#1 GENEROSO ESMENA and ALBERTO ALBA vs JUDGE JULIAN RULING: The court has held that the petitioners
the petitioners were placed
B. POGOY and FISCAL RICARDO TABANAO
FACTS: Petitioners Generoso Esmeña and Alberto Alba and
their co-accused, Alipio, Encabo and Villamira were charged
with grave coercion before city court of Cebu City for allegedly
forcing Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan of the Jaro Cathedral,
Iloilo City to withdraw the sum of P5K and give it to the
accused.
The case was calendared for arraignment and trial. However,
Father Tibudan requested for it to be reset. Esmena and Alba
were not able to appear as they were not notified of the
hearing.
Upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty. No trial was held
after arraignment as Father Tibudan requested to reschedule
the hearing again.
The Fiscal requested for the hearing to be cancelled as he lost
his record of the case.
Respondent judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial "for
the last time on August 16, 1979, at 8:30am."
However, fiscal informed the court that Father Tibudan sent a
telegram that he was sick.
Petitioners' counsel opposed the hearing's cancellation as
they invoke the right of the accused to a speedy trial,
demanding for the case to be heard otherwise, it will be
dismissed invoking the constitutional right of the accused to a
speedy trial.
Judge Pogoy provisionally dismissed the case as it "has been
dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing"
but the fiscal was not ready with his witness.
A Motion for the case's revival was filed by the fiscal 27 days
later and attached Father Tibudan's medical certificate that he
was indeed sick of influenza on the date of the hearing.
Esmena and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of double jeopardy as they did not consent to the
provisional dismissal of the case by the Judge. Hence,
provisional dismissal amounted to acquittal and the case's
revival would place them in double jeopardy.
Fiscal opposed the motion and said that Father Tibudan
appeared in court several times but the hearing was not held.
The Motion to Dismiss was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the revival of a grave coercion case, which
was provisionally dismissed (after the accused had been
arraigned) because of complainant's failure to appear at the
trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy, considering
their constitutional right to have a speedy trial?
in jeopardy by the provisional dismissal of the grave coercion
case.
In the case at bar, the provisional dismissal of the criminal
case has placed petitioners in jeopardy, because it is not very
clear that they consented to such dismissal.
The provisional dismissal was done by respondent judge on
his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. Esmena and
Alba did not expressly manifest their conformity to the
provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in
jeopardy.
Furthermore, they were invoking their constitutional right to
have a speedy trial and insisting for a trial.
However, even if they invoked their constitutional right to a
speedy trial, moved for dismissal and consented to it, the
dismissal would still place them in jeopardy.
Citing Gandicela s. Lutero, the dismissal would only amount to
acquittal when the prosecution does not or cannot produce
evidence, failing to prove defendant's guilt and dismisses the
case upon defendant's motion.
In the case at bar, the dismissal of the criminal case amounted
to an acquittal as the prosecution was not prepared for trial
since the complainant did not appear. This, the acquittal
would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same
offense.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge dated October 8,
1979, reviving the criminal case against the petitioners, and
his order of December 14, 1979, denying petitioners' motion
to dismiss, are reversed and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
#2 CUISON VS CA
Respondent Presiding Judge of RTC Pangasinan rendered a
Joint Decision in Criminal Cases finding accused Eduardo
Cuison guilty of double homicide beyond reasonable doubt.
He was ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim
P30,000.00.
On appeal to CA, said decision was affirmed with modification
and increased civil indemnity to P50,000.00.
Accused elevated the decision to SC. But was denied.
Case was then remanded to RTC Pangasinan for promulgation
of the decision.
Respondent Judge promulgated CA's decision with respect to
the modified civil liability of Cuison but did not commit the
accused to jail to commence service of his sentence.
The matter was reported to the Solicitor General and Motion
to Clarify Decision was filed.
CA rendered a Resolution that they affirmed trial court's
decision and simply modified the appealed decision of the
court a quo with respect to the indemnity to the victim's
heirs.
Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision
anew. A Motion to Set Aside Promulgation was filed by Cuison
as judgment in said case was already promulgated, therefore,
there is nothing to promulgate anymore. Furthermore, this
will constitute a violation on the accused's constitutional right
against jeopardy.
Respondent Judge granted the motion.
However, CA nullified the trial court's order and ordered the
enforcement of the penalty of imprisonment as it is ridiculous
to allow accused to be free after paying the heirs the civil
indemnity imposed by the Court for his participating in the
act of killing the 2 victims because of a wrong interpretation
of a decision.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Cuison's right against double
jeopardy was violated?
RULING: No, Cuison's right against double jeopardy was not
violated as the CA did not modify or amend its Decision. It
merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction and the full execution of the penalty it had earlier
imposed.
For double jeopardy to exist, three requisites must be proven:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to
commit the same or is a frustration thereof .
Meanwhile, legal jeopardy attaches only:
(a) upon a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment;
(d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused (citation omitted)
Cuison claims that first jeopardy has attached when the
criminal cases against him has been terminated.
However, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the
