JOURNAL OF VERBAL LEARNING AND VERBAL BERAVIOR 5,
THEORETICAL NOTES*
Meaning Cannot Be r ?
CHARLES E. OSGOOD
University o] Illinois, Urbana, Illinois
In the January 1965 issue of this JOVRZCAL,Pro-
lessor Jerry Fodor presented a critique of mediation
learning theory titled "Could Meaning be an rm ?''
He identified his adversary as Hobart Mowrer;
however, the symbol r m is characteristic of my dis-
cussions of mediation theory, although the r t re-
ferred to in the body of the critique is Mowrer's
symbol (cf., his APA presidential address, 1954).
Perhaps this choice was dictated by the fact that
Mowrer's presentation was the first serious attempt
in modern behaviorism to deal with the dynamics
of sentences. Fodor wrote the original draft of
"Could Meaning be an rm?" during the year that
he was a visiting professor in the Institute of Com-
munications Research at Illinois and was sittir~g in
on my graduate seminar in Psycholinguistics--if
one can imagine Fodor merely "sitting in" on any-
thing! In any case, the notion of representational
mediation was and continues to be central to my
theorizing about language behavior, and it is there-
fore appropriate for me to write a reply to Fodor's
critique.
Fodor's Criticism o] S - R T h e o r y in General
Fodor begins with a critique of single-stage learn-
ing theory that essentially reiterates points made
earlier by Chomsky (1959) in a review of Skinner's
Verbal Behavior (1957). The three main points
made need to be reconsidered briefly here because
they form the framework within which two-stage,
mediation theory will later be evaluated and they
are not entirely valid.
(1) Linguistic Responses are no~ Obviously De-
pendent upon Specifiable Stimuli. The probability
of emitting the response book may increase with the
palpable presence of BOOK objects in the imme-
diate environment, but such presence is neither a
necessary nor certainly a sufficient condition. Agreed.
* In order to permit discussion of Professor
Fodor's paper without undue de~.ay, these notes were
given early, publication. Editor
402
402-407 (1966)
m
But what psychologist has ever made such a claim ?
Skinner would agree, I am sure, that the overt oc-
currence of a linguistic (or any other) response de-
pends upon the patterned context of total, momen-
tary stimulation, some elements of which may be
facilitative and others inhibitory with respect to the
response in question. Of course, the two-stage model
makes the functional independence of linguistic re-
sponses from particular environmental stimuli even
more obvious.
(2) Learning Theory Cannot Explain the Func-
tional Equivalence o] Linguistic Responses. "Just
as two physiologically distinct actions may both be
instances of a bar-press response, so two phonem-
ically distinct utterances may be functionally equiv-
alent for a given speaker or in a given, language
(Fodor, 1965, p. 74)." The terms bachelor and un-
married man are offered as an example of synonym-
ity. Conversely, responses having the same overt
form may belong to different semantic classes, e.g.,
homonyms such as light (in a light weight vs. a
light color). If this is meant as a criticism of be-
havior theory's descriptive adequacy, then it is well
taken--we could well follow the linguist's lead in
searching for the central (mediating) events which
render physically different stimuli or responses func-
tionally equivalent. But, there is no inherent in-
adequacy in behavior theory here: two signs are
functionally equivalent if they regularly and re-
liably produce the same response (overt or media-
tional) and two responses are functionally equiva-
lent if they regularly and rar~tomly are produced
by the same stimulus (a situation referred to by
linguists as "free variation"). Two words would
have the same meaning, or two word strings be
paraphrases, if and only if they produced precisely
the same simultaneous pattern of rm'S. However,
this is a situation rarely found, and Fodor himself
points out that the characterization of synonymity
is a problem "for which no solution is at present
known (1965, p. 74)." Certainly the effect upon
one's unmarried daughter of telling her so-and-so is
a bachelor is going to be a bit different than telling
 ANALYSIS
her so-and-so is an unmarried man--the latter al-
most amounts to issuing a hunting license!
(3) Linguistic Responses do not Admit o] the
Usual Measures o] Response Strer~gth. Certainly it
is true that stress (amplitude of response) does not
covary with the frequency of usage of word forms.
