1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

 1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Rohan Mehra is a 28-year-old entrepreneur and founder of a perfume company and
Riya
Singh, a 27-year-old marketing executive, both of them had completed their
education
from the Indiana Institute of Technology (Batch 2017-19) in Tucknow, Ultra
Pradesh.
2. During the time at the Indiana Institute of Technology, they both started liking
each other.
And confessed their love to each other.
3. Rohan went abroad to study in 2019. The two used to have long conversations over
voice
calls, instant messages and video calls for over a year. After returning to
Indiana, their
relationship became stronger than ever both physically and emotionally.
4. While in relationship Rohan used to take Riya with him to all the social
gatherings and
functions. On the night of November 20, 2022, Rohan took Riya to his brother’s
marriage,
where she met Rohan’s family and relatives. Rohan introduced Riya to his mother,
where
Rohan’s mother, after meeting Riya, asked both, “When will you two throw a
similar
function for us?”. Listening to the question, Rohan and Riya looked at each other
and
smiled, and then Riya said, “Soon.” Listening to the same Rohan, he did not
respond.
5. Rohan, during a party when he was in a drunken state, was asked by his friends
Rishi and
Radha, who were married, about the future of his relationship with Riya, to which
Rohan
replied, ‘Riya will make a perfect wife’. The same conversation was narrated to
Riya by
Radha without the consent or knowledge of Rohan. Rohan was unaware of any such
communication being made to Riya by Radha.
6. Rohan and Riya started living together. Rohan pitched an idea to Riya that she
should
work with her and develop an app for his perfume company ‘Scents’ so that they
can sell
their perfumes directly. Riya liked the idea and started working on developing
the app for
it, but at the same time, iterated that she would not quit her job.
7. As they were in a relationship, no formal written contract was executed between
the two,
and thus the entire agreement was based on the exchange of messages on WhatApp.
8. Over a WhatApp chat on 13th May 2023, both of them agreed on a payment structure
in
which Riya will get a lumpsum amount of Rs 10 Lac once the application is
developed.
However, the mode and timing of payments were not clearly defined. As the work
progressed, the parties experienced disagreements relating to the development of
the
application, with Rohan claiming that some crucial aspects of the project were
left as Riya
was not able to balance her job and working on the application at the same time,
thereby
leaving Rohan frustrated.
 1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

9. As a consequence of the same, Rohan denied adequate payment as promised in the

WhatApp chats on the ground of a deficiency in services rendered, thus annoying
Riya.
But Rohan calmed her down so that their relationship was not affected.
10. On November 17, 2023, Riya asked Rohan to marry her, which Rohan denied and
thereby called off the relationship.
11. Meanwhile, Riya was feeling deceived and emotionally distressed, and filed an
FIR
alleging that Rohan had engaged in sexual intercourse with her on the pretext of
marriage,
and now he was refusing to fulfil his promise. Rohan denies any expressed promise
relating to marriage made by him, whereas Riya contends that an implied promise
of
marriage was made and thus she gave her consent for sexual intercourse on the
pretext of
marriage. Following the same, medical tests were performed and it was confirmed
on the
basis of reports that sexual intercourse took place frequently between Rohan and
Riya.
However, nothing was concluded on the matter of consent.
12. As a consequence of the same, Rohan was arrested. Rohan was presented before
the
magistrate. Rohan was denied bail and was later acquitted for the charges by
Trial Court
of Tucknow. The trial court held that, both Riya and Rohan were in consensual
relationship, therefore, Rohan cannot be held liable for Rape.
13. Riya filed an appeal against the trial Court’s Order in High Court of Ultra
Pradesh.
The High Court reversed trial Court’s judgment and convicted Rohan for the charge
of
Rape on the pretext of Marriage. Rohan then filed a Special Leave Petition in
Supreme
Court of Indiana against High Court’s order.
14. Rohan further asked the court to take into consideration that his family had
been
looking out for a bride on marriage platform Jeevanteresaathi.com and thus, he
and Shreya
(the girl who agreed to marry him through Jeevanteresaathi.com) have decided to
get
married and that his fundamental Right to Marry enshrined by the Constitution of
Indiana
would be violated.
15. However, Riya also filed a suit for breach of contract. To which Rohan
alleges that
conversations on WhatApp are not formal in nature. He also contends that WhatApp
chats
do not form a valid contract.
16. Apart from this, Rohan has also challenged the constitutional validity of
Section 375
of the Indiana Penal Code, 1860, entitling only women to file a case on the
ground of
consent on the pretext of marriage and the same not available to men.
 1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

