- - - - - ~,--.

File D 11.2 / 14 _.

( HEAVIER-THAN-AIR )

PUBLISHED BY THE CHIEF OF AIR SERVICE, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Vol. II October 30, 1920 No. 120

OBSERVATION, SELECTION, AND

ASSIGNMENT

. Ralph Brawn Draughon

LIBRARY

MAR 2 9 2013
Depository
Auburn University

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1920
(

PREFACE.

As a result of the late wa r, the growth of the Air Service from a comp:uatively small nnd obscure
branch of the Army to one of considerable importance has been made with almost un prececlented rapidity;
oo rapidly in fact that degpite an excellent record in the face of great difficulties, from a point of observa-
tion alone, the knowledge of a preferred science of operations for actual sen·ice is prohahly far b2hincl
similar kno,Yl erlge in other branches of the Army.
In times of peace, methods for training flying personnel are reduced to system. The mo::;t ingenious
trainiug mdhods m;iy then be u sed siltisfactorily, but despite appnrent perfections, their finnl test is wnr.
EYen ob~ervation theories adapted fr om allies in the past emergency were largely inapplica hl e to unfo,r eseen
cornlit:ions fouud with the First Arm;y, and to a large extent successful tactics had to be learned at first
hand.
To assist in having training theories conform as near as possible to actual fighting conditions, the
writer shortly !Jefoi·e his discharge submitted an incomplete and abbreyiated outline of old and new tactical
nwtholls ::;uccessful in his squaclron, entitled, " :\Iethods in ObSf'nation ." This coYe red only tactics in the
field.
Aside from de: ails of observation training, there a re a number of general principles dominating its
efficiency, of equal importrmce with tactics of combat, and \Yhich combined with these tactics Yastly increase
the efficiency of the squadron.
J. E. EATON,
Late Lt., 99th Aero Squadron.
16277-20
(2)
 OBSERVATION, SELECTION, AND ASSIGNMENT.

'I'he material herein contained iuas orig,i nally prepared by fu1·iner Lieut. <ff. E. Eaton, who served with
the 99th Aero Squadron in th e A . E. Ji'.

INDEX.

- SUBJECT. Page. SUBJECT. Page.

Preface - ·---- --------- ------------------------- 9 Itesult of lack of- -------------------- - ---~----- 7
N ecessatT qualities ____________________________ _ 5 The story of A--_____ ______ ___ __ _________ :___ _ 7
Freedom of action -------------------- --------- fi Selection______________________________________ 7.
Fog __________________________________________ _ 5 Judging fli ers b~r Infantry standards____________ 7
In itiati\se in general_ __________________________ _ 6 Age, question of________________________________ 7
r Engines ___________________ ___________________ _
"Prudence" vs. "Recklessness" _______________ _
6
6
Misfits, indications of - -------------------------
Prohibitions in tra ining ________________________
7
8
~1ental states _________________________________ _ 6 Assignment_ _____ ______________________________ 8
Capacity for su spense-------------------------- 7 Summing up_ __________________________________ 8

REFERENCE.

