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Remedial Action Schemes and Defense Systems

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 Remedial Action Schemes and Defense Systems
Y. Zhang, M. Raoufat and K. Tomsovic
Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN

Key Words – Cascading Outage, Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), Small-signal Stability,
Special Protection Scheme (SPS), Transient Stability, Voltage Stability, Phasor Measurement
Unit (PMU),

1. INTRODUCTION
Operation of the modern electric power system has become more complex due to increasing
loads, operation closer to system limits, greater interconnections, and new loads and sources
interfaced through power electronics. Since reliability and continuity of service to customers
remains the driving design criteria for the power grid, the system must be able to withstand
credible contingencies (outages or disturbances). This complexity has led to a series of
specialized responses to address specific disturbances. A Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), which
is also known as a System or Special Protection Scheme (SPS)1, are actions taken to ensure
power system stability and reliability for some event. RAS are designed to detect abnormal or
predetermined system conditions and automatically take a set of corrective actions to preserve
system integrity and provide acceptable system performance [1]. Such actions may include
changes in demand, generation (MW and MVar), or system topology as well as control modes in
order to maintain system stability, acceptable voltage and power flows. Figure 1 shows the
general structure of these corrective actions for counteracting a disturbance in a controlled
manner. Typically, actions must be taken quickly so the decision-making process must be simple
or based on pre-determined criteria.

The recent proposed NERC definition of RAS is [2]:

A scheme designed to detect predetermined system conditions and automatically take

corrective actions that may include, but are not limited to, curtailing or tripping generation
or other sources, curtailing or tripping load, or reconfiguring a system(s).

Under this definition, continuously acting devices and controllers, such as, HVDC modulations
or Power System Stabilizer (PSS), are not remedial actions in the sense that they are not a
correction to some predetermined system condition. There are several different ways to classify
RAS including: event type, impact on wider area performance, and the input variables. Based on
design methodology, RAS can be classified into the following categories:

1
NERC has proposed discontinuing the use of the term SPS in standards due to inconsistency in the use of the term.

1
 I. Event Based: Event based schemes directly detect the outage or fault in the system and
initiate pre-planned target actions to mitigate the problem. Reliability is the major concern in
these types of schemes and to ensure their reliability, numerous detailed off-line simulations
are run. These RAS are used when the problem will develop quickly after the initiating event
and there is insufficient time to wait for, and analyze, the system response. Purely event
based schemes are time consuming to design and developed for a limited number of very
specific events. Because they depend on specific situations, RAS may not be active at all
times but rather “armed” when merited by the current operating condition (e.g., line flow on
a key line exceeds some threshold). Arming can be realized either automatically or manually
but if manual, the operator should be alerted when the RAS is needed.

II. Response Based: These types of remedial actions are generally slower as they take time to
observe the system response to a disturbance, such as, frequency or voltage drop, and then
reach a decision on needed action. Response based schemes react based on measurement of
different variables. These kinds of schemes are able to perform better under unusual
operating conditions. Still, the reliability of response based schemes depends greatly on the
degree to which measured variables can clearly identify problems.

Figure 1 General RAS structure [1].

Researchers have attempted to combine elements of the event and response based approaches to
broaden effectiveness under different operating conditions and across neighboring regions. For
example, an adaptive RAS for different operating points and fault locations is proposed in [3].
To ensure that a RAS meets system reliability requirements, redundancy must be incorporated
into the design. Any single component or communication failure should still preserve
functionality. In some cases, implementation of a voting system (typically, majority rule) is
required to ensure secure operation. This means that multiple criteria are used to detect an
abnormal condition and each vote to initiate corresponding remedial actions. In the following,
specific RAS are discussed based on the type of problem that requires corrective action.

2
Specifically, these concerns are transient instability, voltage instability, thermal overloading,
small signal instability and cascading outages.