STATEMENT OF ISSUE

Issue 1. Whether the Special Leave Petition is Maintainable in the Hon’ble

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Issue 2. Whether the agreement entered into by Rohan and Riya on
WhatApp amounts to a valid contract recognizable by laws in
Indiana?
Issue 3. Whether the consent for sexual intercourse was given by Riya only
the pretext of marriage and does it amount to rape under Section 375
of Indiana Penal Code?
Issue 4. Whether a denial of bail for Rohan for the purpose of his marriage
would amount to an infringement of his fundamental right under the
Constitution of Indiana?
 1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Issue 1. Whether the Special Leave Petition is Maintainable in the Hon’ble

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Issue 2. Whether the agreement entered into by Rohan and Riya on WhatApp
amounts to a valid contract recognizable by laws in Indiana?
Issue 3. Whether the consent for sexual intercourse was given by Riya only the
pretext of marriage and does it amount to rape under Section 375 of
Indiana Penal Code.
Issue 4. Whether a denial of bail for Rohan for the purpose of his marriage
would amount to an infringement of his fundamental right under the
Constitution of Indiana?
 1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

Issue 1. Whether the Special Leave Petition is Maintainable in the Hon’ble

Supreme Court of Indiana.

The counsel addressing the issue humbly submits that the point to argue
is that-
The Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of constitution of Indiana
is not
Maintainable for the Petitioner
1.1 In the favour of respondent, it is contented while the petitioner
may assert his
innocence; the gravity of allegations against him cannot be
understated. rape based on
the pretext of marriage raise serious concerns regarding the
petitioner’s integrity and
conduct.
1.2 Moreover, the presumption of innocence must be balanced with the
need to protect
the complainant and prevent potential harm. Additionally, the
possibility of tampering
with the evidence and influencing the witnesses cannot be discounted,
especially
given the petitioner’s social status and resources
1.3 Cases involving the allegations of sexual assault require special
consideration,
particularly concerning the vulnerable position of the victim
1.4 In the Rafiq vs State Of U.P 1 -The special jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the
Constitution which is meant mainly to correct manifest injustice or
errors of law of
great moment cannot be invoked in the instant case.
1.5 In the Arnab Goswami vs State of Maharashtra2 in this case, the
Supreme Court
reaffirmed the principles governing bail jurisprudence and emphasized
the need to
balance individual rights with the social interests. The court held
bail should not be
granted as the matter of course, particularly in the cases involving
serious offenses
where there is a risk of the accused tampering with evidence on
obstructing the
investigation
1.6 In the PG Manu Vs State of Kerala and Ors1 -The Supreme Court
dismissed the
petition filed by a former Government Pleader at the Kerala High
Court seeking
anticipatory bail in a rape case. A bench comprising Justices
Hrishikesh Roy and
Prashant Kumar Mishra dismissed the Special Leave Petition filed by
Advocate PG
Manu challenging the judgment of the Kerala High Court stating, “you
are in a
position of Dominance”. It is clearly apparent from the circumstances
of the stated
fact that appellant is clearly in the position of Dominance.
1.7 Article 136 Special leave Petition holds a prime place in Indian
judicial system and
 has been provided as a “residual power” in the hands of hon’ble
Supreme Court to be
 1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

exercised only when the matter of substantial question of law is involved or the
gross
miscarriage of justice is done.
1.8 It is a discretionary power vested in the hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana and
the
court may in its discretion refuse to grant the leave to appeal. Article 136 is
not a right
but rather a privilege vested in the Supreme Court of Indiana.
 1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

Issue 2. Whether the agreement entered by Rohan and Riya on WhatApp

amounts to a valid contract recognizable by laws in Indiana?

