Special topic
Experiments in science and science teaching
Experiments in science and science teaching.
Derek Hodson.
Department of Education,
University of Auckland.
Auckland, New Zealand.
Scienceteaching must takeplaceina laboratory;
about that at least there is no controversy ...Both
teacher and pupil are united ... in a belief that
experiment is the right tool (Joan Solomon
1980).
Few teachers or curriculum developers seem to ques-
tion the belief that science courses should contain a
significant amount of laboratory work. The almost uni-
versal assumption of scienceeducatorsat secondary and
tertiarylevelis thattheenormousinvestmentof timeand
energy, and the cost of providing specialized laboratory
space, equipment and consumable materials, are justi-
fied. Whilst the origins of such beliefs stretch back to the
work of H.E. Armstrong, or even earlier (Layton 1973),
the contemporary interest in practical work dates from
the sciencecurriculum ’revolution’of the 1960sandearly
1970s. The central role afforded to practical work during
that period was such that the NSTA (1970) was able to
declare that ‘the time is surely past when teachers must
plead the case for school laboratories’. It has to be admit-
ted, however, that the case for extensive provision of
laboratory work was made rather more on the basis of
strong ’professional feelings’about its value than on the
basis of empirical research evidence concerning i ts effec-
tiveness. If anything, research evidence suggests that
practical work is largely unproductive (Hodson 1985,
Hofstein and Lunetta 1982, Shulman and Tamir 1973).
1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.
53
It isinteresting to speculate on why practical work has
achieved such highstatusin the mythologyof thescience
teaching profession. Perhaps it is because experiments
are widely used in science that science teachers are
conditioned to regard them as a necessary and integral
part of scienceeducation.Withlittle or no critical scrutiny,
two assumptions are made:
* The role of experiments in science and science
education is identical;
* The role of experiments is unproblematic.
As a direct consequence of these assumptions, much
contemporary science curriculum practice, especially
that involving practical work, is ill-conceived, muddled
and of little educational value (Hodson 1987). This article
does not argue for the exclusion of practical work from
the curriculum, but for a radical reshaping of current
practice, based on a critical reappraisal of the roles of
practical work, laboratory work and experiments in sci-
ence education. Thus far, these three terms have been
used somewhat indiscriminately - a deliberate ploy to
illustrate the confusion that arises in science curriculum
debate because of the failure to recognize that not all
practical work is carried out in a laboratory, and that not
all laboratory work comprises experiments.
Any learning method that requires the learner to be
active, rather than passive, accords with the belief that
54
children learn best by direct experience. In that sense,
practical work need not always comprise laboratory
activities. Legitimate alternatives would include CAL,
teacher demonstration or video/film supported by
worksheet activities, case studies, role playing, writing
tasks, making models, posters and scrapbooks, library
work of various kinds. In other words, the wider inter-
pretation of practical work as science learning activities
should replace therathernarroweroneof hands-on labo-
ratory bench work (Reid and Hodson 1987).Just as it is
important to recognize that laboratory bench work is a
sub-set of the wider category of practical work, so it is
important torecognize that ’doingexperiments’isa sub-
set of laboratory bench work There are other kinds of
bench work that are not experiments in the sense that
scientists employ the term. Laboratory work may be
conducted for a variety of purposes and in a variety of
styles. For example, for demonstrating a phenomenon,
illustrating a theoretical principle, collecting data, test-
ing a hypothesis, developing basic skills of observation
or measurement, familiarization with apparatus, pro-
viding a ’flash, bang, wallop show’. Some of these are
‘experiments’, in the sense that scientistsperceiveexperi-
ments; some are not. In constructing a science cumcu-
lum that is both philosophicallyvalid and pedagogically
sound, teachers need to take cogni-
zance of these various distinc-
tions and to relate them to
the crucial distinctions
...........
curriculum.
First, what do
children need
to know about
the nature and
purpose of ex- Relationship between experiments,
periments as a laboratory work, and practical work.
contribution
to their learn-
1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.
Special topic
Derek Hodson
ing abou t science and as a preparation for doing science?
In other words, what is the role of experiments as cur-
riculum content? Second, what is the roleof experiments
as a teaching method? This question focuseson the ways
in which teachers might use experiments to bring about
concept learning, to bring about a deeper understanding
of the nature of experimentation itself (learning about ex-
periments by doing experiments!) and to give children
practice in using them as part of their own scientific in-
vestigations. Running alongside these considerations
are questions about alternative and possibly more ap-
propriate ways of learning science, learning about sci-
ence and doing science.
Experiments in science
Francis Bacon’s recognition that ’the secrets of nature
reveal themselvesmore readily under the vexation of art
than when they go their own way’ firmly established the
experiment as the principal means of acquiring scientific
knowledge. It is not sufficient, he argued, merely to
‘observenature in the raw’. Rather, one must ‘twist the
lion’s tail’ - manipulate the world in order to gain
further access to its secrets. Experiments go
beyond (mere) observation; they are con-
trived and closely controlled events, and
............ that close control that gives them
ir particular power. A number of
aching points arise at this point.
* Scientific method is at its
most powerful and most ef-
fective when it is able to
control and manipulate
events. Indeed, many of the
events observed during ex-
perimentsdonot occur in the
natural world. In such cir-
cumstances, the experimental
approach is able to obtain in-
formation that is considerably
more detailed and precise than
that arising from passive observa-
* Experimentally driven science is not
theonly kind of science.Whilst experiments
often provide scientists with a-powerful
means of acquiring and testing knowledge,
thev are neither sufficient in themselves to
prdvide theoretical knowledge, norare they
always necessary. Many fields of scientific
Special topic
Experiments in science and science teaching
endeavour, such as geology and cosmol-
ogy, which deal with events that are remote
and inaccessible in time and space, make
little or no use of experiments. Conjectures
in meteorology can be confirmed or refuted
by uncontrived observations.In some fields
of medicine, experiments may not be pos-
sible, or may be undesirable for ethical rea-
sons.
* The power that results from close control is
also the major weaknessof theexperimental
method and a potential trap for the unwary.