2. TRANSIENT INSTABILITY
Transient stability is the ability to maintain synchronous operation when subjected to large
contingencies, such as, loss of generation trip or significant load loss. Transient instability
typically is seen as first-swing instability, where the angular separation resulting from the
disturbance is too great to maintain synchronism. It may, however, arise from the interaction of
local and inter-area modes or non-linear effects. It is generally these non-linear effects that are of
interest and make analysis difficult. The timescale available for response ranges from
milliseconds to a few seconds. Thus, decisions must be reached quickly in order to prevent
system separation and this limited time is one of the primary reasons for needing a RAS. The
transient system response may involve large deviations in generator rotor angles, power flows,
bus voltages and other system variables [5]. These phenomena generally increase with high
power transmission over longer distances. Various analysis methods, including time domain
numerical integration, equal area criteria (EAC) which is a graphical method, and energy
function methods can be used to assess transient stability [6] [7]. Generation rejection (tripping),
turbine fast valving, braking resistors and controlled opening of interconnections are the most
commonly used actions to prevent system separation [1].

A generation rejection scheme (GRS) may be implemented for power plants, which contain
multiple generation units and have high generation capacity [8]. Following a large disturbance,
the units at the plant will accelerate quickly, which may cause an out of step condition. The GRS
will reduce the accelerating torque by tripping one or more units to maintain stability. In
practice, this scheme is usually limited to hydro-generator units to avoid risk of damage to
thermal plants. Note excessive generator tripping increases the risk of needing to shed load. In
addition, it may take considerable time for the tripped generator to be reconnected to the
transmission system. Because of these reasons, more sophisticated RAS are currently being
developed to minimize the generator tripping [8] [9].

For thermal units, steam turbine fast valving is a way to instantly decrease input power and
minimize the acceleration due to the decrease in electrical power output power from a fault near
a generator. Turbine fast valving can be either momentary or sustained if needed. This technique
is economical and well-established with initial implementations in the 1920s. While it can
greatly increase critical clearing times, fast valving can also cause thermal stress and various
mechanical issues for the turbine [10] and is best avoided. A similar effect can be realized by a
braking resistor. A braking resistor applies an artificial electrical load during the disturbance to
reduce the accelerating torque. For example, Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) uses a
240kV 1400 MW braking resistor at Chief Joseph substation to improve the transient stability
[11]. Braking is an effective scheme to avoid transient instability problems but again for thermal
plants the effect of a braking resistor can cause stress on the turbine shaft. To lower these adverse
effects, it is usually applied in increments. In practice, optimal size, location and other designing

3
criteria of braking resistor are found through extensive offline simulations for different fault
scenarios. Combining a braking resistor with fast valving can help to reduce the tripped
generation.

If localized actions such as fast valving and braking resistors cannot block disturbance
propagation or if extreme operating conditions are encountered, controlled system separation
may be the only choice. The partitioning into groups can be planned based on slow coherency
approaches [12] or graph theoretic methods. The graph methods involve splitting the system into
smaller networks with minimal active and reactive power imbalance in each sub-system based on
the cut sets with minimum net flow [13] [14]. This reconfiguration strategy essentially divides
the power network into self-sufficient islands. In practice, it is difficult to find separation points
for a large system, except for well-defined operating conditions and disturbances, while avoiding
unintentional system separation [15].