The counsel addressing the issue of validity of contract upon the

social media platform
Whatapp has points to argue that:
I.Whether legally enforceable contract can be formed over
electronic medium?
II.Does electronic conversation have evidentiary value?
2.1 CONTRACTS FORMED OVER ELECTRONIC MEDIUM ARE
LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE AND BINDING OVER THE PARTY AT
FAULT
2.1.1 Contracts executed through electronic methods, such as
WhatsApp, SMS, or email are
valid and binding in India, if such contracts fulfil the
requirements under the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 (“Contract Act”).
2.1.2 As per the Contract Act a valid and legally binding contract
must have a proposal 1,
acceptance2 of such offer, be for legal consideration, and it
should in “consensus ad
idem”.3
2.1.3 Validity of such electronic agreements is further enforced
through Section 10A which
state “Where in a contract formation, the communication of
proposals, the
acceptance of proposals, the revocation of proposals and
acceptances, as the case
may be, are expressed in electronic form or by means of an
electronic records, such
contract shall not be deemed to be unenforceable solely on the
ground that such
electronic form or means was used for that purpose" of the
Information Technology
Act, 2000 (“IT Act”) and Section 85A of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 states The
Court shall presume that every electronic record purporting to
be an agreement
containing the digital signatures of the parties was so
concluded by affixing the digital
signature of the parties. The IT Act does not mandate the need
for a physical copy of
the agreement to be executed unless such a term is a mandatory
provision of the
agreement for it to attain validity.
2.1.4 However, there are certain caveats on the validity of
transactions and documents
regarding subject matters under the First Schedule of the IT
Act.
1
Section 2(a) of the Indian Contract act 1872, “When one person
signifies to another his willingness to do or to
abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that
other to such act or abstinence, he is said
to make a proposal”
2
 Section13 and section 14 of the Indian Contract Act,1872
3
Section 2(b) of the Indian Contract act 1872, “When the person to whom
the proposal is made signifies his
assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted”.
 1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

Issue 3. Whether the consent for sexual intercourse was given by Riya only
the
pretext of marriage and does it amount to rape under Section 375 of
Indiana Penal Code?

The Counsel in addressing the issue whether consent for sexual

intercourse given by the
Respondent (Riya) under the pretext of marriage amounts to rape
under Section 375 of
the Indiana Penal Code has two main points to argue:
(i) The consent of the respondent was not free; it was given under
the pretext of
marriage.
(ii) The Sexual intercourse done under the pretext of marriage
amounts to rape.
3.1 THE CONSENT OF RESPONDENT WAS NOT FREE; IT WAS OBTAIN
UNDER MISCONCEPTION OF FACTS
3.1.1 That in common parlance, consent is an act done deliberately
and by free will.
3.1.2 That in the context of rape, consent is required because a
sexual penetration is a
prima facie wrong.4 It involves the use of force against a
body and involves risks to
the other person.
3.1.3 That According to Section 90 of Indiana penal code if consent
for sexual activity
was obtained through fear of harm or based on a
misunderstanding of the
circumstances (such as promises of marriage), it is not
legally valid consent under
the Indiana Penal Code. Therefore, any sexual activity
conducted under such
circumstances could potentially constitute an offense under
relevant provisions of
the law.
3.1.4 That a plain reading of the words ‘misconception of fact’ is
broad enough to
encompass all kinds of cases where consent is obtained by
misrepresentation.5
3.1.5 That in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v State of Maharashtra 6, the
Supreme Court
of India explained the legal principle as follows:
The ‘consent’ of a woman with respect to Section 375 must
involve an active
and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To
establish whether the
‘consent’ was vitiated by a ‘misconception of fact’
arising out of a promise to

