Gabriel Marcel’s Inter-subjectivity: Issues and Trends in the Contemporary Society.

Marcel’s work focused principally on inter-subjectivity clarifying the requisite attitudes and essential
characteristics of I-Thou encounters, interpersonal relations, commitment and creative fidelity –
notions he developed in Homo Viator and Creative Fidelity. My proposal is to do a study of his notion
of inter-subjectivity along the paths it cuts for a reasoned exercise of freedom to enhance the
possibility of social existence by discerning critically through rigorous, reasoned analyses the
alternative life options. In many of his works, Marcel compassionately portrayed the devastating
sense of emptiness, superficial activities and fractured relationship that plague the modern era
without regard to the other. Marcel’s thought balanced despair and hope, infidelity and infidelity,
self-deception and a spirit of truth. The work, in discussing these, will recognize both the role of
freedom and role of fundamental attitudes or pre-philosophic dispositions, as these influence one’s
way of being in the search for inter-subjectivity, Similarly, the work in the light of Marcel’s Inter-
subjectivity will explore how a human subject can experience the presence of God or the presence of
loved ones from beyond death, showing how such presence can be experienced principally by way
of inwardness and depth. It is in this way that the work will show how to overcome the solipsism of
modern philosophy and provide basis for a genuine inter-subjectivity.

Early life and influences

Marcel was the only child of Henry Marcel, a government official, diplomat, and
distinguished curator. Gabriel’s mother died suddenly when he was four, leaving him with a
sense of deep personal loss and yet of a continuing mysterious presence; the event made
death and the irrevocable an early urgent concern for him. He was brought up by his maternal
grandmother and his aunt—a devoted woman of stern upright character, who became his
father’s second wife and who had a major influence on his early development. He was, much
to his distress, the centre of constant familial attention and care, and, despite his brilliant
scholastic achievements, his family’s incessant demands for ever better academic
performance, together with the rigid, mechanical quality of his schooling, filled him with a
lifelong aversion toward depersonalized, forced-fed modes of education. He found some
consolation in travelling to foreign places on his vacations, and when his father became
French minister to Sweden he accompanied him. These vacations were the beginning of his
lifelong passion for travel and of the fulfillment of a deep inner urge to make himself at home
in the new and to explore the unfamiliar. In later life he became versed in several foreign
languages and literatures and played a significant role in making contemporary foreign
writers known in France.

Religion played no role in Marcel’s upbringing. His father was a lapsed Catholic and cultured
agnostic, who never bothered to have him baptized, and his aunt-stepmother, of nonreligious
Jewish background, was converted to a liberal, humanist type of Protestantism. Reason,
science, and the moral conscience were held to be sufficient guides, superseding traditional
religion. Despite abundant parental love and solicitude, Marcel, in later life, looked back to
this period as one of spiritual “servitude” and “captivity” that impelled him (without his
knowing it) into a personal religious quest and to a philosophical inquiry into the conditions
of religious faith.

Areas of his work

His search took three paths: music, drama, and philosophy. Hearing, playing, and composing
music assumed an important role in the shaping of Marcel’s mind from an early age, and
composers such as J.S. Bach and Mozart played a more decisive role in his spiritual
development than did great religious writers such as Augustine and Blaise Pascal. As a
composer, his favourite mode was improvisation on the piano, for him a communion with a
transcendent reality and not the mere expression of his private feelings and impressions. Only
a small number of Marcel’s improvisations have been transcribed or recorded; in 1945,
however, he became a composer in the ordinary sense, devoting himself to the scored musical
interpretation of poetry, ranging from that of Charles Baudelaire to that of Rainer Maria
Rilke.

Playwriting provided another early and significant mode of expression. Henry Marcel
frequently performed accomplished readings of dramatic works for his family. From an early
age, Gabriel invented dialogues with imaginary brothers and sisters, and he wrote his first
play at the age of eight. His own family situation had provided the living matrix for his later
dramatic presentations of intertwined and irreconcilable aspirations, frustrations, and
conflicts of definitely individual characters. The dramatic delineation of the chaotic and
unpleasant aspects of human life complemented the expression of a transcendent harmony in
his music, and both touched on key experiences and themes which were to be explored later
in his philosophical meditations. They were unconsciously concrete illustrations of his
philosphy before the fact, not deliberately contrived examples after the fact; they dealt with
what were to be Marcel’s main philosophical concerns as they emerged in the dramatic
spiritual crises and relations of his full-dimensioned real-life characters, not with a
disingenuous manipulation of animated concepts as in the conventional “play of ideas.”

Marcel dealt with themes of spiritual authenticity and inauthenticity, fidelity and infidelity,
and the consummation or frustration of personal relationships in his early plays, such as La
Grâce, Le Palais de sable, Le Coeur des autres, and L’Iconoclaste. In Le Quatuor en fa dièse
his musical, philosophical, and dramatic dispositions merge to render vividly the sense of the
interpenetration of persons whose lives are bound up with one another. He appended one of
his most significant philosophical essays (“On the Ontological Mystery”) to the play Le
Monde cassé, in which the “broken world” of the title is displayed in the empty life and
relations of the charming, despairing, and yet still hoping woman who is its protagonist.

Next

His early central concept of “participation,” the direct communion with reality, was gradually
elaborated to elucidate everything from the elemental awareness of one’s own body and
sense-perception to the relation between human beings with ultimate being. The full, open
relation between beings, thus conceived, is essentially “dialogical,” the relation between an I
and a thou, between the whole of a person and the fullness of what he confronts—another
being, a “presence,” and a “mystery,” rather than an “object” of detached perception, thought,
and expression. Such a relation requires an opening up to what is other than oneself,
disponibilité (approximately “availability,” “readiness,” “permeability”) and also an entering
into, involvement, or engagement—dispositions demonstrable in everyday existence. The
opposite is also ubiquitous—the refusal to open up and engage oneself, to give credit, to trust
or hope, the disposition toward negation, despair, or even suicide. This possibility, for
Marcel, is an essential characteristic of the human condition: man may deny as well as affirm
his existence and either fulfill or frustrate his need to participate in being.

Marcel’s method of thought and expression in dealing with these matters is an open, intuitive
one. He probes the meaning of such terms as hope, fidelity, or witness and sketches the
reality that they indicate through a sensitive description of the mind, action, and attitude of
the hoper, faithful one, or witness. He makes use of concrete metaphors and real-life
instances to evoke and embody the difficult-to-express experiences and realities he is
exploring.

In his own unique way, Marcel was an outstanding example of one of the central emphases of
mid-20th-century philosophy—Phenomenology. Marcel’s use of this intuitive method was
original and was developed independently of the work of the great German Phenomenologist
Edmund Husserl and his followers, just as his notion of the I–thou relation was developed
independently of Martin Buber and other dialogical thinkers, and just as his exploration of
Existential themes occurred long before his reading of Kierkegaard and the bursting forth of
Existential philosophy on the mid-20th-century European scene. Marcel may justly be called
the first French Phenomenologist and the first French Existential philosopher (though he
deprecated the term Existentialism).

Marcel was married in 1919 to Jacqueline Boegner (died 1947), whom he called “the
absolute companion of my life.” Their only child was an adopted son, Jean-Marie, the
relation to whom may have inspired Marcel’s later reflections on “creative paternity” and the
spirit of adoption.