Experiments are conducted within a par-
ticular theoretical matrix, which governs
scientists’ perceptions of the problem, de-
termines the experimental design, influ-
ences the interpretation of results, and so
on. Theories determine which experiments
are regarded as legitimate and how they are
to be conducted. For example, in gathering
data to test a hypothesis, the form of the
hypothesis and the nature and method of
data collection are dictated by the very the-
ory that is under test. In other words, no
theory-independent experiments are pos-
sible.
These three points serve to illustrate an important
principle in science curriculum planning, that in at-
tempting to furnish children with an understanding of
the nature and purpose of experiments, we take active
steps to avoid reinforcing the several prevalent myths
about experiments. It is not just non-scientists who hold
to beliefs that the experimental method is universally
essential to science and that all science results from
experimentation. Science teachers conveniently ’forget’
that many aspects of the science they teach are not
susceptible to direct experimental study, that many
major theoretical advances in science did not result from
experimentationand that many theories weredeveloped
and substantiated by indirect means - consistency with
other theoretical systems and use of ’thought experi-
ments’, for example - rather than by experimentally-
based observation (Hacking 1983).
An even more damaging myth, encapsulated in the
discovery learning approach to teaching science, is that
observation and experiment provide objective, reliable
and theory-free data from which generalizations and,
ultimately, theoretical explanations arise. By emphasiz-
ing the priority of observations, many science curricula
seriously misjudge the rela tionships between observa-
tion, theory and experiment. They see theory generation
as little more than a process of looking for regularity in
nature and theories as simple guesses about nature, of
1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.
55
the kind that children produce for themselves after a few
moments of laboratory experience.Theoriesare subordi-
nated to the meticulous and orderly gathering of experi-
mental ’facts’. They are seen to be easily validated by
direct observations and by simple yes/no tests. Such an
approach, which Nadeau and Desautels (1984) label
‘blissful empiricism’, gives children an inflated sense of
the importance of experimental results and a grossly
misleading view of experimentation.
Scientific observation is not a simple matter, and sci-
ence education that portrays it as such is misleading.
Hodson (1986a, b) and Nadeau and Desautels (1984)
describe a number of activities designed to make young
learners aware of the unreliability and theory depend-
ence of observations. If (passive) observation is theory
dependent, how much more so is the active, interroga-
tive observation of contrived events that constitutes
experimentation? It is important that children realize
that every experiment is set within a theoretical matrix,
a procedural matrix (a current ‘method’ or ‘practice’,
underpined by theories and conventions about how to
conduct, record and report experiments) and an instru-
mental matrix (involving various theories of instrumen-
tation).It is theoretical understanding that givespurpose
and form to experiments.
Another prevalent myth is that scientists can conclu-
sively resolve dispute and establish ‘truth’ by means of
critical experiments. Many school sciencecurricula proj-
ect the notion that a hypothesis can be rejected and, by
inference, another accepted on the evidence provided by
a simple experimental test. Indeed, a number of curricula
suggest that thisis the onlyroleof experiments.This kind
of naive interpretation of the Popperian notion of falsifi-
cationism carries with it an assumption that theory-
independent evidence is available and that unambigu-
ous testing is possible. If theories are incommensurable,
a point on which many philosophers agree, there can be
no crucial experiment to decide between them. Such
experiments would require competing theories to make
opposing predictions regarding the same events. In
practice, competing theories address the world in differ-
ent ways (often using different concepts) and, therefore,
make different kinds of predictions about observable
phenomena. Usually, therefore, it is possible only to
provide an experimental evaluation of a theory on its
own terms.
The critical role of experiments is an important one in
science, but theories are only abandoned when there is
compelling evidence (long standing and striking at the
fundamentalcoreof the theory) and/or whenan alterna-
tive and more promising theory becomes available. It is
misleading to present to children the idea that theories
are abandoned because of a few ’negative results’. In
56
practice, all theories have tolive withanomalous results;
it is a natural feature of science. We mislead children
when we pretend that the kinds of experiments they
perform in class constitute a reliable means of choosing
between rival theories. Because experiments are per-
ceived, designed and executed within a particular theo-
retical matrix, considerable judgement is involved in
appraising the significance of apparently falsifying evi-
dence. Experimental testing of theories is not, therefore,
an infallible, single step but a multi-step decision-mak-
ing process monitored and validated by the community.
Decisive theory rejection (revolutionary science) is a
somewhat rare event in science, which it may bebetter to
study by other methods - case studies, for example. In
school science, most allegedly crucial experiments are
tests of minor or specific applications of a theory, rather
than tests of the fundamental tenets of the theory itself.
There is an intriguing paradox with which children
should be confronted: decisions about the acceptability
of theories are made in the light of experimentally ob-
tained observations; and decisions about the legitimacy
of experimental designs and the status and the status of
observations are made in the light of theories. When
theory and experimentally determined evidence are in
conflict, nothing in the logic of the situation requires that
it be the theory that is rejected. Rejection of observational
evidenceon theoretical grounds is a crucial part of scien-
tific research.Childrencanbe brought toan appreciation
of some of these complexitiesby engaging in experimen-
tal design - a sadly neglected aspect of scienceeducation
(Welch et al., 1981).In doing so,they quicklyrealize that
the experimenter has to have some idea of the range of
possible outcomes. One can only design experiments to
observe what isanticipated. For example, it is simply not
possible to design apparatus to detect something about
which one has not speculated. As a consequence, an
experimenter can detect only certain entities, may never
entertain the possibility of detecting other entities, may
fail to recognize or to appreciate the significance of the
unanticipated, and may assume that anomalies are due
to experimental error or to bad luck. If such is the case for
experienced scientists, how much more is it the case for
students with no wealth of ideas and experience on
which to draw?
Such experienceslead naturally into a discussion of the
ways in which our acceptance of a particular theory
prevents us from making the observations that might
refute it. Scientists who accept a particular theoretical
structure may find it difficult to recognizedeficienciesin
that structure because theoretical biases blind them to
the theory’s shortcomings and prevent them obtaining,
or even seeking, appropriate counter evidence. Accord-
ing toFeyerabend (1975),a theory’ssuccessinexplaining
the factsisguaranteed,because the theorycreatesitsown
1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.