3. VOLTAGE INSTABILITY
Voltage stability refers to the ability of a power system to maintain voltage within an acceptable
range after being subjected to a disturbance [16]. A possible result of a voltage instability is
uncontrolled loss of load in an area, or tripping of transmission lines and other elements by their
protective systems as current levels must increase to supply. This in turn may lead to cascading
outages. A voltage collapse scenario results when the load demand exceeds the maximum
transfer capacity. This imbalance will cause some generators to reach reactive power limits and
drive some bus voltages to unacceptably low levels leading to subsequent tripping of loads or
overloaded equipment. This may eventually lead to a blackout in a significant part of the power
system as voltages start to drop precipitously (the reason for the term voltage collapse). Voltage
instability can be either classified as large-disturbance or small-disturbance voltage stability
according to the type of disturbance, or short-term and long-term voltage stability according to
the time scale.
In general, the major cause of voltage instability is the fundamental power transfer limits of the
transmission system. That is, the voltage drops from power flow through the inductive reactance
of the transmission lines exceed the system ability to provide voltage support. The instability
arises from the voltage dependency of loads where as the voltage drops the current required
increases leading to further degradation of voltage. Accordingly, most RASs counteracting
voltage instability aim at eliminating the gap between transfer limit and demand. This can be
either from effectively increasing the transmission capacity or from decreasing the load. Listed in
Table 1 are some common RAS actions for voltage instability [1]. Fast unit start-up and
automatic shunt switching provide additional voltage support. Various undervoltage load
shedding (UVLS), and tap changer blocking / reverse-logic control can reduce demand. A
particularly interesting way to reduce the load is through tap change blocking or reversing the
control logic of the taps to decrease the load side voltage. This takes advantage of the voltage
dependency of the loads. These schemes have been in use for many years in Europe (e.g., RTE in
France) with taps blocked or moved to pre-set positions if low voltage conditions are detected.
This is discussed in a bit more detail in the following.

4
 Table 1 Common RASs to counteract voltage instability
Transmission capacity increase Load requirement decrease
Fast unit start-up Automatic shunt switching
Quick increase of AVR setpoint Tap changer blocking and reverse-logic control

The Under-Load Tap Changer (ULTC) is commonly installed to enable control of load side
voltages. By mechanically moving the tap position (i.e., the transformer turns ratio), the voltage
of the load side can be adjusted to a pre-set reference point. As load increases, the ULTC will
raise the tap position in order to maintain this desired voltage level. This ensures that the load
voltage is restored following a minor disturbance or load fluctuations, to an acceptable value,
typically, within a few minutes. Note that raising the low side voltage will lower the high side
voltage since the load increases with voltage. In effect, the ULTC eliminates the helpful voltage
dependency of the load (up until the tap changers hits the limit). Tap changer blocking during
voltage emergencies is a simple and effective approach to stave off further voltage declines. The
main limit of this technique is that other load restoration processes may continue to depress
transmission voltages. In addition, a long period of low voltage may cause other protection to act
and lead to cascading failures. A more radical approach, called reverse-logic control, may also be
used [22]. In this scheme, the ULTC operates as usual as long as the transmission voltage
remains above the threshold level. If the transmission voltage falls below the threshold value, the
ULTC will reduce the tap ratio to decrease the load voltage and power. With the decrease in both
primary voltage and ULTC ratio, load decreases quickly leading to recovery of transmission
voltage. One issue for these schemes is the coordination of ULTC at different voltage levels. The
ULTC closest to the load (lowest voltage) needs to act first or transmission capacity will be
degraded.

Most Undervoltage Load Shedding (UVLS) is a simple protection function and as such not
classified as a RAS. Still, controlled load shedding if unavoidable is the most effective method
to preserve voltage stability. UVLS is a relatively common method used in industry [17].
Conventional UVLS method employs undervoltage relays to monitor the voltage level and when
the input level falls below a pre-set threshold for more than a few seconds then an undervoltage
relay will operate and trip a feeder circuit breaker. The expected result of which is the recovery
of load voltage. There are two fundamental problems with this approach: (1) voltage level may
not be very indicative of the seriousness of the problem (voltage collapse can occur at relatively
high voltages); and (2) the amount of load shed needed is difficult to determine without system
information. More “intelligent” load shedding approaches have been researched to meet this
challenge [18],[19]. The speed, location, and amount of load shedding can be changed adaptively
depending on the event (disturbance) location, voltage level and other measured responses [20].
Since the frequency decline is inherently lower than that of voltage decrease, load shedding
calculated according to these schemes must be coordinated with Underfrequency Load Shedding
(UFLS). Combinational adaptive load shedding methods have been proposed [21], where both

5
voltage and frequency information provided by PMUs are used to design new load shedding
algorithms.