Next

Gabriel Marcel and Communication

1.0 Introduction
The word ‘communication’ is a very widely used term today. It is a word that catches the
attention of everyone; a word that has gained popularity and acceptance in the recent times. One of
the reasons why this word has gained so much of popularity is also the growth in the field of
communication in the recent years. Due to its wide usage, the word ‘communication’ has also come
to acquire wide range of meanings. One of the common understandings of the word
‘communication’ today, is the mass communication or the mass media communication. However,
‘communication’ is not merely mass media communication; as understood by some. It actually refers
to the whole process of communicating a message, and this could happen at personal, social and
global level. Communication could also happen at the realm of the ‘non-verbal.’ The process of
communication involves the subject who communicates the object (another subject) to whom the
message is communicated and the message that is communicated between the two parties. This
process could involve even more minute steps like receptivity, reciprocity, biases etc., However, the
basic elements in communication are “subject,” “another subject” and the message.

In this article I would like to expound Gabriel Marcel’s philosophy of communication. Gabriel
Marcel (1889-1973), a French existentialist philosopher proposes Intersubjectivity as a model for
communication. For him the problem in meaningful communication lies in the misconception of
‘being;’ a ‘being’ “who” is essentially Intersubjective. He realized how important it was to
communicate, and to communicate in a personal one-to-one level. This kind of communication, he
says, demands an openness, availability, fidelity and faith from the individuals involved in
communication. It demands love and co-operation.

1.1 Clarification of Terms

Marcel, in his exposition of the notion of the human person as communicative beings, uses
some particular terms. Some of these terms he uses, may not be very clear to us, because some of
those terms are coined by him and others, used differently. Before I present his philosophy of
communication I would like to clarify some of these terms.

1.1.1 Problem and Mystery

By mystery, Marcel does not refer to the realm of the unknowable. But he sees it as
approachable by a type of rational thought which he calls secondary reflection. Unlike in the case of
“problems,” in the realm of mystery there are no generalized or objective solutions, only
communion, testimony and witness.

Problems can be discussed completely and objectively; without involving in any manner the
“persons” of the ones studying it. In the world of problem the investigator is dispassionate and
uninvolved. This is the technique employed by the sciences. A mystery on the other hand is a
problem which encroaches upon its own data, invading them, as it were, and thereby transcending
itself as a simple problem. In mystery the distinction between what is in me and what is before me
breaks down. Mystery is a reality rooted in what is beyond the domain of problematical.

Mystery is something that I am involved in or find myself in; actually, I am inside it. Mystery
envelops and comprehends me. The mysterious always eludes the full grasp of man. A mystery is
a meta-problematical state of affairs. It is not given to a thinker, rather it tends to include the thinker
as a participant. It is a reality in which I find myself engaged; it is not a part of myself but the total
“me” which is engaged in it. Mystery transcends definition and it cannot be objectified, the mystery
is in me and in you and not before me or you. This is what Marcel means by mystery.

1.1.2 Primary and Secondary Reflection

Reflection according to Marcel operates on more than one level. While primary reflection
seeks to gain clarity about the world of abstraction, objectification and verification, secondary
reflection seeks to wonder at richer understanding of the meaning of human existence by a return
to, reflection on, the experiences such as appreciation, fidelity and faith. It is only within the
secondary reflection that the mystery of being is apprehended. When I ask myself ‘what is the
significance of my faith in God?’ by primary reflection I may try to search for clarity, explanation,
study the environment etc., whereas, secondary reflection will question ‘what meaning does it have
for me.’ Thus the secondary reflection challenges me at a personal level.

Recollection is a kind of secondary reflection, it is the process by which I look for some
meaning which is not immediately visible. In recollection, I am able to weigh the actual life I am
living and the potential life within me. Recollection involves a deeper participation in the mysterious
fullness and complexity which can be appreciated but never clearly presented to the observing mind.

1.2 Misconception of Being as the Problem in the World of

Communication
According to Marcel, the basic problem in communication is the ignorance of the true ‘nature’
of being. The basic problem being the inability of the subject/communicator to recognize the worth
of the other subject/human person; misconception of ‘being.’ Marcel, in his writings vehemently
criticizes the functional and technocratic world that has lost the sense of being. One of the questions
that could arise is, ‘what is the connection between misconception of being and communication?’
well, the issue here is, for Marcel, the human person (in communication) are persons and if the
“other” in communication is not recognized as person a meaningful communication cannot happen.
Now let us see what Marcel meant by misconception of being.

The ‘subject’/‘being’ is essentially Intersubjective and communicative. In communication,

what is most important is the “other”/“subject” to whom the message is communicated. If we fail to
recognize the ‘other’ as ‘subject,’ how can meaningful communications take place? For Marcel, the
concrete experiences of life are foundational in understanding our being. The question of being, in
fact, focuses mainly upon that which is eternal within human experience. Being is a mystery
approachable only through individual beings; and individual beings can be known in their true reality
only as they are approached in love/Intersubjective communication. Hence the search for being
must begin by a phenomenological analysis of love/ Intersubjective communication and proceed to
examine those experiences, such as availability, fidelity, faith and hope which are modalities of love.
Thus we see very clearly that the tendency to isolate oneself is the result of misconception of being.
Being is fundamentally communicative subject with dignity and eternal intrinsic value. However, the
main problem in communication lies in the inability or ignorance of the communicating subject to
recognize the other as ‘being’ and this has come about due to various reasons one of the reasons
being the “growth” of technology.

1.2.1 Being and Having

Let us further explain the misconception of being by analyzing the notion of ‘being’ and
‘having.’ The way we look at the world and the people around us influence the formation of our self
a great deal. It is worth noting how Marcel distinguishes two attitudes that we could have in
communication. Our attitude could either be that of ‘being’ or ‘having.’ We could treat the other as a
‘person’ or as an ‘object.’ ‘Being’ implies participation, mystery, presence, I-thou relationships,
thought which stands in the presence of, concrete thinking and secondary reflection. On the other
hand having implies objectification, problem, object, I-It relationships, thought which proceeds by
interrogation, abstraction and primary reflection. Both of these views are important but the problem
in communication today is the preoccupation with the possessive (‘having’) attitude. The modern
communication tends to treat the other as ‘having’ i.e., as objects or possessions.

We also see having mentality at the personal level. In the case of suicide we have people
disposing their bodies as though the body is something that we “have;” as though body is a thing. In
the field of communication ‘having’ mentality could lead to a disaster because the man who remains
in the realm of ‘having’ is centred either on himself or on another treated as “another.” At the root
of ‘having’ there lies a certain specialization or better, specification of the self and this is connected
with the partial alienation of the self.

The problem with communication today is that, the other is treated as ‘having’ and not as
‘being.’ In communication, the concern today is, ‘what I can get from the other;’ the ‘person’ or the
‘being’ is forgotten. The whole problem of communication takes place when the subject that
communicates treats the other/subject as ‘having’ i.e., and anonymous entity, an object, a
possession.

1.2.2 Functionalism
Functionalism is the identification of the person with his/her function/role. The problem of
functionalism in the world of Communication is, ‘I communicate to you as long as you are useful to
me.’ We clearly see here how dignity and sacredness of the subject is replaced with the function the
other performs; whatever the function may be. Intersubjective communication should be the
hallmark of being human but it is sad to see the rampart “growth” of functionalism. The attitude of
functionalism is a proof that Man in one way or another have moved away from what he truly is;
being. Modern man has lost the ontological weight of human experience; dignity and sacredness of
being is replaced with functionality.

Functionalism is a perilous trend that could lead to superficiality in communication, cover-

ups and pretension. The consequences of functionalism are grave. Functionalism has aggravated the
degradation human dignity. Life in a functionalized world becomes a process without purpose,
utilization of means with no clearly defined end, a journey without goal. This no doubt is a road to
despair and nihilism.

