his being to creatures, he also communicates his goodness such
that beings have a real, metaphysical participation on the substantial level in the
divine goodness by means of immanent form.

In order to fully grasp the Thomistic causal participation, it is expedient to give an

insight of the foundation of the canon’s of Aristotelian causes, which Thomistic
metaphysics seeks to complete.
Historical foundation of the causes
Philosophy began with the search for the urstuff (arche) or principle of all reality. The
ancient Ionian philosophers were eager to find that one thing from which every other
thing came to be. It was a search for the primordial principle (arche) of being; they
wanted to ascertain the nature and subsequently the number of this principle. Various
elements were suggested. First, they explored material elements like water (Thales -
548BC), air (Anaximenes) fire (Heraclitus), and earth (Empedocles), initially
reducing all things to one of these material elements and latter suggested a
combination of the material elements, which indicated that there must be a force to
join or divide the elements, hence the initial inkling to efficient causality was born. As
they gradually realized that material elements in themselves cannot give a full
explanation of reality especially in the context of their fascination with motion, they
began to explore non-material elements like reason or mind (νοϋς [nous]) thanks to
Anaxagoras; love or harmony(ἒρως[eros]) & hate or discord or strife (νεἲκος [neikos])
thanks to Empedocles.
Notably, in the history of philosophy, the material cause was first to be discovered,
then conceived as the arche of the universe. Next was the discovery of the efficient
cause of motion. Change fascinated the early philosophers that they sought its source.
The first suggestions came from Anaxagoras’ non-material principle, the nous (mind).
He had argued that when the spirit or mind (nous) stated motion, it became separate
from everything that was in motion. The logic is that if the things that are in motion
are material, then the source of motion should be different and as such immaterial. In
this way, the nature of the nous (mind or reason) is considered to be opposed to the
nature of the material things that moved. Aside these discoveries, we also had the
Pythagoreans who had rooted for number as the principle of the universe, since it
seemed to them that the nature of all things was similar in all its extent to numbers. It
could be said that the relation of the arche of beings to numerical proportions in the
Pythagoreans already introduced the seminal philosophical reflection on the
connection of the doctrine of participation to the elements of numbers and so they
thought that the elements of numbers were the elements of all things, and the universe
was harmony and number. For Pythagoreans, even and odd elements were the
elements of numbers, the even one being finite and the odd ones infinite; hence they
saw the efficient principle in those opposites. Pairs of opposites such as limited and
unlimited, even and odd, one and many, left and right, male and female, rest and
motion, straight and curved, light and darkness, good and evil, oblong and square
were all interpreted in terms of harmony of opposites.
The next (third) stage was the discovery of the formal cause. Aristotle had suggested
that it was Parmenides who gave the initial impetus to the discernment of the formal
cause. He notes that “indeed it seems that when Parmenides described the one, he
related it to form, as he thought that by necessity, there is only the one, which means
being, and apart from it there is nothing. 1 This concept of the formal cause reached a
highpoint in Plato’s philosophy. On the one hand Plato shared the sentiments of
Heraclitus that all the things that fall under the senses are changing and so knowledge
of them cannot be true. On the other hand, he followed Socrates who searched for the
source of knowledge in what is general and therefore worked on the problem of
definition. Thus he thought that the problem of definition is concerned not with any
sensible thing that are constantly changing but with entities of another kind. He thus
called beings of the second kind ‘ideas’ and said that all perceptible things exist as
separated from them and have their names from them, since by participation in the
ideas what exists is a plurality of things that are one in name with them. 2 Enchanted
by the Pythagorean principle of numbers, Plato went on to say that besides sensible
things and the Forms, there exists an intermediate class, the objects of mathematics,
which differ from sensile things in being eternal an immutable, and from the Forms
in that there are many similar objects of mathematics, whereas each Form is itself
unique or singular. Since ideas (forms) were supposed to be the cause of things, Plato
thought that the components of the ideas (forms) were the elements of all things.
Accordingly, the material principle is the ‘Great and Small’, and the essence (or
formal principle) is the One, since the numbers are derived the ‘Great and Small’
(matter) by participation in the One (form). He thus considered only two causes – the
form (what a thing is or essence) and matter.
Aristotle took up the task of analysing the discovery of causes by his predecessors –
material, efficient, formal – but also added the next cause, namely the final cause.
According to him, the final cause is the end-purpose for the sake of which acts exist,
and on account of which changes and motions occur. His discovery completed the
four canon of causes. It can be said that Aristotle’s legacy is that he set these causes in
order, determined their number, formulated a conception of the final cause, and
provided a rational justification for why we can explain and understand being (reality
in general) not in terms of one cause, but only in terms of the four causes.