4. THERMAL OVERLOAD
Operating at excessive load for an extended period can lead to overheating and damage to
equipment. Overloading usually happens upon the loss of one, or more, transformers or
transmission lines with a resulting shift of load onto other equipment. Still, some overload above
a nominal rating is generally acceptable for a limited amount of time and thus, overloaded
components should not necessarily be immediately tripped as it may lead to cascading outages
[31]. In many situations, there is sufficient time available for operator intervention to alleviate
the problem; however, to respond more quickly and ensure maximum loadability of the power
system, remedial actions can be designed to manage these thermal overloads. During overload,
the RAS can be initiated and decrease power through the overloaded region or equipment [32].
Typically, this can be accomplished by generator rescheduling, load shedding and using fast
startup units [1]. Given the large time constants typical for a thermal overload, there is usually
sufficient time to recover the system to a normal state and fast corrective actions are not critical.

5. SMALL SIGNAL INSTABILITY

Small signal stability refers to the ability of the system to remain synchronism during normal
operating conditions and following small disturbances [4], [5]. The key is to have sufficient
damping that oscillations die out within a short amount of time after the disturbance, say, within
10 seconds. Typically, damping decreases with increased load or longer power transfers. If
damping becomes too low, the associated power swings may cause generators to fall out of
synchronism or trigger protection. For a synchronous machine, damping is the component of
torque in phase with frequency deviations. Since mechanical damping is relatively small,
damping is provided electrically by design via damper windings or through supplementary
excitation control as with a PSS. In addition, new power electronics devices, such as, a
STATCOM, can provide damping. Generator rescheduling to reduce power across critical
transfers may also be effective [30]. Still, generally, small signal stability problems are addressed
in the controller design and in operations planning and not in response to events so they are not a
primary focus of RAS. When unavoidable, remedial actions, such as, load shedding or generator
tripping, may be effective. Note in recent years, the wide spread deployment of PMUs allows the
possibility of on-line detection of poor oscillations. Prony analysis and similar methods can be
applied to detect these oscillations and estimate the damping ratio on-line from the measured
variables [29]. This in turn could be used as the basis for remedial action. Thus, RAS for poor
damping may become more common in the future.

6. CASCADING OUTAGES
Cascading outages refers to a series of outages in a power system network (e.g. transmission
line) leading to a widespread blackout. Even though this occurs infrequently, when it does
happen, it results in severe social and economic costs. Unlike most disturbances which lead to

6
local outages, cascading failure can lead to wide scale blackouts. For example, while the 2003
US-Canada blackout was a result of poor situational awareness and operator errors within the
First Energy control area, the outages manifested itself as a series of 345kV line trip with each
line outage leading to increased loading on other transmission paths and eventually causing
blackouts across the Northeast [23]. These lines trips could have been managed by appropriate
local load shedding but were not caught in time. Generally, the causes of cascading failures are
highly complex, arising from multiple interactive events, such as, transmission overloads,
protection equipment failure, voltage collapse, operator error, and so on. Since it may be caused
or have a direct relationship with many phenomena, the RAS discussed above may be deployed
either independently or in combination to avoid cascading failures based on operating conditions.
Table 2 shows some possible RAS as countermeasures to cascading failure.
Table 2 General RAS used for cascaded failure
Cause of cascading failure Corresponding countermeasure
Transmission overload Generation rejection
Remote load shedding
Frequency instability Underfrequency load shedding
Transient instability Gas-turbine start-up
Voltage collapse Blocking actions on AGC
Undervoltage load shedding

For example, in 2008, a rare event took place on the UK network resulting in the sequential
tripping of several generators This left frequency outside the regulated limit for 9 minutes.
Underfrequecy load shedding brought the system was brought back from near collapse [24].
Another example from Europe occurred in 2006, a major tie-line tripped due to some disturbance
and started cascaded line tripping due to transmission overloads. The system was eventually split
into three asynchronous islands and a blackout was avoided. Load shedding and generator
scheduling were employed for recovery of system [24]. Standing as the last line of defense,
controlled opening of interconnection is usually expected to work when all other methods are not
effective.