4
Jonathan Herring and Michelle Madden Dempsey, Why Sexual Penetration
Requires Justification, 27 Oxford
Journal Of Legal Studies 467 (2007).
5
 N. Jaladu, In re 1911 SCC OnLine Mad 3: AIR 1914 Mad 49
6
AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 4010
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marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of

marriage must
have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention
of being
adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must
be of
immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision
to engage
in sexual act.7
3.1.6 That in the present case the petitioner had received the consent for
sexual
intercourse with the respondent after the misconception of facts i.e.
implied
promise of marriage and never had the intention to marry her.
Following facts of
cases clearly states that there was an implied promise of marriage by
the petitioner
and no intention of marriage :
A. That as per the Para 3 of the statement of facts petitioner used
to take the
respondent to all the social gatherings and functions. Especially
on the night of
November 20, 2022, the petitioner took the respondent to his
brother’s
marriage, where she met petitioner’s family and relatives. When
petitioner
introduced respondent to his mother, after meeting respondent, she
asked both
of them, “When will you two throw a similar function for us?”
Listening to the
question, the petitioner and respondent looked at each other and
smiled. That
indicates that the respondent believed that one day they will also
marry and
petitioner’s smile on that question also strengthen the belief.
B. That as per the Para 5 of the statement of facts the petitioner
and respondent
started living together. A girl usually lived in the live in
relationship presumes
that there is an implied promise of marry by their partner and
they will marry
one day. Even The Supreme Court decided the couples living in
live-in
relationships will be presumed legally married. 8 But the
intention of the
petitioner was to convince the respondent to work with him in his
perfume
company ‘Scents’ and to have sexual intercourse with the
Respondent on the
misconception of the facts.
C. That as per the Para 6 of the statement of facts Rohan’s denial to
marry and
calling off the relationship immediate after the discussion of
payment. This
shows that the petitioner had used the respondent for his sexual
needs and
 work. The petitioner had not any intention to marry her.

7
(2019) 9 SCC 608 [18]
8
Dhannu Lal v. Ganeshram 2015 AIR SCW 2839
 1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

3.2 SEXUAL INTERCOURSE DONE IN PRETEXT OF MARRIAGE AMOUNTS TO

RAPE
3.2.1 That the Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code provides that consent given
under a
misconception of fact is no consent.
3.2.2 That in promise to marry cases, the false promise of marriage is deemed
a
misconception of fact. Even though the sexual intercourse was, per se,
consensual
but under a misconception of marriage, it falls within the definition
of rape.
3.2.3 That in the case of Yedla Srinivasa Rao vs State Of A.P 9, The Supreme
Court
observed that clearly the girl had sexual intercourse with the accused
on the
promise made by the accused that he would marry her. The conduct of the
accused
fell under the offence of rape.
3.2.4 That in the case of Pradeep Kumar v. State of Bihar10, it was held by
the
Supreme Court that the term ‘misconception of fact’ defined under
Section 90 of
IPC is broad enough to include all cases pertaining to
misrepresentation of facts,
deceit, fraud etc reference to which consent is given. Section 3 of the
Indiana
Evidence Act, 1872 also provides for intention to be treated as fact.11
3.2.5 That in a case for rape under Section 375 of IPC, where the sexual
intercourse by
the accused is proved and the question comes before the court of law
that whether
consent was given by the prosecutrix or not, and she states in her
evidence that she
did not give consent for the act, then the court shall presume that the
act was done
without the consent of the victim.12
3.2.6 That in the State of U.P. v. Naushad13 the court held that the accused
shall be
convicted under Section 375 of IPC as sexual intercourse on false
promise to marry
would amount to ‘without consent’ within the description ‘secondly’ of
Section
375 of IPC.14 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court
and
convicted the accused for the offence of rape under Section 376 of the
IPC.
3.2.7 That in this case as per the facts the petitioner clearly deceived and
cheated the
respondent and took the consent for sexual intercourse on the belief
that he would
marry her. Thus it is a clear case of misconception and
misrepresentation of facts.

9
AIRONLINE 2006 SC 40
10
AIR 2007 SUPREME COURT 3059
11
India Evidence Act 1872
12
Section 114A of the Indian evidence Act,1872
13
AIR 2014 SUPREME COURT 384
14