On the other hand, large samples of verbal behavior
do display a positive relation between frequency of
response (usage) and such strength indices as ta-
chistoscopic threshold and emission probability (the
well-known "Spew Hypothesis"). But psychologists
do not agree on what external indices represent the
strength of a response in general, to say nothing of
verbal responses, and various measures of response
strength do not correlate highly with each other,
even in the animal laboratory. Indeed, stress is a
variable in linguistic responses that is obviously de-
pendent upon central mediating processes, no mat-
ter how they may be ultimately characterized. In
any case, it is not clear to me why this is an issue
for language per]ormance; it could be an issue for
language learning, but here again the functional in-
dependence of decoding and encoding habits pro-
vided by a two-stage model reduces the rigidity of
relations between overt S's and R's.
Fodor's Specific Criticism o] Mediation
Theory
Before developing his critique of mediation theory,
Fodor correctly notes the following: (a) that r m is
]unctionally characterized in two-stage theory; (b)
that r m is not the same thing as R T (total behavior
to the significate, S), but rather r m is a proper part
o] R T. These points are critical in the argument,
both Fodor's (1965) and mine here. It is precisely
because rrn is part of a particular R T that it can, in
theory, have its symbolic or representing property,
and thus allow [S] (a sign) to "stand for" S, the
particular significate which originally elicits R T, The
basic model is shown here as Fig. 1; it is more
explicit than those used by Mowrer and reproduced
by Fodor.
S ~ RT
f insufficient in any case. Certain criticisms of
f
f Mowrer's conception of the sentence as a condition-
1 t
J ing device, with which criticisms I generally agree
t
f
f (Osgood, 1963), are not pertinent to general r m
~] = rm'%---~'S m ~R x
Fro. 1. General paradigm for the development
of representational mediation processes.
As to the characterization of rm, the use of r
(rather than a more neutral x, let us say) does re-
OF MEANING 403
fleet my assumption that rm'S do retain the response-
like properties of the overt behaviors in which they
presumably have their origin (RT) and that they
function in theory as events whose occurrence cart
become dependent on observable stimuli (signs).
Thus all of the conceptual baggage of single-stage
theory (notions like habit-strength, generalization,
inhibition, and so forth) can be utilized for [S] -> r m
decoding relations. This implies nothing whatsoever
about the physical nature or locus of rms--whether
they are peripheral or, as I suspect for the adult
human, entirely central ("corticalized") events. It
is further assumed that, again functionally like other
responses which produce sensory feedback, rm'S will
have their automatic stimulus consequences, sym-
bolized by sm in the model. Thus the same concep-
tual baggage can be utilized for Srn "-> R x encoding
relations, where R x may or may not be linguistic.
In other words, in two-stage theory representational
mediation processes have response functions in de-
coding ("understanding") and stimulus functions in
encoding ("creating") language, regardless of what
may ultimately turn out to be their physical nature.
After granting that the mediation model does ap-
pear to free behavior theory from the fatal flaw of
a single-stage model--namely, that responses to signs
must be the same as responses to their significates
irt order for the signs to have meaning--Fodor (p.
77) concludes as follows: "Nevertheless, the theory
of meaning implicit in the quotations from Mowrer
cited above is thoroughly unsatisfactory. Nor is it
obvious that this inadequacy is specific to the ver-
sion of the mediation theory that Mowrer espouses."
His critique involves three major issues: (1) Media-
tion theory can be shown to differ from single-stage
theory in only one respect--the observability of the
responses in question--and hence is subject to the
same limitations. (2) Mediation theory, therefore,
along with single-stage theory, implies that occur-
rence of significate (S) or sign (IS]) will be a
sufficient condition for occurrence of their associated
linguistic response ( R x ) - - a prediction obviously
contrary to fact. (3) Mediation theory in principle
provides no account of certain well-known charac-
teristics of sign learning and sign usage and is thus
theory and need not be discussed.