1.3 Proper Understanding of Being

Marcel after having identified the problem of communication suggests a very practical
solution. The problem being, the misconception of being/person. Thus, his solution is, a proper
understanding of ‘being.’ In this section we shall see how he suggests reflection on the ordinary
events of life like love, fidelity, faith, and hope in order to understand ‘being.’ His solution may seem
very ordinary, however, his insights are very profound.

Being could be defined as that which does not allow itself to be dissolved by the dialectics of
experience; being is that which resists the corrosive acids of primary reflection’s attempt to reduce
experience to the level of the objective and the problematic. When he calls a ‘subject’ or ‘person’ a
‘being,’ he means that it possesses intrinsic value or dignity; a value or dignity that is not limited in
time but rather eternal. The experience of fidelity and love he says, reveal the presence of such
value in persons. He brings to our notice that people do receive unconditional commitments; which
is an indication that they do possess eternal intrinsic value. Hence, unconditional fidelity and love
between human beings is meaningless if the individual making such commitment does not
experience the other as participating in an imperishable, eternal value that is intrinsic. Absence of
such value would make all such pledges absurd.

Now this being which participates in an eternal intrinsic value is essentially communicative;
human persons are ontologically Intersubjective. Human beings long for meaningful communication
and find fullness of being only in interpersonal communication. A person experiences interpersonal
communication through his experience of love (agape). Marcel insists that structurally my being is a
being-with-others and at no time of my existence am I self sufficient, isolated monad. Our own self
knowledge and self-love is dependent on others and their knowledge and love of us. Our self-
fulfillment comes only through availability to other persons and union with them in Intersubjective
communication such as love and fidelity. For Marcel, just as a concrete individual is inseparable
from his incarnation in a body and his immersion in a situation, he is likewise inseparable from his
Intersubjective communication with other persons. Quoting Marcel, Sam Keen insists that,

Philosophy begins with ‘we are’ rather than ‘think,’ with co-esse rather than esse, with intentional
consciousness rather than self-consciousness, with inter-subjectivity rather than subjectivity. The individual
cannot be conceived as an isolated atom to whom relations are somehow added. Relationship is creative of
being. The ability of a child to use language and to have a sense of personal identity is dependent upon his
being nurtured in a human community. Like an island that arises out of an encompassing sea, the individual
ego emerges from an Intersubjective nexus.

Thus, we see that according to Marcel, the human person establishes oneself as a person
only in Intersubjective communication. But we see some people who may consciously wants to cut
themselves off from others and live within the confines of their own ego. In Marcel’s view such
subjective isolation is a denial of the communion within which the mystery of being is known. In one
of his plays, Les coeurs des autres he writes, ‘there is only one suffering: to be alone.’ He does not
deny that self could become a kind of hellish prison from which all hope and love have been barred,
but he refuses to admit that this is the condition of authentic human life. The imprisoned and
hermetic ego results from a refusal to heed the appeal for communion which arises from other
persons. For Marcel, Intersubjectivity is the precondition of human consciousness, and communion
the mode of authentic life; he says philosophy can be characterized as a series of meditations on the
meaning of ‘with.’

1.3.1 Love
Love issues forth from the whole being of a person and involves him in something which
transcends him. It is an active refusal to treat itself as “subjective” i.e., it is an affirmation of the
value of the other. True love is full of unconditional quality which is the sign of presence; a presence
which is incarnated in the “us.” To say that one loves a being is to affirm that ‘thou shall not die.’
This would mean, because I love you, because I affirm you as being, there is something in you which
can bridge that abyss that I call death. From the moment my affirmation becomes love, it resigns in
favour of that which is affirmed, of the thing which is asserted in its substantial value. This is
precisely what love is; it cannot be divorced from this resignation. Love cannot be separated from
faith; in fact it is faith.

The mysterious quality which is aimed at in love is, “whatever changes may intervene in
what I see before me, you and I will persist as one: the event that has occurred, and which belongs
to the order of accident, cannot nullify the promise of eternity which is enclosed in our love, in our
mutual pledge.” We can understand the God of faith as spirit only in the context of Intersubjectivity
i.e., of love. If human love is centered on itself, if it sinks into a mutually shared narcissism, it turns
into idolatry and pronounces its own death sentence.

1.3.2 Availability
If love is so essential in the realization of our being, our approach to being must first deal
with that attitude which is a pre-condition of love. The spirit of abstraction and possession are the
foundation stones of the prison which the ego builds for itself. In order to make the approaches to
being concrete and practical we must first find ways by which the ego may break out of its self-
inflicted imprisonment and enter into fully personal relationships. The first requirement for such
relationships is the availability.

An unavailable person is locked up in one’s small circle of private experience and judges
others only by the way they fit into one’s preconceived desires and plans. Life is like a possession
which the unavailable man hoards. A person in order to participate in and Intersubjective
communication needs to be available.

The available person is not encumbered with his own possessions, self-image, or a priori
categories into which other persons must fit. Hence, he has the capacity to listen and respond to the
appeal made by others to him. This openness is never an assured disposition but is a conquest which
must be made again and again. One has to battle constantly with “oneself” as well as with the
environment that influences one to be a “self-sufficient” monad. There is also a certain quality of
prodigality and abandon about the way the available man gives of oneself. This prodigality is not an
evidence of lack of responsibility but is the result of a refusal to calculate the possibilities and the
limits within which it is rational to hope and within which love may be creative. It is inevitably the
person who is most consecrated and faithful who is most available. Availability and fidelity go hand
in hand.

1.3.3 Fidelity and Faith

A ‘being’ possesses value or dignity that is not limited in time but rather eternal. This can be
seen in the experience of fidelity. People who give themselves in unconditional commitment or
fidelity recognize in the other, the eternal intrinsic value. Thus, unconditional fidelity and love
between human beings is meaningless if the individual making such commitment does not
experience the other as participating in an imperishable, eternal value that is intrinsic. Absence of
such value would make all such pledges absurd.

Fidelity is the foundation on which a community is built. It refers to our faithfulness to the
engagements we have taken upon ourselves. The idea of fidelity is very close to that of loyalty.
Fidelity always implies an unconditional vow to another person, in other words, commitment to the
other. It is an unimposed presence of an ‘I’ to a ‘thou.’ Fidelity helps the self to achieve some
identity, some unity, some triumph over the corrosive acids of time. It is not a stubborn adherence
to one’s duty neither is it mere constancy. It is not even the preservation of a status quo. But it is
creative and seeks to cooperate with the other person’s efforts to become free. Fidelity does not
calculate rather it is a leap into the dark. In swearing fidelity I am uncertain of the future. I cannot
assure that my feelings will not change tomorrow, next month, or next year? However, beauty of
fidelity lies in this very fact of unknownness or uncertainty of the future. It is this element in fidelity
that gives weightage to our fidelity. It also a sign of the recognition of the other as ‘being.’ Only
when I recognize the other as being will I be able to commit myself in fidelity.

Experience tells us that human beings are radically contingent, frequently fickle, and
generally weak to make a commitment that is unconditional, thus prone to infidelity and Marcel is
aware of it, in fact, Fidelity can never be unconditional except where it is Faith. This is how fidelity
and faith is connected. Having said this, it is also important to note that fidelity aspires to
unconditionality. Fidelity is always directed to the person and it is always a response to a person; it is
the response to an appeal which recognizes in the other person something of lasting value. Fidelity is
an act of the total person taking responsibility for another. In pledging faithfulness to another
person we recognize the being of the other; we recognize him/her as ‘Thou’ and not as an ‘It,’ as
‘Presence’ and not as an ‘Object.’ Fidelity involves the unconditional and it has its justification when
it becomes faith in God.