Special topic
Derek Hodson
supporting evidence and excludes the facts that
would refuteit.Often,anew theoryisneeded toshow up
the errors in the old one, by providing an alternative per-
spective and alternative observational evidence. The
new theory may be supported by a test which was not
even possible within the context of its predecessor, and
the earlier theory may be rejected on the basis of an
observational test that would have been quite inconceiv-
able within the conceptual framework of the old theory.
Thus, it may be necessary, on occasions, to introduce
theories that are inconsistent with existing theory and
existing facts - that is, to proceed counter inductively.
Whether OneacceptsFeyerabend‘sclaimor not, it isclear
that correspondence with the experimentally gathered
’facts’ does not necessarily afford any increased truth
status on a theory, it simply means that it may be true.
However, there may be an alternative theory that also
agrees with the facts (Quine 1970).
The tendency of school curricula to cast experimentsin
either a simpleinductivist roleor a Popperiancritical role
fails to acknowledge and develop the idea that experi-
mentation is part of theory construction and, therefore,
that the kinds of experiments employed at any one stage
depend on the level of theoretical sophistication already
reached. The more developed the field, the more likely it
is that experiments are theory-driven, in the sense that
theoretical speculation represents the starting point for
experimentation. However, it is absurd to suggest that
such speculation always precedes experiment. In less
well developed fields, the more likely it is that practitio-
nersengage in pre-theoreticalobservation- that is,obser-
vations to stimulate conceptualization. Thus, Liebig‘s
assertion that ‘an experiment not preceded by theory ...
bears the same relation to scientific research as a child‘s
rattledoes tomusic’canbeinterpreted ineithera ‘strong‘
or a ‘weak‘ sense (Hacking 1983).Clearly one must have
thought about the experiment and the apparatus to an
extent -a completely mindless investigation is no inves-
tigation at all! However,one need not always have a clear
hypothesis to test. It is just as legitimate to cany out an
experiment ‘just to see what happens’. Experimental
workcannotexistindependentlyofall theory;at thevery
least it depends on theories of observation and instru-
mentation. But it does go on without there always being
a specific hypothesis under test. Nor need hypotheses
always be precisely formulated. It is perfectly legitimate
simply tolook forconfirmation(ornot)ofahypothesisas
vague as ‘x may have an effect’. The history of science
furnishes many examples of experiments that are only
theory-guided in this ‘weak‘ sense,experiments that are
pre-theoretical in the sense that they are attempts to
establish concepts and to stimulate theoretical develop-
ment. Inaddition, thereareexamplesof previously quite
separate lines of experimentation and theoretical devel-
opment suddenly providing mutual support, and cases
Special topic
Experiments in science and science teaching
of experiments designed to provide evidence for one
theory actually furnishing evidence for another. Indeed,
Einstein cited experiments conducted 50 years earlier as
critical evidence for his theory of relativity.
In view of these considerations, it may be more sen-
sible for scienceteachers to encourage children to regard
theory and experiment as having an inter-dependent
and interactive relationship: experiments assist theory
building; and theory, in turn, determines the kinds of
experimentsthat can and should be carried out. In theory
construction, experimentation has a two-fold signifi-
cance. First, in testing the empirical adequacy of the
developing theory and providing retrospective evidence
for theoretical propositions. Second, in guiding the con-
tinued development of theory towards coherence and
completeness. For example, experiments assist the re-
finement of concepts and the quantification of concep-
tual relationships, and establish the limits of applicabil-
ity of the theory. Thus, experiment is seen to be an
integral part of the decision-making of theory construc-
tion. In turn, theory has a two-fold role in experimenta-
tion. First, in the generation of questions to be investi-
gated and problems that require theoretical elucidation
and explanation. Second, as a guiding factor in the pre-
cise designof experiments to answer those questions and
solve those problems (there may be other theories in-
volved, too). This holistic, interactive view of the experi-
ment-theory relationship provides a fruitful model for
concept development in individuals (a point taken up
later).
The actual chronology of experiment and theory is
often rewritten in textbooks. This helps to sustain the
myth that the path of science is certain and assigns a
simple and clear-cut role to experiment,
thereby assisting the perpetuation of further myths
concerning experiments. Part of learning about science
should involve reading actual accounts of experiments,
rather than the more usual post hoc description and
justification of actions, that reinterpret the experi-
menter’s motives and idealize the decision-making
events in terms of currently held theories.
Thus far, the reasons for engaging in experiments have
been discussed solely in terms of their logical relation-
ship with theoreticaland conceptual matters. It must not
be overlooked, however, that there is also a sociological
component. Decisions about what to investigate may be
prompted just as much by economic and social consid-
erations as by theoretical ‘problems’. Decisions about
how to investigateand how toreportfindings may alsobe
driven by factors ’outside science’. Thus, experiments
are socially determined as well as theoretically deter-
mined. Knorr-Cetina (1983)describes scientific enquiry
as constructive, rather than descriptive, in the sense that
1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.
57
everything in the laboratory experience - the materials,
theapparatus, the theories, theprocedures, thepurnals -
are human constructs, influenced by thecollectivevalues
and aspirations of the community of scientists. There-
fore, in principle, they could be otherwise. This interpre-
tation of science has yet to make an impact on the school
curriculum, and the notion of a strong sociological
component in the conduct of experiments is foreign to
most teachers. It will notbeeasy toeffecta paradigmshift
of this magnitude, but a start can be made by the reading
of contemporary studies of scientific practice, such as
those by Barnes (19851, Collins (1985)and Lynch (19851,
suitably adapted for school use.
Knorr-Cetina (1983)goes on to state that the products
of science are not only ‘decision-impregnated’, but also
’decision-impregnating‘, in the sense that they ‘point to
new problems and predispose their solutions’. Previous
decisions taken by the scientificcommunity determine -
to an extent - the choices that are possible now. And the
choices made now will influence, or even determine,
future decisions. Decisions have to be made at every
stage of the scientific enterprise. Individual scientists, or
groups, decide what is a problem, where to look, what to
ignore, and what counts as a solution. All of which are
theory dependent and influenced by individual experi-
ence, belief and position in the social hierarchy. Deci-
sions about choice of apparatus and experimental
method may be influenced by current convention or the
availabilityof funds, and soare not entirely ’objective’,in
the traditional sense. When work is completed, the au-
thor selects the journal (and, therefore, its referees, audi-
ence and policy) that provides the theoretical and socio-
logical climate for decision-making that is most favour-
able to its acceptance.