0. A. S., Fifth Corps, September 8 to· October 20, 1918.

0. A. S., Fifth Cor ps, October 20 to November 11, 1918.
Hccurd<s Ninety-ninth Sq u adron, September 8-Xovember 11, 191S.
(3)
 OBSERVATION, SELECTION, AND ASSIGNMENT
A percentage of misfit men in obser vation is the subject dealt with, and the article may be divided into two
gener a l parts :
1. QUALITIES NEEDED AN D WHY.
2. SELECTION AN D ASSIGNMENT.
PART 1.
As written, the following a pplies to missions of a
single airplane. In fo r mations, with modifications,
more especially to the leader.
The Air Service differs from every other branch of
an army in the following a ll-impor tan t point:
In other branches initiati ve combined with daring
is highly desirab le. In tl1e fl ying personnel of a
squad ron it is indispensable.
While it is desired that all troops have these quali-
t ies, it is probable tha t ground forces acting in mass
may have a large part of their numbers partially
deficient in this respect and yet win su ccesses,
provided the quality is dominant in their commis-
sioned and noncommissioned officers. On the other
hand, should a flyin g member of a sq uadron lack
this in appr eciable quantity, he is not only of prac-
tically no value, but may, and probably does, cau se
incalculable damage, which in terms of gr ound effec-
tives may r each losses equivalent to lnmdreds or
thousands of infantry.
It is doubtful if ther e is a n analogous branch in
the ground forces. There each man or officer is re-
sponsible to a higher r a nk ranging up to the
Commanding General. Contrary to this status, the
Hier on a so litary mission is not only his own master,
but to a ll practical purposes is, on a given mission,
responsible to no one. Theoretically responsible
through order s from the squadron, practically as
soon as he is in the a ir he is free to
(1) Do the mission to the utmost of his abili-
ties ( which may be good or poor),
(2) Slur the mission, or
( 3) In a few cases where h e so decides, not do
it. at all.
The majority do their best. In the last case such
an individual may " get by " fo r a few times and
then be rem oYed or neu tralized with no more dam-
age than loss of a n effective and equipment. In the
second case, more numerous a nd commonly caused bY.
" nerves," the damage is insidious, almost unrecog-
nizab le, and impossible to cope with for the time
being. In ways to be described this damage is
irreparable and means not only a loss of squa dron
effectives, but actual loss of hundreds or thousands
of ground effectives through lack of duties per-
formed which are thoiight to b~ performed. F r om
this general statement it may already be inferred
the importance of the questions dealt with.
(5)
D etai l . -In taking up the qiiality of service ren-
clered it will first be endeavored to illustrate the
in1 portance of mission · carried ·o ut wi th maximum
diligence by citing a few (personally known) critical
cases, in each of which it will be noticed that success
or failure is b ut a sli ght differ ence in th e attitude
of the personnel.
F'og.-I n probably no other way can the tempera-
ment of a squadron be more accurately measured
t han in their reception of ba d weather. A few will
demur at " impossible" flying when conditions are
act ua ll y onl y inconvenient. Of the eight missions
to be given, no less than fiv e were performed in
\\·eather outspoken by some as " impossible," and in
on ly one of the eight were weather conditions really
excellent. It is a n observed fact that demurring at
weather is in a lmost exact proportion to work per-
formed by various members.
Although, taking the year around, nearly half the
necessary missions on a front will fall in disagree-
able or dangerous weather, and such often gives
more opportunity for service t ha n good weather, for
some un accountable r eason this vital fact was prac-
t ically ignored by training schools the writer at-
tended. Training best progresses in good weather,
but by teachin g no dis tin ction between t raining and
fighting there is given a vague impression to some
gradu ates th at an order to fly iu unfavorable weather
is unreasonable and unnecessary.
To the contrary, at t he times of both major attacks
of the First A.l.'my (and throughout nearly the whole
campaign) th e- most favorable hours for observation,
those up to 10 a. m., were in den~e fogs, making
obserYation ext remely difficult and uncertain.
At 8 a . m. of September 26 the writer was only'
able to approach the f r ont by following the dim edge
of a large for est, and, reaching there, staggered