When fidelity reaches its highest point, it becomes faith in God, here the unconditional vow
implied in human love receives its most complete justification. Now, one might ask what is the
connection between fidelity to a ‘thou’ and the faith in ‘Absolute Thou?’ The hint to this is the factor
of unconditionality in fidelity. Fidelity demands an unconditional vow, an absolute commitment to
the other person. Now the question here is, does absolute commitment demand that one be
committed to an absolute personal being? Marcel is of the opinion that it does. Unconditionality is
the true sign of God’s presence. On this point even Sartre agrees with Marcel. For him, fidelity
aspires to an unconditionality which can only be fulfilled when it is joined with faith.
1.3.4 Hope
Hope can be considered as a continuation and expansion of availability. It is indeed
openness in the face of the ultimate mystery of being. There is also a parallel between the structures
of fidelity and hope. Just as faith is the model of fidelity, so also the unconditional hope in God; the
Absolute Thou, alone reveals the true nature of hope. As the reality to which faith is a testimony is
not absent from any genuine fidelity, likewise the presence creating in the believer that hope for
salvation is never wholly absent where authentic human life strives to transcend the broken world in
which it exists. The exigence of transcendence which is the driving force behind all authentic human
life is nothing other than hope that does not yet recognize itself as such. A phenomenology of hope
reveals an unconditional element at the heart of human existence. Thus, suggesting that the
exigence of transcendence is only veiled exigence of God. The most conditioned hope points beyond
itself to an Absolute Thou who is the foundation of, and the presence immanent within
unconditional hope.

As fidelity can arise only where there is the possibility of betrayal, so hope can arise only
where there is the possibility of despair. Hope is directed toward salvation; it involves coming out of
the darkness of illness, separation, exile or slavery. To despair is to affirm the faithlessness of reality,
to proclaim that the future can never break away from the tyranny of the past. It is to measure the
possible by pre-established categories and to establish limits beyond which the rational man must
cease to hope. Only where there is the temptation to despair can hope arise as the self, in freedom,
refusing to absolutise those categories which promise only extinction to the human spirit. The task
of a person therefore is to guard against despair by showing the limits of the categories of primary
reflection and by pointing to the mysterious reality upon which hope rests.

To affirm that man is utterly alone and dependent only on his own resources is to condemn
him to act without hope. Sartre very strongly propagates this. He advocated despair rather than
hope. Hope rests with Intersubjectivity, with love, and ultimately with faith. Hope involves the
refusal to calculate the limits of the possible. The absolute openness of unconditional hope is
inseparable from faith. It appears as a response of the creature to the infinite being to whom it is
conscious of owing everything that it has. The openness of hope indicates that it is of the nature of
hope to be unverifiable. There is no logical limit to hope. To hope is to trust in the final triumph of
the love of God. Hope does not foresee or imagine its end, but trusts on the basis of an established
relationship that the loved one does not, and will not betray love. It is only on the level of
Intersubjectivity that hope is possible. Hope is only possible to the degree that the self overcomes
the egocentrism of possession which is manifest in desire.
1.4 Implications of Marcel’s Philosophy of
Communication
Marcel’s philosophy, I believe, have a lot to contribute to the world of communication. First
and foremost Marcel’s understanding of a human person is that of a ‘being’ who is ontologically
communicative/Intersubjective. This fundamental assertion I suppose conveys how important the
process of communication is for Marcel. He does not use the word ‘communication’ as much as
‘Intersubjectivity’ to express this notion. However, Intersubjectivity could be understood as a
process of communication; in fact it is a very rich experience of communication. In this regard he
could be considered a philosopher of communication par excellence. He views human persons are
beings constantly longing for meaningful communication.

1.4.1 Human Person as Essentially Communicative

As we cannot think of ourselves as separable from our bodies, we cannot think of separating
ourselves from the concrete situations in which we find ourselves. Marcel says, “I am my habitual
surroundings in the same way that I am my body.” For him, I am inseparable from the family, the
nation, the professional and religious groups in which I participate. I cannot think of my self apart
from my situation. There is a mysterious bond that unites us to our situations in the same way that
the child is united in the womb to the mother.

As far as I do not enter into an I- Thou relationship; which my being always invites me to
participate in, I remain an isolated ego, always a prey to loneliness and despair. Apart from the
relationship of mutual intersubjective communication I remain an incomplete ‘being’/‘im-person.’
Human life is a mixture of both I-he as well as I-thou relationships. Sometimes the situation is such
that the society becomes a hindrance in our striving towards an I- thou relationship. Sometimes in
spite of our efforts we still fall in the trap of objectifying the other. This is because complete
communion is a rare flower of love, not the normal atmosphere we generally live in. However, the
creative interchange of communication gradually transforms isolated and possessive egos into
persons. Marcel’s concrete philosophy of the human person as an incarnate being who is
inseparable from his situation leads forward to concrete ontology. For him, the way to meaningful
communication is through our participation. Thus, for him, interpersonal relationship forms the
doorway to the knowledge of the mystery of being.

1.4.2 Intersubjectivity as a Model for Communication

Marcel through his notion of the human person as being; who is essentially intersubjective,
tries to show us a way out of the problems of communication today. The problem being, ignorance
of ‘being.’ The absence of respect for the ‘other’ in communication, or irresponsible behaviour in
communication are all consequences of such ignorance. What Marcel suggests is that all people
begin to reflect on experiences of life and be aware of ‘being.’ This realization will gradually enable
one to enter into a deep relationship with one another in a one to one co-presence. What the world
need today is the deep realization that we are after all Intersubjective beings in need of meaningful
relationships. This realization and the consequent execution of the realization could solve the
problem of communication today. The ‘communicating subject’ needs to realize that people they are
communicating their messages to; whatever the message be, are subjects/individuals. The other is a
subject who desire and deserve respect, love and the care that we are so particular in showering
ourselves with. Applying the same principle to mass media communication, Marcel’s suggestion
would be that, media persons and the mass communication today keep in mind that people to
whom they are communicating their message to, are “persons.”

1.5 Conclusion

In this article my effort has been to present Marcel’s philosophy of communication. It has
been a great experience studying Marcel’s philosophy and applying it to communication. Marcel
indeed has a lot to contribute to the world of communication. I began this article by clarifying some
Marcellian terms and then went on to state the problem that Marcel sees in the field of
communication; which is basically the misconception of being. I then, proceeded to explain Marcel’s
solution to the problem, i.e., proper understanding of ‘being,’ which can be achieved through
reflection on some of the profound experiences of life like love, fidelity, faith and hope.

Reflection indeed shows, that human person is essentially Intersubjective/communicative

being; a being with eternal intrinsic value. This realization of ‘being,’ taken seriously will change us
and facilitate a different approach towards the ‘other.’ Once we become aware of ‘being’/‘other,’
the other no longer become ‘he’/‘she’ but a ‘Thou.’ This then helps the communicating subject to
enter into a meaningful communication; an “I- Thou communication.” As explained earlier, for
Marcel, to exist is to communicate; in fact, his notion of incarnation is a way of saying that we are
born in communication or rather we “find” ourselves in communication. For him ‘to exist is to co-
exist,’ and ‘to live is to live with.’
 BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. PRIMARY SOURCES

Marcel, Gabriel. Mystery of Being, Vol. 1: Reflection and Mystery. Tr. by G.S. Fraser. Indiana: Gateway
Editions, 1950.

-----. Mystery of Being Vol. 2: Faith and Reality. Chicago: Gateway Edition Henry Regnery Company, 1960.

-----. The Philosophy of Existentialism. Tr. by Manya Harari. New York: The Citadel Press, 1967.

-----. Being and Having. Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1976.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

Keen, Sam. Gabriel Marcel. Virginia: John Knox Press, 1967.