The extent to which thedecisionsof the communityare
governed by rational principles and the extent to which
they are irrational is, of course, a matter of some debate.
Kuhn (1970) admits that the reasons why practitioners
switch allegiance from one paradigm to another cannot
always be seen to be en tirely rational, even in retrospect.
This is not a view that is projected through the science
curriculum. On the contrary, the history of science is
frequently rewritten or reconstructed in school text-
books, in order to appear entirely rational. The version of
sciencetha t is usually presented implies logical certainty
and inevitability: theories emerge as a matter of
course from rigorous experimentation. On the few occa-
sions when it is admitted that the creative aspects of hy-
pothesis generationare sometimesa little unpredictable,
it is always asserted that the hypothesis - once pro-
duced - is subject to rigorous test and rational appraisal
by well-characterized procedures. In this respect, these
newer school curricula adopt the Popperian distinction
between the (often) non-logical context of hypothesis
58
generationand the (always)strictlylogical context of hy-
pothesis testing. However, there are those who would
deny this distinction and assert that the processes of
validation and acceptanceof scientificknowledge are no
more ‘logical‘ than the other decision-making proce-
dures of science. Knorr-Cetina (1983)describes how the
scientific communitytakes note of the ‘contextof discov-
ery‘- in particular, who did the researchand how well the
results relate to the current community priorities. In
addition, because knowledge is likely to be used by
othersin further research,or isindirect competitionwith
it, there is a vested interest in certain results being ac-
cepted and others rejected. Thus, the validators often
have a crucial interest in the work they evaluate. They
may evenbe incompetitionfor ‘theoreticalleadership’or
for scarce research funds.
Experiments in science teaching
Figure 1. servesto remind us that not all practical work
in school science is laboratory work and that not all
laboratorywork can be categorized as experiments.The
question that must be asked at this point is whether any
laboratory work in school can be categorized as ‘experi-
ments’, in the senses discussed in the previous section.
Since the curriculum revolution of the 1960s and early
1970s, teachers have assumed that students conduct
experiments, observe, make inferencesand solve prob-
lems in the same way that scientistsdo, and for the same
purposes. This notion demands critical scrutiny. It is
necessary to consider very carefullywhether the experi-
ments that children do in school resemble in any way
those that scientistscarry out in the research laboratory
and whether the teacher‘s purpose in providing SCF
called experimental work as a learning experience re-
sembles that of the scientist in conductingresearch. Are
there, in fact, crucialdifferencesbetween experimentsin
science and experiments in science teaching?
This is an appropriate point at which to discuss the
relevance to science-curriculumdesign of Kuhn’s (1970)
distinction between normal science and revolutionary
science. Children in school are concerned - in the main -
with normal science. That is, they are working within a
particular paradigm, certainlyas far as laboratoryactivi-
ties are concerned.Paradigm shifts are only occasionally
dealt with in school science, and in those cases the most
appropriate teaching vehicle might well be historical
case studies, rather than laboratory work. However,
scientists engaged in normal science (extending and
developing the paradigm) work with a degree of famili-
arity with the paradigm that is denied to children appar-
1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.
Special topic
Derek Hodson
ently engaged in similar activities in school. In this
respect, there is a fundamental difference between the
‘cognitive circumstances’ of experiments conducted in
scienceand those performed in school. Whilst there will
always be a distinction between the cognitive circum-
stances of a researcher and a learner, simply because
school studentscan never hope to possess the theoretical
sophisticationor wealth of experienceof working scien-
tists,it canbeminimized quitesignificantly,and reduced
to one of degree rather than principle, by the introduc-
tion of theory-driven learning experiences. In practice, it
is often exacerbated by the widespread adoption of the
epistemologicallynonsensical and pedagogically inap-
propriate discovery learning and ‘process approaches’
that deliberatelyavoid givingthe learner a prior theoreti-
cal understanding of the context of the experiment
(Hodson,1987).
Whilst experimentsin scienceare conducted primarily
for the purpose of theory development, experiments in
science teaching have a range of pedagogic functions.
They are used by teachers as part of their
planned programme for teaching science, teaching
about science and teaching children how to do
science. These pedagogic functions can, on occasions,
result in very significant problems. For example, many
experiments in class do not ’work’, or give unexpected
results. Yet children are still invited to accept the theory
that theexperimentsmanifestlydo not support, blaming
poor technique or bad luck for any anomalies. This is
because the pedagogic functionof many ’experiments’in
science teaching is to illustrate a particular theoretical
point of view, whereas in science the purpose is to assist
theory development.Theintention to promoteaparticu-
lar view, whilst maintaining a facade of open enquiry,
creates enormous difficulties and is primarily respon-
sible for children’s distorted views of experiments and
scientific methodology. This kind of stage-managed re-
discovery, still very common in schools, is beset by all
manner of theoretical and practical problems (Atkinson
and Delamont 1976,Driver1975,Hodson 1987).It should
be abandoned forthwith and replaced by theory-driven
methods.
In addition, there may be other pedagogic functions
only indirectly related to these three goals. For example,
experiments to build confidence and self-esteem in
pupils. Experiments that demonstrate the predictive
power of children’s developing theoretical understand-
ing will, of course, teach them something about the
nature of scientificknowledge, and so will have value in
teaching about science. However, the major purpose of
such experiencesmight be to show children that they can
manipulateand control events,or to show them that they
can investigate and solve problems - or at least tackle
them! There is a case to be made for children engagingin
Special topic
Experiments in science and science teaching
laboratorywork as a means of expressingtheir individu-
ality, or simply doing what pleases them and interests
them. Reid and Hodson (1987) haveargued at length that
the science curriculumshould be a mapr vehicle for the
development of personal and social skills and the en-
hancement of self-esteem through a cumculum struc-
ture and organization that prioritizes the affective.How-
ever, whatever it is that is distinctiveabout experiments
(inscience)may bemissing from thesekindsof activities.