blindly about, with li ttle hope of success, until a r ift
iu the fog gave a key position, and the result was a
long and satisfactory mission .
On the 3d of November , in a similar experience in
one vast white blanket, after more than an hour
came another "key" placing him on the line at an
im porta nt time.
On a command mission from the Chief of Staff
sever a l clays later it was necessary to flutter a bout
for two hours and all but give up, when another rift
brought a glimpse of a ridge holding back the Second
 6
Di vision , and a message an<l ma p to the artillery
col'recting their rnn gt> wi11e<1 out tllP nbstm:le and
the advance went on.
One of th e single be:st 111bsio11,; of tlw ;;quadron
OCC'll!Ted wh en two fri end:-;, refu,;i ng 1·0 giYe up, \\·ere
Jo~t in fog, and wlwn a littl e Yillage fiashed by,
r ecognized a,; Hornagne, reported a German lliYi siou
massed for co unterattack, with t he result that in a
few hours it ~was all hut annihilated by artillery.
f nitiati re in general.-A.nother group of missions
h,we for th eir <.: r itical point the decision of hO\Y far
to go i11 a giYen ende,wo r, raising the mooted question
of reck lessne;;s, ranging from su ch charges by misfits
to the h'giti mate mi sgi Yin gs of cornmamlin g officers
as to the ultimate ;::trength of their cornrnan<ls being
impaired. This question. undoubtedly the most im-
portant being here cliscu:ssed, relluces to a simple
qu estio n of judgment phases of whi ch it will be en-
dea1·ored to show.
First may be gi\·en a rni;;;sion in which at a criticHl
time of Infantry liai son the air was .controll ed by
hostil e chasse. On t his occasion seYeu of these at-
tackecl a fri endly a irplane immecliately on arriYal.
There immediately arose the question ,Yhether it
""as bes t to retire temporarily and consen·e " eyes"
from prnbalJle destruction or endeaYor to secure
urgent i nformation. 'J'he last \\"U S chosen, with the
r es ult that .lfter three sep>1rate combats the h ostil e
clrnsse withd r ew and the mis;;ion wa::; performed.
1'11 is mission may be argued; the fa ct rem a ins that
it 1ccis succes~ful.
On a simi lar occasion, when photographs " ·er e r~
quired for a grancl offensh·e, an airp lane with engine
trouble r eached the lines to find itself alone and
nea r 12 hosti le chasse. With a sim ilar necessity for
(lecision, it was decided to encleaYor and "b luff" tbe
enemy. The result was a nai-ro,v escape aml the first
negati\·es secured of the objecti\·e.
In the most successful photographic miss ion of the
writer's squadron it::; fiYe airplanes ,1·ere divided by
excessil·e altitude, the leader and the writer becom-
ing separated from three protecting airplanes.
SeYen chasse blocking the way of the two, the leader
and his observer, believing it a last chance to secure
photographs for au attack, deliberately kept their
way and reach.eel the objectirn just as they were at-
tackecl. The writer remembers the unswervin g
co urse of the leader, aud the sight of his obsener,
half blind (ho,Y he got by the tests is a wonder),
looking back through his ,1·eak eyes at approaching
death aud then diYin g clown to slide a plate and
,York his hand ca mera. The arrival of the three
other airplane,- uncler the leadership of au indom-
itabl e flight command er ended a ba tt le in whi ch one
hostile airplane \\"as !Shot clown, · and half the army
front \\"as then photographetl.
l'J11gi1w8.-l\1issions should neYer be started iu ob-
sernttion with a defecti,·e engine, but the mere cut-
ting out of cylinders in the midst of a vital mission
is Hot permission for its immediate abandonment; in
fact, h,tlf the missions obseryefl ,...-oulcl nen'r have
been completed if such were the case. Obserrntion
tloes not de pend , usually as cllasse, primarily on
cl imbi ng abiiity. hut tile ability to k eeJJ in the air.
(Missions ga ining alt itude must be abandoned.)
Tn one of se,·eral eases, \Then the Army ,1·as in
headlong pursuit in :-;trange territory, the question
of hostil e retr eat or stand became important, and a
comBHll1ll mission was attempted in villainous
. weather. On reaching the lines two of the three
engines fleYeloped trouble, but; a moment of rare
Yi:-;ibility occurring, the mi:a;sion was proceeded \\ith,
losing and gaining alti tud e at. gr eat in com·en ience
to co ns id erab le depth IJehind the hostile lines. Thi·
cbauce 11·as thougllt vreferable rather thall lose in-
formation coYering some llun clrecl square miles of
hostile troops " ·ith their intentions.
A,; to the question of' " r ecklessness" ver::ms " pru-
d ence," the · wri ter is personally left in li ttle doubt