Manimala, J. Varghese. Being, Person and Community. New Delhi: Intercultural Publications, 1991.

C. ARTICLES

Anderson, C. Thomas. “The Nature of the Human Self According to Gabriel Marcel,” Philosophy Today 29
(1985), 273-283.

Keen, Sam. “The Development of the Idea of Being in Marcel’s Thought,” The Library of Living Philosophers,
ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn. vol. 17. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University,
1987.

Luther, Arthur. “Marcel’s Metaphysics of We Are,” Philosophy Today 10 (1966), 191-203.

O’ Hara, M. Kevin. “Person in the Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel,” Philosophy Today 8 (1964), 147-153.

Straus, W. Erwin. and Machado, A. Michael. “Gabriel Marcel’s Notion of Incarnate Being,” The Library of
Living Philosophers ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn. vol. 17. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University, 1987.

D. INTERNET ARTICLES
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/marcel/#1, accessed on 28/3/12.

https://20th-centuryphilosophy.wikispaces.com/Marcel+on+Presence+and+Intersubjectivity, accessed on 13/3/2012.

CONTENTS

Chapter Page

1.0 Introduction- 1

1.1 Clarification of Terms 1

1.1.1 Problem and Mystery- 2

1.1.2 Primary and Secondary Reflection- 2

1.2 Misconception of Being as the Problem in the World of Communication 3

1.2.1 Being and Having- 4

1.2.2 Functionalism- 5

1.3 Proper Understanding of Being- 6

1.3.1 Love- 7

1.3.2 Availability- 8

1.3.3 Fidelity and Faith- 9

1.3.4 Hope- 10

1.4 Implications of Marcel’s Philosophy of Communication 12

1.4.1 Human Person as Essentially Communicative- 12

1.4.2 Intersubjectivity as a Model for Communication- 13

BIBLIOGRAPHY-- 15

Sam Keen, Gabriel Marcel (Virginia: John Knox Press, 1967), 21-22.

Varghese J. Manimala, Being, Person and Community (New Delhi: Intercultural Publications,
1991), 146.

Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism. Tr. by Manya Harari (New York: The Citadel
Press, 1967), 19. See also Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having (Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1976),
171.

Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, 20-21.

Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, 20-21.

Manimala, Being, Person and Community, 146.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 22.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 23-24.

Here what Marcel means by true nature of being is that it is an ontologically communicative
being. Cf Gabriel Marcel, Mystery of Being Vol. 2: Faith and Reality (Chicago: Gateway Edition Henry
Regnery Company, 1960), 179.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 9.

What Marcel means by “person” is persons who possess eternal intrinsic value and persons
who are essentially communicative. Cf Thomas C. Anderson, “The Nature of the Human Self
According to Gabriel Marcel,” Philosophy Today 29 (1985), 280.

Marcel, Mystery of Being Vol. 2: Faith and Reality, 179.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 31.

 Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 31-32.

To possess is to have a thing or an object in one’s control. It is to have the power to retain,
conserve, protect and dispose of. Cf Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 14-15. See also Marcel, Being and
Having, 155.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 14-15.

Marcel, Being and Having, 156.

Marcel, Being and Having, 166.

Marcel, Being and Having, 172.

An attitude that is totally utilitarian and materialistic.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 9.

One of the examples of superficiality in communication is, an Air hostess trying to pretend to be very
welcoming to the passengers. She does not do it because she wants to do it but because her function requires
it. In fact she is trained to “pretend” to be welcoming.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 10.

If one applies upon love, faith and hope the logic of primary reflections and rejects them as
subjective illusions, there can be no affirmation of being. It is only as secondary reflection explores
the richest of human experiences that we can get an adequate philosophy of life. Cf Sam keen,
Gabriel Marcel, 32-33.

Sam Keen, “The Development of the Idea of Being in Marcel’s Thought,” in The Library of
Living Philosophers, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University, 1987) 17: 100.

The unconditional commitments one receives could be from a parent, lover, friend etc., in
other words from others. These unconditional commitments, for instance, are manifested in the
commitment of marriage or in the taking of the religious vows.

Anderson, “The Nature of the Human Self according to Gabriel Marcel,” 275.

M. Kevin O’ Hara, “Person in the Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel,” Philosophy Today 8 (1964),
151.

Anderson, “The Nature of the Human Self according to Gabriel Marcel,” 274.

Anderson, “The Nature of the Human Self according to Gabriel Marcel,” 274.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 28.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 28.

Arthur Luther, “Marcel’s Metaphysics of We Are,” Philosophy Today 10 (1966), 199. See also
Marcel, Mystery of Being Vol. 2: Faith and Reality, 68-69.
 Marcel, Mystery of Being Vol. 2: Faith and Reality, 68-69.

Marcel, Mystery of Being Vol. 2: Faith and Reality, 172-173.

Marcel, Mystery of Being Vol. 2: Faith and Reality, 174-175.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 33-34.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 34.

Anderson, “The Nature of the Human Self according to Gabriel Marcel,” 280.

Manimala, Being, Person and Community, 160.

Manimala, Being, Person and Community, 162. See also Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 35.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/marcel/#1, accessed on 28/3/12.

That is recognition of the other as ‘being.’

Manimala, Being, Person and Community, 163.

One of the best examples of unconditional fidelity is marriage vow the partners in marriage
make to each other.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 36-37.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 40-41. See also Gabriel Marcel, Mystery of Being, Vol. 1: Reflection and
Mystery. Tr. by G.S. Fraser. (Indiana: Gateway Editions, 1950), 52.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 41.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 41-43.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 43-44.

Marcel calls this innate longing for communication as ‘nostalgia for being,’ or ‘exigence for
transcendence.’ Cf. Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 40-41.

It also refers to the ‘persons’ in the society and God at the transcendental level.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 26.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 29.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 29-30.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 30.

Marcel uses the term “person” to refer to a whole person. This understanding takes us back
to his notion of being which I believe is very holistic. Here implies being who is incarnate and a being
who is transcendent and a fully realized being.
 Being, here understood as ontologically intersubjecitive.

https://20th-centuryphilosophy.wikispaces.com/Marcel+on+Presence+and+Intersubjectivity,
accessed on 13/3/2012.

Cf Erwin W. Straus and Michael A. Machado, “Gabriel Marcel’s Notion of Incarnate Being,”
in The Library of Living Philosophers ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University, 1987) 17: 123.

Keen, Gabriel Marcel, 28.

Next

THE METAPHYSICS OF LOVE A Study of Gabriel Marcel By

ROBERT MARKUS

GABRIEL MARCEL is one of those philosophers usually kJ/classed as "existentialist."

While not attempting to dispute the appropriateness of this label, in some respects at least, I
prefer to avoid using or discussing it. It is very much a portmanteau word, and fails to draw
attention to differences between, for instance, Sartre and Marcel, which may be more
significant than the common character which justifies the description of both as
"existentialists." In this article, therefore, I shall try to state the source of the appeal that
Marcel's work has to most of his readers, in the conviction that it is worth while to make the
attempt to understand a great contemporary Christian philosopher, who at his greatest is very
great indeed.

In calling Marcel a Christian philosopher one certainly asserts more than the accidental fact
that he is a Christian— he was converted to Catholicism in 1929—and also a philosopher.
This could be said with equal truth about a man like Descartes, for instance. What is meant is
more like what we usually try to say when we call St. Thomas a Christian philosopher. In
both, the philosophy is developed without recourse to the tenets of faith, yet, somehow,
energized from within by a drive towards faith and the supernatural. The result is a
philosophy capable of standing on its own feet ; not based on revelation, but on the natural
use of our intellectual faculties, and yet open to, and completed by the supernatural. Our
Christian faith finds itself thoroughly at home both in St. Thomas's and Marcel's universe.