Relationship between participation and the causes

The discussion for which we set out to consider is the application of the doctrine of
participation to the theory of causes and principles. Here, effeort is taken to explain
the participation of the contingent beings in the life of the necessary being. Or perhaps
1
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 986 b 19-33.
2
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 987 b 5-14.
to offer an explanation of ultimate origin of contingent beings in terms of a causal
relation that implicates the necessary being with respect to efficient causality,
exemplary (formal) causality and final causality.

Efficient Causality
1. Matter/Form participation –
God, as a subsistent being itself (ipsum esse subsistens), gives being by means of
form, which is a created likeness of the divine being. Through form, God gives being
to a created substance, for it is form that gives being (forma dat esse). This means that
form is not absolutely identifiable with a being’s act of existence (esse), but that esse
is mediated through form. Without form, there is no being. Without God, there will be
no form since God is the transcendent first cause.
Aquinas argued that things are good in themselves by virtue of the immanent form
which grants intrinsic relation to the good. The goodness of the creatures must be
formally received as an image and likeness (similitude) of the first good, which is
God. Thus, God is the efficient cause since he produces similitudes or formal likeness
of himself in created things. (Unlike platonic multiplicity of forms in the ideal world,
where a participated being is an aggregate of these universals, but in Aquinas, all
these perfections are resident in God, beings simply participates these perfection in
God.)

Another important question is to consider whether God is the source of the material
element of creation. Now, whatsoever material urstuff created beings are made from,
we can either say that such an urstuff received its existence from God (i.e. material
world is contingent) or did not receive its existence from God (i.e. the material world
is eternal). The second option, which was accepted in ancient philosophy is absurd
because it will imply that the necessary being is the not the ‘First cause’ (not the same
as the first mover)and in terms of motion is not the ‘Unmoved Mover’. But since
ancient philosophy arrived at the discovery of the Unmoved Mover, it only leaves us
with the option of the contingency of the world. Hence, the efficient causality of the
Creator extends to all elements (both matter and form) of the nature or essence of the
existing beings. Therefore, the Creator is the last cause (descending order, ascending
order- reason for the being of things) – ultimate cause - of the existence and the
essence of contingent beings. All that exists come from Him. Put in other words,
created beings ‘receive their beings’ from the Creator and as such participate in the
phenomenon of existence which fully belongs to the Creator. As products of his idea
(form), created beings also derive (receive) their nature/essence from the Creator. In
this way, the application of participation to efficient cause with respect to the relation
of necessary being to contingent beings is absolute in the case of the Creator-creature
relationship. In this way, the doctrine of ‘creatio ex nihilo’ is to be understood as a
metaphysical doctrine of participation of created beings in terms of efficient causality.
(God knows things thus he creates. He knows everything that can participates in
being. )

2. Ens/Essence-existence participation
Esse (the act of being) is the first perfection and the act of all acts. Pure perfection
(perfectio seperata) cannot be anything but unique; a subsisting being (esse
subsistens) must be one whose essence is to be- God. All creatures whose essence is
not to be, must particpate or share existence as a gift. Thus, all creatures are
beings(ens or entia) by participation. In this view, essence is a subject, a potentiality
for esse - the sublime reality shared by many as a gift from God. This is the basis for
Thomistic analogy between God and creatures. God is being by essence, creatures are
being by participation. “Esse is the immanent act of substance and the proper effect of
God alone”

The participation of beings in esse is the most fundamental kind of participation, since
only this participation can show how any given being can actually exist. All creatures
are beings by participation since their essence participates in the esse. In this
relationship, the essence is the participating principle and the esse is that which is
participated. Created substances, in this sense, are compared to their being as potency
to act. Potency participates in act, while limiting act at the same time. It is on this
foundation that the relation between God and creatures is built upon.

From the beginning of philosophy, efficient causality is understood as the factor

which explains motion of beings. More fundamental than motion however is
existence, for only existing beings can move. Given that contingent beings do not
have in themselves a sufficient explanation of their coming-to-be (by virtue of its
composition, a being has no explanation to itself), it follows that a necessary being is
the efficient cause of their existence. It can thus be said that the necessary being,
“imparted” existence on the contingent beings, hence the participation of contingent
beings in the world of existing reality is brought about by the efficient act of the
necessary being. This is what we call Creation (i.e. to bring a being into existence).