For example, laboratorywork used at the beginning of a
lesson as a stimulus - to motivate, arouse interest and
focus attention, to demonstrate a technique to be used
later by the children themselves, to startle, to prompt
questions for later investigation, to increasethe range of
children’s experiences, and so on - has to be regarded as
’non-experimental’. None of these activities is directly
concerned with theory developmentor theory testing in
the way that real experiments are. Similarly, skills train-
ing sessionscannot be regarded as experiments, though
it is entirely possible, of course, for teachers to adopt an
approachin which learnersare expected to acquireskills
whilst engaging in scientific inquiry.
59
It seems that the further teachers move away from the
three major goals of practical work, the more laboratory
work diverges from true experimentation.It is also the
case that many of the learning experiencesthat are most
successful in achieving these three goals are also non-
experimental. Indeed, many are non-laboratory activi-
ties!
Learning about science
The particular views about the nature of science held
by curriculumdevelopers will profoundly influence the
kinds of experiments and laboratory work that are pro-
vided. According to the particular ’philosophic stance’
adopted, relatively different emphases will be afforded
to experiments that attempt to ‘prove’ theories, experi-
ments that gather data from whichchildren try to induce
theories and experiments that attempt to test a theory‘s
predictions or to settle disputes between theories. In

Figure 2. A three-stage model for science education

Stage 1.Preparadigmic (prescientific)science education

Establishing the domain of science (what is and is not science),acquiringthe ‘language’ of science and build-
ing the basic prerequisites for studying science (that there is order in the universe; that such order can be
described; that events have causes; that phenomena can be explained by theories; etc.).

Classroomactivitiesshould concentrateon such things as learning to make observationsand toask appropri-

ate questions, controlling variables, using instruments and making measurements, developing skills of
recording and reporting.

Stage 2. Within-paradigm science education

Learning the substantivestructureof science,acquiring and practising the skills and procedures of normal sci-
ence, using existing theoretical structures to investigate phenomena and to solve problems.

Classroom activitiesshould concentrate on acquiringnew concepts, establishing relationshipsbetween con-

cepts, investigating the empirical adequacy of explanatory theories, generating and testing hypotheses.

Stage 3. Revolutionary science education

Studying the growth and development of science and the history of scientificideas.

Classroom activities should include computer simulationsand historical case studies. Increasing attention
should be paid to socioeconomicmatters and to the role of the community of scientists in validating scientific
knowledge.

1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.

60
addition, the teachefs implicit philosophy of sciencewill
profoundly influence the way in which these experi-
ments are presented to children and written up by them.
It has been argued earlier that almost all existing
science curricula project a distorted view of the nature of
scientific methodology, because of the inadequacy of
their treatment of the complexity of the observation-
experiment-theoryrelationship. The more sophisticated
and epistemologicallyvalid model outlined in the pre-
ceding discussion can best be approached by adopting a
three-stage science curriculum. (see Figure 2. previous
page).
It isclear that the roleof experimentsisdifferentateach
stage, and children would need to be made aware of the
distinctions. Generations of teachers have assumed that
knowledge of the methodology of science can be taught
only through direct hands-on experience at the bench.
However, it is not entirely clear whether an appreciation
of the role of experiments in these three stages is best
achieved by doing similar kinds of experiments in the
school laboratory. It does not follow that doing experi-
ments is necessarily the best way of learning about
experiments. Anumber of writershavediscussed theuse
of historical case studies and the reading of (modified)
research papers and biographiesas alterna tive, and often
superior, ways of introducing children to the role of
experiments (Brush 1974, Epstein 1970, Morgan 1981,
Russell and Chiapetta 1981,Sherratt 1982,Tamir 1976,
Wilson 1974). Nadeau and Desautels (1984)describe in
some detail a 'black box' exercise which simulates both
scientific experimentation and the behaviour of the sci-
entific community in validating knowledge. Activities
involving different styles of scientific writing may be of
value in reinforcing some of these ideas (Hodson 1989).
The use of computer simulations is another very
powerful technique enabling children to engage in the
more creative aspects of science that lead to an under-
standing of the nature of science. In most laboratory-
based lessons, children do not have opportunities to
engage in hypothesis generation and testing, or in ex-
perimental design, because teachers are unwilling to
provide the time, meet the cost or run the riskof children
adopting inappropriate, inefficient or potentially haz-
ardous experimental strategies. Consequently, teachers
tend to do all the experimental design, in advance of the
lesson, and thechildren simply follow instructions. With
a computer simulation, poor designs can go ahead and
any problems can be discovered by the children and
modified, or eliminated, quickly and safely. In this way,
children learn from their mistakes and are led to investi-
gate more thoroughly and more thoughtfully. More
importantly, they learn that designing experimentsisnot
a specialized and difficultbusiness carried out by white-
1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.
Special topic
Derek Hodson
coated experts in sophisticated laboratories. Anyone can
d o it, including them! Too often, experiments in class are
presented as the only way or proceeding; computer
simulations enable different groups of children to come
up withdifferentprocedures.Some will work well, some
less well, some not at all. This is more like real science.
Thereareat least threelearninggrainsembeddedin such
experiences. First, children learn much more about the
concepts and phenomena under investigation,
because they have more opportunity to manipulate
ideas. Second, they acquire some of the thinking skills of
the creative scientist. Third, they learn that science is
about people thinking, guessing and trying things that
sometimes work and sometimes fail. By such experi-
ences we can begin to demythologize science and make
it accessible to everyone.
Many teachers would argue that the use of CAL
(computer assisted learning)instead of laboratory bench
work would distort children's understanding of scien-
tific inquiry -because real scientists go to the bench, or to
the field, in order to conduct investigations. Three points
are worth making in response. First, many scientists do
not go to thebench! Increasingly,scientistsin many areas
of research use computers as tools for modelling and
theory building. Second, the skills that children acquire
from using simulations and databases are precisely the
skills needed for creative scientific inquiry. 'To illustrate
this point it is helpful to regard scientific practice as a
four-stage process: designing experiments; conducting
experiments; interpreting experimental findings; re-
cording and reporting findings and conclusions. CAL
enables learners to concentrate on the more significant
first, second and fourth phases without the distractions
of the muchless significantthird one. Third, toargue that
CAL distorts children's views of science is to confuse
doing science with learning science and learning about
science, and to confuse lab work/practical work, and its
purpose in science education, with experiments and
their purpose in scientific research.