In order to appreciate the importance of Marcel's thought, I think it must be recognized that
such an achievement has on the whole not been possible since the early seventeenth century.
Space compels me to simplify—and perhaps to oversimplify ; but what has happened since
then can, I think, be briefly described in the following way : philosophers, greatly and justly
impressed by the scientific achievements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, thought
that by using similar methods they might have similar success in their own fields. This
method consists essentially in formulating various concepts and systems of concepts—
preferably of a mathematical type—working out their mutual relations, interpreting reality in
terms of them, and finally ensuring by means of experiments that the concepts fit the reality.
The important thing to note is that the concepts are something we create : they are a kind of
mould we impose on the data of our experience, and in accordance with which we interpret,
schematize and co-ordinate these data. Or, to change the metaphor, they are a kind of
transparent map through which we look at the countryside beneath. It is up to us to construct
as good a map as we can, of course, and by this I mean one which will enable us to find our
way about as successfully as possible, provided we hold it the right way up. But no matter
how good we make our map, no matter how much detail we fill in, there is always and
necessarily more in the countryside than in the map.

This important limitation of any map, or, to revert to philosophical jargon, the inadequacy of
any conceptual system to express the content of reality, is precisely what many philosophers
have tended, since the seventeenth century, to forget. They have tended to make a
metaphysics out of a method—they came to think that by expanding the conceptual system it
would finally coincide with reality, or, to revert to our metaphor, that by expanding our map
infinitely, we would eventually have the original countryside. In a sense this is, of course,
true ; but only with the important qualification that one would have to be God in order to
succeed. The position might be summed up by saying that we can have complete rational
insight only into that which we ourselves create, that is to say into our conceptual scheme.
These are, in principle, completely transparent to our understanding : once a concept is
formulated it is only a matter of mathematical and logical competence to draw out all that it
contains. God, who is the creator of all that is, no doubt has such knowledge, a complete
intuitive grasp, to which all reality is completely and immediately transparent. But for us,
though we can have a certain limited understanding of reality by interpreting it in terms of
our concepts and by making sure that these are appropriate, reality remains beyond their
grasp. It transcends them ; it can never, no matter how we expand and multiply them, be
exhausted by concepts. This inexhaustible richness of reality Marcel has called the
Ontological Mystery. By this he means the mystery which resides at the centre of each being,
because each being is, in so far as it is a concrete existent and not a concept or complex of
concepts, absolutely unique. In a picturesque way, I should say that what can be fitted into
our concepts—what I call a "fact"—is something we expect, or might have expected had we
known better. But reality, or existence, is always a surprise.2 Marcel speaks of reality as "that
which resists pulverization by the mediations of experience."

In many fields of activity, in scientific work par excellence, we are not concerned with this
uniqueness of things, but only with what we can handle, either by our concepts in the sphere
of theory, or by techniques of whatever kind in the sphere of action. When Marcel says that
"the Ontological Mystery has gone out of life," he means not that things have lost their
uniqueness, but that we have less and less concern for that in things which eludes our grasp.
In the sphere of action only that becomes worth having and pursuing which we can dispose of
according to our desires, our sole limitations being those of our technical efficiency ; in the
realm of theory only that is admitted as knowledge which can be conceptually formulated,
and only that allowed a full status in reality which can be thus formulated. These realms of
activity or thought Marcel calls that of "Having," which he contrasts with that of "Being." At
an earlier stage, in his Journal Mitaphysique, they were the realms of Objectivity and of
Existence respectively. The world of "having," then, is a kind of bloodless, impoverished
world, looked at from without by a detached spectator, manipulated by the technician. It is a
world riddled with problems, but determined to allow no room for mystery. If it becomes
enclosed, and self-sufficient—and who is to say that it is not doing so at an ever-increasing
rate—it becomes Prufrock's world of trivial insignificance. As Marcel describes it in one of
his profoundest essays (which appeared in an English translation as The Ontological
Mystery) : "The world of the problematical is the world of the functional—or what can be
functionalized . . . it is the kingdom of technics of whatever sort. Every technique serves, or
can be made to serve, some desire or some fear ; conversely, every desire as every fear tends
to invent its appropriate technique. From this standpoint, despair consists in the recognition
of the ultimate inefficacy of all technics, joined to the inability or the refusal to change over
to a new ground—a ground where all technics are seen to be incompatible with the
fundamental nature of being, which itself escapes our grasp.. . . It is for this reason that we
seem nowadays to have entered upon the very era of despair ; we have not ceased to believe
in technics, that is to envisage reality as a complex of problems. Yet at the same time the
failure of technics as a whole is as discernible to us as its partial triumphs. To the question :
what can man achieve ? we continue to reply : as much as his technics ; yet we are obliged to
admit that these technics are unable to save man himself, and even that they are apt to
conclude the most sinister alliance with the enemy he bears within him."

In order, therefore, that man may rise to his full human stature, he must somehow be able to
rise above this world of "having" into that of "being." In this realm the "other," whether it be
a thing or a person, is not regarded as an object of inquiry, or a complex of functions, which
we can manipulate to satisfy our interests and desires. It is rather a kind of "presence" we
encounter. We stand back from our everyday preoccupations and let the presence speak to us.
We open ourselves to its influx, we respond to it. The condition of attaining to this attitude
may be described, as Marcel hints in his Etre et Avoir, as a kind of spiritual humility in face
of reality, whereby we refuse to build it up in the image of our own categories of thought, or
as an object of our own interests and desires.

It will be clear that the difference between the two orders, that of "having" and that of
"being," is quite fundamental where relations between persons are concerned. Whereas it is
allowable for many purposes to treat things as merely complexes of various functions, it is
not possible to resolve men and women into their functions, whether they be social,
biological, psychological or anything else. There is, of course, a place in life for merely
functional relations between people. But is it or is it not true that the hall-mark of a truly
personal relation between two people is precisely whether they are mutually recognized by
one another as beings with unique value, ends in themselves ? Of course, even in what we
sometimes fondly imagine to be our most intimate personal relations there is an element of
substituting for the other being my idea of this being, some particular function satisfying
some particular impulse or desire. In so far as I allow this to happen, I treat the other as a kind
of appendage to me, something I possess. The prerequisite for love, however, is precisely that
I recognize the other as not a thing I can dispose of according to my will, but as a person
entitled to respect in his own right, and endowed with a uniqueness whose mystery it would
be sacrilegious for me to attempt to invade. To adopt the terminology of the Jewish
philosopher Martin Buber, in love the other must never be treated as an "It," but always as a
"Thou." The person who is prepared to give himself to others in this way Marcel calls
"disponible."