a,; lo t heir respectiYe merits. He llas bt>en griev-
ous!~- wrong at timeR; for in stance, the learning of
how close machine guns may be approached cost him
a bullet through oue of t he best obf:'ervers iu th e
sen-ice. On the whole, howeYer, the benefits so out-
weigh the losses as to be simply incomparable.
In conclusion it may be stated as an axiom that
excessive pruclence, a necessary acljunct to prelimi-
nary trHining, loses its Yalue to a large extent once
the change to combat is made.
'l'lle foregoing Hild rather extensiYe nanatiYe may
seem irre leYant to the 1rn111oses of the treati:se, but
has bePn macl e to illustrate cer ta in principles.
M ental states.- In no"· anal~·ziu g emotion s aud
e yent,, influencing the initiati1·e a nd otller 1·ital quali-
ties of a flying personnel i t is necessary to state that
wbaten'r the sen·ice a fli er may r end er or his con-
ception of sen-ice be, fl)~iug llas been so heralded as
llnngerous that probably _all applicants. on starting,
are sincere in a belief iu their abilities. This, how-
e ver, brings us to the crux of the whole ques-
tion. e. g.:
(1) '!'he actual develop eci 1infi.tne8s of some ancl
(2) "::'\en-es" that magnify all(l bring th is to a
head.
Gran ting th11 t all fliers start with equally good in-
ten tions, we soou fiu(l them cliYergin g radically, au cl
(a,) What they belieye sho uld be cl emanded of
them,
( b ). ,vuliugness to sacrifice for military good,
(a) Conception of need of sacrifice,
( d) Conscience,
( e) Capacity for sustai ned sus1)euse,
(!) Interest, and
(g) Da ring
may he cited ass a few of many differences developed,
tllt>se being entire]~· distinct from flying ability or
ohsern1 tion i nstrn ction.
As the Ya Ju e of a flier in observation l'ests chiefl y
upon his mental sstates, i t will be Reen tbat to be
se riou sly 011 th t> \Yroug sille of one or mol"e of these
points practically iIH.:apacitates him for usefu l serv-
ice, an<l the simple teaching of one to fiy and the
prin ciples of obsen- atiou tactics in no 1Yay makes
him a fit member of a squadr on iu war. If it wer e
 7
possibl e to select personnel who without exception
,yere on the right s ide of all the points named, the
effi ciern.:y of squadrons on the whole would he raisetl
to an astouishing per cent. Each ineffective who
~lips h,v, b<rwen'r. c· uts <10, \·11 efficieney to an enor-
rnou:-: <-'XlPnt h.r failure in \·ital miFsions where suc-
cess or failure js often bnt a s light differen ce in
attitude.
Ko t 0111.1· may the Jirst test bring out defectives,
but point ( e) ·' Capacit~- fo r sustained suspense"
( recognized by the SeL'Yice in frequ ent leaves to the
rear ). All flier;:; feel it sooner or inte r. The writer
frankly a<lmits that during illtensiye periods, when
on miss ions eYery flay or t\\·i<:e a <lay a nd in the air
from three to fh·e hour:; rhlil~·. he has often walked
to bis airp lane with a rlull, gripping, nam eless dread,
of O\·envrou gh t an<l O\ erworl~ecl nenes. It Yanish ecl
imrnedintely on taking tlie a il'.
It ca n reaclil:, he seen what th e res ult i,; upon one
untittP<l fo r the sen·ic-e. 'l'he re1naining qualiti es
necessary for sucr·ess \YOultl gi\·e way, first slowly,
then in a panic. Fe\Y men afflicted will admit it ;. if
..tlw~· \\·o nld. the loss would h<' minor. I 11Rtead, they
co ntin ue, possessetl wilh en'ry doubt aml abhorrence.
To ·thp111 the 1Yeathe 1· is '· impo,-,;'h le.'' thdr airplane
is al\\'1tys out of onlPr, and they are often s ick. In
tilt' Jnost <lama 1.dng e\'e nt- t lrnt of t ryin,: to carry out
a mission- it may r p;; ult in a <fa.sh t<> the scene of
a ction ancl quick r eturn with little lea rn ed of value
and tb t> repo rtin °· of inaccurate information or non-
PART 2.
Selection.-lt is not th e in tention of this a rti cle
to suggest either ho\\' or \\·l1ere applie,rnt,; for flyin g
s liall lw secu rerl. or cl etail;.; of training or instruction
after· entrance. hu t rather as to the wt'ecling out or
process of selecting to n required sta ndard.
A. 1netbod by whi ch fliet·s can not be judged is-
B eo,l'ing .- Th e as tonis hing exception is found in
thi s branch. Authorities who realize the importance
of co mm a nd ing appearance and soldierly bearing in
officers handling men might be surprised to learn
that, with one possible exception , no Al pilot of the
writer's squadron ga Ye the impre;:;sion of being the
type to best handle troops. The importance of this
reh1ti\·e to judg ing flying officers \Yjth infantry re-
quirem ents is ob,·ious. It hardly proves that fl ier s