(1) r m Differs ]rom R T Only in Terms of Ob-
servability. Fodor's argument proceeds as follows:
Beyond stating that r m is a proper part of RT,
mediation theory requires an additional postulate--
namely, that each r m which unambiguously mediates
the meaning of a sign must bear a one-to-one,
 404
unique relation to its R T. The consequence of re-
jecting this postulate--i.e., of assuming that one and
the same r m could be part of many I ~ produced
by many different S - - w o u l d be that signs would
necessarily refer ambiguously to many different sig-
nificates. The same argument applies to ambiguous
signs (e.g., the homonymous form bat, as in baseball
bat vs. winged bat); mediation theory tnust assume
distinctive rm'S based on different experiential his-
tories (RT1 vs. RT2) , the selection among them be-
ing based on contextual stimulus conditions (about
which more anon).
With this I entirely agree. Both in 1957 (in Os-
good, Suei, and Tannenbaum), with the argument
restricted to three gross affective factors, and in
1963, the argument here being more generalized, I
have proposed that rra is not a single reaction but
rather a multicomponential affair. In a fashion anal-
ogous to the notion of a phoneme as a simultaneous
bundle of distinctive phonetic features (cf., :[akob-
son and Halle, 1956), the meaning of a sign is con-
ceived to be a simultaneous bundle of distinctive
semantic features--which I identify with component
r's of the total r m. Whereas within a given compo-
nent reaction system (factor, feature) only one al-
ternative can occur to a presented sign (e.g., r m
cannot be simultaneously q- and - - in the same com-
ponent reaction system any more thar~ one can
simultaneously clench and open his hand), the pos-
sibilities for combination across N independent,com-
ponents of r m increase with at least 2x (discrete,
all-or-nothing alternatives) or some larger value
(e.g., 7N if one assumes seven discriminable alter-
natives within each component). In such a system
there is obviously great economy; with a relatively
small number of components one achieves capacity
for distinctive representation of an extraordinarily
large number of entities. It is also obvious that r m
does not need to include correlates of all parts of
RT, but only those parts which make a difference
in the behavior toward significates and hence in
meaning.
But at this point Fodor moves in with what he
seems to feel is the "clincher." If one accepts the
necessity of a one-to-one relation between rnl and
RT--which I do, with the proviso that it is still a
part to whole relation--then, he claims, the formal
difference between single-stage and mediation theo-
ries disappears and we are left with the trivial
(implied) difference of observability. Thus, we have
[S] - - - ( - > r m - - - > Sm--)---> R X
instead of
IS] --> R T - - - > S T -> R x
and are subject to all of the criticisms of single-stage
theory. "To put it still differently, once we grant
OSGOOD
a one to one relation between r's and R's, we insure
that the former lack the "surplus meaning" charac-
teristic of terms designating bona fide theoretical
entities (Fodor, 1965, p. 81)." As will become clear,
I must accept the one-to-one relation between r m
and RT, but not that between r m and R x.
By way of reply, let me point out first that this
difference in observability is by no means trivial
and, indeed, is part of the "surplus meaning" Fodor
demands of theoretical entities. In the well-docu-
mented experiments on semantic generalization--
when, for example, a novel finger-lifting response
is trained to the word joy and transfers sponta-
neously in the test situation to the word glee but not
to the physically more similar word boy--it is ob-
vious that the basis of the transfer is semantic
similarity. But it is equally obvious that nothing
remotely tL~ (total overt behavior originally occur-
ring in glee and joy using situations) occurs between
glee and the novel finger-lifting response---indeed, no
particular mediating responses of an overt nature
typically occur. Psychological theory in general, and
psycholinguistic theory in particular, must be able
to incorporate such phenomena.
Let me point out, second, that Fodor apparently
misses the primary difference between two-stage
and single-stage theories--the functional separation
o/ decoding and encoding (S-r and s-R) phases. It
is the lack of such functional separation that forces
Skinner (1957) into such intuitively unsatisfying
assumptions as (a) that we must subvocally mimic
a speaker in order to comprehend what he says or
(b) that having learned to name objects (tacting)
we will not therefore be able to ask for them
(manding), since they are independent single-stage
operants.