Learning science
Just as the views of science held by curriculum devel-
opersand teachers haveaprofound influenceonboth the
curriculum content and the learning approach taken in
teaching children about science, so their views of learn-
ing will profoundly affect the kind of learning experi-
ences provided and, more significantlyfor the context of
this article, the role assigned to laboratory work in teach-
ingscientific knowledge. In recent years, therehavebeen
three major approaches to learning in science: the trans-
Special topic
Experiments in science and science teaching
mission model, process-oriented or discovery learning, and
the const ructivist approach. Each approach encompasses
significantly different ideas about the nature of knowl-
edge, the role of the learner and the mechanism of the
learning process. In addition, each seems to imply a
different view of science itself.
The traditional didactic approach to secondary-school
science, with its emphasis on formal instruction and
written presentation of information and its highly pre-
scriptive knowledge content, casts children in the role of
passive receiversof accumulated knowledge. Few things
can be more dogmatically stated than that the didactic
method is ineffectual. Worse than that, it is counter-
productive and is a major cause of widespread under-
achievement (Reid and Hodson 1987). In essence, it
mistakes both the nature of knowledge and the nature of
learning, and it makes serious misjudgements about
what is realisticchild behaviour. For example,it assumes
that scientificknowledge is a valuable commodity per se,
and pays little - if any - regard to children’s perceptions of
value. It assumes that scientific knowledge is absolute,
non-negotiable and unproblematic. It assumes that the
teacher is themost importantpersonin theroom. Indeed,
it is the teacher who holds centre state, having up to fifty
times as much space to move in as the children (Sommer
1969),and it is the teacher who is the fount of all knowl-
edge and the source of authority, doing u p to two thirds
of all the talking (Reid 1980).In addition, the approach
prescribes certain patterns of classroom behaviour that
many children find it difficult,if not impossible,tomeet.
Namely, an attitude of physical and mental passivity in
which the abilities to sit still, pay attention, take notes
and be undemanding are the principal virtues. In this
approach, experiments and other kinds of laboratory
work are frequently used to underpin a verificationist
model of science.
The so-called ‘process approach’ to learning science
does have the great virtue of requiring the learners to be
active, but it ignores the influence of children’s existing
ideas on how the processes are employed and conclu-
sionsreached. It assumes that the processesof science are
content-free, generalizable and transferable from one
context to another. In asserting the priority of processes
over concepts, it implies an inductivist model of science.
Thediscovery-learning approach, a prominent feature of
science curricula developed in the 1960s and 1970s, is
similarly discredited from philosophical,psychological,
and practical perspectives (Atkinson and Delamont
1976, Hodson 1987).
By contrast, the constructivist approach to learning
asserts the priority of the learner‘s existing knowledge
(Driver 1983, Driver and Bell 1986, Osborne and Frey-
berg 1985, Osborne and Wittrock 1985). Learning out-
1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.
61
comesdepend not only on thelearning environment that
the teacher provides, bu t also on wha t the learner already
knows. Learning is a continuous process, in which learn-
ers actively construct and reconstruct meaning. There
appear tobe four mainsteps in thisapproach to teaching.
* Identify children’s views.
* Design curricula that build on those views.
* Provide incentives for children to change their
views.
* Support children’s attempts to rethink and
reconstruct their views.
In the past we have tended to assume that most chil-
dren have no scientific knowledge before starting a new
topic and, for those few who have, there will be little
difficulty in replacing their (inadequate view) view by
our (superior) view. Neither assumption seems to be
true. Children do have scientific views, which are often
atvariance with scientists’views,and they areoftenvery
reluctant to give them up (Gilbert et al., 1982, Osborne
and Bell 1983).There is growing evidence that the two
views (the child’s and the teacher’s) can coexist, with
children using their science in everyday life and repro-
ducing ‘official’science when required, in school. If this
is the case, we need to take a different view of teaching
and learning science. A view that is based on developing
and modifying, rather than replacing, children’s ideas.
contains a summary of a series of teaching moves de-
signed to bring about conceptual development and
change in children that isin sympathy with this principle
(Hodson 1988a).Excellent summaries of the theoretical
ideasunderpining thisand othersimilarmodelsof learn-
ing(e.g.,Cogrove etal.,1982)areprovidedbyHillet al.
(1987)andbyosborneand Wittrock (1985).(seeFigure3
next page)
Just as the scientificresearch that leads to theory devel-
opment or theory replacement starts from the existing
theoretical matrix, so activities intended to bring about
conceptuai development and change in individuals
should start from children’s exiting understanding. If it
is accepted that the purpose of theory is to explain
and predict, then children must be encouraged to ex-
plore their existing beliefs in order to test their capacity
for explanation and prediction. If their ideas prove defi-
cient in these capacities, then a new way of looking at
things (a new model or theory) may be introduced as a
means of precipitating a conceptual revolution. What is
clear is that children need to be given sufficient time and
opportunity to reconstruct their understanding for
themselves and to find reasons for changing their views.
Hewson(l981)arguesthata new conceptual scheme will
62
Figure 3.
Teachinglleaming strategies for conceptual development
i. Making children's own ideas explicit through
writing and through discussion with other
children and with the teacher.
ii. Exploring the implicationsof those ideas.
iii. Matching and testing ideas against experience
and the experience of others.
iv. Criticizing the ideas of others. Subjecting one's
own ideas to criticism.
* At this point the teacher should
challenge children to find evidence
and support for their ideas. Critical
interpretationof evidence is the basis
for holding to a particular theoretical
view in science.
V. Using theoretical ideas to explain observa-
tions, phenomena and events.
vi. Applying theoretical ideas to new situations.
vii. Modifying and refining ideas to ensure a
better match with 'reality'.
viii. Making predictions. Subjecting theories and
predictions to test in the search for support,
refutation and refinement.