Exemplarity and participation: creatio ex nihilo:

In Plato, exemplars are the archetypal forms or ideas(eg. The universal goodness,
which the good boy good mat or good tree, participates in) that are separate and
account for the existence of the multiple beings that share in their perfection. These
exemplars possess these perfections absolutely and in an unchanging manner, whereas
these perfections are limited in other entities that participate in them.

In Aquinas, however, exemplarity is understood as “similitude” of the created world

as a resemblance of the divine nature in terms of the divine goodness. God himself
who is the simplicity and absoluteness of his being, is the one “exemplar” of/for
creation. From Him, things in nature receive determinate forms. This determination of
forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle…we must say that in
the divine wisdom are the types of all things, which we call ideas – exemplar forms
existing in the divine mind). Instead of having multitude of exemplary ideas, as in
Plato, Aquinas reduced all of them to the one divine being which is the totality of the
perfection of being.(eg, we do not have seperate existence of beauty, or justice, or
good, but these ideas flows from the devine mind who is the single exemplar.) The
divine ideas are the reasons of created things, but not as formal causes in an intrinsic
(ie. form gives existence to being say a good boy, the form gives the perfection of
existence to that boy, which is good. To be is good.) manner – the divine ideas are not
in things. The divine idea is an extrinsic cause. For Aquinas, the exemplars are within
the divine being itself as God’s knowledge of his imitability and therefore
participability.
In scholastic philosophy, the exemplar cause, while referred to as the “plan in the
mind of an intelligent agent,” is a formal cause insofar as it is spoken of as that idea or
plan; an efficient cause insofar as it “aids or equips the agent for his task,” and a final
cause “insofar as It represents the good to be realized.”
Final Causality
A last consideration for our purposes here is the application of the doctrine of
participation in terms of final causality. As has already been noted, Aristotle’s most
original contribution to the theory of causes is that of final cause or teleology. In a
sense the final cause is connected to the full realization of the plan or idea (nature)
which the efficient cause has in bringing into existence the created being. The world
in which we live in is not a world of chance or chaos. Rather, natural things are
purpose driven things and every agent acts for the sake of an end – each according to
its natural kind. It is the end-purpose of nature (essence) so to speak.

The final cause is the best representation of the reason for being (i.e. purpose of
creation). It is an ideal to be realized and the life of a being consists in an oscillation
with respect to the final cause, that is either approximating closer or distancing away
from the telos (final cause) [purpose fulfillment or abandonment or detour]. A being is
perfected the more it approaches closer to the final cause and imperfection is a
movement in the opposite direction. Participation explained in terms of the final cause
highlights the realization of the plan of the necessary being by the contingent being.
In this way, we mean obeying or accepting or living in accordance to this plan which
the necessary being set out for the contingent being from the beginning.

On the one hand, participation as a realization of the final cause, brings about
harmony of the contingent being with the necessary being. In this way, it engenders
pleasure (of will) and satisfaction (of the intellect) of the creator or necessary being.
(a mango producing bountiful fruit, gladdens the agent). On the other hand,
participation in terms of realization of the final cause perfects and fully actualizes the
contingent being. In Kantian terms, it brings about happiness. The final cause is thus
to be understood as the inclination or potency to actualize the fullness of being, which
entails the participation in the goal or purpose intended by the Creator, which is the
greatest good (perfect satisfaction or happiness) of the creature. When attained, the
final cause is the source/fountain of happiness, which according to Kant is the
satisfaction of all our inclinations.

Conclusion
Participation as causation has been considered to be “the crowning point and
completion of metaphysical cognition.” The rationale for such accolade is found in its
ability to offer metaphysical justification for the source of being through a
demonstration of the necessary connection and ordering of being to the Absolute.
From the fact of causal Participation which denotes the ordering of the contigent
beings to the absolute, the derivation of the principle of creatio-ex-nihilo is not an
absurdity or an impossibility. Creation as a divine action of the Absolute becomes
evident as the source of all beings and that which accounts for the existence of all
reality. It solves the problem of one and many, as well as explain in clear terms not
only existence but, the content/essence of being.
It is worthy of note that in Thomistic participation, as regards “what a being is”, the
contingent being participating in the Absolute’s being, in its external structure is not a
reflection or gleam of the absolute (as in Platonic thought), but that “a being is” and
that “it is what it is”. thus, the absolute is the ultimate reason for the existence of
being and its endowment of content. A being as a whole participates in the existence
of the absolute as the creative cause.