Note also in this connection that in mediation
theory R x does not bear a one-to-one relation to
r m (the relation can be completely arbitrary as in
much of the lexicon, and can be modified, as in
second-language); neither does R x bear a one-to-
one relation to R T, In the substitution (Pavlovian
conditioning) version of single-stage theory, R x
must be the same as R,r (which is patently false);
in the Skinnerian (operant conditioning) version, if
signs produce something other than Rx, or ante-
cedent to Rx, then this something would have to be
rx (i.e., unobservable subvocal replicas of the overt
verbal response), and hence "rm" would have to
bear a one-to-one relation with R x (which leads
to conclusions which are patently nonsensical, as
indicated above). In sum, it is the functional sep-
aration of decoding and encoding stages--yet both
utilizing the full machinery of single-stage t h e o r y - -
that provides the greater flexibility and explanatory
power of the mediation model. The real danger, as
 ANALYSIS OF
I see it, is that by proliferating unobservables (al-
beit of the same kind as overt S's and R's) media-
tion theory may be able to "explain" too much and
hence become untestable.
And, third, let me stress again that the notion of
r m as a simultaneous bundle of events in a limited
number of component reaction systems possesses
the combinatorial properties which should render
distinctive representation compatible with biological
economy. The total momentary pattern of compo-
nents of r m can be thought of as a kind of c o d e - -
a code which represents for the organism those dif-
ferences among Rw's which make a difference with
respect to responding appropriately to S's, or things
signified. To maintain this capacity, there is neither
the requirement that each r m be unique from all
others in all respects (a single feature difference
would be sufficient) nor the requirement that all
ways in which l ~ ' s differ from each other be rep-
resented in their rm'S (only those ways which make
a difference in meaning). For these reasons, one of
Fodor's concluding statements is misleading--where
he says (p. 81) that "the assumption that each
mediator belongs to one and only one total response
appears to destroy any formal distinction between
mediation and single-stage theories."
(2) Occurrence o] Either S or [S] Should be a
Sufficient Condition ]or Occurrence o] the Linguistic
R x with Which They Have Been Associated. The
argument is as follows: (a) Since r m is a, proper
part of R T and S evokes RT, therefore S must in-
crease the probability of r m as well. (b) Since sm
is an automatic consequence of rm,1 and s m evokes
linguistic Rx, therefore S must also increase the
probability of emitting linguistic R x. In other
words, the presence of significates should increase the
probability of overtly naming them. With respect
to signs, the argument is even more straightforward:
(c) Since [S] produces r m and r m is a necessary
and sufficient condition for occurrence of sin, IS]
should increase the probability of emitting linguistic
R x. I n other words, presentation of signs of objects
should increase the probability of making the overt
linguistic responses associated with the signs. If
mediation theory does, indeed, differ from single-
stage theory only in observability of the mediating
responses, then it would also seem to lead to pre-
dictions contrary to fact. We should always read
out loud, we should always mimic other people, and
(the reductio ad absurdum) once we emitted a
word we should always get caught in a cycle of
repeating it until semantically satiated (since hu-
mans hear the words they emit) !
1 Fodor does not include this particular link in
his reasoning, but it is true and is consistent with
his argument, so I include it.
MEANING 405
By way of reply, first with regard to (a) and (b)
above, although r m is a part of RT, r m is not the
same as R T (as Fodor grants earlier), and therefore
ST (the automatic feedback from R~) will not be
identical with sm. Therefore S should have a much
stronger relation with other responses (e.g., ap-
proaching and reaching for the A P P L E ) than the
linguistic R x (naming it). However, S T must be
to some degree similar to s m along a generalization
continuum (by virtue of the whole/part relation of
R T to rm) , and therefore the probability of R x
should indeed increase; I submit that the saying of
"apple" does increase in the presence of such objects,
that the saying of "turkey" increases when it appears
on the Thanksgiving table, and so on. The reason
within behavior theory why R x does not regularly
occur in situations where the presence of s m is
guaranteed will be made clear in a moment.