Research on schemes for preventing cascading failures has intensified with the growth in size
and complexity of modern power networks. Complexity is addressed by probability-based
methods like vulnerability measures [25] and probabilistic indicators [26] for assessment. The
multi-agent system technologies have been applied to assess power system vulnerability, monitor
hidden failures of protective devices, and provide adaptive response to cascading sequences of
events [27], [28]. Analyzing and preventing cascading failures remains an active area of
research.

7. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

In recent years, due to the increased complexity of network operation as well as growth in load,
the power network becomes progressively more stressed. To ensure adequate system reliability

7
under this stress, new RAS have been extensively installed. Moreover, RAS have been used not
just for unusual operating conditions but essentially normal operations in order to allow new
generation interconnections without transmission upgrades. This is clearly economical but has
added to the increasing number and variety of RAS. Table 3 shows recent growth in RAS [40].
WECC members have over 190 RAS in their transmission system, more than 35% of which are
generation tripping [24]. As a result, the coordination among different RAS has become a vital
concern. Lack of coordination can result in ineffective control, unneeded actions and other
unforeseen consequences. While most RAS have been introduced individually, RAS may need to
be combined to build a comprehensive defense plan, e.g., Hydro-Québec’s TDST [17] and RPTC
[33] schemes. Furthermore, to ensure reliability of the system and avoid unforeseen RAS actions,
coordinating with the normal control and protection system operation is important. Complexity
and difficulties of analysis and design as well as management, coordination and maintenance will
also increase. New regulations and standards for RAS may well be needed.

RAS need to respond to system conditions and communications are needed from both the control
center (at a minimum to arm the scheme) and for some schemes directly from a remote
measurement point. Utilities make use of numerous communication media, including power line
carrier, mixed analog/digital, RF, and so on. Still, many RAS require fast response and all RAS
need high reliability. Accordingly, RAS often use dedicated communication systems based on
microwave or optical fiber with some degree of redundancy. Modern communication technology
allows more redundancy in communications capabilities as a backup for adverse conditions such
as hurricanes, earthquakes, or terrorist activity [39]. Since the predominant use of RAS are event
based, much of the monitoring required is status information, such as, circuit breaker opening.
Analog measurements of voltages, currents and frequency are also widely used. More recently
with the deployment of fast communication and wide area monitoring using PMUs, many new
schemes have been proposed. For example, PMUs are fast enough to detect transient instability
problems in real-time.

To meet ever increasing requirements of modern power networks, focus is moving to

comprehensive approaches and the ability to adapt to new conditions without redesign of the
RAS. Moreover, the so-called smart grid technology suggests future schemes are likely to be
“distributed” (independent from the control center) and “smart” (evaluating many measured
quantities before taking action). For example, a distributed RAS for a 500-kV AC transmission
system has been proposed in [34]. As preferred operation is at the most economic condition,
RAS need to be designed so that after the action, the system continues to operate economically
with adequate margins [20]. This can extend into intelligence by such avenues as real-time
predictions achieved [35], and adaptive triggering algorithms, such as, AIEM (Adaptive Impact
Energy Method) [36]. Furthermore, the concept of adaptive learning in multi-agent system has
been suggested [27]. New factors influencing system defense schemes include the rapid
expansion of renewable resources and the associated uncertainties with their operation. RAS
functions can be extended to the mitigation of renewable generation integration issues [37],
particularly for wind with its difficult to predict influence on system response. Others have

8
suggested economic considerations in the design where RAS could be used to, for example,
congestion relief [38].

Table 3 Increase in RAS [40]

1989 Survey 1996 Survey 2009 Survey
Respondents Schemes Respondents Schemes Respondents Schemes
18 93 49 111 110 958

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