recovery of indemnity. Hence, a decision in a case disposes
accused's both criminal and civil liabilities.
In the case at bar, only the civil aspect of the case was
promulgated, not the criminal. Furthermore, promulgation of
CA Decision was void. Trial court judge rendered a
substantially incomplete promulgation. As there was grave
abuse of discretion, the decision is void and the criminal cases
are not yet terminated. Thus, first jeopardy has not yet
attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a
defense.
#3 LEOPOLDO SALCEDO
vs.
JUDGE FILEMON MENDOZA and PEOPLE of the PH
FACTS: A criminal information of homicide through reckless
imprudence was filed against petitioner Leopoldo Salcedo by
Prov. Fiscal Nestor Andrada before CFI Oriental Mindoro.
Salcedo pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
The case was set for trial. When the case was set for trial on
that date, Prov. Fiscal Andrada asked for postponement as
accused failed to appear. However, it was still moved for it
postponement and the case was reset for trial.
When the case was called for trial, no prosecuting appeared
for the prosecution. A private prosecutor, Atty. Juan Adzuarra
moved for its postponement to give prosecution another
chance as they intend to request from the Ministry of Justice
for a special prosecutor the handle the case. However, this
was motion was denied.
Salcedo, through his counsel, moved for the criminal case's
dismissal against him invoking his right to speedy trial.
Respondent Judge Mendoza dismissed the case as it was
already the third time the case was postponed at the instance
of the fiscal.
On the same day, the prosecution, thru Asst. Prov. Arthur
Panganiban, filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of the
case. However, it was denied "for lack of merit, there being no
assurance that the prosecuting fiscal will promptly and
adequately prosecute the case.
A second motion for reconsideration was filed which was set
for a hearing.
Both parties were required to submit their respective
pleadings within 5 days. However, both failed to comply.
Respondent judge entered the order asked to be reviewed,
set aside the order of dismissal "in the interest of justice", and
ordered for the case to be set for trial on June 5, 1978.
Salcedo learned about this order on the date of trial. He filed
a motion for reconsideration alleging the criminal case's
dismissal against him was equivalent to an acquittal and
reinstatement of the same would place him twice in jeopardy
for the same offense.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied and the
case was for trial on July 20, 1978.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with preliminary
injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of a criminal predicated
on the right of the accused to speedy trial constitutes an
acquittal and bars a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.
RULING: Yes, the court has held that the dismissal of the case
constitutes an acquittal and bars a subsequent prosecution
for the same offense.
In the case of Gandicela vs. Lutero, if defendant wants to
exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should
ask for the trial of the case instead of dismissal.
If prosecution asks for hearing's postponement, and the court
believes postponement is already violating the accused's right
to a speedy trial, postponement shall be denied and proceed
with the trial. Fiscal must also be required to present
prosecution's witnesses. However, if he does not or cannot
produce evidence which will render defendant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, Court shall dismiss the case upon the
defendant's motion.
This is not a dismissal per se but a defendant's acquittal as the
prosecution failed to prove defendant's guilt and a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense even though it was
ordered by the Court upon motion or with defendant's
express consent.
Case's dismissal may be regarded as an acquittal. Thus, as the
defendant was entitled to a speedy trial and the case was
dismissed, defendant will be placed in jeopardy of
punishment for offense charged against him and annulment
of dismissal would place him twice in jeopardy of punishment
for same offense.
In the case at bar, the dismissal is not a "dismissal" but an
acquittal as defendant invoked his constitutional right to trial
due to prosecution's failure to appear on the day of the trial
after it has been previously postponed twice.
Thus, if the dismissal of a criminal case is predicated on the
accused's right to speedy trial even if it is upon his own
motion or express consent, such dismissal is equivalent to
acquittal. Any attempt to prosecute the accused for the same
offense will violate the constitutional prohibition that "no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense (New Constitution, Article IV, Sec 22).
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED AND THE
CHALLENGED ORDER DATED MAY 8, 1978, IS HEREBY SET
ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
#4 OSCAR BENARES vs. JOSEPHINE LIM
FACTS: A case of estafa was filed before Metropolitan Trial
Court Makati by respondent Josephine Lim against petitioner
Oscar Benares as the latter failed to comply with the
demanded delivery of properties he sold to Lim as he
mortgaged the same to BPI.
Trial ensued. Prosecution was given 15 days to formally offer
its evidence after presenting its last witness. However,
prosecution did not make any. Hence, Benares filed a motion
praying for prosecution's submission of formal offer of
evidence be deemed waived and dismiss the case for lack of
evidence.
Lim and her counsel failed to attend the hearing on the said
motion.
MeTC gave the prosecution another 15 days to formally offer
its evidence. Petitioner opposed.
MeTC then issued an order granting Benares' motion for the
case's dismissal.
Lim moved to reconsider order of dismissal and prayed for
admission of Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits as she
claims that it was difficult to secure documents from the court
which were marked during trial.
Benares opposed the motion invoking his right against double
jeopardy.
However, MeTC issued an order the case is reinstated as the
court finds merit int eh Prosecution's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Benares' Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence, a