are "peculiar," but rather that their essential quali-
ties ofte n differ radi cally. f rom ground forces, and
nu encleaYor to judge them by stanclard Anny tests
is unju,; t and um\·ise in the extreme.
Aye.- lt is interest ing to note that this question
nffonls so111ewhat clifferent reasoning i n observation
than in chasse. In clrn sse one of the chief objection.
to achanced age is slowness in pure flying reactions
or '· feel.'' I n obserYation this is comparatively un-
important.
As,rnminµ- that a flie r's personal courage is the
same at 20, 25. aml 30 ~-ears, ,ye find that the chief
objection to age is a n increased tend ency to calculate
risks. In other words, the deliberate weighing of
sense, while ( if a liaison or command rnis,:ion) 20,000
men attack and tli e without "sight" or help. There
has been no mission as far as r esults go, yet who jg
to ;;n.v, '· Yon have not done your mission."
In photography it is " use less" to attempt a mis-
sion. Th e~P J'liers probab ly do not rPa lize there is
an~· thing w rong-they carr~· out their missions ac-
cording to their lights- be ing merely lacki ng in one
or more of th e qualitie,; mentioned. Yet the result is
that the etl'ective members, overworked and weary,
a re sent out to find \Yby no accurate front line has
been found for days, to find it in an hou r, and be
reproached h:, certain mis fits on r eturn for being
" reckle~s."
The majori t~· of a squ a dron are conscientious work-
Pr s, b ut m isfits neutrali ze tl 1e benefits and ma ke com-
manding generals "cnss" the Air Sen ice. In this
connection I ca n not help inject ing a li ttle illustra-
tion of tl 1e tri als of a commanding gener al.
A---, one of out· crack fliers, took up a new
,uHl misfit ol.Jsen·er (I must LIO\a ke one point on ob-
spryers) . a ntl, finding the sk~· speck led with "archie;:;,"
skillfnl ly do(lge<l them ancl penetrated the depths of
the enemy li1w, afire \\'ith t lw Rights he saw. The
me,;;:;age w ith its great new,; was drop1)ed on an anx-
ious and wai ting gene,·al, then homeward. " '\Vhat
dill you drop on him? " eagerly asked A - - - on
land ing. With a mournful shake of his bead, the
otl1er repliefl : " ·would liked to haYe gone over, but
too many archies."
chan ces whi ch increa ses with age a nd is counted a
Yirtue in s<ime branches doe,s harm in observation.
Thi,; is owing to much Yital iuformation being secured
at exceptiomll risk. As often happens on a mission,
an opportunit~· or ne<:essity for securin g information
of extreme ntlue at. extreme ri sk suddenly arises. It
is uo r efl ection on fliers to state that while theoreti-
cally the "ca lcu lator" best decides the amount of
risk \\·anantecl, practically he unconsciously gives
undue weight to personal safety. '\Vhen it is realized
that most obserYation fli ers are prone to always un-
derestimate Yal ue and OYeresti mate r isk, i t becomes
clear that extensiYe calculating is undesirable. It
is here that the younger man, seeing an opportunity
and decidi ng on the mom en t, gives on the whole
better senice.
I11clicatio11 s of misfits 'in trciining.- Wbile the
\,·eighing of a man in training is extremely compli-
cated and un ce r·tain. there are numerous indication.;
of un fi t nesf;, a few of which migh t be (there are ex-
ceptions)-
( J ) A mn n who per si;;ten tly looks at clouds and
hopes " there will be no flying to-clay "
may be judged as to Yalue in difficult bat-
tle condition s.
(2) H e \\' ho (with good mechanics) has great
clifficul ty with engines and airplanes or
complains of poor eq uipmellt will probably
do so at the front.
 8
(3) One who argues that difficult or dangerous
tests of flying ability are useless and un-
called for will not care to be assigned
difficult missions in a squadron.
( 4) The man who does not wish to try even
mild acrobatics of his own accord may not
care to attempt difficult ones in forn1a-
tion.
(5) Repeated excuses or faii ure in training mis-
sions indicate similar ones in vital times.
(6) Lack of interest in tests of reglage, in-
fantry liaison, etc., foreshadow lack of in-
terest in the success of artillery or infantry
in battle.
(7) A man who complains of excessive training
fatalities and un r easonable orders tending
thus will damp ·the spirit of a squad r on,
to say the least.
(8) He who frequently says to those who do fin e
bits of: flying or are successful, "You,,ill
get bumped.off if yon keep that up," shoul<l
be immediately removed.
(9) A flier who loses his nerve once in traini ng
is a dangerous man.
It will bP. notict>d that in these exalllples !ms not