It
At this point the teacher should begin
activities designed to effect a shift in
understanding.
be accepted if learners find it 'plausible, intelligible and
fruitful'. In reality, sophisticated theories in science are
implausibleand unintelligibleuntilonebeginstoexplore
them, use them and personalize them; and they become
fruitful only when used to make predictions, explain
phenomena and events, examine other theoretical
propositions, etc. Thus, experiments and other kinds of
bench work provide a uniquely powerful way of engag-
ing in the kinds of activities that provide, albeit retro-
spectively, Hewson's conditionsfor conceptual change.
Viewed in this light, experiments are a principal means
of assisting 'personal theory building', as Claxton (1984)
describes concept development. Although personal
1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.
Special topic
Derek Hodson
ix. Introduction of experiences to challengeand
contradict children's existing views.
X. Encouragingthe generation of alternative
conceptual frameworks and explanationsby
means of 'brainstorming' activities.
xi. Introduction of the 'official' explanatory
framework as one of the alternatives - if
necessary.
xii. Exploration and testing of all alternatives
(repeatingsteps i - viii).
xiii. Comparison, judgement and selection of the
alternativethat proves most acceptable to the
learning group (including the teacher, i.e.,
reaching consensus - a key step in the practice
of science.
* At this point the teacher would em-
bark on a further cycle of conceptual
change (i.e., proceed to step ix, or
would switch to a new topic (i.e.,
proceed to step i).
Throughout these activities the children would
be engaged in recording and reporting tasks,
using both the 'private' languages of personal
exploration and reflection and the 'public'
language of scientific communication.
constructsarea central part of learning, scientificknowl-
edge itself is not idiosyncratic. Science is a communal
activity and scientific knowledge is that which is ac-
cepted by all (i.e., validated by consensus). Hence step
xiii in Figure 3.
If learning science is about making sense of the physi-
cal work in which we live, the first step in the process
must be familiarizationwith the phenomena and events
that are to be understood and explained. Bench work
may be the only way of experiencing first hand the
attraction and repulsion of a magnet or the smell of a gas.
The direct experienceof chemicalchanges(such asbum-
Special topic
Experiments in science and science teaching
ing magnesium), the handling and care of living organ-
isms, the use of instruments that extend our senses (such
as telescopes and microscopes) are other aspects of
familiarizationwith the world around us that cannot be
achievedin any other way. So,in this respect, bench work
is crucial. It isn’t enough just to read about green gases
and blue crystals, about light bending as it passes
through a prism, or about electric fields creating mag-
netic fields. Learners need to see these things, to experi-
ence phenomena directly and to handle real objects or
themselves. But few of these practical laboratory-based
experiences are ‘experiments’, in the senses discussed
earlier.
If conceptualdevelopmentis assisted by encouraging
children to explore,elaborateand test their ideasagainst
experience - both ‘real’ experience and the ’contrived’
experienceof the scientificexperiment -then laboratory
work and experiments in the field (that are theory-led
and well understood by the children)have a crucial role
to play. Equally, it is the case that severalof the stepsmay,
on occasions, be more appropriately approached by
other kinds of active learning methods, particularly by
the use of computer simulationsandscientificdatabases.
The use of computer simulations, as opposed to real
experiments, enables the teacher to tailor the learning
experience precisely to the teaching/learning goals,
instead of the more usual situation of having to fit the
learning goals to the complexities of reality. One can
decrease or increase the level of complexity, include or
exclude certain features, adopt ‘idealized conditions’,
and generally create an experimental situation that en-
ables learners to concentrate on the central concepts
without the distractions, waywardness of materials and
’pedagogic noise’ that is so much a feature of experi-
ments with real things. In many cases, the real learning
gainsareassociatedwith thinkingabout theideas, work-
ing out a means of conducting the inquiry and interpret-
ing the results.The actualperformanceof the experiment
contributes very little. In some cases, because of exces-
sive pedagogic noise, it serves merely to distract; in
others, because the procedures are lengthy, tedious and
uninteresting, it serves to alienate learners. Computer
simulationsenable teachers to place the emphasison the
principal learning goals of the lesson and to ’freeze’, or
rerun or modify an experiment quickly and easily in
order to clarify or develop a teaching point.
The purpose of experimentsin school science (as dis-
tinct from science itself) is not to assist the concrete to
become abstract, as teachers usually maintain. Rather, it
is togive concreteillustration and representation to prior
abstractions. Therefore, laboratory work in school
should be used to assist the exploration and manipula-
tion of concepts and @ make the concept manifest,
comprehensible and useful. It is the exploration of ideas
1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.
63
that constitutes the learning process; the experiment
simply provides the concrete evidence for further con-
ceptual exploration. By eliminating concrete experi-
ences, and providing instant feedback on the appropri-
ateness of certain speculations and predictions (in the
form of ‘experimental results’), computer simulations
and databases enable learners to spend considerably
more time manipulating abstractideas as a way of build-
ing understanding.
It is clear that one cannot engage in laboratory work
without considering the relevant conceptual issues.
Unless, of course, one is striving merely to ’entertain’
children or to develop manipulative skills. By contrast,
one can consider the conceptual relationships relevant to
experimental procedures without actually carrying out
the experiment, in the conventional sense. It may be that
the concrete situation of actual experiments serves, on
occasions, to distract the learner from the important
theoretical featuresof the problemand to inhibit creative
thinking. In the famous Piagetian conservation prob-
lems, for example, concrete experiences seemed to hin-
der understanding: those not subjected to a demonstra-
tion of the transfer to liquid between differently shaped
beakers were better able to judge the quantities (Bruner
et al., 1966). It seems that, on occasions, concrete situ-
ations constitute pedagogic noise that inhibits under-
standing (Kreitlerand Kreitler 1974,Yageret al., 1969).If
these arguments are accepted, it follows that teaching
techniques employing computer simulationsand data-
bases-andany other methods thatenableattention tobe
focused on abstract conceptual issues without the dis-
tractionof thepedagogic noiseof concretesituations-are
more suited to the fostering of such aspects of scientific
creativity a s hypothesis construction and
experimental design (Hodson 1988b, c). Perhaps they
have a similarrole in scienceteaching to ’thoughtexperi-
ments’ in science.The crucialrole of such experimentsin
scientifictheory building is discussed at some length by
Hacking (1983).