"Disponibility," the readiness to become the "I" to a "Thou," is thus the first condition of
love. But of course it is more complicated than this. For only a saint can live all, or nearly the
whole of his life on the level of "being." Sainthood is actually regarded by Marcel as absolute
disponibility. For most of us, however, life is only a series of "scintillations of being." The
vision fades or is lost, responsibility forgotten, humility displaced by selfishness. And yet we
are required to make our life into a continuous whole. Here Marcel has recourse to what is
perhaps his most distinctive notion, that of fidelity. This, at the simplest level, can be seen at
work in keeping a promise. When I promise my friend who is ill in hospital to come to see
him tomorrow, I commit myself for the future on the strength of a momentary impulse of
friendship. Although some other attraction may distract me tomorrow, if I am prepared to
take my commitment seriously, I shall go and see him. Fidelity is thus equivalent to taking
responsibility for a commitment. In fact, Marcel makes a much more extended use of the
notion. Since our fallen life is a series of "scintillations of being," continually apt to sink to
the level of "having," and even to rest content with the latter, "fidelity" is required to knit it
into a living continuity —to bridge, as it were, the gaps between successive "scintillations."
This is true in the realms of thought and of action alike. In both, it is by fidelity that a
momentary encounter with reality, a vision or a commitment, is perpetuated. "It is the
perpetuation," as Marcel puts it, "of a witness which could at any moment be wiped out or
denied." He calls this attestation creative, because it creates a kind of community between
myself and the reality concerned. This togetherness is something new, not simply a new
attitude towards what has been there all the time. Martin Buber, once more, put this in a
memorable way in his I and Thou, when he wrote that "feelings dwell in man ; but man
dwells in his love. . . . Love does not cling to the 'I' in such a way as to have the 'Thou' for its
'content,' its object ; but love is between 'I' and 'Thou.'" A quotation from one of Marcel's
followers, M. Roger Troisfontaines, writing in a volume of essays dedicated to Marcel, brings
out this creative character of fidelity : "If I really love you," he writes, "I shall love you no
matter what you do. According to your actions, my love for you will take different nuances—
of shared joy, of anguish, of patience, of pity—of who knows what else. But I shall never
deny the bond which unites us, any more than a mother can disown her unworthy child, or
God his sinful creature. Because love bears on being, not on an idea of being.. . . What does
this mean ? In the vulgar mind, on the contrary, I love the idea I have of a being, and not the
being itself. Does this imply that my idea may be inexact ? . . . When I say that 'I have been
mistaken about him'; this means surely that I have adopted a wrong construction of him. In
recognizing my error I acknowledge that there is an objective truth, a correct construction of
him. Only is it not true that to love someone is precisely to refuse to treat him in this
manner ? "

That this treatment of love applies also to man's love of God, goes without saying. That
Marcel's treatment of this is open to criticism is, I think, equally true. His language, even in
his later work, makes it difficult to see what place rational discourse about God would have
in his philosophy. He seems unwilling to allow that God, the "absolute Thou," can ever
legitimately become the object of abstract thinking, because this, he rightly observes, would
be to convert the absolute Thou into an It. This is, at least, a valuable reminder that rational
assent to statements about God is in no way equivalent to Faith, which is a personal
commitment, a turning towards God with the whole being. But it seems to me a very different
thing to say that the two attitudes are incompatible, and I can certainly see no ground in the
necessities of Marcel's thought for such an assertion. However this may be—and one's
misgivings or misapprehensions may well be cleared up by Marcel's forthcoming Gifford
lectures—it is impossible not to feel that in his best work we find an exploration of some of
the profoundest implications of the Christian view of love. When we are told to love our
neighbour as a creature of God, for His sake and in His likeness, are we not thereby exhorted
to love him as he is, created by God, instead of substituting for his concrete and unique being
an idea or a function that we create ? Is it or is it not true that to build up another person in
our own image is just a lesser form of what, where God is concerned, is called idolatry ?

Marcel's real greatness can perhaps be seen best in the use he makes of his fundamental
notions. The subtlety and profundity of his analysis of human situations, of men facing the
world, each other or God—in spite of often difficult and heavily metaphorical language—
cannot fail to strike a chord in most of us. We are being addressed by the sincerity of a
philosopher who, in Etienne Gilson's words, "has written nothing that is not taken from his
own depths or experienced in direct contact."

Next

Biographical Sketch

Gabriel Marcel, generally regarded as the first French existential philosopher, was born in
Paris in 1889 and died there in 1973. An only child in an upper-middle class family, Marcel
early excelled in his studies and demonstrated an aptitude for philosophical inquiry. Shortly
after Marcel began his academic career in philosophy, World War I broke out and he served
in the French Red Cross, an experience that contributed to an increasingly humanistic aspect
in his philosophy. In 1919 Marcel married Jacqueline Boegner, a professor at the Schola
Cantorum; they adopted a son, Jean.

From 1914 Marcel kept a series of philosophical notebooks that reveal the evolution of his
thought away from traditional academic philosophy and toward one influenced by the
writings of Soren Kierkegaard. These notebooks were eventually published in 1927 under the
title Journal Métaphysique. Later Marcel continued this practice of publishing directly from
his journals with Être et Avoir (1935) and Présence et Immortalité (1959). The development
of Marcel's philosophy led to his embracing Catholicism in 1929. His evolving "Christian
existentialism" caused, in the years following World War II, his being contrasted in the
popular press with Jean-Paul Sartre and the atheistic existentialism Sartre expounded and
popularized.

Following his service in World War I, Marcel's academic career became an intermittent one,
as he typically earned his living as a literary critic, editor, or publisher's reader. Marcel was,
in these various capacities, instrumental in making contemporary foreign literature better
known in France.

From an early age Gabriel Marcel evinced a keen interest in the dramatic, inventing dialogues
with imaginary siblings. He had written plays as a schoolboy, and by the early 1920s Marcel
had had his plays performed. His plays often demonstrated concerns manifest in his
philosophical writings, and one, Le Monde Cassé (1933), is accompanied in its published
version by a notable philosophical essay, "Position et Approches Concrètes du Mystère
Ontologique."

Music had been an integral part of the Marcel household in his childhood, and in his adult life
Gabriel Marcel was fond of piano improvisations. It was only in 1945, however, that he
undertook--with the assistance of his wife--formal composition, setting down his musical
interpretations of the poems of, among others, Baudelaire and Rilke.

Following the death of his wife in 1947 Marcel continued to write, teach, and travel. The
major international recognition Gabriel Marcel received before his death was the German
Peace Prize, awarded him at the Frankfurt Book Fair in 1964.
Further biographical information on Gabriel Marcel may be found in his "An
Autobiographical Essay" in The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court,
c1984).

Return to the Table of Contents

Scope and Contents

The Gabriel Marcel material assembled by Darwin Yarish, a Canadian student of Marcel, is
arranged in three series: works, correspondence, and miscellaneous. The works series
comprises a collection of over fifty notebooks kept by Marcel over the years. In many of
these notebooks he wrote down his quotidian thoughts, composed drama, or recorded his
reactions to the events of the Second World War. Other notebooks contain a draft of an
unpublished novel, literary criticism, musical compositions, and some fragmentary literary
and philosophical jottings. The philosophical notebooks represent a significant portion of
Marcel's recorded thought from as early as 1908 to the mid-1960s, and, in fact, represent
about half of the total number of notebooks in the archive. Drama, from juvenile efforts to
several plays written in the mid-1940s, form the second-largest portion of the archive.

The 55 notebooks that make up the works series have been arranged by genre into philosophy
and philosophical journals, dramas, other literary materials, journals combining dramatic and
philosophical materials, World War Two diaries, and music. While there is usually more than
one notebook in each folder, the following folder list identifies Marcel's title for each
notebook, separated by colons. The notebooks are all written in Marcel's hand with the
exception of the plays Le Quatuor en Fa Diese (a typescript) and Le Regard Neuf, which is in
the hand of Mme. Marcel. The manuscripts of Existentialisme et Humanisme and Mystère de
l'Être include manuscript notes in the hand of Jeanne Delhomme.

About half of the plays represented in the collection are unpublished; the published drama Le
Quatuor, Chapelle Ardente, Iconoclaste, L'horizon, and Le Regard Neuf are represented in
manuscript.

The unpublished materials include Marcel's World War II journals (from 19 June 1940 to the
end of 1944), together with the manuscript for his only (and unpublished) novel, L'Invocation
a la Nuit.