been inclucle<l " excell ent flying." 'rl1is is because it
is pos~ihle thnt a man who lrn s other ;::?;Ood qualities
yet, trying hanl , is only an average flier, may be
worth more (in observation) than some "crack"
fliers. Generall~-. ho,Yeve1·, good flying is indicative
of other qualities.
In a squadron probably one of the chief services
tile commanding officer can render is the keeping of
a careful record of missions and the removal of iu-
effectives, to be replaced by the many good men in
the rear, thousands of which in the late emergency
d id not secure active service in a squadron.
A very grievous mistake was made in the recent
e1 nrrgency through not then baving grasped observa-
1ion fundarnenta ls. . 'l'his was t he prohibition of
acrobatics at au advanced obsenation school the
wr iter attendee!. ('l'his practice rnay not have been
universal.) To prescribe rules for taking-off, land-
ing, and altitude is one thing; to discourage practice,
initiative, and daring is another. The writet· would
not for half his flying time lose the ho ur or two in
which he learned to execute a vertical bank a hun-
clre!l feet aboYe an interesting observation point, to
sideslip within a few hundred feet of machine guns,
or to skid away from them.
It is, therefore, confidently concludeLl !·hat in war,
after providing the best obtainable airplanes, pri-
mary instruction and rules for a ltitude, only incal-
culable damage can lJe done by .limiting the perform-
ances or tests of fliers, thus instilling excessive
prudence and discouraging the very qualities neces-
sary to success. The few casualties thus saved are
incomparable with the forwarding of incompetent
personnel to a front, and the Air Service can not
afford to increase the inefficient, one of which mar
retard the· efforts of a di vision or corps.
Assignment.-ProYiding essential qualities are pres-
ent, men not assignable to one mission may often be
used i n another. For example, a man useless for
tlle calm calculations of reglage may make a most
effi cient trench str affer. On the other hand, some
missions may require a compound.
l\l erel.v as a n ill ustration is given a possible assign-
men t where necessary qualities are presen t, but some
of these ( or outside) q ua li ties dominate.
Chas~e (pursuit) - " Crack" fliers.
"Str nffing" (ground attack) - Extremely re<;k-
less, gunnery.
A r t i ll er .v r eglnge- Calm, mathematical, excep-
tional co11een t 1·ation.
Photog rnplly- J\·[a.ps distances, etc.
()pep reconnais;.:a nce- l\ faps, gunnery, exceptional
YiSiOll.
('0 1111ll11n1l rnissions- Componncl.
In fn ntr\ lia ison- Componncl.
T hi ,-; h,i;sl",· a ncl i nl)wrfect ill nstrntion rnay yet give
a ,·o ugh i,lea of tlw wi cle ra11ge of distri bution. The
last two rnis,-; ions require a mixture of qualities be-
cn use I ill' tnct ics of :l corps may cle1wnLl in a given
instance 11po11 lhe :1 111C1unl and aecurac~· ol' information
rn rn isl1 erl .
A lli f> r \\'i1 11 qrn1l itiC's rm· se,·e ral 1·~·pes of mi~sions
shon l<l l>e al lo\\·P,l 1·0 choo~e. 'l' he assignment of: a
1mu1 prC'i'erriug low flying to photography or one
p referring lliglt to !llfuutry liaison would obviously
he a rni,;take. Iu this connection it may be stated
th a1· many a conscientious training commandant, wor-
ri ed over a student who, possessing every quality of
ski.11, ab ili ty, ancl u sufll good judgment, still desires
to fly unusual iy low ancl do acrobatics at little alti-
t ude, \\·ou lcl be vastly astonished if informed that
t hi s erring ~turlen1· hfls posRibly a "born instinct"
fo r Infan try liaison arnl shou ld be carefully examined
fo 1· ,-;ufficien t other qualities to a ll ow him to be so
a>':;ignl-'d. By "carefull y exarnineLl" is meant the
:1scer1·a in iug; of wllether he is doing it from inexperi-
ence or has the "instinct." (Accurate detail in
In fant ry Hn i;;;on can seldom be observed above 300
rueters.)
1'n sw11 n 11.- (l) On a given observation mission
in hatt lf> t he occupa nts of nn airplane a re :t little
ru ·m.,· a ll to th emselYes, and it is chiefly in propo r-
tion to t heir conceptions of duty ancl sac1·ifice, their
ini tiative ancl dari ng, that tbe resu lt depends, whether
it rnngP fro 11 1 the destruction of a hosti le d ivision to
one oJ' their ow n.
(2) 'l'lle effectiveness of a squadron is in dir ect
pr opo r tion to the number of flying member s havin g
certain mental states apart from simple flying ability.
(3) It should be the seriou s endeavor of training
forces to single out and select s uch. students above
and beyond the test of good flying ancl stu dious
oapers.