Doing science
The third major learning goal concerning practical
work is doing science. Here the emphasis is not on learn-
ingabout the methods of science, or even on developing
expertise in the individual processes of science, but on
using the methodsand processesof scienceto investigate
phenomena, solveproblemsand follow interests that the
children have chosen, perhaps in negotiation with the
teacher. Within every science course there would be
opportunitiesfor children to engage in such open-ended
investigationwork. It is here that children comeclosestto
64
doing real science and, therefore, we should regard it as
the very pinnacle of science education.
At first glance, it would seem that science education
interpreted as ‘doing science’ is unproblematic. Put
simply, it seems self-evident that children learn to do
science by doing science, so that curriculum decision-
making reduces to answering questions concerning the
amount of choice tobe given to thelearnerand tovarious
managerial issues such as allocation of time, cost of
materials and provision of facilities. However, consid-
eration of what constitutes doing science successfully
reveals that there are certain pre-requisites.
* Possession of an appropriate conceptual
background.
* Ability to perform certain laboratory opera-
tions satisfactorily.
* Experimental flair.
As a consequence,doing science cannot be regarded as
Figure 4. The art and craft of experimentation
Planning Designing
Experiments Experiments
Concept-specific
Context-dependent
unproblematic. Experimentalflair isdifficult todefine. It
is more seems to comprise at least two distinct factors.
(i) The ability to design ’powerful’ experiments
that test or illustrate a theory in an elegant
way.
(ii) The ability to ‘do’ experiments. That is, to
handle the apparatus and carry out the labora-
tory operations in an organized and skilful
way in order to achieve certain goals. It could
be described as the scientific equivalent of the
successful gardenefs ’green fingers’.
The first of these factors is not to be confused with
understanding the nature and purpose of experimentsor
with appreciation of what constitutes a good experi-
ment, which comprise aspects of learning abou t science.
Rather, it is the capacity to plan and design one’s own
experiments. Analysis by Tamir and Amir (1987) sug-
1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.
Special topic
Derek Hodson
gests that planning experiments and designing experi-
ments are two distinct and largely independent skills.
Planning experiments includes identifying a problem,
formulating a hypothesis, identifying dependent and in-
dependent variables, etc., and is largely a concept-driven
activity. Designing experiments involves fitting a par-
ticular experimental design to a hypothesis. It consists
primarily of making decisions about treatments, condi-
tions, controls, measurements to be taken, techniques to
be employed, and so on. It might be summed up by the
phrase ‘a feel for experimentation’. The decisions are
made largely on the basis of previous experience. So,to
that extent, ‘a feel for experimentation’ is located to-
wards the craft end of the art-craft experimentation con-
tinuum represented in figure 4 and is, in consequence,
susceptible to teaching (Vasilakes 1967).
The ability to plan experiments is dependent on par-
ticular conceptual understanding. Therefore, it is likely
to be transferable only to contexts in which the same or
closely similar conceptual frameworks could be ap-
Performing
Experiments
Concept-independent
?
Transferable
plied- though there are those who would argue that
practice in thinking about anything enables one to think
more successfullyabout anything else! As one shifts to-
wards the craft end of the continuum, it is more likely
that ‘experimentalflair’ is transferable, though reserva-
tions must be expressed about whether the ability to use
a pipette and burette successfully, in volumetric analy-
sis, is in any sense transferable to a situation in which an
oscilloscope is being used or a dogfish being dissected!
What may be transferable are certain attitudes and feel-
ings of self-worth. In other words, successfulexperience
in one experiment may make children more determined
and more interested in performing another experiment.
The confidence arising from successfully designing an
experiment might be a factor in helping children to stay
at the task long enough to design a new experiment suc-
cessfully.These kindsof argumentslead toa justification
of doing science in terms of its contribution to the affec-
tive (Reid and Hodson 1987). This is in addition to its
more obvious contribution to children’s understanding
Special topic
Experiments in science and science teaching
of science, conceptual development and acquisition of
laboratory skills.
In this article, doing science has been interpreted as
open-ended project work, in which the content and the
methods, as well as the outcomes, are largely unknown
at the outset. An alternative interpretation is in terms of
problem solving, a discussion of which is to be found
elsewhere (Hodson 1989).
Conclusion
It is thecontention of thisarticle that muchof what goes
on in our scienceclassrooms, under the name of practical
work, is muddled and without real educational value -
largely because teachers fail to recognize the key differ-
ences between the role of experiments in scienceand the
role of experiments in science teaching. Practical work, as
presently perceived by science teachers, should be re-
placed by the wider notion of science learning activities,
thus drawing a distinction between practical work (i.e.,
active learning methods) and laboratory work, and be-
tween laboratory work and experiments (figure 1). It is
important that teachers identify, much more clearly than
in the past, the goals of particular lessons - in terms of
individual goals related to learning science, learning
about science and doing science- and selectactive learn-
ing methods, including laboratory work, appropriate to
those individual goals.
As faraslearningaboutscienceisconcemed,itisimpera-
tive that the traditional inductivist notion that experi-
ments are the open-eyed and open-minded confronta-
tion of nature as a means of acquiring objective, value-
free and certain knowledge of the world, be
discarded. The simplistic interpretation of the Pop-
perian notion that experiments provide crucial testsof a
theory’s empirical adequacy must also be replaced by a
more multifunctional view of experiments and a more
sophisticatedview of therelationshipsbetweenobserva-
tion, theory and experiment.
As faras learningscienceisconcernedit seems that there
is a strong case for constructing a curriculum along
Kuhnian lines. Conceptual development in individuals
can be described in terms similar to those employed by
Kuhn to describeconceptualchangeinscientific commu-
nities (scientific revolutions). Just as the successful gen-
eration of new scientific knowledge through scientific
research starts from the exiting theoretical matrix (para-
digm), so the learning of new scientific concepts starts
from children’s existing understanding of scientific
1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.
65
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1988. Educational Philosophy and Theory (20) 2.