Actually, Fodor fails to make any distinction be-
tween signifieates (S) and perceptual signs of ob-
jects. Signifieates are those (usually proximal)
stimuli of objects which evoke RT, e.g., the posture
of the hand in holding APPLE, the masticating and
swallowing of APPLE, and so on. Perceptual signs
are those (usually distal) stimuli, like the sight of
the A P P L E object, whose significances are not in-
nate but themselves must be learned, and presum-
ably via the same basic model.
Second, with regard to (c) above, since presenta-
tion of [S] (either perceptual or linguistic) does
increase the probability of rm, and since r m is a
sufficient condition for occurrence of sin, why does
the overt labelling response, R x , so often fail to
occur? Note in the first place that sm is associated
with a divergent hierarchy of possible responses.
These can be grossly categorized, as suggested in Fig.
2, as linguistic response R x (the labeling, reading,
or mimicking response in question), linguistic re-
sponse R y (e.g., saying "May I have one?" to the
statement I have some apples b y another), non-
linguistic responses R (e.g., reaching when presented
with the perceptual sign of A P P L E ) , and other rm'S
(as when instructed to free associate). Note in the
second place that which response actually occurs is,
in theory, the result of a momentary convergent
hierarchy of antecedent stimuli. A context which in-
cludes such linguistic cues as Where are the apples?
is not likely to converge upon the R x " a p p l e s " - -
unless the listener is mystified by the question, in
which case a response with rising intonation is very
probable. Such contextual factors may be obvious,
but they are certainly not trivial in a theory of the
user of a language. In other words, s m may be a
necessary condition for its linguistic Rx, but it cer-
tainly is not a sufficient condition.
(3) Some Implied Insufficiencies o] r m as a Basis
406 OSGOOD
Sx .,. Ry
Rx
sy / \ - ,,..
S *-'R
FIc.. 2. Convergent a n d divergent hierarchies op-
erating in the selection of responses to s m as an
antecedent.
]or Meaning. Fodor raises a n u m b e r of other ques-
tions in the course of his critique that can be con-
sidered under this rubric. (a) H o w can an r m be
established without pairing the sign with its signifi-
cate and thereby giving occasion to the essential RT?
" M o s t well brought up children know w h a t a thief
is long before they meet one, a n d are adequately
informed a b o u t dragons and elves though encounters
with such fabulous creatures are, presumably, very
rare (p. 78)." (b) H o w does r m theory account for
the fundamental grammatical fact that in English
we can say What does "thie]" mean? b u t not What
does "Torn" mean? while on the other h a n d we
can say Who is Tom? but not Who is thiel?--in
other words, the distinction between rules of usage
governing common a n d proper nouns? (c) H o w is
it that an3" ordinary speaker of English can assign
an interpretation to the sentence, Torn is a thie],
without either knowing Tom, or believing the as-
sertion, or having tais meaning of the word-form
Tom changed to any significant degree? If instant
conditioning (and hence change in meaning) oc-
curred with every instance of presentation of every
sentence, our semantics would be in a sorry state
indeed !2
-0 This sentence really is m y comment, not Fodor's,
b u t I ' m sure he would agree.
First, as to (a): The definition of S in m y dis-
cussions of mediation theory as applied to meaning
has been "any pattern of stimulation which regu-
larly a n d reliably produces some pattern of be-
havior"--deliberately very broad in scope. It there-
fore follows that previously learned signs can serve
as significates for 2nd, 3rd to nth order signs, which
I have referred to as assigns, since their meanings
are literally "assigned." In fact, there is an obvious
economy h e r e - - a s well as a danger of over-abstract-
i n g - s i n c e the rm's produced by the signs-function-
ing-as-significates are already pre-fabricated, so to
speak, a n d anticipate a n y overt behaviors (which
m a y seldom occur). T h u s in the reading of y o u n g
children non-sense forms (prior to gaining meaning
from context) like thief appear with meaningful
forms like gun, bad, man, night, dangerous, and
against-good-policeman while nonsense forms like
elves co-occur with meaningful forms like tiny,
quick, magical, fairy-story, a n d so on. Obviously a
very large proportion of one's vocabulary is ac-
quired by this route, a m u c h smaller proportion by
association with previously established perceptual
signs, a n d a very small proportion indeed by direct
association with object-significates per se. This
analysis of assign learning appears in m a n y places
in m y writings (e.g., Osgood, 1953, p. 698; Osgood,
Suci, and T a n n e n b a u m , 1957, p p . 6-7; a n d else-
where).