Among the materials contained in the philosophical notebooks are manuscripts for a major
portion of the Journal Métaphysique, as well as Être et Avoir, Homo Viator, and Mystère de
l'Être.

The correspondence series supplements the works series and represents, in the main, letters of
condolence Marcel received in 1947 upon the death of his wife Jacqueline. There is also a
small group of letters from Marcel to Darwin Yarish written in the last four years of the
philosopher's life, together with a few notes from Marcel's sister-in-law Genevieve Boegner
to Yarish. Among the letters of condolence are found notes from Jean Pierre Alterman, Denis
Huisman, Julien Lanoë, Rosamond Lehmann, and Max Picard.
The miscellaneous series contains a substantial amount of material which supports the works
and correspondence series. The largest fraction comprises several hundred clippings of
articles by and about Gabriel Marcel, interviews with him, reviews of his works, and (most
particularly) coverage of his receiving the German Peace Prize in 1964. These clippings are
from contemporary European newspapers and literary journals and are in various languages,
German predominating. A small number of photographs (about 15) of Marcel and his
Parisian neighborhood, together with a few theatrical programs, completes this series.

While the representations of Marcel's work in philosophy and dramatic writing is quite strong
in the archive, there is very little personal material or material representing his work as an
editor, literary critic, or publisher's reader.

Return to the Table of Contents

Summary:

Gabriel Marcel is a French existentialist and existentialism was

divided into two which are atheistic existentialism and the other is theistic
(Christian) existentialism. Marcel is a Christian existentialist, for he still
includes the divine. He is also known for his unsystematical philosophy
where he pointed out that philosophy starts from where one is. He is no
fan of systems, that is why mostly of his works are at random.

So going to Marcel’s thought. Reflection and its two kinds are

significant concepts in his philosophy. Reflection for Marcel is “nothing
other than attention, i.e. directed towards this sort of small break in the
daily chain of habit”.[1] Reflection is simply giving time to think, a
momentary ceasing of work and the giving of attention to it or something
else, and reflection is personal, because each can reflect and one could
reflect through each one’s own personal experience.

Reflection is divided into two kinds according into how it deals

with the subject object relationship. First is primary reflection which tends
to compartmentalize or analyze. It tends to dissociate object or objects.
“It dismantles a whole into parts.”[2] Or to use simply analogy, that is
like slicing a pizza into little pieces. This sort of reflection makes
demarcation points between subject and object. The I is separate with the
object and the I ratiocinates the objects; the objects are analyzed or is
then compartmentalized. This kind of reflection, when applied to the
person, tends to dissociate the person with any object thought of. This
results to one saying I “have” a body or I “have” you, for to “have” in
reflection is implies that a body is something as an extension, not partly
you but something that is separated that is why it is thus called “having”.
To have is to posses and primary reflection causes this kind of result,
especially when related to man with others. It puts a gap between the
two.
 The other kind of reflection is the secondary reflection which
entails that there is no separation or distinction from the object. It tends
to link the gap which primary reflection made. For example, in primary
reflection I have a body implies body as a possession, and something that
is extended; but in secondary reflection, one says I am body. The “am” or
“be” is different from “having” because “to be” is “not to have” but
stresses a unity with the object. Secondary reflection escapes analysis
and everything that escapes analysis is a mystery.
Marcel also has this search for Being, by which Being with capital
B cannot be known. So why quest for something that is way beyond
human capacity of understanding? But “beings” can be known because
these are things that exist and are subject to our inquiry. The beings
must also be in need of thought for it to be known, not the pure thought
of Descartes in which its purity is known as the Thinking I, which has no
object of thought, but that thought that always “thinks of”. So being,
being thought of, is that being that we can also relate with, and in
secondary reflection, being then becomes not an object separate form the
I but will be part and engrossed in the I. So there arises the mystery of
being because when secondary reflection takes place; such reflection is in
refusal to analysis and anything that abhors analysis is a mystery.

Another of Marcel’s thoughts is that of the “broken world”. The

broken world is the result of primary reflection which analyzes things,
compartmentalizes or divides a certain whole. Primary reflection also
makes the broken world more manifest. The world is already broken, and
primary reflection made it more broken. A person is situated with others
and the result of primary reflection is that the I tends to make others as
objects separate form him, especially in the case of man being with
others. As if the others are mere tools for some work. The “I” fails to see
the other as a part of his whole being but rather an extension which the
“I” possesses. The “I” sees persons not according to their persona but as
something associated with predicates. The broken world is thus a world
that is being a machine where the parts are bits of cogs and sprockets.
“Anonymity is another hallmark of this broken world.”[3] Anonymity due
to a person’s being being a being through others, the person has no
identity of himself but gains his pseudo-identity in comparison or contrast
to the other. For example I am the son of Alexander the Great or, He is
the neighbor of Paris Hilton. The person which is in the former I and the
latter He, has nothing on his own but gains his recognition through
others. Therefore that person is anonymous because he is not known in
himself but by others. To clearly show the picture of anonymousity to the
person, remove the predicates and the I or he is now known.

Man is situated in a world with others so he is inevitable with

others. To be with others implies that this statement is the product of
secondary reflection because I with others refers not to being near but an
inner feeling of closeness; contrary to I have others that the other is
merely an object that the I has no inner bond with the Thou(referring to
the other person). Man is immersed in a “we-reality”, that he is not alone
but is with someone or something to live. The “withness” is not
synonymous with physical distance but an inner feeling of distance and
this is mysterious, for the inner feeling is something that escapes
analysis. It just happens that I cannot even know not why, this is the
result of intersubjectivity; the interrelatedness of man with others; the
consequence of a “we-reality”. The “we-reality” then is the key to the
encounter of the “Absolute Thou”. Marcel refers this as God, and God also
must escape the curse of primary reflection that we tend to abstract Him
like how classical theology goes. But God is encountered, not rationalized.
If we tend to rationalize Him, we tend to break God into certain predicates
and will consequently lead to some problems with His existence, but
secondary reflection tends to transcend these logical problems and simply
puts God as there, and can be encountered by the I relating with the
“thou” (referring to persons). For the “I-thou relationship in this approach
is essentially based on fidelity of God”.[4] Fidelity is that belief in God or
faith in Him.

Reflections and Conclusions:

The heading of this part is already an attempt to apply Marcel

(hahaha). So primary reflection is the source or may not ultimately the
source but the giver of more manifestation of the brokenness of the
world. So I may say that primary reflection is like Hegel’s Understanding
that sees not the whole but sees particulars or parts. This is also manifest
in Science which tends to compartmentalize everything, analyze and
break everything into understandable parts. So in the social reality, I see
people not as a person but someone associated with predicates. Like for
example, I see Johannah as a “beautiful HRM student” but the predicate
is not her whole being but a part of who she is. That then I might be
affectionate to her because of the predicate but not the “thou” or the
wholeness of her being. That makes her a broken world, but in secondary
reflection I boil down all her possible predicates into one word which is
her name which engrosses her whole being. Secondary reflection makes
me see not anymore the beautiful, cute and etc. but herself, the totality
of her as a person. Then the I-Thou relationship that I treat her as
myself, not as a possession to have, but someone with dignity (dignity
sounds so mysterious but that is the point). It is like an encounter with
the holy, treating her not as a separate entity but a person within me,
that I can relate to with all due respect.

So much for that far from reality example, but both reflections
are of great importance that one leads to analysis then the other leads to
mystery. That I may say primary reflection though makes the world more
broken , but it also helps us to see the world clearly and I may say
scientifically, but it is in this mystery, the awe of this mystery that we do
not know leads us to an encounter that is far from analysis, and this
mystery tends to give value to the facticity with the others as others not
as possessions.