petition for certiorari filed with the RTC which was granted as
the MeTC Order's dismissal of the case had the effect of an
acquittal which is a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged.
Lim then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA then
reversed RTC's decision and ordered MeTC to set the case for
further trial as there was no double jeopardy because the
order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute had not
become final and executory due to the timely motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent.
Furthermore, petitioner's right to speedy trial was not
violated when respondent failed to formally offer her
evidence within the period required by the trial court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this Petition for Review.
ISSUE: Whether the MeTC's dismissal of the case for failure to
prosecute amounted to an acquittal, giving Benares the right
to invoke double jeopardy.
RULING: No. The Court has ruled that MeTC's dismissal of the
case for failure to prosecute did not amount to an acquittal.
Hence, it does not give Benares the right to invoke double
jeopardy.
Double jeopardy attaches only
(1) upon a valid indictment,
(2) before a competent court,
(3) after arraignment,
(4) when a valid plea has been entered, and
(5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused.
A dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the
accused does not result in double jeopardy, except in two
instances, to wit: (1) the dismissal is based on insufficiency of
evidence or (2) the case is dismissed for violation of the
accused's right to speedy trial.
In the case at bar, all first four (4) elements are present.
However, there was no conviction yet nor an acquittal as
Benares' guilt has not yet been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The case's dismissal was due to failure to prosecute.
While Benares claim that that the six months' delay by the
prosecution to formally offer its evidence is vexatious,
capricious and oppressive, violating his right to speedy trial,
the prosecution had a justifiable reason for its failure to
formally offer its evidence on time.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the MeTC judge expressly
admitted that the documentary exhibits necessary for the
formal offer of evidence were lost in his office. Moreover,
there is no proof the criminal case was unreasonably
prolonged nor deliberate intent to delay the proceedings.
Delay is not a mere mathematical computation of the time
involved. There are factors that must be considered such as:
(1) the length of the delay,
(2) the reasons for such delay,
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
In the instant case, the late filing of the prosecution's formal
offer of evidence was due to justifiable circumstances.
As the delay was neither vexatious nor oppressive,
petitioner's right to speedy trial was not violated. Therefore,
Benares cannot properly invoke his right against double
jeopardy.
Benares cannot argue that judge's dismissal of the case due to
failure to prosecute amounts to an acquittal as testimonial
evidence were presented against him. Even without
documentary evidence, his guilt may be proven. Furthermore,
he admitted the genuineness and due execution of Lim's
documentary evidence. Therefore, prosecution does not need
to present documents as they are enough evidence for the
trial court to determine his guilt.
* NOTE: failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a
ground to dismiss the case. Even without any documentary
exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case through the
testimonies of its witnesses. Thus, we find that when the trial
court reconsidered its order of dismissal, it merely corrected
itself.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals setting aside the Resolution dated May 5,
2004 and Order dated July 9, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 132, as well as its July 7, 2006
Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
#5 CONRADO MELO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PH and CFI RIZAL
FACTS: Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged with frustrated
homicide before CFI Rizal for inflicting several serious wounds
on Benjamin Obillo with a kitchen knife and intent to kill.
Melo pleaded not guilty. On the same day, Obillo died from
his wounds.
An Amended Information was filed charging Melo with
consummated homicide.
A Motion to Quash the amended information was filed by
Melo alleging double jeopardy. However, this was denied.
Hence, the instant petition for prohibition to enjoin the
respondent court from further entertaining the amended
information.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amended information charging
Melo with consummated homicide violated the principle of
double jeopardy?
RULING: No. The Court has held that the amended
information charging Melo with consummated homicide did
not violate principle of double jeopardy.
According to Rule 106, Section 13, 2d par, "If it appears at any
time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the
original complaint or information and order the filing of a new
one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant
would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may
also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial," thus, it was proper for the court to admit the
amended information.

"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for

the same offense," according to Article III, section 1 (20) of
our Constitution.

"Double jeopardy" is when a person is charged with an

offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or
identical offense.

The rule of identity does not apply when the second offenses
was inexistent at the time of the first prosecution.

The case at bar is similar to that of Diaz vs. US where it was

held that where the accused was charged with physical
injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the
charge for homicide against the same accused does not put
him twice in jeopardy.

Thus, when a new fact arises after the first prosecution, and it
constitutes and leads to a new and distinct offense, the
accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted
for the new offense.

For all the foregoing, the petition is denied, and the

respondent court may proceed to the trial of the criminal case
under the amended information. Without costs.