Second, as to (b): T h e r m construct is restricted
to the semantic component in a model of the
speaker (and thus only to that meaning of " m e a n -
ing" which refers to the states of language users
that mediate the rules of usage in T h e Language as
a cultural p h e n o m e n o n ) . However, that there is a
fuzzy border between semantics a n d syntax is be-
coming increasingly clear in the writings of linguists
like C h o m s k y ; in fact, C h o m s k y (1965) utilizes a
mulficomponenfial model similar to m y description
of r m components in discussing subcategorizing a n d
selection rules (cf. particularly Ch. 2). I t would
seem to be difficult to decide at this point whether
the rules which permit Who is Tom? b u t do not
permit Who is thief? are best construed as syntactic
or s e m a n t i c - - w o u l d the subcoding on Tom (includ-
ing proper name) a n d on thief (including common
noun) which do or do not permit combination with
Who is _ _ ? be semantic in n a t u r e ? Until the
answers to questions of this order are clear, it seems
premature to criticize r m theory because it fails to
deal with such examples in a n y obvious way.
And third, as to (c): This is really more a crit-
icism of Mowrer's conception of the sentence as a
conditioning device than of rra theory generally. In
attempting to apply Pavlonian conditioning as an
explanation of h o w we understand sentences, as
 ANALYSIS OF MEANING
contrasted with how we may learn from t h e m - -
that is, failing to distinguish between performances
and learning--Mowrer clearly opened himself to
criticism, which in fact he recognized explicitly in
the printed version of his presidential address. I
have contributed to this criticism myself, along psy-
chological lines as well as those pointed up by Fodor.
However, both in The Measurement of Meaning
(1957) and in my own APA address (1963) I have
tried to show how principles of cognitive interaction
(which in my treatment include rm'S) can apply
both to performance (the momentary cognition of
phrase and sentence meanings) and to learning, or
semantic change (change in r m due to repeated
exposure to co-occurrence of word combinations).
Thus, in theory, I can interpret the meaning of a
sentence like Tom is a thief on a single presentation
without being necessarily much modified by it (par-
ticularly if I do not believe it!), yet I could have
my semantics permanently distorted by repeated
exposure to Filth Amendment Communist (par-
ticularly if I believed the implied assertion ])--as
in fact happened during the heyday of McCarthyism.
Conclusion
As far as the psycholinguist is concerned, Fodor's
critique of rna theory is entirely destructive. If it
were valid, it would leave behavioristic psychology
(as well as behavioristically oriented psycholinguis-
tics) with a big, gaping hole right in its middle.
There are well-documented phenomena (like seman-
tic generalization and semantic satiation) which
cannot be incorporated within single-stage theory
in any obvious way or in any nonobvious way so
far proposed by its adherents--and as both Chomsky
(1959) and Fodor (1965) have demonstrated, single-
stage theories have nothing to say about symbolic
processes. Fodor proposes nothing to fill in this hole
--unless it be an unabridged Webster's Dictionary!
All of which is not to say that entirely destructive
criticism must be useless; if valid, it can force com-
pletely ne,v directions of theory.
But I do not believe that his criticisms--including
his attempt to reduce mediation theory to single-
stage theory--are valid. I have tried to demonstrate
that, beyond the matter of observability of the
407
mediators, there are significant differences between
single- and two-stage theories which Fodor either
fails to recognize or misinterprets. The most im-
portant of these is the functional independence of
decoding and encoding processes in a two-stage
theory. It is interesting to note in passing that a
recent (and to me convincing) paper by Jakobovits
(1966) argues that single-stage theory can be "re-
duced" to two-stage theory--that Skinner is really
a mediation theorist in disguise! However, my argu-
ments in this paper must not be construed as im-
plying either that I consider a two-stage model
sufficient (elsewhere, e.g., 1957, I have indicated
that S-S and R-R integration processes are required
at least) or that I consider the linguistic phenomena
under discussion to be simple in nature.
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